The Ties That Bind:

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Supervisor: Prof. Albert Grundlingh
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I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.

Signature:..........................          Date:.................................
Abstract

South Africa has just celebrated its ten years of democracy. The country’s economic, political and sporting situation is stable. Some would debate this, but for the most part, ten years of democracy has been beneficial for most South Africans. Before 1994, South Africa had endured more than forty years of apartheid. It was a system that governed nearly every facet of life for Black South Africans. Apartheid dictated where one was allowed to live, where one was allowed to go to school and even whom one was allowed to marry. It also used sport to enforce and strengthen the ruling regime.

Sport and politics have long been inextricably entangled in South Africa. The history of South African cricket walks alongside that of South Africa’s political history. Sport, and in this case, cricket, reflected South Africa’s political and social processes. South African cricket embraces an ethos that is symbolic of a wider belief system and as such has distinctive political connotations in the region. Sport in South Africa is influenced by forces beyond the sports field, but politics too can be influenced by the social and economic force of sport.

This thesis aims to show how cricket not only reflected, but was also able to exert pressure on South Africa’s political situation by focussing on the years 1989-1992. A historical analysis of these years will illustrate how cricket assisted the transformation process in South Africa.
Opsomming

Suid-Afrika het onlangs tien jaar van demokrasie gevier. Die land se ekonomiese, politieke en sportsituasie is stabiel. Daar mag verskil van opine wees, maar in die algemeen het demokrasie goeie dinge vir baie mense gebring. Voor 1994 moes die mense van Suid-Afrika meer as veertig jaar van apartheid verduur voordat ‘n demokratiese president verkies in. Apartheid het elke facet van Swart Suid-Afrikaners se lewens geraak. Dit het vir mense gesê waar hulle mag woon, waar hulle kon skool gaan en met wie hulle mag trou. Apartheid het selfs sport gebruik om die regering te versterk.

Sport en politiek was nog altyd baie na aan mekaar in Suid-Afrika. Die geskiedenis van Suid-Afrikaanse krieket loop hand in hand met die geskiedenis van Suid-Afrikaanse politiek. Sport, en in hierdie geval, krieket het nog altyd die politieke en sosiale prosesse van die land gereflekteer. Suid-Afrikaanse krieket erken ‘n etos wat simbolies is van ‘n groter waardesisteem. Hierdie waardesisteem het duidelike politieke konnotasies daaraan gekoppel. Sport in Suid Afrika is beïnvloed deur kragte wat buite die sportveld voorgekom het, maar politiek kan ook deur die sosiale en ekonomiese magte van sport beïnvloed word.

Die doelstelling van hierdie tesis is om te bewys dat krieket nie net Suid-Afrika se politieke prosesse gereflekteer het nie, maar dit was ook in staat om dit te beïnvloed. In hierdie tesis word die jare 1989-1992 ondersoek. ‘n Historiese ontleiding van hierdie jare sal illustreer hoe krieket die transformasieprosess in SuidAfrika aangehelp het.
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Contents

Title Page...........................................................................................................i
Declaration.........................................................................................................ii
Abstract.............................................................................................................iii
Opsomming.......................................................................................................iv
Acknowledgements..........................................................................................v

Chapter 1: Introduction......................................................................................1
1.1. Problem Statement......................................................................................1
1.2. Literature Review.......................................................................................3
   1.2.1. Sports History.........................................................................................3
   1.2.2. The Politicisation of South African Sport..............................................6
   1.2.3. Cricket and Nationalism.........................................................................8
1.3. Methodology...............................................................................................9

Chapter 2: The Gatting Tour............................................................................11
2.1. The Turbulent Eighties.............................................................................11
2.2. Gatting: The Final Rebel Tour.................................................................17
   2.2.1. The National Sports Congress............................................................17
   2.2.2. Matches and Demonstrations.............................................................21
   2.2.3. An Intervention...................................................................................24
2.3. The Significance of the Gatting Tour.......................................................26

Chapter 3: Unity..............................................................................................29
3.1. A Time For Transformation.....................................................................29
3.2. Unity Talks...............................................................................................32
3.2.1. Quiet Diplomacy
3.2.2. ‘Mr. Fixit’
3.2.3. Unity Meetings

Chapter 4: South Africa’s Re-Admission to World Cricket
4.1. International Cricket Council Membership
4.2. 1991 Indian Tour: The Friendship Tour

Chapter 5: The 1992 Cricket World Cup
5.1. The Road to the World Cup
5.2. South Africa’s World Cup Campaign
  5.2.1. Preparations
  5.2.2. Victory Against Australia
  5.2.3. Trouble in New Zealand
  5.2.4. The 1992 Referendum

Chapter 6: The 1992 West Indian Tour
6.1. West Indian Cricket
6.2. South Africa’s 1992 West Indian Tour

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Bibliography
Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1. Problem Statement

The world still widely refers to South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy as a miracle. The 1980’s were a time of great violence and the oppressive force of the government was such that people lost their lives in the fight for a free South Africa. It was generally accepted that South Africa would descend into a bloody racially based civil war, with the country and its people severely affected and set back for decades.

The eighties were known for the longest and most intensive uprising in South Africa’s history. It was characterised by four states of emergency, in which Black liberationists failed to overthrow the government. And after the most repressive action ever undertaken by the government, it failed to crush the legitimacy of the resistance movement or win legitimacy for its own system. By the end of the eighties, a stalemate existed, but Blacks had grown stronger by the mere fact that the government had grown weaker.

The National Party’s reform programme was enough to split its ranks, but not enough to win acceptance of the Black community or the acknowledgement of the world. Its ideology was dead and the Afrikaner Nationalist Movement was in decline. The revolt of the 1980’s plunged South Africa into financial crisis. Sanctions and disinvestment campaigns put the economy under extreme pressure. As the decade ended, South African politics and cricket were approaching a time of transition.

Sport under apartheid was also affected. Governments all over the world use sport to help it in its various endeavours. It helps to enhance or to legitimise a ruling regime. South African sport, like its society, was segregated. Under apartheid legislation, South African cricket was also segregated. There existed the South African Cricket Union (SACU) and the South African Cricket Board (SACB). The former being the White cricket authority and the latter, non-White. Only teams from SACU were

1 A. Sparks: *The Mind of South Africa: The Story of the Rise and Fall of Apartheid*, p.360.

allowed to play against international competition because this was in line with the apartheid legislation. South Africa thus found itself in isolation. Her sporting teams were no longer allowed to compete internationally because of her government’s racist laws.

Sport all over the world is often used as the face of a country. Many countries around the world would remain anonymous if it were not for sport. Brazil is largely famous for its soccer team, while smaller countries such as Samoa would be obscure if it were not for the rugby talent that they produce. In the same way, the UCB became the face of and the sign of things to come for South Africa when it was formed in 1991.

Sport, and in this case, South African cricket, is intimately tied up with conceptions and evaluations of the social order. Sport, in some unique way is symbolic of the social order and is an important source of meaning. Sport represents idealised versions of that order. When the UCB was formed in 1991, cricket became the first sporting code to become unified. It represented the vision that South African politics and sport had for itself. The symbolism of a ‘united’ cricket board was an intentional message sent to the international community. The message that the UCB carried was that it was a sign of things to come, in sport, but also in politics.

During South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy, sport was used as a social agent for change. This thesis aims to show how cricket contributed to the wider political processes that were taking place at the time. South Africa’s politics and sport were always entwined. The apartheid government used sport to entrench its apartheid legislation. Sport in this country reflected its political and social processes. When political transition took place, a transition in sport took place as well.

During apartheid, cricket reflected the political, social and historical processes of South Africa, and it continued to do so when the UCB was formed. The friendship tours to India, in 1991, and the West Indies, in 1992, were a reflection of the wider political context, but during the 1992 Cricket World Cup, cricket was able to exert

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4 John Hargreaves: ‘Sport, Culture and Ideology’ in Jennifer Hargreaves (ed.): Sport, Culture and Ideology, p.33.
social and political influence on the wider political situation of South Africa when it coincided with the 1992 referendum. The relationship between South African politics and sport is thus a complex one. This thesis aims to illustrate the relationship between politics and sport by looking at the example of cricket in South Africa. South Africa’s cricket history walks alongside its political history, and on more than one occasion their paths have crossed. This is perfectly illustrated in the period 1990-1992. Cricket and politics in this country was in a time of transition. Cricket reflected, but also influenced the political and social processes that were taking place in South Africa. This will be illustrated by investigating the relationship between South African cricket, society and politics.

1.2. Literature Review

1.2.1. Sports History

The history of White sport in this country is well documented, but until recently one could not say the same for non-White sport in South Africa. The lack of literature of non-White sport gave rise to the belief that non-Whites did not play cricket, and that they had no cricket history or culture to write about. It led to the assumption that non-Whites preferred soccer. Cricket was after all a ‘gentleman’s game’ and required a discipline that was lacking among non-Whites. It gave rise to the thought that those that did play the game had been brought through the UCB’s Development Programme. The programme was created to ‘introduce’ and ‘sell’ cricket to non-White South Africans. The record books perpetuated the myth that cricket did not exist in the non-White communities. There were no statistics, photographs or names to speak of.

These myths have no empirical basis. André Odendaal’s book, *The Story of an African Game*, places South African cricket against its proper background. It proves that cricket is not a foreign game to non-Whites. They have a history of playing cricket that stretches back 150 years.

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6 *Ibid.*, p.11. Odendaal is currently working with Christopher Merrett on the awaited ‘Green, Gold and White: Race, Politics and Springbok Cricket’, which takes a further look at South Africa’s cricketing history.
Previous narratives about South Africa’s cricket history were dominated by those of the ‘old guard’, that is, members and those affiliated with SACU, but more and more works are emerging that tell the story of non-White cricket in South Africa. Mogamed Allie’s *More Than a Game: History of the Western Province Cricket Board 1959-1991*, tells the story of non-White cricket in the Western Cape. His work is made even more impressive by the fact that he provides statistics and information about WPCB players that were otherwise unknown to the general public. His book also highlights the inequalities perpetuated by the apartheid system.

Slowly but surely, other works are emerging. Odendaal, together with M. Patel have worked on the yet to be published ‘Playing the Game: The Unification of South African Sport’. It highlights the Krom Hendricks affair. Hendricks, a Malay, was excluded from the South African team to tour England in 1894, even though the English captain, WW Read, compared him to FR Spofforth, an Australian fast bowler, known as ‘The Demon’.

There are more stories such as the one of Hendricks. The most well known would be the story of Basil D’Oliveira. Peter Oborne’s book, *Basil D’Oliveira: Cricket and Conspiracy: The Untold Story*, tells the story of how D’Oliveira defied apartheid South Africa. He emigrated to England so that he could realise his dream of playing international cricket. The book illustrates how cricket and political establishments conspired to keep him out of the English team.

Grant Farred’s book, *Midfielder’s Moment: Coloured Literature and Culture in Contemporary South Africa*, looks at the Coloured community in apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa. His book is a complex puzzle that looks at issues such as Coloured identity, race and sport. His work represents a critique of reconciliation in South Africa. He is of the opinion that in its current form, reconciliation erases the Coloured past and deprives the community of its cultural and sporting memory.

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The story of non-White cricket in South Africa is being written, as well as sports’ contribution to wider political processes. Jon Gemmell’s book, *The Politics of South African Cricket*, is a valuable analytical study of South African politics and sport. He adds to the literature of Douglas Booth’s *Sport and Politics in South Africa*, Robert Archer and Antoine Bouillon’s *The South African Game: Sport and Racism*, André Odendaal’s *Cricket in Isolation*, and Mihir Bose’s *Sporting Colours: Sport and Politics in South Africa*.

The intersection of sports and politics has been a major focus of contemporary sports history. South African sports history literature has mostly dealt with issues of sport, politics, race and ethnicity. Now, more than before, more books and works are being published on the history of non-White cricket and its contribution toward the struggle against apartheid. In another effort to acknowledge the role that cricket has played in the struggle against apartheid, the Western Province Cricket Association is renaming some of its stands. What has always been known as the President’s Pavilion has now been named after Hassan Howa. Howa led the opposition to segregated cricket in the apartheid years.

Most of the historical work done in South Africa has been narrative and descriptive, but works by Archer and Bouillon’s work, and other works by Douglas Booth and John Nauright are sophisticated in their analyses of apartheid and its aftermath.

Works by Grant Jarvie, Lincoln Allison and John Hargreaves are different in that there is an introduction in their social and cultural history to emphasise the sociological aspects of sports history, such as phenomenons of nationalism and identity. Politics feature in their work, but it is more to do with ‘power relations’. The result is that political processes become somewhat muted. This thesis has tried to analyse political processes, but also the sociological aspects with regards to politics and cricket in South Africa.

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In the past, the trend has been to bring sport into political history, but sports history is now a well-developed branch of the discipline of history. It discusses more than often political and social change. Sports history therefore comfortably fits in the body of social history. Its emphasis falls on questions of how sports and their development contribute or might contribute to our understanding of fundamental political issues, rather than on the processes through which sport itself has been politicised. Sport is perceived as something reflecting historical processes, but this thesis aims to show it is also capable of exerting social and cultural influence, of being a process, a language and a system of meaning through which we see the world.\textsuperscript{13}

This thesis will add to the existing literature in that it discusses how cricket reflected South Africa’s political situation, but it will contribute by illustrating how cricket was able to exert social and political pressure on South Africa’s political situation.

\textit{1.2.2. The Politicisation of South African Sport}

South African politics and sport have always been entwined. Lincoln Allison notes that sport is one of the most potent of human activities in its capacity to give meaning to life, to create and interconnect senses of achievement and identity.\textsuperscript{14} This capacity not only affects participants, but also partisans. There is therefore a sporting dimension to many political activities.

Katherine Johns contends that as a social institution, sport and its social world is an inseparable part of the larger society and the development of South African sport has always been closely influenced by wider social, political and economic factors.\textsuperscript{15} She continues to say that any analysis of contemporary South African sport must be viewed through a dualistic framework. On the one hand is the historical political position of South African sport as a social institution in which society at large is reflected. Sport in South Africa was and still remains highly publicised. The second strand of the framework is concerned with the continuation of the ideological and cultural manipulation of sport for the use of contemporary socio-political objectives.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14} L. Allison: \textit{The Changing Politics of Sport}, p.4.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
These two positions of the framework continually overlap one another in the story of South African cricket and politics.

During apartheid, the government imposed its apartheid legislation on South African sports, but many sports organisations aimed to create a sporting practice free from all forms of racism. Sporting resistance, since the early 1970’s, was expressed through the South African Council of Sport (SACOS), and the newly formed National Sports Congress (NSC). The NSC was as vital to the resolution of the crisis in South African sport as the ANC was to the solution of the crisis in apartheid society as a whole.

The NSC has a long history. While a number of sporting organisations have historically compromised their demands, the strength of SACOS and the NSC lies in their refusal to separate sporting demands from the broader demands of social change. Freedom in sport, the NSC said, could only materialise from true liberation, which in turn necessitates the dismantling of apartheid’s core statutes and policies.

It must be accepted that politics does not take place in a vacuum. It is related to the wider economy and society in which it finds itself. Politics is distinguishable from economics and social life but it cannot be understood as a distinct field of activity occurring in a separate realm or region of its own. It needs to be grasped as an aspect of all social relations and consequently as an aspect of relative autonomy, conflict and struggle.

In South Africa, politics is present in the power relations that influence schooling, religion, sport, leisure and other facets of South African culture, just like any other aspect of culture has always been an object of struggle within and between different social factions with each social faction having a greater or lesser degree of power.

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17 G. Jarvie: Sport, Racism and Ethnicity, p.176.
18 Ibid., p.177.
1.2.3. Cricket and Nationalism

Sport failed to serve as a social integrating mechanism in the apartheid era because of the political, ideological and spatial forces promoting separatism. As the post-apartheid period began and sport became unified, South Africa returned to the international fold in sport and other activities.

Nelson Mandela and the ANC invested sport with the role of reaching out to worried Whites who feared what majority rule would do to their lives.\textsuperscript{19} At the same time of unity in cricket, a political transition was taking place in South African politics. There were many divisions and as a result of these divisions and separate structures of ‘establishment’ and non-racial sporting codes, the possibility of drawing South Africans together through sport appeared to be a daunting task.

Nationalism is a social phenomenon that can be described as a form of ‘we-group’ identification.\textsuperscript{20} It is an identification with a nation as a ‘survival unit’ as opposed to identification with some other lower level ‘survival unit’ such as a clan, tribe or city. In its modern form, the ideology of nationalism is associated with the elevation of ‘the nation’, not only above groups such as classes, races and genders, but above all other nations as well. The term ‘nation’ tends to be confused with similar concepts such as ‘ethnic group’ or ‘race’.\textsuperscript{21} In a country like South Africa where there are eleven official languages and more than a singular race group and culture, ‘nation building’ has become a priority for the state. It is for this reason that the term ‘nation’, in South Africa, has not been linked to race, but rather to ‘common birth’. When a South African sports team competes internationally, they represent all South Africans, regardless of their race or background, because all South Africans share ‘common birth’. Hence the rugby, and now general sports slogan, ‘our blood is green’, which has more to do with marketing, but it is based on nationalist sentiment.

Sport has an important role to play in national cohesion. Events such as the 1992 Cricket World Cup and international series and tours function as symbolic centres of national pride. At a time when the ‘new South Africa’ was being formed, cricket was

\textsuperscript{19} J. Nauright: Sport, Cultures and Identities in South Africa, p.180.
\textsuperscript{20} J. Wilson: ‘Sport and Nationalism’ in University of Leicester: M.Sc. in Sociology of Sport course material, p.5.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
used by politicians to build a national consciousness. As the world grows into more of a global village, the effects of globalisation on the relationship between sport and nationalism has meant that the relationship has become somewhat dulled in a way.\textsuperscript{22} This can be seen in English football especially, and in the English County Cricket system. Globalisation transcends national difference, but in some aspects, it has recreated them. What emerges are new struggles for nationhood and the ‘we-group’.

Sport can thus function to tie state, the government, and nation, the people, together. This becomes especially true when looking at the 1992 Cricket World Cup. The popular view is that Nelson Mandela and sport have been the two strongest factors holding South Africa together since 1990.\textsuperscript{23} Instead of ignoring different cultures and races for the sake of building nationhood, in South Africa, the term ‘rainbow nation’ has been adopted. It acknowledges that there are different races and cultures, but a nation still exists because of common birth.

There is a danger of over emphasising the role of sport in the making of nations. This could perhaps be true for the case of Nelson Mandela wearing a Springbok jersey at the 1995 Rugby World Cup, but South Africa’s quest for nationhood is also a quest for identity.\textsuperscript{24} Apartheid emphasised South Africa’s differences. It placed everyone into categories and subcategories. Decades of ‘differenceness’ are engrained into South Africans. In the early 1990’s, the emerging government used sport and cricket to build a nation, and instead of ignoring the differences, it celebrated it by calling South Africa ‘the rainbow nation’.

\subsection*{1.3. Methodology}

For the purposes of this thesis, a number of primary and secondary sources were used. The sources utilised include books, journal articles, newspaper articles, internet sources and oral sources. Face to face interviews were conducted with cricket players who participated in the 1991 Indian tour, the 1992 Cricket World Cup, and the 1992 West Indian tour. Those that played in matches were interviewed so that their

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item J. Wilson: ‘Sport and Nationalism’ in University of Leicester: M.Sc. in Sociology of Sport course material, p.5.
\item G. Jarvie: ‘Sport, Nationalism and Cultural Identity’ in University of Leicester: M.Sc. in Sociology of Sport course material, p.116.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
personal experience could be used. These players included Peter Kirsten, Craig Matthews and Brian Macmillan. Faiek Davids accompanied the South African team to India and the World Cup as a development player. His experience was particularly helpful in understanding the experience of a non-White player in the international cricket world. Professor André Odendaal was helpful in analysing and deconstructing cricket within the political context of South Africa.

The narratives provided by these interviews contributed to and added information to other sources, especially newspaper articles. It also helped to add a personal perspective to the academic literature on the subject. Even though the contribution of the oral sources helped, it proved problematic at times. Social history is more difficult to define that political or economic history.\(^{25}\) It deals with people’s perceptions and personal experiences. These are neither right nor wrong, but they help to gain an understanding of the broader political processes of the time.

Chapter 2

The Gatting Tour

2.1. The Turbulent Eighties

The eighties were a time of social and political unrest. When prime minister, PW Botha implemented a new constitution in 1984, politically and racially motivated killings increased.¹ These were a sign of the times. By this time, apartheid had existed for more than thirty years. The oppression by the apartheid regime was such that the political tension was becoming intolerable. The 1984 constitution was created to appease some factions within the Coloured and Indian communities by creating a tricameral parliament with a House of Assembly for Whites, a House of Representatives for Coloureds, and a House of Delegates for Indians.² But the new constitution completely excluded the Black majority. The Black majority did not accept the Government’s ‘attempt’ at reform. Living and economic conditions were becoming intolerable, and Black anger boiled over.

The injustice of apartheid had affected the lives of many Black South Africans. Over 80 000 opponents of apartheid were detained for up to three years without trial during the period 1960-1990, including about 100 000 women and at least 15 000 children under the age of 18.³ These acts inflicted a lot of pain and suffering which manifested itself in the violence of the 1980’s.

From 1984 until 1986, South Africa was shaken by the most sustained and widespread Black revolt it had ever experienced. While the Government managed to suppress it, political protest accompanied by violence continued sporadically beyond the end of the decade.⁴ The state of revolt soon surpassed that of the 1976 Soweto uprisings, which had gained international attention.⁵ Black townships soon became battlegrounds, and ordinary people defended their political rights and themselves with

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⁴ R. Schrire: Adapt or Die: The End of White Politics in South Africa, p.78.
stones and anything else they could get their hands on. The South African police and army reached new levels of brutality during this time. Daily, they would go into the townships and attack people with tear gas, bullets, and armoured vehicles.

Once again, the world’s attention was drawn toward South Africa. While the police and army harassed people in the townships, other opponents of apartheid were harassed, detained, or even killed. During the eighties, there were four states of emergency, each more brutal than the last. It gave the police and army unlimited powers, and South Africa was virtually under martial law.\(^6\)

Even though the Government became more restrictive and militant, at the same time, a growing militancy of resistance was developing on three main fronts, namely, the expanding trade union movement, the armed rebellion of the banned African National Congress (ANC), and the re-emergence of legal, mass-based political movements.\(^7\) During the time of open revolt in the eighties, other forms of struggle included massive worker stay-aways, and rent and school boycotts.\(^8\)

The Government responded to this revolt with four States of Emergency during the eighties, but it did not provide the solution envisaged by the apartheid state. Although the militant resistance was seriously disrupted, it did, however, persist within the country. More importantly though, international opinion against apartheid reached new heights, leading to an increase in political and economic pressure, which contributed greatly toward the anti-apartheid struggle.

During the latter part of the eighties, though, meetings were being held between groups from across the political spectrum. Nelson Mandela was meeting with Botha and other senior government figures, while meetings between prominent Nationalists and members of the ANC were taking place from 1986 to 1990.\(^9\) These meetings helped to break down the stereotypes that each held about each other. In exile, the ANC had established an increasingly influential international network, and the role of

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\(^9\) P.Hain: *Sing the Beloved Country: The Struggle for the new South Africa*, p.150.
anti-apartheid activists was increasingly directed at supporting it. Meetings between ANC members and Afrikaner businessmen and academics took place in London, New York, and even on country estates, deep in the English countryside.\textsuperscript{10} Interestingly, the 1990 Gatting cricket tour was being discussed at these meetings as well.

*Broederbond* members and government advisors became involved in a series of meetings in London between November 1987 and May 1990 with the ANC.\textsuperscript{11} At the same time, business men were also meeting with the ANC. The meetings enabled the government informally to sound out the ANC’s position on various matters and the ANC to do the same on the Government’s attitudes. The meetings destroyed the Afrikaners’ demonised image of the ANC, which was built up by years of propaganda, while the ANC became sensitive to White anxieties, particularly to Afrikaner fears of survival under Black majority rule.\textsuperscript{12}

The eighties were also trying times for cricket, and sport in general, for South Africa. Almost all sporting activities were segregated under apartheid law. Whites enjoyed green fields and well-manicured pitches, while the typical ‘pitch’ for non-Whites was a dusty strip in a township.

During the eighties, six main rebel cricket tours visited South Africa. An England team, nicknamed The Dirty Dozen by the press, visited South Africa in 1982. It was followed by a team from Sri Lanka. In January 1983, a rebel team from the West Indies arrived. At the end of 1983, there was a second and longer tour by the West Indians. An Australian side visited South Africa in the 1985-6 season and again in 1986-7.\textsuperscript{13} The Gatting Tour was the seventh, and last.

Mike Gatting was a major player in world cricket during the 1980’s. He was made captain of England in 1986. His test career average stands at 37.57, with a highest score of 206 against India in Madras in 1984/85.\textsuperscript{14} Having been dropped by England, he made his decision to play in South Africa knowing that he would be banned from

\textsuperscript{11} P.Hain: *Sing the Beloved Country: The Struggle for the new South Africa*, p.150.
\textsuperscript{12} *Ibid.*
\textsuperscript{13} A. Guelke: ‘Sport and the end of Apartheid’ in L. Allison (ed.): *The Changing Politics of Sport*, p.156.
\textsuperscript{14} C. Bryden: *Return of the Prodigal: South Africa’s Cricketing Comeback*, p.32.
test cricket for five years. SACU were very happy to have a player of Gatting’s class agree to play in South Africa. He was a tough batsman and a fearless cricketer, but he was no political animal. For him, a cricket tour was a cricket tour. When asked his opinion about the protests and demonstrations at the matches between England and South Africa, he referred to the demonstrators as a few “singing and dancing people”.\footnote{C. Bryden: \textit{Return of the Prodigal: South Africa’s Cricketing Comeback}, p.30.}

The South African Cricket Union (SACU), the White-led cricketing organisation, decided to organise these rebel tours after the International Cricket Council (ICC) continued to refuse their pleas for re-admittance to world cricket.\footnote{J. Gemmell: \textit{The Politics of South African Cricket}, p.163.} These rebel tours provided South African cricket with a much required fillup and the sports-starved population with international competition, but it was also a source of much unhappiness among other groups in South Africa.

Rebel tours constituted one of the main strategies of the White-dominated sports bodies seeking to counter the country’s sporting isolation during the 1980’s. SACU felt that the ICC’s consistent refusal for re-admission was a justification for hosting the rebel tours. Many within South African cricket felt that SACU had been treated unjustly by the ICC. According to SACU, they had taken moves to integrate the sport and it should therefore be applauded and encouraged for such actions. Moreover, the South African government no longer interfered in the selection of teams. Thus, the conditions that the South Africans had to achieve in order to gain re-admittance had been met. Finally, it was the duty of all international cricketers and boards to help the global development of the game. The rebel players, by going to South Africa, it was argued, were assisting in the development of cricket.\footnote{Ibid., p.165.} For SACU, the tours were about sustaining cricket in South Africa. Starved of international competition, the sport was declining in popularity.

In 1968, the then South African Prime Minister, Mr. BJ Vorster brought to a climax what came to be known as the “D’Oliveira affair”.\footnote{A. Odendaal: \textit{Cricket in Isolation}, p.1.} He said that the English team due to tour South Africa that summer was unacceptable because it included a non-
White player, Basil D’Oliveira. He was a Coloured South African who immigrated to England to realise his dream of playing international cricket. The MCC duly cancelled the tour. Non-racial South African organisations regularly informed the ICC of the racial discrimination that existed in South African sport. This, together with the D’Oliveira affair and South Africa’s unwillingness to play against non-White cricketing nations, resulted in an unfavourable impression of South Africa. On leaving the Commonwealth in March 1961, South Africa automatically forfeited its ICC membership, and the right to play test cricket.\footnote{A. Odendaal: Cricket in Isolation, p.2.}

Throughout the 1970’s, South Africa’s White cricketing authorities concerned themselves with getting back into the international cricketing fold. Year after year, this proved to be unsuccessful. It seemed that political pressures and circumstances would keep South Africa out of international cricket and in isolation. Jimmy Cook, former South African cricket player, argues that SACU had a duty to both supporters and players to bring cricket of the highest level to the country.\footnote{J. Cook: The Jimmy Cook Story, p.6-9.} There were other cricketers who felt the same way. This could be achieved by bypassing the ICC and organising private tours of international strength teams. Thus the emergence of the rebel tours.

During this time, there was considerable political and social unrest in South Africa. This was reflected in the existence of a State of Emergency during both Australian tours in 1985 and 1986. SACU’s president, Geoff Dakin, claimed that the tours had lifted spirits by taking people’s minds off “caspirs and burning tyres”.\footnote{Ibid.}

With the exception of the West Indies, rebel tours could hardly be described as a success in cricketing terms. All the teams were composed of players at the end of their international cricketing careers, the standard of competition was not particularly high and attendance figures for the ‘tests’ were less than spectacular, which meant that SACU had not pocketed as much money as would have been hoped.\footnote{J. Gemmell: The Politics of South African Cricket, p.165.} Controversy was also generated by the very large sums of money each of the visitors received.
There were also attempts to disrupt the second Australian tour by the group, Commando of Angry Sportspersons, who poured oil on the Newlands pitch.\textsuperscript{23}

An obvious disadvantage of the strategy of rebel tours was that it tended to alienate foreign sports administrators because of the disruption rebel tours caused. That made it more difficult for the South African establishment sports bodies to win support. Another disadvantage was that the later tours took place during a period of great unrest within South Africa. The township violence and unrest of 1984 gave rise to the United Democratic Front (UDF). The UDF became an umbrella organisation that linked trade unionists, liberation theologians, educators and members of the ANC.\textsuperscript{24} Sporting groups were also included in this movement, which sought to generate more opposition to Botha’s 1984 constitution.

Seen as a social agent for change and as a factor in stimulating South African morale, the cricket tours became involuntarily intertwined in South Africa’s political landscape. Cricket became a vehicle for anti-racist solidarity, and a central force for opposing the White hegemony. The Australians were threatened with violence by the (non-White) South African Cricket Board (SACB), while Alfred Nzo, secretary-general of the ANC, commented at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting that “the people of South Africa are capable of harming the cricketers”. He added that cricket grounds would become war zones.\textsuperscript{25}

It was hoped that the rebel tours would rejuvenate the game and encourage more Black players to come forward, but it was far more political in nature. The government contributed financially to the tours to the extent that SACU would have been bankrupt without their support, and they allowed a number of exceptions to apartheid legislation in order to accommodate visiting cricketers. This is because cricket, and sport in general, was viewed as a component of the ‘total strategy’ of the National Party (NP).\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{24} J. Gemmell: \textit{The Politics of South African Cricket}, p.175.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., p.176.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p.177.
With growing pressure from the international community, the Government gave the go-ahead for rebel cricket tours. It was hoped that visits from acknowledged and respected cricketers would put the Government in a more flattering light, but it was still part of the ‘total strategy’. The eighties had done much to sustain the game of cricket in South Africa, but also shone the spotlight on South Africa’s political situation. The final rebel tour to South Africa, led by England’s Mike Gatting, would prove to be a turning point in South Africa’s sporting history.

One of the great ironies of the rebel tours was that the Nationalist government, which had consciously helped to steer South African cricket into isolation through its rigid enforcement of sports apartheid, took responsibility for subsidising the tours of visiting Black teams.\(^{27}\) What the arrangements for financing the rebels underlined was that SACU, like its predecessor, the South African Cricket Association, basically worked with, rather than distancing itself from, the apartheid state.

### 2.2. Gatting: The Final Rebel Tour

#### 2.2.1. The National Sports Congress

The 1990 rebel tour, under the captaincy of Mike Gatting, was the last of its kind before South Africa was brought back into the ICC in 1991. It was also the most controversial. The team encountered opposition that was of a much greater scale than any previous such side in any sport had faced in South Africa in the past. Mass protests and demonstrations forced the cancellation of the English Tour. The great success of these demonstrations is largely due to the organisation and efforts of the politically motivated and non-racial National Sports Congress (NSC).

The formation of the NSC was a turning point in South Africa’s sporting history. One of the NSC officials to fight for the cause of non-racial sport was the Reverend Arnold Stofile. He was an executive member of the UDF. In 1985, he formed a ‘cultural desk’ within the UDF.\(^ {28}\) Up until that time, the most vociferous opponents of rebel tours was the non-racial South African Council on Sport (SACOS), which was established in 1973. But SACOS had lost favour with the ANC because it had become


too politicised and had effectively lost its focus.\textsuperscript{29} SACOS traditionally drew its support mainly from the Cape Town area, with backing from Natal, the Eastern Cape and Johannesburg. It advocated non-racialism in sport, but was made up largely of Coloured and Indian members, with little Black involvement, and total reluctance to accommodate Whites.\textsuperscript{30} The formation of a new organisation to oversee the normalisation of sport therefore seemed logical.

Shortly after the creation of the UDF’s cultural desk, it was divided into ‘cultural’ and ‘sports’ desks. Members of the ‘sports’ desk helped create the NSC, which was formally launched in June 1990.\textsuperscript{31} The NSC was a community-based organisation that also extended into trade unions. It would be based on three pillars of priority, namely, Development, Unification and Preparation for reacceptance on the world stage.\textsuperscript{32} The NSC’s chairman was Krish Naidoo. He believed that the time had passed for “straight anti-apartheid resistance”. The NSC believed in building a new non-racial South Africa through negotiation and participation.\textsuperscript{33} This meant that there was no place for rebel tours. But in the meantime, anti-apartheid groups received messages during 1989 from Sam Ramsamy, the London-based activist, that another rebel tour involving an English side, was being organised.

Throughout the summer of 1989, Ali Bacher, managing director of SACU, had organised an English rebel team to tour South Africa at the beginning of 1990. At the time, South African politics was such that it appeared as if the country was heading toward a civil war. Bacher believed that real political reform would only take place in another ten years. Furthermore, political change would not take place as long as PW Botha was still in power.\textsuperscript{34} He concluded that South African cricket would remain in isolation and as managing director of SACU, it was his duty to try to foster interest in cricket at all levels. The international class players in South Africa had been starved for competition since the Australian tour of 1986-87, and Bacher felt they needed stimulus of top-class opposition. He was confident that the tour would not be

\textsuperscript{31} D. Booth: \textit{The Race Game: Sport and Politics in South Africa}, p.177.
\textsuperscript{33} D. Booth: \textit{The Race Game: Sport and Politics in South Africa}, p.178.
\textsuperscript{34} R. Hartman: \textit{Ali: The Life of Ali Bacher}, p.211.
subjected to the violent protests and demonstrations that the previous tours had been subjected to because he had worked out a compromise with the NSC. The NSC agreed that if players coached in the townships, the demonstrations against the tourists would be non-violent.\textsuperscript{35}

It is important to note the time lapse between the announcement of the tour and the start, which was six months. During that time, in late January 1989, PW Botha suffered a stroke, which resulted in him becoming increasingly irrational. He began losing support from his cabinet members and decided to stand down as leader of the NP. FW de Klerk became the new leader of the ruling party.\textsuperscript{36} In August 1989, PW Botha was gone, and De Klerk had taken over. De Klerk, who had always been considered a conservative, started showing signs that he might also be a reformer. Walter Sisulu and other long-term ANC prisoners. Except for Nelson Mandela, were released from Robben Island. Bacher was optimistic about the changes taking place in South Africa, and even commented that by January (the start of the Gatting Tour), the tour could be an official English Tour.\textsuperscript{37}

In September 1989, Krish Naidoo of the NSC offered Bacher a type of compromise in light of the recent political developments. If Bacher called off the tour, Naidoo would arrange to get all the various sports bodies together, so that, even before apartheid ended, South Africa would be back in international sports. But Bacher concluded that this was too vague.\textsuperscript{38} He could call off the tour, but there was no guarantee that South Africa would be back in international sport in 12 or 18 months time.

During the time between the announcement of the tour and the start of the tour, De Klerk had taken over the reigns of government. As part of his reformist gestures, he announced that peaceful demonstrations were now legal, and the newly formed Mass Democratic Movement meant that trade unions would be well organised, and in the position to make life very difficult for Gatting and his men. Then the NSC pulled out of its agreement to harass the English players, and they had sufficient time to prepare

\textsuperscript{35} M. Procter: \textit{South Africa: The Years of Isolation and the return to International Cricket}, p.98.
\textsuperscript{36} R. Hartman: \textit{Ali: The Life of Ali Bacher}, p.211.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., p.203.
for sophisticated disruptions.\textsuperscript{39} Also, the NSC had no plans to apply for permission to demonstrate.\textsuperscript{40} It saw no reason to apply to a system it did not recognise. They planned to come out in force and show the world that SACU did not respect what the NSC, or for that fact, the ANC, stood for. A change with the Gatting tour that was not present with the previous rebel tours was that there were people in the NSC who were hardened political activists.\textsuperscript{41} They were men who had been in prison and suffered violence and torture for their beliefs, but who had also developed an interest and involvement in sport.

In September 1989, one of them, Ngconde Balfour, flew to London to persuade Gatting not to tour. Krish Mackerdhuj, president of the SACB, accompanied Balfour. They spoke to Gatting and found him to be receptive. The meeting, however, did not have the desired result, but it showed the new face of Black South African sport. It showed that there was indeed a face to Black sports.\textsuperscript{42} The advent of political activists in sports, such as Balfour and Mackerdhuj, became all the more evident when in October 1989, in a conference room at the Johannesburg Sun, the NSC met with Bacher and members of SACU to try to persuade them to call off the tour.\textsuperscript{43}

The NSC called the meeting after members of their executive had travelled to Lusaka, Zambia, to consult with ANC leaders in exile. The NSC’s purpose was to formally ask SACU to call off the Gatting Tour as the starting point in their quest to bring about democracy.\textsuperscript{44} The SACU delegates were not all that familiar with the NSC or its members. They were sceptical and Bacher sensed that the NSC would not be too happy with anything but a cancellation. Mluleki George, the NSC president and member of the ANC underground, warned that the consequences of the tour would be “too ghastly to contemplate” and that SACU would be responsible “for the blood that will flow”.\textsuperscript{45} The meeting ended without a decision being taken.

\textsuperscript{39} M. Procter: South Africa: The Years of Isolation and the return to International Cricket, p.98.

\textsuperscript{40} R. Hartman: Ali: The Life of Ali Bacher, p.216.

\textsuperscript{41} M. Bose: Sporting Colours: Sport and Politics in South Africa, p.204.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p.205.


\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., p.217.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., p.217-218.
As the meeting in Johannesburg was taking place, Ramsamy was trying to gain access to the other rebel players, but he was unsuccessful. Gatting and his men also faced opposition from other quarters. Peter Hain, the British anti-apartheid campaigner, wrote an open letter to Mike Gatting, urging him to pull out of the South African tour. In his letter, Hain warned Gatting of the potential for violence. He said that he was amazed at the risks Blacks would be willing to put themselves through to stop the rebels. It was rumoured that they were planning demonstrations and disruptive actions on a scale, similar to the British demonstrations Hain had organised in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, which eventually resulted in South Africa’s sports isolation.46

Gatting said at the time that he had not read Hain’s letter, but he was keen to do so. Hain acquired his information on a nine-day fact finding mission to South Africa. On his trip, he spoke to Black officials and sportsmen who were opposed to the tour taking place. Hain warned Gatting that there was a real danger of violence. Furthermore, if there was any bloodshed, the blame would fall squarely on the shoulders of SACU’s Ali Bacher, State President FW de Klerk and Mike Gatting.

Gatting responded to Hain’s remarks by saying that he and his team would not be influenced by Hain because he is a known agitator.47 Gatting said that he and his team were being guided by SACU and understood that there might be demonstrations. This would be acceptable as long as the demonstrations were peaceful so that he and his team could get on with their jobs.

After the NSC met with SACU in October 1989, they went into immediate action, setting up anti-tour committees in all of the provinces where matches were due to be played. The anti-tour strategy included consumer boycotts, marches on the cricket grounds, trade union strikes in hotels where the team was staying, and where possible, damage to the cricket pitches.48

2.2.2. Matches and Demonstrations
The demonstrations started on January 19, 1990, several hours before the team arrived at Jan Smuts airport. Busloads of demonstrators were waiting at the airport, but the

46 ‘Cricket tour goes on despite Hain’s warnings’ in The Citizen, 4 January 1990.
47 ‘Tour is on come hell or high water – Gatting’ in Sunday Times, 7 January 1990.
flight had been delayed by a bomb scare in London. After this incident, Mike Gatting urged demonstrators to keep their protests peaceful. On arriving at Jan Smuts, Gatting accepted two letters, one from the NSC, spelling out objections to their visit, and a second from the Anti-Sanctions and Investment Association urging them to ignore the protests.

The first match was scheduled for East London, but was switched to Kimberley at the last minute when SACU was advised that East London was an ANC stronghold. Bacher thought this was a smart move, but Krish Naidoo got wind of SACU’s plans. He became friendly with a couple of photographers and journalists from the English tabloids and they would tip him off whenever Gatting’s team would depart from their formal itinerary.

On the eve of the Kimberley match, Geoff Dakin, president of SACU, was informed of the planned demonstration that was to take place at the match. Against his lawyers’ wishes, he decided not to have an interdict against them. The next day, Ali Bacher instructed police to remove rolls of razor wire around the field. There was a group of NSC demonstrators at the ground, along with Krish Naidoo. When Naidoo informed Bacher that they were not being allowed to protest, Bacher told the police captain that peaceful demonstrations were acceptable to him and that his men should move back because being armed with teargas was provoking the crowd. The captain informed Bacher that the protest was illegal and the march organisers had to apply for a permit from the chief magistrate in order to demonstrate. Bacher tried to contact the Minister of Sport, Gerrit Viljoen, and later, Adriaan Vlok, the Minister of Police, but neither were available. All the while, the crowd were becoming more restless under

50 Ibid.
52 L. Alfred: Lifting the Covers: The Inside Story of South African Cricket, p.185.
54 Ibid., p.223.
55 C. Bryden: The Return of the Prodigal: South Africa’s Cricketing Comeback, p.28.
the harsh Kimberley sun, while the police were provoking them by cocking teargas guns. The situation was tense, and there was a very real threat of violence.

Bacher explained the situation to Naidoo. As long as they had a permit and the demonstration was peaceful, there would be no problem. Naidoo agreed. Bacher, along with General Roy During, a riot police commander, contacted Gerrit Viljoen, the cabinet minister responsible for sport, and then later Roelf Meyer, deputy minister of constitutional development. They were now in search of the Chief Magistrate. Bacher went to the Chief Magistrate, who was not in his office, and then to the town clerk. He emerged with the permit. Gatting was confronted by the demonstrators after the match and accepted a letter from Bill Jardine of the NSC. Gatting was regularly confronted by demonstrators, and always agreed to meet the protest groups and accept their petitions. This was the case in Bloemfontein and Pietermaritzburg where the demonstrations grew uglier, the crowds became more enraged and the tour became a mine-field. For the first time, a political organization had organized mobilised mass support against a cricket tour. The tour itself was not a major concern for those protesting. They were protesting against apartheid. The NSC had succeeded in Kimberley. Dissatisfaction with the apartheid system had boiled over into an identifiable issue, and the possibilities for further protests must have been of great concern to SACU.

In Pietermaritzburg, Bacher and Gatting were forced to walk between angry protestors and accept another petition. The Bloemfontein and Pietermaritzburg matches were being played against the background of FW de Klerk’s historic speech to Parliament on Friday 2 February 1990. He announced the unbanning of the ANC, the PAC, the SACP and the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners. In the light of these historical and shattering developments, the cricket tour was becoming increasingly irrelevant.

56 C. Bryden: *The Return of the Prodigal: South Africa’s Cricketing Comeback*, p.28.
60 C. Bryden: *The Return of the Prodigal: South Africa’s Cricketing Comeback*, p.32.
By the time the first ‘test’ took place in Johannesburg on 8 February 1990, the writing was against the wall. Permission for a demonstration had been denied. The match took place with police helicopters flying overhead, while yellow police vans surrounded the ground. Nevertheless, violence erupted after Gatting and Bacher met leaders of the anti-tour demonstrations. While speaking to demonstrators, cans were thrown at Gatting, but he was unhurt and continued with the match.

The match was a disappointment with South Africa winning within 3 days. Bacher agreed to meet Naidoo on the Sunday, which had been planned as a rest day. At the end of the meeting, Bacher agreed that the tour should be curtailed. In return, Naidoo agreed that the demonstrations would be stopped. Instead of the second test match in Cape Town Test, followed by six limited overs matches, the tour was reduced to four limited overs matches only. But, once again, this decision took place against the backdrop of some very significant political developments.

2.2.3. An Intervention
Since 1987, various Afrikaner businessmen, members of the Broederbond, and men from the inner circle of the ruling party had been meeting regularly abroad with the banned ANC. Many of these meetings took place at an English country estate in Somerset, called Mells Park House. It was owned by the British Mining House, Consolidated Goldfields, whose chairman was Rudolph Agnew.

On Friday 9 February 1990, the second day of the Wanderers ‘test’ match, one of these Somerset meetings were once again taking place. The ANC delegation was headed by Thabo Mbeki and included foreign affairs colleague, Aziz Pahad and Joe Nhlanhla, a commander in the ANC’s armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe. Among the Afrikaners were Marinus Daling of Sanlam, Attie du Plessis of Sankorp and Willem Pretorius of the Metropolitan Group, as well as Mof Terreblanche, a broker and friend of President de Klerk and Prof. Willie Esterhuysen, a Stellenbosch University academic.

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61 C. Bryden: The Return of the Prodigal: South Africa’s Cricketing Comeback, p.32.
62 ‘Gatting runs into flack at city match’ in The Natal Witness, 8 February 1990.
63 C. Bryden: The Return of the Prodigal: South Africa’s Cricketing Comeback, p.32.
65 Ibid., p.230.
On this Friday evening, Terreblanche raised the subject of the Gatting Tour. He was concerned of the threat of violence in Cape Town because he felt the children at the nearby schools might be in danger. He asked if the ANC could use their influence to postpone the demonstrations, but Mbeki explained he would not do this because international sport gave legitimacy to the apartheid system. It was for this reason that the demonstrations were necessary. Daling became involved in the conversation and noted that the tour was doing little to advance the position of FW de Klerk and his historic speech. Daling proposed that they try to defuse the situation. Of significance is that only Mbeki, amongst the men present, knew that Mandela was going to be released that Sunday.\(^{66}\) He was therefore very enthusiastic toward Daling’s suggestion. It would only be to South Africa’s benefit if Mandela were to be released into a relatively calm climate.

The next day, Saturday 10 February 1990, the men were hard at work trying to find a solution to the problem. The ANC wanted the tour to be cancelled, while the Afrikaners wanted a compromise. It was decided that Du Plessis, for the businessmen, and Mbeki and Pahad, for the ANC, would take the lead in setting up negotiations in South Africa. Pahad telephoned Sam Ramsamy, while Mbeki made other calls. Daling told Du Plessis to phone Michael Katz in Johannesburg.\(^ {67}\) Katz was one of South Africa’s foremost commercial lawyers as well as one of Bacher’s mentors and closest friends.

Mbeki telephoned Katz on Saturday 10 February. He was told that Mandela would be released on the Sunday, but the Gatting tour was a thorn in their side. Mbeki suggested he phone Bacher and Naidoo and facilitate a meeting with them urgently. Katz phoned Bacher to inform him of the call from Mbeki. At the same time, Mbeki and Ramsamy made calls to Naidoo.\(^ {68}\) It was made clear to Naidoo that the ANC wanted the situation resolved so that Nelson Mandela could be released into a climate of relative calm.

On the third, and subsequent final day of the ‘test’ match, Bacher, Naidoo, and Bill Jardine were in a meeting at the Wanderers, chaired by Katz. The meeting yielded nothing. They reconvened on Sunday, the day Nelson Mandela was released, but made little progress. Katz suggested that they meet at his home on the Monday evening. Bacher, realising the magnitude of the situation, met with SACU on Monday morning to discuss the parameters of the meeting. That Monday, Katz suggested the scrapping of further matches and the second leg of the tour, and instead finish the tour with four limited overs matches. In return, the NSC should agree to halt all demonstrations. After many deliberations and phone calls, the deal was made early Tuesday morning.  

2.3. The Significance of the Gatting Tour

The weeks of protest against the Gatting Tour had shown that non-Whites supported the sports boycott. The Gatting Tour was over and Nelson Mandela had been released from Robben Island. South Africa and South African sport was standing on the threshold of a new era. During this period, many discussions and debates took place as to how to move forward with regard to sports organizations. Post-apartheid sports organizations had to change with the times.

Krish Naidoo addressed the South African Sports Sponsorship Association on how the NSC saw the future of South African sport. He said, that in order to cross the threshold that South Africa was standing on, the collective effort of every Black and White sportsperson was required, to ensure longevity. The NSC identified three questions that encapsulated the future of sports policy in South Africa, namely, “what are our problems at present, what are our sports objectives in a new South Africa and how do we achieve them”. At this time, many other individuals also looked at the challenges facing South African sport.

Steve Tshwete, who at the time was a member of the National Executive Committee of the ANC, said that the basic problem in sport was the state of fragmentation caused by the apartheid system. Factors such as personality and ideological differences, mistrust, the extent of unorganised sport, lack of democracy and accountability, and

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70 ‘The New Ball Game’ in *Sunday Tribune*, 4 March 1990.
the parallel existence of non-racial and establishment sport have compounded the problem.\textsuperscript{71}

Tshwete argued that a sports movement that included all sportspersons was the singular goal of South Africa.\textsuperscript{72} Sport offered people entertainment, excitement, pleasure and the opportunity to bring families and people together, and as South Africa stood on the threshold of a new era, these qualities of sport were essential ingredients in the process of nation-building.

The NSC, which later became the National Olympic and Sports Congress (NOSC) in June 1990 thought it particularly important that unity in sport take place, because together with development and preparation, the building blocks of the future could be laid.\textsuperscript{73} In short, South African sportspersons should realise their role within the broad political struggle for a non-racial, democratic and unitary South Africa.

Sport in South Africa had been predominantly divided along racial lines. To compound the problem, more sponsorships had always been channelled into ‘White’ sport. Now, two major sports movements (establishment and non-racial sport) were attempting to normalise sport from opposed positions and ideologies with varying aspirations. The NOSC was concerned with the normalisation of sport taking place in South Africa, and at the same time, the destruction of apartheid.

The victories of the past few years and the heroes of the struggle were fading, and the difficulties of ‘non-racial’ sport were presenting itself to South Africa’s sports organisations. The NOSC proposed that the starting point should be the laying of a strong foundation for a mass-based democratic movement within sport that would be an integral participant in the struggle to abolish apartheid. The second leg of the NOSC policy was development. It is important to create a genuine and sincere sports movement in South Africa, so that sport could be accessible to all. The third aspect of NOSC’s policy was termed ‘preparation’. The NOSC believed that sportspersons should begin to prepare themselves to occupy their rightful place in the Mass

\textsuperscript{71} S. Tshwete: ‘Challenges Facing Non-Racial Sport’ in C. Roberts (ed.): Challenges Facing South African Sport, p.15.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
Democratic Movement in the anticipation of post-apartheid South Africa.\textsuperscript{74} It was important for sportspersons to understand the political developments in South Africa. They were important ambassadors of any country.

In many countries, and especially South Africa, sports and politics were inseparable. In South Africa, sport, in order to become part of a future progressive society, had to take cognisance and be part of the political developments of the times. Sport as a political and influential factor in South African life became an established phenomenon. In a country like South Africa, where most people are sports-mad, it is thus sufficiently meaningful to a sufficiently large number of individuals for the institution to possess the potential to be manipulated as a medium for political socialisation.\textsuperscript{75}

The Gatting fiasco was of prime significance for South African cricket. In much the way that the D’Oliveira Affair of 1968 had served as the catalysts for the process that resulted in South Africa’s expulsion from test match cricket, so the Gatting tour provided the catalyst for the process that resulted in unification and South Africa’s return to test cricket.

\textsuperscript{74} ‘The New Ball Game’ in \textit{Sunday Tribune}, 4 March 1990.
Chapter 3

Unity

3.1. A Time for Transformation

The cancellation of the Gatting Tour and the implications of President FW de Klerk’s reforms meant that expectations for the transformation in sport were high. The Gatting Tour showed that Blacks supported the sports boycotts and were committed to the anti-apartheid struggle. The nature of protests and demonstrations witnessed during the Gatting Tour were of such a level, that the present situation could not be ignored. The NSC, who in the meantime, had become a more political organization, had also become more organized in their endeavours.

The tour catapulted the NSC into the forefront of the anti-apartheid sports movement at a critical moment. Politically aligned to the Mass Democratic Movement, with strong roots in the townships, the NSC pro-actively sought to negotiate with White sports bodies for the formation of the new unified, non-racial and democratic sports structures so as to prepare sport for post-apartheid South Africa.¹

After the Gatting Tour, SACU met in Durban on March 30 1990 and agreed that the rebel tours were counter productive in the current political climate. The second leg of the tour was cancelled and Bacher was appointed as a one-man commission to investigate all aspects of cricket and to investigate the way forward for South African cricket.² Bacher’s brief was to produce a blue-print for cricket in the nineties. The choice to have Bacher lead this commission could not have been any more appropriate, in that during the course of the Gatting Tour, he had developed a rapport with the NSC. This rapport proved to be sufficient because the NSC decided to sit down and talk about unity in cricket. Bacher knew what both sides of the situation were feeling at the time.

The cancellation of the Gatting Tour was an expensive decision for SACU. Because of the political situation, they were unable to obtain sponsorships. They now had to

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² C. Bryden: The Return of the Prodigal: South Africa’s Cricketing Comeback, p.33.
cover the costs of the first leg of the tour, but also their obligations to the English players, without the benefit from the second leg of the tour.\(^3\) The state of South African cricket at the end of 1990 was in an unfavourable financial state due to the costs of the rebel tours. At this stage, it looked as if unity in any other sporting code would have happened long before cricket got its house in order, because of the financial difficulties that SACU was faced with.

Within two days of being appointed SACU’s one-man commission, Bacher issued a statement signifying an end to rebel tours and calling for unity in South African cricket.\(^4\) Bacher realised that his fact finding mission would take him into a 3-month long plunge into the real political world. This statement was a public signal to the NSC that SACU was ready to create unity and an autonomous body for all cricketers in South Africa.

Initially, the SACB was sceptical of Bacher’s intentions. They viewed him as the architect of all the efforts to undermine SACB’s campaign to totally isolate South African sport.\(^5\) Normalising South African sport was not going to be an easy process. The ANC, for example, viewed it as one of the more difficult sporting ideals. The ANC took a keen interest in the unification of South African sport, because it realised and appreciated the importance of sport in helping to heal the racial rifts in society, but also viewed moves towards multi-racialism as an implement to undermine racial segregation. Sport was used a tool for nation-building by the ANC. When Steve Tshwete was first told by the ANC of their desire to explore the unification of South African cricket, ‘Mr. Fixit’, as he later became known, dismissed the idea as a “stillborn initiative”.\(^6\) It was not because cricket was one of the more reluctant sporting codes toward change. After all, SACU had announced an end to rebel tours. The SACB, on the other hand, were opposed to any contact with SACU because of their past actions. Unity in cricket seemed very far away, especially when the two main cricketing bodies seemed light years apart.

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\(^3\) C. Bryden: *The Return of the Prodigal: South Africa’s Cricketing Comeback*, p.33.
\(^6\) Ibid., p.244.
Bacher, through the development programmes in the Black townships such as Alexandra had made many friends. During one of his trips to Alexandra Township, he witnessed the effects of police brutality during the Gatting Tour. During the Johannesburg ‘test’, many Alexandra demonstrators were beaten by the police after they had been escorted away from the Wanderers stadium. Bacher saw for himself the welts and scars left by the whipping, and he was very upset by the incident. After his visit to Alexandra, he used the opportunity to apologise to the nation for the Gatting tour. His sincere apology did much to mend and build bridges with the Black community.

Many in the Black, Coloured and Indian communities did not hold Bacher in any sort of regard when it came to the development programmes. The UCB’s Development Programme was born out of a desire to ‘promote’ and ‘sell’ the game of cricket to non-White communities. There was an assumption that non-Whites did not play cricket, when in fact the history of non-White cricket in the country goes back 150 years. The patronising manner in which the UCB tried to reach out to the non-White community was not welcomed.

During SACU’s meeting with the NSC at the Johannesburg Sun and Towers in October 1989, Bacher addressed the meeting at length on the development programmes and he spoke passionately of the great benefits that township cricketers were already deriving from it, and how it was giving them and their teachers a new purpose in life. Balfour countered by saying that Blacks had been playing cricket long before Bacher’s development programme had arrived. Likewise, Indian and Coloured communities were proud of their own cricket heritage and their sportspeople’s contribution toward the anti-apartheid struggle, and held Bacher and SACU in utter disregard because of their claim of bringing cricket to non-White communities through the development programme. CLR James, the great West Indian Marxist cricket writer, wrote in his book, Beyond a Boundary, “What know they of

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8 *Ibid*.
10 Interview with Faiek Davids, 12 October 2004.
cricket who only cricket know?"12 This seems to encapsulate the situation with regards to Bacher and the UCB’s Development Programme. James’ statement is also true when applied to a number of cricket issues, such as quota systems, the renaming of stands at cricket grounds and the issue of representivity at all levels of cricket.

3.2. Unity Talks

3.2.1. Quiet Diplomacy

Robbie Muzzell, one of the more junior members of the SACU board, supported Bacher’s future vision for unity, and he and Bacher were firm friends. He thought that those at the top structures of SACU and the NSC were too far apart, ideologically, to speak, but perhaps he and Mthobi Tyamzashe (of the NSC), whom he had met at the Sun and Towers meeting 6 months earlier, could arrange something. Muzzell was good friends with Wayne Munro, who was the Human Resources Director of the Human Resources Department in which Tyamzashe worked.13 These three men became very important facilitators of the unification process, and would meet regularly to discuss ideas as to how to unify South African cricket.

It was decided that the best thing would be to bring Mluleki George, NSC president, and Ali Bacher together for discussions. Tyamzashe would get George, who was also an influential figure within the ANC, and Muzzell would get Bacher. It was agreed that Bacher would meet George at Tyamzashe’s house. Bacher and Muzzell went and met with George and Tyamzashe. They were taking a big risk by meeting with Bacher, because they had not informed the NSC. Bacher recalls that the meeting lasted for twenty minutes, and he spoke for the full twenty minutes about the development programme. He spoke with such pride and passion that George felt he had done enough to warrant another meeting. A few weeks later, this time at Robbie Muzzell’s home, the men enjoyed supper in a somewhat more relaxed atmosphere.14 Trust was growing and it seemed the unification process was on its way.

12 C.L.R. James: Beyond a Boundary, p.258.
14 Ibid., p.249.
3.2.2. ‘Mr. Fixit’

Cricket unification proceeded to take place throughout 1990, with the official date being 29 June 1990. Bacher’s attempts at reconciliation paid off and SACU sought to negotiate with the SACB, through the offices of the NSC and ANC.\(^{15}\) The ANC’s Steve Tshwete, who later became the first Minister of Sport in democratic South Africa, acted as the mediator in a series of meetings between SACU and the SACB. Because of his contributions towards unification in South African cricket, and his contributions in other sporting codes, he later became know as ‘Mr. Fixit’.\(^{16}\)

Tshwete was born a Xhosa, near Ciskei in 1939.\(^{17}\) His parents were not wealthy, and he was the only child amongst his four siblings fortunate enough to attend primary and high school. He showed a keen interest for sports, particularly ball games such as cricket and rugby. His father helped found Swallows, a rugby team, which Tshwete later played for. His father was also a good cricketer, but rugby was Tshwete’s first love. He played rugby throughout his schooldays and was awarded his playing colours for Standard and for Border.\(^{18}\)

Tshwete was also a devout Christian, who taught Sunday School to the entire Sunday School Student Body. His love for the church was so strong, that he contemplated going into the ministry. The church congregants even called him ‘reverend’.\(^{19}\) Tshwete never became a priest, but one could say he had his chance in 1985 when fleeing from the security police, he shaved his head and disguised himself as a priest in order to leave South Africa for Zambia.\(^{20}\) He had been strongly advised by the ANC leadership to go into exile because of his revolutionary stance and his beliefs.

From his youth days, Tshwete sensed that something was wrong in South Africa. He saw White children being able to go to good schools, play on green, lush rugby fields, and have freedom of movement, while he and other Black children had to walk long distances to play on dusty rugby pitches and had to apply for permits if they wanted to

\(^{17}\) M. Bose: *Sporting Colours: Sport and Politics in South Africa*, p.165.
travel anywhere. He followed the treason trials of 1956 and had begun to get a grasp of the struggle being waged in South Africa.

By 1962, after gaining his matric, Tshwete was an ANC organiser and in trouble with the Government. On 24 June 1963, he was arrested in East London for being involved in a sabotage campaign against pass offices, railway lines and other structures. He was part of the regional command of Umkhonto we Sizwe and distributed a pamphlet he wrote on the coming ‘bloodbath’ and was finally arrested when a colleague informed on him. At the age of 26, in April 1964, Tshwete was sent to Robben Island for 15 years.\textsuperscript{21}

While on Robben Island, he received regular beatings and came to think of his survival, not in days, but in hours. International pressure on the apartheid government resulted in some concessions on the island. One of the concessions was to play sport. The prisoners played rugby on a bare pitch of land, but soon planted grass so that they too could play on a “beautiful green pitch”.\textsuperscript{22}

Sport on the island was played along political lines, but Tshwete soon changed this by writing a constitution for Robben Island Rugby. It was adopted on 30 January 1972 as the constitution of the Island Rugby Board and signed by Tshwete as president. Tshwete also started a sporting newspaper, \textit{Island News}, to record the details of the matches.\textsuperscript{23} He became the head of political education on the island, was described as a ‘walking encyclopaedia of world revolutionary experience’ and completed a BA degree in education and philosophy by correspondence from the University of South Africa.\textsuperscript{24}

When he was released from Robben Island he learned that his mother had died and he was served with a two year banning order that restricted him to his Eastern Cape village. When his banning order expired in 1981, he continued his political activities

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Ibid.}, p.171.
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Ibid.}, p.172.
by becoming involved in the new trade union movement and in 1983, became one of the founding members of the UDF.²⁵

The apartheid Government harassed UDF members much the same as ANC members. Many of Tshwete’s colleagues started disappearing and some died. In 1985, Tshwete decided to go into exile in Zambia. He did this by fleeing from the security police, disguised as a priest. His wife, Pam, and their children followed three weeks later. They had two of their own children, and two ‘adopted’ children, one of whom is Monde Zondeki, a fast bowler who made his one day international debut for South Africa in 2002 when he took a wicket with his first ball. Monde, and his younger sister, Namhla, are the children of Pam Tshwete’s late sister.²⁶

Towards the end of the eighties, a new found realism among Afrikaner intellectuals started emerging. These Afrikaner intellectuals, academics and businessmen started having meetings with the ANC in various locations all over the world. The new movement received a tremendous boost in the summer of 1987 when Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert, an Afrikaner who had been the leader of the Progressive Party, decided to engage in dialogue with the ANC.²⁷ In one of the major historic steps in South African history, he took a group of Afrikaner intellectuals to Dakar to meet the ANC leaders, one of whom was Tshwete. The Dakar Conference made Tshwete into a nationally known political figure.

The Dakar conference was inter alia about legitimizing the ANC. It was a fact-finding mission for both sides. Up until then, sport had not featured in ANC policy-making. But, sometime in 1987 in Lusaka, the full executive of the ANC adopted a position paper on sport and culture. The ANC was starting to realise the influence that sport could have on politics. The protests and demonstrations during the rebel tours to South Africa in the 1980’s resulted in a four year gap between the Australian rebel tour of 1986 and the Gatting tour of 1990. Sports isolation also reflected political sanctions and attitudes. By using sport, the ANC would be able to communicate to White South Africans that they had common interests. Tshwete said that by the time

²⁷ M. Bose: Sporting Colours: Sport and Politics in South Africa, p.175.
this paper emerged, there were two opposing sports bodies in South Africa, namely, the apartheid establishment sport, and the alternative, non-racial, democratic sport.\textsuperscript{28} The ANC decided to ask the international community not to focus as much on the sports boycott, but to ask them to support the non-racial, democratic sports structure that was beginning to emerge, as this was the legitimate voice of South African sport.\textsuperscript{29} It asked the international community to provide it with expertise so that it could grow to become a real force against apartheid.\textsuperscript{30}

The ANC showed White South Africans that they had international clout by using sport as its tool. There was also the possibility that the ANC could play a decisive role in bringing about the end of the international sports boycott. In the coming years, by following a strategy of flexibility with White sporting organizations, the ANC were revealing that any blockages were the fault of White South Africa.\textsuperscript{31} It was a demonstration of their ability to exercise power without having to resort to force.

3.2.3. Unity Meetings

During the 1980’s, Van Zyl Slabbert helped a number of groups travel north to meet with the ANC in exile. He had been part of the 1987 delegation that met with the ANC in Dakar. He had met Tshwete and was impressed by him. In 1989, another delegation travelled to Lusaka, Zambia, to meet with the ANC. Flip Potgieter, a colleague of Geoff Dakin’s on the Eastern Province cricket board, also travelled to Lusaka. Of those he met, he was very impressed with Thabo Mbeki and Steve Tshwete.\textsuperscript{32}

In the meantime, Bacher had been appointed as SACU’s one-man fact-finding mission into the future of South African cricket, and was looking for advice and assistance as to how to move forward. When Potgieter returned to Port Elizabeth, he contacted Dakin and told him to contact Ali to say that Steve Tshwete was the man to speak to. Early in 1990, there was a business conference with the people from the ANC who had come from exile in Lusaka. The conference dinner was at the Carlton

\textsuperscript{28}M. Bose: \textit{Sporting Colours: Sport and Politics in South Africa}, p.178.
\textsuperscript{29}Interview with André Odendaal, 21 October 2004.
\textsuperscript{30}M. Bose: \textit{Sporting Colours: Sport and Politics in South Africa}, p.175.
\textsuperscript{31}J. Gemmell: \textit{The Politics of South African Cricket}, p.196.
Hotel in Johannesburg where businessmen met Nelson Mandela and other ANC members. Van Zyl Slabbert was at the conference. He immediately contacted Bacher and told him to go to East London to meet with Steve Tshwete.33

The name did not ring a clear bell with Bacher, but he trusted Van Zyl Slabbert. In 1989 Bacher started leaning on Van Zyl Slabbert, the former leader of the opposition in Parliament, who he trusted and admired. Slabbert was a very astute political consultant and bridge builder. He had already made successful attempts at that time to engage the ANC leadership in exile and its underground structures in South Africa. In London in June 1989, Slabbert facilitated a lunch meeting for Bacher with Aziz Pahad where they discussed the future of South African cricket.34 By this time, Thabo Mbeki was head of the ANC’s foreign affairs desk, and Pahad his right-hand man.

Now, Van Zyl Slabbert was telling Bacher to meet with a man he knew nothing about, but Bacher trusted him. Bacher flew to East London where Robbie Muzzell, another important facilitator in the unification process, was at the airport to meet him. Bacher had a telephone number and a name, and neither of them had any knowledge of Steve Tshwete, or that he was the head of the ANC sports desk.

Bacher went to a house in Mdantsane, with the help of Muzzell’s driver, Freddy. Mdantsane was the second largest township in South Africa, and a no-go area for Whites, but Bacher did not back down, and he and Freddy drove there at night.35 When Bacher arrived at the house, Tshwete was not yet there. Tshwete was not too eager to meet with Bacher. He had just returned from Zambia and did not know the exact situation regarding South African cricket, but he realised that sport unification was in intricate business.

When Tshwete arrived, the two men shook hands. Bacher spoke for roughly fifteen minutes. He spoke passionately about South African cricket and he argued that there was a definite future for cricket in South Africa. As Bacher spoke, Tshwete listened.

At the end of Bacher’s speech, Tshwete said “I’ll help you”. The first meeting between the head of White cricket and one of the ANC’s executive members resulted in a friendship that could only benefit South African cricket. Straight after the meeting with Bacher, Tshwete consulted with the ANC leadership, in particular with Nelson Mandela, as how to move forward.

At the same time, the SACB was sceptical and had suspicions of Bacher and his April first statement, in 1991, that rebel tours had ended and that SACU were keen to start unity talks and negotiations. But on May 26 1991, the SACB responded. At its annual meeting it was agreed that, as the SACB was a natural extension of the sport and political events of the time, it was inevitable that SACU and the SACB would have to meet.

A few weeks later, Tshwete contacted Bacher, inviting him to a meeting at Shell House in Johannesburg, the ANC’s national headquarters. Robbie Muzzell accompanied Bacher to Shell House. It was there where Tshwete agreed to facilitate talks between SACU and the SACB. Initially, Krish Mackurdhuj of SACB did not want to meet with Geoff Dakin, president of SACU, but Tshwete spoke to Mackerdhuj and the meeting was agreed upon.

The two bodies met in Durban in September 1990. Tshwete acted as the chair. Many agree that without Tshwete there, the obvious tensions that existed would have erupted, and that would have been the end of the unity talks. The two bodies agreed to meet for a further meeting at Port Elizabeth on 16 December.

The December talks were filled with as many hostilities as the September talks, but ‘Mr. Fixit’s’ ability to put out fires were invaluable. The tension centred around the point of whether or not to adopt the “Statement of Intent” that SACB had tabled for adoption which required cricket to redress imbalances outside its sphere of

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37 C. Bryden: *Return of the Prodigal: South Africa’s Cricketing Comeback*, p.35.
influence. This ‘Charter’ came with a number of political demands. SACU did not think that a sporting body should be involved with the provision of housing and other amenities, which the Charter called for. Tensions were running high, and Tshwete called for a ten minute adjournment. He took the members of SACB aside, and explained the situation to them, and what was at stake. He told he SACB members that if the unity talks folded, he would tell the ANC that it was their fault. When the men emerged, the Statement of Intent and a moratorium on International contracts was agreed upon.

The third and final session of unity talks was held at a Holiday Inn in Johannesburg. The meeting went well, and there was a motion to merge the two bodies, but SACU had ten members, while the SACB only had seven. It seemed as if everyone’s hard work would be for nothing. If the two bodies merged, the SACB would have been at a 10-7 disadvantage. Tshwete could sense a breakdown, but Dakin stepped in and suggested that the SACB invite three more members. The SACB accepted and celebrations duly took place.

It was decided that the newly formed executive committee would consist of 10 members from the SACB and 10 from SACU. For the first year, Dakin would be president, and Mackerdhuj would be vice-president. For the second year, the roles would be reversed, and Dr. Bacher would be the Managing Director. The newly formed body would be called the United Cricket Board of South Africa (UCB). On 29 June 1991, the 20-man executive met at the Wanderers Club to formally constitute the new body. Messages of congratulations poured in from all over the world.

The UCB could only move onto greater things, but during the negotiation process, a name for the new cricket body had to be decided upon. Many would think that the ‘United Cricket Board’ is self explanatory, but by April 1991, SACU and the SACB had still not decided on a name. In April 1991, Dr. Bacher and Percy Sonn, the SACB vice-president from the Western Province Cricket Board, went to Cape Town to meet

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41 Ibid.
42 C. Bryden: Return of the Prodigal: South Africa’s Cricketing Comeback, p.36.
44 C. Bryden: Return of the Prodigal: South Africa’s Cricketing Comeback, p.37.
the German ambassador, Dr. Immo Stabreit.\textsuperscript{45} The point of their visit was to ask for funding for cricket’s development programme. After Bacher and Sonn introduced themselves, Stabreit asked them the name of their new cricket organisation. They told him that a decision had not yet been made. Stabreit then told them that it would seem obvious to have the word ‘unity’ or ‘united’ in the new body’s name, especially since that is what Bacher and Sonn had been talking to him about. It was then, that the United Cricket Board was titled.\textsuperscript{46}

On 29 June 1991, cricket in South Africa, which had been divided along racial lines for nearly a century, was now one. The unification process had many role players, from those at the top, such as Bacher, Dakin, Mackerdhuj and George, to those in the lower ranks, but still with a sizeable contribution to unification, those such as Robbie Muzzell and Mthobi Tyamzashe, and even Muzzell’s driver, Freddy. But Steve Tshwete’s role as chairman of the unity talks was critical.

To Tshwete, cricket unity was not only the unity of sportsmen. He saw it as bringing together two South Africas who have been kept apart by the apartheid system.\textsuperscript{47} After the unification of cricket, he tackled rugby, but his involvement in cricket did not end there. Mr. Fixit also helped the UCB in London when they met the ICC regarding re-admission to international cricket and the 1992 Cricket World Cup in Australia.

\textsuperscript{46} ‘SA Krieket se nuwe naam’ in \textit{Beeld}, 22 April 1991.
\textsuperscript{47} ‘Steve’s Pitch’ in \textit{The Sunday Star}, 26 May 1991
Chapter 4

South Africa’s Re-Admission to International Cricket

4.1. International Cricket Council Membership

The United Cricket Board of South Africa came into being on June 29 1991. Barely a week later, the UCB was at Lords to put its case forward for membership of the International Cricket Council (ICC). On July 10 1991, South Africa was formally re-admitted to the ICC.\(^1\) In the space of two years following re-admission, South Africa played in the West Indies, India, Australia, New Zealand, Sri Lanka and Australia again, with a series at home as well.\(^2\) It would seem that the return of South African cricket took place at a break-neck pace, and that it was somewhat of a miracle, or fairytale story, but there was considerable behind the scenes work done by Ali Bacher and Steve Tshwete, along with the help of Thabo Mbeki, the then secretary for International Affairs of the ANC, and Nelson Mandela.

Even before the dismantling of apartheid, SACU regularly sent delegations to Lords to try and regain membership. Ali Bacher was always a prominent figure in these delegations and believed in the cause, but FW de Klerk’s speech in 1990, and the subsequent release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, along with the successful and peaceful negotiation of the UCBSA meant that South Africa’s chances were now better than ever to return to the international cricketing stage.

In April 1991, before the official unification of South African cricket occurred, Tshwete took Bacher to a house in Mayfair, Johannesburg for a very important meeting. Bacher was there to meet Thabo Mbeki. Other ANC members included were Joe Modise, commander of Umkhonto we Sizwe, and Essop Pahad, a member of the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party.\(^3\) Bacher was there to outline to Mbeki the progress that cricket had made towards unification. He also told the men gathered that the UCB wished to reapply to the ICC for membership. Bacher wanted Mbeki’s, and the ANC’s blessing. He realised that countries such as the West Indies, India and Pakistan were staunch opponents of apartheid, and supporters of the

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\(^1\) C. Bryden: *Return of the Prodigal: South Africa’s Cricketing Comeback*, p.38.
\(^2\) M. Procter: *South Africa: The Years of Isolation and the Return to International Cricket*, p.129.
ANC and the anti-Apartheid movement. If the UCB had the ANC’s backing, it would surely mean that South African cricket had its house in order.

Mbeki instructed Tshwete to accompany Bacher to visit the high commissioners in London and get them to support the application for membership. Mbeki also said that he would write a letter of support, addressed to each high commissioner that they should take with them. If the steps taken by Bacher seem to be a bit over zealous, it is only because he knew what he was up against with regards to the ICC and Colin Cowdrey, the ICC president. In March 1991, Cowdrey had telephoned Bacher and told him that the best he could offer was that the ICC would meet the UCB informally after its annual meeting in July to have a discussion with Bacher and the newly formed UCB. This is because there was no formal path laid down for South African cricket to come back into the international fold. It was then that Bacher realised he had to enlist the support of the ANC.

That same month, Bacher travelled to Harare with Tshwete to meet with the high commissioners of India and Pakistan, to establish some initial contact. Bacher was also in regular contact with David Richards, chief executive of the Australian Cricket Board. Richards put Bacher in contact with Jagmohan Dalmiya, secretary of the Indian Cricket Board. Bacher telephoned Dalmiya and struck up a rapport. Between their first call in April and the ICC meeting in July, the two had spoken at least forty times on the telephone. By the time the two met in London, they both felt they knew each other quite well.

Bacher and Tshwete travelled to London armed with the full support of the ANC, and a letter from Thabo Mbeki, addressed to each high commissioner concerned. The two arrived in London on May 17 and had a very busy schedule to keep up with. Between 17 and 24 May 1991, Bacher and Tshwete had a non-stop diary of meetings.

Their first meeting was with the high commissioners of a number of Caribbean Islands, as well as Sri Lanka and New Zealand. They were also set to meet Britain’s

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6 Ibid.
Test and County Cricket Board while attending the first one-day international between England and the West Indies at Edgbaston. A visit to Lords, to meet the ICC’s Colin Cowdrey, was also included. The aim of these meetings was for Bacher and Tshwete to give a briefing to the various governments regarding the unity talks in cricket. Of all the test countries, only England could vote for South Africa’s re-admission to the ICC without their government’s approval. This is an illustration of the extent to which politics and sport are tied together. Taking a decision on the status of South African sport would have political repercussions. It is for this reason that India especially, and the West Indies, who vehemently opposed apartheid, were beholden to their governments. Hence the importance of the meetings with the various high commissioners.

The provisional itinerary did not include meetings with the Indian and Pakistani high commissioners because Bacher and Tshwete had already made contact with them in Harare in March. The message they took to Harare would be the same as the one they now carried to London: No tests or international tours would be undertaken until apartheid had been removed from the statute books.

Bacher and Tshwete returned to South Africa at the end of May after a successful trip to London. They were cautiously confident that South Africa would be accepted back as a member of the ICC. They knew that if they had India, Pakistan and the West Indies’ support, then membership would be secured. South Africa’s chances looked good, especially when Sunil Gavaskar flew into Johannesburg for the unity banquet in June 1991. Also at the unity dinner were Walter Sisulu and his wife, Albertina. A few days before the dinner Bacher had taken Sir Gary Sobers and Gavaskar to Soweto to play with the children who were part of the development programme. Nelson Mandela also invited the two to his Soweto home where he reminisced about his cricket watching days. He also expressed his appreciation for Bacher’s Township Development Programme.

10 Ibid.
A month later, Bacher and Tshwete returned to London, along with the UCB president, Geoff Dakin and vice-president Krish Mackerdhuj to hear the outcome of their application for re-admission, but before this happened, the UCB was still working to win the support of all the cricketing nations. In June 1991, Australia and New Zealand both pledged their support for South Africa’s re-admission. South Africa’s position was good, but Bacher made it clear that the UCB wanted maximum support and wanted to be re-admitted with 100 per cent support, not just a two-thirds majority. Bacher and Tshwete worked tirelessly behind the scenes in order to make this happen. In June, he had breakfast with a group that included the Australian Foreign Minister, senator Gareth Evans, Eddie Funde, the ANC’s long time representative in Australia, representatives of the National Olympic and Sports Congress, and a number of diplomats.12

Meetings such as these were necessary to win re-admission. There were two ways of gaining re-admission. The first was the route that Bacher and Tshwete were concentrating on. To gain re-admission, the UCB required a unanimous vote from the ICC’s seven test playing countries, namely Britain, Australia, New Zealand, the West Indies, Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka.13 Should the first verdict be divided, the second option would be to have another vote, involving the associate members of the ICC. Here, the test playing nations receive two votes each. The associate members are allocated one vote each, and a two-thirds majority would be required for the application to be accepted.14 Hence Bacher’s desire for 100 per cent support at the ICC meeting in July.

A day after gaining Australia and New Zealand’s support, Britain announced its support for South Africa’s re-admission. Bacher and Tshwete continued to campaign for South Africa’s re-admission. The British Prime Minister at the time, John Major, was also a member of the MCC. In a meeting at Lords, he spoke to Clyde Walcott, president of the West Indies Cricket Board, whose vote was crucial to the re-admission of South Africa to the ICC. Major wanted to convince Walcott that South Africa’s re-admission to test cricket would help the political progress towards South

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12 “Aussies and New Zealand will back South Africa at Lords’ in The Star, 12 June 1991.
14 Ibid.
Africa’s post-apartheid stage. Britain’s foreign minister made it clear to the governments of the other six test playing countries that South Africa’s re-admission would be beneficial to international cricket and the political community.

The ICC was to meet at Lords on 10 July to vote on the resolution proposing South Africa’s re-admission to international cricket. Bacher, Tshwete, Dakin and Mackerdhuj were in London to hear the outcome. It was expected that Dalmiya, secretary of the Board of Control of Cricket in India (BCCI) would propose the motion of re-admission, and Australia would second it. However, the night before the ICC were to have the meeting, Dalmiya contacted Bacher and informed him that the Indian government were unhappy about the speed at which South Africa was moving to regain ICC status. Dalmiya added that he was under pressure from the West Indies and Pakistan, who were still unsure about South Africa’s re-admission. Dalmiya advised Bacher to get someone from the ANC to speak to Madhavrao Scindia, president of the BCCI and member of the ruling Congress Party in India, to convince him of South Africa’s re-admission. Bacher told Tshwete about the situation. They telephoned Scindia immediately. Tshwete spent ten minutes on the phone with him. Thereafter, Tshwete told Bacher that everything had been sorted out. Dalmiya then telephoned Bacher to tell him that Scindia had instructed him to propose South Africa’s re-admission to world cricket.

It was to be a significant week for South Africa. Sam Ramsamy was on his way to Lausanne, Switzerland, where the International Olympic Committee was meeting on 9 July, to consider South Africa’s application to rejoin the Olympic movement. On his way to Lausanne, he stopped in London to lend support to the UCB’s cause. He spoke with a number of West Indian high commissioners who were still unsure of South Africa’s re-admission. He assured them that he supported the UCB’s application for re-admission.

18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., p.236.
20 Ibid.
On 9 July, South Africa was re-admitted to the Olympic movement. The next day, Walcott abstained from voting. He said that he had not been given a clear mandate from all the territories of the Caribbean, but this did not hinder South Africa’s efforts. They were welcomed back into world cricket and became a full member of the ICC.

The acceptance of South Africa by the IOC and ICC was recognition of the changes that had taken place in South Africa and it reflected South Africa’s changing political landscape. It was also a sign of good faith for the changes yet to come. Bacher and Ramsamy made it clear that the lifting of the sports boycott did not only mean a return to international competition. It also meant that sports facilities and opportunities had to be and would be provided to those who had not been afforded these services during apartheid.\(^\text{21}\) International competition was but one aspect of the return to world sport.

It is important to note that those who fought and supported the sports boycott were now campaigning for South Africa’s re-admission. Sam Ramsamy, former head of the anti-apartheid movement’s campaign against South Africa’s participation, read the signs well and led the new no-racial association’s return to world sport. Peter Hain, a very successful anti-apartheid fighter, applauded the IOC when South Africa was re-admitted.

Hain pinpointed the crucial issue. Sports, such as cricket that did things right and were working to promote sport in under privileged areas, were being rewarded.\(^\text{22}\) Cricket showed that unity and development programmes were the main priorities, and not international competition. The ANC helped sports associations it regarded as genuine, and it reaped the rewards politically. The ANC felt that the UCB had taken sufficient steps to right the wrongs that apartheid had inflicted upon cricket. The development programmes were a way of reversing the damage and the ANC accepted this as a sincere gesture from the UCB. The ANC affiliated itself with sporting codes that were making a concerted effort to building a new South Africa. By following a strategy of flexibility with White sporting organisations, the ANC was revealing that any blockages were the fault of White South Africa.\(^\text{23}\)

\(^{23}\) J. Gemmell: \textit{The Politics of South African Cricket}, p.196.
4.2. 1991 Indian Tour: The Friendship Tour

After South Africa had been re-admitted to international cricket, many assumed that they would be taking part in the 1992 Cricket World Cup, to be held in Australia, but the ICC decided against South Africa’s participation. Cowdrey argued that because the World Cup was only seven months away, the schedule had already been decided upon, and many of the tickets had already been sold. South Africa’s inclusion would have meant a considerable reorganisation. Cowdrey’s decision was also taken to avoid a possible conflict with the West Indies and Pakistan. Both opposed South Africa being re-admitted to international matches so early. As it turned out, South Africa did take part in the 1992 World Cup. It was a momentous occasion in South Africa’s cricketing and political history, which will be discussed in the following chapter.

At the time, Bacher and the UCB were not too discouraged by the World Cup issue. They had put their emphasis on unity and re-admission, rather than appearing too eager to participate in international matches, but after an emergency meeting in Sharjah in October, it was decided that South Africa would indeed be part of the 1992 World Cup. After the Sharjah meeting, a four man UCB delegation comprising of Dakin, Mackerdhuj, Bacher and Percy Sonn, visited a few non-White cricketing nations on a ‘good-will tour’. The aim of these meetings was to develop cricket ties with Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan and Kenya. South Africa had never had cricket ties with these countries before, and it was felt that they should introduce themselves to their new ICC colleagues.

The delegation first travelled to Sri Lanka, where Bacher invited Tyronne Fernando, the president of the Board of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka, to visit South Africa in 1993 with a Sri Lankan under-24 team. The next stop was India. Once again, Bacher invited an Indian team to tour South Africa. This meant that India would be the first team to tour South Africa since its re-admission to world cricket. It was decided that an Indian team would visit South Africa, starting in November 1992. The tour would include test matches as well as one-day fixtures. This tour was a confirmation of the

original idea, which was expressed at the ICC’s meeting in June. It was decided that it would only be fitting for the first international team to tour South Africa to be India, because of their support in the anti-apartheid struggle, and their support which led to South Africa’s re-admission.

Interestingly, long before unification and re-admission, at one of the meetings between members of the Broederbond and the ANC at Mells Park House in 1990, these men were discussing the Gatting tour then taking place in South Africa. Nelson Mandela was about to be released and the ANC felt that the Gatting Tour should be cancelled so that Mandela could be released into relative calm. Professor Willie Esterhuyse recalls Aziz Pahad suggesting jokingly that when the time would come, the first official match by a South African team should be against India, because India had been so supportive in the anti-apartheid struggle.28

The UCB delegation planned to go to India on a goodwill visit. They had also been invited to attend a few of the India-Pakistan matches. Upon their arrival, the BCCI informed the group that Pakistan had cancelled their planned tour to India. Dalmiya, with whom Bacher had struck up a friendship, asked him to send a South African team to replace the Pakistanis. When the delegation travelled to Delhi, Scindia made a similar plea.29

The decision to tour or not to tour was not an easy one. The Pakistan team had pulled out of the five-match series because of the threat of violence by Hindu extremists. The extremists had recently dug up and poured oil on a pitch where the first international was to have been played.30

The main problem for the South Africans was timing. The invitation came at very short notice. There would not be more than a week in which to select a team and prepare it. The other consideration for the UCB would have been the unity factor. The newly formed UCB were hoping for a full season of domestic cricket before any

29 Ibid.
international competition. On the other hand, there would be some great advantages to touring. It would serve as an invaluable warm-up for the coming World Cup. Also, there was the history between these two cricketing nations. As Bacher put it, “It’s a case of a friend asking a friend to help”. These two nations had built up a good relationship during the unification process, and it would be difficult to say ‘no’ to a country that had been so supportive of South Africa’s causes. The Indians were even willing to postpone the start of their own tour to Australia in December.

The South African delegation was on their last stop in Nairobi, Kenya before returning to Johannesburg. Upon their arrival at Johannesburg International airport, the then Jan Smuts airport, the UCB and NSC held an emergency meeting at an airport hotel. Representing the NSC was Mluleki George, Makhenkesi Stofile, a member of the ANC national executive committee, and Mthobi Tyamzashe. It was decided that, given India’s role in having South Africa reaccepted into international cricket, it was only appropriate that India should be South Africa’s first opponents upon re-entry to the international stage.

South Africa’s acceptance to play in India meant that 21 years of isolation would officially come to an end, but there were still a few hurdles to be cleared. There was some concern that the selection of an all-White team would threaten unity in the sport, but Tshwete said that this bothered him less than any “bogus tokenism would have done”. It was decided that the tour carried more advantages than disadvantages. Also, all the profits from the tour, and from South Africa’s participation in the forthcoming World Cup, would be ploughed back into South Africa’s cricket development programme.

Another issue that had to be addressed was whether or not to refer to the national cricket team as ‘Springboks’. A strong controversy had been running in the country as to whether or not the team should be called by the traditional unofficial tag given to

31 “To tour or not to tour” in The Argus, 1 November 1991.
32 Interview with Craig Matthew, 27 October 2004.
all national sides. Most Whites wanted the tradition to continue, but there were strong objections raised from non-White organisations.\textsuperscript{38} Many felt that the Springbok should go, as it represented the old Whites-only South Africa. It was decided that the Springbok would not feature on the national team’s blazer. Instead, the touring colours were green, gold and dark blue of the UCB.\textsuperscript{39} The players’ shirts also carried the name of the company that sponsored them, Panasonic.\textsuperscript{40}

There was still unhappiness about the fact that an all-White team would be touring India. After the team announcement, some administrators felt like they were under a bit of pressure to choose a team that would reflect the newly formed unity in cricket. It was decided that four young players would be added to the squad in order to gain experience. Faiek Davids of Western Province and Hoosain Manack of Transvaal were selected from the former SACB, together with Hansie Cronje and Derek Crookes from the old SACU.\textsuperscript{41}

There had been no formal links between South Africa and India since 1948. Amongst other things, this meant that there were no formal direct flights into India from South Africa. All travel arrangements were made within four days.\textsuperscript{42} Interestingly, Ali Bacher and the old SACU staff used their knowledge and experience from the rebel tours to organise all the travel arrangements. Bacher charted a Boeing 707, which had been used by President FW de Klerk for overseas trips.\textsuperscript{43} The aircraft carried the team, cricket administrators, about fifty media personnel, 120 supporters and about 3000 cases of Castle Lager.\textsuperscript{44} The mood on the aircraft was understandably one of excitement. After twelve hours, and a stop in the Seychelles to refuel, the plane landed at Dum Dum airport in Calcutta.\textsuperscript{45}

There were fears that the South African team would encounter demonstrations on their arrival in India. There were a few trade union movements that were strongly
opposed to the tour and its members. They vowed to stop the trip, or at least to disrupt it. The first match between South African and India was scheduled to take place at Calcutta’s Eden Gardens, where local radical trade unionists threatened to take action against the South African team.\textsuperscript{46} Thereafter, the team would head for Gwalior and finally, Delhi, where more protests were threatened to take place. South Africa was not only facing difficulty in India, but also in South Africa, there were people opposed to the tour. Hassan Howa, a veteran anti-apartheid sports campaigner and former selector at the SACB, said he believed the South African cricket tour of India was “premature and should not have taken place”.\textsuperscript{47} Furthermore, Howa said that Black cricketers had been discriminated against by the white cricketing fraternity and that until sufficient steps had been taken to bridge the gap, only then could a South African team be chosen.\textsuperscript{48}

In and amongst the well wishes and threats, the South African team and their entourage arrived at Dum Dum airport in Calcutta. The team realised that the tour was somewhat controversial, and that there would be some interest, but the team was not prepared for what they had encountered.

There were crowds of people everywhere to welcome the South African team. They waved flags and shouted greetings. The team was garlanded by flowers and their foreheads smeared with vermilion, a traditional Hindu greeting.\textsuperscript{49} The team were then ushered into cars for the trip to the hotel. A trip of twenty kilometres took the team three hours to complete. The Indian press estimated the crowd that cheered the team along the way at 1.5 million.\textsuperscript{50} There were placards of well wishes everywhere. On two occasions, the convoy had to be stopped so that Ali Bacher, Geoff Dakin, Clive Rice, captain of the team, and coach, Mike Procter, could make brief speeches on stages which had been specially erected.\textsuperscript{51} It would seem as though Calcutta had forgotten any anti-apartheid stance it might have had while the team were being

\textsuperscript{46} ‘SA team may face demo’s’ in The Leader, 8 November 1991.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid. and Interview with André Odendaal, 21 October 2004.
\textsuperscript{49} J. Cook: The Jimmy Cook Story, p.152.
\textsuperscript{50} M. Procter: South Africa: The Years of Isolation and the Return to International Cricket, p.131.
\textsuperscript{51} J. Cook: The Jimmy Cook Story, p.152.
showered with flowers and well wishes. Clive Rice described the experience as the happiest day of his cricketing life.\textsuperscript{52}

The team proceeded onto the hotel and had to attend yet another press conference, something which they would have to get used to in the coming months. At the press conference, each member of the team was introduced. Thereafter, a light net session for the already jet-lagged and tired team followed. The team retired to their hotel rooms for the night. The next day, they travelled to meet Mother Teresa. They had been granted an audience with the saintly nun, who in her own words, described the tour as a “great peace mission”.\textsuperscript{53} The day was recorded by many photographers, while armed police kept the crowd away. Traffic in the street was blocked until the South Africans drove away after their brief, but humbling fifteen minute greeting.\textsuperscript{54}

The visit had made such an impact on the South Africans, that immediately after the meeting, the UCB announced a R10 000 donation to Mother Teresa’s organisation, which she said she would use to build another school.\textsuperscript{55}

That night, the team attended another press conference for the announcement of the teams for the first one day international the following day. South Africa lost the toss and was asked to bat. Andrew Hudson and Jimmy Cook walked out for South Africa. They walked out into the huge concrete cauldron of a cricket stadium that is Eden Gardens, which is designed to seat about 90 000. The day of the first match, local experts estimated the crowd to be at 100 000. Before the start of the match, Jimmy Cook led the team onto the field to acknowledge the crowd, by bowing and waving, amid the drums and hooters, which were customary in India, but something which was quite foreign to the South Africans. The team was understandably nervous, and it was nerves that got the better of Andrew Hudson who received a ball in the first over that moved away late. He got an edge, and was caught behind for a duck.\textsuperscript{56}

The team lost the match by three wickets, but this was not the issue. Hudson said that he was not surprised by his dismissal, because he had lost control of his emotions. He

\textsuperscript{52} J. Cook: The Jimmy Cook Story, p.153.
\textsuperscript{53} “Now I know why she’s loved by all” in The Sunday Star, 10 November 1991.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{55} J. Cook: The Jimmy Cook Story, p.157.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., p.155 and C. Bryden: Return of the Prodigal: South Africa’s cricketing comeback, p.54.
later said that if he had to do it all over again, he would still be out for nought.\footnote{R. Hartman: \textit{Ali: The Life of Ali Bacher}, p.282.} But South Africa played in an historic test. They had never before faced official international competition, having been out of world cricket for 21 years. They played in strange surroundings, before a huge and bustling crowd, and even though South Africa lost, cricket was the winner on the day. The largest crowd ever to have assembled anywhere to watch a game of cricket did so to watch South Africa emerge from its 21 years of isolation.\footnote{\textquote{Historic Test} in \textit{The Daily News}, 11 November 1991.} The match result never really mattered. What mattered was that South African cricket was allowed to gain momentum and signal to the world that apartheid was over.

After a function at Eden Garden after the match had ended, the team flew to Agra the next morning. They visited the Taj Mahal before reboarding the plane for the flight to Gwalior. Upon their arrival, their cricket kit was still en route, and their planned net session had to be cancelled. The team looked forward to an early night, but they had to attend yet another welcoming dinner an hour's drive away.\footnote{J. Cook: \textit{The Jimmy Cook Story}, p.160.} As the team was starting to discover, cricket was becoming increasingly inconsequential on this ‘cricket’ tour, with the selection committee barely finding time to decide on the next day’s team.

South Africa lost the second one day international by 38 runs. This time, it was Cook who was dismissed in the first over for a duck.\footnote{C. Bryden: \textit{Return of the Prodigal: South Africa’s cricketing comeback}, p.57.} South Africa had lost the series, but the team was growing in team spirit and they were binding together into a cohesive unit.

Both teams, officials and supporters were invited to attend a dinner on the night of the match day at Madhavrao Scindia’s palace in Gwalior.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}} Scindia was president of the Indian Cricket Board and descendant of one of the great Maharajah families of India.\footnote{\textit{Ibid..}, p.54.} The palace had 1000 rooms and spacious formal gardens. Guests were treated to a fireworks display before going to the banqueting hall for a buffet meal.\footnote{Interview with Craig Matthews, 27 October 2004 and Interview with Peter Kirsten, 26 October 2004.}
South African team flew to New Delhi that night for the third and final one day international of the series.

The team arrived at their hotel at three in the morning. They had a net session later that day, and were invited out to dinner by the Indian officials. The final match was a day/night affair. This meant that the team could catch up on some sleep during the day, knowing that there would be no morning rush.

The third and final match of the tour produced a victory for South Africa. This time, Kepler Wessels opened the batting with Cook. Wessels produced a match winning 90 runs to steer South Africa to victory. The team was obviously delighted with their victory, but did not go overboard with their celebrations – no running onto the field and shouting.

During the tour, while visiting the Taj Mahal, some of the players commented that the outing, and the numerous press conferences were unnecessary as it was cutting into valuable practice time. Others commented that the tour had lost its way in a cricket sense. Perhaps it was too much to ask that cricketers understand that cricket was somewhat incidental on a ‘cricket’ tour, but after the tour, the real meaning of it all became clear. Cricket was incidental to the ten days the South Africans spent in India. The flowers, firecrackers, press conferences, receptions and smiling for photographers all took place so that the South African cricket team could represent the ‘New South Africa’. They were ambassadors of the ‘New South Africa’. They broke down old barriers and forged new friendships where there were none before.

At the end of 1992, India made its first tour of South Africa for the ‘Friendship Series’, and South Africa engaged in its first home series since 1969/70, winning it 1-0. In the first test, in Durban, the left arm spinner, Omar Henry, became the first player of colour to represent South Africa in a test since C.B. Llewellyn, another left

64 J. Cook: The Jimmy Cook Story, p.164.
65 C. Bryden: Return of the Prodigal: South Africa’s cricketing comeback, p.54.
arm spinner, some eighty years previously. At forty, Henry was the oldest South African player to make his test debut. 67

Upon the team’s arrival in South Africa, Ali Bacher, managing director of the UCB and team manager on the Indian tour wrote for the Johannesburg Sunday Star. In it, he said:

“Before we left South Africa, I told a media conference that the results of our historic tour were not important. The occasion itself and the vast implications stemming from it were crucial issues. Now that the tour is over, I can say from the bottom of my heart that the mission succeeded beyond our wildest hopes. Our country is undergoing a period of progressive change and people are looking for role models and reassurance of the innate good that lives with mankind. India, through this cricket tour, has helped to do just that, and the result of the tour has been probably the most important of all. It was written in fate that it was to be in India to achieve this because it was the father of this great nation, Mahatma Ghandi, who began his teachings in South Africa, and the message of goodwill he brought to South Africa and the world that has been resurrected on this tour. I believe that history will record this great moment, not for cricket alone, but as a moment when two nations lit the torch of peace that will be carried into the hearts of all our people” 68

The cricket tour to India set an example to other South African sporting codes that were trying to get their houses in order. Cricket was the first sport to realise that the rebel tour road was a dead end. It showed that non-racism, unity and development was the road back to international sport. There were stumbling blocks, such as threats and proposed demonstrations, on the way, but they were able to overcome this through determination, patience, sincerity and sacrifice.

68 J. Cook: The Jimmy Cook Story, p.165-166.
Chapter 5
The 1992 Cricket World Cup

5.1. The Road to the 1992 World Cup
On July 10 1991, South Africa was formally admitted to the ICC. It was assumed by the UCB that ICC membership automatically meant that South Africa would participate in the upcoming Cricket World Cup, which was to be held in Australia and New Zealand. The World Cup organisers recognised the team’s marketing potential and they, together with many cricket fans were eager to see South Africa back in this type of international competition.1 However, Colin Cowdrey, president of the ICC, announced that although South Africa was a member of the ICC, it would not be possible for the country to play in the World Cup. His decision was taken to avoid a possible conflict with the West Indies and Pakistan. Both had been opposed to South Africa’s early readmission to international matches. Cowdrey also said that preparations were too far advanced to include South Africa in the World Cup.

The decision was a disappointment to some, but the UCB had put its emphasis on unity and readmission to the ICC. If they had lobbied for participation in the World Cup so early after unity and readmission, it is certain that many in the cricketing world, in and outside of South Africa, would have questioned their motives. There were still many former SACB administrators that were unhappy with the pace at which South African cricket was moving. Many felt that the upcoming Indian tour was a mistake because unity still needed to run its course.2 A decision to take part in the World Cup so early after unification and re-admission could have derailed the newly formed UCB.

In August 1991, the South African cricket officials were invited to meet with British Prime Minister, John Major at No. 10 Downing Street.3 Cowdrey accompanied the South Africans. Major expressed his disappointment that South Africa would not be taking part in the World Cup. He told Cowdrey that every effort should be made so that South Africa could participate.

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1 C. Bryden: Return of the Prodigal: South Africa’s Cricketing Comeback, p.39.
2 Interview with Prof. André Odendaal, 21 October 2004.
In August 1991, the Australian Cricket Board (ACB), who was the World Cup organiser, extended an invitation to the UCB to lodge an official application to play in the 1992 World Cup from February 22 to March 26. The World Cup committee decided that everything was in order for South Africa to play. All they would have to do is get the approval from the ICC, and all the other teams participating at the World Cup.

Malcolm Gray, chairman of the ACB World Cup organising committee and Colin Egar, ACB president, urged South Africa to make an application to play. Dakin pointed out the ICC’s argument that World Cup arrangements were too far advanced for South Africa to compete, but he added that the UCB executive would meet the NOSC within two weeks. At the meeting the UCB and NOSC would discuss the moratorium on the South African overseas sports contract, but Dakin was confident that South Africa would get the go ahead for the World Cup.

The World Cup committee opened up its doors to the UCB. They said that they would accommodate the team. It was now up to the ICC to say ‘yes’, by September 30. The September 30 deadline was set by the tournament organisers at a meeting in Melbourne the previous weekend, when it was re-affirmed that logistically and operationally, the addition of a ninth team was feasible. The tournament committee added that the ACB and New Zealand Cricket Board supported the inclusion of South Africa, subject to receipt of appropriate approvals from within South African sport.

Official reaction from the UCB managing director, Ali Bacher, was that even though the inclusion of South Africa in the World Cup would be preferable, the UCB still had other priorities to attend to. The UCB’s biggest priority was to continue to expand its development programme to ensure equal opportunities for all those in South Africa who wanted to play cricket. Secondly, Bacher added that the UCB’s successful application for membership of the ICC had given South African cricket unprecedented opportunities in the medium and long term. The UCB was very

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4 ‘SA will play in Cricket World Cup’ in *The Citizen*, 7 August 1991.
6 ‘SA receive invite to World Cup’ in *The Citizen*, 20 August 1991.
mindful that in the short term they should not do anything to hamper that. Finally, Bacher said that it was very important that when South Africa returned to international cricket, it would be with the blessing of every South African, and the support of all the cricket playing countries.\(^8\)

It was at Lord’s that Ali Bacher met Clive Lloyd for the first time. He extended an invitation to the former West Indies captain to come to South Africa to lend support and encouragement to the children in the development programme. Soon after his arrival a month later in September 1991, he called Bacher to ask whether it would be possible to arrange to meet Nelson Mandela. Bacher telephoned Steve Tshwete. He was instructed to bring Lloyd to Shell House the next day.\(^9\)

The following day, Bacher and Lloyd arrived at Shell House to find a big Swedish delegation and media representatives, also waiting to meet Mandela. As Bacher and Lloyd entered Mandela’s office, the Swedish delegation followed. Mandela spoke for a while about South African cricket and the strides being made through the development programme. He praised cricket’s commitment to a development programme, saying that non-racialism in sport must not just start at the top, but it must also be seen to appear at the bottom.\(^10\) It was during this time that one of the Swedish journalists asked Mandela whether or not he wanted to see South Africa take part in the World Cup. His answer was “definitely yes”.\(^11\)

It was now official. Nelson Mandela supported South Africa’s bid to play in the 1992 Cricket World Cup. He said that he would do everything in his power to support South Africa’s application. Bacher then confirmed that the UCB executive had voted at the previous weekend to accept the invitation to the World Cup in Australia and New Zealand.\(^12\) It was now up to the ICC to add its support.

Bacher thanked Mandela for the invaluable role played by ANC spokesperson on sport, Steve Tshwete, who was largely responsible for unifying the game under the

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\(^8\) ‘SA receive invite to World Cup’ in *The Citizen*, 20 August 1991.
\(^10\) ‘Mandela goes in to bat for World Cup play’ in *Business Day*, 24 September 1991.
\(^12\) ‘Mandela goes in to bat for World Cup play’ in *Business Day*, 24 September 1991.
UCB banner. Tshwete said that he saw no reason for opposition to the application, now that South African cricket had been firmly placed on a non-racial basis.13

The news of Mandela’s endorsement travelled around the world. Tyronne Fernando, the president of the Board of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka, and later his country’s foreign minister, had questioned the ICC’s first decision to exclude South Africa from the World Cup. He had heard of Mandela’s endorsement. At the same time, Cowdrey telephoned him to ask for advice. Fernando suggested that a special session be held in Sharjah, in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on October 23.14 The venue for the meeting was chosen because representatives of the West Indies, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka would be in the UAE for the Sharjah Cup.15

Ahead of the Sharjah Cup, West Indies legend, Sir Garfield Sobers, told a news conference in Dubai that South Africa’s cricketers had been isolated from the world through no fault of their own, and they should immediately be allowed to participate in the 1992 World Cup.16

Indian officials assured the ANC representative in Delhi that the Indians would vote for South African participation at the special meeting of the ICC in Sharjah on October 23 1991.17 Indian support was likely to swing Pakistan and Sri Lanka behind the South Africans, just as it did during the ICC meeting at Lord’s, when the South Africans were readmitted. A month prior to the Sharjah meeting, the Pakistani Cricket Control Board voted against allowing South Africa to play in the World Cup. The council members found no reason to allow South Africa to play.18 Hopefully, Mandela’s endorsement, as well as India’s assurance of support for South Africa, would sway the Pakistani.

The UCB needed the support of all the test playing nations. India’s support would hopefully have a meaningful influence on Pakistan, the West Indies and Sri Lanka.

16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
England, New Zealand and Australia had already given their blessing.\(^{19}\) The South African delegation that would be present in Sharjah consisted of Ali Bacher, UCB president, Geoff Dakin, vice president, Krish Mackerdhuj and Cape Town advocate Percy Sonn.\(^{20}\) They planned to attend the Sharjah Cup match between India and Pakistan, which would be followed by the meeting of the ICC.\(^{21}\) At the meeting, the UCB presented its case to the world body. The meeting did not last longer than twenty minutes, and South Africa’s place in the 1992 World Cup was assured.\(^{22}\)

Bacher thanked Fernando for hastening the process. He also acknowledged the role played by Steve Tshwete and Nelson Mandela. The role of the ANC was crucial and should not be overlooked during this critical phase of South African cricket. They purposefully used sport as a tool to negotiate a new South Africa. It was a way in which to communicate with White South Africa. By supporting the South African cricket team, they were winning the hearts of many Whites and other South Africans.

Prior to the 1992 World Cup, the BCCI invited the South African cricket team to tour India. Pakistan had pulled out of their tour of India at the last minute and India had a gap in its schedule. The UCB were on a whistle stop tour of goodwill in India when the BCCI extended its invitation. It was never the UCB’s intention to enter into international cricket so early in its career. Their inclusion in the upcoming World Cup was also not on their agenda, but Bacher looked at the situation as a friend helping another friend. South Africa has always had a long history with India. More than 152,000 Indians came to Natal (now Kwa-Zulu Natal) as indentured labourers in 1911.\(^{23}\) South Africa’s Indian population is one of the largest outside of India. Mahatma Ghandi, the Indian political activist, also spent many years in South Africa. He was closely involved in the establishment of the Natal Indian Congress.\(^{24}\) In hindsight, the ten days in India did much for the fledgling UCB and South African cricket situation. The trip to India also counted as some sort of preparation for the World Cup. Without the trip to India, the South Africans would have been truly out of their depth in Australia.

\(^{19}\) ‘India will support SA World Cup Entry’ in *The Citizen*, 17 October 1991.
\(^{21}\) ‘India will support SA World Cup Entry’ in *The Citizen*, 17 October 1991.
\(^{23}\) B.J. Liebenberg and S.B. Spies: *South Africa in the Twentieth Century*, p. 67.
Before the team travelled to Australia, there were some that felt the somewhat ageing South African team would not be able to competitively compete with the youth of the other teams taking part at the World Cup. When the team was announced, Clive Rice, Jimmy Cook and Peter Kirsten were not included.\textsuperscript{25} The team selection was met with outrage from the team that travelled to India, as well as from the public. A Johannesburg newspaper decided to have an opinion poll to gauge what its readers were thinking. The team selection was greeted with a vote of no confidence from the opinion poll.\textsuperscript{26}

Kepler Wessels was chosen as captain, while Mike Procter stayed on as coach Ali Bacher made himself available as manager, as he was the manager on the Indian tour, but Dakin felt the managing director of the UCB should not be away from his desk for so long. Alan Jordaan, president of the Northern Transvaal Cricket Union travelled to the World Cup as the manager.\textsuperscript{27} Wessels and Procter consulted with the selectors after the initial selection. They put their case forward for Cook and Kirsten. It was felt that Rice’s age counted against him. The final team thus included Kirsten, who was playing for Border at the time. The selection came as a surprise to him, but he was happy to be included.\textsuperscript{28} Faiek Davids was once again included in the squad to gain experience and to play in the warm up matches.\textsuperscript{29}

### 5.2. South Africa’s World Cup Campaign

#### 5.2.1. Preparations

Before the team left for its warm up match in Zimbabwe and then Australia for the World Cup, Alan Jordaan left without packing the South African flag or a recording of Die Stem. As was the case in India, the team would also not have the Springbok displayed on their shirts. South Africa and South African cricket was in a time of transition. Springbok colours were something only awarded to White sportsmen during the apartheid years. Even though some sportsmen other than White aspired to being Springboks, because that meant that they could play for their country, it could

\textsuperscript{25} C. Bryden: Return of the Prodigal: South Africa’s Cricketing Comeback, p.64.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p.65.

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., p.66.

\textsuperscript{28} Interview with Peter Kirsten, 26 October 2004.

\textsuperscript{29} Interview with Faiek Davids, 12 October 2004.
never happen because of apartheid laws pertaining to sport. The whole concept of flags, national anthems and emblems was a sensitive issue, but the players and those involved with the South African cricket team understood the sensitivities around the subject.

On the team’s arrival in Australia, a press conference was set up at Perth’s airport. The manager, Alan Jordaan, had made himself ready for a battery of tricky and political questions. He should not have worried. The dozens of journalists and camera crews were only interested in how strong a challenge the South African cricket team would pose in the tournament. Wessels too, was expecting a few tough questions to come his way, but this did not happen. Kepler Wessels started playing first class cricket for Free State when he was just 16 years old. A few years later, he started playing for Sussex and subsequently moved to Australia, representing that country in Kerry Packer’s World Series. He scored four test centuries for his adopted country. He was also part of Kim Hughes’ rebel Australian team that toured South Africa in 1986/87, already having moved back to South Africa to captain Eastern Province. Three years later, he was a springbok playing against Make Gatting’s rebel English side. Kepler Wessels is the only cricketer to have played officially and in rebel series for two countries.

Because of his subsequent disloyalty to Australia, Wessels’ notoriety Down Under has taken on a markedly unpopular aspect. A sub-plot in the Australian movie Muriel’s Wedding is similar to Wessels’ situation. It depicts a White South African swimmer so desperate for international competition that he offers to pay an Australian woman to marry him so that he can participate in the Olympics. Wessels married an Australian woman and in dong so, qualified for Australia’s national team. Physically and ideologically, the swimmer and Wessels are alike. It is thus understandable to assume that Wessels would get a roasting from the Australian press. Instead, they let him go after one reasonable question. Wessels thanked the ACB at the press

30 Interview with Faiek Davids, 12 October 2004.
31 Interview with Brian Macmillan, 12 October 2004.
32 C. Bryden: Return of the Prodigal: South Africa’s Cricketing Comeback, p.75.
33 Ibid., p.72.
34 G. Farred: Midfielder’s Moment: Coloured Literature and Culture in Contemporary South Africa, p.139.
conference, whose permission had been needed before he could play for another country in the World Cup.\textsuperscript{35}

Australia had always supported South African cricket, and it was the ACB who invited the South Africans to take part in the World Cup. It was made clear at the press conference that the Australians were happy to have the South Africans there.

South Africa went on to play five warm up matches before the World Cup got underway. They put in some good performances against Western Australia, an Australian provincial team that had already beaten India and the West Indies. They also had a good warm up match against Pakistan.

Everything was new to the South Africans. They were learning new things all the time. The world’s press was also eager to learn more about the side so that cricket fans could know more about the South Africans. There was always a strong media contingent at practices and warm up matches when the South African team was present. Faiek Davids recalls being interviewed by an Australian radio station. The reason for this was so that the radio stations’ listeners could learn more about the South African cricket team and its recent history.\textsuperscript{36}

5.2.2. Victory against Australia

South Africa’s first match in the World Cup was against Australia. Many people did not think that South Africa stood a chance against the Aussies, but back home in South Africa, expectations soared. The South African public embraced the 1992 World Cup. World Cup fever gripped millions of people, most of them White, but many other people too. Messages of goodwill were received from State President FW de Klerk and Nelson Mandela. On February 26 1992, a new chapter was written in the history of world cricket. It was the night South Africa made its debut.

The build up to the match was not ideal. Four consecutive days of rain had disrupted South Africa’s preparation, and prevented a planned fielding practice under lights.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{35} E. Griffiths: \textit{Kepler: The Biography}, p.200.

\textsuperscript{36} Interview with Faiek Davids, 12 October 2004.

\textsuperscript{37} C. Bryden: \textit{Return of the Prodigal: South Africa's Cricketing Comeback}, p.84.
There was a lot of tension in the South African squad. Wessels invited Alan Jones, the former Australian Rugby Union coach to have a talk with the team.\textsuperscript{38} Jones had been sympathetic to Wessels during his time with the ACB. He provided a classical motivational talk. Richard Snell, one of the youngsters in the side recalls, “I went into that room wondering how we could win, and I came out wondering how we could lose”.\textsuperscript{39} It would be safe to assume that others felt the same way.

On the day of the match, Allen Border, captain of the Australian team, won the toss and decided to bat first, which proved to be a mistake. After 21 overs, Australia were 76 for the loss of 3 wickets. A target of 171 for victory was set.\textsuperscript{40} South Africa went on to win that match. The South African captain was named man of the match for his 81 not out. Andrew Hudson contributed 28 runs to the total, while Kirsten finished on 49 not out.\textsuperscript{41} South Africa had done the unthinkable. The no hopers had won by 9 wickets, with overs to spare. The South Africans had put in a convincing and professional performance against the Australians.

The match against Australia was made even more famous and unforgettable because of what happened in the South African dressing room after the match. The South African dressing room was packed with media and well wishers. At the end of the press conference that was held in the dressing room, Steve Tshwete appeared at the door behind the captain. The ecstatic ANC official grabbed Wessels at the shoulders and hugged him. The photographers that were present started snapping away. That photo did as much for the cause of South African cricket, if not more, than anything else the UCB had tried to do in the past. That photo became the ultimate image of reconciliation through sport. Mike Gatting, who two years earlier had been a thorn in the side of the non-racial sports movement, was also embraced by Tshwete.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{38} R. Hartman: \textit{Hansie and the Boys}, p.115.
\textsuperscript{39} E. Griffiths: \textit{Kepler: The Biography}, p.203.
\textsuperscript{40} C. Bryden: \textit{Return of the Prodigal: South Africa’s Cricketing Comeback}, p.91-92.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., p.95.
Van Zyl Slabbert, the leading progressive politician, was among the many well-wishers. He commented that the win against Australia would swing 10 per cent of the country to vote ‘yes’ in the forthcoming referendum on reform.

When the team returned to the hotel, there were more than 250 congratulatory faxes waiting for them. Wessels also received a phone call from State President FW de Klerk. De Klerk congratulated Wessels and the team on their performance. The message was later broadcast, in full, on the main national news in South Africa. The congratulatory message was passed on to the rest of the team by Wessels.

5.2.3. Trouble in New Zealand

In typically confident South African fashion, the team felt that they could now win the World Cup after just one great performance, but that was not the case when they arrived in New Zealand. They were scheduled to play against New Zealand on February 29 1992.

They flew into New Zealand on February 27, and had to face their first genuine political hurdle of the tour. A number of members of the Halt All Racist Tours (HART) organisation met manager Alan Jordaan at the team’s hotel. The HART delegation was led by its international secretary, John Minto. He presented Jordaan with a letter and insisted that all members of the team should sign it within 24 hours. The letter stated that the make-up of the South African cricket team was not a reflection of a new South Africa, but rather it reflected the iniquity of apartheid. It continued to say that White players within the team were there at the expense of Black players that were denied the same opportunities to train and compete at international level. HART thought that their actions would add pressure for the establishment of a genuine democratic South Africa.

HART’s intention was that each member of the South African management and team would sign the solidarity agreement. They intended to send a copy of the declaration

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44 Ibid.
to both FW de Klerk and Nelson Mandela.⁴⁸ Amongst the condemnation of Apartheid and the support for a democratic South Africa, HART was against De Klerk’s Whites only referendum that was to be held in the near future.⁴⁹

ANC spokesperson Steve Tshwete met with the HART delegates at a private meeting. He told the HART members that their views were outdated and that the ANC’s support for the cricketers was unequivocal.⁵⁰ The issue did not surface in public again, and that was the last time the South Africans heard from HART. This showed that the ANC was effectively in control. The incident of HART was kept away from the players. They were completely unaware of what was going on and left to concentrate on cricket.⁵¹

The South Africans arrived in New Zealand completely unprepared for the match against the Kiwis. They had put all their mental and physical focus on their match against Australia. There were times on the field when they did not know whether an incoming batsman was right or left-handed.⁵² They were outclassed by the Kiwis in Auckland, who were nicknamed the ‘Young Guns’. They lost by 7 wickets.⁵³

The South Africans then moved on to Wellington to face the Sri Lankans. It was a case of from the gutter to the sewer. It was another disappointing performance from South Africa. Sri Lanka won the match by 3 wickets.⁵⁴

While the team were losing to Sri Lanka, at home the referendum was becoming a hot topic of conversation, and it would appear South Africa’s cricket team were becoming involved in the saga. For the first time, advertising boards were on display at South African matches, urging South African supporters to vote ‘yes’ in the upcoming ⁴⁸ ‘Political Bumper in NZ for cricketers’ in The Citizen, 28 February 1992.
⁴⁹ C. Bryden: Return of the Prodigal: South Africa’s Cricketing Comeback, p.97.
⁵⁰ Ibid.
⁵¹ Interview with Faiek Davids, 12 October 2004 and Interview with Brian Macmillan, 12 October 2004.
⁵² E. Griffiths: Kepler: The Biography, p.207.
⁵³ P. Robinson: How’s That! On Tour with SA in India, the World Cup and the West Indies, p.25.
Clearly, a substantial ‘no’ vote would have a negative effect on international sporting relations.

The team moved onto Christchurch to face the West Indies. They had to do something dramatic if they wanted to salvage their World Cup hopes. Many South African politicians and sports administrators were also hoping that South Africa could win and advance so that the referendum result would be a favourable one. Wessels went into the match unhappy with the way the media was criticising the team, but South Africa won the match by 64 runs and made a comeback in the World Cup.56

At the halfway stage of the tournament, after playing four of their eight matches, there was a renewed spring in the steps of the South African players as they travelled back to Australia for the second half of the tournament. The team had four more pool matches ahead of them before paying in the semi-finals. During the same time, De Klerk was campaigning for the ‘yes’ vote in the upcoming referendum to be held on March 17. The South African cricket team would become an important cog in De Klerk’s plans for the referendum.

5.2.4. The 1992 Referendum

In the 1989 election campaign, the ruling National Party (NP) asked White voters for a mandate to negotiate with all concerned about a new constitution, an undivided South Africa, one citizenship, equal votes, protection of minorities and the removal of stumbling blocks such as discrimination against people of colour.57 The NP achieved a clear majority, but the right wing opposition made distinct progress. The Conservative Party (CP) captured more seats from the NP in by elections in February 1992. Just prior to the beginning of the World Cup, State President, FW de Klerk called for a referendum for White voters to decide whether or not to continue the negotiation process already underway.58 The referendum was called to remove any doubts about the mandate and it was hoped that a ‘yes’ vote could marginalise right wing dissent, and give De Klerk power to move towards a new constitution.

56 C. Bryden: Return of the Prodigal: South Africa’s Cricketing Comeback, p.113.
58 J. Nauright: Sport, Cultures and Identities, p.163.
The carefully worded question which the electorate had to answer was as follows:

Do you support continuation of the reform process which the State President began on February 2, 1990, and which is aimed at a new constitution through negotiation?\(^{59}\)

The ANC had deep reservations about endorsing exclusive White political rights, but it called on Whites to vote ‘yes’.\(^{60}\) If a majority voted ‘yes’, negotiations could be accelerated at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa), the multi-party forum where 20 organisations had started to deliberate on a new constitution during 1991.\(^{61}\) The president undertook to resign should there be a ‘no’ majority, and it was clear that if there was to be any ensuing White parliamentary election, the right wing would certainly be victorious.\(^{62}\) The leaders of the CP had already refused to be a part of Codesa. This, coupled with a possible ‘no’ majority, would bring the negotiations to a standstill. But whatever the result of the referendum, the implications would be far reaching.

The NP, however, cleverly used the surprise success of the cricket team in its advertisements for a ‘yes’ vote. NP advertisements asked voters a number of questions, including, “Aren’t our sportspersons on the playing fields of the world?” in seeking continued support from Whites.\(^{63}\)

It was not only the NP campaigning for the ‘yes’ vote. All throughout South Africa’s World Cup campaign, a consortium of South African businessmen had booked signs at the grounds where South African matches were being played, urging South Africans to vote ‘yes’ in the referendum. The first time these boards appeared was when South Africa played against Sri Lanka in Wellington on March 2 1992, but when South Africa played against Zimbabwe in Canberra on March 10, the sign was taken down on the eve of the match, because of a telephone call demanding equal


\(^{63}\) J. Nauright: *Sport, Cultures and Identities*, p.164.
space for a ‘no’ sign. Rather than become involved in a political controversy, the Australian Capital Territories cricket authorities decided to accept neither sign.

Some of the boards merely said “South Africa: Vote ‘Yes’ on March 17”, while another advertisement said, “Without reform, South Africa hasn’t got a sporting chance. Vote Yes on March 17 and keep South Africa in the Game.” This advertisement was placed in the *Weekly Mail*. It shows a deserted and overgrown cricket field with broken wickets and is contrast with the South African cricketers celebrating their victory over Australia at the start of the World Cup.

In the referendum campaign, the NP had all the advantages. Television and (in many parts of the country), radio are government controlled. The business community raised money, and most newspapers helped by giving discount rates to the ‘yes’ advertisements. The left-of-centre Democratic Party also supported the NP position on the referendum. The Conservative Party, with no comparable funds and no access to discounts, was effectively locked out of the mass media, relying on posters to get its message of a ‘no’ vote across.

After their win against the West Indies, the South Africans travelled back to Australia to play against Pakistan, Zimbabwe, England and India. They won three of the four remaining matches, losing only to England. South Africa had now made it to the semi-finals, where they were to play against England on March 22, but there was another matter that had to be settled in South Africa before the team could play in the semi-final. FW de Klerk’s referendum still needed to take place.

Geoff Dakin was in Australia with the team when he called a special meeting. He outlined the significance and importance of the referendum taking place in South Africa. He also highlighted its impact on sporting matters. The South African team

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64 C. Bryden: *Return of the Prodigal: South Africa’s Cricketing Comeback*, p.123.
became very much involved in De Klerk’s campaign for the ‘yes’ vote. The players were kept up to date with what was going on in South Africa. But it would seem the South African management and senior players were kept more informed than those lower down the ranks, so as to keep most of the team’s focus on cricket and off politics.

The South African management and the team’s senior players threw their weight behind the campaign for a ‘yes’ vote. A statement was released saying that the 13 members of the South African contingent that were eligible to vote would all vote ‘yes’ in the referendum. Wessels became one of many sporting and entertainment personalities to add his voice to the ‘yes’ vote.

Special arrangements were made for the South Africans to cast their vote at the South African embassy in Canberra on March 11, the day after their match against Zimbabwe, which also took place in Canberra. It turned out that only two members of the South African team were able to vote, namely, Adrian Kuiper and Meyrick Pringle. The team’s manager, Alan Jordaan, was the only member of management that was allowed to vote. The other eligible members of the team were not able to vote because they did not have the correct identity documents, which were their passports as well as their identity books.

The team had now done all it could for the ‘yes’ vote, but just two days before March 17 when South Africans had to go to the polls, Geoff Dakin said that a ‘no’ result would mean that he would be left with no choice but to send the South African team home. Dakin added that the proposed West Indian tour, scheduled to take place shortly after the World Cup, would also be cancelled. Dakin pleaded with all South Africans to understand the consequences of a ‘no’ result.

69 Interview with Faiek Davids, 12 October 2004 and Interview with Peter Kirsten, 26 October 2004.
70 Ibid.
72 C. Bryden: Return of the Prodigal: South Africa’s Cricketing Comeback, p.123.
74 C. Bryden: Return of the Prodigal: South Africa’s Cricketing Comeback, p.123.
75 ‘SA will quit World Cup of vote is No’ in The Citizen, 16 March 1992.
76 Ibid.
There have been few other occasions when sport and politics have been so entwined. A ‘no’ vote would have had devastating consequences on the future of South African sport. There was already talk of cancelling the West Indian tour if the result came back as ‘no’. There was also talk of cancelling a planned rugby tour to South Africa by the All Blacks and the Wallabies that was planned to take place later in 1992. The South African public had a taste of international competition and it was made clear to them what a ‘no’ majority would mean in sporting terms. The NP cleverly used sports such as cricket and rugby, which was popular amongst the White population, in its campaign for the ‘yes’ vote.

Dakin had announced that he would send the South African team home if the result of the referendum was a ‘no’. One would assume that it would be a tense time for the South African cricket team, but it was only the inner circle of senior players and management that were aware of the possible flight home. This would mean that South Africa would not take part in the semi-final against England. Nevertheless, the other participating teams at the World Cup, except Pakistan, expressed that they would still want South Africa to continue playing in the World Cup if the referendum result was ‘no’. Based on the response of the other teams, Dakin decided that the team would carry on playing in the World Cup regardless of the referendum result, but if any team felt awkward playing against South Africa, he would have no other choice but to send the team home.

As it happened, when the votes and results had been counted, the final ‘yes’ vote was declared at 68.7 per cent. De Klerk had won, and could now proceed with his plans of political reform and transformation. After the referendum result had come in, the South African cricket team received a phone call from FW de Klerk. He thanked the team for their contribution to the ‘yes’ result. The news was greeted with relief by the South African team and management in Australia. For them, it meant that they could now focus on cricket, and more importantly, their semi-final against England.

77 J. Nauright: Sport, Cultures and Identities, p.164.
78 Interview with Faiek Davids, 12 October 2004 and Interview with Brian Macmillan, 12 October 2004.
79 ‘World Cup cricket teams support SA’ in Sowetan, 18 March 1992.
Dr. Danie Craven, joint chairman of the South African Rugby and Football Union (SARFU), expressed his joy at the outcome of the referendum. He said that it was not only good news for rugby, but for all South African sports. Ali Bacher also added his thanks to the South African public for the ‘yes’ vote. Sam Ramsamy, chairman of NOCSA said that the ‘yes’ result was a victory for the morality of the non-racial sports movement. Other sporting bodies added their thanks to the South African public for turning out to vote ‘yes’, including South African athletics, golf and soccer bodies.

The role played by sport, and cricket in particular in the referendum among White South Africans on whether to continue with the political reform process owed much to the accidental coincidence in timing between the campaign and the World Cup. The unexpected landslide in favour of reform in the referendum was made possible, in part, by the very high turnout among English-speaking voters, who responded to the extensive advertising campaign that aroused fears of international isolation in the event of a ‘no’ majority.

The NP was meticulous with its referendum campaign. Firstly, De Klerk telephoned Kepler Wessels and congratulated him and the team on the victory against Australia. That phone call was broadcast on the national news. Then, shortly before voting day, Geoff Dakin announced that the team would no longer take part in the tournament if the referendum delivered a ‘no’ result. Businessmen used advertising boards at grounds where South Africa played to urge South Africans to vote ‘yes’. Advertisements were also placed in newspapers and magazines that centred on cricket and other sports enjoyed by Whites, such as rugby. It was announced that the upcoming All Black and Wallaby rugby tours would be cancelled if there were a ‘no’ majority. The NP also used an upcoming Grand Prix in its campaign. It would be the first one to take place in South Africa in years. It was made clear that none of these sporting events would take place if the referendum delivered a ‘no’ vote.

84 Ibid.
In its campaign, the NP appealed more to emotion than to reason, offering few details about their plans but predicting doomsday if their opponents won. The NP warned of a return to the failed apartheid system, renewed sanctions, renewed exclusion from international sports, deepening economic crisis, and the anger of the country’s Black majority if the ‘no’ vote prevailed.

As one can note from the above-mentioned, sports played a prominent part in this campaign, since it was one area in which the reform process had brought Whites benefits at little or no cost. Thousands of sports lovers made up the voting population and the NP knew this. One has to ask the question, how many voters were swayed not by an urge to put right the injustices of apartheid, but by a desire to watch South Africa compete on the international sports stage? It must have been a decent number of people if one looks at the campaign that the NP, media and businessmen constructed that was based on and around sport.

Sport and cricket was able to influence the wider political processes that were taking place in South Africa. The media used rugby, cricket, tennis, boxing and athletics to make emotional pleas to the public. Indeed, sport and economic issues were the main propaganda pillars on which the ‘yes’ vote rested.

The referendum was entwined with matches leading up to the semi-finals of the Cricket World Cup in an intimate way. Seldom can a sporting occasion play such a large role in the political process. An advert on the eve of the referendum on 17 March 1992 showed Jonty Rhodes, the charismatic South African cricketer, and posed the question “imagine how far he would go with the ‘yes’ vote.” Whites were led to believe that something that was culturally “theirs” would remain so, as a reward for good behaviour.

The South African team were now free to focus on winning their semi-final against England, but it was not meant to be. It was as if the South African cricket team had

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88 Ibid., p.38.
served its purpose. They had successfully contributed to the ‘yes’ vote in the referendum at home, and now the gods had decided that they had no further use for them, but they did not exit the World Cup quietly.

South Africa stood on the brink of one of the greatest sporting triumphs ever. They required 22 runs off 13 balls for a win over England and a place in the cricket World Cup final, but then the rain started to fall and the players left the field. When they returned, the dreaded Duckworth-Lewis system had already done its damage, as it had before, and as it would do in so many cricket matches to follow. South Africa now required 22 runs off just one ball. It was actually 21 required off one ball, but that hardly mattered. Brian Macmillan tapped the ball and took the single. South Africa was out of the World Cup, but they had successfully contributed toward the building of a new nation.
6.1. West Indian Cricket

The West Indian Cricket Board was the only one to abstain from voting at the July 1991 meeting of the ICC to discuss South Africa’s re-admission. At the meeting in Sharjah in October 1991, the West Indies opposed South Africa’s participation in the 1992 Cricket World Cup. Relations between the West Indies and South Africa were shaky, to say the least. During the apartheid years, South Africa had chosen to play cricket against England, Australia and New Zealand, but not against the West Indies, Pakistan, Sri Lanka or India, the so-called ‘Black’ cricketing nations. This would not be in line with apartheid legislation. The Imperial Cricket Conference, now the International Cricket Council, were not disturbed by South Africa’s refusal to play these countries at the time.

The people of the West Indies had always identified with the fight against apartheid. The history of these two countries is similar and it is interesting as to why South Africa did not follow the same path as the West Indies politically and in cricket. The West Indies was a British colony and it resembled South Africa in many ways. Both societies had to cope with the legacy of slavery and both were dominated by the White elite. The West Indies too, had exclusively White cricket clubs such as Queen's Park in Trinidad.1 Plantation owners felt that they were outnumbered by the Black population, just as the settlers in South Africa felt that they were outnumbered by the indigenous Black population. Both societies’ White population isolated themselves which resulted in a potentially explosive situation.

This is, however, where South Africa took a different path to that of the West Indies. When the West Indies started playing Test cricket in 1920, there was never a question of fielding an all-White team, despite the social and racial tensions that clearly existed between clubs.2 South Africa, on the other hand, segregated its sports teams because of a colonial segregationist tradition and apartheid legislation. White cricketers still

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1 P. Oborne: Basil D’Oliveira: Cricket and Conspiracy: The Untold Story, p.18.
2 Ibid.
felt superior to their Black counterparts in the West Indies, but they never tried to deny that Black cricket existed, something which happened in South Africa. It is clear that West Indian cricket had its problems, and it was not until 1960, that the first Black player captained a West Indian side. Frank Worrell, one of the three great “W’s” of West Indian cricket, namely, Worrell, Walcott and Weekes, captained the West Indies and united disparate forces within the Caribbean. Cricket in the Caribbean played a critical role in the search for social cohesion. It created a context where social interaction across class and race lines could occur.

Like in South Africa, cricket in the West Indies is more than merely a game. In C.L.R. James’ book, Beyond a Boundary, he explains the importance of cricket in the West Indies for a people who have everything to do with constructing a national identity. He explains by illustrating how the English have a conception of themselves bred from birth. This constitutes their national identity. Under-developed countries have to go back centuries to rebuild one. The West Indies have none of that.

He goes on to emphasise how significant cricket, and especially successful competition at the international level, has been for the definition of a West Indian consciousness. James linked cricket culture and national society in a way that captured the public imagination. James explains the West Indies’ dominance of World cricket from the mid 1970’s to 1995, in terms of the liberating democratic ethos of the game within the Caribbean context.

Cricket in the West Indies has been used to build a national identity. It is for this reason that when West Indies cricket sneezes, the Caribbean catches a cold. At a meeting of Caribbean ministers in 2004, on the state of cricket in the Caribbean, one minister said that the time had come for society to move on, to turn its back on the game, because it had served its purpose. The context of the statement was one of popular social distress caused by another defeat at the hands of the Australians. The West Indies had also endured a defeat by the English. These constant defeats inflicted

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4 C.L.R. James: Beyond a Boundary, p.225.
5 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
social traumas on the Caribbean, which could be found everywhere. Family relations were made miserable, while social anxiety grew. Their team were constantly losing. What did this mean for the people of the Caribbean? Their national identity had been built on the successes of their national cricket team. If the team was a failure, then surely by reason, the people of the Caribbean were failures.

Cricket was brought to the Caribbean through colonialism. In its infancy, West Indian cricket was played by colonial masters, while Black West Indians were employed to bowl to their White counterparts in the nets. It its expressions in the Caribbean colonies, however, cricket changed. It developed into a street and beach game, known as *Calypso Cricket*. It was played by the emerging, post-emancipation proletariat, appropriated by them, and bearing the stamp of their own cultural expression.

The development of cricket as a cultural expression contributing to West Indian self-determination is paralleled by its importance for West Indian nationalism. The way in which people culturally represent themselves and their world can be revealed by the ways in which they play and organise their performances. This is not only true for West Indian cricket, but also for South African cricket, and sport in general.

### 6.2. South Africa’s 1992 West Indian Tour

Prior to the ICC meetings at Lords and Sharjah in 1991, the Caribbean Heads of State gave their approval of creating cricket contacts between themselves and South Africa because of their positive view of the ANC. This, however, did not happen at those meetings because the West Indies Cricket Board of Control (WICBC) comprises of six associations. Each association represents an island or a group of islands. It is thus logistically very difficult for the Board to physically meet throughout the year. The WICBC did not have a clear mandate at the time when the ICC sat down to vote on South Africa’s re-admission into the ICC.

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The UCB and WICBC were, however, eager to create a working relationship as soon as possible. In January 1992, Clyde Walcott, president of the WICBC and Steve Camacho, secretary of the Board, travelled to South Africa to negotiate future contacts with the UCB. The two men visited Black townships and were excited by the UCB’s development programme. At a meeting in Johannesburg, Walcott and Camacho extended an invitation for South Africa to make a short tour of the Caribbean within a week of the end of the World Cup. In addition to the national side, an under-19 team representing the development programme would also play matches against West Indian youths. The side would not play on the same days as the senior side so that they would be able to attend those matches and learn from them. Of that development side, only Dale Benkenstein and Herschelle Gibbs went on to win national colours. Benkenstein captained the team, while Gibbs was vice-captain. Gibbs, interestingly, became the first South African to score a half century in the Caribbean when the team played against a Jamaica Youth side on April 6 1992.

Traditionally, host countries pay for all costs for visiting teams, but the West Indies had lost money on every tour to the West Indies since 1976. The UCB made an arrangement where they would pay their own way and the WICBC would be able to benefit from the agreement. In return, the West Indies would visit South Africa in February 1993 for a series of one-day internationals.

The costs of South Africa’s tour to the West Indies would be covered by BP South Africa. Finding sponsorship was not easy. Live television coverage was essential to attract a sponsor, but the West Indies did not have the facilities. A television crew was imported from Miami in the United States. This pushed up the cost of the tour to R5 million. It was a huge amount for a four match tour, but it would be the first time in twenty years that the WICBC would be generating a profit from a home series.
Without the sponsorship, the tour would not have happened, and without the television coverage, South Africa would not have toured either. Bacher said that it was vital that South Africans, particularly in the disadvantaged communities, could watch the cricket tour on television so that they could see the success of the development programme.\textsuperscript{18} It was also agreed that the WICBC would keep all gate takings from the tour.\textsuperscript{19} Bacher thought it was important for Black South Africans to be able to watch Black cricketers playing the game. He also wanted South Africans to see the spirit between the teams so as to illustrate that cricket across the colour line was possible.

South Africa would play a one-day international in Jamaica, two one-day internationals in Trinidad, and then a five day official test match at the Kensington Oval in Bridgetown, Barbados. It would be the first test match between these two nations.\textsuperscript{20}

The excitement and symbolism of the tour was clear to the players, but the timing was not ideal. They would only spend a week at home after the World Cup before travelling half way around the world, again, to play in the Caribbean for the first time without having the opportunity to practice in a single warm up match.\textsuperscript{21}

The selectors named an unchanged squad. The only casualty was Brian Macmillan. He could not go on the tour because of an Achilles tendon injury and was replaced by Corrie van Zyl.\textsuperscript{22} The four development players that accompanied the team to India and the World Cup did not travel to the Caribbean. Instead, the under-19 development team travelled to the West Indies.

Once again, some special travel arrangements had to be made. Bacher persuaded South African Airways to reschedule a flight to New York to stop in Kingston, Jamaica. The team arrived in Jamaica. They, together with officials, supporters and

\textsuperscript{18} ‘SA deal ensures profits for West Indies cricket’ in \textit{The Star}, 13 April 1992.
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{20} C. Bryden: \textit{Return of the Prodigal: South Africa's Cricketing Comeback}, 169.
\textsuperscript{21} Interview with Peter Kirsten, 26 October 2004.
\textsuperscript{22} C. Bryden: \textit{The Story of South African Cricket}, p.39.
media were escorted to their hotels by motor cades. While travelling through the streets of Jamaica, the team did not encounter the same air of poverty as their bus ride through Calcutta, but the appearance of the poorer areas resembled that of a South African township.

When the team arrived at their hotel, the first press conference of the tour confirmed that apartheid was an important issue in the West Indies. There were a number of questions related to South Africa’s political situation, but the UCB came prepared. Before the South Africans left for the West Indies, Steve Tshwete telephoned Tebogo Mafole, the ANC representative at the United Nations in New York. Tshwete asked Mafole to fly from New York to accompany the tour. At the press conference he assured journalists that South African cricket had taken leaps and bounds towards a new South Africa. His statement was strengthened by letters sent to the Caribbean Prime Ministers by Nelson Mandela. In those letters, Mandela voiced his support for South African cricket and the tour to the West Indies.

Mafole met with prime ministers and appeared on a number of television and radio talk shows during his time in the Caribbean to calm the political waters. He explained that the tour was the right thing to do even though South Africa had not yet gone through democratic elections. Mafole was an ex-Alexandra township activist and Black Consciousness devotee. What makes his achievements in the Caribbean so remarkable were that he not only knew nothing about cricket, but he somewhat resented the game. He regarded cricket as a White man’s game. When he arrived in the Caribbean he did not know how many players there were in a team. By the time he left, he was engaged in conversations with the UCB’s vice-president, Krish Mackerdhuj, about topics such as ‘length and line’.

The role played by Mafole in the Caribbean gave the South Africans a clearer picture of the West Indies’ attitude toward South Africa and its politics. When Mafole arrived at the Port of Spain airport, he went through customs as a VIP, while the rest of the

23 C. Bryden: Return of the Prodigal: South Africa’s Cricketing Comeback, 171.
24 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
tourists had to wait patiently. In his meetings with prime ministers, he was accorded
the title ‘ambassador’, and when he walked through the streets he was greeted as a
hero. All over Jamaica, one would see images of Nelson Mandela. He was regarded
as apartheid’s greatest adversary. Retired Jamaican Prime Minister, Michael Manley,
explained that in the Caribbean, Mandela was regarded as a hero of a proportion that
the South Africans did not understand. Mafolie’s presence did much for the
relationship between the UCB and WICBC.

All three one-day internationals were very one-sided. The West Indies won the first
match in Jamaica by 107 runs, the second in Port of Spain by 10 wickets and the third,
also in Port of Spain, by 7 wickets.

The under-19 development side faired a bit better than the senior side. During their
first match against a Jamaica Youth team, Herschelle Gibbs scored a fifty, but the
team went on to lose that match. They then moved on to Port of Spain where they
played at Queen’s College, the island’s famed educational institution whose past
scholars included CLR James, the great West Indian writer and historian. It was an
appropriate question for the South Africans during their tour of the West Indies. The
South Africans easily beat a Secondary Schools XI in a one day match in Port of
Spain. They encountered stiffer opposition against a Trinidad Youth XI in a two day
match at the ground of St. Mary’s college in Port of Spain. That match ended in a
draw. When Kepler Wessels’ side moved on to Barbados to play in the test match,
the under-19’s played in three more matches. They drew two matches against a
Barbados Youth squad and easily beat a Conrad Hunte XI.

Conrad Hunte was regarded as one of the greatest opening batsman of West Indies
cricket. He was vice-captain to Gary Sobers. After his retirement he offered his

32 ‘Makliker stryd vir SA se jonges’ in Die Burger, 10 April 1992.
33 C. Bryden: Herschelle: A Biography, p.43.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., p.44.
services to Bacher in the development programme, and after a while settled in South Africa with his family. He was knighted in 1998, two months before his death.\footnote{R. Hartman: \textit{Ali: The Life of Ali Bacher}, p.347.}

Khaya Majola, director of the UCB’s development programme, praised the under-19 team, its coach Adrian Birrell, the manager Jackie McGlew and the vice-manager, Ray Mali, for the performances put in by the side. The side was advertised as the future of South African cricket. Of that under-19 side, only Dale Benkenstein and Herschelle Gibbs went on to achieve national colours.\footnote{‘Makliker stryd vir SA se jonges’ in \textit{Die Burger}, 10 April 1992.}

After being comprehensively beaten in three one-day internationals, some of the South Africans complained that they were being used as political pawns without consideration for what they had to endure on the field. They understood what the tour was about, but at the same time, they were there to play cricket. They were part of South Africa’s cricketing history, but they were losing, and they were being viewed as failures back home.\footnote{Interview with Peter Kirsten, 26 October 2004.} Wessels asked Bacher to speak to the players. He told the players about the benefits of the tour for South African cricket, and told them that the tour to the West Indies was important because of how the West Indian people felt about apartheid and the anti-apartheid struggle.\footnote{R. Hartman: \textit{Ali: The Life of Ali Bacher}, p.303.}

It was now off to the Kingston Oval in Barbados for the first official test match between South Africa and the West Indies. The match ended in a nail-biting climax for South Africa with 79 runs required for victory with eight wickets in hand on the last day of the test match.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}}

Gary Kirsten, who at the time was playing for Western Province, had stopped over in Barbados before the start of the test match with fellow Western Province team-mate, Kenny Jackson. They were on their way to New York for a holiday. They were only able to stay for four days because their connecting flight to New York would leave before the start of the fifth day’s play.\footnote{R. Hartman: \textit{Hansie and the Boys}, p.134.} They left Barbados on the night of the fourth day and congratulated their countrymen on their expected victory. When the final

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{R. Hartman: \textit{Ali: The Life of Ali Bacher}, p.347.}
\item \footnote{‘Makliker stryd vir SA se jonges’ in \textit{Die Burger}, 10 April 1992.}
\item \footnote{Interview with Peter Kirsten, 26 October 2004.}
\item \footnote{R. Hartman: \textit{Ali: The Life of Ali Bacher}, p.303.}
\item \footnote{\textit{Ibid.}}
\item \footnote{R. Hartman: \textit{Hansie and the Boys}, p.134.}
\end{itemize}
morning arrived, crates of beer and champagne were carried into the South African dressing room. The supporters were making themselves ready for the victory party.42

Two nights earlier, after the third day’s play, the WICBC invited the South African team and administrators along with the West Indians to a party on board of a Caribbean cruiser called the Beijun Queen.43 The South Africans were very relaxed and the test match was not present in their minds. Some felt that they enjoyed themselves a bit too much. On the fifth day, South Africa was confident that they could wrap up the match. They needed 79 runs with eight wickets in hand and they had the whole day to achieve this. Twenty minutes before lunch and it was all over. South Africa’s last eight wickets fell for 26 runs. They were all out for 148. They lost by 52 runs.44

The South Africans were devastated. Gary Kirsten managed to find the results of the match in a New York newspaper. He could not believe what had happened.45 After the match, Ali Bacher told Peter Kirsten that perhaps it was better that things worked out the way they did. If South Africa had won, it would have given them a false sense of their own ability.46

South Africa had been part of another historic tour. The tour of the West Indies was the last ride in their rollercoaster summer that started in India in November 1991. Within six months, they had played in India, had taken part in the World Cup and almost reached the final, and they played their first official test match against the West Indies. They headed home after a historic six months.

46 Interview with Peter Kirsten, 26 October 2004.
South African cricket is born out of a segregated past due to the country’s political history. Cricket, like many other facets of life, was segregated along racial lines during apartheid. Only White teams were allowed to represent the country at provincial and international level. During this time, the myth arose that non-White cricket simply did not exist. This could not be further from the truth. Non-White cricket in this country has a history that stretches back 150 years. Interestingly, the growth and development of the ANC runs alongside the history of non-White cricket in this country, in that many ANC leaders were also at the helm of cricket during the early 20th century. Many present ANC officials can trace their lineage back to 19th century Black cricketers and Black cricket clubs. The development of sport in South Africa has always been part of the larger social and political processes that have taken place over the years.

While the rest of the world was moving toward democracy in the mid 20th century, the South African government entrenched its segregationist policies and apartheid was becoming a way of life. There were eventually more than 300 laws controlling the lives of non-Whites in South Africa. They were denied political representation and the apartheid laws governed every part of their lives. This transcended to sport as well. Under apartheid law, all sports were segregated along racial lines.

Apartheid could no longer be ignored by the international community. Human rights violations were being committed daily, and South Africa’s apartheid driven economic policies were no longer in favour with the international community. In the 1960’s, the international community penalised South Africa with various sanctions and it ushered in the era of sports isolation. SACU replied by organising ‘rebel tours’. They paid overseas cricketers, who were at the end of their careers, large sums of money to play in ‘test matches’ against all White SACU sides. The large sums of money were meant to compensate the cricketers for the loss of earnings they would have to endure

2 Ibid.
because of the ban they would receive when they returned home. Some players received one or two year bans, while others received life bans.

The Gatting tour in 1990 was the last of the rebel tours to visit South Africa. During the Gatting tour, FW de Klerk made a speech in which he unbanned the African National Congress (ANC), and Nelson Mandela was released from Robben Island. The tour was cut short and ended just prior to the release of Nelson Mandela. Many matches during the Gatting tour were marred by protests and demonstrations. It was felt that releasing Mandela in the absence of the Gatting tour would result in a calmer environment.

South Africa was clearly at a time of transition, and cricket reflected the political processes by moving toward unity. Steve Tshwete of the ANC sports desk facilitated a series of three unity meetings between SACU and SACB members. Cricket was the first sporting code to form a united, non-racial body. The United Cricket Board (UCB) was born out of a desire from SACU and SACB to once again be part of the cricketing world. The ANC threw its weight behind the unification process. It affiliated itself with a cause that White South Africans associated with, and so became less of an ‘evil’ to White South Africans.

After unification, the UCB successfully applied for re-admittance to the ICC. The summer of 1992 saw South Africa travelling to India, Australia, New Zealand and the Caribbean in the the space of six months. The Indian and West Indian tours became known as ‘friendship tours’. These did much to build relations between South Africa and India, and South Africa and the West Indies. These cricketing nations were the staunchest opponents of apartheid cricket.

South Africa’s participation in the 1992 Cricket World Cup coincided with FW de Klerk’s 1992 referendum. The NP’s campaign used various sporting codes to urge voters to vote ‘yes’. The South African cricket team were used in several ways to campaign for the ‘yes’ vote.

There were many factors that contributed to the ‘yes’ vote. Political and economic reasons influenced many people to vote ‘yes’, but the inclusion of South Africa’s
participation in the World Cup in De Klerk’s campaign for the ‘yes’ vote, is an indication of the role that sport plays in political processes.

The second ‘friendship tour’ against the West Indies did much to build relations between the newly formed UCB and the WICBC.

During South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy, sport, and in this case, cricket, was used as a social agent for change. Cricket contributed to the wider political processes that were taking place at the time. South Africa’s politics and sport were always entwined. The apartheid government used sport to entrench its apartheid legislation. Sport in this country reflected its political and social processes. When political transition took place, a transition in sport took place as well. South African cricket embraces an ethos that is symbolic of a wider belief system and as such has distinctive political connotations in the region. Sport in South Africa is influenced by forces beyond the sports field, but politics too can be influenced by the social and economic force of sport.

The aim of this thesis has been to explore the relationship between politics and cricket in South Africa. It has been established that South African cricket has always been bound to larger political processes. The years discussed here, namely, 1989-1992, was a time of transition for South African politics and cricket. As the South African political landscape changed, so did cricket, thus reflecting the country’s political situation. During the 1992 Cricket World Cup, South Africa’s participation coincided with FW de Klerk’s referendum in South Africa. The South Africam team became a part of the referendum’s ‘yes’ campaign, and in that way, sport did not reflect but was able to influence the political processes of a country.

After unity and democracy in South Africa, cricket succeeded where the government failed, by penetrating Black communities. Cricket in the Black communities was played by those who were also political figures. These people were leaders in the community. They were respected and were able to communicate with ordinary people in a way that the government could not.³

Sports history has always looked at how sport reflected political processes that were taking place around it. South Africa’s example has been able to illustrate how cricket was able to exert social and cultural influence on a society. In doing so, it was able to influence South Africa’s political processes from 1989-1992.
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