International Relations Theory and the “Third World academic”: Bridging the Gap

by
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Declaration

By submitting this dissertation electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the owner of the copyright thereof (unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated) and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

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Abstract

This thesis takes as its point of departure the problem that the disciplined study of International Relations (IR), whose very basis of existence makes claims towards universality and international applicability, is seen by some to push pertinent issues relating to the majority of the world’s population to the periphery of its enquiry. It begins by exploring the concept “Third World”, arguing for its continued relevance in the post-Cold War arena as generalised term when referring to the “majority of the world’s population”. It is then theorised that one can parallel the marginalisation of the Third World in the global political economy with a perceived marginalisation of a “Third World academic” in the discipline of IR. By making use of both quantitative and qualitative methods, the thesis investigates the production of knowledge within the discipline of IR theory to argue that a possible root cause for the above problem could be the absence of Third World academic contributions to the core of the discipline. Embarking from the notion that IR theory is dominated by a British-American condominium of authorship, by re-interpreting the data provided by Ole Waever on academic contributions to leading IR journals, the researcher concludes that “Third World academics” find themselves on the periphery of knowledge production within the discipline of IR and are therefore dependent on the core to construct knowledge. A brief critical look at the history of the social sciences dominated by Western science as a hegemonic and specific “ethnoscience” furthermore puts into context the development of IR as a conversation dominated by voices from the First World academic community. With reference to the concepts of “responsibility” and “reflexivity” as they relate to theory, it is proposed that the development of IR as a discipline can be equated to a dialogue/conversation rather than a debate. For the dialogue to be responsible, all voices should be considered valid contributors, while all contributors should themselves act responsibly by being self-reflexive. Ultimately, although the discipline of IR must open up to contributions from the Third World, for the development of a truly global discipline that reflects the diversity of global interactions, it is necessary for academics from the Third World to establish themselves within the discourse by producing valuable contributions towards advancing the discipline as a whole and stepping out of the periphery by realising the importance of teaching and understanding “theory”.

Opsomming

Die vertrekpunt van hierdie tesis is die probleem dat die vakrigting van Internasionale Betrekkinge (IB), waarvan die bestaansgrond juist aanspraak maak op universaliteit en internasionale toepasbaarheid, volgens sommige akademici kwessies wat vir die meerderheid van die wêreldbevolking tersaaklik is, na die periferie van sy ondersoekveld afskuif. Eerstens word ondersoek ingestel na die begrip “Derde Wêreld” en aangevoer dat dié term steeds relevant is in die na-Koueoorlogse era wanneer daar in die algemeen na die “meerderheid van die wêreldbevolking” verwys word. Vervolgens word geteoretiseer dat daar ’n parallel getrek kan word tussen die marginalisering van die Derde Wêreld in die globale politieke ekonomie en die waargenome marginalisering van ’n “Derdewêreldakademikus” in die IB-vakrigting. Kwantitatiewe sowel as kwalitatiewe ondersoekmetodes word gebruik om kennisproduksie binne die vakrigting van IB-teorie te bestudeer en die resultate gevestig. Kwantitatiewe geteoretiseerde ondersoek in IB-teorie deur Brits-Amerikaanse onderzoekers, vooral na die Koueoorlog, het bewys dat IB-teorie deur ’n Brits-Amerikaanse kondominium van auteurs, op grond van die skryf van Ole Waever se data oor bydrae tot toonaangewende IB-vaktydskrifte, kom die navorser tot die slotsom dat “Derdewêreldakademikus” hulle op die periferie van kennisproduksie binne die IB-vakrigting bevind en dus afhanklik is van die kern wat kenniskonstruksie betref. ’n Bondige kritiese blik op die geskiedenis van die sosiale wetenskappe se oorheersing deur Westerse wetenskap as ’n hegemoniese en spesifieke “etnowetenskap” verskaf ’n verdere konteks vir die ontwikkeling van IB as ’n gesprek wat deur stemme uit die Eerstewêreldse akademiese gemeenskap oorheers word. Met verwysing na die begrippe “verantwoordelikheid” en “refleksiwiteit” met betrekking tot teorie, word voorgestel dat die ontwikkeling van IB deur ’n dialoog/gesprek as ’n debat vergelyk kan word. ’n Verantwoordelike dialoog sou behels dat alle stemme as geldige bydraeers geag word, terwyl alle bydraeers self verantwoordelik behoort op te tree en self-refleksief te wees. Die uiteindelike slotsom is dat, hoewel die IB-vakrigting hom moet oopstel vir bydrae uit die Derde Wêreld ten einde ’n waarlik globale vakrigting te word wat die diversiteit van globale interaksies weerspieël, is dit terselfdertyd nodig dat akademici uit die Derde Wêreld hulle binne die diskoers laat geld deur waardevolle bydrae tot die vooruitgang van die vakrigting as ’n geheel te lever en uit die periferie te tree deur die belangrikheid van die onderrig en verstaan van “teorie” te besef.
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Chapter 1

1.1 Problem statement

The world today is more complex than ever before in history. Rapid technological advances and the process of globalisation have changed the very nature of the way in which we view social, political and economic relations throughout the globe (Scholte, 2005). Terms such as regionalisation, internationalisation, globalisation, transmigration, transterritorial and supraterritorial are used in conjunction with constructs such as international human rights, international marketing, city-to-city diplomacy and multinational corporations to describe a world in which traditional notions of international connectivity are challenged with every technological innovation that makes movement and communication across borders more efficient, transcending even traditional notions of time and space.

Since its conception the disciplined study of International Relations (IR) has built on the thoughts of major Western political philosophers such as Kant and Rousseau who were perplexed by the complexities of conflict and peace, order and anarchy in their own communities, eventually helping to mould the world into the image we, as IR scholars, see today (Holsti, 1985). From the expansionist projects during the age of imperialism to the era of decolonisation and the end of the Cold War that ushered in the age of democratisation and the rapid increase of globalisation, more and more players have entered what has been referred to by Immanuel Wallerstein (1979) as the global capitalist economy with its international state system. Today, from such a perspective, the global system has grown to be a complex mix of both state and non-state actors, from non-governmental organisations to terrorist cells, from environmental groups to individual activists backed by money, fame and a popular cause. One could therefore expect that the very nature of the disciplined study of IR, and the interests of the distinguished theoreticians and writers of its history, would reflect
a constant effort towards expanding their/its understanding of the world so as to keep pace with the ever-expanding complexities of conflict and peace, order and anarchy within the international or global arena. As James and Wolfson (2003: 244) observe,

More than anything else the new millennium should encourage the field of International Relations to take a look at its trends in thinking and ask whether they seem appropriate in light of developments in the outside world.

It is surprising, then, that the past few years have seen a number of studies questioning the applicability of mainstream IR theories to the majority of the world, and arguing the neglect of the Third World¹, and Africa in particular, in mainstream IR theory (Croft, 1997: 607-608). While Karen Smith (2006) and William Brown (2006) agree that the criticism is well founded, they maintain that the critics, instead of challenging the discipline as a whole, direct their dissatisfaction more specifically at the dominance of neorealism and neoliberalism within mainstream IR. Both authors point out that there have been challenges to mainstream theories², such as constructivism, Neo-Marxism and critical theory, which have contributed to a better understanding of the developing world while also serving to establish more theoretical pluralism within the discipline. On the other hand, more radical critics, such as Stephanie Neumann (1998: 2), contend that, in spite of major global change, no new theoretical revolutions have occurred within the field of IR since the end of the Cold War that truly reflect the realities of our time, calling for major conceptual reform within the discipline. Finally, scholars such as Mohammed Ayoob (1998: 31), K.J Holsti (1998: 104), Donald Puchala (1998: 136) as well as Neumann, who themselves differ in opinion about the problem, find consensus in maintaining that the issue could rather be, more broadly, that mainstream IR theory is essentially “Western-

¹ “Third World” is a contentious term and there is much debate about the validity of its continued use in the post-Cold War arena. Chapter 2 further explores this concept in full and argues for its preferred and continued use in this thesis.
² According to Brown the criticism against the “mainstream” is more specifically directed towards the dominant “neo-neo synthesis”, not taking into account the developments of critical theories that attempt to challenge its hegemony. This thesis maintains a similar perspective.
centric”. Dominant theories are said to have originated in a European context, finding their feet in the academic institutions of the United States and based almost exclusively on what happens or happened in the West (Neumann, 1998: 1-2). Such critics of mainstream theories agree that if the published record could be used as any measure, “then most IR theorists believe that studying the Western experience alone is empirically sufficient to establish general laws of individual, group or state behaviour irrespective of point in time or the geographic location” (Neumann, 1998: 2).

Above we have a problem and three differing perspectives as to its roots. The problem would be that the study of International Relations, whose very basis of existence makes claims towards universality and international applicability, is seen by some to push pertinent issues relating to the majority of the world’s population to the periphery of its enquiry, its theories thus not able to fully grasp the complexities of the majority of the world’s people and the states, nations or groups that they fall under.

The first two perspectives place their focus more on the battle lines between existing theories within the discipline and can thus be seen as an extension of the “third debate” between “rationalism” and “reflectivism” (Smith, 2000). The first perspective is fairly moderate in maintaining that the problem lies not within the discipline of IR as a whole, but rather with the unfettered theoretical domination of it by neorealism, neoliberalism and their specific methodological and epistemological assumptions. It is argued that, given the chance, there exist a few mainstream perspectives that are able to address problematic issues, thus calling for more theoretical pluralism within the discipline opposed to this theoretical hegemony. Yet if this were the case, would there really be a cry for more attention? If it is argued that the relevant issues pertaining to the majority of the world within international politics and academia have been excluded from most IR literature (Ayoob, 1998: 17; Neumann, 1998: 2; Zhang, 2002: 107-108; Wang, in Zhang, 2002: 106), then would it not be enough to rap the discipline of
IR, in its current state, over the knuckles with a ruler and send it home to reflect on what is truly going on in the world? Or could it be that the current paradigm underlying all areas of understanding within the discipline should be the issue that merits attention?

This last question is closer to the more radical view conveyed by Neumann in the second perspective. She calls for conceptual reform, seeing the problem rather as being that the discipline as a whole has not moved conceptually beyond the Cold War. Yet where will this paradigm shift come from? Can one truly say that the global paradigm in which we live in has undergone a major polar shift rendering all knowledge accumulated thus far obsolete and erroneous?

The debates about the applicability of traditional IR theory to the Third World, and Africa in particular, and the criticisms that are directed towards the dominant strain, at one level seem to call, according to William Brown\(^3\) (2006: 122), for “a refined conceptual basis for IR theories, which rethought the concepts of the state, sovereignty, anarchy and the international, and which could produce models of international order based on the different assumptions which are more flexible and historically open”. On another level, however, the criticisms seem to imply that the direction forward entails the formulation of new IR theories that are more applicable to the realities within the marginalised majority of the world which is generally referred to as the Third World. In reaction to “Africanist”\(^4\) writers such as Kevin Dunn and Tim Shaw, Brown (2006) warns of falling into the trap of essentialising both African and European or Western histories. The portrayal of Europe as essentially in accord with received theories and arguing an African reality which is essentially different serve to exoticise Africa, only

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\(^3\) In his article William Brown (2006) directs his criticism more specifically at Neumann (1998) and her fellow contributors in *International Relations Theory and the Third World* as well as those he terms “Africanists”, such as the contributors to Kevin Dunn and Peter M. Shaw’s *Africa’s Challenge to International Relations Theory*.

\(^4\) William Brown uses this generalised term to refer to critics from outside of Africa as well as those within it who agree on certain difficulties that mainstream IR theory faces when applied to Africa. Brown, however, does concede that not all researchers on Africa fall into this group and that although this is not the most appropriate term to group such critics together, it makes itself useful when considering a shared view found amongst such thinkers and critics.
widening the rift between the IR mainstream and “Africanist” writings. The South African scholar Karen Smith (2006), herself from a developing country, states that although the criticism of the current state of the discipline remains well founded in its perception that topical issues pertinent to the majority of the world are pushed to the peripheries, “it is nevertheless limited in its impact as it still frames the global South in a dependent position”. Thus it is concluded that what is lacking in IR theory is not just the need for building on existing theories or formulating new perspectives in understanding the situation of the majority of the world, but actual IR theories coming from the Third World that “constitute valuable contributions to advancing the field of IR in general”.

Yet where are these theoretical contributions? Why does it seem at face value that there are no theories or contributions being extended from the Third World that constitute “valuable contributions” to advancing the field of IR, or rather, where is the Third World academic in the process of IR theory construction? This brings us to the crux of the enquiry of this thesis. Could the exclusion of topical issues pertinent to the majority of the world not exactly lie in the dependency of the Third World on the First World for the construction of knowledge?

Although the final perspective can also be considered an extension of the “third debate”, rather than focusing on the inadequacies of specific theories, it speaks instead of a broader issue that has received scant consideration within IR but has gained much attention within other areas of the social sciences such as comparative education (Altbach, Selvaratnam, Stanfield) and literature studies (Spivak, Rajan), namely the “Western-centric” nature of the social sciences as a whole and the hegemonic domination of knowledge production by the West. From such a perspective IR theory is considered to be a one-sided, “Western-centric” exercise that establishes general/universal laws built on the study of the international from a specific perspective, from within a particular part of the globe, and from a particular context which are then asymmetrically exported to the peripheries for application.
It has been proposed that “at worst … [traditional IR theory] … participates in an exercise of neo-colonial theoretical hegemony…” (Brown, 2006: 119). The dominance of Anglo-American theory building in the discipline of IR was already revealed in the 1970s by Stanley Hoffman’s essay on IR as “An American Social Science” (Hoffman, 1977: 41-60). Referring to academic representation in the discipline of IR, K.J. Holsti, in 1985, agreed that the discipline was dominated by a British-American condominium of authorship, proposing furthermore, with the later support of authors such as Ole Waever (1998) and Steve Smith (2000), that there exists a US hegemony over the entire discipline. Addressing the Australian IR community, the UK academic Steve Smith (2000: 1) asks the question, “to what extent does the picture of the dominance of the US IR community resonate with the situation facing Australian IR, does Australian political science face the same dominance from US political science?”

This question is not only of great importance to all IR communities in general but even more pertinent to those scholars that find themselves to be, not only residentially on the periphery of global affairs, but on the periphery of knowledge production within their specific field of study, and to those scholars who are attempting to enter a so-called international discourse that has thus far been dominated by voices coming from the two North Atlantic schools of IR.

In this thesis I propose the hypothesis that one of the greatest problems that IR faces in understanding issues pertaining to the majority of the world is the dominance of it by a hierarchal structure of knowledge production that favours the perspectives of a few core academic communities within the discipline. To my mind, it would seem that knowledge production within the discipline is dominated by these communities while their perspectives are diffused and applied across the globe, in many instances to contexts that are far removed from the “ivory towers” from whence they came. This is an issue to which many other disciplines
within the social sciences have given attention but to which IR seems to have turned somewhat of a blind eye.

According to Mohammed Ayoob (1998:17), IR theories may be used as lenses to view, understand, structure or construct reality. These theories, in themselves constructs stemming from previous notions of reality, further reproduce and perpetuate images of reality on which analysts and policymakers base their prescriptions, decisions and policies. Consequently, for IR as a powerful academic practice that constructs knowledge based on the interactions of international players to be as objective as possible, should contributions to the construction of this knowledge not reflect the diversity of global activity? It is thus that I repeat the question, “Where is the Third World academic in the process of International Relations Theory construction?”

1.2 Rationale

Although this thesis serves to complement the general critiques on mainstream IR theories, it does agree with William Brown and Karen Smith that some existent theories within the mainstream of IR can be considered helpful in dealing with the Third World. This will be elaborated on in the theoretical framework under section 1.7. More broadly, this thesis wishes to move beyond the piecemeal focus on the specific inadequacies of certain “Western-centric” theories and rather focus on the role that knowledge, knowledge production and higher education play in perpetuating the marginalisation of the realities of the majority of the world within IR theory.

When referring to economic development in the global South, Shridath Ramphal (1979: 189-190) explains that self-reliance should underpin an action-oriented strategy of development within the Third World. Self-reliant development, according to Ramphal, is based “not on what the world can do for us, but on what we can do for ourselves”. Furthermore, the fate of the poor in rich countries as
well as the fate of poor countries is, according to Ramphal (1979: 190), “inextricably intertwined; but wider still, that for the North and South there is a mutuality of interest in changes”.

The following comments by Ramphal (1979: 194-193) on the future role of the university within the First World and the Third World date back to 1979, but they are equally relevant today:

The point I am groping towards is that international co-operation for development is so all-encompassing in terms of the quality of human life worldwide, that our Universities would be irrelevant to our times were they not to perceive and develop a role of substance and practicality in relation to it, and to its central question of securing a more stable, just, and habitable planet. 'The new word for peace is development', said Pope Paul VI in his fifth encyclical. The role of the Universities cannot begin to be developed with any measure of relevance and significance unless international co-operation for development is itself acknowledged in these fundamentalist terms.

Reflecting on the statement by Ramphal, one can connect the ideas of self-reliance, cooperation and interconnectedness to the role that IR theory, as academic practice, has played in history and should play in the future as it serves, as Ayoob (1998: 17) maintains, to further reproduce and perpetuate images of reality on which analysts and policymakers base their prescriptions, decisions and policies. Steve Smith (2002: 233) states that “the way the profession remains strangely quiet, almost silenced … makes this a particularly relevant time to enquire into the links between theory and practice”.

If the majority of the world's voices have been excluded from the debates that have formed the discipline of International Relations and those concepts which the discipline maintains to be universal, then it is self-evident that the most prominent voices in the discipline must act responsibly in being self-reflexive by reflecting on the history of how the discipline has developed and its role in a world ever more interconnected by the processes of globalisation. On the other
hand, if there is no voice coming from the academic periphery constituting valuable contributions to advancing the field of IR in general, then the “other” will remain silenced, excluded from the dialogue, and the project for a more inclusive, global discipline of IR will be doomed to fail. Thus a case must be made for the importance of teaching and understanding of pure theory within the Third World, and within IR in particular, that can inform the intellectual breadth and maturity of future practitioners and not merely educate students in the policy relevance of the day (Guzzini, 2001: 98).

1.3 Research aims

This thesis builds on the foundation of existing critiques directed at mainstream IR theory and its scholarly neglect of those issues that are most pertinent to the majority of the world, and expands on the view that one of the main contributing problems to this dilemma is the “Western-centric” nature of the discipline. The question posed is, “Where is the Third World academic in the process of International Relations Theory construction?”. It is my hypothesis that the marginalisation of the issues pertaining to the majority of the world within mainstream IR is partly due to the lack of representation of Third World academics, who find themselves on the periphery of knowledge production in the discipline with their specific and contextual perspectives thus excluded from its canon.

Aims:

- The main aim of this thesis is to explore the representation of “Third World academics” within the mainstream of the discipline of International Relations theory.

- A preliminary step and secondary aim is to explore generalised concepts such as Third World, developing world, South and periphery in order to
make a case for the continued importance of the term Third World in the post-Cold War arena and conceptualise the “Third World academic” as it is used throughout the thesis.

- The final aim is to illustrate why it is important to work towards more equal representation of scholarly input within the mainstream of the discipline by starting to bridge the gap between academics from the Third World and the First World in IR.

1.4 Chapter outline

The aim of the second chapter is to explore terms such as Third World, developing world, core/periphery and global South. It has been proposed that terms such as these, which have been used by critics of “traditional IR theory”, seem to still frame the global South in a dependent position and perpetuate the marginalisation of the majority of a diverse world into some seemingly homogenous imagined community. By focusing mainly on the “Third World”, this chapter will explore the relevance of such generalised terms of reference in the current world order, arguing for the continued relevance of the term Third World as analytical tool in the post-Cold War environment. Finally, it will be proposed that as there is a division between the affluent and dominant First World and the subordinate, poor and dependent Third World in international relations, so too there is a parallel between academics within the discipline of IR, introducing the term “Third World academic”.

The third chapter forms the backbone of the enquiry of this thesis. It asks the fundamental question, “Where is the Third World academic in the process of International Relations Theory construction?”. This section will examine the area of knowledge production within the discipline of IR itself. Building on the second chapter’s conceptualisation of the “Third World academic”, the aim is to argue that the problem posed in the introduction does not lie in the fact that all existing
IR approaches are devoid of understanding of the Third World (as some critics would maintain), but that a major constraint within the discipline lies, rather, in the area of knowledge production and its hierarchical structure that historically has favoured and continues to favour the “First World academic” and his/her specific perspective in the study of IR. The field of IR needs to be opened up to contributions from the Third World, yet these contributions in themselves need to “constitute valuable contributions to advancing the field of IR in general” (Smith, 2006).

The fourth chapter will ask the question, “Why is it important to include the Third World academic’s perspective in IR theory construction?”. The case will be made for the importance of teaching theory in general and specifically in the case of the discipline of IR in the Third World. Drawing on what Peter Finn understands as “theory” and Christopher McIntosh’s reading of Spivak’s paper “Responsibility” through the lens of IR scholar, the chapter will elaborate on the notion of responsible theory. It is easy to propose that an answer to the unequal representation of scholarly contribution lies in the dominant academic communities opening up the discourse to include those who have been marginalised on the disciplinary periphery. Yet how does this benefit the progression of the discipline as a whole? In my view, there needs to be a concerted effort coming from both sides of the divide to bridge the gap, thus an effort to build bridges between academic communities. Consequently, for the development of a truly global discipline that reflects the diversity of global interactions, it is necessary for academics from the Third World to establish themselves within the discourse. This can only be done by producing valuable contributions towards advancing the discipline as a whole.

Chapter five will be the final chapter and will act as a conclusion in which the thesis and its main points will be reflected on. The subject of this thesis falls into a broad discourse and one that is quite new, in my opinion, to the discipline of IR.
Therefore any firm conclusions and answers will rather come in the form of recommendations for further areas of study.

1.5. Limitations

The first obvious limitations of this study are those of time and length prescriptions. Owing to these limitations, the study focuses on one specific issue that is highlighted as problematic within the field of IR, namely the place of the Third World academic in theory construction and the debates that surround the exclusion of Third World perspectives and contributions of Third World academics from mainstream IR theory.

One of the main problems I have faced has been finding information that is directly related to my topic as it has received little or no attention, to my knowledge, within IR itself. My theme has led me through education journals, sociological journals and literary journals, leading me to believe that the topic of academic exclusion, although a pertinent issue and one that has been widely explored in the social sciences, has had little coverage within the disciplined study of IR. This can be seen as a limitation but as an opportunity as well, enabling me to bring something new to the table and contribute to knowledge creation.

Owing to language constraints, only work in English will be examined. Another limitation has been finding relevant sources from contributors in the Third World, especially directly related to IR. This clearly limits the comprehensiveness and representivity of the study. However, being self-reflexive and aware of the constraints will be an important part of the conclusion drawn about access to IR knowledge from the periphery, and the role existing hegemonic structures within knowledge production play in limiting contributions from the Third World.
Seeing myself as part of a community of Third World academics, I, too, have a personal history influenced by situations around me that help to construct my view on reality. I will have to be aware of my own limitations due to personal contamination as well as subconscious preferences for sources and viewpoints. Therefore it must be noted that any conclusions that the thesis arrive at could have been led in a certain direction as a result of prior socialisation, possibly closing off certain avenues that may have generated alternative enquiries, perspectives and conclusions.

1.6 Methodology

This thesis will take the form of an explorative study and the research will be conducted by means of an interpretive literature study involving a review of existing IR literature as well as other areas within the social sciences such as sociology and post-colonial writings, where possible focusing on non-Western contributions. The study will therefore, for the most part, be qualitative and explorative in nature, yet the third chapter will rely on some quantitative data from secondary sources which I will engage with both as primary and secondary material.

1.7 Theoretical framework

Although this thesis acts as a critique of the discipline of IR and the disciplinary practices that serve to exclude Third World academics from its discourse, it on the other hand must do this through attempting to enter into this discourse. I agree with William Brown’s argument that the Third World is not beyond the understanding of all existing theoretical frameworks. I furthermore do not believe that all academics within the First World sit around tables like colonial, metropolitan politicians planning the subjugation of inferior minds. On the contrary, it would seem that the call for a more inclusive discipline is coming exactly from the West, while Third World scholars wait for an answer to come
from those ranks as well. This thesis merely constitutes a critical enquiry into the practices of inclusion and exclusion in the process of knowledge production within the discipline of IR.

In a true celebration of theoretical pluralism, this thesis makes use of different critical theoretical perspectives as lenses when approaching its subject: constructivist as well as post-colonial perspectives are used in analysing the social construction of identities such as Third World/First World and the exclusion of an identified “other” within global affairs as well as academia (chapters two and four); a Gramscian Neo-Marxist approach is used in analysing the creation of a continued situation of domination of knowledge production within the social sciences (and IR in particular) by the West (chapter three). These critical approaches all use historical analysis as a key to understanding trends in the present. Therefore much of chapters two and three looks at historical developments. Chapter two explores the term Third World in history, while chapter three looks briefly at the historical development of IR as a discipline against the background of the domination of the construction of knowledge within the social sciences by the West.
Chapter 2

There is no gap so wide as that between those who seek to change the Third World and those who seek to understand it (Clapham, 1986: 427).

2.1 Introduction

The very process of theory-building involves generalising from historical experience and the specific, and this has to be done today in the context of an “increasingly interdependent global system” (Giddens, 1990: 16). Although Brown contends that “Africanists” fall into the trap of essentialising histories, generalisation is an important part of theorising in our current scientific paradigm, especially in the vast and complex arena of International Studies. It is, however, imperative that generalised concepts be ever reflected on as they flow in and out of historical vogue.

Cedric Grant (1995: 567) states that “any discourse on equity in international relations that claims to emanate from a Third World perspective invites a question that has been recurrently posed: Does the Third World really exist?”. One of the main variables in this thesis is what one could term “the marginalised majority of the world”, or rather what has over the years interchangeably been referred to as the Third World, developing world, periphery and South. Although these names differ and seem to consist of different conceptual criteria, they do have one thing in common. They all equate with a negative pole, if you will, that exists in relation to its positive counterpart, the First World, developed world, core and North.
This thesis will favour the use of the term Third World above other terms when referring to the majority of the world’s population. When using broad generalisations freely within a study, it is necessary to explain who one is talking about and how it comes to be that they are grouped under the same concept. Owing to space constraints it will not be possible to look at each term in detail. Using the Third World as its basis, the chapter will later elaborate on the terms developing world, periphery and South, making a case for the preferred use of the Third World as an existing generalisation that still reflects the reality of marginalisation and inequality within the international arena. Finally, the subordinate position of the Third World in international political and economic affairs and its dependency on the powerful and affluent First World may be seen to extend itself to the academic profession in terms of the marginalisation of Third World scholars within the discipline of IR. The discipline of IR thus constitutes a microcosm of the global macrocosm, with inequalities on a global scale being reflected in the academic relations, practices and study of International Relations.

2.2 The Third World in history

According to post-colonial authors such as Robert J.C. Young (2003: 16), the Third World is the post-colonial world, illustrated by a picture of “children assembling at a school, standing barefoot on the stones”. The term Third World, as Young maintains, was originally derived from the model of the Third Estate of France before and during the French Revolution. The term arose during the Cold War, a period in world history when a bipolar power structure dominated world politics. The structure consisted of two opposing blocs of power, one led by the United States (the First World), the other led by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or USSR (the Second World). Within the bipolar structure the Third World represented the newly independent nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America that consisted of economically and technologically less developed states, not aligned to either bloc and generally with a shared history of colonisation (Young, 2003: 17; Cassen, 2005: n.p). Ingersoll (1991: 245)
explains that the term Third World was coined as a positive alternative for non-aligned nations. According to Ingersoll, the term has acquired a negative connotation as it has become a convenient political myth that, when examined empirically, can no longer be easily identified. An important characteristic of the term Third World, according to Tomlinson (2003: 311), is that its academic usage has declined in recent years. He explains that according to a keyword search of major library collections, at least 1 805 books have been published on the subject. Of these, 140 were published before 1975, 654 between 1975 and 1984, 755 between 1985 and 1994, and 169 between 1995 and 2001. In contrast, the use of the term globalisation, which he maintains is in some senses an antonym for the Third World, has increased. According to Tomlinson’s data the first three books with globalisation in their titles were published in 1988, whereas the first year in which there were more books published on globalisation than on the Third World was 1996. Between 1995 and 2001, 358 titles on globalisation appeared compared to 162 on the Third World (Tomlinson, 2003: 311).

Neil Macfarlane (1999: 18) notes that the concept of the Third World, especially in the post-Cold War era, is problematic as the definition of the term has always been controversial. While some argue that the concept has lost its relevance as a useful category in the examination of political and economic processes outside of North America and Europe, others contend that the term itself has served and still serves to put those states and societies to which it is applied in a disempowered position, thus forming part of “a discourse of dominance and oppression, disenfranchising and peripheralising these entities”. According to Tomlinson (2003: 307), although the term Third World was frequently used in explaining the histories of the societies, economies and cultures of the majority of the world in the second half of the twentieth century, it was never clear whether the term was a finite category of analysis, or merely served as a convenient and vague label for an imprecise collectivity of states and some of the common problems they faced at the time. Tomlinson equates the term Third World to terms such as Africa, the South, the developing world and the less-developed
world, contending that collective designations such as these rather centred on what such places were not, in contrast to what they were.

The rest of this chapter will explore different definitions associated with the term Third World. Authors such as Macfarlane, David, Tomlinson and Grant agree on the difficulty of the term but find aspects which, in their opinion, justify the grouping of states and societies under one designation. The chapter will examine the relevance of the term Third World in the post-Cold War context, thus attempting to establish if one could justify generalising when talking about the Third World. As has been mentioned, over the years numerous alternative terms have arisen to describe those states grouped under the term Third World, among them the “South” in a North-South dichotomy; the “periphery”, in a core-periphery juxtapositioning; and the “developing world”, in a developed-developing world dyad (Macfarlane, 1999: 18). Such terms will also be explored and compared to the use of the term Third World to further assess its relevance.

2.3 Third World: who am I?

According to Macfarlane (1999: 18), there is a wide array of meanings associated with the concept of the Third World as it has been traditionally used. One must note that different authors who use the concept of the Third World as explanatory framework differ in their many conceptualisations of the term, thus making the concept even more contentious. Macfarlane (1999: 18-20) mentions five conceptualisations of the Third World that may be differentiated, namely meanings related to: the process of colonisation and decolonisation; geography; peripherality in the world capitalist economy; the strength of the state and the relationship between the state and society; and psychological association, with membership of the Third World associated with self-identification.

Third World in which he includes all countries in the world except the United States, the European republics of the former Soviet Union, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the European states and the People’s Republic of China. Although he recognises the term Third World as problematic in the post-Cold War world on account of the fragmentation among the non-aligned states as well as high growth rates of some countries of the Third World, he maintains that there are enough similarities, such as being young states created by colonial powers, to justify considering them together. Macfarlane (1999: 18) argues that the problem with the concept of a generalised Third World derived from a notion of shared history and identity due to colonisation and decolonisation is, firstly, that the process of colonisation was in certain instances never complete, such as in the cases of Thailand, Ethiopia and Liberia that fall under the categorisation. Furthermore, some Western states, such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States, share such a history of having been colonies at one time, yet one would not normally consider them part of the Third World.

Secondly, the term Third World has in some instances had a geographical meaning, with the categorisation including those areas outside of Europe and North America, namely Asia, Africa and Latin America. The main problem with such a definition is that it includes Japan, which by other measures would be considered part of the “West” (Macfarlane, 1999: 18).

A third basis for a definition of the Third World is economic and concerns a subordinate status or, as dependency theorists and world systems proponents would maintain, peripherality in the world capitalist economy. According to Macfarlane (1999: 18), the first problem with such a basis for categorisation is that some Third World societies appear to be exiting the periphery and joining the core.
Hans-Henrik Holm (1990: 1-7) states that “the Third World as a concept describing a group of countries of comparable economic situation in the international system is allegedly no longer a valid label”. Using examples such as South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Mexico and Brazil, Holm explains that the increasing differentiation between countries within the international system renders “the flat categories ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries” useless. Moreover, increasing economic differences also reinforce the political differences among Third World countries. Jordaan (2003: 172) notes that emerging middle powers such as South Africa, Nigeria, Brazil, Argentina and Malaysia are economically powerful compared to countries in their immediate geographic vicinity as well as in most cases regionally dominant.

A second problem highlighted by Macfarlane (1999: 19) is that there exist reasonably well-defined peripheries within many Western states, as well as core-like areas within Third World states, thus making it difficult to define core and periphery in terms of collections of states and regions. Dreier (2006: 2) states that the sociologist Eric Klinenberg reveals, in his book *Heat wave: a social autopsy of disaster in Chicago*, how that city’s economic and social divisions were reflected in who died and who survived during a severe heat wave in July 1995. Klinenberg contends that the poor, people of colour and the elderly – those most likely to be socially isolated and without resources – were the most likely to die.

A fourth means of defining “Third Worldness” relates to the strength of the state as well as the nature and content of the relationship between state and society. Third World states are, according to Macfarlane (1999: 18), characterised by their weakness, thus a “lack of control over their territory and activities occurring within in it, their illegitimacy in the eyes of their citizens, the fragility of the rule of law, and the weakness of a shared idea of national community in ethnically heterogeneous and fractious societies”. Macfarlane states that the problem occurs when one compares states within the regions of the Third World, as they
vary considerably along all lines and axes when the above criteria for weakness are considered.

Brown (2006: 133) explains that, in Christopher Clapham’s terms, statehood may be a matter of “degree” rather than present or absent, while forms of states may vary as a result of different historical and social settings. Referring to state difference within Africa, Brown (2006: 135) points out that “for every Sierra Leone, Liberia and Somalia, there is a Botswana, Tanzania and Kenya”. According to Macfarlane (1999: 19), when one considers democratic legitimacy, examples in the Third World may vary from states where the idea simply does not exist, such as in the former Zaire, to ones with a long and healthy democratic tradition such as Costa Rica. States within the traditional Third World may furthermore include states characterised by great heterogeneity and a considerable weakness of the national idea, such as Nigeria and Sri Lanka; states that are more or less homogenous and with a reasonably strong national idea, such as Argentina; states in which society is heterogeneous but the national idea is relatively strong, such as Singapore; and finally, relatively homogenous societies where the national idea is weak, such as Turkmenistan.

In his article “Self-assertion in the Third World”, Anton Bebl er (1980: 370) uses the term Third World to designate over a hundred states, mostly in Africa, Asia and the Americas, and Oceania which: (1) as a rule are not industrially developed; (2) at least psychologically and politically, if not in fact economically, belong to the poor two-thirds of the world population; and (3) still have fairly fresh and politically relevant memory of domination by former imperial powers (mostly from Europe, the United States and Japan).

Bebler points out that since these countries differ greatly on salient factors such as size, resources, length of continuous indigenous statehood, age of political independence, level of social and economic development and wealth, social and
political order, to mention a few, they could only conditionally be treated as a single group. What stands out in terms of Bebler’s designation are the second and the third points that include psychological identification with the “poor two-thirds of the world” as well as a “politically relevant memory of domination”.

As Salmon Rushdie (quoted in Shukri, 2005: 201) writes in *Jaguar smile*:

> It was perhaps also true that those of us who did not have our origins in the countries of the mighty West, or North, have some things in common – not, certainly, anything as simplistic as a unified “Third World” outlook – but at least some knowledge of what weakness was like, some awareness of the view from underneath, and of how it felt to be there, at the bottom, looking up at the descending heel.

### 2.4 A “Third World” identity: mortar for the masses?

Macfarlane (1999: 19) favours a predominantly psychological approach to conceptualising the term Third World. Both Tomlinson (2003: 308) and Macfarlane (1999: 19-20) stress the importance of collective perception of a Third World consciousness formed by common ideas and an awareness of a common history involving peripheralisation and victimisation in relation to the West, “thus in some accounts the Third World has existed because it provided an identity that was important to those both inside and outside the borders” (Tomlinson, 2003: 308). Stets and Burke (2000: 224) maintain that in both social identity theory and identity theory, “the self is reflexive in that it can take itself as an object and can categorise, classify or name itself in particular ways in relation to other social categories or classifications”. The basis for social identity is in the uniformity of perception and actions among group members.

On the other side of the “perceptual coin”, as Macfarlane puts it, it is not only the process of self-definition that serves to create an identity, but also definition stemming from those outside of the group. Thus Macfarlane (1999: 20) states, “whether or not there were ‘objective’ attributes to the Third World, and whether
or not those residing outside of the West conceived of themselves as comprising a distinct identity, if relevant elites and publics in the West conceived of them in such terms and acted in part upon such conceptions, there would be a meaningful Third World identity.”

Attempting to explore what came first, self-identification or out-group definition, is like trying to grapple with the question, “what came first, the chicken or the egg?”. But by noting both aspects of identity formation one may explore how relevant such identities have been in the past and still could be in the post-Cold War world with the increasing influence of globalisation.

2.4.1 The Third World/South

It is noted by Tomlinson (2003:309) that the notion of a Third World stemmed from the Cold War rhetoric of the 1940s and 1950s. He recounts that the term was coined by the demographer and economic historian Alfred Sauvy, in an article entitled “Trois Mondes, Une Planète”, which appeared in the French socialist newspaper *L’Observateur* in 1952. Sauvy stressed the disempowerment of the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa, concluding, as Leslie Wolf-Phillips (1987: 1131-9) explains, that “the Third World has, like the Third Estate, been ignored and despised and it too wants to be something”. Thomas and Wilkin (2004: 242) contend that the term was used by those whom it designated in the immediate post-colonial period as a form of identity “for a self-defining group of mostly post-colonial states with relatively low per capita incomes”.

The Third World served as a collective identity behind which the newly independent states could organise through a variety of international organisations such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), to the Group of 77 (G-77 now

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5 Thomas and Wilkin (2004: 241) use the term Third World and South interchangeably to refer to a common unifying experience shared by the majority of countries and people, such as a lack of voice or say in global affairs and a vulnerability to external forces beyond their control. I use the same approach, equating the term South to a progression of the principle of the Third World in the post-Cold War context.
including China) to the United Nations General Assembly, thus constituting a positive meaning for members of this group as well as activists and analyst within these countries, who, as noted by Thomas and Wilkin (2004: 242), continue to rally behind it to this day with examples such as Third World Network and its publication as well as talk of “Third World Resurgence”. Holm (1990: 2) agrees, explaining that in the post-Cold War era the term Third World as theoretical construct has waned in relevance and rather retains its importance as a label that several countries still associate with themselves. The 128 countries that participate in the work of the Group of 77+China in the UN, according to Holm, have considered themselves to be members of the Third World. Included is the subgroup the NAM, which has been particularly important as it generally serves to set a stage where joint positions of the Third World are prepared and negotiated.

Grant (1995: 568-569) explains that, as the situation of a bipolar power structure with its two powerful opposing blocs started to wane, the NAM, apart from their political objectives, started to focus more on the economic difficulties of the Third World. The organisation attributed the difficulties primarily to the international economic system in which the Third World countries had to operate and which was, in their opinion, geared in every respect to the perpetuation and increase of advantages long enjoyed by the developed, industrial nations. The environment did not favour the rapid and equitable development of countries whose economies had been deprived and distorted by economic exploitation and periodic improvements in the international system did not fundamentally change the status of Third World countries, which remained poor, subordinate and powerless.

According to Thomas and Wilkin (2004: 242), “within orthodox IR theory the concept took on a marginal and secondary meaning and often had negative connotations.” Within the Cold War system that governed the post-colonial period, the concerns of the newly independent states as well as their citizens
were relegated to an inferior position below the geopolitical interests and power structures of the Eastern and Western blocs. Thus it came about that the Third World, rather than constituting a new force within global politics, was used to distinguish non-industrialised countries (including China) from the industrialised countries of Western Europe, North America, Japan and Australasia (First World) and the planned economies of the USSR and Eastern Europe (Second World). The term Third World (as well as terms that followed, such as the South) gained a dual identity, as most identities do, with a positive connotation for proponents of it within the “in-group” and a negative one for the “out-group” (the relevant publics and elites within the superpowers or later even those within the “in-group” who saw/see it as a “Western-centric” generalisation).

Although Macfarlane (1999: 19-20) favours a psychological approach to conceptualising the term, he explains that this approach, like the others discussed above, has been found to be problematic in the post-Cold War context. Concerning the variable of a shared perception of peripheralisation, Macfarlane states that peripheralisation and identification with it not only occurs outside of Western, developed states but within them as well. Furthermore, although this construct may have been valid for the regions of the Third World in the past, it is less obviously the case now, if one takes as example areas which are experiencing rapid economic development and integration into the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) world. Thomas and Wilkin (2004: 243) point out that increasing economic differentiation within the Third World, the end of the Cold War, the sensitivities of (often First World) analysts and the globalisation of poverty have brought forth an array of other terms, including developing countries (DCs), less-developed countries (LCDs), core/periphery duality, South and, most recently, global South.
2.4.2 The developing world

In their international edition of *Global marketing*, Keegan and Green (2005: 53-62) explain that although individual country markets are at different stages of economic development, the World Bank has developed a four-category system of classification based on per capita gross national product (GNP). Although the definition for each stage is described as arbitrary, countries within each classification, according to Keegan and Green, tend to show a few common characteristics. The World Bank classification differentiates between low-income (LIC) countries with a GNP per capita of less than $755, lower-middle-income countries (LMIC) with a GNP per capita of $755 to $2 995, upper-middle-income countries (UMIC) with a GNP per capita of more than $2 995 and less than $9 266, and high-income (HIC) countries with a GNP per capita equal to or greater than $9 266 (Keegan & Green, 2005: 55).

LICs constitute 40 percent of the world’s population, with the bottom ranks of this income category gaining the description of least-developed countries (LDCs). LICs are characterised by limited industrialisation, high percentages of populations engaged in agriculture and subsistence farming, high birth rates, low literacy rates, heavy reliance on foreign aid, and political instability, and are generally concentrated in Africa south of the Sahara. LMICs are described as developing countries along with the upper ranks of the LICs and the UMICs, and include economies such as China, Thailand and South Africa. UMICs are sometimes referred to as newly industrialising economies, including rapidly industrialising countries such as Malaysia, Brazil, Chile, Turkey and Hungary. HICs are also known as advanced, developed, industrialised or post-industrial societies (as Daniel Bell contends) and include countries such as the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Britain, Canada and Italy who comprise the Group of Seven (G-7, now including Russia to form the G-8). Kenichi Ohmae, in his 1985 book *Triad power*, maintained that Japan, Western Europe and the US formed a Triad representing the dominant economic centres of the world. Later
he expanded these original areas, with the Japanese leg including the whole Pacific region, the US leg including Canada and Mexico, and the European leg expanding eastward. Today nearly 75% of world income as measured by GNP is located within the Triad (Keegan & Green, 2005: 55-64).

It is clear to see that the developing world today is very heterogeneous, with countries such as Argentina, Chile, South Korea, Turkey and Mauritius ranked among the 60 better-off countries in the world with per capita incomes of $3 000 or higher, high primary and secondary school enrolment, life expectancies of higher than 60 years, and increasingly diversified economies. On the other hand, in most of the sub-Saharan region, where the average per capita income is less than $500, only two thirds of eligible children are in school and life expectancies are at 50 years and declining due to HIV/AIDS, while economies are still reliant on production and export of a few primary products (Lancaster, 2001: 654-655). The term developing world, although articulated within arbitrary economic terms, links the societies in a shared perception of material marginalisation in opposition to the high-income, developed countries that control most of the world economy.

2.4.3 Core/periphery duality

Wellhofer (1989: 342) explains that the core and the periphery have appeared in many different guises within the social sciences. He contends that, without exception, all scholars present cores as advantaged and peripheries as disadvantaged. In economic terms peripheries are poorly developed, primary and less diverse economies, with low technologies and high labour-intensive activities, having a lower standard of living and quality of life, and lacking technical capacity and capital goods. According to Lelia Green (n.d.: 167), the usefulness of the core/periphery theory lies within its basic focus on haves and have-nots. She states that “it addresses the issue that nations, communities, individuals are linked by relationships of power and dependency which vary according to the specific circumstances of the situation considered”. The
core/periphery duality involves oppositional distinctions between places and cultures within the periphery and the core. The core exploits the periphery, thus benefiting at its expense. Furthermore, within the duality of such identity there is a notion of otherness and self, with the self seen as positive compared to the negative connotation of the other.

Green’s understanding of Third World peripheralisation as well as a notion of identity formation due to self-perception and “out-group” definition is illustrated in the conceptualisation of what she terms homo informaticus (First World), characterised as urban, civilised, Christian, rational, astute, innovative, rich and generous compared to the homo incommunicaticus (Third World) who is rural, wild, emotional, gullible, unbelieving, traditional, poor and needy. According to Green (n.d. 168),

This duality is not offered as a ‘real’ explanation of difference between the first and the third worlds, but as a demonstration of how a periphery can be constructed in opposition to the core. Such a construction demonstrates the ignorance caused by economic bias – the third world receives scant attention from the first except as a potential market or as a recipient of aid. The information poor and information rich rarely communicate, so ignorance is perpetuated.

From this perspective the core/periphery duality not only constitutes a divide between countries, but within them as well. The effects of Hurricane Katrina on the inhabitants of New Orleans in the USA provide a good example of not only how peripheries within a country are more harshly affected in terms of human security issues and natural disasters, but of how the core relegates their needs and their voices to the peripheries of its policies. Pieter Dreier (2006: 2) is of the opinion that Katrina was not “an equal opportunity disaster”. He explains that the poorest neighbourhoods were hit hardest by the hurricane while the Bush administration assumed that people would evacuate the city on their own, not giving a thought to who these people were, what resources they had or where
they would go. New Orleans could be classified as constituting a periphery within the United States. Dreier (2006: 2-3) notes that

New Orleans is not only one of the country’s poorest cities, but also among the most ghettoized. Among the nation's 100 largest metro areas, it ranks third in poverty concentration…[while]…in 2000, 23% of the poor in metro New Orleans lived in high-poverty neighbourhoods (where at least 40% of the population live below the poverty line).

2.5 Globalising the Third World

Thomas and Wilkin (2004: 243) maintain that, at the core, terms such as the Third World, DCs, LDCs and South or global South reflect a common unifying experience shared by the majority of countries, such as a lack of voice or say in global affairs, a vulnerability to external forces beyond their control (e.g. commodity price fluctuations, G-8/World Bank/IMF decisions and capital movements) and human insecurity, that characterises the lives of their citizens. In the post-Cold War context these terms have not remained static, with many former Soviet countries having more in common with the Third World, such as a lack of voice or say in global affairs, and widespread human insecurity and poverty. According to Green (n.d. 166), a periphery can be constructed in opposition to a core in many ways and at different levels. As has been mentioned, when one considers the effects of Hurricane Katrina on the poorer population of New Orleans within the USA (First World), it is clear that the process of peripheralisation not only occurs between states, but within them as well.

Basing her approach on deconstructive philosophies and discourse analysis, Ann Game, according to Green (n.d. 162), “starts with the basic assumption that the social is written, that there is no extra-discursive ‘real’ outside cultural systems”. Green maintains that the way people perceive core/periphery issues creates the text which is analysed. In other words, there is no “real” core and periphery apart
from what is seen as such. In this way terms such as Third World, South, core and periphery, although with perceived different categorisations or differing in terms of context, on the other hand may serve as terms of self-identification, be it a shared perception of peripheralisation and victimisation due to (neo)imperialism, economic exploitation and marginalisation, or a shared feeling of fear and bitterness due to a lack of global voice in international affairs and a lack of control over external forces, or a shared lot due to human insecurity.

From the evidence gathered by Tomlinson that has been mentioned earlier, globalisation as a term has since the 1980s stepped into the limelight of academic theory, while pushing the term Third World to the proverbial periphery. Globalisation, a term just as contentious as the term Third World itself, is defined by Jan Aard Scholte (2005: 59-62) as “the spread of transplanetary - and in recent times also more particularly supraterritorial - connections between people”. Transplanetary is equated to the intensification of the traditional movement of people and information across territorial (geographic) boundaries such as those of states and provincial lines, while supraterritorial refers to the transformation of the traditional notions of social time and space in the wake of technological advances, transcending the traditional aspect of territorial geography and serving to connect a person on one side of the globe to a person on the other side of it in what can be termed “real” time. According to Scholte (2005: 59),

A global social relation is one that can link persons situated at any inhabitable points on the earth. Globalisation involves reductions of barriers to such transworld social contacts. With globalisation people become more able – physically, legally, linguistically, culturally and psychologically – to engage with each other wherever on planet Earth they might be.

There have been many arguments over whether globalisation has served to exacerbate global inequalities, for example in areas such as knowledge, technology and wealth, or whether the process may be considered as helping to
quell such trends, with the emergence of a global civil society and transnational social movements and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) such as Oxfam (Scholte, 2005: 33-34). The ongoing debate within globalisation theory is too vast to explore here, but what may be said is that, whether good or bad, globalisation has served to connect like-minded groups of people across the globe, providing that they have the relevant resources to gain access to these avenues of connectivity, be they in the First World or the Third World, in the South or the North, on the periphery or in the core. On a broader scale, globalisation has also served to intertwine the fates of many people across the globe, with issues such as global warming, natural disasters, poverty, global terrorism and crime as well as infectious diseases, to mention a few, becoming major global security concerns (Scholte, 2005: 279).

Although the term Third World has been gradually pushed from academic scrutiny by new interest areas, it could be argued that issues that surround the term and what it has become known to represent are still firmly rooted in the social minds of a growing global populace. Although the concept as academic area of study has, according to Tomlinson, waned, its footprint is set in the day-to-day use of terms such as developing world, South, global South and periphery. Although these terms may differ in definition, they have certain things in common that make them significant when one considers the future of the study of International Relations and its main concerns: conflict and peace, order and anarchy.

Writers such as Neumann (1998), Thomas and Wilkin (2004) and Holsti (1998) maintain that the majority of people on the globe fall under the designation of the terms Third World, developing world, South and periphery. As argued earlier, terms such as these have not only found their creation and continuity by means of out-group definition, but in the fire of the identity-forming tool of self-identification. In a globalised world, terms of identification may be seen to transcend their geographic restraints and with increased connectivity, form
concepts such as “global South” for the majority of the world who do not share in the profits of global “progress” to rally behind, be they states or other global actors.

### 2.6 Conclusion

Thomas and Wilkin (2004: 119) use the terms Third World and South interchangeably to refer to a common, unifying experience shared by the majority of countries and people of the world. This thesis approaches these concepts in the same way. It could be argued that the process of globalisation could intensify such a shared feeling due to increased connectivity. Carol Lancaster (2001: 653) states:

> Globalisation offers many potential benefits to developing countries. At the same time, it carries potential costs in terms of economic volatility and recession and of increasing income inequalities (both within and among countries) that, combined with greatly improved access to information and arms, can fuel discontent and violence and create expanded commercial opportunities for criminals and warlords to finance their violence and looting by exporting valuable raw materials.

Issues associated with the Third World peoples are thus becoming more of a concern within the study of IR as these not only involve the majority of the world but intertwine the internal and external securities of the more affluent states/actors within the global system with those of the periphery.

When one reflects on this chapter, it may become clear that the construction of terms such as Third World reflect an ongoing problem within the Global Political Economy. The First World tends to be viewed as a positive pole of dominant, powerful and elite countries, while the Third World is put into a negative, inferior and dependent position. While the terms Third World, developing world, periphery and South may have this in common, I believe Third World still to be
the most relevant term under which to group states that share an identity of marginalisation, dependency and inferiority within the global arena.

As far as the term South is concerned, the word itself places too much emphasis on a geographic location, thus including countries such as Australia and New Zealand that do not share Third World characteristics, and potentially obscuring the shared characteristics of Third World countries that are located in the Northern and Southern hemispheres. Grant (1995: 569) explains that the description of the development experience of Third World countries does not apply uniformly to all countries of the South, such as the newly industrialised countries (NICs) of South Korea and Singapore. Furthermore, according to Grant (1995: 569), “there has been no stampede from the NICs to disassociate themselves from the Third World, especially as the portals of the industrialised countries of the North have not been flung open to them”. From such a perspective “developing”, which refers to a country’s economic position in the global political economy, is also a weak term as it places certain countries that are otherwise still in a dependent position closer to the core and out of focus. The periphery is a broader term that refers to all countries (or people), even those on the semi-periphery, that fall outside of the core, and places them in a dependent position. On the other hand, it may also be used to explain a situation within a core country, such as has been mentioned in the case of New Orleans in the United States.

Although the Third World as a term has fallen out of vogue, it has several aspects that make it a more preferable term to use in this thesis. Firstly, it most strongly denotes a shared identity of marginalisation as reflected by the Group of 77+China and the NAM’s self-identification. According to Grant (1995: 569),

The NAM therefore encompasses countries whose political viewpoints often diverge, whose voting patterns place them on both sides of some political issues, and whose economies range from robust to weak, from promising to unpromising. Altogether the essential features of non-alignment are its positive stand for peace, its respect for
sovereignty, regardless of power or size and its belief in an economically just world which, by inference, means the rejection of relationships that involve sacrifice of the national interest by perpetuating injustice and inequality.

Secondly, it does not merely refer to economics or geography but reflects an all-encompassing negative pole in a First World/Third World dichotomy where the Third World is the negative, subordinate and dependent pole. Lastly, the term is so ingrained in history that it has become part of the consciousness, not only within the political realm of international interaction, but in the minds of ordinary people who still use it in everyday socialisation, not in academic dissertations or political and economic papers but in life as they know it.

This thesis thus agrees with Grant (1995: 569-570) when he states:

In my judgment, therefore, the transition from a bipolar world does not render NAM anachronistic; nor does it justify the removal of the concept of the Third World from among the tools for analysing international politics. On the contrary, the Third World, as an analytical concept, is likely to retain its usefulness so long as the world continues to be riven by serious economic and political disparities.

In the same vein as Neumann and her contributors, Thomas and Wilkin (2004: 241) place the Third World on the periphery of the International Relations discipline. They suggest that the Third World continues to figure largely on the margins of the field in the US and UK, and contend that “what lies largely behind this silence is the failure of the dominant theories of International Relations to engage with the global human condition on the basis of anything other than its impact on the G-8 …” (Thomas & Wilkin, 2004: 241) (emphasis in the original).

In the same way as the Third World is perceived to be pushed to the periphery of academic scrutiny in IR theory, so too there exists a Third World within the discipline of IR when one considers academic contribution. This is a generalisation, and thus the concept of a “Third World academic” placed on the
periphery of the discipline also lends itself to generalisation. I propose that, as in the above conceptualisation of the Third World, “Third World academics” can rally around a shared identity of marginalisation and lack of voice in the discipline they are working in. By not having the resources to produce knowledge, these scholars rather work at applying knowledge, serving as data providers to the academic core.

Owing to the cursory nature of this study and length prescriptions, issues such as academics who originally came from the Third World but live in the core and work at the leading institutions in their field and vice versa or the dominance of certain institutions within one country have been excluded, while I believe them still to be important for further research. The focus of this study will restrict itself to academics who do not residentially fall within the First World IR communities and who do not seem to contribute widely to the production of knowledge in the field.

This chapter attempted to make a case for the continued use of the term Third World when considering global inequalities. As mentioned before, many critics of traditional IR theory argue the neglect of the concerns of the majority of the world within the field, with the Third World being placed on the periphery of the discipline. In the same way as the Third World can be perceived to be on the periphery of global political activity as well as that of IR as a discipline, the following chapter proposes that “Third World academics” fall on the periphery of the global system of knowledge production in the social sciences, with IR in particular. By looking at the area of residence of contributors to major journals within the discipline of IR as well as the representation of specific areas of study in a few of the same major journals, a comparison can be made between the representation of authors of specific areas of residence and the focus on the study of specific issue areas that are pushed to the core of IR investigation.
Chapter 3

But, Why give me scholarship (if my worth is nil); Why rake my brain (if my thoughts are overlooked); Why endure a winter grim (if harder will I become)? Is the uplifting ended (with me unaware)? Has the march stopped (and I didn’t hear ‘halt’)? (Taban Lo Liyong, 1971:119-120).

3.1 Introduction

By focusing on the influence of international knowledge systems on higher education institutions, this chapter will attempt to answer the following question: “Where is the Third World academic in International Relations theory construction?” The chapter starts with a cursory analysis of the historical developments that led to the formation of a disciplined study of International Relations, hoping to enlighten the reader that the very roots of the discipline lie within the confines of Western thinking.

By comparing data accumulated by Thomas and Wilken on the dominant areas of study within major IR journals and Ole Waever’s data on the representation of contributors to leading IR journals, based on residence of author, one can start to deduce that the lack of representation of issues pertinent to the Third World goes hand in hand with the domination of major journal contributions by Western scholars, especially those from the US and UK.

Making use of the critical perspectives of Marxism (especially Gramsci’s hegemony), dependency theory and post-colonialism, the final section of the chapter will devote itself to situating the academic exclusion of perspectives from the Third World in IR within the broader context of the social sciences as dominated by Western science, favouring the production of knowledge in the West and its export and application in the Third World. In this light a distinction
can be made between the “Third World academic” and the “First World academic”, with the notion of a shared identity of marginalisation and subordination stemming from the hegemonic nature of the global system of knowledge production dominated by Western science, as one specific ethnoscience, forming a subordinated “Third World” within academia.

3.2 IR: Western construct, Western discipline?

In his paper “The discipline of International Relations: still an American Social Science?”, Steve Smith (2000) discusses the current trends within the discipline of IR in an attempt to draw a comparison between the UK and US IR communities. For the purpose of this thesis, what can be taken note of in this paper is not just that there remains a divide within the discipline of IR between proponents of different theoretical, epistemological and methodological assumptions, but furthermore that these “great debates” fall very much in the domain of scholars within the US and Europe (mostly the UK).

Smith (2000: 2) provides an overview of a discipline dominated by rationalism, especially in the United States. He discusses the two main historical approaches to the development of the discipline. The first appears in most textbooks and is based on a chronology of how the discipline developed, starting with the dominance of idealism in the inter-war years and its replacement by realism in the aftermath of World War II and, after a period of much debate from different approaches, the dominance of the discourse between neo-realism and neo-liberalism in the 1980s, leading to mainstream consensus in what Waever dubbed the “neo-neo synthesis” in the 1990s. The second approach discusses the “great debates” between competing theoretical positions: between idealism and realism in the 1930s, between traditionalism (realism) and behaviourism in the 1960s, between state-centric and transnationalist approaches in the 1970s, between three competing paradigms of realism, liberalism and Marxism in the
1980s, and finally, the latest debate between the “neo-neo synthesis” (rationalism) and a set of alternative approaches (reflectivism) after the 1990s.

In 1965 Hoffman wrote, “Whoever studies contemporary international relations cannot but hear, behind the clash of interests and ideologies, a kind of permanent dialogue between Rousseau and Kant” (quoted in Holsti, 1985: 15). Holsti (1985: 15) makes the observation that International Relations as an organised academic discipline is young compared to most areas of social enquiry, while on the other hand systematic thought regarding the activities of independent political units is much older, such as Thucydides’s generalisations about the behaviour of city states or Kautilya’s observations in *Arthashastra*, formulated to serve as advice to statesmen, transcending the critical issues of the times.

Holsti (1985: 15-16) explains that in the formative years of the European state system it was mostly philosophers who, in the context of their more general works, contemplated aspects of international relations. Within the volatile arena of state formation and power struggles political philosophers such as Rousseau and Kant devoted specific treatises to elaborating plans for peace. Most of the lasting work of the nineteenth century was a product of English philosophers, such as liberal descendants of Jeremy Bentham.

As specialists in international relations and law started finding institutional settings in universities and other foundations, enabling them to devote their full energies to the analysis of diplomatic affairs, so the discipline of International Relations started to take form, with the disciplinary roots of these specialists in history and law going hand in hand with familiarity with the works of Western political philosophers. In the two decades following World War I a series of debates about the appropriate forms of a discipline took place in reaction to the hyper-factual and preaching nature of general works in politics up to that point.
There was a growing awareness/consensus that the purpose of the study of IR should be to develop generalisations about patterns of behaviour and recurring phenomena, to emphasise that which was common to most nations, rather than unique events. As Holsti (1985: 16) explains,

By the 1940s, in short, English and American scholars had come to a position developed centuries previously. As seen in the works of E.H. Carr, Martin Wight, Hans Morgenthau and others, the new era of theoretical effort demonstrated clearly that the classical problematic of Grotius, Saint-Pierre, Hobbes, Rousseau and Kant still provided the framework around which analysis in the field should be organised.

Although the above brief discussion of the historical evolution of the discipline of IR by no means cracks the surface of actual, specific developments and the debates that surrounded its growth up to the situation that we see it in today, such as the impact of critical theory and the influence of inter-epistemic debates, the point is rather to take note of the origins of the discipline and its practices within the context of a specific Western setting of theorising. One could argue that it is therefore understandable that a discipline constituted of academics writing from a specific context in time and influenced by specific ideas of knowledge would evolve to a point that would seem to exclude the majority of the world. The problem is that the debates that founded a global disciplined study of IR and its perspectives of what good knowledge and proper theory are did not seem to include very many perspectives from outside of the West. Specific ideas on the practices that constitute good theory-building and good science were instead exported in an asymmetrical fashion to the peripheries whose academics, due to the dominance of Western science and a geographically specific ideation of IR, were socialised in accordance with such ideas yet never had the chance to enter the discussions to further establish the discipline as the world developed.
3.3 Is there no IR outside of the West?

In his article "Mirror, mirror on the wall, which theories are the fairest of all?", Holsti (1989: 255) explains that over the years the field of IR has borrowed extensively from the epistemological foundations of historians, natural scientists and various forms of positivism. He argues that due to the increasing complexity of the field itself, International Relations should/will be characterised by a multiplicity of theories, contending that “the search for a single authoritative theoretical or epistemological stance is likely to be harmful for the generation of reliable knowledge in the field”. Holsti (1989: 261) concludes that the field of IR is maturing because there is an increased recognition and acceptance of multiple realities, and thus multiple theories. Advocating theoretical pluralism, Holsti (1989: 261) states:

The other sources of theory are important, but in my view there is no foundation of theory superior to a keen understanding of the facts of international relations, past and present. For reasons stated here, we are indeed condemned – happily - to live a life of theoretical pluralism. If we keep our eyes on what is actually happening in the world and on the requirements of reliable knowledge (Singer, 1985: 245-262), we may be able to avoid the dangers of the replacement of syndrome, faddism, and extreme theoretical and methodological relativism – that is, of an intellectual life without standards.

Can the discipline of IR in its current state be as content as Holsti with happily living a life of theoretical pluralism? Does the celebration of pluralism not merely equate to giving the peasants cake while the root of the problem lies in the social structure that keeps them in a dependent and subordinate position?

When considering "what is actually happening in the world", Thomas and Wilkin (2004: 244-245) observe that the majority of populations of the globe, in contemporary times, are facing a complex human crisis characterised by multiple interconnections and reinforcements between different problems, such as
increasing economic marginalisation, global demographic trends, youthful population profiles in the South, technological divides, environmental problems and per capita availability of water and croplands. Furthermore, increased material deprivation can prompt conflict, resulting in direct and indirect human costs such as physical violence, small-arms proliferation, child soldiers and landmines, leading to further loss of food, shelter and livelihoods.

Investigating the extent to which mainstream IR scholarship engages with issues such as these, Thomas and Wilkin (2004: 245) conducted a very cursory analysis of the topics covered in five leading IR journals from January 1998 to November 2003 – *International Organisation, Foreign Policy, International Studies Quarterly, International Affairs* and *Review of International Studies* – attempting to illustrate the current focus of research and interest. The results of their analysis are reflected in Table 1 below.

**Table 1. Topics covered in leading IR journals**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>IO</th>
<th>FP</th>
<th>ISQ</th>
<th>IA</th>
<th>RIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identity/religion/culture</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment/agriculture</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IO: *International Organisation*  
RIS: *Review of International Studies*  
FP: *Foreign Policy*  
IA: *International Affairs*  
ISQ: *International Studies Quarterly*

(Source: Thomas and Wilkin, 2004: 245)
The two authors argue that interest areas pertaining to the Third World receive attention only when considered important to the dominant powers within global affairs. Thus a focus on Third World security issues stems from perceived threats to the North’s security such as terrorism, migration and drug trafficking or a reflection of Northern interests such as natural resources and regime stability, rather than from a concern to understand issues that matter to people on the periphery such as poverty, identity, voice, livelihoods, under- and unemployment, inequality, and violence in its many forms. With regard to governance it would seem, according to Thomas and Wilkin, that the interest is rooted in analysing corruption, failed and rogue states, crime, the progress of embedding liberal democracy, private property rights, public-private partnerships, and so on instead of possible alternative focus areas such as the undemocratic and increasingly co-ordinated nature of global governance via the G8/WTO/IMF/World Bank, the deepening role of the private sector in global public policy, corporate governance, and the need to encourage locally appropriate forms of representation. Moreover, economic interests, rather than addressing issues of global poverty and possible remedies, revolve around matters of perceived potential threats to Northern economies, such as financial crises, with most attention being given to East Asia, leading to an imbalance of regional coverage (Thomas & Wilkin: 2004: 245-246).

The evidence above supports the claims of those critics of mainstream theories who agree that if the published record could be used as any measure, “then most IR theorists believe that studying the Western experience alone is empirically sufficient to establish general laws of individual, group or state behaviour irrespective of point in time or the geographic location” (Neumann, 1998: 2). The question thus arises: how was it constructed that the Western experience came to be perceived as sufficient to establish what is seen as scientifically universal theories that help to explain conflict and peace, order and anarchy in an international system?
The development of IR as a discipline has already earlier been placed within the context of a Western upbringing, yet does this truly reflect a discipline dominated by a Western voice? In his survey of the discipline, Holsti (1985: 102-103) came to the following conclusion:

None of the major fields in the theoretical physical sciences is dominated by the investigations of only two countries. Hierarchy, however, seems to be a hallmark of international politics and theory. Most of the mutually acknowledged literature has been produced by scholars from only two of more than 155 countries: the United States and Great Britain. There is, in brief, a British-American intellectual condominium.

Holsti’s observation from 1985 illustrates well one of the overarching reasons why the Third World fails to register significantly in mainstream IR theory. Making use of IR textbook contributions, he looked in detail at the discipline in eight countries, concluding that most of the mutually acknowledged literature had been produced by scholars from only two of more than 155 countries, namely the United States and Britain. Holsti’s data furthermore paints a picture of US domination of the condominium. In his survey of texts, it was found that only 11,1% of references were to British scholars, compared with 74,1% to US scholars. On the basis of his findings he concludes that there is a “reliance solely on Americans to produce the new insights, theoretical formulations, paradigms, and data sets of our fields … the trends operating in the direction of greater concentration” (Holsti, 1985: 128).

In the article “The sociology of a not so international discipline: American and European developments in International Relations”, Ole Waever (1998: 686-727) explores disciplinary developments within the IR communities in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany and France in an attempt to discover why IR could be considered to be dominated by the ideas and theories stemming from the American school. What stands out in this article, for someone looking through a “Third World academic” lens, is the fact that Waever consistently talks around
the question of whether IR could be considered a global discipline, yet he focuses only on the US and European influences on the disciplinary developments. Where does the rest of the world figure in a “global IR”?

Waever (1998: 687) does ask this question, and briefly shrugs it off by stating:

Some surveys claim that not much research is to be found elsewhere – the next largest community is the Japanese, which produces very little theory in general and much less that is not based on American inspiration. The most obvious candidate for an independent IR tradition based on a unique philosophical tradition is China, though very little independent theorising has taken place. Even a sympathetic pro-non-Western observer like Stephen Chan concludes that for the most of the non-Western world strategic studies overshadows IR theory.

Waever (1998: 697) contends that when one explores patterns in IR, three types of sources can be examined, namely textbooks, curricula and journals. According to him journals are the most direct measure of the discipline itself and can be considered as the crucial institution of modern sciences. Consequently, to get an overview of representation within the discipline, journals are the richest source of information. Waever compares the distribution of authors’ country of residence within the eight most influential journals in North America and Europe.

According to Waever’s (1998: 698-699) findings, in all four North American journals, between the period 1970-1995, Americans accounted for between 66% and 100% of the authors, at an average of 88,1%. The European journals exhibited a more balanced relationship, with Americans and Britons equally represented at more or less 40% in The Review of International Studies and Millennium, and with Americans and “the rest of Europe” (mostly Scandinavians) equally represented at about 40% in the Journal of Peace Research. What can be deducted, offhand, is that, not only is the discipline dominated by authors from the US and Europe (in most respects British and then Scandinavian), but the US furthermore maintains a hegemonic hold on the discipline, with the European
community more open to scholarship from abroad, yet in most cases contributions again mostly stem from the US.

Yet what does Waever’s analysis reflect concerning the representation of the “rest of the world”? In all respects it does not show much, but rather says a whole lot more about the representation of the majority of the world’s voices and thus of their interests within the field. Although there is definitely transatlantic cooperation concerning contributions to the leading IR journals (with the US enjoying broader representation), there is definitely not equal representation concerning IR as a global discipline. Waever’s findings are summarised in Table 2 below.

**Table 2. Distribution of authors by geographic residence in American and European journals, 1970-95**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Journal/Origin</th>
<th>North America (%)</th>
<th>British (%)</th>
<th>Rest of Europe (%)</th>
<th>Rest of world (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>IO</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>ISQ</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>88.5</td>
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<td>7.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>IS</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>68.75</td>
<td>18.75</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>WP</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>RIS</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When comparing the theoretical positions of articles in four leading IR journals (two from the US and two European), Waever (1998: 702-703) explains that the two European journals are published in Europe, mainly edited by Europeans, refereed by Europeans and thus partly reflecting, partly constituting the definition of what is “good IR” in Europe. The two North American journals, published in America, edited mainly by Americans, refereed mainly by Americans and furthermore written predominantly by Americans, show a different profile, thus a different ideal of IR scholarship. Waever contends that there is one IR discipline with much transatlantic publishing taking place, yet theories are produced mainly in the US. Furthermore, meta-theoretical orientations differ between the two sides of the Atlantic, with US interest directed towards rational choice approaches,

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while European orientation points towards an interest in constructivism and post-modernism (reflectivism).

The above observations published by Waever in 1998 thus support Holsti’s observation from 1985 that there is a British-American intellectual condominium within the field of IR, and furthermore indicate that this relationship is dominated by the US contingent in terms of publishing and theory-building. Waever points out that Americans who publish in European journals are more rationalist than Europeans, yet more reflectivist than the American mainstream. Thus, although there is a pluralism of theoretical approaches, as celebrated by Holsti in 1989, each IR community differs in what is considered “good IR”. Accordingly, to gain access to these communities and their leading institutions one should preferably reside within their geographic location (with the US constituting a more closed community), yet, more importantly, build ideas on certain theoretical assumptions understood as ideal for “good IR” scholarship within each geographic location, in accordance with standards generally set by elites within those academic communities (Waever, 1998: 702-703).

According to Smith (2000: 14), an obvious result of the dependence on US IR is that certain kinds of theories, insights, paradigms and data sets dominate the IR literature. A 1984 survey by Alker and Biersteker (quoted in Smith, 2000: 14) revealed that the US literature is concentrated in one kind of methodology and in one kind of theory. In the case of methodology, findings were that 70% of the literature was behavioural, slightly over 20% was traditional and less than 10% dialectical. A similar concentration was clear in the case of ontological practices. Of the behavioural literature, 72% was neo-realist and 82% of traditional literature was realist. In Smith’s view (2000: 14), “the implication of these findings is that the discipline was then (and still is I would argue) both parochial in the US and was focused on a specific methodology and ontology”. Therefore, in terms of Smith’s observation, not only did US theory dominate IR, but so did the specific
US commitment to a realist/neo-realist view of the world, and a commitment to studying the world behaviourally.

From the above findings it should be clear that perspectives, be they academic or otherwise, within the discipline of IR are dominated by a few core academic communities, who within themselves are dominated by a few core theoretical communities. But what does this tell us about the marginalisation of certain areas of study more pertinent to the populations who find themselves outside of the core?

Waever and Thomas and Wilkin use three journals in common to collect their data, namely IO, ISQ and RIS. When one compares their respective enquiries and data, it becomes clear that not only do American and European (mostly British) authors gain the most representation and coverage when it comes to publishing in leading journals, these authors, according to Thomas and Wilkin’s data, also generally focus on specific issue areas that are of interest to the societies of the broader geographic locations wherein they preside. Furthermore, the fact that each community seems to have their own prescriptions as to what “good IR” is, also seems to pertain to what is considered to be important areas of interest when conducting research and publishing findings. If journals, as Merton and Whitley (quoted in Waever, 1998: 697) maintain, are to be considered the crucial institution of modern science, serving as representation of the field for practitioners, then the dominance of a British-American intellectual condominium serves to set the standards of what are “good IR” and publishable areas of interest for practitioners across the globe.

Writing from the perspective of the US hegemony of the discipline, Steve Smith (2000: 18) concludes:

In my view IR remains a US social science both in terms of the policy agenda that US IR exports to the world in the name of relevant theory, and in terms of the dominant
(and often implicit) epistemological and methodological assumptions contained in that theory … The US IR community dominates the study of the subject through its sheer size and its role in producing theory … As the evidence of Holsti, Alker and Biersteker, and Waever shows, the US continues to be hegemonic in the discipline, just as the US is hegemonic in the international political and economic system. Ontologically, the literature tends to operate in the space defined by rationalism, and epistemologically it is empiricist and methodologically it is positivist. Together these define ‘proper’ social science and thereby serve as gatekeepers for what counts as legitimate scholarship.

3.4 On the periphery of knowledge production: the Third World University?

For the purpose of this thesis, what is evident from Smith’s (2000) article is not just that there remains a divide within the discipline of IR between proponents of different theoretical, epistemological and methodological assumptions, but furthermore that these great debates fall very much in the domain of scholars within the US and Europe, more specifically the United Kingdom. Thus this domination also reflects the domination of specific theoretical, epistemological and methodological assumptions about what constitutes “good IR”

Addressing the Australian IR community, Smith (2000: 1) asks, “to what extent does the picture of the dominance of the US IR community resonate with the situation facing Australian IR, does Australian political science face the same dominance from US political science?”. Should this question not be extended to the rest of the world’s IR communities as well? It could be argued that “Third World academics” should feel this effect maybe even more than those within “First World academic” communities such as England and Australia, with greater resources than those within the Third World.

As has been noted above, IR as a discipline consists of a hierarchy of academic influence. When one compares the areas of residence of published authors in leading IR journals, it would seem that a structure consists of a European-
American domination of the field, in which the US appears to preside as the hegemonic force in the relationship, while the rest of the world tends to figure on the periphery of disciplinary contribution. The Third World experience of relevant IR issue areas as well as Third World academic representation seems to be firmly set on the periphery of the discipline of IR theory and at the bottom of a distinct hierarchy.

Although some authors such as Groom and Mandaville (in Jorgenson, 2003: 333) suggest that “hegemony” could be a misleading term for the current state of affairs, one only needs to look at cited names such as Jorgenson (2003), Neumann (1999), Holsti (1985), Waever (1998) and Smith (2000) to note that this current debate still occurs within the core, with relative silence from the periphery. For example, the American scholar Anne Tickner talks on behalf of the Third World IR community in her two articles “Seeing IR differently: notes from the Third World” (2003a) and “Hearing Latin American voices in International Relations Studies” (2003b) while another American, Kevin Dunn, along with colleague Peter Shaw, approaches *Africa’s challenge to International Relations Theory* (2001). The great debates among contesting theoretical and methodological views as well as those about the state of the discipline seem to be centred within the discourse between Europe and the United States, with the most prominent scholars within these geographic locations debating the parameters of “good social science” and “good IR theory”. While debates rage between the metropolitan scholars, the scholars on the periphery appear to be mostly silent. The question remains as to how such a situation has been created as well as maintained. For a possible answer to this we must look further than just IR as a discipline and briefly explore the development of the broad category of social sciences.

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7 In defence of this edited book one should mention that it does include perspectives from both First World- and Third World-based academics, including Janis van der Westhuizen of the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa, as well as Larry Swatuk of the University of Botswana’s Harry Oppenheimer Okavango Research Centre.
Although there seems to be a celebration of different theories across the social sciences and a maturing of the field of IR, Doreen Musson (2006: 44) quotes Bell Hooks in stating:

In the post-modern world there is an unprecedented support among scholars and intellectuals for the inclusion of ‘the other’ in theory. Yes! Everyone seems to be clamouring for ‘difference’, only too few seem to want any difference that is about changing policy or that supports active engagement and struggle (another no-no word) … Too often it seems the point is to promote the appearance of difference within intellectual discourse, a ‘celebration’ that fails to ask who is sponsoring the party and who is extending the invitations. For who is controlling the new discourse? Who is getting hired to teach it, and where? Who is getting paid to write about it?

3.4.1 Hegemony, neocolonialism and the dominance of one “ethnoscience”

Up to now we have talked about the dominance of certain core communities and ideas within the discipline of IR. These dominant communities have not only helped shape the discipline of IR and its practices as a whole but have served to elevate the study of specific issue areas that are of greater interest to the broader core communities from whence they come. If IR theories are, according to Ayoob (1998: 17), images of reality on which analysts and policymakers base their prescriptions, decisions and policies, how does the dominance of core communities within the world of ideas and knowledge construction correspond to the global disparities of power and privilege between the First World and the Third World?

In Karl Marx’s view of a world dominated by class conflict, “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas” (Parmar, 2007: 4). As this thesis makes its subject the domination of a few elite voices and the subordination of the majority of voices within a certain social setting, in our case the discipline of IR, ideas stemming from critical IR theories may be most helpful in framing an
understanding of such a situation. By making use of critical theory, especially Neo-Marxism and its derivatives, mainly Antonio Gramsci’s ideas on hegemony as well as post-colonialism, this section will attempt to place the “Western-centric” domination of knowledge production in IR within the broader context of the diffusion of ideas within the social sciences as a whole.

Critical International Relations theory draws from Antonio Gramsci’s work on the construction of societal compromises in early twentieth-century capitalist societies, in order to explore the relative stability and potential for change across different historical periods (Mundy, 1998: 451). In an attempt to explain Western capitalism’s relative resistance to revolution, Antonio Gramsci made a radical departure from orthodox Marxism by noting that there existed important protective layers of pro-bourgeois culture ideology, values and institutions that had played a powerful role in shaping the minds of the masses in favour of the status quo and against violent revolution. By locating ideological, political and cultural struggle more centrally into Marxist thought, a space was created within the theory for the principal sources and disseminators of new ideas and theories, namely the intellectuals (Parmar, 2007: 4).

Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, according to David Macey (2000: 176), makes an important contribution to the theory of ideology, as it offers an alternative to the base/superstructure model. Gramsci distinguishes between the two superstructural levels of political society: the state and its agencies, and civil society (the set of organs assumed to belong to the private realm). While the state establishes and reproduces the dominance of the ruling group or class through direct forms of domination such as legislation and coercion, civil society reproduces its hegemony by ensuring that the mass of the population “spontaneously” consents to the general direction imposed upon social life by the ruling group (Macey, 2000: 176). Nadia Urbinati (1998: 370) writes:
Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony was meant to be a strategy of power pursued through cultural work. It mainly refers to situations of subordination of both individuals and groups. Subordination entails a relation of domination by which the subjects are deprived of their self-reliance as persons as well as citizens. It denotes both a factual condition of powerlessness and a representation of oneself as an impotent hostage in the hands of an ineffable destiny.

According to Gramsci (in Macey, 2000: 176-177), the establishment of a hegemony is the task of the organic intellectuals\(^8\) of the ruling class, who at the highest level create philosophy, the sciences and the arts, and at a lower level administer an existing body of knowledge and ideology through their work in the educational system, cultural institutions and the media. Hegemony is also viewed as a precondition for dominance, as a social group or class can only take power when it has established its ideological hegemony over society. Hegemony is thus an all-encompassing domination by consent where, as Macey (2000: 177) explains, “the hegemonic group establishes and maintains its dominance by creating a ‘historical bloc’ in which there is an organic cohesion between leaders and led, and in which the ‘feelings’ of the population are completely imbued with its dominant view of the world”. Or, put differently, the historical bloc is generated and sustained by leadership based on the “consent of the governed”, under the hegemonic leadership of politicians and intellectuals of the capitalist class (Parmar, 2007: 5).

In this way the dominant ideology validates the hegemony of the ruling classes and the subordinate classes justify their inferior position through accepting the dominant ideologies as historically given. Can this not also be seen from a global perspective, with the First World in a dominant position over the Third World in

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\(^8\) According to Gramsci (in Macey, 2000: 282) all men are intellectuals, yet not all men have the social function of intellectuals. He distinguishes between traditional and organic intellectuals. Traditional intellectuals are equated to “subaltern officers in an army”, such as teachers and administrators. They articulate the relationship between their superiors and the rank and file, but have no innovative and creative role and repeat their tasks over and over again. In contrast, organic intellectuals are directly related to the rising classes or groups who use them to innovate and to establish a new hegemony.
the International Political Economy? How can this be connected to the situation in IR or the social sciences as a whole, for that matter?

Stanfield (1985: 390) relates the term validation to the social sciences as ethnocultural and hegemonic institutions. The validation of knowledge in all its forms is grounded, according to Stanfield, in objectification processes. These processes, in turn, are based on the validation by consensus among representatives of the power brokers of the social order. Stanfield (1985: 390) states that “the resulting social knowledge is therefore defined by the social order, through its allied elite institutional sectors – schools, the political economy, media, financial institutions, and science”. Thus the objectification of knowledge is a matter of power and privilege, with knowledge becoming the official way of interpreting realities through the ability of a privileged “few” to exert its will over the subordinate “many”.

Altbach (1971: 237) considers colonialism to be “the direct political, economic and educational control of one nation over another”. He maintains that although the means of external control and influence is no longer direct, some aspects of colonialism still exist. Consequently, Altbach (1971: 237) defines neocolonialism as “the continued post-colonial impact of advanced industrial countries on the educational systems and policies as well as the intellectual life of developing countries”.

According to Sandra Harding (1992: 311), criticisms of the effects of Western sciences and their technologies on Third World societies are not at all new to Westerners. She explains that for decades both Third World and Western authors have analysed and protested the frequent ill effects in the Third World of Western assumptions, concepts, paradigms and practices in health care, ecology, militarism, economic development and their associated technology transfers. Critics such as Adas, Goonatilake, Van Sertima and Weatherford, according to Harding, perceive Western science to be merely one set of culturally specific “ethnosciences” among many that have existed. These authors argue
that the problem lies not in the concept of science, but rather in the reality of a worldwide dominance of one ethnoscience which inherently legitimates, or even relies on, "an imperialism against other scientific traditions, other cultures, other peoples and nature itself" (Harding, 1992: 311).

Harding (1992: 313) maintains that European science did not flourish due to it being inherently better, in some absolute sense, than other sciences, but rather that this specific ethnoscience developed and became dominant because it travelled with and benefited from European expansion. She is of the opinion that "European science advanced in the early modern period because it focused on describing and explaining those aspects of nature's regularities that permitted certain classes of Europeans to multiply and thrive, especially through the prospering of their expansionist projects".

Henk van Rinsum (2002: 28) approaches the assumption that Western science and its modern institutionalisation are universal. He contends that universities are the organisational units in which science is institutionalised in universal practices, thus making “the universitas into a universal institution”. According to Van Rinsum (2002: 29), the development of higher education and research in Africa can be interpreted as a process of prescriptive construction, or imposition, of an identity, where “Western science, constituting an intrinsic part of the process of colonisation and globalisation, developed from a local, culturally and historically determined, contingent ethnoscience to a hegemonic discourse”. Taking a similar view, Selvaratnam (1988: 42) moves the perspective of the lens from just Africa and focuses on the Third World in general:

Universities in the modern sense in all Third World countries are in origin Western. They were mostly implanted into their social fabric when they were under the formal and direct jurisdiction of a colonial power, or in some cases on achieving their political independence … these universities have become part and parcel of the international knowledge system and its networks.
Tierney and Kempfer approach higher education from the critical post-modernist perspective of Giroux, who saw “a world in which knowledge is used to maintain oppressive relations” (quoted in Musson, 2006: 62). According to Tierney and Kempfer’s anthropological perspective, the effects of culture are central to understanding and explaining what and whom are valued and devalued in a society, and furthermore both enable and restrict new ways of thinking and of transmitting and constructing knowledge. They thus contend that “institutions of higher education are socially constructed realities that in part develop from their own socio-cultural histories and traditions ... shaped by the external cultural environment and a nation’s place within the ‘international knowledge networks’” (quoted in Musson, 2006: 62). Cultural relativity, according to Stanfield, has tended to be ignored in social analysis, attributing its neglect to the reproduction of Euro-American hegemony in the social sciences. Stanfield (1985: 390) makes the observation that

Ways of seeing and knowing in the social sciences are ethnoculturally based. As in the case of conceptualisation, social scientists have generalised the application of methodological techniques with no sensitivity to ethnocultural diversity. For instance, logical positivism, which pervasively undergrinds philosophies of data collection and analyses in the social sciences, dictates methods of enquiry which cannot handle contradictions and situational variance. The utility of the logical positivism paradigm in addressing human diversity issues is thus an empirical question and not a given fact of science.

As indicated by Selvaratnam (1988: 45), the higher education system that took deep root in the various countries of the Third World was a replication of metropolitan/Western models, which in turn exported Western notions of knowledge to the peripheries, thereby setting the stage for the creation of a hegemony of Western science as a dominant and universal ethnoscience. Van Rinsum (2002: 29) equates the model of Western expansion of science and knowledge to the export of Western models of religion. In this sense the West has defined their academic reality as a model and standard, and exported this
model to other parts of the world to enlighten and modernise the primitive “other”, thus rhetorically presenting high modernism as the antidote to backwardness. Van Rinsum (2002: 29) elaborates on this as follows:

This hegemonic ambition was based on a fundamental dichotomy: “developed” (and therefore modern) versus “not (yet) developed” (and therefore primitive or traditional). “We” are developed and therefore the “Other” needs to be developed after our image. We in the West need this dichotomy [for] without such underdevelopment and ignorance the West could not represent itself as developed and possessing knowledge … The dichotomy unfolds, then, between believer, messenger, and academic, on the one hand, and unbeliever, receiver, and ignoramus on the other.

Selvaratnam (1988: 42) states that Third World universities are charged with the same specific objectives as their Western counterparts, including acting as a reservoir and transmitter of knowledge, generating and enhancing knowledge continuously through research and teaching in various disciplines, and providing a pool of qualified people to meet their countries’ high-level manpower needs. In particular, they are expected to contribute to the development of their respective societies through their research, teaching and related service-oriented activities. According to Selvaratnam (1988: 42), universities in the Third World “represent the presence in their midst of a Western academic and intellectual heritage and cultural phenomenon” and in spite of their shared origins, objectives and goals with their Western counterparts, “find themselves at a disadvantage in achieving one of their key objectives, namely equality in the generation and enhancement of the frontiers of knowledge”.

3.4.2 Aiding uneven development: exporting hegemony through education

From a Neo-Marxist perspective it could be argued that Western positivist science therefore first expanded, in colonial times, from the core, which was situated in Europe and first dominated by a Dutch (United Provinces) and then a British hegemony (Wallerstein, 1979: vii-viii; Wallerstein, 2003: 1), to the
periphery (at that time including the US) within the global political economy. After World War II foreign aid became the cornerstone of US foreign policy, the emerging global hegemonic power at the time, with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 (Suri, 1979: 28). The US’s striving for global hegemony included the domination of assistance for development and education to the Third World. The flow of staff, experts, training, equipment, loans, fellowships and grants was accompanied by a Eurocentric knowledge system and the dominance of positivistic science (Selvaratnam, 1988: 47; Ichman & Ichman, 1987: 57-58; Stanfield, 1985: 392) that found a bastion in the powerful US, a former colony, working towards instilling a perspective of one dominant reality. “European colonial administrators used science, especially sociology and anthropology, to justify their rule in non-white societies. American capitalists welded science to technology and used the synthesis to support their profit-making enterprise”9 (Stanfield, 1985: 395).

Neo-Marxist and dependency accounts of international educational development have viewed the policies and practices of multilateral organisations primarily as instruments of Western neo-imperialism. From such a perspective, especially drawing on world-systems thought, educational assistance provides a vehicle for the transmission of ideologies from the core to the periphery, serving the goal of future “intellectual socialisation” of periphery individuals (Mundy, 1998: 449, 485). Selvaratnam (1988: 47-48) explains that “American aid was channelled, through the Point-Four Aid programme, launched in 1949, and was complemented in varying degrees by the US’s industrialised ideological partners like France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany”. The Cold War saw a new “scramble for Africa”, or rather a scramble for Third World alignment. The US and its ideological allies were faced with a parallel aid scramble in the form of international cooperation programmes initiated and implemented by the Soviet Union and its Eastern bloc allies. Soviet expansion thus threatened the US’s

9 See also Braverman, 1975; Hofstader, 1965; Hymes, 1972; Noble, 1977.
hegemony, economic interests and culture in the form of “the American way of
life” that was being exported across the globe.

The construction of a US hegemony in the global arena, according to Inderjeet
Parmar (2007: 2), saw a parallel with the rise and dominance of realism in the
study of IR in the United States:

The rise of a nuanced Realist tradition in the United States – and of International
Relations as a discipline – is a study of political sociology of knowledge-construction,
a study of powerful private and public financial-ideological-political institutions
representing key rising elites attempting to generate an approach to foreign policy
that placed power at its very heart. It is an exploration of how elites generate
knowledge, not for its own sake but for the purposes of expanding their own power
and influence simultaneously inside and outside the United States. It is a study of an
east coast elite-led mobilisation behind a hegemonic project of American globalism.

Parmar (2007) attributes the rise and the domination of realism within the
American school of IR to the close relationship between such philanthropic
bodies, for example the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation,
with universities such as Princeton and Yale. These institutions served to
strategically mediate between the modern university (and other knowledge
producers) and the state, as well as between universities and big business.
Parmar (2007: 3) states that “the foundation[s] played a central role in articulating
key state agencies, international corporations, and the universities, especially the
research universities, behind a hegemonic project of domestic federal-state
building and US global expansion: Progressivism and imperialism went hand in
hand”.

To safeguard Western interests, Western states and their private agencies;
including American philanthropic bodies such as the Asia, Ford and Rockefeller
Foundations and the Carnegie Corporation, also gave educational assistance to
Third World countries with the objective of helping them to develop their own
human resources with essential skills, which in turn would help develop their resources and improve their standard of living, with the Western experience as model (Selvaratnam, 1988: 59-64).

In the view of Selvaratnam (1988: 50-54), development aid and cooperation undoubtedly brought about remarkable progress in higher education within the countries of the Third World, benefiting both recipients and donors. Such merits for recipient Third World countries included the development of institutional indigenisation, the establishment of new teaching and research institutions, increased student influxes from rural areas, and the ultimate relief of their critical manpower shortages. The export of Western knowledge was also accompanied by technological know-how and the transfer of information which not only helped recipient countries to train and develop professionals in the various fields within their own regional and national boundaries, but also to a limited extent provided the ability to devise, assimilate and adapt technology in vital areas such as agriculture and industry.

On the other hand, even though Western educational development assistance to Third World countries produced some tangible benefits, it also had some serious negative sociopolitical implications. Critics of foreign aid within the Third World highlight the “excessive theoretical bias and … absence of practical orientation, with no relevance to the community outside” (quoted in Selvaratnam, 1988: 54). It was pointed out that the curriculum had merely been copied from institutions abroad, thus bearing no relevance to the communities it had been exported to. Peripheral students, teachers, administrators and policymakers encounter core ideas through books and other curricular materials provided by core educational enterprises and teachers, thus being taught to think from a particular perspective of understanding (Mundy, 1998: 485).

According to Selvaratnam (1988: 55), who wrote in 1988, the development assistance and the cooperation programme in higher education that emerged
and grew out of aid policies brought into existence only a couple of dozen “centres of excellence” in Third World communities, such as the five Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT). The norm was rather the increase in Third World countries of second- and third-rate academic centres that were heavily dependent on foreign aid, with very few of them acting as centres of academic excellence.

High percentages of Third World graduates, aided by academic cooperation initiatives, looked to further their academic knowledge in postgraduate studies at the institutions of developed countries, with many using the opportunity to eventually work in those countries. The class of first-rate research scholars that emerged within Third World universities, especially those with a more direct influence from Western institutions, was not only exposed to various alternative ideologies and ways of life but, more importantly, was intellectually oriented and socialised towards the West. Selvaratnam (1988: 55) observes:

The training created a technocratically oriented class of academic social scientists who accepted and absorbed Western educational perspectives, thought processes, scientific and methodological paradigms, work habits and professional norms. In other words, they were being trained in methodologies and ideologies grounded in the Western capitalist-oriented theory of development.

Referring to own experience, Selvaratnam (1988: 56) states that Third World graduates educated at prestigious Western institutions gain “a status which names them part of a very distinct elitist group”, and on their return home these “alienated” academics consciously and unconsciously serve as carriers of cultural imperialism with an entrenched servitude of the mind towards Western knowledge and academic traditions (Altbach, 1981). According to Rajan (1997: 610), the dependence upon the West has traditionally “produced various forms of introspection, angst and resolution” reflected in Third World intellectuals’ “derivative categories and protocols of thought, as well as in their search for validation and endorsement from the intellectual centres of the West”.
The hegemony of one ethnoscientific paradigm also goes hand in hand with a hierarchy within academia. The hierarchy is dominated by academics located at prestigious institutions of academic excellence in the West. To gain respectability both nationally and internationally, research is done in collaboration with and under the tutelage of these academic elites. Once research is completed, “it is published by a Western publisher or journal under joint authorship and in most instances with a Western author as senior author, although the local scholar may have done the major part of the research …” (Selvaratnam, 1988: 57).

When one connects this observation with the situation within IR and the intellectual hierarchy within the discipline as pointed out by Holsti, Waever, Alker and Biersteker as well as Smith, it is clear that the “Third World academic”, positioned on the periphery of the production of knowledge, is dependent on the metropolitan centres for direction as well as acknowledgment within the field. In Smith’s (2000: 7) opinion the dominant power within the discipline, in this case the American institutions, define what is considered to be “proper” social science, thereby serving as the gatekeepers for what is considered legitimate scholarship.

The situation is thus created where the “Third World academic” relies on “First World academics” for recognition when attempting to further individual advancement within his/her field of study. The “Third World academic” must conform to certain standards of what “good science” is, which are in turn developed by the international academic elite that reside within the core of a global system of knowledge, which is dominated by one specific ethnoscientific paradigm. By residing within the dominant geographic locations of knowledge production and aligning him-/herself with dominant institutions and ideologies, the “Third World academic” gains access to the elite club, but could also be perceived as becoming alienated from his/her community of origin. It could further be proposed that this does not only happen between academics of different countries, but also within a national perspective. Thus a “Third World
academic” identity that transcends traditional geographic borders is created by a shared perspective of marginalisation within a global academic community.

Furthermore, when one considers the situation from a Neo-Gramscian perspective in the same vein as Parmar (2007: 1-4), the hegemony of one notion of legitimate scholarship such as the dominance of realism within the IR community situated within the borders of the global political and economic hegemon could be thought to have infused dependent “Third World academics” with the hegemonic project of the elite intellectuals within the core of the discipline, who themselves have been influenced by the expansionist projects of government elites and big business within their own country. In this way academics within the Third World serve to reproduce the hegemonic discourse within their own communities, diffusing these ideas in their broader societies.

Within the United States, according to Parmar (2007: 2), the rise, projection and diffusion of realism, realists and internationalism within and through the academy served to bring universities closer into line with the forms of thought and practice about how power works within the real world that predominated within the American state. By setting a framework of terms and ideas the two worlds were able to communicate with each other and by the diffusion of realism and globalism within university teaching, organic intellectuals helped cement the hegemony of these ideas within strategic minorities in American public opinion, such as the educated and professional classes. Parmar (2007: 2) explains this as follows:

In the division of labour between scholars and state officials, IR (and other) intellectuals/academics were mobilised behind hegemonic projects designed intellectually to penetrate the academy, ‘isolationist’ strongholds in the mid-West, regional elites, as well as overseas elites, while the US state (which also deployed ‘soft’ power or ‘soft Realism’) employed ‘hard’ power strategies, i.e., military power.
These ideas were exported to the academic institutions within the Third World in the form of dominant views of “good” scientific practices and aided by developmental and educational aid projects.

3.5 Conclusion

Borrowing from the perspectives of dependency theory, Selvaratnam (1988: 43) contends that poor Third World universities that suffer from a lack of resources do not have the capacity to generate an indigenous intellectual and publishing capacity within their borders compared to the more affluent core:

Under such an unequal system of resource and academic relationship the core of knowledge naturally grows largely in the central institutions in the developed countries and is constantly disseminated to the Third World universities and their institutions through an asymmetrical academic and intellectual relationship.

Selvaratnam (1988: 43) and Altbach (1981: 601) agree that the central institutions play an important role in shaping and internationalising the university curriculum and knowledge, and that Third World universities are accordingly perceived as being on the periphery of this generation, proclamation and dissemination of their curriculum and knowledge. Altbach (1981: 602) maintains that while the Third World’s universities copy development from abroad, produce little that is original, and are generally not on the frontiers of knowledge, most universities located in First World countries are research oriented, prestigious, and form the main links in the chain of a powerful, influential and pervasive international knowledge system and its networks.

While Western training of Third World academics in general, and for the purpose of this discussion the social sciences in particular, provides access to an international community and knowledge framework, the international community is grounded in a dominant ethnoscientific paradigm which affords access to those
who are willing to internalise specific norms and notions of reality as well as those who possess the ability to pay for membership of this elite club. Euro-American domination of knowledge production is further enforced by English being the favoured means of intellectual communication. The “First World academic” is placed in a dominant position concerning the means to access information as well as to generate knowledge. The “Third World academic” is placed in a situation of dependency and, as a result, an uneven distribution of knowledge production favouring the dominant perspectives of the “First World academic” elite is maintained. It could furthermore be argued that hegemonic ideas are exported to the academic institutions within the Third World in the form of ideology underpinning the dominant views of “good” scientific practices and aided by developmental and educational aid projects, thus instilling and maintaining further the dependency of the periphery on the core.

How does this all link to IR? Looking at the state of IR as a discipline from the perspective of Waever and Smith, one can deduce that ideas stemming from different geographic locations subscribe to certain theories specific to what “good IR” should be within those regions, such as realism in the US and constructivism and post-modernism in the UK (Waever, 1998: 702-703) or rationalism in the US and reflectivism in the UK (Smith, 2000). Thus “Third World academics” and academic institutions with greater links to those core communities align themselves with the dominant perspectives within those regions, merely reproducing dominant debates between the academic communities within the core, and ones which they have generally been excluded from, for example Waever’s notion of Japanese IR (1998: 697).
4.1. Introduction

The previous chapter attempted to illustrate how the marginalisation of topical issues pertinent to the Third World in the disciplined study of International Relations could be directly connected to the exclusion of perspectives and contributions of Third World academics from the mainstream of the discipline. On the one hand, this is due to a British-American condominium over the discipline, with the US dominating the relationship with an American hegemony. On the other hand, it has also been noted by Waever (1998) that there does not seem to be much IR outside of Europe and the United States. One could argue that this is due to the dependent position of knowledge-producing institutions within the Third World such as universities that, like the countries they are situated in, lack the resources to compete with the wealthier institutions and academics in the core.

If the expansion of Western science along with Western modernism has favoured the perspectives of Western scholars, situating knowledge production in the core and knowledge application in the periphery, what can/should be done to produce a more equitable situation in IR theory as a discipline? Why is theory in International Relations important, especially within Third World universities? Should the luxury of theory-building not be left to the better-resourced First World intellectuals, while Third World academics rather focus on the application of knowledge to practical situations in their developing countries?

In Culture and imperialism Edward Said (1994: 401) advises that for newly independent societies to remain free of domination in the future, the task will be to match the economic and sociopolitical dislocations and configurations of our time with the startling realities of human interdependence on a world scale. Said
argues that the Japanese, East European, Islamic and Western instances of conflict and nationalism should enlighten us to the fact that a new critical consciousness is needed, which can only be achieved by revised attitudes to education. According to Said (1994: 401),

> merely to urge students to insist on one’s own identity, history, tradition, uniqueness may initially get them to name their basic requirements for democracy and for the right to an assured, decently humane existence. But we need to go on and situate these in a geography of other identities, peoples, cultures and then to study how, despite their differences, they have always overlapped one another, through un-hierarchical influence, crossing, incorporation, recollection, deliberate forgetfulness, and, of course, conflict.

Karl Popper’s (1966) critique of ideologies which in his opinion brought on the major conflicts of the twentieth century was partly centred on the belief that history, which ideology uses as legitimating agent, is always written from the perspective of the powerful elite, who generally take the form of emperors and generals. In the same vein Said (1994: 401) contends that, although we may not be anywhere near Fukuyama’s “end of history”, we are still very far from being free of monopolising attitudes towards it. In a world in which we are mixed in with one another in ways that most national systems of education did not dream of, the intellectual and cultural challenge of the moment is, according to Said, to match knowledge in the arts and sciences with these realities.

David Held (2001: 1-2) quotes Immanuel Kant’s expression that we are “unavoidably side by side”. Held contends that violent challenges to law and justice in one place have consequences for many other places and can be experienced everywhere. Referring to our mutual interconnectedness and vulnerability that have grown so rapidly since the age of Kant, Held (2001: 2) notes that we live in a world of “overlapping communities of fate … From the movement of ideas and cultural artefacts to the fundamental issues raised by
This chapter argues, therefore, that on the one hand the mainstream within IR should promote contributions from the Third World that add to the production of knowledge so as to further develop the discipline in the post-Cold War era. Therefore we start off with the idea of responsibility concerning theory construction, hoping to convey the message that responsibility involves not only being self-reflexive in one’s own position, but also promoting the inclusion of all voices within a conversation, dialogue or debate. In addition, the chapter will argue the importance of teaching theory in general, and in IR in particular, within the Third World. In such a way the call for inclusion can be answered by a responsible voice and one that can contribute equally to the discussion, thereby bridging the divide between First World and Third World academics.

4.2 Responsible theory and the voice of the other

There are differing ideas as to what theory is for and how one should approach its purpose and best practices. Theory has been defined as the “critical practices which make philosophical foundational claims” (Docherty, 1993: 4). According to Popper (1968: 112), theories may be used to capture the world so as to rationalise, explain and ultimately master it, while Carr (1995: 32) explains theory as “the framework of thought that structures and guides any distinctive activity … denoting the underlying conceptual framework in terms of which a particular theoretical enterprise is carried out and which provides it with its rationale”. Piki Ish-Shalom (2006: 565) understands theory as a hermeneutical mechanism of attaching meaning to political concepts in a three-stage model starting with theoretical construction that transforms into public conventions and ultimately takes the form of political convictions. Attempting to reconcile IR theory with philosophy, Peter Finn (2007: 1) explains that when enquiring what international theory is for, one requires the knowledge of what theory itself is for, “the identity
of theory”. Borrowing from the insights of Michael Oakeshott, Finn conceptualises theory as an activity (theorising) rather than a set of propositions. For Finn, the activity reveals itself in two distinct forms: conditional and unconditional theorising.

Conditional theorising relates to attempting to “understand an event, an object, or a problem in terms of a set of postulates which are taken for granted”, for example Kenneth Waltz explaining international politics on the assumption that economic and systems theory are a given. Unconditional theorising, on the other hand, “confronts the postulates themselves in a characteristically critical and sceptical manner…[and]…is what the term philosophy, properly understood, refers to”. Finn (2007: 1) writes:

Thus, IR theorists like Richard Ashley who question the positivist assumptions underpinning Waltz’s theory, and who ask whether those present a proper starting place for understanding the international, act as philosophers. IR theory and philosophy are not antithetical enterprises. Since the philosopher’s stance is inherently critical, the IR theorist qua philosopher can neither make prescriptive judgments, nor conditional claims. The philosopher’s vital role remains one of sceptical attendance to the postulates of theory — sustaining the argument which impels theory forward.

The question “What is theory for?” is in Finn’s (2007: 1) view a moral question that, if answered, “comes in the form of an ‘ought’, and, being prescriptive, implies responsibility”. The relationship between the conditional side of theorising and the unconditional side is one that resonates in responsibility. Thus, when certain postulates are identified and grouped together in relation to each other, a “platform of understanding” is constructed from which it is possible to make judgments and prescribe certain actions in certain situations based on conditional facts. Finn (2007: 3) states, for example,

Hence we may perceive in the relationships which constitute a given alliance, a constellation forming around a “hegemon”, and (consistent with our understanding of
this situation in balance of power terms), a coherent response might be to organise a counterbalancing coalition.

The understanding is conditional as it is not yet understood and is based on the assumed existence of entities such as states, alliances, balance of power politics, cooperation, and so on. The assumptions are conditional and therefore never beyond scrutiny. This makes way for unconditional theorising, the activity being the critical scrutiny of the “platform of understanding” and the presumed entities which allow for its existence, which should properly be understood as philosophy (Finn, 2007: 3).

When the IR theorist looks critically at his/her platform of understanding, s/he is no longer a theorist but a philosopher, and vice versa, when the philosopher has scrutinised the platform and makes prescriptions, s/he is no longer acting as philosopher but as theorist. This relationship between IR theory and IR philosophy may be connected to reflexivity in what one may perceive as the responsibility of theory. Carr (1995: 40) states that theorising is “a practice forced into a new form of self-reflectiveness … human activity bending back on itself, constrained into a new kind of self-reflexivity”.

With regard to the university as an institution, Martin Heidegger wrote in 1933 (quoted in Büger, 2007: 1):

The predominant, essential character of the university is generally considered to reside in its ‘self-governance’: this shall be preserved. But have we also fully considered what this claim to the right of self-governance demands of us? Self-governance means: to set ourselves the task and to determine for ourselves the ways and means of realizing that task in order to be what we ourselves ought to be. But do we know who we ourselves are […]? Can we know that at all, without the most constant and most uncompromising and harshest self-examination?

Heidegger’s statement falls within ongoing debates about the nature and purpose of universities within society as well as debates about theory and practice. In both
cases perspectives differ between, on the one hand, those who advocate the autonomy of the university and the academic as alluded to by Heidegger, and, on the other hand, those who maintain that “the separation from the world of decisions and consequences has gone too far in international relations” (Lepgold & Nincic, 2001: 185). Connecting this debate to International Relations theory, Steve Smith (quoted in Büger, 2007: 1) observes that “the way the profession remains strangely quiet, almost silenced, makes this a particularly relevant time to enquire into the links between theory and practice”.

One can highlight two important points in the passage above by Heidegger. The first is that of responsibility, which is implied in the question “But have we also fully considered what this claim to the right of self-governance demands of us?”. The second is self-reflexivity, in the line, “… the most constant and most uncompromising and harshest self-examination”.

Thus, responsibility and self-reflexivity may be connected to IR when one considers existing theories that claim to be universally applicable not being able to fully explain situations within different parts of the globe as well as the exclusion of issues pertinent to the majority of the world’s population.

In his reading of Gayatri Spivak’s essay simply titled “Responsibility”, Christopher Mcintosh (2007: 2) explains how Spivak makes a strong call for reflexivity as an important site for thinking responsibly. Mcintosh (2007: 5-7) agrees that responsibility is commonly conceived as a set of comments, duties and directions for how an agent should act upon other agents. For Spivak, responsibility is a call to listen, think/write and set-to-work, and is not an idea that operates outside of academics and is “discovered” or produced by theorists. She formalises the process of responsibility as a relationship of moments, beginning with a call and then thinking/writing followed by “setting-to-work”. In the academic arena, thought (thinking/writing) is a move towards formalisation, which is separate from an action (setting-to-work). The only real way to test the thought is by seeing it in
action. To truly engage in the dialogue of responsibility requires setting-to-work. McIntosh (2007: 7) states that “in the academic context the belief that thought is action, collapsing the political and the academic, precludes the proper testing of thought, as well as ignoring that practice norms thinking as well as thinking norms practice”.

The notion of a distinct thought stuck between a calling and an action leads Spivak (quoted in McIntosh, 2007: 6) to insist that “(the thinking of) responsibility is also (a thinking of) contamination”. Within the social sciences the position of the academic is similar to that of the natural scientist. The idea is that the scientist is set apart from the environment s/he is attempting to observe and study as a text. In this line of thinking, theories are created and produced and are always under the control of the observer. Yet from Spivak’s conceptualisation, according to McIntosh (2007: 8), the situation becomes inverted; the scientist is now an agent embedded in a structure whose autonomy is problematised. Complicity is an inescapable feature of thought and action, and acting (thinking responsibly) is not exempt from this contamination. Making a critical distinction between Heidegger’s Destruktion and Derrida’s deconstruction, Spivak contends that Derrida’s deconstruction does not merely involve exposing errors. Inherent in it is a call to construction as well, a setting-to-work, in addition to the process of “tearing down” (McIntosh, 2007: 10).

Spivak uses the example of the Flood Action Plan (FAP) to demonstrate the unacknowledged contamination of well-intentioned intellectuals by certain backgrounds built on the “structures that maintain oppression”. McIntosh (2007: 10) states that

[in] her discussion of the FAP she demonstrates how European groups (and individuals) who sought to “solve” the “problem” of Bangladeshi floods ultimately failed and silenced those who they were attempting (intending) to assist. Many of these intellectuals or academics were motivated by good intentions and awareness
of their positionality relative to those subalterns they were responding to, but still
could not intellectually escape the contamination of their own subject position.

The recent debate within International Relations theory concerning the
inapplicability of “Western-centric” theories to explain the differing realities in the
Third World can be viewed through such a deconstructive lens as used by Spivak
(in McIntosh, 2007). When one looks at prominent writers on the topic such as
Neumann, Dunne, Holsti and Ayoob who all reside in the academic core, it
becomes clear that although they are well-intentioned, they are unable to escape
the contamination of their respective socialisations unless they become aware of
them, and even so must set this awareness to work within the space of dialogue
that includes those voices from the periphery.

McIntosh (2007: 3) focuses on the idea of responsibility as dialogue. He quotes
Spivak who maintains that “dialogue is, in fact, the accepted proper name of
responsibility as exchange of responses from both sides”. The call,
thinking/writing (idea) and setting-to-work (action) are the three elements of this
dialogue. Although writers such as Neumann approach their subject with good
intentions and the aim of helping the subaltern, because the subaltern falls on the
periphery of this dialogue due to dependency on the core, the subaltern remains
silenced. Moreover, the subaltern’s world is exoticised and thought to be so
different from the dominant reality that a complete conceptual reform is
necessary for it to be understood.

When one considers IR as a discipline that has been built on what has been
termed the “great debates” (Smith, 2000) between conflicting theoretical,
methodological and epistemological assumptions, the idea of responsibility as
dialogue offers a refreshing option for the progression of IR towards a more
inclusive, responsible and truly global discipline. The quantum physicist David
Bohm (Oxford Research Group, n.d.) makes some enlightening distinctions
between dialogue and debate. According to Bohm, dialogue is collaborative in
that two or more sides work together towards common ground/understanding,
while debate renders itself oppositional, in that two sides oppose each other and attempt to prove each other wrong (winning). Dialogue reveals assumptions for re-evaluation while debates defend assumptions as truth. Dialogue causes introspection on one’s own position, opening one to the possibility of reaching a better solution than any of the original solutions. Debate, on the other hand, causes critique of the other’s position by defending one’s own solution as the best, excluding all others. Finally, in dialogue, by submitting one’s best thinking, knowing that other people’s reflections will only help improve rather than destroy it, a real concern for the other person is involved and one seeks to not alienate or offend the other. By contrast, in debate, by defending one’s best thinking to prove it as the only right answer without focusing on feelings or relationships, one often belittles or depreciates the other.

Ironically, “The Forum: Are dialogue and synthesis possible in International Relations” in the 2003 International Studies Review once again sets this new discourse between the familiar poles of North America and Europe. On the one hand, the editor Gunther Hellman (2003: 123) states that “where parochialisms of different sorts (geographical, linguistic, methodological and political) undermine the goal of achieving a ‘synthetic and genuinely global interdiscipline of international studies’, dialogue is widely considered to be a key to finding a way out”. On the other hand, the contributing scholars, although from different epistemic and paradigmatic communities, still only represent “a diverse group of scholars from North America and Europe” (Hellman, 2003: 123).

This thesis does not now attempt to enter this debate, but rather situates its argument as agreeing with scholars such as Lapid (2003), Smith (2003) and Kratochwil (2003) as well as Harvey and Cobb (2003) that “dialogue is better than monologue” (Hellman, 2003: 123). It would like to merely draw attention to how such dialogue, even the inter-epistemic one on the virtues of dialogue, can be responsible by including those voices that have traditionally been excluded from the developments of the discipline as a whole.
McIntosh (2007: 23) contends that “IR theory concerns itself with an enhanced understanding of the international system, presumably so that there can be an improvement for those who are at the bottom - those who are negatively affected by the operation of the international system”. Although McIntosh admits to the problematic nature of the collective term subaltern, he is of the contention that those “at the bottom” share in the negative effects of the system and the call to action involves making the international system more responsible and more capable of responding to the call of the other. For McIntosh the inability of the subaltern, or in our case the “Third World academic”, to fit precisely demonstrates the way in which IR theory has already silenced the question of responsibility, as there is no other to call for a response.

Furthermore, “IR theory has endorsed the conception of a value-neutrality and disinterested ‘pure’ objectivity” (McIntosh, 2007: 23). This can be thought to be due to the fear of political contamination that abides amongst IR scholars. In this way the question of responsibility as constituted by responding to the/an other is “silenced in favour of the notion of academic responsibility that seeks epistemologically laudable activity, without regard to the effect or actions that may, should or can follow from this” (McIntosh, 2007: 24-25).

Taking into account the notion of global interconnectedness as referred to by Kant, Said and Held, it could be argued that the subject matter of IR theory as well as its disciplinary practices has the responsibility to reflect this interconnectedness. If there exists an urgency for IR theorists to reflect on the inadequacies within the international system, and in so doing answer the call of those who seem to be negatively affected by it as alluded to by McIntosh (2007: 23), it is self-evident that the voices and perspectives of “Third World academics” cannot be absent from what should be a global dialogue.
A leading twentieth-century conservative philosopher, Michael Oakeshott (1962), is probably one of the most articulate anti-foundationalists of his time. Characterising “civilised human beings” as inheritors “of a conversation begun in the primeval forests and extended and made more articulate in the course of centuries”, Oakeshott (1962: 199) maintains that a conversation, which is neither an enquiry nor a debate, is “the appropriate image of human intercourse, appropriate because it recognises the qualities, the diversities and the proper relationships of human utterances”. For Oakeshott (1962: 198), who refers to conversation as “an unrehearsed intellectual adventure”, it is not possible in the absence of a diversity of voices: in conversation “different universes of discourse meet, acknowledge each other and enjoy an oblique relationship which neither requires nor forecasts their being assimilated to one another”.

Oakeshott famously distinguishes between empirical sciences and history as distinct modes of understanding on the basis of how they understand their respective domains of concern. According to John Gray (1988: n.p.), for Oakeshott the human world could never be a unified or hierarchical system of ideas. “It is instead made up of a diversity of worlds, each separate and distinct, each within its own particular characteristics …”. Thus for Oakeshott history, science, religion, philosophy and so on are like different voices in a conversation. In describing thoughts of different species interacting in a conversation, Oakeshott (1962: 197) writes,

Nobody asks where they have come from or on what authority they are present … There is no symposiarch or arbiter, not even a door keeper to examine credentials. Every entrant is taken at its face-value and everything is permitted which can get itself accepted into the flow of speculation. And voices that speak in conversation do not compose a hierarchy (emphasis added).

Extending Oakeshott’s description of conversation to the marginalisation of the “Third World academic” within the social sciences in general and IR in particular, in the modern version of this conversation all members are expected to speak
through the same voice: that of Western empirical science. Furthermore, certain contributors seem to be considered more worthy of having their voices heard.

The call for self-reflexivity and greater inclusiveness in IR theory as a discipline comes at the same time as global efforts to reform international organisations (IOs) such as the UN so as to render them more democratic, on the same criteria that democracy is being propagated as a superior form of government worldwide. Referring to the notion that democracy was born in ancient Greece together with philosophy and not with capitalism, Liisa Laakso (1995: 217) maintains that the essence of democracy became public discussion and a questioning attitude, which provides a basis for emancipation and a more just society. Every citizen had to be committed to expressing interests and opinions in public discussion, and decisions were to be made on general grounds, not determined by the mathematical proportions of those interests. It could be argued that the same ideal of inclusive participation should pertain to the discipline of IR.

4.3 Why theory in the Third World?

Taking into account the above observations on responsibility in theory construction, one can finally ask the question: why theory in the Third World? Karen Smith (2006) contends that what is lacking in IR theory is not just the need for building on existing theories or formulating new perspectives in understanding the situation of the majority of the world in the post-Cold War context, but actual contributions coming from the Third World that “constitute valuable contributions to advancing the field of IR in general”. Yet on whose criteria would contributions be judged to be valuable? If the problem lies in opening up the field of IR, which in itself is a Western construct, to contributions from the Third World, then one could propose that it lies in the hands of the Western academic community to open up its doors to the rest of the world, thus calling for self-reflexivity and responsible dialogue within those IR communities that dominate the discipline.
On the one hand, it could be argued that this kind of thought further cements the idea of dependency of the Third World academic on the core as s/he will never enter the inner circles of any discipline if not included in the dialogue/debates. On the other hand, one can easily fall into the trap of considering all areas in the world as so essentially different that what is needed is a total scrapping and disregard of what has developed before. Reflecting on debates surrounding Indian creative and critical writing on the loss of autonomy, originality, mental colonisation and mimicry, Rajan (1997: 610-612) explains that the preoccupation with the issue of writing “under a Western eye” has seen the rise of an aggressive nationalist rhetoric coming from broad circles of nationalist, anti-Westernisation and antimodern “indigenists”. Not having produced much strong alternative thinking, this rhetoric rather served to aid regressive causes such as the support of *suti* (widow immolation) and the rise of the militant Hindutva movement that has accompanied the growth of the economic and military power of the Indian nation state.


In thinking through the predicament of the intellectual, Anantha Murthy refuses to recuperate the past - by definition a closed avenue - and envisages only a determinate future that follows the path of modernization, so that no resolution in terms of any voluntaristic, individual choice is realistic for the writer. His reflections are extraordinarily subtle, avoiding the pitfalls of both revivalist thinking (quite explicitly) and of pragmatic reconciliation to hegemonic Western thought. But he keeps close to both these resolutions of the dilemma, thus largely retaining the problematic of the binary frame.

Drawing on Rajan’s observations on Murthy and Karen Smith’s (2006) idea of “bridge-building”, it can be proposed that the onus does not solely lie on the academic communities in the core opening up a Western IR discipline to the rest of the world, but that what is needed is a mutual step forward towards the
inclusion of the marginalised Third World academic in a global dialogue. As the interconnected and overlapping of interests and realities within the globe have developed to the point dominated by a US hegemony, so too the discipline of IR has mostly developed in one direction while expanding its influence across many borders. Third World academics cannot turn their backs on the rest of the world and attempt to start their own dialogue, as much as they should not take for granted their peripheral position within the discipline and the continuation of an American-British condominium.

For scholars such as Walt (1998: 29) and Guzzini (2001: 103) the importance of the scholarly study of international relations lies in the fundamental fact that everyone uses theories, whether they are conscious of it or not, and that disagreements in the world of practice, such as how to respond to China’s expansion, generally arise as a result of more fundamental disagreements on the basic forces that shape international outcomes.

Guzzini argues that the importance of teaching IR theory lies in the dual nature of theories being both explanatory and constitutive. Theories are explanatory in the sense that no empirical analysis is without theoretical assumptions or without a framework of analysis, and constitutive in that a theory is the very condition for the possibility of knowledge. Secondly, by making future practitioners and observers aware of the constitutive function of theories, the teaching of theory fulfils the crucial role of a time-independent intellectual education. Guzzini (2001: 103) states,

Exactly because data does not speak for itself, because all observation is theory-dependent, and because observation can in itself have an effect on this very reality it is supposed to describe, it is fundamental that observers of international relations, whether practical or academic, be trained to become aware of their own and others’ assumptions.
What Guzzini (2001: 98) sees as a major problem in the academic education of IR theory is falling into the trap of thinking in terms of the opposition between theory/practice and academia/politics. The effect, according to Guzzini, has created the “illusion that empirical studies can never be divorced from theory, and that university education is only there to serve the policy relevance of the day and not the intellectual breadth and maturity of the future practitioners”.

Such a conceptualisation of IR theory accentuates the boundaries within IR that Christopher Hill and Pamela Beshoff approach in their edited book *Two worlds of international relations*: that of the academic and the practitioner. Hill (1994: 3) warns of the sensitive area where policy and academics come together. This divide sits on a volatile boundary where the academic must responsibly be aware of his/her effect on policy, yet keep his/her distance so as to avoid becoming too immersed in the politics of the day and the absolutely current.

While IR theorists will concede the accusation of superficiality if they sit in their “ivory tower” and watch as their own distinctive business passes by, they must also be aware of their own normative concerns as to why they entered IR in the first place, be conscious of the threat of contamination that ideology holds, and be free from the influence of the politics of the day, no matter how lucrative, which can lead to the sacrifice of perspective. Hill (1994: 19) describes their situation as follows:

> At bottom scholars of international relations face a twofold and paradoxical task. On the one hand they have to avoid academic snobbery and accept that they share with journalists, policy-makers and informed citizens (each group just about deserves the benefit of the doubt) a desire to create the conditions in which human beings can live free and fulfilling lives. On the other, they have to preserve a distinct sense of purpose and not relinquish their particular comparative advantages.

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10 There has always been much debate surrounding the relationship between theory and practice and this is an area that still needs more attention within IR. Although “theory vs practice” does not directly enter into the discussion here, it is important to take note of it as it is and undoubtedly will continue to be an area for further study in most enquiries into the applicability of IR theory.
As has been mentioned, Piki Ish-Shalom (2006: 565) explains theory as a hermeneutical mechanism of attaching meaning to political concepts in a three-stage model starting with theoretical construction that transforms into public conventions and ultimately takes the form of political convictions. By applying Gramsci’s theory of hegemony to reconstruct constructivism, Ish-Shalom attempts to create a model that advances the metatheoretical understanding of theory as “offering a holistic understanding of reality, rather than a mere limited understanding of specific phenomena” and by highlighting theory’s real-world involvement, he “emphasises theory’s political capital, with the resulting moral responsibility of theoreticians”.

Both Said (1994: 401) and McIntosh (2007: 11-16) warn of the intellectual involvement in nationalist projects, referring to examples such as Nazi Germany and Japan, while Ish-Shalom (2006: 565) uses the example of how the democratic-peace thesis played a political role for the Israeli Right’s criticism of the Oslo Accords, and the American neoconservatives’ policies in the Middle East. Thus it is easy for intellectuals who lack critical responsibility grounded in a good understanding of theory as both conditional and unconditional activities to become caught up in the politics of the day, consciously and unconsciously driving forward certain ideological engines. It is helpful to keep in mind Gayatri Spivak’s warnings to intellectuals and theorists “to ‘watch out’ as keenly in the presence of nationalist discourse as in the presence of imperialist discourse ‘for the continuing construction of the subaltern’” (Luthra, 2003: 49).

The uncritical use by an intellectual president such as South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki (1998:1) of terms like “the rediscovery of our soul” and “our African identity” (Mbeki, 2005: 1) (in both instances these terms are made applicable to all the diverse peoples of the African continent) points to a problem area for South African and African intellectuals as a whole, who are inclined to question such attempts at essentialising and romanticising a supposedly different and
monolithic African reality. If in the course of theorising self-reflexive critics were to question the underlying theoretical framework of projects such as the African Renaissance and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), they run the risk of being marginalised and disregarded by the newly democratised establishment. McIntosh (2007: 15-17) warns that “nationalism and the discourse utilised and produced by its project are rife with contradictions and danger. Given this danger and their unique position in the articulation of the discourse of the nation, intellectuals have the responsibility to remain attuned to this concept without devolving into the production of easy essential truths”. From an African perspective, Mamphela Ramphele (2008: 291) observes that “African leaders are yet to embrace intellectuals as partners in development. There is much mistrust of independent thinkers, with constructive criticism often seen as ‘betrayal of the revolution’.”

Further illustrating the dangers of the neglect of teaching theory, Guzzini (2001: 107-108) states that although young or poor countries must focus on their most technical needs, through the failure of both acknowledging the need for theory and establishing the possibility for theoretical studies to develop academic communities run the risk of remaining or becoming simply “theory-takers” or passive knowledge consumers and mere “data-providers”. In the complex context of globalisation, internationalisation and the multiple agendas urged on by events such as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATTs) negotiations, it is increasingly difficult to get a clear grasp of developments that characterise the so-called “knowledge society”. In a setting characterised by the hegemony of neoliberal ideology, grounded in the logic of the market and the privatisation of knowledge production, the focus on “end application” as well as manpower training for employability and wealth creation has been spurred on by a market-driven rationale based on criteria of efficiency (UNESCO, 2003: 1-3).

One of the biggest, yet also contested (Scholte, 2005), impacts of globalisation has been the widening of the gap between First World and Third World countries.
This is most evident in the lack of critical research capacities within Third World countries and the greater research output in economically advanced countries. Their limited capacity to access, apply, absorb or develop internal and external knowledge places many constraints on Third World countries and their ability to identify problems and formulate their own solutions. As a result, wholesale solutions are imported that give rise to unforeseen consequences and unintended effects in different contexts (UNESCO, 2003: 1-3).

In new democracies such as South Africa where governments are attempting nation-building projects based on the assumptions and prescriptions of Western theory and elite concerns, the focus on practically oriented teaching in an attempt to quickly fill the gap in human resources has led to the eye being taken off knowledge production and fixed rather on application. Nordling (2007: 6) explains that since governments such as these have their attention fixed on the current crises of poverty and development they try to be too prescriptive in the funding of research, the result being the loss of other imperative research. Nordling (2007: 6) writes that “with the recent focus on science as a tool kit to kick-start development in Africa, the continent is importing the culture of science management”. Voices of the academic community, according to Nordling, complain that in South Africa the National Research Foundation budget is terribly starved by the department of science and technology, while research areas which do not pertain to an immediate impact of wealth, such as the humanities, are pushed to the side. It can also be noted that even from the side of South Africa’s Department of Science and Technology there are concerns about the constraints on the country’s ability to conduct research – while Japan spends 3% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on research and development, and the United States 2.7%, in South Africa’s case it is only 0.91% (Nyide, 2007: n.p).

Referring to IR theory teaching in general, Guzzini (2001: 99) quotes Chris Brown:
The fear is that students are not interested in theory, that they study IR with a practical orientation and become alienated if asked to think conceptually and abstractly, and, most damagingly, that students want to be told the ‘right’ answers and not to be exposed to the scandalous fact that authorities differ even on quite basic issues. These positions must be resisted. All understandings of IR and of the other social sciences are necessarily theoretical, the only issue is whether this is made explicit or not and most good students are well aware that this is so.

It would seem that developing countries such as South Africa run the risk of undervaluing theory, rather focusing their attention on the practical orientation of students who can immediately fill particular positions within government and the private sector. As Guzzini perceives, while it is undeniable that there is a great need for technical expertise, “any neglect of theoretical work would be short-sighted”. Apart from the intrinsic value and importance of theory, one can agree with Guzzini (2001: 107) that as “future teachers have to be trained, theoretical requirements are even more important, since, without it, no academic work (including Ph.Ds!) of an international standard can be expected”.

4.4. Conclusion

Referring to International Relations, Büger (2007: 36) asks “why, if such a useless discipline, should it persist?”. Although very sceptical of his own practices, Büger once again stresses the importance of reflexivity in the form of “the currently evolving sociology of IR”, which needs to avoid becoming “disciplined” and “narcissistic” by not thinking strictly inside the borders of the discipline. He contends that the organisation and institutionalisation of knowledge production, the institutional issues shaping it and the translations between IR and other cultural spheres require attention.

Guzzini (2001: 106) agrees with Selvaratnam and Altbach in stating that theoretical strength has become an indicator of defining an academic core and academic periphery. For our purposes, what Guzzini (2001: 99) aims to
showcase is how the neglect of theoretical studies can cement the peripheral position of academic communities in the international division of academic labour, by causing them to remain slotted into the roles of mere “data-collectors” and “thought-takers”, thereby serving as a warning to those countries attempting to step out of the periphery or semi-periphery. Although Guzzini (2001: 106-107) juxtaposes the thriving German IR community with its seemingly stagnant Italian counterpart, thus not moving his perspective further than the European boundaries, he does enlighten one to the importance of teaching theory in IR for scholarly communities and countries who are still defining their place in the international division of academic labour.

It can be argued, therefore, that the movement towards a truly global IR discipline should come, as Steve Smith believes, at a time when the discipline seems “quiet, almost silent”, for within the quiet of self-reflection it could be that those voices that have been silent/silenced by the raging storm of debate are given the opportunity to resonate, bringing with them relevant new perspectives into a global dialogue. Yet for these voices to make sense, they would have to be intimate with the different languages of the game and aware that the future of International Relations lies within the labyrinth of interconnected perspectives in the multifaceted garden of the global. To restate the words of James and Wolfson (2003: 344), “more than anything else, the new millennium should encourage the field of International Relations to take a look at its trends in thinking and ask whether they seem appropriate in light of developments in the outside world”.

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This chapter will constitute the final act of this manuscript, serving as a conclusion for the enquiry at hand. This thesis has intended to shed further light on an identified problem area within the discipline of IR that has, one can argue, only recently started to emerge from out of the shadow of more prominent meta-theoretical debates, namely that of the exclusion of Third World academic voices from the construction of the IR canon. As the dark clouds of smoke start to dissipate over the battlefields of interdisciplinary debate, more figures begin to stir in the shadows, more voices are heard floating over the debris in the silence of post-battle calm. Consequently, no finite conclusion can be forwarded when so many areas are still left veiled. Rather than putting forward for consideration specific solutions to the proposed problem, this final chapter will attempt to make recommendations that may serve as areas for further research and enquiry as the discipline of IR endeavours to cement itself as a truly global discipline in the globalised post-Cold War arena. But let us first summarise the findings thus far.

The introductory chapter of this thesis set out certain aims that were constructed against the backdrop of a specific problem and a hypothesis. The problem identified was that the study of International Relations, whose very basis of existence makes claims towards universality and international applicability, is seen by some to push pertinent issues relating to the majority of the world’s population to the periphery of its enquiry, its theories thus not able to fully grasp the complexities of the majority of the world’s people and the states, nations or groups that they fall under. The hypothesis was then presented that one of the root causes of this problem could very well be the “Western-centric” nature of IR as a discipline and the domination of its knowledge production by Western institutions and scholars. Consequently, the question for enquiry was presented
as, “Where is the Third World academic in the process of IR theory construction?”.

For the purpose of summarising the discussion up to this point, I restate the aims of this thesis:

- Foremost to explore the representation of “Third World academics” within the mainstream of the discipline of International Relations theory.

- A preliminary step and secondary aim is to explore generalised concepts such as Third World, developing world, South and periphery, making a case for the continued importance of the term Third World in the post-Cold War arena and conceptualising the “Third World academic” as it is used throughout the thesis.

- The final aim is to illustrate why it is important to work towards more equal representation of scholarly input within the mainstream of the discipline by starting to bridge the gap between academics from the Third World and the First World in IR.

The second chapter served as a conceptual framework of the term Third World as used throughout the thesis. It argued for the continued relevance of the generalised term “Third World” as analytical tool in the post-Cold war arena, favouring it over terms such as South, developing world and periphery. As shown in that chapter, the Third World can be said to reflect a continued constructed common, unifying experience shared by the majority of countries and people in the world. In the post-Cold War context this term has not remained static, with many former Soviet countries having more in common with the Third World, such as a lack of voice or say in global affairs, and widespread human insecurity and poverty. It was then proposed that the same kind of relationship as that between First World and Third World countries and people within the global arena could
be seen in the world of academics in the social sciences and the disciplined study of IR in particular, with the contributions towards knowledge production being centred in the First World and such knowledge being exported asymmetrically to the Third World for application. Therefore the First World academics, their experiences, and their contributions to knowledge production as well as theories constituting the end product of these constructs are put into a dominant position, placing the Third World academics in a dependent position.

The third chapter situated the historical development of the disciplined study of IR in the geographic locations of Europe and the United States. The point of this cursory analysis was to situate the very development of the discipline in a “Western-centric” context, with the “great debates” that helped to form the discipline merely constituting a trans-North-Atlantic discourse. Data accumulated by Thomas and Wilkin (2004) on the representation of issues studied within the leading IR journals served as evidence that issues pertinent to the majority of the world’s people are effectively pushed to the periphery of the discipline, and when addressed are rather approached from an angle of Western experience. How was such a situation created? Ole Waever, K.J. Holsti, Steve Smith as well as Alker and Biersteker agree that the discipline of IR is dominated by a European-American condominium of authorship, with the US furthermore maintaining a hegemonic position in this relationship. My own interpretation of Waever’s data was that, although he illustrates the above-mentioned fact of US hegemony of authorship, he does not say much about the Third World, merely concluding that there does not appear to be much IR outside of this condominium. It seems, therefore, that Third World authors exist on the periphery of contribution to leading IR journals.

The dominance of certain ideas of “good knowledge”, in our case “good IR”, and their specific theoretical and methodological approaches in each community sets the standard for “good scholarship” in those communities. In this way certain theoretical and methodological approaches also become dominant in the arena
of the discipline of IR, and as knowledge is exported to the peripheries, so too these specific notions of “good knowledge” become dominant in the global arena. When comparing Thomas and Wilken’s data to those of Waever (the authors makes use of four corresponding leading IR journals), one can start to conclude that the marginalisation of Third World issues seem to parallel the marginalisation of Third World academic contribution to the leading journals, in the same way that these two issues are paralleled by the marginalisation and dependency of the Third World in global political and economic affairs.

When the expansion of knowledge in the social sciences in general is analysed through a Neo-Gramscian Marxist lens, it becomes clear that the situation of a dependent Third World within academia has been created and perpetuated by the real-world political expansion of major powers within the global arena. Along with the expansion of European and American political and economic domination over the global political economy came the domination of Western science as one dominant “ethnoscience”. Through developmental aid extended by many wealthy Western philanthropic and government agencies, Western science as dominant “ethnoscience” was exported to the rest of the world, instilled in the academic aid and Western-model universities presented to the “backward” peoples of the poor majority of the world.

This thesis does not want to present Western science as the fallible villain in this post-colonial drama. On the contrary, Western notions of science have been most helpful to humankind in all respects of enquiry about the world we live in, IR included. The problem has been the construction of a situation of Third World academic dependence, specifically in the social sciences, on the well-resourced First World academic institutions and their well-funded academics to produce knowledge for application in the rest of the world. Yet how can general theories with universal applicability continuously be constructed by the academic contributions of only a few academic communities in our internationalised, interconnected world?
The fourth chapter, reflecting on the evidence that went before it, attempted to approach the question of why a more inclusive, truly global discipline of IR is needed in understanding the complexities of the post-Cold War era. This question was linked to two concepts relating to theory, those of responsibility and self-reflexivity. If the problem lies in the failure of mainstream theories to adequately deal with issues pertinent to the Third World, one could argue that the answer lies in the discipline of IR and its esteemed theoreticians acting responsibly and reflecting on what is truly going on in the world, especially in terms of theory versus practice. Yet this could be the equivalent of curing the symptoms while neglecting the root causes. As has been shown in chapter three, the neglect of the study of pertinent issues to the majority of the world can be connected to the dominance of knowledge production in IR by a few core communities in the US and Europe. This thesis views this situation as a root cause, one connected to knowledge production in the social sciences in general and one that reflects the real political and economic situation in global affairs.

So how can we address such a root problem? It is certainly not easy, especially if people do not agree that this is a real reason for conflict in the discipline. The discipline of IR, as noted throughout this thesis, is based on a dominant discourse between the US and Europe, while the peripheries of the discipline merely reproduce this conversation as they are dependent on the core for advancing the debates that help form and develop the discipline. On the one hand, one could argue that it lies in the hands of the West to act responsibly by reflecting on the development of the discipline, and opening up their discourse to the voice of the “other”. But such a perspective once again puts the Third World in a dependent and inferior position. What is needed at the same time is for those academic communities on the peripheries of the discipline to answer the call for inclusion by producing relevant contributions towards advancing the discipline as a whole.
In 1979, Shridath Ramphal (1979: 184) wrote that “it is in man’s nature that each generation in turn reflects change”. Although the character and pace of these changes are never constant, there are times when “human needs demand that it proceed with unusual urgency”. Ramphal suggests that in times where the repeated use of terms such as “international cooperation” and “development” cause them to lose their impact on our consciousness and international figures depicting global trends in “absolute poverty” mask the “grim reality that it should portray”, we must be moved to question to which world we belong, to which world our universities belong and to what extent the university fulfils its mission of universality.

For Ramphal, the answer partly lies in an understanding of where we are in the evolution of international cooperation and how different perceptions of the world lie at the heart of global misunderstandings. As Ramphal (1979: 184) explains,

> The picture is just not the same from Washington to Bonn as it is from a jute plantation in Bangladesh or the arid scrubland of a village in Mali. It is perhaps natural that the advantaged do not readily discern what is wrong with the world, but the view as it is seen by two-thirds of mankind that is disadvantaged, is itself one of the realities of the global scene. Even if this view is not shared by the North, there can be no fruitful dialogue unless it is understood as the perception of the South. If it is at least acknowledged as such, it will become easier to understand why the developing world calls for a new order.

Here Ramphal is talking about addressing real global economic and political inequalities through cooperation and dialogue. As has been noted, these inequalities, at least those of voice and representation, seem to be reflected in the discipline of IR as much as they are in the income inequalities between countries in the international system. Where can one start to look for change? How can a new order within the discipline come about? This thesis proposes that a starting point lies in the concepts of dialogue and bridge-building. Dialogue, as discussed in chapter 4, constitutes an answer to the exclusive debates that have formed the discipline thus far. Can there be dialogue within IR? This is a question
that can only be answered through practice, by including all voices in a global discourse and a global study of International Relations, and once again depends on those participating in such conversation acting responsibly through continuous self-reflexivity.

Thus far, as seen in chapter 4, the discussion on dialogue in the mainstream once again falls into the confines of a Western dialogue and is therefore an area that needs further enquiry. This brings us to the concept of bridge-building. Bridge-building, like dialogue, refers to the two sides working towards a mutual step forward by meeting one another on equal ground. How can bridges be built between the Third World and First World academic communities? This cannot be answered in the confines of this thesis, but there are a few things that one could consider for future research.

Where can we start to explore the prospects for a more inclusive global discipline of IR, both in terms of academic representation and the representation of real global issues? Looking towards the West, it seems that such calls for inclusion of “the other” within IR is already being made in the works of scholars such as Neumann, Dunn, Brown and Tickner. Attempts have also been made in practice to include the Third World, especially Africa, in the global study of IR, a good example being the British International Studies Association’s BISA Africa and International Studies Working Group (BISA International Studies Association Working group, 2008: n.p). The Group was formally established in 2007 with the aim to provide:

[A] forum in which to bring together a diverse range of scholars to discuss and debate substantive issues arising from competing dimensions of ‘the international’ in Africa; theoretical and conceptual debates about the relationship between generalities of the discipline of International Studies and African historically-based specificities; and ideas about the relationship of issues and theory in the pedagogy of International Studies in and of Africa.
Yet when one looks at the official members of this group as stated on its website, it seems, offhand, that only two or three scholars who are resident in the Third World are formally associated with its work! Is this not a recurring problem within the study of the Third World, especially Africa, in all disciplines of the social sciences? Could it be due to exclusion by the core, or rather a lack of interest and lack of self-worth on the part of the Third World? To my mind it is a bit of both. This is something that should be further explored. Western scholars will have to start reflecting on the role they play in the continued construction of a dependent Third World within both academia and global politics and economics, and how this reflects in the knowledge they help to construct. Could well-intentioned authors who write on behalf of the Third World be drawing the battle lines, unaware that the war continues to rage within a discourse confined to the First World?

If the call for a more inclusive global discipline of IR seems to be coming from First World academics as much as it should be coming from those in the Third World, it is easy to once again argue for it to be a reflection of the degree of representation of Third World academics in the discipline. On the other hand, it seems that the call has been made and that it now falls on the shoulders of those in the Third World to answer it. What can the Third World do to answer this call?

Knowledge and the dependency of the Third World on the First World for its construction in the social sciences has been a theme that has run throughout this thesis. It has also been mentioned that Third World academics lack the resources, especially in terms of the social sciences, to focus attention on theory and the construction of knowledge. Yet, as concluded by Guzzini, for academic communities (in this case IR communities) to move from out of the academic periphery, attention must be given to teaching and understanding of theory and one can therefore also include the critical study and construction thereof.
Must Third World academics in International Relations not also become aware of the role that they themselves play in perpetuating their subordinate position in the global production of knowledge? What can the Third World IR community do to enter into a global discourse and in so doing answer the call of Western scholars who seem to write on their behalf? As has been mentioned, Waever (1998: 686) states that there does not seem, according to most surveys, to be much theorising in IR outside of the European-American condominium. What can be done to address this lack, if it indeed exists?

The first step would obviously be to research in more depth whether there have been relevant contributions coming from the Third World, especially in languages other than English, towards advancing the discipline of IR, especially in the last few years. This is something that this thesis talked around yet because of time and space constraints was not able to further explore. Such a stocktaking of academic contribution could set the parameters for further exploration, research and conclusions.

A second and more practical step could be the promotion of theoretical studies in IR within the Third World. In such a way scholars become intimate with their subject, being taught the language to enter into a global discourse and, if need be, challenge it by bringing into the picture the real experiences of those communities from which they stem. This could be further promoted by the establishment of International Relations institutes at universities within the Third World which can focus on producing theory, rather than merely applying it. Realistically, a problem has been the scarcity of resources, especially in terms of finance, but by effectively utilising existing structures, such as South-South cooperation i.e. that between India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) (Soko, 2006) as well as city-to-city cooperation (De Villiers, 2005), trade and flow in ideas amongst Third World academics, as well between them and First World scholars, can be situated in one or a few centres of excellence working towards a specific goal of knowledge construction as well as instilling a feeling of self-confidence.
and independence amongst a growing community of Third World IR academics who struggle to enter into a profession traditionally dominated by European and American brains. The possible establishment of such institutes is another area for further enquiry, especially in terms of growing research into the global practice of city-to-city diplomacy, twinning and partnering in all areas, yet most importantly the area of higher education.

It is to be hoped that what has become clear from the enquiry of this thesis is the intricacies of studying any complex phenomenon, especially from an international perspective. It would seem that the discipline of International Relations has matured to a certain point where all who are involved with it must start to reflect on how the discipline itself has progressed towards a point at which it finds itself intertwined with the complexities of an interconnected world. The discipline of International Relations can no longer merely be seen as a study of certain units within the international arena based on conflicting theories constructed by a few elite academic voices. The discipline itself, its history and its practices have become part of that study and therefore must render themselves open to critical enquiry.
References


