The 2003 Cricket World Cup: Implications for identity formation and democratization prospects for Zimbabwe

By

Justin Daniel Sean van der Merwe

Assignment presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master in Philosophy at the University of Stellenbosch

Supervisor: Dr Janis van der Westhuizen
Department Political Science
University of Stellenbosch

April 2004
I, the undersigned ......................................................... hereby declare that the work contained in this assignment is my own original work and that I have not previously submitted it in its entirety or in part at any university for a degree

...............................   ..............................
Signature               Date

........................................
Signature               Date
Abstract

There can be little doubt about the ability of major international sporting events to capture the aspirations and hopes of nations. These events have an uncanny ability of seemingly effortlessly doing what a hundred speeches and mass rallies by politicians could only hope to achieve. Therefore, it is no surprise that they are commonly understood to be able to bring nations and people together and provide a focus for national identity and unity. The 1995 Rugby World Cup in South Africa is an obvious proponent of such a claim, whereby South Africa was emerging from a long and arduous political transition and needed something more than going to the polling booths to unite the nation.

Major international sporting events are also said to be able to provide a catalyst or incentive for democratization and human rights enhancement in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes. The 1988 Olympics in South Korea is a landmark of such claims whereby the South Korean government was said to bow to the democratizing pressures exerted on it due to its hosting of the event. Many have argued that China’s hosting of the Olympics in 2008 will have a similar effect. However, equally potent, major international sporting events can have various unintended consequences in terms of identity formation, democratization prospects and human rights for the host nations. An analysis of South Africa and Zimbabwe’s co-hosting of the 2003 Cricket World Cup demonstrates this point.

The outcomes of the study suggest that whilst it is normally the intention for the host nations to use the games to bring nations and people together, the Cricket World Cup opened up a rift between races, both within the race contours of the cricket playing Commonwealth world and within South Africa's domestic politics. It was also established that much like the 1995 Rugby World Cup had sought to reconcile blacks and whites domestically under the “Rainbow Nation” during Mandela's presidency, the 2003 Cricket World Cup, with its more regional focus and under Mbeki’s presidency, presented an excellent opportunity for transnational reconciliation between Africa and the Anglo-Saxon world. However, the 2003 Cricket World Cup, as a project in racial reconciliation, was essentially a failure. This was predominantly due to the choice by South Africa of Zimbabwe as co-host and due to the shift of South Africa's national identity from that of the “Rainbow Nation” under Mandela, to that of “Africanism” under Mbeki. President Mbeki’s drive towards “Africanism” proved divisive both transnationally and domestically. Symbolically, the Cricket World Cup, when compared with the 1995 Rugby World Cup, had served to highlight the decline of the “Rainbow Nation”.
Zimbabwe's co-hosting of the event had served to further entrench the authoritarian regime. Instead of the regime opening up due to its co-hosting of the event, a broad clampdown on civil and political liberties was experienced. The Zimbabwean government felt the need to tighten its grip during the lead up to the event and throughout the tournament itself. The aim was to project a sanitized view of Zimbabwe to the rest of the world. Thus, the event presented an opportunity for the government to shore up its credibility and produce political propaganda. South Africa’s stance of “quiet diplomacy” also indirectly helped to further entrench the regime through the World Cup. Zimbabwe's co-hosting also impacted negatively on the opposition, the MDC. In addition to this, the various pressures which major events are said to exert on a host nation to reform politically and which result from boycott campaigns, pressure from the media, stimulation of civil society and protests, were not very effective in enhancing democratization prospects and human rights in Zimbabwe.

This study reaches the overall conclusion that the claims that major events bring nations and people together and provide a catalyst or incentive for democratization and human rights enhancement in authoritarian regimes, need further revision. South Africa and Zimbabwe's co-hosting of the event did indeed have unintended consequences. Policy implications are also assessed. Future areas for research are also identified.
Opsomming

Daar bestaan min twyfel dat groot internasionale sportgebeurtenisse die strewes en verwagtinge van nasies aanwakker. Hierdie gebeurtenisse het die vermoë om op ‘n oënskylike moeilose wyse meer te bereik as wat ‘n honderd toesprake en massavgaderings deur politici kan hoop om te bereik. Daarom is dit geen verrassing nie dat daar vry algemeen aanvaar word dat hierdie gebeurtenisse oor die vermoë beskik om nasies en mense by mekaar te bring en ‘n fokus vir nasionale identiteit en eenheid kan verskaf. Die 1995 Rugby Wêreldbeker in Suid-Afrika, is ‘n ooglopende voorbeeld: Suid Afrika het uit ‘n lang en moeilike politieke oorgang gekom en het meer as ‘n blote verkiesing nodig gehad ten einde die nasie te verenig.

Voorts is dit ook so dat groot internasionale sportgebeurtenisse ‘n katalisator of aansporing is vir demokratisering en die bevordering van mensregte in outoritêre en semi-utoritêre regerings. Die 1988 Olimpiese Spele in Suid-Korea ondersteun hierdie aanspraak. As gasheerland van hierdie spele, het die Suid-Koreaanse regering onder toenemende druk gekom om aan die vereistes van demokrasie te voldoen. Daar word verwag dat die Olimpiese Spele van 2008 dieselfde impak op China, die gasheerland, sal hê. Terselfdertyd is dit egter ook so dat groot internasionale sportgebeurtenisse vir die gasheerlande onverwagte negatiewe gevolge ten opsigte van identiteitsvorming, demokratiseringsvooruitsigte en bevordering van menseregte kan hê. n’ Ontleiding van Sui-Afrika en Zimbabwe se mede-aanbieding van die 2003 Krieket Wêreldbeker staaf hierdie stelling.

Die resultate van die studie toon aan dat alhoewel gasheerlande normaalweg groot sportgebeurtenisse gebruik om nasies en mense byeen te bring, het die 2003 Krieket Wêreldbeker ‘n kloof tussen rasse veroorsaak – binne die krieketspelende Statebondswêreld sowel as die Suid-Afrikaanse huishoudelike politiek. Daar is ook vasgestel dat net soos die 1995 Rugby Wêreldbeker aan Suid-Afrika tydens die presidentskap van Mandela en onder die vaandel van die “Reënboognasie” ‘n plaaslike versoensgeleentheid tussen swart en wit gebied het, net so het die 2003 Krieket Wêreldbeker, met sy regionale fokus en onder presidentskap van Mbeki, ook ‘n uitstekende geleentheid vir trans-nasionale versoening tussen Afrika en die Anglo-Saksiese wêreld gebied. As versoensprojek was die 2003 Krieket Wêreldbeker egter in wese ‘n mislukking, hoofsaaklik as gevolg van Suid-Afrika se besluit dat Zimbabwe ‘n mede-gasheer moes wees en weens die feit dat Suid-Afrika se nasionale identiteit ‘n klemverskuwing van “Reënboognasie” onder Mandela tot “Afrikanisme” onder Mbeki, ondergaan het. President Mbeki se beklemtoning van “Afrikanisme” was ook huishoudelik en trans-nasionaal verdelend. Simbolies gesproke, het die Krieket Wêreldbeker – in teenstelling met die Rugby Wêreldbeker – die “Reënboognasie” se verkwyning beklemtoon.
Daar is ook vasgestel dat Zimbabwe se mede-aanbieding van die Krieket Wêreldbeker inderdaad hierdie outoritêre regering versterk het. In plaas daarvan die Zimbabwiese regering sy outoritêre greep as gevolg van sy mede-aanbieding verslap het, was daar inderdaad ‘n verdere breë onderdrukking van burgerlike en politieke regte. Die Zimbabwiese regering het in die aanloop tot en in die loop van die toernooi sy outoritêre greep verstewig ten einde ‘n gesaniteerde beeld van Zimbabwe aan die res van die wêreld te kon voorhou. Die Zimbabwiese regering het die geleentheid misbruik om geloofwaardigheid te probeer wen en politieke propaganda uit te stuur. Suid-Afrika se standpunt van “stille diplomasia” het ook die hand van Zimbabwiese regering versterk; en Zimbabwe se mede-aanbieding van die toernooi het ‘n negatiewe impak op die opposisie, die MDC, gehad. Die dwang wat op gasheerlande deur middel van boikotte, die media en proteste uitgeoefen kan word om polities te hervorm, was in die geval van Zimbabwe nie effektief nie.

In hierdie studie word tot die slotsom gekom dat die aansprake dat groot sportgebeurtenisse nasies en mense saambring en ‘n aansporing vir demokratisering van outoritêre regerings is, verdere hersiening verg. Suid-Afrika en Zimbabwe se mede-aanbieding van die toernooi het onbeoogde gevolge gehad – en in sommige gevalle was hierdie gevolge selfs direk die teenoorgestelde van wat verwag is. Beleidsimplikasies word ook evalueer. Voorts word toekomstige navorsingsareas ook identifiseer.
Acknowledgements

I would like to extend my gratitude to the following people:

• To my supervisor, Dr Janis van der Westhuizen, for his patience and guidance

• To Professor Albert Grundlingh, Dr Scarlett Cornelissen, Greg Fredericks and Dr David Black for their insightful comments

• To my family and friends for their support and encouragement

Justin Daniel Sean van der Merwe
Stellenbosch

April 2004
Table of contents

Declaration.........................................................................................................................i
Abstract.............................................................................................................................ii
Opsomming.........................................................................................................................iv
Acknowledgements..........................................................................................................v
Table of Contents.................................................................................................................vi
List of Abbreviations..........................................................................................................vii

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL BACKGROUND
1.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................1
1.2 Problem Statement......................................................................................................6
1.3 Conceptualization.........................................................................................................6
1.4 Literature review and analytical approach.................................................................7
1.5 Aims.............................................................................................................................12
1.6 Methodology................................................................................................................14
1.7 Significance..................................................................................................................14
1.8 Outline..........................................................................................................................15

CHAPTER TWO: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL CRICKET AND ZIMBABWE’S STATUS AS CO-HOST
2.1 The politics of international cricket..............................................................................17
2.2 History of the Cricket World Cup..................................................................................22
2.3 South Africa's exclusion from international cricket......................................................25
2.4 South Africa re-enters international cricket.................................................................27
2.5 South Africa enters bidding process............................................................................28
2.6 Taking the games to Africa..........................................................................................29
2.7 Political situation deteriorates in Zimbabwe.................................................................30
2.8 The African World Cup...............................................................................................35
CHAPTER THREE: THE CRICKET WORLD CUP IN IDENTITY FORMATION

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Racial split within the cricket playing Commonwealth world

3.3 Racial split within South African domestic politics

3.4 The Cricket World Cup in racial reconciliation

3.5 Chapter summary

CHAPTER FOUR: THE CRICKET WORLD CUP IN DEMOCRATIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS ENHANCEMENT FOR ZIMBABWE

4.1 Introduction

4.2 The significance of a World Cup in Zimbabwe

4.3 South Africa's stance: Keeping Zimbabwe in the game

4.4 Impact upon MDC's position

4.5 The boycott campaign

4.6 The media

4.7 Civil society

4.8 Protests

4.9 Chapter summary

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY
List of Abbreviations

ANC- African National Congress
ABC- Australian Broadcast Corporation
BSAC - British South African Company
DA- Democratic Alliance
ECB- England and Wales Cricket Board
EU- European Union
GCIS- Government Communication and Information Systems
ICC- International Cricket Council
MDC- Movement for Democratic Change
NP- National Party
ORG- Organized Resistance Group
RDP- Reconstruction and Development Programme
SACA- South African Cricket Association
SACBOS- South African Cricket Board of Control
SADC- Southern African Development Community
SARS- Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SASA- South African Sports Association
UCB- United Cricket Board
UDI- Unilateral Declaration of Independence
ZANU- Zimbabwean African National Union
ZANU-PF- Zimbabwean African National Union – Patriotic Front
ZBC- Zimbabwean Broadcasting Corporation
ZCU- Zimbabwean Cricket Union
From a satirical point of view, much of the confusion which preceded and surrounded Zimbabwe’s co-hosting of the 2003 Cricket World Cup can be compared to the following:

“Cricket
as explained to a foreign visitor:

You have two sides, one out in the field and one in.

Each man that’s in the side that’s in goes out and when he’s out he comes in and the next man goes in until he’s out.

When they are all out the side that’s out comes in and the side that’s been in goes out and tries to get those coming in out.

Sometimes you get men still in and not out.

When both sides have been in and out, including the not outs,

that’s the end of the game – Howzat!”

(Acknowledgement to the Marylebourne Cricket Club)
CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL BACKGROUND

1.1 Introduction

During the first half of the twentieth century few governments, besides the Nazi government and fascist governments, showed concern for sporting prestige. On the whole sport was often said to be trivial or none of government’s business. However, in the latter half of the twentieth century sport started featuring high on the agenda of some government’s who considered sport a fairly easy and low cost means of gaining international prestige (Allison and Monnington, 2002: 133).

Traditionally sport was used by nations in a variety of ways in their foreign relations. For example, sport has been used by nations in order to sell themselves and thereby hoping to enhance their image. Sport has also often been used to penalize behaviour of which nations disapprove. However, increasingly, many states have often turned to sport just to demonstrate their acceptability within the international community (Allison and Monnington, 2002: 107).

A good example of how sport has been invoked within international relations was through the game of cricket. Historically, cricket was often used as a diplomatic tool within the British Empire. It was used to signal notions of both independence by the colonies and domination by the colonizer. By contrast, soccer has often been associated with multi-racialism and is commonly referred as “the peoples’ game,” making it a fairly effective vehicle to promote friendship and unity amongst nations. Another prime example of sports diplomatic potential, was the so-called “ping-pong diplomacy” between the United States and China in the 1970's whereby ping-pong touring teams between the two nations was said to foster good relations and formed part of the broader United State’s stance of constructive engagement towards China.

Indeed, given the increasing salience of modern sport internationally, it is rather surprisingly then that sport has traditionally been rather neglected by international relations scholars, except for a few (Houlihan, 1994; Lowe, Kanin and Strenk, 1978). It appears that sport has often taken a back seat within international relations due to the more realist concerns of material power, which dominated the earlier discourse within the field.

Invariably though, where sport has arisen as a priority of nations, it has habitually featured prominently within the more elusive notions of identity building. Most prominent of these is the
ability of sport to foster notions of national identity (Jarvie, 1993; Maguire, 1999; Allison, 1993). Governments within the latter half of the twentieth century have used sport and major international sporting events not only to generate international prestige and foster relations between nations, but also for purposes of building and celebrating national identities.

The manner in which countries fiercely bid to host major international sporting events is a prime example of the quest for identity building through sport. The hosting of major international sporting events has become of increasing significance to nations in the contemporary era, particularly nations on the semi-periphery or emerging nations who would struggle to assert themselves otherwise. These events provide a powerful vehicle for signaling key developments to the international community and bring with them a range of beneficial spin-offs for the host nation, such as enhanced tourism, infrastructural development and job creation (see Black and Van der Westhuizen, 2003).

A prime example of a country in which the state elites have commonly looked to sport and sporting events to unite a divided society and provide a focus for national identity, is South Africa. Both the ANC and the Government of National Unity after coming into power, reinscribed sport as playing a pivotal role in the post apartheid reconstruction and nation building efforts in moving from an authoritarian state to a democracy. Even within the RDP sport was afforded a pivotal role in the nation building and reconciliatory process (Jarvie and Reid, 1999: 242).

However, with South Africa having hosted the Rugby World Cup, the African Cup of Nations and the All Africa Games to name a few, sport, and more particularly major international sporting events, are increasingly pursued by the South African government, not only for their developmental and financial gains, but also for their more elusive identity building qualities as state elites harness their populist appeal for political ends. Roche (2000) comments on the significance attached to sporting events by the South African government by referring to the sustained efforts of Mandela since his retirement in 1999 to support and provide leadership for South Africa's bids for the 2006 World Cup and the 2008 Olympics. More recently though, the South African government, having realized the powerful vehicle they provide for the “hearts and minds” of South Africans as well as their wallets, a “twenty year plan” has been devised in order to attract such events (GCIS Ministerial Briefing, 20 February 2003).

Therefore, it is no surprise that the 2003 Cricket World Cup hosted by South Africa, Zimbabwe and Kenya stood out as an excellent opportunity for South African state elites to use a sporting event to
build on South Africa's national identity ten years into the new democracy. However, the fact that it was a “Cricket” World Cup in Africa, is also what makes for such pertinent investigation into notions of identity. Placed within the back-drop of Africa, the Cricket World Cup raises telling questions on how Africa is dealing with its colonialisand past seeing that cricket is such a workable metaphor for cultural colonialism, and, as the World Cup so poignantly elucidates through the overarching discourse surrounding Zimbabwe's suitability as co-host, how Africa is dealing with the North-South divide and the stalwart arguments surrounding race.

Pertinent to this study though, and South African state elites are loud proponents of such a claim, is the belief that major events have some inherent quality to bring nations and people together. The 1995 Rugby World Cup is an excellent example of the ability of major events to unite a previously divided society whereby South Africans of all walks of life were united under the symbolically potent “One team, One nation” slogan, a symbolism which was to extend into the identity building of the “Rainbow Nation” (see Steenveld and Strelitz, 1998).

Similarly, transnationally, major events have also been used to foster good relations between nations and maintain cultural links. For example, major events such as the Commonwealth Games have often been used to foster good relations between the “white” predominantly Anglo-Saxon members of the Commonwealth (Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) and the former colonies of the global South. The Francophonie countries have tried to emulate this through various regional games that are said to promote intra-regional identities and friendships (Black and Van der Westhuizen, 2003: 5). Historically, the Cricket World Cup was also used in a similar manner to foster good relations and maintain cultural links between the predominantly “white” colonies and England.

However, the effects that major events will have on identity formation are not always pre-determinable. The notions of goodwill and reconciliation by politicians do not always translate into meaningful identification and can have unintended consequences. As Black and Nauright (1998: 5-6) contend “sports potential value for identity building is something of which the state elites have been keenly aware of, and which they have attempted to manipulate for their own purposes”. However, as they further note, the overt politicization of major events and sport in general may only have “an ephemeral impact and can indeed backfire”. In the instance of identity formation this ephemeral impact manifests itself in foregone opportunities to transform a sport or unite previously conflictual relationships between nations and people through sport and major events.
For example, the Rugby World Cup, although arguably initially bringing South Africans together in an unprecedented manner, many remained sceptical of the long term reconciliatory effects of the event. For example, Grundlingh (1998) discusses the events subsequent to the 1995 Rugby World Cup as detracting from the nation building headway made during the Rugby World Cup. Grundlingh proceeds to describe the opening ceremony as being choreographed as well as historically incorrect, further coupling the euphoria produced by the event with a buoyant public mood that was merely conducive towards celebrations and that the World Cup just provided the necessary catalyst.

Similarly, Booth (1996) is also sceptical about the success of the 1995 Rugby World Cup at uniting South Africans. Booth discusses South Africa's transformation through the symbols and discourse surrounding Rugby, most noticeably the Springbok emblem that has long been regarded a symbol of the former “white suppressors” of apartheid. Although the Springboks were “Africanized” by calling them “Amabokoboko,” Booth believes that “[t]he springbok emblem will remain a symbol of racial division until there is ample evidence of black ownership, for example an equal mix of players. Only then will blacks recognize a legitimate historical discontinuity”.

In the case of major events having unintended consequences transnationally, Maguire (1999: 201) illustrates an interesting case whereby the Euro 96 Soccer event served to divide European nations in which soccer matches between “old foes” such as England and Germany opened up broader debates on national identities within Europe and also resonated England's reluctance to join a “United States of Europe”. Similarly, and pertinent to this case study of the 2003 Cricket World Cup, sports and sporting events can also prove divisive between the former colonies and Britain, because of the historical inequalities between the global North and South, and often find their more formalized political articulation within the Commonwealth. Therefore, the consequences in terms of identity formation through major events are not always pre-determinable. The identity building invoked through such events, as promulgated by politicians, could only have an ephemeral impact, reinforce the status quo, or in a worst case scenario, worsen relationships between people and nations.

To a much lesser extent though, the role that major international sporting events play in putting pressure on authoritarian or semi-authoritarian governments to reform politically has been explored. However, it is generally believed that through various means, such as, protests, boycotts, the media and the stimulation of civil society, authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regime’s hosting of major events could provide some form of catalyst or incentive for democratization and human rights
enhancement. A prime example of this, is the Olympics in South Korea in 1988 whereby the government was said to bow to the democratizing pressures exerted on it due to its hosting of the event (see Mannheim, 1989; Larson and Park, 1993).

The debate surrounding the democratizing effects of major events was also very lively in the recent 2008 Olympic Beijing bid and often drew on the South Korean analogy to lend further credence to the positive effects the hosting of the games will have for China (see Tyson, 2001; Gilley 2001). Similarly, many might have speculated that Zimbabwe's co-hosting of the Cricket World Cup might provide some form of incentive or catalyst for democratization and human rights enhancement in Zimbabwe.

However, once again, the effects that an authoritarian regime or semi-authoritarian regime’s hosting of a major event will have on the broader political landscape of the host nation is also not always pre-determinable. Awarding major events to authoritarian regimes does not always have a positive impact and can in some instances have perverse or unintended consequences. For example, perhaps the most provocative example of a major event having unintended consequences was that of Nazi Germany's hosting of the 1936 Olympics - an event that many have argued was a great diplomatic coup for Hitler, served to shore up credibility for the Nazi government and raise the profile of Hitler internationally (see Hart-Davis, 1986).

Another example, of major events having unintended consequences, is that in the lead up to the 1968 Mexican Olympics, the government massacred protesting students with “relatively little immediate fallout”. However, “norms of human rights and democracy have spread significantly in the interim. The global mass media has become more critical and intrusive” (Black and Van der Westhuizen, 2003: 22-23).

There can even be many rewards for an authoritarian regime’s hosting of a major event. Firstly, they present an opportunity to showcase the country and hence an opportunity to demonstrate its “acceptability” to the international community (Black and Van der Westhuizen, 2003: 7). Another possible benefit for authoritarian regimes hosting such an event is that the event may serve as a pacifier or distraction from the real issues at hand. Amidst an increasingly disillusioned populace, the government may essentially pursue such events to placate the citizens of that country and foil the real problems at hand. The fleeting moments of national identity that such events can produce, essentially allow for the citizens to be swept away from the daily problems and allow them a chance to be proud of their country.
Undoubtedly, the politics of risk also feature high in any country’s hosting of a major event, and finds particular resonance for authoritarian regimes hosting such an event. The hosting of major events can backfire on the government by essentially getting bad publicity through the event. However, the government would normally try to create the “illusion of normality” by projecting a sanitized view of the country to the rest of the world. Authoritarian regimes hosting of major events also bears upon questions of human rights norms and hosting events in such countries can often be seen as a contravention of such a norm (see Klotz, 1995).

Therefore, the effects that hosting major international sporting events will have on the host nations broader prospects for democratization and human rights enhancement are not necessarily pre-determinable. Authoritarian regimes hosting of major events can in some instances even reduce pressures for democratization, or in a worst case scenario, serve to further entrench the regime.

1.2 Problem statement

This study argues that the effects that major international sporting events will have on identity formation, and furthermore, democratization prospects and human rights enhancement for the host nations, are not always pre-determinable and can have unintended consequences. In order to demonstrate this a case study of the 2003 Cricket World Cup that was co-hosted by South Africa, Zimbabwe and Kenya will be analyzed. Although Kenya was integral to the make up of the tournament, it will not be central to this analysis. Therefore, this study will analyze, whether the identity formation invoked through the Cricket World Cup was conducive towards bringing nations and people together, and whether Zimbabwe’s co-hosting of the Cricket World Cup encouraged democratization and the promotion of human rights in Zimbabwe.

1.3 Conceptualization

Major events are commonly defined as “major fairs, expositions, cultural and sporting events of international status which are held either on a regular or a one off basis” (Hall, 1989: 263). They are understood to be “large-scale cultural ... events which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance” (Roche, 2000: 1). Major events are commonly further divided into first order events and second order events. First order events are the events such as the Olympics and Soccer World Cup, and second order events are smaller in scale such as the Cricket World Cup, Rugby World Cup, Commonwealth Games, All African Games and Pan-American
In order to assess the effects that the Cricket World Cup had on identity formation, the concept of national identity will be conceptualized according to Jarvie's (1993:61) definition as the “subjective feelings and valuations of any population which possesses common experiences and many shared cultural characteristics.” Taking into account that sport itself plays an integral role in this, through notions of “nationhood, national-consciousness, racism and national sovereignty,” sport often contributes to the quest for national identity.

Racial identity and gender identity are to be understood as important sub-dimensions of national identity working from the assumption that “the national identity with which sport is bound up has a very different implications for men and women, and is very much male centered” (Black and Nauright, 1998: 9). Similarly, the national identity pursued through sports and major events has also very different implications for races, particularly because of South Africa's racist past, but also often due to the historical links of the sport in question. For example, and pertinent to this study, the historical links of cricket as a white, colonial game, versus the image of soccer as being a much more multi-racial sport.

Racial identity is conceptualized as belonging to a race upon which the individual is said to feel a sense of belonging and share common experiences with members of that group. Similarly, gender identity is to be conceptualized as identity based upon the person’s gender of which the person is said to feel a sense of belonging and share common experiences with members of that group.

The second component of the study deals with the democratizing and human rights enhancing effects of the Cricket World Cup on Zimbabwe. In order to assess this, the main ways in which major events are said to promote democratization and human rights will be discussed. These are through boycott campaigns, the media, civil society and protests. Of these, it will be necessary to conceptualize civil society as the institutions and members of the public outside of government itself.

This definition is purposely broad as to allow for maximum discussion on how the games benefited people beyond the Zimbabwean government. The definition of civil society in the literature discussing the democratization effects of major events does not go to any great length to conceptualize civil society rigidly and generally concedes that civil society can benefit in vague, rather diffuse means.
1.4 Literature review and analytical approach

There is no in depth scholarly literature written on the effects that the 2003 Cricket World Cup had on constructions of identity. However, the literature dealing with sport, major events and identity, commonly discusses sports and sporting events in terms of a national identity (Marks, 1999; Jarvie, 1993; Maguire, 1999; Black and Nauright, 1998; Merrit, 2003; Hoberman, 1993; Allison, 1993; Wamsley, 2002; Black and Van der Westhuizen, 2003). Within this literature, race and gender are generally treated as being sub-dimensions of national identity. A separation between the specifically sports and major events literature is not really appropriate, or possible for that matter, as they intersect on a number of levels and their consequences in terms of identity are inextricably linked. Therefore, this literature review and analytical approach attempts to delineate the debates surrounding sports, major events and identity.

For example, Marks (1999: 54) speaks of the 1998 Soccer World Cup in France, and more particularly, the French soccer national team as being linked to the broader questions affecting France’s national identity of “immigration in post-war France” and “the ability of the French to adapt and modernize in the post-war period”.

Jarvie (1993: 59-78) refers to the semi-finals of the 1991 Rugby World Cup between Scotland and England as opening debates on Scottish independence within the United Kingdom. Although noting a word of caution about reading too much into the role that sport plays in “making” nations, Jarvie also makes some pertinent observations into the role that sport plays in fostering national identity. Of particular relevance to this study, is the claim “that sports itself has some inherent property that makes it a possible instrument of national unity and integration, in peripheral or emerging nations”.

With regards to national identity and sport, Maguire (1999: 177) contends that there are many competing discourses wrapped up in the actions of specific groups and that the discourses that are promulgated through sport by the dominant groups “construct identities by producing meanings about the nation with which people can identify”. Maguire further concedes: “These meanings are contained in the stories that are told about the nation. They are also evident in the memories that connect a nation's present with its past. Images are also actively constructed about the nation in social practices,” adding that sport plays an integral role in this.
The literature dealing with the 1995 Rugby World Cup and national identity is also particularly important to this study because it provides examples of how a World Cup affected South Africa's national identity. It also demonstrates quite clearly the role that race and gender play within the broader workings of South Africa's national identity. In addition to this, because no extensive research on the Cricket World Cup has been carried out a comparative approach to the effects the Rugby World Cup had on identity formation and racial reconciliation will be adopted within chapter 3.

For example, Black and Nauright (1998: 9) illustrate some pertinent insights into the role that sport plays “in defining and differentiating identities within a society”. Adding that “sport has contributed significantly to gender socialization and differentiation.” They proceed to note that: "Women are the keepers of the home front, the long suffering and loyal supporters who foster a comfortable and comforting environment to ensure that the athlete is able to achieve his full performance potential”.

However, of particular importance to this analysis of the Cricket World Cup is “the role sport plays in the remaking and making of an ethnically and racially plural society” (Black and Nauright, 1998: 10). Much like gender, race is a major sub-cleavage of national identity and in South Africa finds particular salience because of its racist past. Therefore, the remaking of a South African national identity is always in part a reaction to our racist past. Indeed, sport was used by the apartheid government in this regard through rugby, as “sport traditionally played a prominent role in reinforcing rigidly distinct, or racially based community identities. Rugby in particular, became intimately tied up with Afrikanerdom: 'rugby had a symbolic significance which predisposed Afrikaners not merely to play it, but to identify with the game, in such measure that to some extent they have transformed it in their own image” (Black and Nauright, 1998: 10).

Merrit (2003) also makes some particularly important observations which are relevant to this study. He refers to South Africa's quest for national identity through sport as being a struggle between two types of nationalisms: black and white. This distinction is particularly important to understanding the role that sport can play in being divisive between blacks and white in South Africa and how racial divides in sport can be seen as having broader implications for South Africa's national identity.

However, not everyone is sure about the manner in which sport fosters national identity. For example, Hoberman (1993: 18) makes a distinction between sportive nationalism and other types of nationalism. Hoberman works from the assumption that sportive nationalism is only one form of
nationalism, adding that sportive nationalism is a “complicated socio-political response to challenges and events, both sportive and non-sportive, that must be understood in terms of varying national contexts in which it appears”.

On the other hand, others such as Allison (1993: 4-12) believe that sport is more directly linked to the processes of national identity, stating, “sport is one of the most potent of human activities in its capacity to give meaning to life, to create and interconnect senses of achievement and identity”. Further conceding that, “above all, and increasingly, sport has a complex and important interaction with nationality and the phenomenon of nationalism”. Allison further believes that the key concepts to understanding sport were through skill and prowess, adding that these associations with sport have the unavoidable assertion that sports is masculine, that “the cultural roots of sporting practices and our appreciations of sporting prowess are laced with specifically masculine images and virtue”.

Traditionally, notions of national identity were also often inextricably linked to notions of masculinity. For example, as Wamsley (2002: 396) asserts: “At a national level sport was utilized to rejuvenate masculine identities and invigorate the youth of the nation after the ravages of both the Napoleonic wars and Franco-Prussian wars”. He also states that “[c]ountries such as Germany, Denmark, and Sweden initiated uniquely styled gymnastics movements to train young men, perhaps future soldiers, to summon deeper feelings of national identity and culture, inextricably linked to military fitness on a larger scale”.

Masculinity through sport was also seen as an integral part of Britain's colonial socialization process. Wamsley (2002: 396) contends: “Britain invoked and harnessed the passions of virile sometimes violent, but value-laden masculinities through sports and games, seeking to build a nation of strong men and boys committed to the nations imperial and colonial foreign policies”. Cricket was seen as pivotal in spreading this masculine identity throughout the British Empire.

Much less has been written on gender and major events. In this regard, Wamsley (2002: 399) also makes some observations which are particularly relevant to gender and major events. He discusses how the Olympics were traditionally a male event and hence, partly in reaction to this, women decided to organize their own event. However, this was soon to be dismantled and subsumed under the male dominated “proper” Olympics, while throughout the 1900's women slowly increased their participation in the event.
Black and Van der Westhuizen (2003: 15) also make some important observations on the role that major events can play in identity building and signaling. Particularly relevant to this study, is the question they put forward of “When sport is invoked for identity building, who is incorporated and who is marginalized ... What values are celebrated, projected and conversely obfuscated in the context of major international sporting events?” This question bears particular reference to notions of racial identity and gender identity that are celebrated through major events and particularly their flamboyant opening ceremonies.

The second component of this study, dealing with the democratizing and human rights enhancing effects of major events, has very little literature written on it. The link between major events, human rights and democratization is mostly discussed in the context of certain cases and follows the logic of constructive engagement generally. In addition to this, there appears to be a total lack of literature dealing with the effects that World Cups, or second order events, can have on human rights or democratization in the host nation, and none that bear particular reference to South Africa or Southern Africa.

Therefore, this study attempts to address this by drawing lessons from the likes of the Olympics and expanding it to the case study of the Cricket World Cup. However, it is important to differentiate analytically between the levels of scrutiny associated with the Olympics and the likes of the World Cup. The Olympics, for obvious reasons, because of its sheer size, history and ideological pretensions, is a much more potent force than a Cricket World Cup. For example, rule one of the Olympic Rules and Regulations prohibits discrimination in the Games against any country or person on the grounds of race, religion or politics. Rule 34 requires that, “National Olympic Committees must ... make sure that no one has been left out for racial, religious or political reasons” (Nafziger, 1978 :175).

Nevertheless, the most celebrated example of a major international sporting event sparking political reform is undoubtedly South Korea's hosting of the 1988 Olympics. The case of South Korea's hosting of the Olympics in 1988 appears to be the landmark from which the claims of the democratizing effects of major events have originated. Mannheim (1989) contends that the Olympics in South Korea provided a catalyst for political reform, due to the rising fears of boycotts, increasing student demonstrations, heightened international media attention and the sheer importance attached to the Olympics by the South Korean government, “the Olympic countdown marked a deadline for a restructuring of the political system” in South Korea.
Mannheim proceeds to note that the government actually lost control over the images it was trying to project. The Olympics were a symbol bestowed with such great importance by the government that it actually ended up having to conform to the democratic principles underlying the games if it wanted to see it go ahead smoothly. Therefore, in the lead up to the event the South Korean government was said to bow to the democratization tide brought to bear by its hosting of the Olympics.

Another way in which major events is said to promote human rights, is by enhancing and stimulating civil society. In this connection Black and Van der Westhuizen (2003: 21) note as follows: “People are said to feel empowered by the successful staging of such monumental events and by succeeding in the eyes of the world. They are argued to develop a sense of common purpose with their fellow citizens and to feel a greater sense of ownership of both the event itself, and the community of which they are part. These benefits could be expected to contribute, in turn, to development of an informed and empowered citizenry, with a greater ability to assert itself and hold governments accountable”.

For example, at the Sydney Olympics in 2000 Allison and Monnington (2002: 110-111) contend that the opening ceremony in particular “enhanced the self esteem” of the people and was said to be “good for individual Australians”. However, the effects that a major event can have on civil society can be very varied and there are numerous other ways in which civil society can benefit. For example, enhanced tourism, stimulating local business entrepreneurs, spreading sports at grass roots level and even the upgrading of facilities.

1.5 Aims

Firstly, this study aims to examine whether the claim that major international sporting events have some inherent ability to bring nations and people together, was indeed the case during the 2003 Cricket World Cup. In order to ascertain this, the identity formation invoked through the Cricket World Cup within the cricket playing Commonwealth world will be discussed. This is because international cricketing disputes have historically found their more formalized political articulation within the Commonwealth, as all nations who play international cricket were once British colonies who inherited the game from their former colonizer, and hence are Commonwealth members as well. Over and above this though, given the historical inequalities between the global North and South, and the historical dominance of the predominantly “white” Anglo-Saxon nations within the Commonwealth, international cricketing disputes and calls for boycotts have often illuminated the
role that racial identity can play in forming group identity within the Commonwealth. Therefore, the effects of Zimbabwe's co-host status on identity formation within the Commonwealth cricket playing world will be explored.

The hosting of and bidding for major events have often sparked much political infighting within South African domestic politics. For example, the failed 2004 Olympic bid by South Africa is a prime example of how South Africa's hosting of and bidding for such events can spark political infighting. Implicit within the debates surrounding these events, notions of racial identity are often to be found, particularly given South Africa's racist past. Therefore, the effects that the Cricket World Cup had on identity formation within South Africa's domestic politics will also be explored.

Furthermore, in light of the fact that there is no in-depth literature written on the effects that the 2003 Cricket World Cup had on South Africa's national identity, a comparative approach between the effects that the 1995 Rugby World Cup had on South Africa's national identity will be adopted.

Secondly, this study also aims to examine whether the claim that major events can encourage or spark political reform and enhance human rights in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes, was indeed the case in Zimbabwe's co-hosting of the event. In order to assess this, the manner in which the Olympics is generally said to promote democratization and enhance human rights will be explored. However, issues that are specifically pertinent to this case study will also be discussed, namely, the significance of a Cricket World Cup in Zimbabwe, how South Africa's stance of “quiet diplomacy” served to maintain and facilitate Zimbabwe's co-host status, and, the impact of the World Cup on the opposition party in Zimbabwe, the MDC, will also be assessed.

With regards to the manner in which major events are generally said to promote democratization and human rights, the boycott campaign, the media, civil society and protests will be discussed. The boycott campaign waged by particularly England to take a moral stand against Zimbabwe will be discussed with regards to how effective it was on placing pressure on the Zimbabwean government to reform politically. The effectiveness of the boycott campaign will be discussed, working on the assumption that boycott campaigns are meant to inflict punishment, serve to delegitimize the regime and set precedents whereby other types of sanctions will follow (see Black, 1999). Lessons from the sport boycotts against apartheid South Africa will also be applied to Zimbabwe.

In examining the role the media played during the World Cup, the state owned media in Zimbabwe,
the independent media in Zimbabwe and the role that the international media played during the World Cup will be taken into account. However, it is important to keep in mind that the discussion of the media's role during the World Cup is through the prism of the politics of risk and ties in closely with the phenomenon that major events can backfire on the host nation, by essentially receiving bad publicity through the event.

In examining the extent to which civil society benefited from the games in Zimbabwe, the extensive volunteerism and involvement of local craftsmen, tourism, spreading the game at grass roots level and the upgrading of facilities, will be discussed. In examining the role that protests played in putting pressure on the government to reform and enhance human rights, the protests by spectators and the symbolically potent protest by two Zimbabwean players will be discussed.

1.6 Methodology

In this analysis a qualitative method of research was used. The main method of data collection was a newspaper search covering the period from 1993 when the games were awarded to South Africa, to March 2003 when the event was finalized. Various journal articles, books and video recordings were also used. This study is an exploratory case study as little if any in-depth scholarly work has been written on the 2003 Cricket World Cup. A case study allows the researcher to examine one or more cases in considerable detail typically using a number of data collection methods. The value of a case study is to be found in the manner in which it allows a researcher to develop explanations and test theories of political phenomena (Jonhnson and Joslyn, 1995: 143). This study is also primary research.

The choice of doing a case study on South Africa and Zimbabwe's co-hosting of the event provides excellent examples of the two claims pertaining to major events that this study wishes to explore. Firstly, with regards to the claim that major events can bring nations and people together, South Africa is a nation that has often tried to use sport and sporting events to unite a divided society and provide a focus for national identity and unity. Secondly, with regards to the democratizing and human rights enhancing claims of major events, Zimbabwe is a country that has become notorious for its human rights abuses and can undoubtedly be classed as an elected autocracy.

1.7 Significance

This study is significant for several reasons. Firstly, the Cricket World Cup occurred in early 2003.
At the time of writing, no one that the author is aware of, has written in any great depth about the effects of this World Cup on identity formation and furthermore, democratization and human rights enhancement in Zimbabwe. This study will hopefully open up debates on South Africa and Zimbabwe's co-hosting of the Cricket World Cup.

Secondly, there is a considerable lack of theory dealing with the effects that major events can have on authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes. In fact, there is no real theory, just really examples. The literature that does exist with regards to the democratizing and human rights enhancing effects of major events basically just deals with the Olympics, and not second order events such as the Cricket World Cup. Therefore, this study could add to the awareness of the lack of theory.

Thirdly, countries are increasingly pursuing major events. Further research should be conducted not only on the financial or developmental incentives, but also the effects on identity formation and democratization prospects, which are normally in most instances not as easy to predict before the event. A study such as this could aid sport administrators, sporting organizations and governments in being able to predict when the choice of host or co-hosts could create a risk of unintended consequences.

Fourthly, regional hosted major events are becoming increasingly the norm in the modern era. It requires co-operation between the host nations and allows an opportunity for the state elites to engage. This raises questions with regards to how “sports diplomacy” through co-hosting major events with other nations can serve to complicate, contradict or just highlight weaknesses or an ambivalence within the countries overall foreign policies towards co-host nations. Co-hosting events with other nations could have various unintended consequences for a country’s broader relations with each other. This question finds particular resonance within this case study as South Africa's rather contentious stance of “quiet diplomacy” towards Zimbabwe came through strongly during the debates on South Africa's co-hosting with Zimbabwe. A study such as this, could aid in predicting when this might occur.

1.8 Outline

Chapter one has introduced the questions that are to be investigated in this study. It has provided a background on the nature of international sports and major events. The problem statement further refined the focus of this study and presented the questions that are to be investigated in this study.
Chapter two will essentially outline the case study from a historical perspective all the way to the end of the games. In particular, it will be demonstrated how cricket and the World Cup itself were long synonymous with being a white, colonial game. In light of the fact that this is a case study of predominantly South Africa's hosting of the event, as South Africa were primary host of the World Cup, chapter two will also outline South Africa's involvement in international cricket from an historical perspective. The political deterioration in Zimbabwe will also be highlighted and it will be demonstrated how this affected the World Cup.

Chapter three will further explore the identity formation through the Cricket World Cup and whether it was actually conducive towards bringing nations and people together. Chapter four will assess whether Zimbabwe's co-hosting of the event did indeed provide some form of catalyst or incentive for democratization and human rights enhancement in Zimbabwe. The conclusion will tie all the findings together and illustrate what was laid down in chapter one. Policy implications will also be discussed. The study concludes by identifying areas for future research.
CHAPTER TWO:  
THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL CRICKET AND ZIMBABWE’S  
STATUS AS CO-HOST

2.1 The international politics of cricket

The 2003 Cricket World Cup in Africa represented a growing trend by the ICC, and indeed the game of cricket itself, to move away from its white, colonial image and globalize the game of cricket. This shift within international cricket is quite clearly underscored by the fact that the body regulating international cricket within the Commonwealth, the International Cricket Council, was formerly known as the “Imperial Cricket Council” and was for a long time seen as being an extension of British politics. It was only as late as 1961 when it changed its name to the “International Cricket Council” to become more inclusive towards the former colonies independent status (Farred, 1999: 66), while just the mere presence of cricket in former colonies has long been regarded a symbol of British imperialism and white domination.

The remnants of the game, much like institutional heritage or judicial systems, are a telling signature of the colonial master and often serve as a workable metaphor for cultural colonialism. Historically, cricket was said to epitomise “all that was noble in the Anglo-Saxon character ... an exclusively English creation unsullied by outside influence, as proof of their cultural supremacy” (Sandiford, 1998: 9). Hence the game has long been regarded as synonymous with English values and culture. Maguire (1999: 178) states: “Certain sports are said to embody all the qualities of national character. In the habitus of male upper-class Englishness, cricket embodies the qualities of fair play, valour, graceful conduct on and off the pitch and steadfastness in the face of adversity. Cricket is seen to represent what England is and gives meaning to the identity of being English”.

The early import of the sport quite clearly parallels British imperialist expansion as initially only British colonies were to inherit the game from their colonizers. The cricket field thus became one area where political grudges in former colonies struggling for new identities was often played out. Diverse and often turbulent backgrounds characterized most of the cricket playing nations. Indeed, almost per definition, most of the cricketing nations had to endure some form of political instability due to their colonial struggles for independence and often found themselves trying hard to establish new national identities, in what was normally an already divided society. For example, as Sandiford (1998: 1) contends: “The story of imperial cricket is really about the colonial quest for identity in
the face of the colonisers search for authority”.

While sport was often seen as a means to unite people in Africa (see Uweche, 1978) and elsewhere, cricket can prove rather divisive because of the symbolism of game. Indeed, while most colonies were to assimilate this aspect of English culture within their own, not all the colonies were to take to cricket in the same manner. The cultural, socio-economic and racial landscape of each colony was to play a role in how cricket was to be viewed, and how the cricket field was essentially to become a diplomatic tool for the colonies’ relations with England.

In Australia, cricket was often used as a site of resistance to the domination of the colonizer by essentially beating them at their own game. For example, as Mandle (1973) contends of Australia, cricket was seen as a way to stamp Australian nationalist pride over the colonizers by providing fierce competition through the sport. Frost (2002:66) discusses the English tour to Australia of 1861-62 as opening debates on what it meant to be an Australian. While some of the attributes inherited from England were upheld, such as “good character, manliness, education, discipline, military ardour and sobriety,” the colonists in Australia also started “justifying and defending institutions which they had developed independently of England, most particularly a democratic system of governance.” This sparking of an Australian nationalism through cricket also led to broader notions of nationhood and federation.

Cashman (1998: 35-38) agrees with Mandle and Frost about the stirrings of an Australian nationalism through cricket; however, he adds to Mandles assessment by stating that this Australian national identity which emerged through cricket was rather pro-imperialist and differential. Cashman contends that for British settlers playing cricket in an alien environment was seen as a way of establishing normalcy as village cricket was seen to be a way to simulate the pastoral pastime of eighteenth century cricket. Cricket was also linked with a sort of “imperial nostalgia” and was also to prove that “English culture could flourish in an alien environment ... that Anglo-Saxon blood had not been thinned by the sun”.

Similar to Frost, Cashman (1998: 35) further argues that cricket also played a large role in defining the colonies' relation with England, as cricket was to become the “prism” through which the colonies' links with England were to be viewed. English touring teams were seen as pivotal in this regard, attracting much attention. The contests between England and Australia were always bestowed with much importance to signal how the colony had developed and to create “popular images of the empire”.
However, as Cashman (1998: 38) further notes, “Australian cricket was said to be rather egalitarian, except for one area. Women were never encouraged to play cricket. The ideal of manliness was a core notion from the 1830’s and along with this ideal were sexism and criticism of women who attempted to play cricket ... Women have been accepted as spectators, tea persons and even as scorers, umpires and commentators, but women playing cricket have been persistently ridiculed or marginalized”.

On the other hand, for the predominantly black West Indies, as Houlihan (1994: 17) states by quoting from Patterson (1969: 23-4): “Cricket is the game we love for it is the only game we can play well, the only activity which gives us some international prestige. But it is the game, deep down, which we must hate - the game of the master”. While the adoption of the sport of cricket was often seen as being denigrating to West Indian culture because of its white, colonial image (see Houlihan, 1994: 17), Stoddart (1998: 80-81) believes that cricket in the West Indies was somewhat more complex than suggested by Patterson, adding that cricket in the West Indies was “a complex mixture of accommodation and resistance rather than ... domination and subordination”. For Stoddart: “As elsewhere in Britain's colonies, the Oxbridge-educated civil servants of the empire spread both the play and the philosophy of cricket in the belief that it created a cross-cultural bond amongst members of an artificial political entity who had little else in common”.

Cricket in the West Indies was to develop two main versions of the game, the one which was distinctly English and the other which was marked by the local appropriation of the sport. Contrasting the two styles Stoddart (1998: 81) states: “The white elites of the Caribbean territories behaved as they thought befitted the local equivalents of the country cadres back in England ...They took afternoon tea as in England, dressed as in England, and applauded politely as in England ... At the other end of the scale the poor blacks packed the outer regions of the grounds, drank hard, shouted hard and saw spectating as a direct form of involvement, as another form of carnival”.

With the English viewing cricket as “education-for-life” this type of behaviour by the black West Indian crowds was frowned upon as “the white elite frequently took black crowd behaviour as a sign of non-social progress with all the consequences of that for education, commerce and politics in the wider realm”. However, cricket in the West Indies was also marked with socio-economic divides that featured not only between the blacks and whites, but also amongst the whites, as the West Indies inherited much of the snobbery from the more pure articulation of the game in England. Cricket in the West Indies, much like in Australia, was also seen as a way for the white elites to feel
comfortable in their new, sometimes hostile surroundings and provided “a link with the culture of home” (Stoddart, 1998: 82-83).

In India, in contrast, cricket was to take on various sub-dimensions due to class, race, gender and religious differences. The British in India saw cricket as a chance “to cement the relationship between them and their colony,” although cricket in colonial India often served to “divide as much as it served to unite ruler and ruled” (Guha, 1997: 176-177). As Majumdar (2003: 163) notes of the work of Guha (2002), cricket in India was said to emerge with an “indigenized brand of nationalism”, further noting that, “turning the colonial ideology on its head, resistance and subversion were often dominant in the second phase of the histories of British games in the colonies”.

Similarly Sen (2001: 238) believes that Indian cricket nationalism started not only as anti-colonial sentiments, but also due to “England's need for nationally defined opponents on the playing field”. He further contends that “cricket has long been regarded a forum for contests over race, culture, gender and moral authority in the British Empire/Commonwealth. Even as the game has functioned as an instrument for the assertion (and defense) of English-elite-male models of authority, the colonized and the decolonizing have attempted to subvert or to capture this authority … These attempts have been resisted by the defenders of the old center, by co-option if possible but also, if necessary by casting aspirations on the morality, masculinity, or centrality of the challenger”.

For Sen (2001: 237), “cricket in the decolonizing world functions as a metaphor of war between the old and new world metropoles and simultaneously provides small or marginalized countries a means of overcoming their marginality in global popular culture”. According to Sen, England has now moved to the periphery of world cricket as demonstrated by their fading reputation as a strong side and its declining influence in international regulatory bodies such as the International Cricket Council.

In most parts of Africa cricket has never really been that popular. This is largely attributed to the small numbers of white settlers and because the Victorian public school ethos never really took root. South Africa and Zimbabwe were, and still are, the main cricket playing nations in Africa. However, countries such as Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda have recently started showing signs of developing into promising cricketing nations (Sandiford, 1998: 4).

According to Merrit and Nauright (1998: 57), South Africa encompassed the full range of social,
cultural, political, racial and gender problems which existed throughout the British empire. They further note that “cricket in South Africa represented British imperialist ideology and, increasingly a racist exclusivism”. This was articulated in segregated schools and clubs whose purpose was to demonstrate “solidarity, superiority and apartness”. The whites in South Africa were said to “dispense English culture as the measure of social acceptability” and this was said to include “a sense of cultural, moral power and superiority”.

It was not South Africa who invented notions of racial exclusivity in sport and other social activities, but rather the English who refused to mix with “racial inferiors”. Rather, cricket and rugby were a means of creating unity amongst the whites and to maintain social distance from the rest of the population, as South Africa often showed what is described as “common frontier behaviour insisting upon religious, moral and cultural barriers between itself and its neighbours” (Merrit and Nauright, 1998: 57).

Andre Odendaal (2003) contends that black cricket in South Africa has a history which stretches 150 years back and that blacks in South Africa have played the game as long as whites have played it. The central thesis running through Odendaal’s book, The African Game, is that the rather Eurocentric history of cricket in South Africa needs to be re-articulated taking into account the games black history in South Africa as well.

Historically, the main centre for black cricket in South Africa was the Eastern Cape in which cricket was given a central role in education through the mission school system instilled by the colonizers. Recreation was given a central role, because the many amusements of Africans were seen as “incompatible with Christian purity of life”. The agents of imperialism in South Africa, much like elsewhere in the British empire, were missionaries, teachers, traders and farmers as they moved into African territories, “bringing the indigenous people into contact with alien ideas and institutions from Europe” (Odendaal, 2003: 31-32).

The dispersion of cricket in South Africa was not only to occur through the schooling system instilled by the colonizers, but “Xhosa speakers were also being introduced to cricket in informal ways outside of the educational system”. For example African speakers were apparently avid spectators at the cricket matches staged during the 1850's in the towns that were being built in conquered African territories. However, with the new colonists having an influence on African society new forms of African consciousness were said to arise. The black peasant farmers were said to develop into a whole new class or strata of society, a rising black middle class. Sport was
seen as central to this process of assimilation and mobilization. It was said to be one of the aspects of British culture that the new elites adopted to promote their goals of ensuring the full participation of Africans in the new colonial society. Cricket was seen as being central in this role “because it embodied a perfect system of ethics and morals for the Victorians” (Odendaal, 2003: 35).

Political leaders were also often members of the sports clubs; and rank in the sporting arena was said to add to their status in other spheres of life and demonstrated their commitment to community development at a time when people were building a framework for “interrelated activities based on western models”. In addition to this “the emergent black leadership was intent on using sport as an instrument of improvement and assimilation. By enthusiastically playing the most gentlemanly of games, they intended to demonstrate their ability to adopt and assimilate European culture - and by extension - to show their fitness to be accepted as full citizens in Cape society. Through sport they could pay homage to the ideas of civilization, progress, Christianity, and Empire that were so precious to the Victorians and call for imperial concepts of 'fair play' to be respected” (Odendaal, 2003: 35). Even Mandela in the foreword of Odendaal’s book writes of his experiences at Healdtown College in the late 1930's, stating that: “The educated Englishman was our model; what we aspired to be were 'black Englishmen,' as we were sometimes derisively called. We were taught and – believed that – the best ideas were English ones. In line with these ideas, sport particularly cricket, was given a high priority”.

Meanwhile, very little has been written about cricket in Zimbabwe, although it has been established that the early pioneers who crossed the Limpopo in 1880 had space for cricket bats in their ox wagons and the game was to develop in Zimbabwe according to English interests (Winch, 1983: 1). However, even today much like in South Africa, Zimbabwean cricket has remained a predominantly white sport in a country in which the majority of the population is black.

2.2 History of the Cricket World Cup

The 2003 Cricket World Cup hosted by South Africa, Zimbabwe and Kenya was the first World Cup to be held on African soil. It was also the largest tournament in the history of the games. It presented an historic opportunity to import the games to areas of a continent where cricket has never really been very popular and has often come to represent British imperialism and white domination. More specifically though, what makes the “African World Cup” so significant is that it contrasts quite starkly with the white, colonialisit ideology underpinning cricket and the World Cup itself. The ever expanding format of the World Cup is also reminiscent of the ICC's attempts to
move the game away from its traditional image and keep abreast with the ever evolving face of modern cricket.

Historically, the World Cup itself was actually instrumental in fostering the white, colonial image of cricket as the initial idea of a Cricket World Cup actually came from a South African mining millionaire named Abe Bailey, who had played for Transvaal in the Currie Cup and strongly believed that cricket “strengthened the bonds of the Empire”. Thus, the initial purpose of the first World Cup in 1912 was to unite the “white” colonies of Australia and South Africa with Britain (Young, 13 March 2003). The power of South Africa’s gold was apparently instrumental in setting up the 1912 tournament. The founding of the Imperial Cricket Council by Bailey also tied South Africa firmly into the international cricketing fixture list (Merrit and Nauright, 1998: 64).

Hence the first attempt at a Cricket World Cup took place in the “home of cricket” in 1912 and was initiated by a South African. It is quite interesting to note that by comparison, the first attempts at a Soccer World Cup were apparently only made in 1930 in Uruguay and featured a number of 13 teams (Morgan, 24 July 2003), pointing to much more eclectic and cosmopolitan early beginnings of the sport of soccer, devoid of the direct symbolism of British Imperialism.

Nevertheless, the concept of a Cricket World Cup lay dormant from 1912 to 1975 due to various practical constraints. However, it was reawakened in 1975 by the increasing commercialization of international cricket and the rising prominence of colonies as both cricket playing nations and as independent political entities within the Commonwealth. By 1975 the international cricketing scene had diversified sufficiently for a handful of colonies to provide sufficient competition for the trophy of cricketing world champions.

Therefore, the Cricket World Cup in the format we know it today, only actually came into full realization in 1975 and were to be hosted in England again. It featured the six recognized cricket playing nations: England, Australia, New Zealand, West Indies, Pakistan and India. South Africa did not take part in this tournament due to its exclusion from international sport because of apartheid (Morgan, 2003) and Zimbabwe was also boycotted from international cricket due to the civil war in Zimbabwe.

Nevertheless, the games were to be maintained as an exclusively English creation as it was to be hosted in England well into the 1980's, underscoring the colonialist ideology underlying the World Cup. Held quadrennially, it was only as late as 1987 when the games were to be hosted outside of
England for the first time and held in India and Pakistan. Two cricket mad countries who played the game at least equally as well as their Anglo-Saxon counterparts and had often used cricket to foster good relations with England. Perhaps most memorable of these was when the Indian Prince declared that “cricket is certainly among the most powerful links that keep our empire together” (Young, 12 March 2003). Nevertheless, the decision to award the games to Asia once again illustrates the rising prominence of British colonies as independent political entities, and more pertinent in the case of Asia, the increasingly commercialization of sport, as Asia, particularly India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, generates most of international cricket’s finances.

The next games in 1992 were to be hosted by the established “white” colonies of Australia and New Zealand and with an ever expanding format countries on the periphery of world cricket were to be included. From 1912 to 1992 the Cricket World Cup had gone from only three “white” countries of Australia, South Africa and England to a total of nine teams. South Africa had just re-entered international cricket in time to join this tournament.

The 1996 tournament was again to be hosted in Asia after a strong bid was put in for a regionally hosted World Cup between Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka (Bacher, 2002). This would be the second time the games were to be hosted in Asia in a very short time since England decided to allow former colonies to host the event, and once again bears stark testimony to the lucrative nature of cricket on the sub-continent. However, it is interesting to note that by contrast to Asia hosting the games twice, until 2003 the games were never hosted on the African continent. Besides illustrating the fact that cricket has never been very lucrative or popular in Africa, and that South Africa was boycotted till 1990 and were the most obvious candidates to carry the mantle for an African hosted World Cup, the West Indies who were very much at the forefront of international cricket in the Seventies and Eighties also never got a chance to host the games. Of all the established cricket playing nations, the World Cup up until 2003 was never hosted within the “black” strongholds of the British Empire, Africa or the West Indies, perhaps further elucidating the old white, colonialist ideology of the game. The next tournament in 1999 was to be hosted in England again and that would have been the fourth time the games were to be hosted in England out of the nine held thus far.

Finally, in 2003 the World Cup was to be hosted in Africa, almost a century after its initial conception by a South African. The World Cup had come to the continent in which cricket had often come to represent cultural colonialism and presented an historic opportunity to import it to all areas of a continent in which cricket has never been very popular.
Moreover, the “African World Cup” was to be the largest Cricket World Cup ever with a total of 14 teams. It was also to be the largest international sports event held in Africa up to date. The format of the games had to be extended due to the ICC's attempts to globalize the game. There was to be a total of 54 matches over the span of six weeks on 15 different cricket grounds. Forty six matches were scheduled for South Africa, six in Zimbabwe and two in Kenya. It was also expected that a total of one billion viewers in 60 different countries would watch the event, with over 800 000 live spectators (SupersportZone, 24 July 2003).

2.3 South Africa's exclusion from international sport

South Africa was to take a leading role in trying to maintain the white, colonial image of cricket as early as 1898/99 when the all white SACA banned an Indian cricket player, Ranji, of notable repute with a test average of 44.95, from touring South Africa. The South African Cricket Association wrote to England stating that “his appearance ... would create certain embarrassment,” and the England administrators were said to bow to South Africa's requests. Thirty years later, Ranji's nephew Duleepsinhji was kept away from playing South Africans when they were touring England (Young, 12 March 2003). Only whites could play cricket for South Africa and in 172 tests between 1888 and 1970 South Africa only played against white countries (Odendaal, 2003: 10).

Although blacks, coloureds and Asians had been playing cricket before the early 1900's, in the early 1900's they started “developing their own form of culture in opposition to the white domination” in South Africa. Many non-racial sporting organizations were established, such as the South African Coloured Cricket Board, the Malay Board and the Bantu Cricket Board. The latter was abandoned in 1932 due to differences between the black cricket administrations under the forces of separationists policies. Then in 1948 when the National Party came into existence with the formal realization of apartheid “the status quo survived” (Merrit and Nauright, 1998: 66-67).

However, as Merrit and Nauright (1998: 67-68) note, “the post war period was one of resistance to the prevailing social orthodoxy and the imperial heritage. Within black and liberation politics interracial alliances were made and this was reflected gradually in cricket” as from 1945 when SACBOC, which was an umbrella organization representing non-racial sportsmen, worked to reunify black cricket. SASA also worked in collaboration with SACBOC and put pressure on the white SACA and the ICC to recognize the non-racial players. Pressure from these two organizations caused India, Pakistan and the West Indies to question the position of white South
Africa in the ICC, causing fractures within the ICC amongst the white and non-white cricket playing nations.

The blatant white supremacy of the game becomes very apparent in the ICC’s historic protection of apartheid South Africa and their special relationship with the pre-dominantly “white” colonies of South Africa and Australia. The ICC was for a long time seen as protecting apartheid South Africa by maintaining their member nation status within the body and trying to foster links through cricket; and disputes of apartheid South Africa's cricket playing status would often find their more formalized political articulation within the Commonwealth, with Pakistan, India and the West Indies objecting to playing cricket in South Africa because of its race policies. This is quite clearly demonstrated by the fact that after South Africa was banned from the Commonwealth and lost their membership within the ICC, so-called rebel tours could only initially be organized from the Anglo-Saxon cricket playing world. However, after the formal realization of apartheid and its extension into South African sporting practices were leading to increasing alienation in the cricketing world, South Africa still managed to maintain its links to the empire through the sport of cricket.

By 1956 South Africa's race policies in sport were becoming formalized in legislation. The first and most noticeable of these appears to be when the Minister of Interior announced that “while the government was most sympathetic towards and anxious to help ‘legitimate Non-Europeans sporting activities,’ these sporting activities must comply with the policies of separate development. Whites and Non-whites should organize their sporting activities separately and there should be no interracial competitions within the Republic’s borders, mixing of races in teams should be avoided; and sportsmen from other lands should respect the country’s customs as she respected theirs. Within this framework, Non-whites sports men from outside would not be debarred from entering South Africa to compete with non-whites” (Draper, 1963: 6).

Throughout the 1950's, inspite of its race policies, South Africa were still accepted into the ICC due the white, colonial bonds which had pervaded international cricket. By the 1960's the political climate towards South Africa within the ICC was changing. Even though South Africa had been instrumental in setting up the ICC, Foster Bowly, stated in 1961 that if South Africa wanted to maintain its test status it should leave the ICC upon departing from the Commonwealth after which all the matches played with them will be deemed unofficial. The final decision of the ICC was one which allowed the prevailing status quo to remain while appearing as if it was trying to deal with change and placate the anti-South African elements within the body. Australia was said to be supporting South Africa, stating that any games they play with them will be deemed official (Merrit
Yet, South Africa were to prove the architects of their own exclusion from international sports, particularly after the Basil D'Oliveira affair. Basil D'Oliveira was a talented South African coloured cricketer who left South Africa to play cricket in England in 1960. In 1968 D'Oliveira was chosen to play for England in a tour of South Africa. In order to avoid embarrassment his selection was said to be the reason for Prime Minister John Vorsters' cancellation of the tour. This event is reputed to have preempted South Africa's isolation from world cricket (Black, 1999: 216).

By the 1970's South Africa's race policies had led them to isolation in the sporting world and its symbolic ties with the white cricket playing nations had given way to commercial expediency (Merrit and Nauright, 1998: 73). The bonds of the old white empire, were becoming increasingly hard to bear as South Africa had caused much division within international cricket due to its race policies, while the face of modern cricket was evolving, with the “non-white” ex-colonies' such as India, West Indies and Pakistan becoming much more prominent in world cricket.

The shift towards the “commercial expediency” of international cricket, over that of symbolic ties within the white cricket playing nations, was perhaps most noticeable within the reawakening of the World Cup itself in 1975 just after South Africa had been banned from international sport. From 1970 to 1990 South Africa was not to play an “official” cricket match with only the occasional so-called rebel tours being organized. However, much of this was set to change at the outset of the 1990's.

2.4 South Africa re-enters international cricket

With the unbanning of the ANC in 1990 and the release of political prisoners, the international cricket boycott on South Africa was rather quickly lifted. South Africa was promptly reinstated in the ICC and in 1994 readmitted to the Commonwealth. By the time South Africa emerged from twenty years out in the wilderness, “the traditional links between the empire had succumbed to the commercialization of sport and the ideological bond that was once so strongly embedded in racial superiority had taken second place to political, social and economic power” (Merrit and Nauright, 1998: 74).

South Africa's inclusion into international cricket in 1990 is a prime example of re-entry into the sporting world precipitating the more formal political negotiations. The Commonwealth had an
official sports policy towards apartheid South Africa, namely the Gleneagles Agreement. At a meeting in New Delhi in September 1991 it was decided to normalize “people to people sanctions” such as visas and sports contracts. This led to India quickly renewing its cricketing contact with South Africa and South Africa were to tour India and the West Indies very soon after re-admittance.

South Africa re-entered the fray of international cricket just in time to take part in the 1992 World Cup to be held in Australia and New Zealand. Mandela was apparently the catalyst behind South Africa taking part in the 1992 Cricket World Cup (Bacher, 2002); and symbolically, South Africa's inclusion in the 1992 World Cup marked their re-entry into the world. South Africa was also to take part in the 1992 Barcelona Olympics before the political transition was complete.

However, with the South African government quickly realizing the ability of major international sporting events as a strategy to elevate the countries profile internationally after years of isolation and stimulate some much needed developmental and nation-building feats, it was not long before South Africa was to seek host status, having already acquired the rights to host the 1995 Rugby World Cup. Therefore, on the wave of the marketing power of “Mandela mania,” whose iconic status was central to the manner in which South Africa sought to market themselves internationally after isolation, South Africa was to move from absolute obscurity in Cricket World Cups to actively seeking host status.

2.5 South Africa enters bidding process

Instead of the long and acrimonious bidding processes which are normally synonymous with such major events, a few events were to play into South Africa's hands and provide a catalyst for its ascendency from isolation to host nation. Firstly, the successful early stages of South Africa's political transition had stood it in good stead to be included in the 1992 Cricket World Cup and Mandela had expressed his satisfaction with South Africa taking part in the tournament. A chance meeting between Ali Bacher and Clive Lloyd, who was a prominent figure in the ICC at the time, was to prove beneficial to South Africa's recognition within the ICC and various attempts were being made by the UCB to transform the game within South Africa (Bacher 2002). South Africa was also emerging from a long and arduous transition period and needed something more than going to the polling booths to unite the nation. Hence, sport and sporting events were well placed to have just such an effect.

The significance attached to the Rugby World Cup by state elites was a prime example of how
South Africa was seen as appropriating major events for reconciliatory purposes. The personage and stature of Mandela, whose primary focus was on racial reconciliation and nation building, were pivotal to South Africa's reconciliatory attempts through sporting events in the early 1990's. Seeking host status for a Cricket World Cup would provide a platform for such a reconciliation attempt through a major international sporting event.

In 1993 the ICC decided to convene a meeting to decide the future host nations for the World Cup tournaments. South African cricket administrators lobbied hard for Africa to have its chance to host the World Cup at the meeting (Bacher, 2002). With South Africa having the strongest cricketing infrastructure in Africa, one of the benefits of the apartheid cricketing legacy, South Africa seemed the likely candidate to carry the mantle for an African hosted World Cup. In spite of the twenty years out in the wilderness, South Africa, because of its historical ties with the ICC, seemed an old favourite and relatively known quantity. South Africa seemed the most feasible link between Africa and the ICC. More specifically though, from the viewpoint of the ICC, hosting the games in Africa provided an opportunity to globalize the games and move it away from its traditional image. Hence, the decision to give the games to South Africa was officially made in 1993, but was to only be hosted ten years later in 2003.

2.6 Taking the games to Africa

The games were only given to South Africa by the ICC in 1993, but the concept of an “African” hosted World Cup gathered momentum. By the late 1990's it was decided to take the games to Zimbabwe and Kenya, and turn what could have been a purely South African hosted event into a truly “African” games. From an infrastructural and geographical point of view, Zimbabwe, being the only other test playing nation in Africa and neighbours with South Africa, seemed the most likely candidate to co-host the event with South Africa. Kenya was also rising in status as a one day international team and eager to put themselves on the map in terms of major events in order to try elevate their status internationally, and therefore seemed a likely candidate as well.

Over and above this though, the decision to take the games to Africa was consistent with a pattern of foreign policy initiatives by president Mandela's successor, Thabo Mbeki, and directly formed part of Mbeki's attempts to rejuvenate the African continent socially and economically through the African Renaissance (Bacher, 9 February 2003). The ideational power of the African Renaissance was to become the cornerstone of the image South Africa was trying to promote through the World Cup. The symbolic power behind the decision to take the games to Africa was threefold.
Firstly, it represented a growing trend by South Africa of the exertion of its cultural hegemony over the rest of Africa. The latest reality television shows, Big Brother Africa and the second Pop Idols including African contestants, are testimony to this increasing trend by South Africa to include African countries in sporting and cultural events. The exertion of South Africa's cultural hegemony over the rest of Africa is also consistent with South Africa's strong influence over Africa through commerce (see Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan, 1998). Secondly, the decision by South Africa to include African countries in the World Cup also represented South Africa's willingness to consolidate its national identity as an African state after years of white rule under the apartheid regime. Thirdly, the decision to take the games to Africa also demonstrates the attempts by the UCB domestically, and the ICC internationally, to transform the game of cricket and move it away from its traditional image.

The mandate of the Cricket World Cup organizing committee, put forward by the ICC, quite clearly sums up the developmental and transformational forces underpinning the “African World Cup”. The mission statement of the ICC for the 2003 World Cup explicitly states that they “aim to unite peoples of the country behind the event” and “use the opportunity to raise the profile of cricket in South Africa and throughout Africa and to develop the sport like never before”. The mission statement goes on to state that the ICC “wishes to contribute significantly to the lasting enhancement of the image of South Africa abroad as commercial, sporting and tourist destination” (ICC Cricket World Cup, 2003).

However, with hindsight, South Africa should have made a more carefully calculated decision of co-host, as the choice of Zimbabwe as co-host was to prove problematic for a number of reasons which will be further explored in the next section.

2.7 Political situation deteriorates in Zimbabwe

The Cricket World Cup in Zimbabwe presented a chance to foster good relations between Zimbabwe and the Commonwealth world, as Zimbabwe was often regarded as a thorn in the side of the British empire, and more recently the Commonwealth world (see McWilliam, 2003). However, with the political situation in Zimbabwe changing quite drastically from when the games were given to Zimbabwe in the late 1990's, to early 2003 when the games were to be hosted, the relations between Zimbabwe and the Commonwealth world had once again become an issue of much contention, and within Zimbabwe the games started to represent a chance for the government to
shore up its credibility and produce political propaganda through the event.

Zimbabwe officially became a British colony in 1923, predominantly due to British mining interests led by Cecil John Rhodes' BSAC since 1890. However, the interests of the white minority in a country in which the majority of the population was black was always under threat and in 1965, in order to avoid decolonization and a loss of ties with England, the white settlers in Zimbabwe issued a UDI. The UDI had sparked a bitter civil war between the white minority government and those fighting for African independence (Columbus, 2003). The civil war in Zimbabwe had stunted Zimbabwe's development in cricket and the subsequent imposition of sanctions had led to Zimbabwe's isolation within international cricket and a loss of ties with the British Empire (Ward, 1999).

The civil war was only to end in 1980, after which Zimbabwe then gained independence through free and fair elections. The Lancaster House Agreement was apparently instrumental in laying the foundations for Zimbabwe's independence and Mugabe's, then ZANU party, later ZANU-PF, won the elections. It has remained in power until the World Cup was to commence in 2003.

For the first time Zimbabwe had gone from an all white government to a black majority government. Cricket reflected these historical inequalities between the blacks and whites in Zimbabwe. Much like the apartheid South African team, the cricket team under the UDI government was exclusively white (Farred, 1999: 65).

However, after independence was gained and Zimbabwe's independence was widely recognized internationally, Zimbabwe was not immediately admitted to full international cricketing competition. Due to Zimbabwe's all white cricket side, the body governing international cricket within the Commonwealth, the ICC, was to adopt a policy of piecemeal concessions whereby Zimbabwe would slowly be admitted into the ICC (Farred, 1999: 66).

The Zimbabwean team in the 1980's had to host a number of B-sides from England and Australia. However the only condition laid down by the ICC was that they were to develop cricket for Asians and blacks in Zimbabwe. It was only in 1992, more than a decade after independence, that Zimbabwe achieved full international cricketing status (Farred, 1999: 66). England were apparently the only test playing nation which was not supporting Zimbabwe's bid for test status (Ward, 1999).

Quite interestingly though, the historic protection of apartheid South Africa within the ICC, due to
the white colonial bonds of empire, contrasted quite starkly with the treatment Zimbabwe received by the ICC. The ICC was always more in favour of South Africa playing a symbolically prominent role within the body, and English interests in Zimbabwe as a colony were never as prominent as those of South Africa. The more than ten years spent on trying to transform the game before Zimbabwe would be allowed fully into international cricket, contrasts quite starkly with the manner in which South Africa was so hastily reinstated in the ICC in 1990, while the political transition in South Africa was still very much in its initial phases, and even more pertinently, while cricket in South Africa was still very much a predominantly white sport. Clearly, Zimbabwe's slow and conditional re-admission into international cricket was not going to be a model for South Africa's re-entry (Farred, 1999: 67). This differential treatment given to Zimbabwe quite clearly underscores the manner in which Zimbabwe had long been regarded a problem within the Commonwealth world.

Nevertheless, the Victorian ethos of fair play and gentlemanly behaviour, and if one can stretch the analogy to its limits, good governance embodied in the sport of cricket, had quite clearly taken root in Zimbabwe in the early 1980's. The new government under Robert Mugabe, who had been instrumental in his country's liberation struggle, was quite clearly aspiring towards these British ideals. Proof can be found in the following comment made by Mugabe in 1984: “Cricket, it civilizes people and creates good gentlemen. I want everyone to play cricket in Zimbabwe. I want ours to be a nation of gentlemen” (Mail and Guardian, 15 March 2003).

Throughout the 1980's Mugabe's ZANU party was to try and eradicate the historical inequalities between blacks and whites and the broader political problems beset through the previous government. Democratic values were upheld. The emphasis of the new government was on helping the poor, forming small scale settlements and large orderly land distribution. Education was made free for everyone. Health facilities were built. There was an agricultural boom. Zimbabwe became known as Southern Africa's food basket. Zimbabwe was also given the responsibility for food security, communications and transport within SADC and a nation of highly educated professionals and administrators was said to emerge in Zimbabwe (Tsedu, 10 August 2003).

However, in the latter part of the 1990's the Zimbabwean government, and Mugabe himself, changed quite drastically as economic stagnations led to the rise of trade unionism and an opposition party, the MDC. Mugabe's later rule became marked by repression, economic chaos and intolerance (Tsedu, 10 August 2003).
It is with hindsight, that the quote by Mugabe in 1984 about wanting to create a civilized nation of cricket players, becomes so ironic. It was exactly Zimbabwe’s “ungentlemanly” status with regards to its human rights track record that was causing outcries from human rights groups, opposition parties and Zimbabwean exiles alike over Zimbabwe’s co-host status for the 2003 Cricket World Cup. Given the extent to which the Zimbabwean situation had deteriorated by 2003, many critics would argue that the colonialisn import of cricket in Zimbabwe did little by way of establishing the rules of fair play and gentlemanly behaviour.

In the months and years leading up to the World Cup, Zimbabwe had become a gaunt and elusive shadow of its former “bread-basket of Southern Africa”. Torture, beatings, rape, lack of basic commodities, droughts, agricultural mismanagement and an ever-ailing economy had become synonymous with Zimbabwean life. Mugabe, whose official residence is just a stone’s throw away from the manicured lawns of the Harare Cricket Club where England were scheduled to play Zimbabwe during the World Cup, was once hailed as a great leader and skillful politician. But he had now become largely to blame for a lot of Zimbabwe’s problems. His stubbornness in the face of international pressure, party loyalty above all else, controversial land reform policies, colonialist grudges and refusal to step down from power, had not painted a very positive picture for the outside world, let alone those opposition groups within the borders of the country.

Therefore, when South Africa approached their neighbours to the North in the late 1990's inviting them to co-host the Cricket World Cup, the opportunity of hosting such an event seemed to good to refuse. Preparations were promptly set underway. The state elites saw the hosting of such an event as an opportunity to elevate their profile, generate some much needed profit and display a fairly normal country to the rest of the world through the distant, serene images of cricket fields. In effect, it can be argued, there was an opportunity to produce political propaganda or score political points. As the Sunday Times (10 August 2003) recently noted about Zimbabwe’s newly found fascination with sporting and cultural events: “Soccer matches, music shows, beauty pageants and various other cultural events are being touted as ‘government projects’ in what appears to be a desperate bid to revive president Mugabe's flagging political profile”. Meanwhile, the official opposition party, the MDC, and various human rights groups suppressed by Mugabe’s regime, were opposed to the games going ahead in Zimbabwe. And yet, should the games go ahead, it could provide a window period or platform from which to voice their plight to the rest of the world due to the heightened media attention generated by such an event.
In a country where a loaf of bread costs about 80 Zimbabwean dollars and a toilet paper roll about 75 Zimbabwean dollars, no expenses were spared on cultivating the “illusion of normality” as the cricketing world was to focus on Mugabe’s show. 480 000 pounds were spent on upgrading facilities for the World Cup. Zimbabwe stood to earn 3.8 million pounds in television revenue as well as a percentage of tournament profits (Redfern, 27 November 2002)

Political events leading up to the World Cup were now having a direct impact on the games. For example, the controversial land reform policies instituted in 2000, which the government had habitually coloured by framing it through the unfair consequences of colonialism, sparked much deliberation about the suitability of Zimbabwe’s host status in the British media and had impacted upon every sphere of Zimbabwean society, sportsmen being no exception. The government’s controversial land reform policies had impacted upon the white Zimbabwean cricket players of which many are farmers themselves or have families who are farmers. Most noticeable of these, was when the father of the white Zimbabwean cricket captain, Heath Streak, was evicted from his farm and held in jail for 48 hours shortly before the World Cup was to commence (Majonga and Katiyo, 22 August 2002).

A few months later in March 2002 the allegedly fraudulent elections marked another distinctive event that resulted in increasing fears over Zimbabwe’s suitability as hosts. As a result of the fraudulent elections, Zimbabwe was suspended from the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth politics over the Zimbabwean crisis was to clearly spill over into international cricket during the World Cup.

It was indeed Zimbabwe’s former colonizer and Australia who were leading the calls for a boycott of Zimbabwe during the lead up to the World Cup, both strong forces in the Commonwealth and both primary movers to have further sanctions imposed on the Zimbabwean regime. The relations between Zimbabwe and its former colonizer had become very strained during the months leading up to the event. Perhaps most memorable of the more recent clashes between England and Zimbabwe being Mugabe’s, “Let him have his Britain and I will keep my Zimbabwe,” directed at Tony Blair at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002, whereby arguably, Mugabe was already showing little appreciation for the standard protocol of major events.

Nevertheless, the World Cup was also to occur at a critical time when the official opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai was involved in a trial for allegedly plotting to assassinate Mugabe. The trial of Morgan Tsvangirai was to coincide with the World Cup in early 2003 and was to add to the
likelihood that the opposition would use the games to highlight what was going on in the country.

The World Cup was also to intersect pivotally with a particularly turbulent time in international relations in general. As the British cricketers were battling hard to have the games moved from the home of a notorious Southern African dictator, much against the will of the global cricketing authorities, their military counterparts were preparing to march towards Baghdad to bring down another notorious dictator in the Middle East, much against the will of the United Nations. However, in Mugabe’s case it was bats and balls doing the talking and not bullets and bombs.

2.8 The African World Cup

By the time the opening ceremony rolled into Cape Town on the 8th of February 2003, the success of the World Cup hung in the balance. Up till then it had been marred by controversy surrounding Zimbabwe. An estimated 86% of the international print media coverage before the event, focused on the political issues of Zimbabwe and Kenya's co-host status (Future Foresight Group, 2003). In addition, South African cricket, looking to become the first winners on home soil, only recently having recovered from the Hansie Cronje match fixing scandal and still grappling with issues of representation within its own team, also needed a boost. Therefore, in typically exuberant fashion, the opening ceremony had to lift the spirits of those entangled in the web of controversy and prove undeniably that Africa could host an event of this magnitude. All the dress rehearsals and costumes of “a true African experience” were finalized. The stage was set for a demonstration of Africa's prowess on the international stage, rivalled by no other seen before.

Amidst anonymous calls of a bomb scare, visually one could see South Africa aching to host the likes of first order events, such as the Olympics or Soccer World Cup through the magnitude and splendour of the opening ceremony. However naïve these monumental feats of organization as an instrument of foreign policy, it has become quite acceptable for developing nations, or nations on the semi periphery, to inflate and self-style second order events to a magnitude akin towards the likes of more first order events. Indeed, compared with the last World Cup in England in 1999, South Africa’s opening ceremony was more along the likes of something cricket had never quite seen. “Touted as one of the most extravagant opening ceremonies since the Sydney Olympics” by the running commentary at the opening ceremony, South Africa was quite successful in outstripping any doubts that they are not suited to hosting such events.

In spite of all the political problems over Zimbabwe, Dr Ali Bacher, Executive Director of the
Cricket World Cup 2003, remained optimistic and “promised cricket lovers world wide that the opening ceremony at Newlands in Cape Town would be the biggest event in the history of cricket and the largest production ever staged in South Africa”. Some were sceptical, but once again Ali Bacher was true to his promise with 25 000 spectators and an estimated 1.4 billion television viewers enthralled and entertained in a two hour live spectacular (Lane, 8 February 2003).

The kaleidoscopic array of animals, musicians and dancers reflecting Africa's rich cultural diversity managed to stamp a uniquely “Africanized” version upon a game bequeathed on former colonies by British imperialism. It sought to broaden the cultural base of the game and imported it to all areas on the African continent. Over and above this though, Africa was implicitly trying to subvert the values and ideals of modernization and civilization underlying the game of the former “white suppressors” by “Africanizing” the World Cup. Essentially, by using the game which most epitomizes British values and ideals to celebrate African values and ideals, Africa was implicitly trying to reconfigure not only the hegemonic order of international cricket, but also the historical inequalities between the Anglo-Saxon world and Africa. The bright lights, modernity and sophistication of the ceremony symbolized the African Renaissance, and served to reinforce this subversion.

Not only had Africa managed to stage an event of unqualified splendour and magnitude, bigger and better than anything the custodians of the games had previously bestowed upon it, but had quite clearly attempted to take Africa into the 21st Century through announcing Africa's arrival on the international stage. Through the human centred approach to stadium theatre, and culture of volunteerism, the organizing team was also successful in showcasing South Africans in all their diversity as thousands of volunteers involved from the surrounding communities, ranging from the police to the unemployed, danced in synchronized harmony.

South Africa, having managed to successfully negotiate the transition from apartheid to democracy, was also implicitly trying to project messages to the international community of its potential as an arbitrator or mediator in conflicts. For example, as Mark Lottering, the famous South African comedian who was hosting the opening ceremony said when confronted by a larger than life “big five” in his Safari jeep: “Don't worry everybody, I'm South African. I'm something of an expert when it comes to conflict resolution”.

However, as much as the South African government would like to believe these scripted sentiments extended by Marc Lottering, always looming under the bright lights of the spectacle was the
contention over Zimbabwe as secondary hosts. Strategically, Mugabe was not invited to the opening ceremony. This raises the curious question of why would one go to all the trouble of broadcasting the Cricket World Cup under the banner of an “African” games and not invite the necessary dignitaries to bask in the glory? It is generally the norm that international heads of state share the stage when co-hosting such events (Johns, 6 February 2003).

In defence, the ICC spokesperson Bongu Masisi said that they had not gone out of their way to invite foreign dignitaries (Johns, 6 February 2003). Nevertheless, this sort of behaviour is an indictment of the ANC's ambivalence towards the issue, highlighting the increasingly compromising position the ANC found itself in towards the Zimbabwean crisis, leaving it open to playing lip service to both sides when it suited it and ending up portraying themselves as hypocrits from time to time. In a broader sense, South Africa's inclusion and insistence of Zimbabwe as co-host could be construed as contravening a norm against human rights abuses and the World Cup demonstrated how the ANC was becoming increasingly uncomfortable towards this.

The opening ceremony also had interesting implications for gender identity, or a certain gear shift with regards to gender roles and major events. Traditionally women were reserved the right of “ornamental spectator” (Wamsley, 2002: 399) associated with major events, or in the case of the Cricket World Cup, adding to the aesthetic appeal of opening ceremonies. This was demonstrated by each nation at the opening ceremony having a model walking out in front of the team, “representing their nation,” upon doing their lap of honour at the opening ceremony.

It came to light in an article published in the Cape Times (24 February 2003), that the model hired to lead the Zimbabwean team was actually a trans-sexual undergoing a sex change. The article stated that: “Barbara Diop, a Senegalese national, came to South Africa two years ago from Milan to work as a female model. After her appearance at the cricket showpiece it transpired that Diop was a man and undergoing a sex change. Diop's former agency boss Neil Vincent said he found it 'extremely funny' that Diop was chosen to lead Zimbabwe at the opening ceremony ‘because Mugabe regards homosexual people as pigs fit for slaughter.’ ‘I don’t know what will happen, but the fact is that old Mugabe will not be happy if he hears about the issue and she is not even from Zimbabwe,’ said Vincent”

Symbolically, the fact that a man undergoing a sex change was fulfilling the role of adding to the aesthetic appeal of the opening ceremony marks an interesting shift with regards to gender roles and major events. In the contemporary era there are exclusively female major international sporting
events being held, such as the FIFA Women’s Soccer World Cup. Opportunities for women in sport have appeared to open up significantly within the latter part of the twentieth century.

The fact that a trans-sexual was leading out the Zimbabwean team “representing their nation” could just have been a bona fide mistake by the organizing team of the opening ceremony or by the modeling agency which allocated her. However, on the other hand, it could have been a deliberate silent protest against Mugabe because of his discrimination against homosexuals. Homosexuals and trans-sexuals are two different things, but it is also about how stereotypes can be appropriated to exclude certain groups without paying attention to the subtle differences.

The whole episode serves to highlight how authoritarian regimes can be embarrassed on the platform of major international sporting events because of their suppressive policies. For example, the black American athlete, Jesse Owens, who ran away with gold medals in Hitler’s back garden in the 1936 Olympics, can be said to have embarrassed the regime because of its discriminatory policies towards blacks. However, unlike Hitler, Mugabe was not present at the opening ceremony.

Nevertheless, South Africa was essentially successful in putting together an opening ceremony which projected the rich cultural diversity and potential of Africa on the international stage. With South Africa being dubbed the fastest growing tourist destination in the world in early 2003, the opening ceremony undeniably played a large role in projecting a vibrant, flourishing tourist destination, coupled with the fact that SARS was perhaps detracting from the allure of some of the more beaten tourist paths.

After the opening ceremony, which outspoken political commentators such as Max du Preez (13 February 2003) had commented, “was stuffed with lies,” because of the manner in which it conveniently ignored the deeper social and economic problems of Africa, perhaps the greatest lie of them all was yet to come, that of Zimbabwe's suitability to host such an event. Only four days after the opening ceremony the cracks in this sophisticated and civilized continent started to show, as the “home of cricket,” England, found it unacceptable to play cricket in Zimbabwe due to “safety and security concerns,” at what most people considered as a smokescreen for political reasons.

When minnows Kenya finally eliminated Zimbabwe after reaching the second phase of the tournament, Heath Streak, captain of Zimbabwe, directly blamed politics for Zimbabwe’s dismal performance. He was quoted as saying: “It’s been tough. There have been a lot of political insinuations, and it’s been tough for the players to keep focused on the cricket. These things do
have a bearing on how you perform out there” (The Daily News, 14 March 2003).

Meanwhile, the South African cricket team’s disappointing performances on the field, having lost to all the established cricket playing nations in the first round and then subsequently dropping out in that round, had not overshadowed the successful hosting of such an event for South Africa. According to South African Tourism, the country had cause to celebrate staging a “very successful” international event. More than 85,000 spectators are thought to have attended the games, with 1.2 billion viewers thought to have watched the games on television (Bua News, 24 March 2003). The overall South African economic activity generated by the event is estimated at R2.0 billion (Future Foresight Group, 2003).

Although at the time of writing the Zimbabwean Cricket Union was yet to establish how much it would have received from the tournament, they had already received $7.8 from the ICC, because of its status as a full participatory member country. The rest will come from the World Cup itself, in particular, from merchandising and gate takings (Kariachi, 28 April 2002).

There were congratulations and self-gratuitous speeches by politicians and cricket administrators after the event. And there were premature speculations that South Africa was now definitely going to get the 2010 Soccer World Cup. However, not many people stopped to ponder the effects the World Cup had had on the somewhat more elusive notions of identity formation and that of the broader prospects for democratization and human rights in Zimbabwe. The next two chapters examine these questions.

2.9 Chapter summary

This chapter has demonstrated how cricket has long been regarded a symbol of British Imperialism and white domination. The history of the cricket World Cup was also discussed and it was illustrated how historically the World Cup was instrumental in fostering the white, colonial image of cricket. From the late 1800's South Africa was to take a leading role in trying to maintain the game as a white, colonial creation. However, South Africa's race policies finally led them to isolation within the cricketing world in 1970. In 1990 the cricketing boycott against South Africa was rather quickly lifted and South Africa made their re-entry into international cricket.

After years of isolation and due to a deeply divided society, sporting events were being pursued by the South African government in order to try to unite South Africans and provide a focus for
national identity. Hence South Africa entered the bidding process for the Cricket World Cup in 1993 and won the rights to host the event in 2003. However, by the late 1990's the idea of an African hosted World Cup had gathered momentum and South Africa decided to take the games to Zimbabwe and Kenya. The idea of an African Renaissance was to become the cornerstone of the image South Africa was trying to promote to the rest of world through the World Cup.

The subsequent deterioration of the political situation in Zimbabwe was spoiling the chances of the African World Cup being a success. The World Cup started to represent a chance for the Zimbabwean government to produce political propaganda through the event and shore up its credibility. By the time the World Cup was to commence it had become marred by controversy surrounding Zimbabwe's co-host status. The event managed to go by seemingly fairly smoothly, and was hailed as a great success. Yet a closer analysis suggests otherwise.

Having outlined the case study of the 2003 Cricket World Cup from a historical perspective all the way to the end of the games, the next chapter will explore whether the identity formation invoked through the World Cup was conducive towards bringing people and nations together.
CHAPTER THREE:  
THE CRICKET WORLD CUP IN IDENTITY FORMATION

3.1 Introduction

“[I]ts about strengthening friendships amongst the nations of the world ... You're on our continent to make a statement about the inherent worth and dignity of every human being regardless of race, gender or belief.”

(Speech made by Thabo Mbeki at the opening ceremony of the 2003 Cricket World Cup)

With the official mascot of the Cricket World Cup being the symbolically black and white striped zebra, the “rainbow” of races was far from the chromatically unified pelt of one of Africa's much flaunted indigenous animals. The opening quote by Thabo Mbeki quite clearly illustrates the instrumental value of major events as an opportunity for state elites to use the games to bring nations and people together “regardless of race, gender or belief.” However, this chapter argues that major international sporting events do not always provide a focus for identity formation which is conducive towards bringing people and nations together, as is often touted by South African state elites. The Cricket World Cup opened a rift between races, both within South Africa's borders and transnationally.

Accordingly, this chapter will discuss the racial split within the cricket playing Commonwealth world over Zimbabwe's co-host status, the racial split within South African domestic politics over Zimbabwe's co-host status and, furthermore, the Cricket World Cup in racial reconciliation.

3.2 Racial split within the Commonwealth cricket playing world

As already mentioned, international cricketing disputes often find their more formalized political articulation within the Commonwealth, as the body regulating international cricket within the Commonwealth is the ICC. Belonging to the Commonwealth is therefore almost a prerequisite for playing international cricket. However, international cricketing disputes and calls for cricketing boycotts within the Commonwealth have often illuminated the role that race plays in forming group identity within Commonwealth politics. The cricketing boycott calls against apartheid South Africa by the West Indies and Asia in the 1960's at a time when the “white” countries of England and Australia were protecting apartheid South Africa by maintaining their member status within the
ICC, is testimony to this historical trend.

Similarly, the dispute over Zimbabwe's hosting of the Cricket World Cup split the Commonwealth cricket playing world into two camps, largely according to racial lines. Those who favoured a boycott of Zimbabwe were the predominantly “white” Anglo-Saxon cricket playing countries of England, Australia and New Zealand. While, on the other hand, the African countries of the global South, and also India and Pakistan had no problem with playing in Zimbabwe, and were indeed supporting the games going ahead in Zimbabwe. The World Cup was also to take place at a time when Zimbabwe had already been suspended from the Commonwealth and was being assessed for re-entry.

A cartoon featured in the *Mail and Guardian* (7 February 2003) quite clearly illustrates the transnational split within the cricket playing Commonwealth world and the effects it had on the South African organizing team and politicians. The cartoon illustrates Ali Bacher and Ngconde Balfour staring bewilderedly at a scoreboard illustrating the various cricket playing countries stances towards playing in Zimbabwe:

![Scoreboard Cartoon](image)

However, this standoff between the Anglo-Saxon cricket playing countries and the cricket playing countries of the global South is not only true of the dispute over Zimbabwe's hosting of the Cricket World Cup. It also resonates the current loggerhead position within the Commonwealth between the Anglo-Saxon and African countries over the Zimbabwean crisis in general.
The Zimbabwean crisis has caused sharp divisions within the Commonwealth between the African and Anglo-Saxon nations. The troika mandated in March 2002 to decide whether Zimbabwe should be readmitted comprised Nigeria's Obasanjo, Australia's John Howard and South Africa's Mbeki. The latter two are leaders of prominent cricket playing nations, but have distinctly different viewpoints on playing cricket in Zimbabwe, and indeed how to handle the Zimbabwean crisis in general, with Mbeki calling for Zimbabwe's re-admittance into the Commonwealth, while Howard wanted Zimbabwe's suspension extended.

The discrepancy between how South Africa's Mbeki and Australia's John Howard (or more broadly speaking, how Africa and the Anglo-Saxon countries) wanted to deal with the Zimbabwean crisis is quite clearly demonstrated through the discourse surrounding Zimbabwe's suitability as hosts. On the one hand, Africa chose constructive engagement with Zimbabwe, most noticeable in South Africa's stance of “quiet diplomacy” and later by “taking the games to Zimbabwe” under the banner of the “African Renaissance”. On the other hand, England, Australia and New Zealand, all prominent cricket playing nations, wanted harsher action taken against Zimbabwe by the Commonwealth, as manifested in their willingness to apply sporting sanctions during the World Cup.

Therefore, while the ICC was adamant that they did not want to “dabble in politics” and that they “would like to use sport to unite people” (Reuters, 7 August 2002), it was becoming increasingly clear that Zimbabwe's host status would do exactly the opposite. The Commonwealth politics over the Zimbabwean crisis was clearly spilling over into the cricketing world during the World Cup and being used as a terrain for struggle between those countries wanting to further alienate Zimbabwe and those countries calling for Zimbabwe's re-entry into the Commonwealth.

3.3 Political infighting in South Africa over Zimbabwe's co-host status

The dispute over Zimbabwe's hosting of the Cricket World Cup did not only illuminate notions of racial identity transnationally, but also within South Africa's borders. Zimbabwe's hosting had sparked much political infighting within South Africa. Just like Zimbabwe's hosting had divided the Commonwealth cricket playing world into two camps, so had South Africa's domestic parties been divided, once again largely according to racial lines. The ANC insisted emphatically that the games scheduled for Zimbabwe should go ahead. While remaining consistent with the overriding African motif, Thabo Mbeki framed all the talk of a boycott against Zimbabwe “as a plot against an
African hosted World Cup” (BBC News, 7 February 2003).

By contrast, echoing the sentiments of their Anglo-Saxon counterparts, the DA, South Africa's largely white opposition party, firmly believed Zimbabwe's hosting of the Cricket World Cup should not go ahead as it would shore up Mugabe the same way the 1936 Olympics did for Hitler (SABCNEWS, 5 January 2003). Once again this sort of discrepancy between the views of the ANC towards playing cricket in Zimbabwe and the views of the DA towards playing cricket in Zimbabwe, resonates their prospective stances towards how they believe the Zimbabwean situation should be handled. The domestic picture quite clearly mirrors the transnational split according to race.

Quite interestingly though, some people such as political analyst Aubrey Matshiqi, have derived some deeply introspective lessons from South Africa's handling of the Zimbabwean crisis. Matshiqi (2003) notes: “I have begun to believe that when South Africans discuss Zimbabwe, they are actually debating how SA is coping with its racist past...” The viewpoint that South Africa's handling of the Zimbabwean crisis has become some kind of warped barometer whereby South Africa measures its own transformation is quite interesting when placed within the political infighting surrounding Zimbabwe's co-host status.

The crude argument would be that those who are black are more willing to identify with Mugabe through some broader allegiance towards an African identity. They are prepared to buffer the authoritarian regime through notions of a diffuse “African Renaissance,” hence rendering South Africa's transformation well on track in moving from a white government to a distinctly African one.

On the other hand, white minorities find themselves increasingly excluded in this current formation of an African identity. They are not willing to “cover” for Zimbabwe through some affiliation towards an African identity, leaving them more prone to identifying with their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. This viewpoint becomes quite clear within the discourse surrounding Zimbabwe's suitability as hosts. The DA would clearly echo all the fears voiced by their Anglo-Saxon counterparts about playing cricket in Zimbabwe. But African countries would with a united African voice, reject the calls for a boycott of Zimbabwe.

However, within South African public political discourse in general, the Zimbabwean crisis has quite clearly reflected a great deal about South Africa's insecurities ten years into a new democracy.
Debates over the Zimbabwean crisis have implicitly exposed lingering racial disharmonies within South Africa. Essentially, Zimbabwe allows black and white South Africans to transpose their racial identities and viewpoints as moulded by the historical inequalities of apartheid, on a country which is just outside South Africa’s borders and safe enough to criticize, yet similar to South Africa in ways.

Mbeki was seen as attacking the British and Australians for wanting to boycott their games in Zimbabwe. This manifested itself in the South African government projecting its insecurities, and some might say reactionary stance after apartheid, on to the international realm during the World Cup. Implicitly, this demonstrated how the South African government was seen to still be grappling with the country’s racist past.

Therefore, it is not hard to imagine the divisiveness of the Zimbabwean issue within South African domestic politics, as it has the potential to pointedly stand out as a defining issue with regards to racial identity in South African politics.

3.4 The Cricket World Cup in racial reconciliation

Many have written about the 1995 Rugby World Cup’s potential and relative success at reconciling blacks and whites in South Africa. It gave the white population of South Africa an historic opportunity to “embrace the symbols, leaders, and the idea of a new, multiracial, democratic country,” essentially, “to complete the symbolic journey from the old to the new South Africa” (Black and Nauright, 1998: 131). The fact that it was a Rugby World Cup was also important. Historically rugby was predominately the game of the former “white suppressors” of apartheid, which in effect added to the chances that the white population of South Africa would identify with this reconciliation project. But also because it was rugby, there was a risk that whites might also be resistance to change by holding onto the symbols and anthems which had so long been synonymous with the sport (see Booth, 1998).

The timing of the event was also particularly important, that of 1995. South Africa had just had its first democratic election and needed something more than going to the polling booths to unite the nation. However, perhaps the most crucial ingredient to this project of reconciliation was the fact that Mandela harnessed the opportunity “to advance his own priority of national reconciliation” (Black and Nauright, 1998: 131). The symbolic power behind an “African” Cricket World Cup had similar reconciliatory dynamics at play to that of the 1995 Rugby World Cup. However, the
Cricket World Cup, with its more regional focus, was operating on a larger scale between Africa and the Anglo-Saxon world.

The Cricket World Cup presented an historic opportunity for transnational reconciliation between Africa and the Anglo-Saxon world. Only this time it was not apartheid that was seen as being the cause of this racial divide, but colonialism. Moreover, given Mbeki's preoccupation with Africa within international politics and his framing of the North-South divide as the “new apartheid,” the Cricket World Cup was more about Africa on the international stage forging reconciliatory links, than about domestic reconciliation, like that of the 1995 Rugby World Cup.

Therefore, to a large degree, the issue was still about blacks and whites, only this time it was on a broader scale, trying to bring blacks in Africa and the whites in the Anglo-Saxon world together. In addition to this, what added to the potential of reconciliation through the Cricket World Cup, was that much like the Afrikaner whites strong identification with the sport of rugby, to some degree, made them more willing to buy into the nation building project of the Rugby World Cup, the Anglo-Saxon's world identification with the sport of cricket is equally strong and could have had a similar effect.

However, this project in transnational reconciliation through the Cricket World Cup was essentially a failure as two factors were working against it: firstly, South Africa's choice of Zimbabwe as co-host and, secondly, Mbeki is a president who has distinctly moved away from a focus on the “Rainbow Nation” to that of “Africanism”.

South Africa should have considered its choice of co-host more carefully. The fact that it was a "Cricket" World Cup, laden with the inevitable symbolism of British imperialism, meant that Zimbabwe could not resist the opportunity to frame debates about its suitability as hosts through colonialism and served as a base from which race could be politicized. For example, Zimbabwe’s chief government spokesperson, Jonathan Moyo, stated that Australia’s John Howard and Britain’s Tony Blair wanted to “keep cricket white.” “If the British want to keep cricket as a white and colonial sport, then they should do so alone because we are not interested in their rubbish” (Reuters, 30 December 2002). Therefore, the manner in which Zimbabwe responded to the calls for a boycott by England and Australia reinforced the white, colonial image of cricket that had pervaded the game for so long.

The ANC voiced sentiments which appeared to reinforce what Zimbabwe was saying and indirectly
also served to reinforce the white, colonial image of cricket. For a more extreme take on a party’s position it is sometimes interesting to hear the viewpoint of their more youthful, often less tactful counterparts. The ANC Youth League came out emphatically in favour of games going ahead in Zimbabwe. They stated that they were “flabbergasted” by British and Australian attempts to deny Zimbabwe the opportunity of contributing to the development of cricket as a sport that belonged to everyone “and not just a few people from the developed world.” They also claimed that England “must take full responsibility for the deterioration of the socio-economic situation in that country [Zimbabwe] since it is a living legacy of the British colonial plunder of African resources” (Leader, 10 January 2003).

A Soccer World Cup would have been better suited as a vehicle to broadcast the African Renaissance. Soccer has overwhelming popularity in Africa. It is more cosmopolitan and has eclectic beginnings, devoid of the direct symbolism of the sport being so closely attached to British imperialism. Therefore, the debates surrounding Zimbabwe's host status actually ended up broadcasting a fairly dysfunctional, backwards image of Africa, one that is quick to harp on the past and remind the Anglo-Saxon world of “the nefarious deeds of their ancestors,” (Leader, 10 January 2003) as the ANC Youth League put it.

Both the Rugby World Cup and the Cricket World Cup had the potential to reinscribe differences between races or provide resistance to change between races because of the historical links of the sport in question. However, in the case of the Rugby World Cup Mandela was seemingly able to disguise the sport of the former “white suppressors” in a way that was mostly appealing to all races. Coupled with the personage of the man and his focus on nation building, whites and blacks to a large extent were able to identify with the sport of rugby operating in a new disguise. However, what was lacking in the case of the Cricket World Cup was indeed such a figure as Mandela to harness the games for reconciliatory purposes and in a manner that all races could identify with.

Therefore, in contrast, the Rugby World Cup quite clearly marked the rise of the “Rainbow Nation” with Mandela at the helm, a president whose focus on multi-racialism transcended the previous barriers between races. However, what the Cricket World Cup sought to project was a distinctly more African identity, with Thabo Mbeki at the helm, a president that has quite clearly moved from a focus on the “Rainbow Nation” to that of “Africanism”. This shift from “Rainbow” to “Africanism” was indicated through the World Cup, firstly, by the willingness to take the games to Africa under the banner of the African Renaissance, and secondly, through the visuals and symbolisms celebrated at the opening ceremony.
Although this shift from “Rainbow” to “Africanism” is arguably the natural conclusion to the evolution of South Africa's national identity after years of white rule under apartheid, on the platform of a major event it can prove rather divisive both domestically and transnationally. The Cricket World Cup proved that domestically this focus on “Africanism” could often lead to being construed as minority exclusion. For example, the official anthem of the Cricket World Cup was apparently rejected by the white musicians of the Cricket World Cup music committee as being “too African.” The row over the writing of the song “had divided the committee into two racial camps – one white, which says the music is too African, and the other group consisting of Blacks, who say the music is suitable for the occasion” (Sapa and Mfoloe, 17 October 2002).

The worrying factor implicit in this drive towards “Africanism” is the “revived awareness of race,” as Merrit (2003: 52) notes: “The popular idea that sport and Nelson Mandela can unite South Africa and provide a foundation for the nation is now far less compelling than it was in the mid 1990's. South Africans have shown divisiveness even in victory and in particular in defeat; and as Nelson Mandela's successor as president, Thabo Mbeki, is a man whose legislative programmes and attitudes have encouraged a revived awareness of race.”

However, in Mbeki's defence, it must be said that when he became president, he inherited the real hard work of economic and social transformation. By contrast, Mandela was president during the early phases of the transition period. His gregarious nature played into the hands of the immediate domestic reconciliation and nation building projects post 1994. By contrast, Mbeki's focus has been much more on economics and international politics.

Therefore, it appears, ten years down the road of democracy, South Africa's focus has moved from reconciling whites and blacks in South Africa under Mandela, to a much broader focus on reconciling Africa within the international realm, under Mbeki. However, this much broader focus, at the neglect of minority groups within South Africa, is arguably exactly what underlies the political infighting. Perhaps South Africa is not yet mature enough when it comes to racial identity within its own borders. When this is coupled with the idea that South Africa should play big brother to African countries through securing and organizing major international sporting events for other African countries, South Africa is left vulnerable to exposing its own racial disharmonies, through the varied and often implicit racially motivated domestic squabbling.

Transnationally, the shift of South Africa’s national identity towards “Africanism” can also prove
divisive, depending on the sport in question. For example, as already highlighted in chapter two, the overt “Africanization” of a game bequeathed on former colonies by British imperialism, was an attempt to subvert the moral authority of the former colonizer, by essentially using their own rules against them by celebrating African values and identity through cricket. This subversion through the sport of cricket emerges with an “indigenized brand of nationalism” and is reminiscent of what was experienced in Asia through cricket by providing some form of resistance to the authority of the colonizer (see Guha, 2002).

Nevertheless, besides the wider societal implications sport can have for society, issues of team performance are notoriously overlooked or pushed aside as being irrelevant to the broader societal implications. However, in the case of the Rugby World Cup the performance of the South African team on home soil was pivotal to enhancing South Africa's national identity.

Grundlingh (1998:75) comments on the performance of the South African rugby team at the 1995 Rugby World Cup. He states that: “The fact that the Springboks won all their matches ensured that public interest was kept alive,” adding that, “if the results were different there would not have been much cause for nationwide celebrations”. Grundlingh further couples these sporting victories with a broader societal “public mood” within South Africa shortly after a successful political transition to democracy.

Indeed, the fact that the South African Rugby team was able to take first prize during the Rugby World Cup in 1995 on home soil, added immensely to the signaling of a new era of champions over adversity and a certain “coming of age” of South Africa on the domestic and international stage, both politically and in the sporting arena. By contrast, the poor performance of the South African cricket team during the Cricket World Cup, having lost to all the established cricket playing nations in the first round and subsequently dropping out in that round, underlines a growing problem in South African sport and politics in general.

After readmission, South Africa was initially riding high on the honeymoon period of democratization. It was carried by the wave of “Mandelamania” and inspired by great feats of triumph against all odds, having returned from a possible civil war to democracy. The sky was the limit both politically and within the sporting arena. However, now that the honeymoon period of democratization is over, it appears as if South Africa somehow overestimated its ability to perform both within the sporting arena and the political arena.
The novelty of the “new South Africa” has worn off. Ten years down the line since the first democratic elections, the vows so gleefully exchanged between the wedding parties are bearing little offspring, leading to an increasing disillusionment with the new government. There is a state of mediocrity, both politically and within sports. For example, the pace of transformation within South Africa is still rather slow, while the South African Rugby team did not even make it to the quarter finals in the 2003 Rugby World Cup in Australia.

The poor performance of the South African cricket team at the World Cup also highlights how, post-1994, the sports of rugby and cricket have been on a decline, partly because of the shift in resources and training which were put into these sports during the apartheid era and the much more diverse allocation of resources to and training in sports in a democratic South Africa. The rise of the sport of soccer post-1994 is testimony to this trend.

Even the motivational speeches by Mandela during the 1995 Rugby World Cup, which were said to inspire the Amabokoboko and help them win the trophy, did not help the Proteas eight years later, as Zimbabwe were to get further than South Africa in the tournament. Mandela had tried to recreate the so-called “Madiba Magic” which was synonymous with the 1995 Rugby World Cup by giving the South African Cricket team a final motivational boost before their opening game against the West Indies at the 2003 Cricket World Cup; however, they lost that game. And failure was to become a trend throughout the tournament.

Symbolically, the fact that Mandela’s motivational speeches during the Cricket World Cup were not able to translate into winning performances, served to highlight the decline of the “Rainbow Nation”. The Rugby World Cup was a unique event and no matter how hard South African state elites try to emulate the magical moments of the Rugby World Cup, the right ingredients will never fall into place in such momentous fashion again. South Africa has also become much more business-like in its approach to major events and the more elusive notions of identity building through such events are taking a back seat to the financial incentives.

3.5 Chapter summary

Whilst it is normally the intention of the host nation to use the games to project images of unity, togetherness and friendship among nations and people, the Cricket World Cup proved divisive on a number of accounts. Zimbabwe's co-hosting of the Cricket World Cup had divided the cricket playing Commonwealth world largely according to racial lines. This also served to highlight the
current stand off between the Anglo-Saxon world and Africa over the Zimbabwean crisis in general.

Within South Africa's borders Zimbabwe's hosting had highlighted the degree to which South African domestic parties can still sometimes be drawn according to racial lines. The Zimbabwean situation in general has the potential to stand out as a defining issue with regards to racial identity within South Africa's borders and implicitly the debates within South Africa over Zimbabwe's co-host status illuminated a lot about South Africa's insecurities ten years into a new democracy.

The Cricket World Cup in Africa presented an excellent opportunity for transnational reconciliation between Africa and the Anglo-Saxon world. However, the choice of Zimbabwe as co-hosts served to reinforce the white, colonial image of cricket and, similarly, the manner in which the ANC responded to the calls for a boycott of Zimbabwe also indirectly served to reinforce the white, colonial image of cricket. It was also demonstrated how South Africa's national identity has moved from one of the “Rainbow Nation” to “Africanism” and how this can be divisive domestically and transnationally through major events. Domestically it can be construed as minority exclusion through the anthems and symbols celebrated at such events. The drive towards “Africanism” can also be divisive transnationally, as the fact that it was a cricket World Cup in Africa served to subvert the moral authority of the former colonizer by essentially celebrating African values and identity through the formats that were traditionally used to celebrate English identity.

This chapter further demonstrated how South Africa's poor performance in the Cricket World Cup when contrasted with the South African Rugby team taking the trophy in the 1995 Rugby World Cup, symbolically, marked the decline of the “Rainbow Nation”. Therefore, the identity formation invoked through the Cricket World Cup was not conducive towards bring people and nations together.
CHAPTER FOUR:

THE CRICKET WORLD CUP IN DEMOCRATIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS ENHANCEMENT FOR ZIMBABWE

4.1 Introduction

In chapter one it was noted that major international sporting events are said to provide an incentive or catalyst for democratization and human rights enhancement in authoritarian regimes through various pressures exerted on the host nation to reform politically for the privilege of hosting such an event. The Olympics in South Korea in 1988 is a prime example. Similarly, the up and coming Olympics in China in 2008 is an event that many have speculated would have a similar effect.

In this chapter it is argued that the effects on authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes by their hosting of major events, are not always pre-determinable. Accordingly, this chapter will illustrate how the events of the Cricket World Cup did not impact positively upon democratization and human rights in Zimbabwe. The first part of this chapter will broadly outline the significance of the World Cup in Zimbabwe and the effects of South Africa's stance of “quiet diplomacy” during the World Cup. The manner in which the World Cup impacted on the opposition party, the MDC, in Zimbabwe will also be discussed.

Ultimately, the focus of the chapter will be on an analysis of the ways in which major events are generally said to promote democratization and human rights, namely, through boycott campaigns, pressures from the media, the stimulation of civil society and protests.

4.2 The significance of the World Cup in Zimbabwe

In chapter two it was pointed out that throughout the lead up to the games and during the World Cup itself, the World Cup had become a much politicized event in Zimbabwe. It was to coincide pivotally with a particularly turbulent time in Zimbabwean politics. The situation between the government and opposition groups was delicately poised. The government had quite clearly realized the potential of the games to produce some form of political propaganda, by essentially projecting a sanitized view of Zimbabwe to the rest of the world. But the opposition groups in Zimbabwe had also realized the World Cup's potential for protest.
Some would argue that in a country where human rights abuses have become the norm, the opposition will reach a point where the more diplomatic channels leading to a negotiated settlement are abandoned or cut off to them. The opposition might then, through lack of alternative avenues, opt for widespread civil disobedience as its only way to bring about reform and reopen the channels of communication. This appears to have been the case in Zimbabwe in early 2003 with relations between ZANU-PF and the MDC hitting an all time low during the World Cup. The leader of the opposition was on trial for treason. Mass stayaways and food riots were organized in the cities in which the matches were to take place. All this happened to coincide with the Cricket World Cup.

The World Cup had the potential to place the Zimbabwean crisis on the front page of the international media again. The fact that the World Cup could also potentially open up channels of transnational human rights advocacy networks (see Keck and Sikkink, 1998), and create greater press freedom within Zimbabwe, meant that the time was ripe for the opposition groups to harness the games for political statements which would be louder and clearer than a hundred “illegal” mass rallies in Zimbabwe could ever broadcast.

However, in order to project a sanitized view of Zimbabwe, various measures were being put in place by the Zimbabwean government. The police and army were deployed to ensure no dissenters would try and hi-jack Mugabe’s show. There was a broad clampdown on opposition groups, as now more than ever the country had to be on its best behaviour. The army was sent in to disperse queues at the petrol stations en route to the cricket grounds so that people arriving would not see the extent of Zimbabwe’s fuel crises. The cricket grounds had become like police stations after threats by opposition groups to dig up pitches and plant maize on the cricket fields for the starving millions (The Daily News, 10 February 2003).

The measures put in place to create the “illusion of normality,” reminds one of the more notorious examples throughout history. Most striking of these were Hitler’s appropriation of the 1936 Olympic Games when all the anti-Jewish notices and slogans were carefully removed and concentration camps, which were already active, strategically concealed from the public eye (see Hart-Davis, 1986). Yet, in 1936 all the promises and measures put in place by government did little to convince the hardened critics of the Nazi regime that all was well. Not unlike those strongly opposed to the Zimbabwean regime, especially the human rights groups and the opposition MDC in Zimbabwe, who in the months preceding the event and throughout the delivery of the tournament itself were experiencing the brunt of a repression of noticeably heightened intensity. Mugabe had vowed to crackdown on those suspected of planning to disrupt cricket matches. MDC
representative Paul Temba Nyathi noted: “There had been a sudden increase of violence and arrests of MDC MP’s and officials and leaders of civic organizations since the beginning of the month [January 2003] as preparations for the Cricket World Cup reached advanced stages” (Mail and Guardian, 24 Jan 2003).

Nevertheless, the World Cup in Zimbabwe, like the Olympics in Nazi Germany, was fraught with symbolisms of “endorsing tyranny with a bat and ball” (Hain, 5 January 2003) should the international community decide to play there. For example, Tony Blair warned his players that should they go to Zimbabwe, they should “not shake Mugabe’s hand,” as this would be seen as a sign of endorsement. This caused the English captain, who resigned as captain of the One Day International team after the World Cup, to say that he had “lost faith in the authorities”. Perhaps Blair wanted to avoid a repeat of the blunder of the British soccer player, Sir Stanley Matthews, when he gave the Nazi salute at the 1936 Olympics (The Herald, 31 January 2003).

Indeed, what had become quite clear during the months leading up to the World Cup and throughout the tournament itself is that it was no longer about a game. Cricket had become the vehicle for protest. In a country where civil society struggles for room to manouevre, the World Cup had opened up a space, if only fleetingly, for so many voices silenced by the Zimbabwean regime to protest on the back of the Cricket World Cup. A game which is not even particularly popular in Zimbabwe, had suddenly been elevated to an issue of national importance. Much of the exchanges between political parties and pressure groups alike, was now centred around this one event.

Moreover, the fact that the games were to be hosted in Zimbabwe of all places on the continent, where Mugabe seldom turns down an opportunity to blame colonialism for Zimbabwe’s current problems, raised the pertinence of the issue even one notch further. Not only had the world’s cricket nations assembled on the African continent, but had chosen to play the game which most epitomizes all that is bad in Mugabe’s eyes in his own back garden. Left in Mugabe’s hands on such a platform, the World Cup could quite easily have become a perfect opportunity to further espouse his colonial grudges.

A cartoon featured in The Star (13 February 2003) rather succinctly sums up the political situation in Zimbabwe during the World Cup. The cartoon illustrates a game hopelessly in favour of the batsman, Mugabe, with the bowler, Morgan Tsvangirai, bound by a ball and chain bowling to a field in which the fielders are gagged and tied up. The caption above it reads “twenty two years not
4.3 South Africa’s stance: Keeping Zimbabwe in the game

“In international sports, the political protest is a much frowned upon maneuver. Better to play games it is said, to keep the door for diplomacy always open” (MacLeans, 2003:13).

This outlook, it would appear, has been the major premise upon which South Africa’s stance towards Zimbabwe has revolved. South Africa, who were primary hosts of the World Cup, have also been primed to play a critical role in diffusing the political situation in Zimbabwe. As the regional hegemon, a major trading partner, a force within the Commonwealth and having in its fairly recent past experienced the brunt of grueling sanctions themselves, it is believed that South Africa holds a strategically influential position with regards to mediation in the Zimbabwean crises.

However, South Africa came under much criticism for their inclusion of Zimbabwe as a co-host in the World Cup. Implicit in South Africa’s invitation to Zimbabwe to co-host the games with them, was the ANC’s persistent stance of “quiet diplomacy” with Zimbabwe, thereby “keeping Zimbabwe in the game”. The more umbrella notions of pan-Africanism were also present in South Africa's invitation to Zimbabwe, as Kenya were to host two games as well.

Yet, looking at the bigger picture, international pressure on Zimbabwe up till now has been somewhat inconsistent (Macleans, 2003:13). The EU imposed a travel ban on Harare’s leaders after
Mugabe’s re-election in March 2002. The decision was made after EU observers found the polling fraudulent. However, Mugabe said the voting was free and fair. He accused Zimbabwe’s former colonial “master,” Britain, of promoting an EU vendetta against him. In a separate move, the Commonwealth suspended Zimbabwe for 12 months from its meetings in March 2002, but stopped short of full suspension (CNN.com, 19 December 2002).

In addition, no sport boycotts have been imposed on Zimbabwe by any country. Yet, many critics had looked to the past and called for a similar type of boycott on Zimbabwe as South Africa endured during the apartheid years. During the apartheid era South Africa was excluded from international sporting events due to its race policies, a similar, yet slight variant of human rights abuses to what is currently being experienced in Zimbabwe.

All the indecision as to whether Zimbabwe should be boycotted or have their co-host status revoked, revealed that the human rights violations taking place in Zimbabwe are more subtle than those of the apartheid government. In the case of apartheid South Africa, robust anti-racist norms were applied which eventually led to its isolation (see Klotz, 1995). But in the case of Zimbabwe, the human rights violations are not so explicit as that of the apartheid government. Nevertheless, those who favoured a boycott of Zimbabwe repeatedly point out that it was an effective tool against the apartheid regime, begging the comparison.

However, Ali Bacher, head of the World Cup organizing committee and a South African cricket captain in the seventies who had personally experienced the cricketing boycott unfolding against South Africa, was quick to stamp out any comparisons. He claimed that the moral grounds on which South Africa was banned, had no bearing on Zimbabwe. “South Africa had a whites only team because of apartheid,” he said. “Zimbabwe has a fully integrated, multiracial team. There is no comparison” (Ghosh et al, 2003:39). Similarly, the ANC had been equally dismissive of attempts to compare sports boycotts of apartheid South Africa with Zimbabwe, saying this is “ill informed and hypocritical” (Cape Times, 16 January 2003). However, apartheid South Africa went through periods when they had players of colour representing them; and besides, representation within a national sporting team is essentially a rather superficial indicator of democracy, particularly if the main suppression taking place is not according to race.

On the other hand, Peter Hain, secretary for Wales and a former minister who was a powerful force in the sports boycott of apartheid South Africa, argued that, “although the Zimbabwe cricket visit raises different issues from apartheid in sport ... the common principle is that sports people cannot
divorce themselves from life and the moral decisions of life.” Hain further added that the sports boycott against South Africa was later confirmed by Nelson Mandela as having been a mortal blow to apartheid (Peta and Hooper-Box, 4 January 2003).

What did make apartheid South Africa unique was that all sport – from school to club to provincial to national level – was organized upon racial lines (Hain, 5 Jan 2003). This depth and extent of sporting discrimination were only paralleled by Nazi Germany’s persecution of Jews in sport (see Lapchick, 1975). This is not the case in Zimbabwe, as at least four players of colour have to be in the national cricket team.

Another striking difference is that Zimbabwe was believed by some people to have had a democratic election in March of 2002, unlike in apartheid South Africa when blacks were disenfranchised. This point was appropriated by the ANC parliamentary sports committee chairperson when shooting down comparisons between apartheid South Africa and current Zimbabwe (Cape Times, 16 January 2003).

However, many people detect a great irony in the manner in which the ANC is suddenly so willing to divorce sport and politics with regards to the Zimbabwean crisis, undermining the effectiveness of the anti-apartheid activists ability to marry sport and politics during the apartheid era in order to deprive particularly white, Afrikaans males of the sports which they so dearly loved.

The ANC once viewed liberal sport activists as partners in the struggle against apartheid. But now that they are in power, and a major sporting event on the African continent is at stake, this all seems to have changed. Therefore, effectively, within the span of ten years after the first democratic elections in South Africa, the ANC seemed to have changed its song from “No sport in an abnormal society” to “Sport and politics don’t mix.” This irony is most easily explained within the strategic alliance between South Africa as primary hosts of the World Cup and Zimbabwe as secondary hosts, yet one which resonates South Africa’s overall handling of the Zimbabwean crises.

The superficial argument would be that if the games were marred by politics and ended up being an outright failure, then that would also reflect badly on South Africa as primary hosts. Therefore, South Africa had to go all out in trying to quell security and political fears over Zimbabwe. However, due to the manner in which the ANC spoke out in favor of the games in Zimbabwe, suggests somewhat of a more tainted diplomatic stance. Indeed, the Cricket World Cup quite clearly demonstrated South Africa's stance towards Zimbabwe to be riddled with broader notions of
pan-Africanism and trying to promote African solidarity.

Many opposition parties were quick to criticize the ANC for forgetting what it was like when they were in the struggle against apartheid. In typically devil advocate’s fashion, DA spokesman Donald Lee said the ANC had forgotten that it led the sports boycott of South Africa when human rights violations took place in South Africa. Lee also stated that now that human rights violations are taking place as a matter of government policy in Zimbabwe, sports Minister Ngconde Balfour wants sportsmen to stay out of politics (Radio Algoa, 1 January 2003).

Ngconde Balfour, the minister of sport, strongly urged all countries participating in the World Cup to support the International Cricket Council’s decision to play the six scheduled matches in Zimbabwe. He added that “this stance was in line with government policy” (Peta and Hooper-Box, 4 January 2003).

However, in South Africa’s defence, and indeed the world cricketing authorities, when it was first decided “to take the games to Africa” by including Zimbabwe in the World Cup, the controversial land reform policies were not yet underway and the allegedly fraudulent 2002 elections had not yet occurred. According to Rodney Hartman, the World Cup communications director, the decision to take the games to Zimbabwe was made “either in late 1997 or early 1998” (Carew, 4 January 2003). This is a very important point seeing that both the land invasions and 2002 elections were normally identified as the major grounds upon which Zimbabwe had found itself excluded from the Commonwealth and indeed alienated from the international community at large.

Nevertheless, Zimbabwe’s secondary host status could technically have been retracted at any stage during the lead up to the event. All the indications were that the political situation was actually getting worse during the lead up to the World Cup; and, as this study argues, was in fact worsened by giving the games to Zimbabwe. Many critics have pointed to the political expediency of the organizing team and world cricketing authorities for allowing the World Cup to go ahead in Zimbabwe. Many question marks remain as to what factors were indeed weighted when giving the green light to Zimbabwe in spite of the deteriorating political situation. Max Du Preez (6 February 2003) observed: “[P]erhaps he [Ali Bacher] is so eager to please those with other agendas and so scared of being criticized as a white man that he lost his good judgment on including Zimbabwe in the World Cup ... Or is it true, that Bacher simply acts on orders from the South African government”.

58
There is evidence to suggest that Bacher was indeed under pressure from the South Africa government not to retract Zimbabwe's host status, as this would be seen as jeopardizing South Africa's chances of hosting the 2010 Soccer World Cup (Van der Walt, 17 February 2003). In addition to this, Ali Bacher himself also conceded that if Zimbabwe's host status were to be withdrawn, it would go against the African theme the South African government was trying to promote through the World Cup (Bacher, 9 February 2003). This goes a long way to explaining South Africa's unanimous support for Zimbabwe as co-host: the ideational power of the African Renaissance was becoming the yardstick against which an African hosted World Cup was to be judged, and a successful leg of the tournament in Zimbabwe was pivotal to projecting this image.

Therefore, as already highlighted in chapter three, South Africa's stance towards Zimbabwe during the World Cup was largely one of trying to project a solid African identity. However, this was often at the expense of the ANC being viewed as indirectly endorsing human rights violations in Zimbabwe. Implicitly, South Africa was also facilitating Zimbabwe's appropriation of the event by maintaining their status as a co-host and thereby helping to further entrench the authoritarian regime through the event.

4.4 Impact upon the MDC's position

The MDC is the official opposition party in Zimbabwe. Their ability to place pressure on Zanu-PF and open negotiations between parties, is vital for laying the foundations of a non-violent political transition in Zimbabwe. However, the World Cup in Zimbabwe appeared to have impacted negatively on the MDC's position.

Firstly, co-hosting the tournament made Zimbabwe look more normal. It is reasonable to assume that this detracted from the plight of the MDC. Coupled with the fact that the event was to take place while Morgan Tsvangirai was on trial, could really be seen as adding insult to the MDC's cause, or a total lack of insensitivity shown by the international community towards the volatile political situation in Zimbabwe.

Secondly, Zimbabwe's co-hosting of the Cricket World Cup also served to dislocate the upper echelons of the party at a critical time when the leader was in prison. The MDC experienced internal disputes as to whether or not Zimbabwe should co-host the event. Morgan Tsvangirai, the leader of the MDC, believed that Mugabe would use the World Cup for political propaganda. But the mayors of Harare and Bulawayo, both senior MDC members, wanted their cities to host the
games on account of the economic benefits it would bring (The Herald, 4 January 2003).

It is quite interesting to note that all the games scheduled for Zimbabwe were held in two cities in which the mayors were MDC members, Harare and Bulawayo. Be that as it may, the fact that the two mayors concerned, were seen to be endorsing the games going ahead in their cities at a time when the party's leader was in prison could not bode well for the unification of the upper structures of the party.

Rather ironically though, quite shortly after the mayor of Harare had endorsed the games taking place in his city, he was arrested with 22 city officials, and allegedly beaten by police. The arrests were made as he was to speak to 500 residents about water supply problems in the capital (Kelso and Meldrum, 13 January 2003). The mayor then obviously changed his story about games going ahead in Zimbabwe. He was held in jail for 48 hours without being charged and stated: “If they can throw the mayor in jail for two days without a reason, then they can do that to anybody or player. There is no rule in Zimbabwe. No one is safe” (Meldrum and Hoult, 21 January 2003). This sort of indecision and conflicting viewpoints within the MDC appears to resonate the oft criticism that the MDC is fairly ineffectual as an opposition to ZANU-PF and that Morgan Tsvangirai is not a strong enough leader of the opposition.

Thirdly, the MDC also bore the brunt of the heightened repression being experienced in Zimbabwe. For example, in the weeks before the World Cup at least 10 MDC members, including two members of parliament and one lawyer, reported receiving electric shocks administered by the Zimbabwean police (Meldrum, 5 February 2003). These torture tactics used during the lead up to the event, bear testimony to the manner in which the Zimbabwean authorities were trying to get information about plans to disrupt cricket matches ahead of the event. One such MDC MP, Job Sikhala, was tortured just before the World Cup was about to commence. His torture was allegedly an attempt by the police to get information about the MDC's plans for the months during the World Cup (Harris, 26 January 2003).

Fourthly, the ANC's insistence that the games go ahead in Zimbabwe also served to compound the ailing relationship between the MDC and the ANC. The MDC has for a long time been calling on Mbeki to take a harder stance against ZANU-PF and Mugabe. The ANC's unanimous support for Zimbabwe as a co-host served to further highlight the growing rift between the MDC and ANC in general. Therefore, in light of the above, one can see how the World Cup in Zimbabwe had a largely negative effect on the MDC at a particularly crucial time when they should have been at the
forefront of trying to foster negotiations in Zimbabwe.

Having outlined how events specific to this case study impacted negatively on democratization and the promotion of human rights in Zimbabwe, the focus of the chapter will now turn to interrogating the claims whereby major events are generally said to encourage democratization and promote human rights in authoritarian regimes.

4.5 The boycott campaign

Major international sporting events are said to be able to apply pressure on the host nation to reform politically through various means. One of the ways in which they are said to be able to do this is through boycott campaigns. However, the boycott campaign being waged by particularly England was not very effective, and in some instances resulted in unintended consequences.

During the lead up to the event, the English cricketers faced increasing pressure to take a moral stand by boycotting their opening match of the World Cup in Zimbabwe on 13 February. Tony Blair and John Howard remained adamant in their stance that their governments were against England and Australian teams playing in Zimbabwe, but had no power to ban them and would leave the final decisions to their respective cricket boards. However, the England and Wales Cricket Board found themselves increasingly in a “no win situation”: if they were to boycott their game scheduled for Harare they would lose millions of pounds, while they remained doubtful about how effective a boycott would be.

Meanwhile the British media were coming out emphatically against the games going ahead in Zimbabwe. *The Guardian* (9 January 2003) quite rightfully noted that, “one of the remarkable aspects of the boycott campaign had been the unanimity of editorial voices in the British media.” The article proceeded to note: “*The Sun* said that: ‘The issue is simple. Zimbabwe is a tortured and miserable land ruled by a tyrant. Playing international cricket matches there will create the impression that things can’t be that bad after all.’ *The Times* was equally emphatic stating that: ‘The England cricket authorities must recognize the inevitable symbolism of a visit, and call it off in protest at such repression’”.

However, pressure had not only come from the “home of cricket’s” media, but from all quarters of the British cricketing fraternity, not to mention former players, such as Gladstone Small, who stated that “Nasser Hussain and his team should stand up and be counted”. He added: “Sometimes we
need to look at the wider issues and not hide behind the excuses that politics should not get in the way of sport … The cricket authorities have made their decision, it now comes down to the individual players” (Manthorpe and Turberville, 22 December 2002).

The cricketers themselves did not want to get involved in politics. They kept on calling on their government to make the decision; and in turn the governments kept on asking the ICC to make the decision. Yet the ICC, driven by motives of profit and wanting to globalize the franchise of the World Cup, refused to move the games. The result was a long winded boycott campaign that had the end result of England withdrawing from their match in Zimbabwe due to “safety and security” concerns. But by then, with all the political insinuations and talks of a boycott, few people actually believed that the decision not to play in Zimbabwe was not a political one.

Nevertheless, working on the assumption that boycott campaigns and boycotts themselves are meant to encourage reform, through means of punishment, delegitimization and precedent setting (Black, 1999: 219-226), the boycott campaign being waged by particularly England to take a moral stand against Zimbabwe, was not very effective for a number of reasons.

Firstly, and rather hypocritically, alongside England's moralist calls for a boycott, British companies were still doing business with Zimbabwe, undermining any effectiveness of a perceived sporting boycott. Trade between the two countries was estimated at about 195 million pounds in 2002. Heath Streak, captain of the Zimbabwean cricket team said that, “if they target cricket alone, that’s plain hypocritical” (Ghosh et al, 2003: 39). The same sentiment made Tim Lamb, CEO of the ECB, come out strongly against calls for a boycott by the government. He claimed that it was “perverse and inequitable” that cricket alone had been asked to make a “purely symbolic gesture” by withdrawing from their fixture (O’Neil, 15 January 2003).

On the other hand, as a British government spokesperson argued, economic sanctions on Zimbabwe would be counterproductive because they would harm the ordinary Zimbabweans. “The problem is not with the people ... It's with the governing regime. A cricket boycott, the British government contends would hurt the regime - and Mugabe personally, since he is the patron of the ZCU” (Ghosh et al. 2003: 39). Sport has often been targeted for sanctions ahead of economic sanctions, because of its more symbolic qualities. It often ends up setting a precedent where upon other types of sanctions follow (see Black, 1999).

Nevertheless, if one were to draw lessons from the sporting boycott against apartheid South Africa,
“the approach to sporting sanctions was coupled with economic sanctions, which affected several other factors. Therefore, a combination of various sanctions played a significant role in applying pressure on the apartheid regime” (Pheko, 26 January 2003). However, the boycott campaign against Zimbabwe had no such financial backing, thereby, arguably, undermining the effectiveness of a perceived sporting boycott.

Secondly, when drawing lessons from the sporting boycott against apartheid South Africa, as compared to the current Zimbabwean situation, it is also important to note the different value attached to cricket, and indeed, which groups identify with cricket in the two countries. Black (1999: 220) has noted that “the potency and precise social impact of the punishment inflicted by the denial of international competition varied considerably ... as each major sport has its own socio-cultural identities and meanings”.

For example, it is argued that one of the major successes of the sporting boycott against South Africa lay in its ability to deprive particularly white Afrikaans males of the sports which they so dearly loved. Cricket in South Africa, like rugby, was traditionally perceived as a “white” game and much national pride was pinned on South Africa’s dominance in such games. South Africa’s isolation in cricket and rugby was said to be more painful and harder to accept given the dominance of traditionally Western allies in these sports. The ruling NP was believed to have come under strain from white Afrikaans speaking people due to the sporting boycott. The persistent efforts of the NP to maintain sporting links with traditional friends, while keeping the essence of apartheid intact, were also presumably motivated at least partly by a desire to prevent unhappiness among its white electorate (Black, 1999: 221-219).

Another prime example of sport being invoked to inflict pain, or at least a threat of pain internally on the white NP electorate, was during the 1991 all white referendum in South Africa. In its advertisements ahead of the referendum, the NP used the success of the South African cricket team straight after readmission. The NP would use pictures of the South African cricket team, asking voters a number of questions, such as, “Aren't our players on the playing fields of the world?” By doing this, they were hoping that whites in South Africa would continue to support the transition and subsequent negotiations (Nauright, 1997: 163-164).

The pressure asserted by sporting boycotts on apartheid South Africa, provides a fairly accurate indication of the effectiveness of the sporting boycott on the intended target audience, being that of predominantly white Afrikaans male NP supporters. However, what one finds in Zimbabwe is that
cricket is still predominantly a game that the white elites are interested in. Cricket as such is not very popular with Zimbabweans. The Cricket World Cup illustrated the white stigma which still attaches to the game in Zimbabwe, rather poignantly when police broke up crowds of mostly black would-be ticket buyers for a match in Zimbabwe, saying: “You don't know anything about cricket, go away” (Meldrum, 8 February 2003). Indeed, the game of choice for the black majority is soccer. One need only really look at the composition of race within the Zimbabwean national cricket team as an indicator of interest within the wider population.

Therefore, based on this assumption, cricketing boycotts, as an instrumental cultural boycott of Zimbabwe, would probably miss the majority of its intended target audience, that is, ZANU-PF and its supporters, seeing that most of ZANU-PF members are black and are not very attached to the sport of cricket. This is in contrast to the acute manner in which the sporting boycotts of cricket and rugby were able to target the NP and its white electorate during apartheid South Africa.

Thirdly, all the talk about a cricketing boycott played into the hands of Harare's propaganda machine. An attempt was made to turn the tables on the British and Australian governments by turning their unwillingness to play cricket in Zimbabwe into a colonialism, race issue, instead of being genuinely concerned about the political situation. This in part served to distract or foil the real political problems in Zimbabwe, most notably to draw attention away from the countries immediate food shortages and human rights abuses.

In this regard, it can also be argued that Zimbabwe’s co-hosting of the Cricket World Cup served as a pacifier to placate the rising civil unrest in Zimbabwe by providing the citizens with entertainment and a chance to be proud of their country by hosting such an event. In effect, its citizens could escape for a few weeks from the daily problems of food shortages and human rights abuses. Although the Zimbabwean cricket supporters were by and large fairly divided as to whether they thought the games should go ahead or not, Zimbabwe's co-hosting of the event also provided fleeting moments for Zimbabwe's national identity. However, the Zimbabwean public did not really have anything to identify with at the time, except the current enmity of the state.

Fourthly, as the more the long-winded and diffuse talk about an impending boycott continued, the harsher the treatment on opposition groups in Zimbabwe became. It appeared as if Harare was trying to prove particularly England's accusations about it wrong; and the longer the drawn out “war of words” prevailed, the harsher the Zimbabwean government was clamping down to ensure that the regime would not be embarrassed. For example, Welshman Ncube, the MDC secretary-general,
quite clearly noticed this and blamed the whole crackdown during the lead up to the event, “on cricket authorities who had reinstated pressure to move the matches from Zimbabwe” (Peta, 19 January 2003).

Therefore, essentially the boycott campaign was too wordy and indecisive; and while all the political posturing was going on, opposition groups were being treated harsher in an attempt to prove all the accusations about the country wrong. In addition, the fact that it was England that was causing such a fuss about playing in Zimbabwe, incited the government to clampdown harder on whites living in Zimbabwe. For example, a few days before the ICC was to give the green light for games going ahead in Zimbabwe, Mugabe said: “The more they [European governments] work against us, the more negative we will become to their kith and kin here” (Coltart, 3 January 2003).

In this regard, because it was a “cricket” boycott, with England featuring prominently in international cricketing debates, also meant that it played into the hands of Mugabe's suppression of whites in Zimbabwe, most noticeably the white farmers. It formed part of the broader colouring of the so-called “land invasions”. Therefore, one can see how the boycott campaign being waged through the Cricket World Cup, although trying to place pressure on the Zimbabwean government, in the end it appeared to have been rather ineffectual and did indeed have unintended consequences.

4.6 The media

The media's role during a major event serves to highlight the politics of risk involved for the host nation. This ties in closely with the potential for major events to backfire, essentially by the host nation receiving bad publicity through the event. The injection of media hype, coupled with the opportunity to showcase the country, could quite easily have the effect of quick and desperate measures being put in place to provide a superficial projection to the world that “the country isn't that bad after all”. This appeared to be the case in Zimbabwe as the nation was being put under pressure to hide the extent of the country's problems during the World Cup. Similarly, controlling the media is one form of censoring what messages are projected to the international community.

However, with an estimate of about 86% of the pre-event international media's coverage focusing on the political issues of Zimbabwe's and Kenya's host status (Future Foresight Group, 2003), the event had served to shore up a substantial amount of negative publicity for Zimbabwe internationally and just Zimbabwe's hosting of the event had a gone a long way in moving the Zimbabwean crisis up the international media's agenda.
Yet, even with the glare of the international media scrutiny, the Zimbabwean government would not allow full access to all media personnel and placed restrictions on what they were allowed to report on. For example, although the ICC had tried to steer clear of the unfolding political crisis in Zimbabwe, they did have to send a delegation to investigate Zimbabwe's suitability as a host in November 2002. Just before the ICC's delegation was to arrive in Zimbabwe a decision was passed by the Zimbabwean High Commission in London to refuse visas to two accredited journalists seeking to cover the trip. The two journalists appear to have been banned despite giving an undertaking that they would only report on cricketing matters relating to the ICC's visit and the World Cup specifically. Journalists covering the ICC’s trip were specifically barred from reporting on famine, the plight of white farmers and the suppression of political opposition and were not allowed to travel to other parts of the country. As one of the journalists who was banned rightfully quipped, “By banning the media the natural conclusion is that there is something to hide” (Redfern, 27 November 2002).

The much talked about stringent media laws in Zimbabwe had to be relaxed when the World Cup rolled into town, meaning that it would open a space, if only fleetingly, for greater press freedom within Zimbabwe. Groups such as, ORG, which includes many leading opposition politicians, gave warning that it was “highly likely that political pressure groups will take full advantage of the perceived protection of the press during the World Cup and use the event to highlight the human rights issue in Zimbabwe” (The Times, 11 January 2003).

In addition to this, during the lead up to the event, there were a lot of mixed messages being sent out between the government and opposition groups through the media. The Zimbabwean government would use the state owned media in Zimbabwe to politicize the event in its favour. For example, the state owned media in Zimbabwe, which is largely viewed as being the state ventriloquist puppet, would repeatedly appropriate information to further legitimize Mugabe’s clampdown in the face of growing threats of protestors during the World Cup. This often served to blur the lines between fact and propaganda, and thereby sending out mixed messages. Even random acts of violence or theft were readily appropriated as anti-World Cup demonstrations. This was done to shore up legitimacy for the government’s clampdown.

A good example is that shortly before the World Cup the ZBC reported that the murder of an Australian tourist was an attempt to debunk Zimbabwe’s co-hosting of the event. Home Affairs Minister Kembo Mohadi of Zimbabwe told state television that the murder might have been a deliberate attempt “to try to scare, or to try to justify what other countries are saying about
Zimbabwe" (Africa News, 9 January 2003). However, about a week after the murder, police arrested a man in connection with the murder. It was then promptly claimed that the murder had nothing to do with politics. “It is a straightforward criminal act by a gang we suspect wanted to rob the tourist of property,” Chihuri said (News 24, 13 January 2003).

Quite interestingly though, it appears that the government really did start attaching a lot of significance to the event and did indeed start interpreting all the civil disobedience in the lead to the event, as an attempt to debunk the games. This was often in spite of opposition groups denying that the unrest had anything to do with the games per se, just that the timing of the event was unfortunate. Therefore, it appeared that the importance attached to the event by the Zimbabwean government, added to the fact that most, if not all, protests in the immediate lead up to the event were now being seen as anti-world Cup demonstrations.

However, all the mixed messages between government and the opposition groups appeared to gather momentum and spiral out of control as it became a self-fulfilling prophecy by the government to clampdown and opposition groups to use the games to highlight what was going on in the country.

By the time the games were to start the independent media in Zimbabwe had quite clearly recognized the significance of the event and actively spurred on players and spectators at the games to use the games for political protest. For example, an independent Sunday newspaper in Zimbabwe carried an advertisement, “It's a dark day for cricket,” which urged Zimbabweans to boycott the games in protest, or to dress in black and white and wear a black armband if they attended it (Xabanisa, 16 February 2003). Through the independent media, human rights groups were also encouraging spectators to do the same.

Therefore, the role of the media in Zimbabwe during the World Cup, served to highlight the ambiguities and the politics of risk that the media can invoke during a major event. In part, the independent media in Zimbabwe was successful in spurring on protestors. They also used the relaxation on the media laws to their advantage and all the negative publicity the Zimbabwean government received through the international media went a long way to highlighting the human rights abuses internationally. But at the same time, the state owned media was rather successful in legitimizing Mugabe's clampdown during and before the event. Therefore, while it is normally the intention of the media to place pressure on the government to reform politically by hosting such an event, the state owned media can serve to counteract all the negative messages and use the
opportunity for state propaganda.

4.7 Civil society

Major events are said to benefit civil society through the extensive volunteerism and mass mobilization associated with such events. This is generally believed to bring a range of beneficial effects, such as the positive empowerment of citizens, which is broadly assumed to result in a more informed and empowered citizenry which is in turn said to be more capable of holding governments accountable (Black and Van der Westhuizen, 2003: 20). Major events are also able to stimulate civil society in other ways, such as, enhancing tourism, encouraging local business entrepreneurs or craftsmen, and spreading sports at grass roots level.

The ability of major events to stimulate civil society was well noted by one Zimbabwean player who offered a rather interesting alternative viewpoint to all the talk of a boycott. He stated: “Mugabe’s aim … has been to destroy civil society. [but] sportsmen, artists and academics … come here to rebuild it – so let the cricketers play” (Hartnack and McGrory, 30 December 2002). However, for a number of reasons this does not appear to be very relevant to Zimbabwe's co-hosting of the Cricket World Cup.

Firstly, the ceremonies associated with such events and which generally involve extensive volunteerism and employment of local craftsmen, were kept down to an absolute minimum in Zimbabwe. It would appear that this was not only because of the much talked about fears of Mugabe trying to coin political propaganda through the event, but also because of the fact that Zimbabwe were only secondary hosts, leaving South Africa's civil society to benefit (very broadly) from the games. For example, in spite of the overriding African motif, Zimbabwe was not really represented at the opening ceremony. All the volunteers and craftsmen involved in making the costumes for the opening ceremony and taking part in the opening ceremony itself, came from the communities surrounding Newland's stadium in South Africa.

Secondly, Zimbabwean tourism did not benefit much either. An indication of this is that not a single package tour for the Barmy Army was sold. The Barmy Army is a group of English cricket supporters who religiously follow their side all over the world. In the past they found it acceptable to go to Pakistan and Sri Lanka amidst security fears. But now they have chosen not to watch England play Zimbabwe on the latter’s soil. This is in stark contrast with the more than 800 packages sold at about 2 500 pounds to travel to South Africa (Petropoulos, 22 January 2003).
Thirdly, there were also no noticeable attempts made to spread the games at grass roots level through Zimbabwe’s hosting of the event. Major international sporting events have increasingly become synonymous with spreading the sport in the country in which it is taking place. By doing so, it is commonly hoped to rally new supporters and players and to particularly empower those in disadvantaged communities through sport, whereby involvement in sport can often instill feelings of pride and belonging. For example, the cricket teams visiting South Africa during the World Cup would play warm up games in disadvantaged areas in order to stimulate interest within these areas and allow a chance for the disadvantaged kids to meet with their cricketing heroes. However, security fears in Zimbabwe would not allow this.

Fourthly, perhaps the greatest irony of all was that millions of Zimbabwean dollars were spent on the upgrading of cricket grounds and media facilities at the grounds, while millions of ordinary Zimbabwean people were starving and unemployed. The World Cup, therefore, quite clearly marked a misappropriation of funds by the Zimbabwean government at a critical time when money should rather have been spent on the broader social problems in Zimbabwe and the betterment of civil society. It is possible that Mugabe feared that the strengthening of civil society through the event, would indeed strengthen the opposition. Therefore, based on this assumption alone, one can see how civil society would not have been harnessed through the games.

It appears that the people who really benefited through Zimbabwe's co-hosting of the Cricket World Cup, was indeed Mugabe himself. He is the sole patron of the Zimbabwean Cricket Union and would have benefited in terms of his stature as a public figure. It also appears that the Zimbabwean government was placing great importance on the games, not because it was particularly interested in its broader developmental potential, but rather because it could serve as a diplomatic coup for the government itself. And this essentially manifested itself at the expense of the ordinary Zimbabwe citizen's benefiting from the games. Therefore, in light of the above discussion, the potential of major events to stimulate civil society (very broadly) does not appear to have been the case in Zimbabwe's hosting of the event.

4.8 Protests

It is believed that protests can embarrass the regime at a major event hosted by it. Therefore, in order to avoid this embarrassment, a regime will put measures in place to improve its human rights track record; and a general democratization of the political system might occur (see Mannheim,
The threat of protests during major events ties in closely with the politics of risk involved in hosting such events. In the case of Zimbabwe's co-hosting of the Cricket World Cup, the protests taking place at the cricket grounds appeared to play into the hands of the government’s current suppression of the opposition and ultimately formed part of the broader silencing of dissenting voices. In spite of numerous assurances that the Zimbabwean authorities would allow peaceful protests to go ahead during the World Cup, the Zimbabwean authorities were not willing to tolerate any form of protest of a political nature or otherwise, at the games.

When the games in Zimbabwe got fully underway, protestors at the games were waving banners reading “Mugabe equals Hitler” and “Zimbabwe needs justice” and the Public Order and Security Act, which prohibits public gatherings without government’s permission, was invoked. Scores of protestors were arrested during the games. However, Ali Bacher stated that he had received assurances from Zimbabwean police that demonstrations will be allowed if protest groups had applied for and received permits (ABC Radio, 24 January 2003).

Whether or not the protesters had indeed applied for protest permits, is unclear. But ABC Radio (24 January 2003) noted: “Like most commodities [protest permits] in Zimbabwe are pretty rare. The government doesn't hand them out in a hurry and it is unlikely that it will stand back and watch mass rallies taking place”. While millions of viewers were watching the packaged images of One Day Internationals games back home. Behind the scenes at the cricket grounds protesters were using the games to highlight the human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. What was undoubtedly to follow was a series of arrests at the games scheduled for Zimbabwe, as the state’s suppressive apparatus was to swing into full gear. The first arrests taking place at the games, appear to have been at the game between Zimbabwe and Australia at Bulawayo on the 24th of February when only five protesters were reportedly arrested (Associated Press, 5 March 2003).

This number is relatively small compared with the number of arrests that were to follow. The protesters were becoming increasingly rowdy at the games as they were being spurred on by the independent media. The next major arrests at the cricket grounds appear to have been at the game between Zimbabwe and the Netherlands at Bulawayo on the 28th of February when a total of 42 cricket supporters were arrested (Sunday Times, 2 March 2003). One of the protesters who had not been arrested, but who was at the cricket grounds, was quoted as saying: “The world needs to know what is going on here. It was a completely peaceful protest,” blaming the ICC and world cup
organizers for saying peaceful demonstrations would be allowed (Meldrum, 2 March 2003). However, Ali Bacher responded once again by saying that it was World Cup policy that banners with “vulgar or political connotations” were not allowed into tournament venues; and the police confirmed the arrests, stating that “[m]ost of them [the protesters] were taking advantage of the game to display political banners, and five of them were arrested for assaulting a police officer” (Sunday Times, 2 March 2003).

However, the 42 cricket supporters arrested in Bulawayo during the game between Zimbabwe and the Netherlands, were apparently among some nearly 200 people arrested in the course of five days. In addition to this, it appeared the police did not want to release them before the next game against Pakistan so that the same people would not cause any further disruptions at cricket matches in the near future (Mail and Guardian, 4 March 2003). Quite interestingly though, an activist who was interviewed on the forty two arrests, stated that various plain clothed policemen from the Criminal Investigations Department were deployed during the games to walk amongst the crowd. The activists further noted that the police “only made their arrests during the lunch hour, when the media was also having their lunch and not paying attention to the stands” (ZW News, 4 March 2003). However, in spite of all the arrests, people still continued to protest at the games. On the 4th of March at the game between Zimbabwe and Pakistan, once again in Bulawayo, the police arrested another 24 people at a World Cup cricket match (Mail and Guardian, 5 March 2003).

All the arrests at the cricket grounds demonstrated how the World Cup games themselves had become fertile grounds for the Zimbabwean authorities to flex their suppressive muscle. Awarding cricket matches to Zimbabwe where crowds of spectators would be gathering, quite clearly created massive scope for the invocation of suppressive legislation such as the Public Order and Security Act.

Be that as it may, the protesters were not without their victory though. It was to be a protest by two Zimbabwean players that was going to set a precedent and inspire even the most “apathetic of countrymen” as one Zimbabwean put it, while another summed it up more bluntly, albeit crudely, stating, “it had given him the balls to want to do something” (Xabanisa, 16 February 2003).

The protest came from “black icon” (SupersportZone, 27 April 2003) fast bowler, Henry Olonga, and one of Zimbabwe's greatest cricketers ever, white batsman Andy Flower. The two players walked onto the field of Zimbabwe's opening match of the tournament, each wearing a black armband. They stated that in doing so they were “mourning the death of democracy in our beloved
country” (Vice, 10 February 2003). It was a particularly brave protest because they were directly on Mugabe's payroll; and the ultimate but discretionary sentence for treason in Zimbabwe is death. The protest was also particularly brave because, if the Zimbabwean players spoke out themselves, they risked not only retaliation on themselves, but also their friends and families (Butcher, 30 December 2002).

Nevertheless, an abbreviated version of their statement read as follows: “We are making a silent plea to those responsible to stop the abuse of human rights in Zimbabwe. We pray that our small action may help to restore sanity and dignity to our nation … We cannot in good conscience take to the field and ignore the fact that many of our compatriots are starving, unemployed and oppressed … We are aware that hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans may even die in the coming months through a combination of starvation, poverty and aids … We have heard a torrent of racist hate speech directed at minority groups” (Vice, 10 Feb 2003).

Olonga and Flower were applauded in the international media for the bravery and poignancy of their protest. MacLeans (2003: 13) observed as follows on the protest of the two players: “Their actions reverberated well beyond the games. As sporting protests go, it is up there with the black power salute during the 1968 Olympics, or Muhammad Ali’s refusal to fight in the Vietnam War”.

Although Flower and Olonga's symbolically potent protest had “reverberated well beyond the games,” the Zimbabwean authorities showed no sign of easing up. The protest by the players, while spurring on many spectators to protest, also appeared to have elevated the need for the Zimbabwean authorities to clampdown harder.

Quite interestingly though, the state run Herald didn't publish a word about the protest, while the also state run Daily Mirror carried a report accusing Flower of “selling out” Zimbabwe by striking a deal with his British county side Essex (Xabanisa, 16 February 2003). However, in spite of the tremendous pressure being put on both players to abandon their protest, they persisted throughout Zimbabwe’s games in the World Cup.

Indeed, the “snow ball effect” (Xabanisa, 16 February 2003) of Olonga and Flower's protest was becoming quite evident in Zimbabwe at the game against the Netherlands, where both players were the centre of attention. Take for example what Dean (1 March 2003) reported about the ongoing protest by the players: “[A] crowd of 3000 sang protest chants against the Zimbabwe regime holding anti-government banners. Flower had helped his side to 301 with a fine 72 ball 71... When
Olonga whose father lives in Bulawayo, came onto the field, there was a huge roar from the crowd. A Zimbabwean team source said he thought the publicity given in the international press, and in particular *The Times*, to Olonga’s treatment had helped to force the ZCU to allow him to field … There’s no doubt in my mind that this sort of pressure will have an effect on how the ZCU handle the whole Olonga and Flower affair.”

Ultimately, the two players appeared to have received different treatment for their actions; and as the tournament was winding down the repercussions of their actions were becoming increasingly dubious. The fact that Olonga was seen as being a “black icon” and the longest serving black player in the national team, seems to be the reason for the two players getting different treatment for their protest. It is almost as if such a protest could have been expected from Andy Flower because he is white, but the fact that a black player such as Henry Olonga protested in that manner appears to have heightened the sense of betrayal felt by the Zimbabwean government. For example, as Xabanisa (16 February 2003) reported, the players protest was considered a “white thing to do” and that “black administrators are angry with Olonga – reportedly accusing him of being a coconut,” black on the outside, white on the inside.

Olonga was once hailed as the product of the Zimbabwean Cricket Union's attempts to include more black players and as representing the hopes and dreams of many young aspiring black Zimbabwean players. But now the government was quick to disown their eldest cricketing black son. The Zimbabwean Information Secretary alleged that the players had been “pressured by the British and external forces” to wear the armbands. “No true Zimbabwean would have joined in that,” he said, adding that “Olonga is not a Zimbabwean. He is a British” (SABC News, 23 February 2003). This, however, is not true at all. Olonga was born in Zambia with a Kenyan father and a Zimbabwean mother. Flower was born in Cape Town of Zimbabwean parents, but has lived in Zimbabwe all his life (SABC News, 23 February 2003). Yet, this is once again a prime example of the Zimbabwean government putting a spin on the incident.

Olonga was subsequently dropped from the side. Shortly after Zimbabwe’s match against Pakistan in Zimbabwe, the effects the protest had on the 26-year-old black fast bowler were becoming rather devastating. Manthrope (16 March 2003) reported: “Henry Olonga’s international career came to an end with a secret journey to a safe house in South Africa. He was to hide until he is able to start a new life in a different country”. The article went on to state: “Seven plain clothed officers from Zimbabwe’s secret police arrived in East London ... However, their real purpose for being in South
Africa was apparently much more sinister than watching their country’s cricket game. Olonga had received numerous death threats during last month, but this one was different. He was told the officers intended to ‘escort him home,’ where a likely charge of treason awaited. The punishment for treason in Zimbabwe is death.”

Quite interestingly though, when Olonga escaped the Zimbabwean secret police and went into hiding in South Africa, essentially as a “political exile,” he made it quite clear that he did not feel safe in South Africa. Olonga was quoted as saying: “You have to remember that the ANC and Zanu-PF are bedfellows. I’ll feel completely safe only once I get to England.” However, the ANC was quick to react to Olonga's comments. A spokesperson said that “Olonga clearly knows nothing about the constitutional and political environment in South Africa or about the nature of international inter-party relation. His suggestion that his life could be in danger in South Africa is insulting.” Olonga was also called “delusional or supremely ill informed” for saying he does not feel safe in South Africa (Cape Times, 18 March 2003).

Nevertheless, the fact that Olonga called the ANC and Zanu-PF “bedfellows” is of more than passing significance. Olonga, a black player who had criticized the Zimbabwean government on its human rights abuses, concluded that the ANC was in effect endorsing the unacceptable behaviour of the Zimbabwean government. The ANC’s response that Olonga is “delusional,” once again underlined the ambivalence within the ANC over the Zimbabwean issue at large. In their quest for “taking the games to Africa” under the banner of an African Renaissance, the ANC has, perhaps inadvertently, also been endorsing human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. Olonga's comments also appear to resonate the oft criticism by opposition groups in Zimbabwe, and Morgan Tsvangirai in particular, that the South African government is not doing enough to oppose the Zimbabwean government. In short, the South African government is seen to side with Mugabe.

Therefore, while the protest by the two Zimbabwean players had initially “reverberated well beyond the games,” it had, with hindsight, only an ephemeral impact and no real effect on the broader prospects for democratization and the promotion of human rights in Zimbabwe. It also appeared as though the protest had had unintended consequences, in the sense that it heightened the need for the Zimbabwean authorities to clampdown during the games.

4.9 Chapter summary

This chapter has highlighted how the Cricket World Cup in Zimbabwe did not impact positively
upon democratization and human rights in Zimbabwe. The significance of the World Cup in Zimbabwe was discussed. It was demonstrated how the government was trying to produce political propaganda through the event by projecting a sanitized view of Zimbabwe, while the opposition had quite clearly recognized the event’s potential for protest. South Africa's stance of quiet diplomacy was also discussed. It was pointed out how South Africa was trying to maintain Zimbabwe's co-host status by projecting a solid African identity through the World Cup, yet indirectly this helped to further entrench the authoritarian regime during the World Cup. The World Cup also impacted negatively on the position of the opposition party in Zimbabwe, the MDC.

The ways in which major events are generally said to encourage political reform and promote human rights were also explored. It was found that the boycott campaign waged by particularly England to take a moral stand against the Zimbabwean regime, was not very effective; and in some instances had unintended consequences. The role played by the media was also discussed. It was illustrated how the state owned media in Zimbabwe was rather successful in shoring up credibility for the government through the World Cup.

The World Cup had also not done much to stimulate civil society in Zimbabwe. None of the volunteers or craftsmen involved in the opening ceremony was from Zimbabwe. The protests at the games were also not very effective in putting pressure on the government to reform politically. The protests played into the hands of the government’s broader suppression of the opposition. The symbolically potent protest by the two Zimbabwean players against the Zimbabwean government’s human rights abuses, had only had an ephemeral impact; and in some instances had even heightened the Zimbabwean authorities need to clampdown during the games. Therefore, whilst it is normally the intention that major international sporting events would encourage political reform and promote human rights, the World Cup in Zimbabwe had not been very effective in this regard. In some instances, it can be argued, it had served to further entrench the authoritarian regime.
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

“As a country and continent, we have sent a message to the global community that South Africa is up there with the best with regard to the hosting of major international sporting events. We have effectively debunked the myth and mistaken notion that world-class events cannot be staged in the developing world. With our co-hosts, Zimbabwe and Kenya, we have staged an event that has been precise in its planning, superb in its splendour, efficient in its execution and unprecedented in its magnitude”.

(Statement made by Ngconde Balfour to the National Assembly of Parliament, Ministry of Sport and Recreation, 26 March 2003)

Minister of Sport and Recreation, Ngconde Balfour, was indeed correct in his assessment that South Africa had hosted an event that from an infrastructural and organizational point of view was a resounding success. South Africa had quite clearly demonstrated that it is capable of hosting major events and its successful hosting of the Cricket World Cup will undoubtedly stand South Africa in good stead to host the 2010 Soccer World Cup. However, much more elusive and harder to assess afterwards, are the effects the World Cup had on identity formation and, furthermore, democratization and human rights in Zimbabwe. These issues, Minister Balfour, whilst singing the praises of the Cricket World Cup, appeared to have conveniently forgotten.

In this study it was established, that whilst it is normally the intention of the host nation to use the games to bring nations and people together, the 2003 Cricket World Cup proved rather divisive on a number of accounts. It was demonstrated how Zimbabwe's co-hosting of the Cricket World Cup had divided the Commonwealth cricket playing world largely according to racial lines. It was also demonstrated how this divide according to race, resonated the current standoff between the African and Anglo-Saxon world within the Commonwealth over the Zimbabwean crisis in general.

Similarly, it was also illustrated how Zimbabwe's co-hosting of the Cricket World Cup had divided South African domestic politics largely according to racial lines. This racial divide within South Africa's borders mirrored the split transnationally according to race. It also illustrated the potential of Zimbabwe to pointedly stand out as a defining issue with regards to racial identity within South Africa.

It was also found that much like the 1995 Rugby World Cup had sought to reconcile blacks and whites domestically under the “Rainbow Nation,” during Mandela’s presidency, the 2003 Cricket
World Cup under Mbeki’s presidency, with its more regional focus, presented an excellent opportunity for transnational reconciliation between Africa and the Anglo-Saxon world. Only this time it was not apartheid that was seen as the cause of this racial divide, but colonialism.

The dynamics transnationally became complicated. Also due to the nature of the regional hosted games much of the identity formation consequences was left out of South Africa's hands. Hence, the Cricket World Cup’s potential for racial reconciliation was essentially a failure after Zimbabwe harnessed the opportunity to frame debates about the impending boycott by England and Australia, through the prism of colonialism. This approach ultimately served as a base to politicize race and reinforced the white, colonial image of cricket. The manner in which the ANC reacted to the boycotting talks also echoed what Zimbabwe was saying and thereby also indirectly reinforced the white, colonial image of cricket.

South Africa and Zimbabwe were for different reasons reacting to the talk of a boycott. South Africa tried to promote a solid African identity through the World Cup, whereas Zimbabwe tried to coin political propaganda through the event. However, from an outsiders perspective the two run the risk of being easily coupled or getting blurred. President Mbeki's drive towards “Africanism” also proved divisive between blacks and whites, both domestically and transnationally.

Domestically, it was demonstrated how the row over writing the official anthem of the Cricket World Cup had divided the Cricket World Cup music committee. The white musicians in the World Cup music committee believed that the anthem was too African. At the same time the black members of the committee felt the song was just right for the occasion.

Transnationally, Mbeki’s “Africanism” also proved divisive. This was demonstrated through the sheer “Africanization” of the opening ceremony. Africa was implicitly subverting the moral authority of the former colonizer by celebrating African values and ideals through the cultural ritual of cricket and the World Cup itself. The game of cricket and the World Cup have long been synonymous with British values and ideals; and historically cricket was used in a rather denigrating fashion in Africa through trying to socialize the local “natives” into a British way of life. The African Renaissance theme at the World Cup reinforced this subversion by focusing on the sophistication, modernity and civilization of Africa. Symbolically, this subversion served to highlight the decline of the colonizer and the rise of the colonies, essentially a reconfiguration of the hegemonic order of world cricket, one that can be interpreted more broadly in terms of a shift in global power relations between the former colonizer and the colonies.
It was also demonstrated how symbolically, the Cricket World Cup, when compared to the 1995 Rugby World Cup, had served to highlight the decline of the “Rainbow Nation”. Therefore, the identity formation invoked through the Cricket World Cup was not conducive towards bringing nations and people together, as South African state elites often proclaim, as it appeared to be divisive on a number of accounts.

It was also established that, Zimbabwe's hosting of the Cricket World Cup had arguably served to further entrench the authoritarian regime. Instead of providing some form of catalyst or incentive for democratization, a broad clampdown on civil and political liberties was experienced. There was no opening up of the Zimbabwean regime. The Zimbabwean government felt the need to tighten its grip ahead of the World Cup, and during the event itself, in order to project a sanitized view of Zimbabwe to the rest of the World. The Zimbabwean government also started attaching great significance to the event. Co-hosting the event was perceived as an opportunity to shore up credibility and produce political propaganda.

South Africa's stance of “quiet diplomacy” also indirectly facilitated Zimbabwe's appropriation of the event and, in part, helped to further entrench the authoritarian regime through the World Cup. The World Cup also appeared to have had a negative effect on the opposition party in Zimbabwe, the MDC. Furthermore, the pressures brought to bear on Zimbabwe by their co-hosting of the event were also not very effective.

This was indicated by the rather ineffectual boycott campaign waged by particularly England. The media also played a particularly crucial role during the World Cup. But the state owned media was rather successful in shoring up credibility for the Zimbabwean government during the event. Civil society did not benefit much either through the event in Zimbabwe. The numerous arrests made at the cricket grounds were indicative of the Zimbabwean authorities’ lack of tolerance of any forms of protest during the event. The World Cup eventually played into the hands of the Zimbabwean government’s broader suppression of the opposition. Therefore, while it is normally the intention of major events to provide an incentive or catalyst for democratization in authoritarian regimes, Zimbabwe's co-hosting of the Cricket World Cup had had unintended consequences, and in part, it can be argued, served to further entrench the authoritarian regime.

How could these unintended consequences be avoided in future similar cases? As far as the identity component of this study is concerned, the historical links of the sport in question is important to
take into account when awarding major international sporting events to countries. The traditional white, colonial image of cricket provided the Zimbabwean government with a workable metaphor for cultural colonialism and played into the hands of its anti-Western rhetoric.

Mbeki’s drive towards “Africanism” is, in part, a reaction against the white rule under apartheid. Transnationally, it appears that during the World Cup the South African government was transposing its somewhat reactionary stance and insecurities after apartheid onto the international realm. The theme of “Africanism” promoted through the World Cup, appeared to promote “Africanism” at all costs, the idea of a zebra nation with white stripes was almost incidental.

This study also disclosed that there are various factors which impact on an authoritarian regime’s response to hosting major international sporting events. Motive for acting as host and the significance attached to the event is important. For example, the 1936 Olympics in Nazi Germany apparently were not given to Nazi Germany, but a previous German government. It was more by default that Nazi Germany was to host the event. This is in contrast with the 2008 Olympics in China, whereby the Chinese authorities are apparently reformers who actively sought to host the Olympics in order to encourage political and economic liberalization. In Zimbabwe’s case, the games were given to them by South Africa. Zimbabwe’s status as co-host fell fairly easily in its lap. There was no long-term strategy or bidding process for how the games were going to be utilized politically. Nor was there any long-term commitment in exchange for the privilege of acting as co-host.

In the case of the 1936 Berlin Olympics, Hitler apparently did not want the games at first. However, he quickly sensed its potential as a diplomatic coup. He saw the opportunity to showcase the country, and therefore started attaching great significance to the event. In the case of Zimbabwe’s co-hosting of the World Cup, the political climate in Zimbabwe changed quite drastically from the late 1990’s, when co-hosting status was first offered to them, to 2003. Zimbabwe’s international persona had become increasingly unpopular due to political problems in Zimbabwe. Therefore, the government started attaching significance to the event as it created an opportunity for the regime to boost its credibility on an international level. This is quite starkly contrasted with South Korea’s hosting of the Olympics in 1988, whereby the importance attached to the event by the government is exactly what made it bow to the democratizing pressures exerted on it.

If a country were to be allocated the status of hosting a major event, the policies of the country
concerned, and even the profile of its elites, should be taken into account. For example, the stringent media laws in Zimbabwe and the Public Order and Security Act should have been indications (advance warnings) of how the World Cup could play into the hands of the suppressive apparatus of the Zimbabwean government. The games in Zimbabwe also represented a chance for Mugabe himself to attempt to elevate his dwindling political profile.

The broader international relations of a country which is to serve as host, should be considered. This is of particular relevance in respect of Zimbabwe’s co-hosting of the event. Indeed, one has to question the soundness of the decision to allow an international sporting event to go ahead in a country in which the government has for a long time continued to show complete irreverence for the concerns of the international community.

Therefore, international sporting organizations should be mindful of these indicators when awarding major international sporting events to authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes. If the regime is actively pursuing the event to encourage political and economic liberalization, and is placing significance on it because of this, the country should be awarded the games. Once the event has been awarded, the situation should be closely monitored; and sporting organizations should have the right to revoke the countries host status should the games start to represent something ominous.

Such a right would have implications for international sporting organizations. They should be more politically astute. They should not shy away from getting involved in politics. Revoking a country’s host status will arguably be more effective than boycotts themselves in embarrassing the regime and applying pressure to reform.

The World Cup also had implications for how a country’s “sports diplomacy” through co-hosting events with other nations, can have unexpected consequences against the backdrop of its overall diplomatic stance. This was demonstrated by the ANC becoming increasingly ambivalent within their stance of “quiet diplomacy” towards Zimbabwe during the World Cup. The ANC’s insistence that the games should go ahead in Zimbabwe despite the deteriorating internal and external political situation, indirectly showed up the ANC as endorsing human rights abuses by the Zimbabwean government. The ANC estranged itself from the plight of the MDC and human rights organizations in Zimbabwe. The choice of Zimbabwe as co-hosts also jarred with the theme the South African government was trying to promote through the World Cup, that of the African Renaissance.
A government that seeks a co-host for major events, must seek to ensure that its overall diplomatic stance is not as contentious as that of South Africa’s “quiet diplomacy” towards Zimbabwe. Co-hosting the event with Zimbabwe allowed for an opportunity for South Africa’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe to be discredited even further.

Future areas of research on the 2003 Cricket World Cup could focus on the themes of subversion and reconciliation between Africa and the Anglo-Saxon world. Research could also focus on the effects the World Cup had on Zimbabwe’s national identity and what implications this had for uniting Zimbabweans through protest.

Future research on the effects of Zimbabwe's co-hosting on the broader implications for democratization, could also focus on the extent to which transnational human rights networks were mobilized due to Zimbabwe's hosting of the event (see Keck and Sikkink, 1998). The role the media played in Zimbabwe during the World Cup could also make for interesting research into political communication studies or discourse analysis.

When all is said and done, it can also be concluded that the Zimbabwean government has had its innings. The number of “no balls” and illegal “bouncers” delivered by the Zimbabwean regime during the course of the Cricket World Cup of 2003, simply is not cricket.
Bibliography

_Africa News_, 09/01/2003. ‘Zim says link between tourist murder and anti-cwc group’
http://africa.com/c2cnews/200153.htm

_Journal of Contemporary African Studies_, Vol. 16 Nr. 1


_Associated Press_, 04/03/2003. ‘Cricket fans released from Zimbabwe jail’
http://zwnews.com/print.cfm?ArticleID=6317

_Australian Broadcasting Corporation_, 24/01/2003. ‘ICC to decide on Zimbabwe World Cup’
http://www.abc.net.au/am/s769236.htm


Bacher, A. in _Sunday Times_. 09/02/2003. ‘So many Questions’

_BBC News_, 07/02/2003. ‘Mbeki joins cricket controversy’
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2737963.stm


Bua News, 24/03/2003. ‘World Cup success for SA’


Cape Times, 16/01/2003. ‘Right tactic to boycott sport in old SA – ANC’

Cape Times, 24/02/2003. ‘Transsexual model led Zim team at opening’

Cape Times, 18/03/2003. “ANC says Olonga is ‘deluded’ and ‘insulting’”


CNN.com/WORLD. 19/12/2002. ‘Cricketers will play in Zimbabwe’

Coltart, D. in Zimbabwe Independent, 03/01/2003. ‘The Dilemma of a Cricket Boycott’
http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200301030510.html


Daily News, The, 10/02/2003. ‘Ruling Could Be a Blessing in Disguise’
http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200302110453.html

Daily News, The, 14/03/2003. ‘Skipper Streak Blames Cricket Loss On Politics’
Dean, G. in *Times (UK)* 01/03/2003. ‘Flower injury allows Olonga to resume protest on home soil’
http://zwnews.com/print.cfm?ArticleID=6294


Du Preez, M. in *Star*, 06/02/2003. ‘Can we now try to save the tournament, please?’

Du Preez, M. in *Star*, 13/02/2003. ‘Opening show was stuffed with lies’


GCIS Ministerial Briefing (20 February 2003) Ministerial Cluster: International Relations, Peace and Security Committee Cluster, Sport and Recreation


*Guardian (UK)* 09/01/2003. ‘Time to take a stand over Zimbabwe’
http://zwnews.com/print.cfm?ArticleID=5901


84

Hain, P. in *Sunday Independent*, 05/01/2003. ‘Endorsing tyranny with a bat and ball’

Harris, P. in *Observer (UK)* 26/01/2003. ‘Mugabe’s grip tightens on eve of cricket tour’
http://zwnews.com/print.cfm?ArticleID=6063


*Herald, The*, 04/01/2003. ‘Tsvangirai Bungles in Public Once Again’
http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200301040116.html


*ICC Cricket World Cup South Africa 2003*, 24/07/2003. ‘Mission Statement’
http://www.cricketworldcup.com/mission.html


Johns, L. in *The Daily News*. 06/02/2003. ‘Mugabe, Kibaki snubbed by cricket council’
http://www.iol.co.za/general/newsprint.php?art_id=vn20030206132459724C

Kariati, M in *Zimbabwe Standard*, 28/04/2003. ‘US$10m for Cricket Union’
http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200204290791.html


Kelso, P and Meldrum, A in *Guardian (UK)* 13/01/2003. ‘World Cup fears grow as mayor is arrested,’ http://zwnews.com/print.cfm?ArticleID=5934


Lane, K. 08/02/2003, *CricInfo.com*. ‘World Cup launched in style at Newlands’


Leader, 10/01/2003, ‘ANCYL criticize England-Australia stance on Cricket World Cup’.


Mail and Guardian, 24/01/2003. ‘Obasanjo to pave way for Zim handover’

Mail and Guardian, 07/02/2003. ‘Cartoon’
Mail and Guardian, 04/03/2003. ‘Forty-one cricket fans jailed in Zimbabwe’

Mail and Guardian, 05/03/2003. ‘Zimbabwe cops arrest another 24 cricket fans’

Mail and Guardian, 15/03/2003. ‘Secret of Idasa's Success’

Majonga and Katiyo in Financial Gazette, 22/08/2002. ‘Farm Evictions Spell Doom for Cricket’
http://allafrica.com/stories/printable


Manthorpe, N. in Sunday Telegraph, 16/03/2003. ‘Olonga goes into hiding to dodge secret police’ http://zwnews.com/print.cfm?ArticleID=6385


Matshiqi, A. in Business Day, 04/07/2003. ‘Nonracial SA Can Be Created By Teamwork’


Meldrum, A. in Guardian (UK) 05/02/2003. ‘Police blamed over protestor’s death’
Meldrum, A. in *Guardian (SA)* 08/02/2003. ‘Armed police disperse queues’

Meldrum, A. and Hoult, N. in *Guardian (UK)* 21/01/03. ‘Armed police guard Harare pitch’

Meldrum, A. in *Observer (UK)* “Mugabe’s police ‘beat and jail’ peaceful World Cup protesters”


*Ministry of Sport and Recreation,* 26/03/2003. ‘Balfour: ICC Cricket World Cup 2003’


Nauright, J. (1997) *Sport, Cultures and Identities in South Africa.* Cape Town & Johannesburg:

O’Neill, S. in *Daily Telegraph (UK)* 15/01/2003. ‘Anger as cricketers reject Harare boycott’
http://zwnews.com/print.cfm?ArticleID=5951


Peta, B. in *The Sunday Independent*, 19/01/2003. ‘Police, army gear up to take on anti-Mugabe protesters’

Peta, B. and Hooper-Box, C. in *The Sunday Independent*. 04/01/2003. ‘Mugabe’s bizarre cricket threat blocked’

Petropoulos, T. in *Times (UK)* 22/01/2003. ‘Barmy Army beats retreat from Zimbabwe campaign’
http://zwnews.com/print.cfm?ArticleID=6071

Pheko, M. in *City Press*, 26/01/2003. ‘Boycott won’t stump Mugabe’

*Radio Algoa*, 01/01/2003. ‘CWC 2003 Zimbabwe matches: Debate hots up’
http://www…/CWC%202003%20Zimbabwe%20matches%20Debate%20up.htm

Redfern, P. in *The Nation*, 27/11/2002. ‘Harare keeps media away from ICC visit’
http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200211260773.html

*Reuters*, 30/12/2002. ‘Zimbabwe, South Africa hit back in World Cup row’
http://www-rsal.cricket.org/link_to_database

*Reuters*, 07/08/2003. ‘World Cup games in Zimbabwe to go ahead as planned, ICC’
http://www-uk.cricket.org/link_to_data…/043415_REUTERS_07aug2002.htm


*SABC News*, 23/02/2003. ‘Flower, Olonga grilled over Mugabe protest’
http://zwnews.com/print.cfm?ArticleID=6258

Sen, S (2001) ‘Enduring colonialism in cricket: from Ranjitsinhji to the Cronje affair,’ *Contemporary South Africa* Vol.10 Nr.2

Sapa and Matshube in *Sowetan,* 17/10/2002. ‘No race row over song, says Bacher’


*Star,* 13/02/2003. ‘Cartoon’

*Sunday Times,* 02/03/2003. ‘Cricket fans arrested in Zimbabwe’

*Sunday Times,* 10/08/2003. ‘Mugabe hitches a ride on soccer and music’

*Sunday Tribune,* 12/01/2003. ‘Don’t let Zim steal cricket goodwill’


*Supersportzone,* 24/07/2003. “Cricket – Know the Game ‘2003 Cricket World Cup’”

http://www.supersport.co.za/content_large.asp?eld+5362

*Times, The,* 11/01/2003. ‘Protesters fear World Cup riots in Zimbabwe’

http://citation.asp?tb=1&_ug=dbs+3+In+en%2DUs+sid+A4722AF1%2D5B12%2D42F5%2D

Tsedu, M. in *Sunday Times,* 10/08/2003. ‘Mugabe may be tarnished now, but once he was pure


Van der Walt, S. in Burger, 16/02/2003. “Bacher ‘was onder regeringsdruk oor Zim’”


Ward, J. in Zimbabwe Cricket Union 10/02/1999. ‘A Brief History Of Cricket In Zimbabwe’ http://www-rsa.cricket.org/link_to_database/NATIONAL


Young, J. in Mail and Guardian, 13/03/2003. “SA must not squander the ‘rainbow moments’”


ZWNEWS, 04/03/2003. ‘Names and Injuries’  http://zwnews.com/print.cfm?ArticleID=6312