

**FIRST CONTACT:
AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF THE ROLE OF
PSYCHOANALYTIC INFANT OBSERVATION
IN SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNITY
PSYCHOLOGY INTERVENTIONS**

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DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this dissertation is my own original work, and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.

Signature

Date

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ABSTRACT

Very little is known about the experiences of black children living in poverty in South Africa. This compromises the delivery of appropriate psychological services. This dissertation considers the contribution that psychoanalytic infant observation might make to a needs assessment process within the community psychology paradigm. To date, infant observation has predominantly been used for training psychotherapists and other professionals in Western contexts. The goal of the present project was to conduct a "classical" observation of a mother and child in a low-income South African community in the first year of the infant's life, in order to ascertain what kind of description it would yield. The question was whether such a description is useful for the needs assessment process, and ultimately, whether infant observation is a viable tool for psychologists working in low-income communities in South Africa.

The study was set in a poor, semi-rural, so-called coloured township in the Western Cape. The data were analysed using an intersubjective psychoanalytic lens and a social constructionist grounded theory approach. In overview, the findings relate to two main areas, namely a) the nature and content of the resultant description, and b) the effect of the process. The analysis of the case material showed that the observation produced an extremely detailed account of the experience of poverty and oppression, involving the way in which it influences all relationships, including the one between mother and child. The knowledge gained offers clear pointers to the kind of intervention that would benefit the particular infant in the present study, and potentially other infants in vulnerable social contexts as well. One surprising outcome was the extensive way in which the observation functioned therapeutically for the whole family. It is therefore concluded that infant observation can provide a very rich contribution to low-income communities on a number of levels, if it is able to make both the theoretical and practical adjustments needed. It is thus argued that it is necessary to look at infant observation in more critical ways, both in terms of how it has traditionally been conceptualised and how it is and can be applied across all contexts.

SAMEVATTING

Daar bestaan min inligting oor die ervarings van swart kinders in Suid-Afrika wat in armoede leef. Dit lê die lewering van gepaste sielkundige dienste aan bande. In hierdie studie word die bydrae bespreek wat psigoanalitiese baba-observasie moontlik tot 'n behoefte-assesseringsproses binne die gemeenskapsielkundige paradigma kan lewer. Tot nou toe is hierdie observasie hoofsaaklik gebruik om psigoterapeute en ander professionele persone binne 'n Westerse konteks op te lei. Die doelwit van die huidige projek was om - in die baba se eerste lewensjaar - 'n klassieke observasie van 'n moeder en kind binne 'n lae-inkomstegemeenskap in Suid-Afrika uit te voer ten einde te bepaal watter soort beskrywing dit sou oplewer. Die vraag was of so 'n beskrywing relevant is vir die behoeftebepalingsproses en, in laaste instansie, of baba-observasie 'n bruikbare werktuig is vir sielkundiges wat in lae-inkomstegemeenskappe werksaam is.

Die studie is uitgevoer in 'n arm, semi-landelike, sogenaamde bruin gemeenskap in Wes-Kaapland. Data is geanaliseer met 'n intersubjektiewe psigoanalitiese lens en in ooreenstemming met die sosiale-konstruksieteorie. Kortliks saamgevat, het die bevindinge betrekking op twee hoofgebiede, naamlik (a) die aard en inhoud van die beskrywing wat daaruit voortvloei het en (b) die uitwerking van die proses. Die analise van die ondersoekmateriaal het getoon dat die observasie 'n besonder gedetailleerde beskrywing van die ervaring van armoede en onderdrukking opgelewer het en, by name, van die wyse waarop dit alle verhoudinge, ook dié tussen moeder en kind, beïnvloed. Die inligting wat ingewin is, gee duidelike aanduidings van die soort intervensie wat 'n positiewe uitwerking sou hê op die spesifieke baba in die huidige studie, en potensieel ook sou hê op ander babas in kwesbare sosiale kontekste. Een van die verrassende konklusies was die mate waarin die hele gesin terapeuties baat gevind het by hierdie observasie. Die gevolgtrekking is dus dat baba-observasie op verskeie vlakke 'n kosbare bydrae kan lewer, mits dit die nodige teoretiese en praktiese aanpassings kan maak. Daar word gevolglik aangevoer dat dit noodsaaklik is om baba-observasie meer krities te ondersoek, en dit geld sowel die tradisionele konseptualisering daarvan as die wyse waarop dit oor alle kontekste heen toegepas word, en kán word.

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with my love and gratitude.

I see everything...But most people are lazy. They never look at everything. They do what is called glancing, which is the same word for bumping off something and carrying on in almost the same direction, e.g. when a snooker ball glances off another snooker ball. And the information in their head is really simple. (Haddon, 2003, p. 40)

And I think that there are so many things just in one house that it would take years to think about all of them properly. Also, a thing is interesting because of thinking about it and not because of being new. (Haddon, 2003, p. 178)

Oh, can't you see
You belong to me
How my poor heart aches
With every step you take

Every move you make
Every vow you break
Every smile you fake
Every claim you stake
I'll be watching you

(The Police)

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SECTION ONE: ASSUMPTIONS

CHAPTER ONE: Introduction

1.1 Context of the study

There are many poor infants and children in the world.¹ Every year approximately 135 million infants are born worldwide (Tomlinson & L. Swartz, 2003b). Of these, over 90% live in low-income or "developing" countries (Population Reference Bureau, 2002, quoted in Tomlinson & L. Swartz, 2003b, p. 487). Poverty is a major concern in South Africa (K. Gibson, 2002b). South Africa is classified as a middle-income country (Terre Blanche, 2004), yet at least 50% of the population is impoverished (Desai, 2005). South Africa is a country of extreme inequalities, and poverty is unevenly distributed: there is more poverty among black² people, in rural areas, and in female-headed households (Terre Blanche, 2004). This phenomenon in South Africa is connected with the effects of long-term oppression and discrimination under apartheid (Pillay & Lockhat, 2001). Desai (2005) noted that the material poverty that exists in South Africa is, quite uniquely, a consequence of deliberate policy, including "an assault on people's humanity" (pp. 1-2).

The majority of South African children are at risk as a result of poverty. Six out of every ten South African children can be defined as "poor" and potentially experiencing the mental health problems associated with this (K. Gibson, 2002b). It has been estimated that at least 15% of South Africa's children (more than 3 million) are affected by mental health problems of one form or another (Pillay & Lockhat, 2001). The majority of South Africa's children have been subjected to the consequences of the policies of apartheid, including the impoverished and hostile environments it gave rise to. The result is that such children are thought to show a much higher rate of psychological morbidity than children in other countries (K. Gibson, 2002b; Pillay & Lockhat, 2001).

It is widely asserted that conditions like poverty can have a negative impact on physical and mental health (Barbarin & Richter, 2001; Desai, 2005; McLoyd, 1998; Scheper-Hughes, 1992; Terre Blanche, 2004; Tomlinson & L. Swartz, 2003a). On the other hand, Terre Blanche (2004) warned against thinking of poverty as having a direct causal effect on mental health, suggesting rather that we should consider the challenges that poverty presents and the opportunities it takes away. Persistent poverty has been found to have more detrimental effects than transitory poverty, "with children experiencing both types of poverty generally doing less well than never-poor children" (McLoyd, 1998, p. 185). Desai (2005) noted that, especially in urban areas, millions of South Africans live in woefully inadequate shacks and do not have access to adequate heating, water and sanitation, despite the government's attempt over the past decade to meet basic needs. South Africa has an unsustainably high

¹ In developmental psychology, the first year of life is typically considered to comprise infancy, while a child is defined as a person between infancy and puberty (Reber, 1995). Most broadly, the term child will also be used here to denote individuals between birth and maturity (Reber, 1995).

² I am mindful of the fact that the use of racial categories in South African scholarship is controversial: such categories are socially constructed and carry important social meanings (L. Swartz, K. Gibson & Gelman, 2002a). Following L. Swartz et al. (2002a), the category of "black" will be used in this dissertation to refer to all South Africans disenfranchised under apartheid. The category "coloured" is used to refer to South Africans of diverse and mixed racial origins.

unemployment rate (Desai, 2005). People living in poverty may work long hours for insufficient wages. They are susceptible to poverty-related diseases such as tuberculosis and AIDS, and are exposed to risk of injury (Terre Blanche, 2004). South Africa has a high infant mortality rate and a low life expectancy (Desai, 2005; Terre Blanche, 2004). Poverty leads to high rates of perinatal complications, and reduced access to resources that buffer such complications (McLoyd, 1998). Together with less home-based stimulation and lower teacher expectations, this partly accounts for diminished cognitive functioning in poor children (McLoyd, 1998). Secondly, schools in poverty environments may themselves be inadequate (Dawes & Donald, 2000).

Every tenth child in South Africa is malnourished (Terre Blanche, 2004). At its worst, poverty causes death by starvation (Desai, 2005; Sheper-Hughes, 1992). Chronic malnutrition can cause stunting and illness (Barbarin & Richter, 2001; Sheper-Hughes, 1992). For children, the ability to learn in a formal school environment can be further affected by poor concentration resulting from inadequate diet, and uncorrected visual and hearing problems. In summary, malnourishment can lead to "impaired physical, mental, scholastic and, in the longer term, occupational and social functioning" (Duncan & Van Niekerk, 2001). Poor children may take on more parental responsibilities at home and grow up in crowded environments. They are more likely to witness or be victims of crime and violence (Terre Blanche, 2004). K. Gibson (2002b) noted that there are still many areas in South Africa where very high levels of violence, which impact negatively on children's development, exist. Political violence has declined, but criminal and domestic violence, including sexualised violence, prevails in South African townships³ (Duncan & Van Niekerk, 2001). Child abandonment and homeless children have been reported with increasing frequency in poorer rural environments (Duncan & Van Niekerk, 2001). Pillay and Lockhat (2001) listed post-traumatic stress disorder, sexual abuse, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder and self-destructive behaviours as some of the childhood mental health problems that can arise in disadvantaged communities. Generally, it is thought that the experience of living in poverty can involve hopelessness, uncertainty about the future, and alienation from mainstream society (Terre Blanche, 2004).

Citing Harpham (1994), Cooper et al. (2002) noted that infants from poor communities in the developing world are especially vulnerable, because they are subject to parenting that is under the strain of both marked socio-economic hardship and high rates of depression. The susceptibility to depression of low-income mothers has been well documented (Belle, 1982) (see, for example, Murray and Cooper, 1997). Financial strain and responsibility for young children increases the risk of this mental health problem (Belle, 1982). For example, a high rate of maternal depression (one in three) and associated disturbance in the mother-infant relationship was found in the indigent peri-urban South African community of Khayelitsha (Cooper et al., 2002). Such women were found to be "significantly less sensitively engaged with their infants, and, correspondingly, the infants of these mothers were significantly less positively engaged in interaction with their mothers" (Cooper et al., 2002, p. 76). Writing in the United States, McLoyd (1998) noted that "the link between socio-economic disadvantage and children's socioemotional functioning appears to be mediated partly by harsh, inconsistent parenting and elevated exposure to acute and chronic stressors" (p. 185). There is a growing literature on resilience in the face of adverse circumstances (Terre Blanche, 2004). For example, research conducted in South Africa during the early 1990s

³ Shantytowns, or informal settlements. Townships were the legislated residential areas for urban black people during the apartheid era, and generally retain this demographic.

indicated that the deleterious impact of social stressors can be significantly diminished if children have recourse to effective and stable support systems (Barbarin & Richter, 2001; Dawes & Donald, 2000; Duncan & Van Niekerk, 2001).

In summary, poor children's needs are simply greater. In the following section I will consider the extent and nature of our current knowledge about this significant and pervasive problem in South Africa.

1.1.1 A lack of knowledge

Despite the fact that there are so many poor children in South Africa deemed at risk through poverty, we 1) lack conclusive, high-quality epidemiological data related to them; 2) lack in-depth knowledge about how their experiences shape their internal worlds;⁴ and 3) lack adequate frameworks within which to conduct research.

There has been an explosion in psychological research on infants in the past few decades, resulting in a remarkable growth in knowledge and expertise about infancy (Gopnick, Meltzoff & Kuhl, 1999; Rochat, 2001; Stern, 1998a; Tomlinson & L. Swartz, 2003a, 2003b). New technology such as television has assisted in this (Gopnick et al., 1999; Stern, 1995). M.J. Rustin (1989) noted that the resources of video-recording, one-way screens and meticulous time measurement have added to the rigorous conditions of the child study laboratory. Stern (1995) referred to a "revolution in the scientific observation of babies" as a result of which "we have more systematic observations on the first two years of life than on any other period in the entire life span" (p. 1).

In a summary of recent literature reviews, Kruger (2005a), however, noted the dearth of work on poverty in psychology: "a gap that exists even while there have been more considerable efforts to deal with sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, race, disabilities and age" (p. 16). Poor women in particular seem to have been "virtually excluded from mainstream psychological research" (Kruger, 2005a, p. 16). Similarly, poor children in South Africa have been marginalised in terms of research. There is a "proud tradition" in the infant mental health field of work that focuses on the poor and the marginalised in high-income countries (Tomlinson & L. Swartz, 2003a, p. 549). However, Tomlinson and L. Swartz (2003a) warned that not all marginalised groups are the same and that social structure in poorer countries has implications for health and human behaviour. In South Africa childhood suffering could be said to have a unique profile (Dawes & Donald, 1994; Donald, Dawes & Louw, 2000). Imported concepts of what constitutes childhood are arguably made irrelevant by the particularity of our socio-political history. Despite this, there is a paucity of research about the effects of poverty environments on the lives of black South Africans and children in particular (Bloom, 1996; K. Gibson, 1996; Pillay & Lockhat, 2001; L. Swartz, 1991, 2002):

To date, literature and research on childhood mental health problems in this country have been skewed and have been more concerned with advantaged and urban children, with the result that little is known about the problems of children from poorer, rural, and peri-urban communities. Perusal of the psychological and psychiatric

⁴ The concept of the internal world is a psychoanalytic one that will be discussed fully in the next chapter. It refers to a psychical reality that is derived from, but not identical to, an external reality (Rycroft, 1995).

literature published in and about South Africa in the past few decades bears testimony to this. (Pillay & Lockhat, 2001, p. 89)

Accurate, high-quality epidemiological data on the incidence of mental health problems amongst South African children is therefore lacking (Barbarin & Richter, 2001; K. Gibson, 2002b; Pillay & Lockhat, 2001; Tomlinson, 2003; Tomlinson & L. Swartz, 2003a, 2003b). Surveying articles on infancy for the last five years in 12 major infancy and developmental journals worldwide, Tomlinson and L. Swartz (2003a) noted that 94 % of these articles were written in North America or Europe. As recently as 2006 Andrews, Skinner and Zuma pointed out that there are hardly any studies that, for example, compare the experiences of Sub-Saharan children orphaned by AIDS with those of non-orphans. Macleod (2004) discussed the way that psychology continues, in the main, to ignore some of the most pressing issues facing South Africa today. In her situational analysis of research in psychology over the last five years, it emerged that

...quantitative methods based on "hard" science theory as well as the traditional topics of assessment, psychotherapy/counselling, psychopathology and stress continue to dominate psychological research. A minority of studies utilize theoretical frameworks and tackle topics that illuminate the interweaving of the individual with the socio-political context. (p. 2)

Furthermore, an analysis of the location and participants of research indicated that knowledge is still being generated chiefly about urban, middle-class adults living in the three wealthiest provinces, with university students being the most popular source of participants (Macleod, 2004). Macleod noted that this is in contradistinction to the demographic realities of South Africa. Some of the future challenges for psychology she highlighted were:

1. Theoretical development that brings insights from South Africa's unique sociohistorical-political context into local and international theoretical debates;
2. Expanding traditional approaches, topics and participants to ones that speak to the socio-political concerns of South Africa, and that represent South Africa's demography;
3. Forging links with researchers in the rest of Africa and other developing countries. (Macleod, 2004, p. 1)

Thom's (2003) extensive review found that the bulk of South African research has been descriptive or analytic in nature, in other words describing the extent of mental health problems and the need for services, and highlighting the obstacles to implementation of policy. However, there is a limited amount of work that tests interventions and assesses their impact, "particularly of innovative projects that involve a lot of community participation, and that seem to be working well" (Thom, 2003, p. 25). In particular, Thom (2003) highlighted that there is a need to research, among other topics, child and adolescent mental health services and women's mental health issues.

The reasons for the "glaring gaps" in the literature are complex (Macleod, 2004, p. 2). In South Africa black poverty has historically been neglected as a research subject because of racism: the first comprehensive study of black poverty in South Africa was undertaken only in 1983 (compared to an enquiry into white poverty in the 1920s) (Desai, 2005). Citing Kristeva and Foucault, Kruger (2005a) pointed out that techniques and procedures of power manifest on the most basic levels as techniques and procedures of exclusion, and that such techniques and procedures are economically and politically useful. In part, educational and research infrastructures in poorer countries also play a part in our lack of knowledge (Tomlinson & L. Swartz, 2003a). Because of inadequate South African health-management information services, information on service needs is sketchy and inadequate, and we

have had to use projections from international prevalence studies (Pillay & Lockhat, 2001). Tomlinson and L. Swartz (2003a) speculated that, because African researchers are working in foreign contexts or marginal ways, they might at times be unintentionally excluded, because they are producing work that does not always interact easily with the mainstream. In an earlier review of research on the social context of South African children (J. Lazarus, 2003), I⁵ noted that, while there is some record of social ills stemming from apartheid

...there is a comparative paucity of literature about *internal* life under conditions of poverty and neglect. As a result of Apartheid and the unequal distribution of resources, few accounts exist which might start to give us a glimpse into the interior world of poor black children. This lack has been exacerbated by the growth of a community psychology that has necessarily privileged the role of social deprivation in psychological suffering. (p. 7)

Again, there are numerous possible reasons for the particular character of existent accounts. Firstly, as noted above, there has been a necessary and conscious corrective emphasis on the social. The thinking connected with this and underlying South African "community psychology" will be explicated in Chapter Three. L. Swartz (1991) suggested, however, that a rigid focus on external factors such as stress and resilience when discussing the psychological problems of black people might indicate a subtle form of racism and self-protection against "the other"⁶ (p. 241). He noted that talk of stressors, most prevalent in describing black patients, submerges talk of internal dynamics and allows one "to contemplate a mode of understanding African patients which does not require a deep empathy with them" (p. 244). Secondly, South African authors, like practitioners elsewhere, have commented on the tremendous emotional impact of psychodynamic⁷ work with deprived and abused clients,⁷ and children in particular (Alvarez, 1992; Hoxter, 1983; Sinason, 1991, 2001). K. Gibson (1996) suggested that a need to dissociate from the emotional impact of working with severely traumatised groups might also contribute to a reluctance to work with the internal lives of severely deprived people, specifically children.

It is imperative to gather in-depth information about South African children's experiences to remedy this deficit. Tomlinson and L. Swartz (2003a, 2003b) drew attention to the fact that, despite the fact that 90% of infants born in the world live in low-income countries, most scholarly knowledge about infancy is produced in wealthy countries. They asserted that far more information on infancy throughout the world is needed. These authors showed that the recent plethora of psychological research on infants ignores cultural and historical variability. Infancy is portrayed as an a-contextual, romanticised zone, with little fieldwork being done and authors relying on secondary sources. In other words, infant research needs to be conducted in poorer countries and needs to consider cultural facets. Especially in a divided post-apartheid society, it is imperative that more local ethnographic-style field trips (in the sense of considering culture) are made. Tierney (2002) has stressed "the importance of understanding what is going

⁵ In a theory-based choice to forefront my own subjectivity, I will be speaking in the first person both as the author of the present dissertation and as the practitioner in the case study discussed.

⁶ Olesen (2005) described "othering" as the "invidious, oppressive defining of the persons with whom research is done" (p. 242). S. Swartz (2006b) noted that "the other is half ourselves, the self that we cannot consciously entertain" (p. 3).

⁷ While psychoanalysis favours the terms "patient", the present dissertation will generally use the word "client" in view of the community psychology context of the study, except where referring to the most traditional psychoanalytic therapies.

on in your own backyard before thinking of going off to exotic places, as traditional anthropologists (are) supposed to do" (p. 10). Apart from the logistical and practical difficulties of infant research in Third World countries, the ethnographic endeavour itself has been problematised in such contexts in ways that will be examined in Chapter Four. Attempts at describing culture, which in itself is a difficult term to define, involve issues of power and, frequently, of fear and othering (Tomlinson, 2003; Tomlinson & L. Swartz, 2003b; L. Swartz, 2002).

It has been shown that for a number of complex reasons stemming from the impact of apartheid, there is very little detailed information about black children (and their mothers) who live in poverty. The present study will use a postmodern ethnographic lens in an attempt to remedy this. By this is meant a lens that involves "the comparative study of individual cultures" (Reber, 1995, p. 262), but which also interrogates this kind of encounter. The present dissertation takes its title, somewhat ironically, from the idea that one can discover a group of people in a moment or period of "first contact" in which they become known to the ethnographer (Geertz, 2000, p. 106). This idea will be problematised using postmodern tools. In the inimitable words of the ethnographer Clifford Geertz:

...we don't know anything about the Nuer, the people Evans-Pritchard wrote about. I've never seen a Nuer, and I never will probably, and ninety percent of the students won't. Maybe a few will, but even they will go at a different time from the original investigator... (Olson, 1991, p. 192)

In the present study there were several kinds of first contact. Because there was a quest to uncover new information, I entered a community about which comparatively little was known. Here a meeting occurred between a newborn and her family and I wished to observe this interaction. But there was also another kind of new contact: namely between a researcher and a family, involving their respective cultures, social norms, politics and histories. The broader community also met and interacted with me. Following on from suggestions by Tomlinson and L. Swartz (2003b), it is felt that the nature of such a meeting space must be closely examined. It is assumed, but was also found, that we cannot separate "culture" and "internal life" either from each other, or from the political and socio-economic systems within which they exist. In other words, an infant observation constitutes a multi-levelled meeting space, and could potentially result in a very complex relationship with the practitioner.

1.1.2 A lack of services

The *Freedom Charter* (1955) foresaw that "All people shall have the right to live where they choose, be decently housed, and to bring up their families in comfort and security" (quoted in Terre Blanche, 2004, p. 267). Yet without sufficient research into the local conditions that are antithetical to this ideal, steps towards this "modest utopia" cannot be taken (Terre Blanche, 2004, p. 267). In South Africa low-income children of colour are perhaps the least powerful members of under-served communities disadvantaged by apartheid (Barbarin & Richter, 2001; Dawes et al., 1997; Dawes & Donald, 1994; Donald et al., 2000; Duncan & Van Niekerk, 2001; Petersen et al., 1997; Pillay & Lockhat, 2001). They often cannot speak or are not heard. And yet ironically their well-being is important in fostering a healthier South African society in the future, free of the legacy of the "psychopathogenic" policies of apartheid (Dawes, 1985, quoted in Pillay & Lockhat, 2001, p. 88). It is essential to deepen our understanding of the challenges such children face "through the exploration of the experiences of some of those on the margins of society" (Kruger, 2005, p. 3).

In South Africa Thom (2003) noted that there is "a huge unmet need for mental health services for children and adolescents, and a gross lack of resources for this vulnerable group" (p. 30). Child mental health services are concentrated in metropolitan areas and community mental health services for children are virtually non-existent (Pillay & Lockhat, 2001). Thom (2003) noted that important contextual factors are

...the inheritance of previously fragmented services, where mental health services were isolated from general health services, were inequitably distributed, under-resourced and stigmatised, the broad range of role-players in the mental health field (from a variety of sectors) and the extent to which different disciplines and professions have been able or unable to move beyond the boundaries of their own specific contexts to a broader vision and understanding of mental health care. (p. 20)

Citing Thom (2003), Spedding (2005) noted that limited mental health care is still provided to a small percentage of the population that actually needs services. Public sector resources are scarce (Spedding, 2005) and mental health services for children are even less adequate than those for adults (Milne & Robertson, cited in K. Gibson, 2002b). Children from poorer families are generally more disadvantaged in terms of access to services, and because racial division in South Africa has corresponded to a division along economic lines (Foster & S. Swartz, 1997), resources available for black children are particularly insufficient. This means that problems are left untreated and develop into chronic or complicated conditions. For example, in a survey of mental health and related services available to low-income women in the Winelands region specifically (where the present study was set), it was found that services were predominantly located in bigger centres such as Stellenbosch and Paarl (Women's Mental Health Research Project, 2000).

K. Gibson (2002b) delineated some of the recent changes in the field of South African mental health. One of the core questions being raised is how to meet the needs of black communities and how to adapt psychological practice in order to do so (K. Gibson, 2002b). The community psychologist working in a context of poverty and rapid social change has a particular position that needs to be considered (Tomlinson, L. Swartz & Landman, 2003). Many of those involved in mental health in South Africa have been engaged in thinking about ways of "re-visioning the role of professionals in a way which would help to address the issue of scarce resources and overwhelming need" (K. Gibson & L. Swartz, 2000). The traditional practice model in South Africa has been criticised and is in need of transformation. Individual models of intervention are generally felt to be inadequate. Pillay and Lockhat (2001) stated that we cannot wait for the parents of disadvantaged children, who have insufficient economic resources, to identify psychological problems and seek consultations from mental health specialists. K. Gibson (2002b) cited Donald et al. (2000) for examples related to children. She made the point that part of this transformation process has been to try and involve black communities in thinking how best to work with mental health problems (empowerment). The post-apartheid government has implemented policies aimed at making health services accessible on a primary level, at local clinics and day hospitals (Spedding, 2005). However, resources are limited and psychological services are still considered a luxury reserved for the elite in the private sector (Spedding, 2005).

Planning efficient child mental health services requires a clear perspective of the rates of psychological and psychiatric morbidity, nationally and even regionally (Pillay & Lockhat, 2001). To plan and offer needed psychological services and to improve existing services in South Africa, in-depth qualitative research studies focusing on the experiences of low-income children within their specific socio-cultural contexts seem to be

imperative. An extensive review of the literature (J. Lazarus, 2003; J. Lazarus & Kruger, 2004a) made it clear that psychodynamically oriented practitioners in the United Kingdom, Europe and the United States work with deprived children both in groups and individually. The literature strongly suggested, however, that lasting change for such children can only be possible when the systems that surround them are also addressed (Boston & Szur, 1983; Hoghugi, 1998). In other words, research into children's lives ideally needs to target both internal life and external circumstances. Tomlinson et al. (2003) cited Richter (1995) when they asserted that there is also very little good-quality scientific research on the impact of existent infant intervention programmes in South Africa. They held that it was important to conduct research in this area in order to advocate for a state focus on early mother-infant intervention, which they felt would be of benefit to South Africa.

1.2 Using new tools

Concerns about the appropriateness of professional psychology for the needs of disadvantaged communities have been raised (see, for example, Foster & S. Swartz, 1997). In a recent review of international literature spanning 40 years, Kruger (2005a, 2006) noted that psychology has tended simply to pathologise the poor:

This tendency to pathologise and to situate the origins of poverty in the personalities of the poor (irredeemable, lazy, dependent, careless, impulsive, weak, irresponsible) was prominent in earlier years and from there it was an easy step to justify demonisation, denigration, not getting involved or even worse, getting involved in curative ways. (Kruger, 2005a, p. 18)

Kruger (2006) explored the ways in which and reasons why the poor have been blatantly excluded from psychological research and practice. She found that poverty is quantitatively reduced to a variable or romanticised. Data about the poor are left as self-evident and not explored theoretically. Kruger (2006) suggested that such tendencies are ways of excluding the painful experience of poverty.

Psychoanalysis has specifically been criticised for its failure to deal with the problem of poverty (Kruger, 2005a). Despite its shortcomings, K. Gibson and L. Swartz (2004) warned us not to "reject wholesale" the potential of modes of psychological knowledge such as psychoanalysis (p. 466). K. Gibson (2002b) noted that there is in fact a "new psychoanalysis" that has developed sufficiently to have some flexibility as an analytic tool (p. 37). In recent years several South African institutions and leading practitioners have actively begun to use psychodynamic⁸ thought to understand the complex fabric of the South African community psychology intervention (see, for instance, the recent *Reflective practice*, edited by L. Swartz et al., 2002a). In a previous review we noted that South African community practitioners have predominantly used psychodynamic tools to conceptualise and work with the feelings evoked by community work (J. Lazarus & Kruger, 2004a).

However, the psychodynamic paradigm's potential to provide a rich description of internal life and its reciprocal relationship to social context seems to have been under-utilised in South Africa to date. Given the proliferation of

⁸ It is acceptable to use the terms "psychoanalytic" and "psychodynamic" synonymously (Reber, 1995). The present dissertation will do so because there is no formal psychoanalytic training institute in South Africa at this time. Psychodynamic practitioners in this country are mostly psychologists who have absorbed psychoanalytic theory and have been trained to work with the unconscious within a therapeutic relationship.

community research and a new emphasis on psychodynamic work in the community, one can argue there is still a paucity in accounts of casework done with children in local communities utilising a psychodynamic perspective. This means (i) that there are still very few psychodynamic accounts of the internal lives of impoverished black or coloured South African clients (Bloom, 1996); and (ii) that not much has been written about how exactly the use of traditional psychodynamic techniques does or does not work in community settings (see, for instance, K. Gibson, Mogale & Friedlander, 1991; Richardson, 1994; Rudenberg, Jansen & Fridjhon, 1998; Williams, 2001). Bloom stated in 1996:

We have...no research that gathers children's dreams, expressive behaviour and acting out, stories, drawings and other forms of art, and which systematically uses and interprets play and psychodrama. We still know very little about how apartheid's psychological turbulence and disruption distorted children's relationships with adults and thus distorted the formation of a benign superego and ego ideal. We are almost totally ignorant of how sado-masochistic sublimations and introjections were managed. (p. 59)

In the present dissertation the specific psychoanalytic tool of infant observation (Miller, M.E. Rustin, M.J. Rustin & Shuttleworth, 1989) will be adopted as a way to fill this gap. Infant observation was introduced at the Tavistock Centre⁹ in London as part of the training course for child psychotherapists after the Second World War (Miller et al., 1989). It involves intently watching an infant (and her mother) in the home for an hour a week for the first one or two years of life. Notes about what transpired are written up afterwards. In 2003, concluding my MA in which I discussed a community intervention with children in a Play Group (see **Addendum A**), I proposed that

...a focus should turn, in line with community psychology principles of prevention and empowerment, to the study of mother-infant behaviour. In Moretown,¹⁰ for example, the principles of psychodynamic infant observation could be used in assessing appropriate interventions around maternal response. (J. Lazarus, 2003, p. 102)

When taken out of its context as a training tool, the potential of infant observation to assist community work by creating a watching and thinking space is conceivably great. New and particularised phenomena could be observed and worked with in this space. It is possible to think about infant observation as a way to gather substantial information about children and their mothers within a specific social, cultural, political and economic environment. The present research draws on the assumption that infant observation could yield an extremely detailed account of the way in which the environment, including cultural factors, unconscious forces and socio-economic positioning, impacts on one microcosm of relating. Beyond this, its focus on complexity and depth could be a useful adjunct to gaining a deeper understanding of the political and emotional dynamics in any community intervention. My hypothesis was that it could give us various insights that nothing else can. However, its viability as a method for gaining knowledge in communities needed to be tested.

⁹ Full name: The Tavistock Clinic and Portman NHS Trust.

¹⁰ The same community in which the present research was conducted. Note that all names in the present study, including place, street and family names, have been changed to ensure the participants' confidentiality.

An infant observation account can record both deficits and strengths. It was hypothesised that such a thick description,¹¹ including the effect of the infant observation experience on the observer/practitioner, could add depth to a needs assessment¹² process in community work, by saying more about the interplay between context and the internal world. This information could potentially assist in designing highly empathic and particularised preventative community interventions. S. Briggs (1997b) suggested that "the [observation] role may be developed in a way in which professionals can use it to make accurate, informed interventions in families" (p. 212). At the same time, an infant observation account represents only one unit of information, and would therefore need to be used within the context of a larger needs assessment project when working in communities. (See **Addendum A** for details of the needs assessment process currently underway in Moretown.) One of the contributions of the present study is to continue to critically explore the limits and possibilities of psychoanalytic thinking within the community psychology paradigm (K. Gibson, 2002b).

An infant observation in a community setting is akin to an ethnographic endeavour, in the sense that the observer enters the community and home of the observed (participant observation). Infant observation can be regarded as a form of field research, in that in its most inclusive sense it involves an observer's immersion in a study of people acting in the natural courses of their daily lives. In fact, the design of an infant observation has been likened to ethnographic fieldwork in psychodynamic literature (Piontelli, 1992; M.J. Rustin, 1989, 1997, 2006; Winship, 2000, 2001). In ethnography the emphasis is on describing "social or cultural phenomena based on direct systematic observation" in the field (Bhana & Kanjee, 2001, p. 152). More specifically, as indicated earlier, ethnography is thought to be the *comparative* study of individual cultures (Angrosino, 2002; Bhana & Kanjee, 2001). It will be shown that this aspect has not traditionally been a focal point in infant observation accounts. However, when observing infants in any culture different from one's own, comparison with one's own culture and that described in other infant observation accounts could theoretically occur.

It is impossible to know with certainty beforehand what will translate across very different contexts (Tomlinson et al., 2003). Tomlinson et al. (2003) noted, "if social science research is to continue to develop and remain relevant throughout the world, it is important that knowledge and guidelines produced in any one context be interrogated from the perspective of another" (p. 205). Because most social science and psychiatric research is produced in wealthy countries, there is a particular onus on researchers in low-income communities to comment on the value and limitations of this knowledge for other parts of the world (Tomlinson et al., 2003).

1.3 Aims of the study

The over-arching aim of the present study was to contribute to planning and offering needed psychological services for low-income black children in South Africa, and to improve existing services. The focus of the study was

¹¹ Denzin (1989) described this ethnographic term as follows: "A 'thick' description does more than record what a person is doing. It goes beyond mere fact and surface appearances. It presents detail, context, emotion, and the webs of social relationships that join persons to one another. Thick description evokes emotionality and self-feelings. It inserts history into experience. It establishes the significance of an experience, or the sequence of events, for the person or persons in question. In thick description, the voices, feelings, actions, and meanings of interacting individuals are heard" (p. 83).

¹² The concept of needs assessment in community psychology will be described in Chapters Three and Six.

methodological, namely to consider whether the thick description achieved through infant observation could be utilised in doing psychological work in community settings. This means that the study aimed to:

1. Provide a thick description of a single low-income mother-infant dyad (including their interaction);
2. Consider the potential contribution that such a description might make to a needs assessment process; and thus
3. Explore the utility of infant observation (a practice that is essentially informed by a theoretical framework constructed in Western contexts) as a tool for psychologists working in low-income communities in South Africa.

Following Tomlinson and L. Swartz (2003a), it has been argued here that it is dangerous to import knowledge without considering context, and to make generalisations from one context to another, without investigating the local. The orientation of the present project was very much to investigate the local, because so few studies have done this. The tools for doing this in terms of community work are still being tried out and developed (Orford, 2002). The purpose of the present investigation was to contribute to developing a methodology for working in communities, by using theory and fieldwork in an exploratory way. My premise was that using infant observation in a different context will substantially affect it and perhaps alter its value. To have value in its new context, it may need to change. A secondary question I was asking is whether infant observation gives us more of the child's context, in a deeper way. An important consideration here is how context is defined by infant observation, by more postmodern branches of psychoanalysis and ethnography, and by community psychology. An investigation of these paradigms will reveal that there are differences and tensions in this regard.

In a sense, then, the present study set out to ask questions about what infant observation can and cannot do within a new context. An unforeseen outcome, however, was that a broader critique of infant observation emerged, by which is meant a detailed analysis and assessment (*Concise Oxford English dictionary*, 2006). In other words, my suggestion was, in the end, that not only does infant observation need to make adjustments for a South African context, but that it needs to revisit its own theory and praxis. This is a larger finding that is applicable beyond South African community psychology interventions.

1.4 The researcher-practitioner

Aunger (2004) felt that "the only way for readers to appreciate where you are coming from, is to own up to your own biases as explicitly as possible by becoming aware of them yourself, and writing them down" (p. 9). It is important to situate myself, both in terms of making my perspective known, and in an attempt to assert my credentials for a study of this nature. I conducted the infant observation, wrote it up in reports, analysed the material, and represented it here in written form. Therefore I have been very prominent in the research process. I used a variety of theoretical lenses, with inherent assumptions, which I will discuss in the following four chapters. Broadly, my orientation is postmodern and psychoanalytic. It involves social constructionist and intersubjective perspectives (Chapter Two). I will also be using principles from psychodynamic community psychology (Chapter Three) and postmodern ethnography (Chapter Four). In Chapter Five I will discuss the infant observation paradigm, which is part of a more traditional psychoanalytic model. As an infant observer in the present project, I was a

practitioner, and yet my overarching aim was to ask questions about infant observation in a new context (research). This meant that I found myself with two quite different agendas simultaneously, that were in conflict in some ways. However, it was at these uncomfortable intersections that some of the most important questions, issues and findings became apparent.

I am a middle-class, 36-year-old, white, English-speaking South African from an Afrikaans background, who grew up overseas (in Germany, Israel and England) until the age of 11. I was childless at the time of the research. I am a clinical psychologist in part-time private practice, where I see children and their families, as well as adults. Before I trained, I worked as a stage, film, radio and television actress for 12 years. Towards the end of that career I was involved in writing, directing and performing in community, educational and industrial theatre projects.

I received my clinical training from Stellenbosch University, where I graduated with a Master's Degree in 2003. This training (which was co-ordinated by Professor Lou-Marié Kruger) consisted of working in both psychodynamic and community psychology paradigms. Before this, I received an MA in Psychoanalytic Studies (a non-clinical degree) from the Tavistock in 2002. On the M16 course I was taught modules on the wider application of psychoanalytic theory by M.E. Rustin and M.J. Rustin, whose work is cited liberally in the present dissertation. As part of the latter degree course, I conducted a year-long observation of a young child in a middle-class London pre-school in 2001 and thus have had experience of the Tavistock infant observation procedure in a Western context, used for its original purpose, namely as a training tool. My infant observation seminar leader was Annette Mendelsohn. By chance, the 2-year-old I observed in 2001 was a French child born to a French mother and an English father. She spoke no English, but attended an English-medium pre-school. Therefore a cross-cultural setting also existed here between the child and myself (a South African who spoke no French). There is also an interesting parallel with my own dislocation as a South African abroad (I initially spoke only Afrikaans as a child).

Since returning to South Africa, I have attended presentations and seminars by visitors associated with the Tavistock such as Valerie Sinason, Louise Emanuel and Suzanne Maiello, whose work is cited in the present dissertation. I am a member of the Tavistock Society of Psychotherapists and Allied Professionals (TSP), the Cape Town Psychoanalytic Self Psychology Group (CTPSPG), and the International Association for Psychoanalytic Self Psychology (IAPSP). My exposure to more postmodern forms of psychoanalysis such as intersubjectivity has occurred through the Self Psychology Group in Cape Town, through which I attend monthly reading groups, and which offers introductory courses and coordinates a biannual conference with international speakers.

My personal and academic histories situate me in two very different worlds simultaneously and with fairly equal weight, namely a local South African one and a more Western, international one. To my knowledge, I am one of very few South Africans (if not the only one) who has received an MA from both the Tavistock and a South African university, and who is focusing on community work. Regarding the Tavistock, the assumption here is that an institution that developed the original, unapplied or "pure" form of infant observation capped me as an insider of sorts. I have experienced that this gives me credibility in the eyes of the Tavistock itself in terms of enabling my re-entry in order to present my work there. It may also affect the way South African infant observers see me, a few of whom have themselves brought home a kind of legitimacy by training at the Tavistock and returning to teach and

supervise. On the other hand, I also received a degree from a university that practices in different ways, including a focus on "community psychology". This in some ways makes me an outsider regarding "the Tavistock approach" (Waddel, 2006). I feel that I am uniquely positioned to conduct a study of this kind because of my dual focus. The potential for friction between these two positions also exists. At the same time, I recognise the "Tavistock" as a co-construction that my colleagues, my teachers and I all play a role in upholding at different times. This construction is linked with the concept of "the classic 'observational stance'" (Sternberg, 2005, p. 6), the "ideal observation" and the "'proper' way observation should be done" (Sternberg, 2005, p. 95). It may be so that sectors of the Tavistock Clinic itself are less conservative in practice and approach than is sometimes assumed. Lastly, my exposure to intersubjectivity theory, which I have recently begun to apply in my thinking about community work (J. Lazarus, 2005, 2006) offers an alternative perspective to the more modernist tradition upheld at the Tavistock.

The present research project represents my introduction to the field of ethnography. I have no experience of conducting fieldwork with an explicitly ethnographic purpose. However, postmodern ethnography allows genres to blur and disciplines to meet (Clifford & Marcus, 1986; Denzin, 1997; Ortnor, 1999). This means that my psychoanalytic tools become a legitimate strategy for research in an ethnographic sense (Clifford, 1986). Secondly, the way in which ethnographies are invariably fictions (in the sense of constructions) and function as literature is increasingly being recognised (Clifford & Marcus, 1986; Denzin, 1997; Geertz, 1988; Olson, 1991). Thirdly, some contemporary and experimental forms of ethnography are moving towards becoming forms of art, including performance (Clifford & Marcus, 1986; Denzin, 1997). My background is in the arts: my BA majors were English and Drama, and I concurrently obtained a Performer's Diploma in Speech and Drama (1992). I also studied History of Art, Greek and Roman Literature and Thought, and Philosophy towards my first degree. I have painted and published poetry at student levels. My Tavistock MA applied psychoanalytic theory in considering an unusual piece of "Outsider Art" by a South African called Helen Martins (J. Lazarus, 2002). Late in her life, Martins turned her home, which was situated in a small village, into an artwork called *The Owl House*. My focus was on the ways in which her past, her internal world, and her physical, cultural and metaphorical dwelling places intersected. Conceptually and practically, an ethnographic lens was an essential component in the present study. Ironically, it provided the greatest challenges and the broadest usefulness, and enabled the deepest learning. In retrospect, I feel I am interestingly situated for a study of this nature. I have stood inside and outside the paradigms of both classical psychoanalysis and ethnography at different times.

1.5 Organisation of the dissertation

In this chapter the research problem and rationale for the study have been outlined. In Chapter Two the postmodern metatheoretical lens of the thesis will be described. Together these two opening chapters comprise a first section that lays out the theoretical points of departure and assumptions of the thesis. In a second section three chapters will outline three major traditions or paradigms that have further informed the study theoretically, and which comprise the literature review. These are psychodynamic community psychology, postmodern ethnography and psychoanalytic infant observation. In each case the ways in which these paradigms engage and do not engage with a postmodern psychoanalytic perspective will be investigated. Throughout Sections One and Two important concepts for the discussion that follows will be highlighted and developed at the end of each chapter ("key terms").

These preliminary remarks will culminate in an attempt at giving working definitions of the terms at the end of Section Two. In a third section the methodology of the present study will be described. In Section Four its results will be noted and discussed. An evaluation of the study will be conducted in the concluding chapter and recommendations will be made.

1.6 Key terms

This introduction has noted that, in terms of knowledge production, context is important. In other words, when we use a tool such as psychoanalytic infant observation, it is important to think about where and how it originally developed. The kind of information it has produced in the past will be contingent on where the observations have taken place, and on who has been observed. Secondly, the present research project set out, without privileging the external, to find out more about every aspect surrounding the observed child, and how this might affect her relationships and development. In this way the most inclusive ethnographic sense of the word "context" is implicitly employed. Thirdly, it was recognised at proposal level that the subjectivity or personhood of the researcher would be involved in the present study and would have to be considered. Lastly, it seems important at the outset to define the concept of therapy. From a medical perspective this is an "inclusive label for all manners and forms of treatment of disease and disorder" (Reber, 1995, p. 794). In other words, it involves change in the direction of mental health, a term which in itself poses "medical, logical and empirical problems" (Reber, 1995, p. 452), but is generally used to designate a high level of behavioural and emotional functioning. Reber (1995) noted that "therapy" is a very broad term connotatively and denotatively, and is typically used with qualifiers to designate the form of therapy referenced - for example, psychoanalytic psychotherapy.

1.7 Conclusion

In South Africa many children live in poverty without access to health services, including mental health services. At the same time, this sector of the population has been neglected in terms of local research about what their difficulties and needs are. There are broad ideas about how poverty may affect socio-economically disadvantaged children, but there is little detailed information about the actual experience of South African children living in poverty. This means that it is hard to plan adequate services. It is suggested that one way to remedy this is to actively investigate the lives of such children by means of ethnographic case studies that add detail to the needs assessment process in community psychology projects. It was therefore assumed that an ethnographic lens would be an important tool in the present study. It will be shown that a contemporary ethnographic approach further allows the practitioner to engage with the complex issues that arise in a study of this kind. These include issues of difference, power and representation, all of which are felt to be crucial to South Africa in the light of our history of apartheid. One way of adding depth that has been explored in community work is the psychoanalytic tool of analysing the unconscious. The present dissertation suggests that very traditional tools such as psychoanalytic infant observation might be employed in this endeavour.

CHAPTER TWO: Theoretical points of departure

2.1 Introduction

The present research is located within a psychoanalytic paradigm that draws on postmodern thinking. As a study, it aims to investigate that which is marginalised and has been forgotten, as indicated in the previous chapter. It also represents a critique of more traditional modes of thinking, operating and theorising. Postmodernism is a form of interrogation with "an intense concern for pluralism" and "an acknowledgement of difference and otherness" (Jencks, 1992, p. 7). This is felt to be an important lens in a country like South Africa, where power is contested and there has been "a legacy of racial, gender and other forms of oppression" (Foster & S. Swartz, 1997). In the present chapter the characteristics of a postmodern psychoanalytic lens will be considered in some detail.

2.2 A definition of postmodernism

Postmodernism has become a key term across a range of disciplines since the 1980s (Waugh, 1992). Frosh (1991) noted the complexity of the term and of the various forces that make up the postmodernist movement. Waugh (1992) pointed out that there are "many Postmodernisms" and that they have "a variety of theoretical precursors and historical trajectories" (p. 1). Theorists such as Nietzsche, Barthes, Foucault, Derrida and Lacan are important in its genealogies (Waugh, 1992).

Postmodernism, Waugh (1992) suggested, is a theoretical and representational "mood" or "structure of feeling" that has developed over the last thirty years (pp. 1, 3). This tendency involves a "loss of faith in the progressivist and speculative discourses of modernity" (Waugh, 1992, p. 3). The advance of modernity was associated with a focus on reason (Frosh, 2000). The project of postmodernism might be summarised as dismantling the received certainties of modernism, including the task of deconstructing the self (Frosh, 1991). The postmodern mood implies the collapse of the grand narratives of modernity. Frosh (1991) quoted Lyotard's (1979) well-known summary: "I define postmodern as incredulity towards metanarratives" (p. 23). Postmodernism opposes the illusions of wholeness and of received wisdom or knowledge within which we take refuge (Frosh, 1991). Lyotard (1979) identified the renunciation of universalisation, a loss of confidence in the modern notion of "progress", and a process of self-reflectiveness (of "working-through...operated by modernity on itself") as three particular debates which can be distinguished in the term postmodern (quoted in Frosh, 1991, pp. 22-23). Individuality is seen as being permeated by sociality. Waugh (1992) noted that the term initially carried emphatically aesthetic connotations. At first it described "a range of aesthetic practices involving playful irony, parody, parataxis, self-consciousness, fragmentation" (Waugh, 1992, p. 3):

Interestingly, by 1990, although "Postmodernism" as a concept has emphatically spilled out of the boundaries of literary critical debate, it still carries with it, wherever it goes, the idea of "telling stories". But the stories are now indistinguishable from what was once assumed to be knowledge: scientific truth, ethics, law, history. (Waugh, 1992, p. 1)

Postmodernism suggests dissent and diversity; "the margins have become the centre" (Frosh, 2000, p. 60). It grants privileges to the voices of those usually silenced (Lesch, 2000) and asks about otherness both as something to

encounter without and within (Frosh, 2000; S. Swartz, 2005). Frosh (2000) pointed out that postmodernism argues against the existence of general theories and the value of broad debates (p. 61). Local knowledge and specific modes of practice are seen as more useful in understanding the world (Frosh, 2000).

Frosh (2000) wrote about the development of critical psychology as reflecting a wider struggle over the nature and forms of power. His comments about what critical psychology is situate it firmly within the postmodernist ethos and provide a useful sense of how postmodernist thought operates:

It is about excrement, about spoiling the purity of the vision of the normative as "good", about denouncing claims to truth. It is constantly provoking, never-endingly analytic, always trying to see the system in the individual, always prising open the "natural" to see how it is constructed. It is gendered and racialized, it promotes social and political analysis; it celebrates diversity and otherness. What romance... (p. 58)

These ideas form a framework for critical thinking in the present dissertation: "Postmodernists challenge Enlightenment ideas about truth, knowledge, power, history, self, and language still predominant in the West" (Flax, 1993, p. 48).

2.3 A definition of social constructionism

Social constructionism is a postmodernist metatheory that has informed approaches to a number of social sciences (Durrheim, 1997; Gergen, 1997). One could say that it involves the application of a postmodernist perspective in practical terms (Lupton, 1995). It represents a shift away from empiricism (dualism and representationism) (Durrheim, 1997). Theorists such as Berger and Luckmann, Gergen, Bruner and Shotter have developed it. As Gergen, Lightfoot and Sydow (2004) have pointed out, social constructionism is not a unified theory, but an unfolding dialogue, and attempts to summarise its values and practices are somewhat antithetical to its nature. However, Wetherell and Maybin (1996) described social constructionism as a way of thinking about the self that begins with the social context. The self and the social world are not seen as separated; social constructionism questions the independent and self-contained nature of the individual (Wetherell & Maybin, 1996). Referring to Gergen (1991, 1994), Wetherell and Maybin (1996) noted that the self is seen not as an object for description, but as "a continuously changing and fluid history of relationships" (p. 222). It is felt that the social world, or meaningful human activity, should be at the heart of psychological investigations (Gergen, 1973; Shotter, 1993).

Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson and Duvall (1999) held that social constructivist analysis implies a commitment to three interrelated principles, namely:

1. What is understood as reality is socially constructed.
2. Constructions of reality reflect, enact, and reify relations of power. In turn, certain agents or groups of agents play a privileged role in the production and reproduction of these realities.
3. A critical constructivist approach denaturalizes dominant constructions, offers guidelines for the transformation of common sense, and facilitates imagining of alternative life-worlds. It also problematizes the conditions of its own claims; that is, a critical constructivism is also reflexive. (p. 13)

2.4 Central concerns in social constructionist thought

2.4.1 Reality and truth

Several South African masters and doctoral students have examined the basic tenets of social constructionism recently (Appelt, 2006; Herbst de Villiers, 2006; Lesch, 2000; Long, 1999). Of importance to the present study is the social constructionist idea of anti-realism: the notion is that the nature of social life is constructed through language, in a performative and not a descriptive sense (Gergen, 1997; Long, 1999). Hosking and Morley (2004) noted that social constructionists hold that "objective truth is not absolute truth but socially certified truth" (p. 327). There is, in other words, no one unitary truth to be uncovered in a positivist sense (Durrheim, 1997; Gergen, 1997). Clifford and Marcus (1986) succinctly articulated this position as follows: "What appears as 'real' in history, the social sciences, the arts, even in common sense, is always analyzable as a restrictive and expressive set of social codes and conventions" (p. 10). This raises the question of verisimilitude, as Denzin (1997) has pointed out. Our understanding of reality is always a representation and not a replica (Herbst de Villiers, 2006). Citing Baudrillard (1983), Denzin (1997) noted that "the very definition of the real becomes: that of which it is possible to give an equivalent reproduction" (p. 13). Denzin (1997) held that the researcher can only ever produce a text that reproduces multiple versions of the real. Each version is also thought to impinge on and shape that which is being studied. Verisimilitude, in Denzin's view, is the text's ability "to reproduce and deconstruct the reproductions and simulations that structure the real" (1997, p. 13).

Waugh (1992) noted that "the Cartesian assumption of a radical split between knowing subject and inert object of knowledge has led to a world in which the detached superiority of the scientist becomes the model and ground of all existence" (p. 2). Social constructionists' stories about truth do not focus on reason and the subject/object relationship (Flax, 1993). Instead, they focus on discursive practices. They contest the idea that the mind can somehow receive accurate information about reality, without its being obscured by theoretical assumptions, methods and mental processes (Flax, 1993). It is felt that it is not possible to "directly observe" data in an empirical sense. We cannot produce a body of knowledge that faithfully mirrors nature "out there" (Rorty, 1979, quoted in Durrheim, 1997, p. 18).

Social constructionism is described as "an active and subjective approach of becoming involved with how people make meaning of their lives" (Herbst de Villiers, 2006). These meanings are seen as context-dependent (Lesch, 2000). People act towards objects and other actors based on the meanings that the objects have for them (Wendt, 1992, cited in Weldes et al., 1999).

2.4.2 Subjectivity

The concept of subjectivity alludes to that which is dependent on the mind for existence; something that is subjective is thought to be "based on or influenced by personal feelings, tastes or opinions" (*Concise Oxford English dictionary*, 2006, p. 1435). In other words, subjectivity is related to a particular perceiving consciousness or person. From a social constructionist perspective, personhood is seen as emergent, contextual, discursive,

multiple, relational and mutual (Wetherell & Maybin, 1996). Identity and personhood are thought to be contextual in that they are located in and defined by complexes of social activities (Wetherell & Maybin, 1996). In other words, "consciousness and self emerge in fields of meanings and practices which are socially and culturally organised" (Wetherell & Maybin, 1996, p. 229). There is no self apart from social context. This position is perhaps best summarised by Berger and Luckmann in their influential text, *The social construction of reality* (1967):

While it is possible to say that man has a nature, it is more significant to say that man constructs his own nature, or more simply, that man produces himself...it is important to emphasize that the relationship between man, the producer, and the social world, his product, is and remains a dialectical one. That is, man (not, of course, in isolation, but in his collectivities) and his social world interact with each other. (quoted in Mishler, 1981, p. 141)

In other words, social constructionism recognises that we have multiple selves: "We are not single persons, but a multitude of possibilities any one of which might reveal itself in a specific field situation" (Lincoln, 1997, quoted in Olesen, 2005, p. 248).

2.4.3 Language

Language, and the way it relates to the status of knowledge, is a central concern in social constructionist thinking. Hosking and Morley (2004) said that "social constructionists are likely to be contextualists who...think that what we say does not just mirror the world but in some sense helps to constitute that world" (p. 319). In the positivist paradigm, it is assumed that language can describe and represent external objects in the world (Durrheim, 1997). Flax (1993) pointed out that, in social constructionist terms, language "cannot be a transparent, passive, or neutral instrument" (p. 49). Language is not a way to label objects - on the contrary, social constructionists stress that thought is dependent on language (Flax, 1993).

Language partially constructs our personhood and affects the meanings of our experiences and understandings of them (Flax, 1993). We are, Flax (1993) noted, "born into an ongoing set of language games" (p. 49). Our identities are seen in part to be discursive products, in that "language, talk and discourse provide some important raw materials for the construction of the self" (Wetherell & Maybin, 1996, p. 228). Discourse involves conversations, narratives and stories. It has been defined as "the talk and texts of social life" (Wetherell & Maybin, 1996, p. 240). Lupton (1995) described discourse as:

...a pattern of words, figures of speech, concepts, values and symbols. A discourse is a coherent way of describing and categorizing the social and physical worlds. Discourses gather around an object, person, social group or event of interest, providing a means of "making sense" of that object, person, and so on. (p. 18)

Discourse analysts stress that language is a practical activity and not just an abstract system of rules (Wetherell & Maybin, 1996). Talk and writing are ways to constitute or build worlds, lives and selves (social reality) (Wetherell & Maybin, 1996). As Taylor (1985) observed: "language is constitutive of the reality, is essential to its being the kind of reality it is" (p. 34). Stevenson (2004) noted that what follows is "the potential for multiplicity in accounts, and the rejection of straightforward representationalism" (p. 19). Discourse analysis is about examining texts and how language is used to establish power (Lupton, 1995).

2.4.4 Power

The focus of social constructionist thought is, as the name suggests, on interaction and social processes rather than on the intrapsychic (Long, 1999). This includes an examination of how institutions and institutional discourse plays a role in the construction of reality (as in the work of Foucault) and has led to the practices of narrative and discourse analysis. Hosking and Morley (2004) noted that "conversations matter. If we pay more attention to the structure and process of conversations we may be able to bring new insights to change in individuals, groups, and communities" (p. 327).

Lesch (2000), citing Danziger (1997), pointed out that power is an important term in social constructionism and that "current patterns of interaction are dependent on power structures originating in the past and maintained by many institutionalised practices and conventions" (p. 50). Discourse, in Foucauldian terms, "is understood as a way of understanding language, power and subjectivity" (Long, 1999, p. 21). Dominant discourses are sustained by power relations but are in themselves important sources of power, because they bring with them the power to define and thus constitute the world (Weldes et al., 1999). As Foucault (1979) argued, "power and knowledge directly imply one another...there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations" (quoted in Weldes et al., 1999, p. 18). Flax (1993) pointed out that the emphasis on power distinguishes social constructionists from hermeneutic thinkers. When we acquire linguistic skills, she held, we "enter into specific circuits of power" (p. 49). "Truth" is seen as an effect of multiple discursive practices, including the circulation of power (Flax, 1993).

2.5 Postmodern psychoanalysis

Psychoanalysis is a vast field and a comprehensive review will not be attempted here. Instead, after a brief definition, the particular brand of psychoanalysis that informs the analysis in the present study will be considered. Most broadly, it should be noted that all the concerns of social constructionism delineated above feature as concerns in postmodern psychoanalysis. My discussion will delineate some theoretical ideas that are used in the present thesis but will then emphasise psychoanalytic practice. Kruger (2006) commented that what is particularly important is that psychoanalytic practice (the cure) and technique (the method of the cure) have, since Freud, always been firmly tied to theory.

2.5.1 A definition of psychoanalysis

Psychoanalysis emerged in late nineteenth-century Europe and has become one of the strongest influences on twentieth-century thought (Frosh, 1987). Originating with Freud, it postulated the existence of a dynamic unconscious:

...the idea that in each of us there is a realm of psychological functioning which is not accessible to ordinary introspection, but which nevertheless has a determining or at least a motivating influence on the activities, thoughts and emotions of everyday life. (Frosh, 1987, p. 2)

Since Freud, psychoanalysis has produced many different schools of thought, each with its own theories, which yet share this basic assumption (Frosh, 1987). Frosh (2000), writing about critical psychology and citing Eliot (1920), noted that Freudian psychoanalysis set in motion "the relentless quest for *what's really happening*, for the underlying, the hidden, the that-which-trips-us-up, 'the skull beneath the skin'" (p. 58). S. Swartz (2006a) noted that "insofar as the analytic work includes unconscious needs, impulses and desire, it must also assume a discourse shaped by anxiety and defence" (p. 434). The structure and content of the unconscious is a debated topic. Frosh (1987) noted that most analysts agree that it is made up of the residues of infantile experiences, possibly alongside instinctual impulses, particularly sexual ones. There is further agreement that children develop by passing through certain stages and that the experiences of early life (up to age 5), particularly with the parents, are of significance for later life (Frosh, 1987).

In object relations theory the internal world is described as being peopled by mental representations of others (internal objects), "sharing as they do some of the characteristics of 'real' people as well as some of their capacity to trigger behavioural response, yet being demonstrably 'different'" (Greenberg & S. Mitchell, 1983, p. 11). Greenberg and S. Mitchell (1983) commented that object relations theory, originating in the work of Klein, is built on the "potentially confounding observation that people live simultaneously in an external and an internal world, and that the relationship between the two ranges from the most fluid intermingling to the most rigid separation" (p. 12). The implication is that people react not only to an actual other, but also an internal other (Greenberg & S. Mitchell, 1983).

Laplanche and Pontalis (1980) defined projection as the psychic expulsion of "qualities, feelings, wishes or even 'objects'" from the self into another person or thing (quoted in S. Swartz, 2006a, p. 431). S. Swartz pointed out that such operations are identifiable in verbal exchange, "and in particular in the use and abuse of ordinary conversational rules" (2006a, p. 431). Klein (1946) originally described the related concept of projective identification "as a mechanism of defence by which the patient locates an experience that is felt to be intolerable in an external object, which is then felt to be affected by the experience" (Colam, 1997, p. 31). Colam (1997) went on to discuss the way in which Bion (1962, 1970) later outlined projective identification as functioning as a form of non-verbal communication. Both the processes of projection and projective identification are thought to be primitive or immature defence mechanisms, which can occur both in the infant and in the adult (Bateman & Holmes, 1995).

In terms of practice, it is thought that the intense examination of psychological and cultural phenomena such as "dreams, slips of the tongue, works of art, [and] neuroses" can unearth the underlying dynamics of mental life (Frosh, 1987, p. 2). This happens most clearly in the therapeutic situation, or "talking cure", described below (Frosh, 1987, p.2). Core concepts are the use of free association, interpretation and the transference (Rycroft, 1995). The patient is encouraged to report her thoughts without reservation and concentration (Rycroft, 1995). Psychoanalytic technique demands that in response "all criticism, advice, encouragement, reassurance, and the like, is rigorously avoided" (Segal, 1986, quoted in Colam, 1997, p. 30). Freud recommended that the analyst attempt a kind of free-floating attention (Piontelli, 1992). This ties in with the analytic attitude described by Bion (1974, cited in Casement, 1985) of "not knowing", that is, of entering the therapy space with as few assumptions as possible

(see also Ivey, 1999). The psychoanalytic frame creates the therapeutic context, which is comprised of a private, stable space, regular sessions of the same length over an extended time period, and payment (Colam, 1997). It is important that the analyst refrain from "doing" by avoiding extra-analytic contact, retaliation in the analysis, and contact with third parties (Colam, 1997, p. 30). It is felt that a properly established frame provides safe and open conditions for unencumbered communication (Langs, 1982, cited in Colam, 1997). Langs (1982) pointed out that changes in the therapeutic "rules", though consciously gratifying to the patient, are unconsciously experienced as negative (quoted in Colam, 1997, p. 30).

Jacobson (1993) noted that the opening phase of an analysis is characterised by the mutual attempts of the analyst and patient to establish a meaningful attachment or analytic bond. The patient's previous life experiences with fundamental issues such as basic trust come into play. Jacobson (1993) likened this process to the mutual accommodation and attunement visible in mother-infant interactions, and emphasised the importance of the "holding environment" at this time (Winnicott, 1960, pp. 43-44). The latter term describes a process whereby the infant (or patient) is supported emotionally while in the grip of difficult feelings. A related concept is that of "mirroring", namely the way in which the mother's face reflects the emotional states she sees in the infant's face (Winnicott, 1971b). Winnicott and Bion both extended Klein's ideas. Winnicott was supervised by Klein for five years (Aguayo, 2002). Bion (1959, 1962, 1970), who was Klein's analysand, developed the notion of container/contained, whereby the mother (or analyst) helps the processing of overwhelming, undigested feeling that is projected into her. By means of an empathic response, these feelings are detoxified as they resonate in her and are returned in a more processed form.

It is felt that the analytic frame creates containment for the patient by providing an inherent sense of safety and protection (Langs, 1982, cited in Colam, 1997). In the analytic encounter, "the patient's life history begins to surface with increasing intensity, deepening, expanding, testing, distorting, threatening and sometimes rupturing the initial therapeutic bond" (Jacobson, 1993, p. 528). This is the transference: reactions that appear to arise with the analyst can be seen to actually originate with figures from the patient's past. The counter-transference is the process whereby the analyst uses her "own intrapsychic experiences of the patient to comprehend the patient's inner workings", the idea being to communicate these understandings to the patient (interpretation) (Jacobson, 1993, p. 529). In attempting to differentiate itself from hypnosis, early psychoanalysis emphasised the importance of providing a "blank screen constant" which avoided the taint of suggestion (Jacobson, 1993, p. 535). Against this, the patient's hidden wishes could emerge and become "interpretable in the service of mastery and autonomy" (Jacobson, 1993, p. 535). Jacobson (1993) noted that effective interpretation strengthens the bond, but that this may in itself "provoke fears of engulfment, or of humiliation, leading to an affective storm and crisis quite bewildering to patient and analyst alike until the link is seen and understood" (p. 530). He added that if not grasped, a negative therapeutic reaction can develop. The analytic frame, meanwhile, "implies a capacity in the therapist to control his or her countertransferences and to create conditions and modes of relatedness best suited for the patient's therapeutic needs" (Langs, 1982, quoted in Colam, 1997, p. 30).

From the beginning of psychoanalysis the relationship of analyst and patient has thus been an area of interest and controversy (Jacobson, 1993). There has always been a dynamic tension between "the analyst's stance of mirror-

like opacity, meant to provide an ideal silent backdrop for transferences to appear most clearly" (Jacobson, 1993, pp. 523-524) and the kind of human interaction which is necessary for the analytic situation to proceed at all. The human side of the relationship has been referred to using a variety of terms, including the "real relationship" (Jacobson, 1993, p. 524).

Winnicott, with his emphasis on the role of the maternal environment, can be seen as a forerunner of contemporary relational forms of psychoanalysis (Ogden, 1994; Strozier, 2001). Bion also moved Kleinian theory away from drives and towards relationships (Bateman & Holmes, 1995). Equally, Bowlby (1969) thought about defences in interpersonal terms in his development of attachment theory. He described secure attachment by the infant to an available caregiver as a positive primary defence, while avoidant and ambivalent attachment styles are thought to develop as a way of retaining closeness to unavailable or rejecting attachment figures (Bateman & Holmes, 1995).

2.5.2 Postmodern psychoanalysis

A significant challenge to "classical" psychoanalysis has been the rise of Kohut's (1971, 1977) Self Psychology in America, which emphasised deficit rather than conflict (Bateman & Holmes, 1995). A core concept in Self Psychology is the self-object, which is "one's subjective sense of a sustaining intimate relationship with another whose security and interest maintains the self" (Bateman & Holmes, 1995, p. 46). Self-object needs, which are considered normal, lead to self-object transferences, comprising mirroring, idealising and twinship transferences, "each corresponding to a different pole of the tripolar self" (Bateman & Holmes, 1995, p. 46). The theory is that the child needs to be mirrored, to idealise the caregiver, and to attain a sense of being paired with another who has talents and abilities. If these self-object functions were not met in childhood, a lack of cohesion in the self and low self-esteem can occur. The adult client will again seek these experiences in analysis, as in all later relationships (Bateman & Holmes, 1995).

K. Gibson (2002b) noted that since Freud psychoanalytic thinking has developed to recognise that the subjectivity (the phantasies¹ and feelings) of *both* analyst and patient are equally important. Developments in Self Psychology since Kohut have opened exciting possibilities for the exploration of the interplay between identities in the therapeutic space. Strozier (2001) described the current focus in psychoanalysis as encompassing relational issues, intersubjectivity, and the self:

Before Kohut, psychoanalysis talked about patients in ways that objectified their experience. A theory of self is of necessity connected, mutual, interdependent. There are many contending views at present in what can be very generally called relational psychoanalysis, from the constructivists to the postmoderns to the intersubjectivists. What they share, however, is a basic sense of experience (which is to say, self) that first entered psychoanalytic thinking in a coherent way with Kohut. (p. 224)

Citing Stolorow, Atwood and Orange (2001), Leighton (2004) noted that postmodern psychoanalysis "rejects notions of Cartesian objectivism and the autonomy of the isolated mind and embraces that which is pluralistic, subjective and perspectival" (p. 170). This has translated into a commitment to a "two-person theory" (Leighton,

¹ In the unconscious sense, and as differentiated from conscious fantasies, daydreams or wishes (Bateman & Holmes, 1995).

2004, p. 170). By this is meant the assumption that in the therapeutic dyad "both realities are valid, though they may be different, and both mutually influence each other" (Leighton, 2004, p. 171). There is recognition of a "co-constructed stance" (Hainer, 1999, quoted in Leighton, 2004, p. 171).

The present dissertation will use intersubjectivity theory, which is a metatheory of psychoanalysis (Orange, Atwood & Stolorow, 1997). The intersubjective systems perspective in psychoanalysis has developed over the past three decades in the United States. Definitions of it vary in different theoretical contexts (S. Swartz, 2006a). I will be using the work of theorists such as Brandchaft, Atwood, Stolorow and Orange, rather than the relational intersubjectivity of Ogden, Benjamin and Bollas.

Intersubjectivity is interested in complexity, context and organic systems (Orange, 2005). The intersubjective viewpoint is that in analysis a psychological field or system is created by the intersection of two subjectivities (Atwood & Stolorow, 1984). Both of these subjectivities have also emerged from different systems. An "interest in subjectivity as central to our experience of the world" is thus at the core of intersubjective thought (S. Swartz, 2006a, p. 433). The principal components of subjectivity are thought to be unconscious organising principles, and its emergence and modification are seen as "irreducibly relational" (Orange et al., 1997, p. 4). Relatedness between subjects is thus a second core concern. Human beings are seen as organisers of experience, with differently organised subjectivities that are in constant interplay with each other (Orange et al., 1997). A third concern is contextualism, namely the way in which specific intersubjective contexts have shaped our developmental processes as children: "the observational focus is the evolving psychological field constituted by the interplay between the differently organised subjectivities of child and caretakers" (Atwood & Stolorow, 1984, quoted in Orange et al., 1997, p. 4). There is a central claim that "all psychological life emerges from the interplay of two or more worlds of experience" (Buirski, 2005, p. xi). S. Swartz (2006a) noted that from a feminist perspective, intersubjectivity "opens the door to negotiations about power" (p. 433):

...moreover, in taking seriously the search for individual meanings, it constructs a platform from which the clinical subject might speak and be heard. This addresses feminist qualms about the erasure of women's voices in psychoanalytic theory's patriarchal cellars. (S. Swartz, 2006a, p. 433)

In terms of practice, analysts within this paradigm insist on thinking and working contextually in the therapeutic process - in other words, with an eye on who patient and analyst are and have been, and who they are together (Orange et al., 1997). This involves reflection (thinking):

We must examine the theories, prejudices and assumptions that form our own subjectivity, but we can work psychoanalytically and understand psychoanalytically only from within the intersubjective field. (Orange et al., 1997)

Orange et al. (1997) utilised Kohut's radical insistence "that the entire domain of psychoanalytic inquiry is subjective experience" (p. 6). Kohut believed that the only data for psychoanalytic understanding are those that are accessible by introspection and empathy (Orange et al., 1997). Since Kohut, the centrality of empathy (empathic immersion) in therapeutic technique has been recognised: attuned responsiveness by the therapist is thought to allow the integration of the patient's disavowed affect states (Buirski, 2005; Buirski & Haglund, 1999). Rather than disputing or verifying the objective reality of the patient's complaint, an attempt is made to understand personal

meanings (Buirski & Haglund, 1999). Analysts working in this paradigm are sceptical about the existence of interpretation-free facts, and try to keep from imposing "realistic" preconceptions about facts and values onto their patients (Orange, 2005, p. xi). In this paradigm, subjectivity is defined not as a thing in itself, but as personal worlds of experience (Orange et al., 1997).

The implication is that the analyst can never stand outside her own subjectivity in a kind of "God's eye view" of the patient (Orange et al., 1997, p. 4). Analytic neutrality and objectivity are seen as impossibilities (Buirski, 2005; Orange et al., 1997). Both members of the therapeutic dyad bring their own organisations of experience, based on past relating, to create what has more appropriately been termed the "co-transference" (Orange et al., 1997). Intersubjective systems theory is thus built around the notion that context and relationship are central components of the clinical exchange (Buirski, 2005; Buirski & Haglund, 2001; Orange et al., 1997). There is a recognition that the analytic situation is "a dyadic intersubjective system of reciprocal mutual influence, to which the organising activities of both participants make ongoing, codetermining contributions" (Orange et al., 1997, p. 43).

Instead of maintaining an external perspective of participant observation, the analyst is seen as "undergoing the situation" with the patient (Gadamer, 1975, quoted in Orange et al., 1997, p. 5). Analysis is reframed as "the dialogic attempt of two people together to understand one person's organization of emotional experience by making sense together of their intersubjectively configured experience" (Orange, 1995, quoted in Orange et al., 1997, p. 5). The concept of humans as self-contained bundles of instincts is transcended. In terms of practice, Orange et al. (1997) proposed eschewing specific analytic rules and techniques in favour of psychoanalysis as "a kind of practice in the Aristotelian sense" (p. 27):

Unlike technique, practice is always oriented to the particular. Practice embodies an attitude of inquiry, deliberation and discovery. It eschews rules, but loves questions - questions about what is wise to do with this person, at this time, for this reason. (Orange et al., 1997, p. 27)

To date, intersubjectivity theorists do not seem to have commented explicitly on the Tavistock infant observation procedure. This is possibly because infant observation research – in other words, systematic experimental infant observation, as epitomised in the work of Stern, Beebe and Tronick – is more prominent in the United States than is the British Tavistock model of "naturalistic infant observation" in homes, for training purposes (Sternberg, 2005, p. 7). Theoretically and practically, there also seems to be a sharp divide between the intersubjective world and the Tavistock paradigm, with little cross-pollination. By contrast, relational forms of psychology and experimental infant observation have proved a good fit. I will consider this point further in Chapter Five, when I examine current critiques of the observation procedure from within psychoanalytic circles.

2.6 The application of social constructionist thought to the present study

The present study attempts to utilise infant observation, which emerged in 1948 and is part of a modernist paradigm, in a community psychology setting. It is proposed that the recent contribution of social constructionist thought to both psychoanalytic and ethnographic thinking will be a useful adjunct for dealing with the complexities of such a project. This is because social constructionism is able to interrogate the Lacanian concept of the "Real", or the "underside of experience": "the way unarticulated pockets of emotion act to disturb the orders of

representation with which we are more easily familiar - those of logic and law, and also of common fantasy" (Žižek, 1991, quoted in Frosh, 2000, p. 63). In other words, social constructionism helps us to think about that which lies outside particular paradigms, and about the nature of our chosen paradigms themselves. It is a way to contest or deconstruct privileged constructions of the world (Weldes et al., 1999). I will use this lens to deconstruct "the Esther Bick method" (Sternberg, 2005, p. 9), in other words, the classical tradition of infant observation that is upheld as the gold standard for observers worldwide.

2.7 A note about feminism

Feminism was not explicitly chosen as a lens in the present study at the outset, because my proposal grew out of an earlier clinical intervention, namely the Play Group, which was situated within a community psychology paradigm (J. Lazarus, 2003) (see **Addendum A**). The intervention in fact formed the practical component of a community psychology module during my clinical training. However, as always, feminism showed itself to be an important perspective during the process and analysis of the present study. Therefore its basic tenets, as they have a bearing on the concerns that arose in my study, will be very briefly outlined below, and considered extensively in later papers.

Feminism, which emerged from the social criticism and activism of the early 1960s, cannot be reduced to a single theory or homogenous system of thought or action (Mulvey, 1988). However, Mulvey (1988) quoted Jaggar (1983) in giving a simple working definition of feminism as referring "to all those who seek, no matter on what grounds, to end women's subordination" (p. 71). The women's movement grew out of opposition to social institutions that maintained male privilege and power (Mulvey, 1988). The concept of "women's nature" as something biologically determined was shown to obscure key factors of sexism and inequality (Mulvey, 1988). Instead, postmodern feminist theory holds the epistemological position that the mind, the self and knowledge are socially constituted and are the products of particular socio-cultural contexts (Flax, 1990). These ideas were explicated in this chapter in a consideration of social constructionist thought.

It is felt that not only women's representation of experience, but the material, social, economic or gendered conditions that articulate that experience need to be analysed (Olesen, 2005; Scheper-Hughes, 1992). Recently sexual identity has been constructed as performative rather than either given or socially ascribed (Butler, 1990, 1993, cited in Olesen, 2005). As the concept of "a universalised woman" has faded, researchers have become more sensitive to differences among women, even in the same group (Ferguson, 1993, quoted in Olesen, 2005, p. 241). Tuana (1993) argued that it was more realistic to expect pluralities of experiences rather than "a common core of shared experiences that are immune to economic conditions, cultural imperatives, etc." (quoted in Olesen, 2005, p. 250).

Feminist criticism has emphasised the gendered nature of things. Postmodern feminism is concerned with the deconstruction of stereotypical sex roles and the exposure of unequal power relations and social control. The absence of women from, or marginalised women in, research accounts has been noted (Olesen, 2005). The question of voice and the nature of the account are concerns that go back to the earliest beginnings of feminist research

(Olesen, 2005). Feminists insist on "hearing the voice of the oppressed, the silent and the abject" and "the possibilities of speaking and hearing through the misunderstandings and defences of race, class and gender positions" (S. Swartz, 2006a, pp. 433-434). If the personal is political, then documenting "the everyday, everynight activities" of women's lives is central (Olesen, 2005, p. 244). However, this enterprise is problematised: how to make women's voices heard without exploiting or distorting those voices is an ongoing concern (Olesen, 2005). Hidden problems of control occur when literary devices are borrowed to express voice (Olesen, 2005). The researcher, who has responsibility for the text, remains in the more powerful position, and one must ask which audience she is writing for (Olesen, 2005). These concerns were examined above in 2.4 and will be drawn on throughout the present dissertation. Olesen (2005) argued that "research *for* women should extend and amplify research merely *about* women" (p. 236). In other words, descriptions about unknown, unrecognised and oppressive aspects of women's situations should lead to action to realise social justice for women (and men) in specific contexts (Eichler, 1986, 1997, cited in Olesen, 2005).

From a feminist perspective, it seems impossible to think about infants living in poverty, as the present study attempts to do, without reference to their mothers. Spedding (2005) argued that feminist theory directs attention to the necessity of listening to mothers' voices, and that the feminist approach to psychotherapy "provides an imperative opportunity for their voices to be heard" (p. 34). Kruger (2003) citing Collins (1994) noted that different sets of expectations and preconditions are associated with motherhood in different contexts. Feminist researchers have aimed to "document experiences that had previously been ignored, forgotten, ridiculed, and devalued" and in so doing have "set out to collect alternative voices of women, including voices on motherhood" (Kruger, 2003, p. 198). She held that feminist psychologists should continuously explore and try to understand how women are experiencing motherhood and why. In an extensive body of work Kruger has dealt with the profound impact of factors such as race, religion, culture and personal history on the ways in which women narrate pregnancy and motherhood. In 2005b she argued that psychologists should not only listen to their clients' stories, but that they should also be attuned to the unspeakable and the uncontrollable. In any study focusing on infants, space also needs to be allowed for that which the mother cannot say.

It should be noted that the phallogentrism of classical psychoanalytic theory has been thoroughly critiqued by feminists, but many authors have also articulated different schools of psychoanalysis with feminist thought (see, for example, Benjamin, 1990; Chodorow, 1978; Flax, 1990, 1993; Gallop, 1982; J. Mitchell, 1974; S. Swartz, 2006). Psychoanalytic theories about the acquisition of subjectivity and gender identity have been described as "exceedingly controversial" (Moore, 1999, p. 42). One of the debated issues is whether Freud's account of the production of sexuality endorses patriarchal forms of heterosexuality, in the context of a theory of fixed sexual difference that postulates masculinity as the norm (Moore, 1994). Feminists have argued that psychoanalysis in effect "pays scant attention to power, race, gender or class" (S. Swartz, 2006, p. 433).

2.8 Key terms

In the foregoing discussion several concepts that are central to the present study have again been touched on, namely context, subjectivity, relationship, and internal versus external life. Firstly, the idea of context was

revisited. Intersubjectivity presents context as the particularity of the meeting space between people, including their gender constructions. Every person invariably brings his or her own personal history, assumptions and psychological theories to bear on the clinical situation, as on any other. This includes racial, sexual, socio-cultural, political and economic positioning. In a comparable way, feminism recognises "the essential interrelationships among the larger social structure, the immediate context, and individual well-being" (Mulvey, 1988, p. 70). In other words, one cannot consider a person without considering her surroundings. Social constructionism has alerted us not only to our subjectivity, but our multiple selves. Such aspects are thought to inform any relationship that results in unique ways that must be recognised. Relationship is thus a third important consideration in postmodern psychoanalytic thought. It is recognised as a site both where old traumas are replayed, and where a particular interaction between individuals is occurring in the present. A fourth concept that is linked to the concept of context is that of internal versus external life. Psychoanalysis has classically made a distinction between these two realms, while acknowledging the fluid interplay between them. Within this paradigm, the concept of inner human dynamics remains in tension with the realm of external physical and material conditions. For a long time psychoanalysis took more of an interest in an internal reality than in thinking about how environmental ills cause mental health problems. "Context" in a traditional psychoanalytic sense refers then predominantly to maternal influence rather than, say, political turmoil or poverty. From a social constructionist perspective, however, the very duality of internal/external and maternal/socio-political will be questioned. These complex concepts will be returned to and expanded on at the end of Chapter Five, where working definitions will be provided.

2.9 Conclusion

In this chapter a metatheoretical lens for the present study involving social constructionism and intersubjectivity was described. Intersubjectivity is centrally concerned with the past and the unconscious, with different subjectivities, with relationship, and with specific context. Social constructionism asks questions about how language and power operate in the creation of particular "truths".

In the following three chapters, which constitute the theoretical framework for the present study, three major traditions that impacted on and informed the choices in the present study will be considered. These are the paradigms of psychodynamic community psychology, postmodern ethnography and psychoanalytic infant observation. In an examination of the theoretical and empirical literature, the contribution and deficits of each paradigm will be shown. The ways in which they can be profitably articulated with each other will be considered. The assumptions laid out here, such as the social construction of reality and the existence of the unconscious, will be taken as given and will not be queried.

However, the ways in which these theoretical paradigms use concepts such as subjectivity, context, relationship and power will be examined. In each case the question being asked is what these major traditions add to the enquiry; in other words, how useful are they to the present investigation? These questions enable a position from which I will conduct a critique of infant observation, arising out of its application in a South African community context. Chapter Six, in which the present study's methodology is described, will show that each of these three traditions has also contributed methodologically to the way that the study was conducted and its results interpreted.

SECTION TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

CHAPTER THREE: Community psychology and psychoanalysis

3.1 Introduction

In most countries of the world community psychology developed in response to oppressive systems and the helping services linked to them, such as in apartheid in South Africa (Pretorius-Heuchert & Ahmed, 2001). Community psychology defines itself in opposition to mainstream psychology. It critiques the traditional paradigm for its inaccessible mental health services, its lack of active recognition of the way in which social context pertains to the genesis and development of mental health problems, and its limitations in cross-cultural contexts (Naidoo, 2000). Extensive reviews of different aspects of community psychology have been conducted (see, for example, Susskind & Klein, 1985). A comprehensive description of the development of different forms of community psychology both worldwide and in South Africa has been done (see Maw, 1996).

In its concern with redressing social ills, community psychology has in the past had a tendency to focus on social determinants, which has often also involved a critique of depth psychology, with its interest in internal processes. However, in an important development, psychodynamic practice in South African community work has recently begun to examine internal and interpersonal dynamics within community projects, using psychoanalytic ideas. The contribution of psychoanalysis, as K. Gibson and L. Swartz (2004) have noted, is that through this lens "it is possible to look below the neat surface of things for the ambivalent and contradictory possibilities this model is capable of grasping" (p. 468). In other words, psychodynamic insights allow us to consider community processes more deeply, and importantly, to uncover that which is hidden, unknown or unacknowledged.

In this chapter the theoretical principles underlying a psychodynamic community psychology approach will be described as a way of situating the present study within this paradigm. Examples of how these principles have been utilised in South African practice by major contributors will be given. In thinking about community work, I will predominantly discuss South African practice because it has been argued that the problems with which South Africa presents are unique and need tailor-made solutions (Dawes & Donald, 1994; Desai, 2005; Donald et al., 2000). After briefly examining the history and basic principles of community psychology, there will be a discussion of three important considerations that have come out of psychodynamic community work in South Africa - namely, relationships (where the emotional and political are inextricably linked), reflexivity and the holding environment. All three issues have come out of a realisation that what happens between people in any community intervention is crucial material to be worked with (K. Gibson & L. Swartz, 2000). This central principle will be taken as a theoretical point of departure when attempting to apply infant observation within a community psychology paradigm.

3.2 The origins of community psychology in South Africa

Community psychology arose in the 1960s and 1970s in the United States in the wake of the social upheaval of the civil rights era (Naidoo, 2000). It grew out of an awareness of the advantages of collective action and was given

impetus by the community mental health movement of the 1960s (Spedding, 2005; Tlali, 2000). In South Africa community psychology arose in the general political struggle against apartheid in the 1970s and 1980s (Naidoo, 2000). It functioned as a progressive, liberatory practice that was part of the political and social change leading to the demise of apartheid (K. Gibson & L. Swartz, 2004). Psychologists began to organise themselves around political issues (see, for example, L. Swartz, K. Gibson & S. Swartz, 1990; S. Swartz & L. Swartz, 1986). Existing psychological service delivery, it was argued, maintained the status quo (Naidoo, 2000). There was concern for the fact that psychological resources were unequally distributed and that the South African majority had little or no access to them (Spedding, 2005). Apart from being inadequate and inaccessible, it was also shown that existing mental health services were inappropriate and discriminatory (Naidoo, 2000). They seemed unable to address the impact of apartheid on its victims and the social problems facing South Africa (Naidoo, 2000). Traditional psychotherapy was felt to be "lacking in social utility" (Heller, Price, Reinharz, Riger & Wandersman, 1984, quoted in Tlali, 2000, p. 78) and too individualistic. As Mulvey (1988), citing Ryan (1971) put it:

To provide individual therapy to people who were without adequate food or decent housing and not to address these life conditions seemed irrelevant at best. These social scientists also criticized clinical psychology for "blaming the victim" while reinforcing a social order responsible for his or her victimization. (p. 71)

In South Africa the appropriateness of Western-based psychological models have thus repeatedly been contested (see, for example, Anonymous, 1986; Nsamineng, 1993). Community psychology sought to find more appropriate ways of working (Druiff, 2001; K. Gibson & L. Swartz, 2004; Long, 1999; Maw, 1996; Spedding, 2005).

3.3 The basic principles of community psychology

3.3.1 A definition of community psychology

There is no single definition of community psychology and its practices are quite varied (K. Gibson, 2002b; Spedding, 2005). Lounsbury, Cook, Leader and Meares (1985) spoke of "the variegated concerns of this bustling new field" and noted that "formal definitions of community psychology suggest a vast and potentially heterogeneous territory" (pp. 39-40). Rappaport (1984) defined community psychology most broadly as being oriented towards the social (cited in Tlali, 2000, p. 81). Tlali, citing Tolan, Keys, Chertok and Jansen (1990) said, "community psychology is interested in the person in context and context in persons" (p. 80). Trickett (1996) upheld "the importance of developing theory, research, and intervention that locates individuals, social settings, and communities in sociocultural context" (p. 209). Lounsbury et al. (1985) noted that most definitions of community psychology incorporate the perspective of an "environmental, ecological, or systems viewpoint" (p. 40). In terms of aetiology, the psychological problems of individuals are thought to have their roots in the broader society (K. Gibson, 2002b; K. Gibson & L. Swartz, 2004). Therefore a central principle in community psychology is that of context (Orford, 1992).

Specifically, Orford (1992) noted, community psychology is concerned with social change (cited in Tlali, 2000, p. 81). Several other authors (Edwards, 2002; Naidoo, 2000; Tlali, 2000) have stressed that a helping framework, in which community and individual well-being is improved and resources extended, is central to the model. The

political has always been recognised as an essential and inevitable part of community intervention and research; in fact, K. Gibson (2002b) referred to "the fundamentally political objectives of community psychology" (p. 36).

In summary, S. Lazarus (1985, cited in Duncan & Van Niekerk, 2001) identified the following values as the defining characteristics of community psychology:

1. Commitment to marginalised communities;
2. An ecological perspective;
3. Prevention;
4. Empowerment;
5. Social action;
6. Professional-client collaboration;
7. Self-reflection and critique (evaluation).

Mulvey (1988) noted that feminism and community psychology share both a historical context and significant theoretical assumptions, such as the importance of empowerment for social change. S. Swartz (2006a) pointed out that advocacy and activism have been part of the definition of feminism since the term came into use more than a century ago. Mulvey (1988) argued that community psychology should incorporate a feminist agenda more fully into research, theory and practice. In an overview of feminist theory, Spedding (2005) pointed out the importance of considering the socio-cultural context of marginalised women. In attempting to comprehend the lives of low-income women, Belle (1994) noted that "by ignoring dramatic differences in their actual life contexts we could attribute their differences to personal factors alone, once again pathologizing the psychological outcomes of oppression" (p. 47). Like community psychology, the women's movement criticised clinical psychology, and psychoanalysis in particular (Mulvey, 1988). Both paradigms suggested that the relationship between therapist and client was a disempowering one and that therapy encouraged adjustment to a system of inequitable power and control (Mulvey, 1988).

Several South African authors have outlined the tenets of community psychology by way of introduction to their own studies in the field (see, for example, K. Gibson, 2002b; Long, 1999; J. Lazarus, 2003; Spedding, 2005; Maw, 1996). K. Gibson (2002b) and Lounsbury et al. (1985) pointed out that there are considerable variations in the way different writers interpret the basic ideas of community psychology and envisage them being implemented. Spedding (2005) noted at least four varying approaches: the mental health model, the social action model, the ecological model, and the organisational model. Both K. Gibson (2002b) and Long (1999) highlighted several international and local debates in the field of community psychology that have helped define it. In overview, these concern the role of the community practitioner (whether she should be involved in social action, or prevention in a more narrow sense) and of community psychology itself (such as taking a stand against apartheid, and recognising the role of society more fully).

Therefore some of the complexities inherent in community psychology inevitably come up in any discussion about what it has been and might be, in its various contexts. Spedding (2005) suggested that global definitions for

community psychology should in fact not be pursued: "Surely communities themselves, whether on a macro or micro level, are responsible for shaping definitions of community psychology, relative to their needs and concerns, within their unique contexts?" (p. 44). Her call was for community psychologists to collect more local meanings, so that a specific community creates a specific "community psychology" that is tailored to its needs. Lounsbury et al. (1985) predicted that in the field of community psychology "we might witness a vast amount of research which will be characterised by an increasing differentiation and expansion of topics dealing with therapy, diagnosis, intervention, and consultation" (p. 98).

In terms of practice, community psychology challenges an individualist bias and addresses the root causes of psychological difficulty through changes to context, most often using group, organisation or community-based forms of intervention (K. Gibson, 2002b). Consultation is the primary model for intervention, by which is meant that experts assist organisations to help themselves (Maw, 1996). This has been referred to as "giving psychology away" (Miller, 1969, cited in Orford, 1992, p. 138). Meeting the needs of communities in the change process is felt to be important. As K. Gibson (2002b) put it, community voices need to be heard in professional circles. Needs assessment is thus a core tool in community psychology (Orford, 1992). In this field, research is often closely linked to estimating the incidence and prevalence of psychological problems within a given population. This is not, however, felt to be a sufficient source of information about needs, particularly when individual needs vary greatly within one category of people in need (Orford, 1992). Awareness of this fact has led to the development of the needs assessment approach, which can take various forms. The function of needs assessment is to produce a more detailed, textured understanding of a community's difficulties, including highlighting some of the factors that are related to the prevalence of the problem (Nelson & Prilleltensky, 2005).

In community psychology the role of the psychologist changes; she may be involved in advocacy, consciousness raising, and social upliftment (K. Gibson, 2002b). She will intervene at social and community levels, with the location of her practice being as close as possible to local contexts (Orford, 1992). Long (1999) quoted Tollman (1991) when she said that "accessibility has also meant relocation of the site of psychological intervention from the hospital or consulting room into the community in order to redress past imbalances where many communities had limited access to psychological interventions" (pp. 12-13). K. Gibson (2002b) noted that the community psychologist identifies with the concerns of the socially and politically disadvantaged members of any society. A primary purpose is the empowerment of marginalised groups (Spedding, 2005) and the extension of mental health services to the historically oppressed (S. Lazarus & Seedat, 1995). K. Gibson and L. Swartz (2004) noted that:

Community psychology is often represented as being more politically sensitive than other forms of psychological theorising and intervention. It was specifically designed to shift power from professionals into the hands of ordinary people and to build the capacity of communities to address problems in their social and political environments. (p. 466)

Organisations working with disadvantaged children in South Africa deal directly with the effects of apartheid on their clients (K. Gibson & L. Swartz, 2000). At the same time, K. Gibson and L. Swartz (2000) showed that an additional burden is the impact of South Africa's painful political history on the emotional life of organisations themselves. They highlighted "the common experiences of deprivation and loss, fears around the abuse of power

and problems with acknowledging the differences between people, which are a part of South Africa's political legacy" (p. 133). These authors showed that this political legacy has had a major impact on the functioning of these organisations, and also, by extrapolation, on the consultation relationship. They argued that it is therefore important to achieve some kind of understanding of political experiences in childcare work. They felt that the containment of political experiences for the carers (in the technical sense of processing overwhelming feeling) is the very thing that allows their work to continue and be effective.

A critique of community psychology has been that it is primarily practice- rather than theory-based (K. Gibson, 2002b; J. Lazarus, 2003; Long, 1999; Orford, 1992; Rieff, 1977; Seedat, Cloete & Shochet, 1988). In a 1985 review of the literature, Lounsbury et al. identified an under-emphasis on theoretical research and noted that "this field is still at an early stage of development; conceptual base building is essential for the growth of a cumulative body of scientific knowledge" (p. 93). In 2000 Naidoo noted that it is still a paradigm not yet fully realised.

3.3.2 Defining communities

As the name suggests, community psychology regards whole communities, and not only individuals, as possible clients (Pretorius-Heuchert & Ahmed, 2001). This approach involves identifying a coherent, distinctive "community" to be worked with (Kelly & Van der Riet, 2001). The inherent assumption is that such a community necessarily has some form of homogenous identity in order to be classified like this (Kelly & Van der Riet, 2001). Ka Sigogo and Modipa (2004) described the way in which the term has most commonly been used in South African psychology:

The concept "community" refers to a sense of coherence that enables people to make sense of their social actions, social interactions and thought processes. Shared experiences among people gathered in "community" contribute to the creation of a "common character". Recently, in the South African context, the term has acquired political meaning and reflects the political histories and beliefs of people in a given socio-political context (Butchart & Seedat, 1990). In addition, the concept is used to refer to African communities, in their diversities, interacting with different political environments. (p. 317)

This is a very problematic definition. K. Gibson (2002b), Long (1999) and Maw (1996), among others, cautioned against using the concept of community too glibly, as it is not a simple concept to define. Communities may be less homogenous than the word suggests, and issues of difference and power within them should not be overlooked. Communities have multiple sub-groups, with differing access to resources within the larger community (Kelly & Van der Riet, 2001). In South Africa the apartheid government in fact artificially constructed many communities (Butchart & Seedat, 1990). Butchart and Seedat (1990) argued that an uncritical view of such groupings can reinforce racial divides. Similarly, Ka Sigogo and Modipa (2004) wrote about the idea of community operating as a code for race. In this way, they criticised the term for anchoring a sense of racial difference; they noted, for example, that we do not often speak of "white communities" in South Africa (p. 317). Secondly, this term may play a role in a greater discourse of avoidance of issues of race and privilege. It may gloss over the fact that not all social groupings in South Africa have shared the same social, political and economic benefits (Ka Sigogo & Modipa, 2004). In 2005 I highlighted these enormous and ongoing disparities, noting that "in reality, the races are still largely geographically separated, to the point that working cross-culturally as a white psychologist often entails

going out into communities very different to one's own, to bestow 'community psychology' on the masses" (J. Lazarus, 2005, p. 2). Here I was suggesting that inherent in the community psychology model is the idea that the more privileged (who do not live in "communities") move out into areas classified as "communities" to assist the poor.

In so doing, it is easy to overlook the complexities and tensions in a community in the attempt to produce general statements about the community as a whole (Kelly & Van der Riet, 2001). An uncritical view of communities can lead to romanticised notions about them, which may in itself serve certain functions. For example, Sterling (2002) showed how the "simplicity" of a quiet rural community (Mooidorp) was a myth created by consultants defensively idealising a community in which there were in fact complex issues around shame, confidentiality and a reluctance to engage with offered services (p. 26). Without recognising the "difficulties and ambiguities of experience" in both community members and community practitioners, such work can be impeded (Sterling, 2002, p. 31). K. Gibson and L. Swartz (2004) put it this way:

The community psychologist may harbour romanticised ideas of harmonious communities and a satisfying role for themselves involving good works and high deeds. This, however, may end up deflecting attention away from understanding the complexity of society and the fact that relationships between professionals and "communities" are often fraught with tensions and difficulties. (p. 467)

In the present dissertation I will be using the complex word "community" in a particular way, namely to denote black South Africans living in poverty in townships created by the apartheid system. They represent part of the under-serviced sector of the population that psychologists in the New South Africa need to reach. This is not a definition of community that implies cohesion and shared cultural identity, but rather the historical disadvantage of black South Africans, and the associated phenomenon of poverty. In the interests of simplicity I will, however, dispense with inverted commas (which can be implied) when referring to "community", "community work" and "community psychology" in the present thesis.

In the following section I will consider how psychodynamic ideas have been used in the community psychology model in South Africa. I will emphasise the work of Kerry Gibson, because many of these ideas are represented in her work in the area of community psychology over two decades. She has also produced the most extensive research study involving the principles discussed. She reviewed ten years of community work by the Child Guidance Clinic at the University of Cape Town as part of a doctoral dissertation on the consultation model.

3.4 Psychodynamic community psychology in South Africa

The emphasis on psychodynamic ideas in community psychology practice is a relatively new one in South Africa. It has been taken up by leading practitioners in the field (see, for example, L. Swartz et al., 2002a¹). Despite the critique by community psychology of the psychodynamic approach (see Druiff, 2001 for a comprehensive review),

¹ An extensive review of this literature as it pertains to work specifically with children was conducted elsewhere (J. Lazarus, 2003; J. Lazarus & Kruger, 2004a).

arguments have increasingly been made for its being an important "tool to think and work with" in the South African context (L. Swartz et al., 2002b, p. 4). K. Gibson and L. Swartz (2000) argued that a resolution of the political crisis has allowed for a more reflective workspace - in other words, a thinking space. L. Swartz et al. (2002b) have noted how important a reflective analytic approach is in community work, "even in a situation in which material and emotional deprivation would appear to call for more action-oriented approaches" (p. 5). Previously, "the idea of a slow and thoughtful process seemed like an unaffordable luxury when in reality lives were being threatened" during the apartheid regime (K. Gibson & L. Swartz, 2000, p. 137). Although some of this tension has eased, it can be argued that ongoing poverty and inequality still create conditions of great urgency for community interventions. In this sense, psychodynamic work is admittedly still under pressure in a community context.

Community psychology and psychoanalysis are more compatible than they may seem at first glance.² Borg (2004), writing in the United States, is among recent international practitioners who are exploring the intersections between psychoanalysis and community psychology. Borg is a practising psychoanalyst as well as a community/organisational consultant working in New York city. He used psychoanalytic ideas to describe a community intervention in a four-year project with an impoverished community in South Central Los Angeles after the riots that occurred there in 1992. He arrived at new community concepts that are psychoanalytically informed. K. Gibson and L. Swartz (2004) noted that psychoanalysis has always been interested in the interface between the individual and society. This responds to a concern of community psychology. The conception of internal life in psychoanalysis is not an isolated or static concept, as was shown in Chapter Two. For example, as S. Mitchell and Black (1995) put it, "Klein's vision of mind is fluid, perpetually fractured and kaleidoscopic" (p. 111). There is thought to be a constant interplay between internal, external, past and present, which is exemplified by such processes as projection and the transference (K. Gibson & L. Swartz, 2004). Object relations and attachment theory provide two ways to think about the relationship between the external and the internal, and the way in which the social world, in the form of early interactions with the mother, is internalised (J. Lazarus & Kruger, 2004a). Psychoanalysis could thus be said, in some of its forms, to share community psychology's focus on how environment impacts on development. Both paradigms are concerned with prevention by means of early intervention (J. Lazarus, 2003).

However, it seems that the main contribution by psychodynamic psychology to community psychology can be an exploration of the unconscious. Hayes (2002) quoted Laplace and Pontalis (1973) when he said that:

Psychoanalysis has a specificity, and lays claim to being the knowledge of a particular object. Psychoanalysis can be defined as "...a method of investigation which consists essentially in bringing out the unconscious meanings of the words, the actions and the products of the imagination (dreams, phantasies, delusions) of a particular subject." (p. 16)

Kruger (2006) has referred to this pursuit as a focus on the gaps, namely, on what has been left out:

² I have argued for the legitimacy of psychoanalytic ideas for community practice elsewhere (J. Lazarus, 2003). This will thus be taken as a premise and the main points underlying this argument will only be summarised here.

As a clinical and research psychologist I have been rendered deeply suspicious of everything that is certain, proven and even empirically verified. Instead my adherence to (Freud's) theoretical assumptions has forced me into a sustained (and some would say perverse) interest in everything that is not there and a suspicion about everything that is there. (p. 3)

Examining the unconscious helps us to make sense of the irrational, the illogical and the emotional. Therefore it can tell us more, and in greater depth, about the subject under study. Using the tool of the unconscious, psychoanalysis can lend depth to the endeavour in community psychology to find out more about needs. It was previously noted that psychodynamic technique has been firmly tied to theory, including theory about the unconscious, since its inception. This theory could supplement community psychology, which has been criticised for lacking theory and focusing on external circumstance, in important ways. On the other hand, psychologists working in different paradigms within traumatised low-income South African communities have argued that to say that the practitioner has some kind of privileged knowledge about the client that is unavailable to the client herself is disempowering (Appelt, 2006).

The question is how exactly to make use of the unconscious in the arena of community work, where the subject under study is not only the individual, but also the systems that surround her. Traditionally, we take up a reflective or thinking attitude during and between clinical sessions with individuals. We analyse the counter-transference (how we feel when we are with the client) because we believe it transmits information to us about the unknown, hidden parts of the client. In South African community work, however, as described, individual work of this nature is not suitable. Below I will describe the ways in which South African community work has utilised psychodynamic ideas to date.

3.4.1 J. Lazarus and Kruger

In an earlier review we noted that what has typically been done in South Africa is that community psychology has used psychodynamic principles in the process of consultation (J. Lazarus & Kruger, 2004a). There has been a focus on consultation relationships, because this is the central locus of practice. We described how practitioners have begun to turn to an examination of the unconscious in order to help unpack the powerful dynamics affecting the consultation relationship (Long, 1999; Maw, 1996, 2002). This was referred to as "reflective practice" (thinking practice) (L. Swartz et al., 2002a). Central to this was considering the way in which the personhood of the practitioner, and its interplay with that of the client against the history of apartheid, was influencing outcomes (reflexivity). An allied concept is that of self-reflection (considering self-experience). A consciousness of self and self in the work is seen as an important source of information. In other words, this kind of community psychology has begun to embrace both the general psychodynamic principle of thoughtfulness, and the more specific intersubjective concept of considering how different worlds intersect in any therapeutic space. In the literature reviewed there was most often a retrospective focus on how the unconscious had been at work in a project, although arguments were also made for more direct interpretation of the unconscious to clients within interventions (Long, 1999; Maw, 1996, 2002). Analysis also guided the practitioner's choices in the intervention in an ongoing way.

Within this context, working reflectively (thoughtfully) and reflexively (self-referentially) was seen to be a way to manage the complexity of community work. Exploring the unconscious to examine the origin of emotion and behaviour was reassuring for the practitioner, because it provided explanation and meaning. This way of conceptualising cases provided containment and allowed the work to continue, even when it was difficult.

Regarding children, we showed that psychodynamic ideas have again chiefly been used to inform consultation relationships with organisations working with children. Secondly, a small body of literature described using psychodynamic ideas to help to gain access to "the inner lives of children of whom we know little (partly through self-reflection on the part of the practitioner)" (J. Lazarus & Kruger, 2004b, p. 22). Drawing on these local examples (K. Gibson et al., 1991; Milne, 1995; Roos, Prinsloo & Van Niekerk, 2001; Rudenberg et al., 1998; Williams, 2001), we began to argue that psychoanalytic tools could potentially be applied innovatively in more direct therapeutic ways with children in community projects, and then described a case study (the Play Group) that did this (J. Lazarus & Kruger, 2004b). Based on this community intervention, we argued that one could make verbal interpretations to such children in the course of an intervention, including interpretations about the complex relationship that existed between them and the practitioner, linking it to their social reality and past history. Therefore, technically, relationship and interpretation within a play therapy context were highlighted as tools that could become important in work with deprived children (J. Lazarus & Kruger, 2004a). Thirdly, the importance of a psychodynamic frame was emphasised as a way to hold the practitioner emotionally while she was working in this way (containment).

We thus found that psychodynamic ideas have been used to understand, explore and manage community work, predominantly via the consultation relationship. At the same time, we held that more traditional ways of working psychodynamically in communities could be utilised. In overview, our most important conclusion was that relationship is central in community projects and actively needs to be worked with, sometimes in direct interpretation to the client, and always in ongoing supervision.

3.4.2 K. Gibson and L. Swartz

K. Gibson (2002b) and K. Gibson and L. Swartz (2000, 2004) have developed their ideas about emotion in political work over some years. They noted that "what is unique about psychoanalysis is the weight it gives to emotional processes in understanding psychology" (K. Gibson & L. Swartz, 2004, p. 469). These authors asserted that an important principle in a psychodynamic community psychology is the examination of emotion. This adds a new, but complementary dimension to community psychology's focus on the political, which was explicated above. K. Gibson and L. Swartz (2004) noted that psychoanalysis, while retaining its social conception of the person, is able to look at how people and groups operate under the sway of powerful emotional processes. The role of emotion, they argued, has been minimised by social theorists who are more interested in understanding political phenomena. K. Gibson and L. Swartz (2004) argued that "emotion may provide an important link between the individual and the social world, showing how political identities and relationships are forged and internalised at very deep levels" (p. 469).

K. Gibson (2002b), in an intensive case study of three consultation relationships with community organisations, targeted the ways in which the social is represented in relationship in community work. She held that there "seems to be a gap in understanding about the way in which broader social issues play themselves out in the micro-structures and relationships of human service organisations and in the consultation relationship itself" (2002b, p. 7). She pointed to the fact that recent local research in community psychology has therefore become more interested in the way in which emotional processes may be a more fundamental part of human service work and partnerships than they were previously considered to be (K. Gibson & L. Swartz, 2000; Long, 1999; Maw, 1996). She held that the use of psychoanalytic knowledge is a prime way to understand the significant role of emotion and irrationality in community work.

An example of a study in which understanding emotion was felt to be important was K. Gibson and L. Swartz's (2000) description of the experience of consulting to organisations involved in the provision of care to disadvantaged groups of children in South Africa. They noted that practitioners attempted to develop culturally appropriate materials, but that it became clear that it was not about the suitability of the content of training workshops, "but more about complicated power dynamics, resistance to change and emotional misunderstanding" (p. 137). The authors commented that this was not surprising, in retrospect, considering the context of the work. Psychodynamic ways of thinking were useful in exploring and unravelling the *meaning* behind extremely powerful and confusing feelings aroused in providing the requested training and support. This concept of uncovering what might lie behind strong feelings in community work is an extremely important notion. These authors have shown that a "helpful" or well-intentioned community practitioner may in fact find herself experiencing difficult and negative feelings during the course of an intervention. Cross-cultural work in South Africa arouses significant reciprocal anxiety. K. Gibson and L. Swartz (2000) suggested that a psychodynamic approach could help to digest, explain and work with these feelings in a productive and containing way, so that the work can continue.

These authors showed that it is essential to examine emotion in political work, because the political becomes internalised. There seems to be a complex link between the political and the personal. Secondly, the political will be expressed in emotional ways in the relationships involved in community interventions. Because of its political context, community work is never just "personal", even when it uses psychodynamic ideas related to internal life. It would therefore be a mistake to try and theorise about intrapsychic and even interpersonal elements without taking broader context into account. Community psychology has emphasised this and for this reason has at times opposed the use of a psychodynamic lens in order to guard against an acontextual view. For example, elsewhere I noted that "a focus on the internal may provide a dangerous excuse for social atrocity" (J. Lazarus, 2003, p. 30). To neglect the external is to neglect the forces that shape internal life and thus constitute both a physical and psychic reality. I argued that these domains are inextricably linked (J. Lazarus, 2003) and that there is therefore no need to favour one above the other. Referring to Orange et al. (1997), who in turn quoted Bakhtin (1981), I complained that "there seems to be a psychoanalytic divide between studying psychological experience and studying that real life toward which it is directed and by which it is determined" (J. Lazarus, 2005, p. 8). In the postmodern view such dualistic categories as physical and psychic, internal and external, and individual and social are in themselves thought to be problematic.

Chapter Two showed that psychoanalysis has developed sufficiently to be able to embrace this inter-relationship between internal and external life, and between the subjectivities of the practitioner and client. Elsewhere (J. Lazarus & Kruger, 2004a) it was noted that when we attempt to use psychoanalytic ideas in community work, we can no longer speak of a single, unified paradigm, because contemporary psychoanalysis "has become quite complex and varied" (S. Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 206). K. Gibson (2002b), citing Ghent (1992), held that current relational forms of psychoanalysis are essentially concerned with motivation and meaning. This represents a departure from the traditional Freudian emphasis on structures of the mind, focusing instead on making sense of mental and emotional processes in the context of a social relationship. As S. Mitchell (1988) put it: "Mind has been redefined from a set of predetermined structures emerging from inside an individual organism to transactional patterns and internal structures derived from an interactive, interpersonal field" (p. 17). K. Gibson extrapolated this idea to indicate that there is consequently less concern with identifying familiar patterns related to theory and more emphasis on discovering new patterns: "From this perspective, meaning making has less to do with underlying causes and more to do with the performative functions any communication serves in the context of a relationship" (2002b, p. 39).

In a retrospective view of my community work with children, I drew on the work of Orange et al. (1997) to criticise my own lack of an intersubjective focus during this intervention (J. Lazarus, 2005). I argued that considering practitioner subjectivity, power and one's own positioning is crucial in South Africa. I called for a contextualist stance that admits that "our present understanding of anything or anyone is...inevitably limited by the historicity of our own organised and organising experience" (Orange et al., 1997, p. 89).

The important points arising out of this review are that a psychodynamic South African community psychology can use the unconscious both to increase understanding and in the direct use of established therapeutic techniques such as relationship and interpretation. However, such relationships will be fraught because the political will be present in them in emotional ways. In line with postmodern thought, context and subjectivity then become more important. Reflection and reflexivity will help to create containment for these challenging processes in community work. For the purposes of the present study, and following on from these ideas, I will emphasise the importance of 1) complex relationships, 2) increased practitioner reflexivity, and 3) a holding environment in this kind of work. It is argued that these principles are important for all situations where contact occurs between communities and practitioners, whether they are involved in research, intervention, or both.

3.5 Important assumptions in psychodynamic community work

3.5.1 Complex relationships

Hollway (1998) referred to the way in which the phrase "the personal is political" informed emancipatory thought in the women's movement. This redefined political struggle as a battle fought in women's daily lives. In South African community psychology it could be said that "the political is personal" in that the history of oppression must invariably be present in all cross-cultural encounters in one way or another, even when not overtly acknowledged.

The implication is also that this could be a site for healing, specifically if there is a deeper analysis of the unspoken. Commenting on my community work with the Play Group children, I noted:

Several years on, I am still doing research in the same community, and I am always struck by how important relationship is in such processes. Intellectually, I can state that the relationship between a white psychologist in South Africa and a poor black child is a very rich source of information (historically, politically, and emotionally), as well as a site for deep intervention. It also feels almost unbearable. (J. Lazarus, 2005, p. 8)

There has been a recent focus on relationships in the literature on community work (see, for example, K. Gibson, 2002b; K. Gibson & L. Swartz, 2000; K. Gibson & L. Swartz, 2004; Long, 1999; Maw, 1996; L. Swartz et al., 2002a). In 2002b K. Gibson claimed that "the relationship between the community psychologist and the community is central to understanding and intervention in this field" (p. 27). In this section K. Gibson's case study of three consultation relationships with organisations serving children at risk will be considered (2002b). It is felt that this important work highlights typical and often unconscious facets of practitioner-community relationships, including the role of power, politics, emotion and difference.

In community work, entering this territory may be a particularly complex endeavour. I referred to it as "traversing the land of guillotines" (J. Lazarus, 2005, p. 8) by which was meant that community work is a fraught arena (and often avoided) because it is so closely tied to the history of oppression in South Africa. Community interventions often constitute cross-cultural therapy contact, and always involve discrepancies between class, material wealth and education. K. Gibson (2002b) and Long (1999) noted that even where black psychologists work in black communities, their education and training often sets them apart. This results in a complex and potentially painful interplay between the history and legacy of apartheid, cultural difference and current context (K. Gibson, Sandenbergh & L. Swartz, 2001; Maw, 1996; L. Swartz, 1998).

K. Gibson and L. Swartz (2000) summarised the issue succinctly when they referred to "a situation in which the dynamics we experienced in our consultation relationships appeared to be a mirror of the most difficult aspects of our damaged social and political environment" (p.139). K. Gibson and L. Swartz (2000) have pointed out that from a psychodynamic perspective, community practitioners can be helped to see that these issues are not impediments to the work, but "the very substance of the work itself" (p. 138). A consideration of the unconscious offers one way to unpack the complexity of any interactional process: "Psychoanalysis acknowledges that motives may not only be mysterious to the participants involved but also that they may be multiple, contradictory and generated independently of rational intention" (K. Gibson, 2002b, p. 39).

Psychodynamic community psychology in South Africa can be said to have brought the dual roles of the political and the emotional into focus, and has examined the way that these are interlinked and expressed in relationships in community work. K. Gibson (2002b) wrote about the consequent complexity of consultation relationships. The pain and difficulty in relationships involved in community work is widely acknowledged in the literature (K. Gibson & L. Swartz, 2000). This view is contrary to initial hopes for a neat and logical partnership. In fact, K. Gibson showed that such relationships are subject to "a variety of powerful but not always well understood

dynamics and processes" (2002b, p. 7). This results in a certain unpredictability about the outcome of such interventions.

Much has been written about inequalities in power and political influences in the consultation relationship; such considerations have in fact been highlighted as important starting points in any attempt to transform mental health (Long, 1999; Maw, 1996; Mogoduso & Butchart, 1992; Seedat & Nel, 1992; L. Swartz, 1998; Terre Blanche, 1994). K. Gibson (2002b) noted that the power of the psychologist may operate in subtle and insidious ways, despite the intention to give psychology away (in the sense of empowering others) or to minimise the expert status of psychologists (S. Swartz & L. Swartz, 1986). It has been acknowledged that in South Africa historical inequalities have created a particularly difficult set of power relations between a largely white profession and the black communities its practitioners work with (K. Gibson, 2001, 2002b). These ideas need to be extrapolated to thinking about any relationship occurring within the context of community work, including those involved in research.

In her seminal project K. Gibson (2002b) explored the social and psychological dynamics of consultation partnerships across three case studies. Her study was, however, still situated within a concern with the broader political context of mental health. She took the well-established concept of dynamic layering within organisations, and demonstrated ways in which emotional processes also hold political meaning and in fact interact with, and reproduce some of, the more painful political realities of South African society. Using a psychodynamic lens, she tried to develop a deeper understanding of this process. She was able to document and analyse the enormous emotional and political complexities involved in such relationships. The community psychology approach, she observed, typically gives less consideration to the emotional dynamics of such work and the subtle forms in which they appear in the intervention. In her analysis of several consultation relationships with organisations working with children at risk, she illustrated the indivisible connections between "politics and emotion". In this way, she further expanded concepts of community consultation using psychoanalytic ideas.

Within the interventions themselves, psychodynamic thought was used to help practitioners connect with oppression, racism and colonialism - "the very issues that community psychologists were struggling with" (K. Gibson, 2002b, p. 36). It becomes clear that to ignore these aspects (because they are painful, or seem to lie outside some kind of theoretical domain) is counterproductive and can threaten the life of the project. K. Gibson (2002b) produced a case study of each consultation relationship, using process notes and interviews. Fundamentally, she found that meanings were assigned to the relationships, based on the specific emotional and political dynamics of each organisation and each relationship. In this way the practitioners' understanding could be expanded. Her insights from the analyses were used to reflect on and deepen the understanding of central concepts such as training, support and empowerment, which underlie the practice of community consultation.

Interviews with workers about how they had experienced the consultants' involvement led to answers which, crucially, only really made sense in the context of the complex dynamics of the relationship which had developed between them:

It seemed to me that hidden in the answers to the obvious questions about whether people's needs or expectations had been met was a complex network of underlying motives and assumptions. These in turn seemed to carry powerful emotional and political meanings that themselves needed to be understood. (K. Gibson, 2002b, p. 9)

The psychodynamic approach gave K. Gibson's (2002b) study a spirit of open-ended enquiry. She began her analysis of three case studies with a few "relatively straightforward questions" that were just "a starting point for exploring the meanings and motives that ultimately might lie behind the answers" they generated (2002b, p. 10). Her intention in fact was to show the "complex and emotionally laden interaction of personal, relational, organisational and social circumstances" as well as the less conscious concerns they reveal (2002b, p. 10). In summary, K. Gibson (2002b) was able to decipher and work with some of the unconscious purposes of the relationship. Her study resulted in great specificity and variation about differing needs. It is noted that this very detailed insight is potentially very useful to a needs assessment process. K. Gibson's (2002b) work also contributed, as the present study hopes to, towards theorising about complex community projects. K. Gibson (2002b) held that:

As much as the literature on community psychology raises and addresses important questions about context, power, the politics of expertise and the need for social transformation, it seems to leave some aspects of these experiences insufficiently accounted for. It appears that there is room for a theory that develops a fuller understanding of the inter-penetration of the social and political with the individual. (p. 37)

3.5.2 Practitioner reflexivity

K. Gibson (2002b) pointed out that a consideration of the psychologist's role is increasingly considered essential to the community psychology intervention, "the focus of which must always be the reciprocal relationship between psychologist and the community" (p. 38). Richter (2002) commented that any serious engagement with community change must at the same time involve a high degree of introspection on the part of those trying to make this difference: "In transforming our practice and in attempting to transform people's lives, we similarly transform ourselves" (p. vii). The practitioner's consciousness of herself is seen as an important source of information in two ways, namely thinking about who she is (positioning) and what she feels (counter-transference). K. Gibson and L. Swartz (2004) stated that:

With the notion of the unconscious, this approach invites us to challenge what seems ordinary or obvious and to consider explanations that may contradict and even threaten our conventional understanding. It may thus encourage psychologists to think beyond the comfortable accounts they give of their actions and to reflect more critically on their own work. (p. 468)

It has been argued that the position of the social researcher has become central in a postmodern world. K. Gibson (2002b) drew on the intersubjective approach (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992) to argue for an acknowledgement of the contribution the psychologist makes in interventions - "whether by their emotional response, their enactment of power or their cultural positioning" (p. 38). The issues which K. Gibson and L. Swartz (2000) mentioned in their consideration of organisational and consultation dynamics are also of relevance to a cross-cultural infant observation in a poverty setting. The researcher and participant will also have "their own political histories, often from very different sides of the apartheid fence" (K. Gibson & L. Swartz, 2000, p.139) and unequal access to resources in the past and present. Racial, class and gender identities in South Africa carry pain (K. Gibson & L.

Swartz, 2000; S. Swartz, 2005). Reflected in personal identity is our country's history of authoritarian practices and difficulties with balancing leadership and democracy (K. Gibson & L. Swartz, 2000). No community practitioner can claim to stand outside of this intricate web.

K. Gibson (2002b) argued that a psychoanalytic understanding, when used well, could contribute to the developing awareness of the researcher's role through self-reflection. Particularly, thinking about what one feels can be a clue to the unconscious emotional dynamics between researcher and researched (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000). This has been referred to as listening deeply (Stein, 1994). However, accounts of the consultation relationship mostly reflect the experiences of psychologists themselves (K. Gibson, 2002b). In 2004 we commented that in the literature about community child work there is a lack of integration of the psychodynamic tools of describing the links between internal and external life, communicating with clients for change, and containment of the practitioner:

In other words, in studies where the counter-transferential feelings of the community workers were focused on, it was not shown how the containment and management of these feelings impacted on the child clients. Conversely, in case studies where actual work with children was described there was little or no focus on how their inner worlds impacted upon the clinicians working with them and how a reflective process can be powerful in getting better information or providing more effective help. (J. Lazarus & Kruger, 2004a, p. 66)

It may be important, in community infant observations, to realise that feelings put into the practitioner by means of projective processes may be related to socio-political and cultural positioning. In other words, there is no clear divide between internal and external. Focusing on internal, unconscious processes need not imply an exclusion of the contribution that the environment is making. It would be a mistake, in pursuit of some kind of "psychoanalytic purity", to look at internal processes as something separate from environment. In effect, the internal *is* external, and vice versa.

3.5.3 The holding environment

The difficulty of community work has been referred to by a number of practitioners (see, for example, K. Gibson & L. Swartz, 2004). Work with deprived children is described as particularly taxing (Alvarez, 1992; Boston & Szur, 1983; Copley & Forryan, 1987; K. Gibson, 1996; Hoxter, 1983). In South Africa psychodynamic theory and technique have often been used to contain the counter-transferential feelings of community workers in contact with children (J. Lazarus & Kruger, 2004a). This extends to both supervision and consultation work. This framework has been described as "holding the consultant who holds the practitioner who holds the child" (J. Lazarus & Kruger, 2004a). In exploring the utility of group process for low-income dyads, Spedding (2005) referred to "rocking the hand that rocks the cradle" in the title of her work. Containment (Bion, 1959, 1970) is thus a fundamental psychoanalytic principle that informs community work on many different levels.

In our review of the literature we concluded that local authors "have showed convincingly that the use of critical self-reflection and a holding environment in supervisory and consultation work are crucial elements of community work with deprived children" (J. Lazarus & Kruger, 2004a, pp. 60-61). Without this containment, in which relationships can be thought about and the meanings of actions, feelings and words analysed, the danger exists that

valuable projects could be abandoned (J. Lazarus, 2003, 2005). Both practitioners and clients in the community may resort to acting out more difficult issues such as difference, power and inequality. Where there is no space to think or talk about what is really going on, the intervention may create tremendous bi-directional strain. This is particularly true in the emotionally and politically charged territory of community work (K. Gibson, 2002b; J. Lazarus, 2005).

3.6 Key terms

Community psychology's definition of context is a systemic one: namely, that every problem that an individual faces needs to be thought about in terms of the multiple environments which surround her. In other words, within the community psychology paradigm, context refers to social context. The individual is seen as the product of a particular socio-political and economic history. As in the feminist perspective, mental health problems are viewed as the product of a problematic system, instead of pathologising the individual's functioning. Secondly, when theories and practices are imported for the purposes of community work, it is felt that attention must be paid to the particular community context: the setting must be allowed to shape the action, and practitioners must remain flexible and responsive to the environment. This relates to a concern raised in Chapter One, about importing methods for learning about children (and indeed knowledge) without considering different contexts.

Context is also thought to influence relationship in psychodynamic community work: it becomes a site in which national history, among other things, is represented and replayed. As Long (1999) put it, "psychoanalysis is best utilised in community settings when it explicitly recognises socio-political influences and includes these in the object-worlds of ourselves and our clients, and when recognition of power and difference are foregrounded" (p. i). In other words, there is such a thing as a socio-political internal object, which can affect the transference. Relationship is equally, or more, important in psychodynamic community work as it is in psychodynamic work more generally. Related to this is the importance of reflexivity for the current discussion. This relates to a process of referring to self (Potter, 1996), whether it is the researcher, practitioner, or method itself that becomes self-conscious or is increasingly revealed in this way. Involved in this is the psychodynamic tool of reflection (thinking) and self-reflection (thinking about the self). By using these concepts, community psychology to a degree operationalises a postmodern stance. It has been argued here that community psychology and indeed psychoanalysis can further incorporate postmodern thinking by recognising that the internal and the external are one thing.

3.7 Conclusion

Community psychology's main contribution to the present psychoanalytic endeavour is its awareness that the political atrocities in South Africa's past shape the psychological and material realities of its citizens in an ongoing way. Its dedication to a more active, searching and practical approach to social problems is important. The present study situates itself as part of a progressive and varied community psychology tradition that urges practitioners to move out into "communities", to empower and to increase services for the historically oppressed. It embraces a spirit of innovation, flexibility and adaptability to context. As a study, it also aligns itself with a focus on the root

cause of psychological problems and a preventative approach. It follows on from community psychology's emphasis on change that its own methodologies include needs assessment. It has also, like psychoanalysis, used a case study approach.

In addition, a psychodynamic community psychology provides a way to work with unconscious aspects of community interventions, specifically the ways in which politics and emotion intersect and play themselves out in relationship. In terms of social constructionist concerns, psychodynamic community psychology has placed emphasis on the emotion and subjective experience of the practitioner (as a source of insight) as well as on the political and social context of any intervention. Community psychology is centrally concerned with power and acknowledges that intervention constitutes a political act.

However, it can be argued that community psychology needs a way to deconstruct the needs assessment process. Particularly for the purposes of the present study, an overtly postmodern ethnographic approach offers a way to think more deeply about *whose* meanings are being constructed (as opposed to being gathered), and about what actually happens when we use "observation" and/or interviewing to collect information about people. This extends to the use of infant observation in a needs assessment process. The present study will thus use an ethnographic lens in conjunction with the one offered by infant observation, and situate both within the community psychology paradigm delineated above. This represents a novel three-way synthesis that is intended to expand the usefulness of infant observation for the South African context. The next chapter examines the contribution that postmodern ethnography can make.

CHAPTER FOUR: Ethnography and psychoanalysis

4.1 Introduction

It was suggested in Chapter One that infant observation for community needs assessment purposes must be considered to be an ethnographic project, as is any research that attempts to produce thick description about infants in conditions of poverty. Here it will be proposed that a postmodern ethnographic lens in particular will be of central importance in a study that attempts an infant observation in a South African community setting. This lens is a crucial aid to the critical interrogation of such an endeavour, because it takes into account issues of representation and authority. It throws a reflexive light on the practitioner; that is, it takes into account who she is and what she brings to a research project, and advocates that she should be "positioned" within some context in the ethnographic picture (Aunger, 2004). Postmodern ethnography considers the particular context of all observed behaviour when thinking about meaning. It also admits that there are many meanings, and that power is at play in determining whose meanings are foregrounded in any text. Feminist ethnographers have made valuable contributions in this respect. As the previous chapter on community psychology has shown, power in the interaction between practitioner and community is a central concern in community work. Postmodern forms of ethnography are helpful because they have begun to consider this aspect in thinking about the ways in which the researcher, who is an outsider, enters communities in order to gain information about them.

4.2 Definitions: Ethnography, culture and fieldwork

The Greek root of the word "anthropology" refers to "knowledge about humans" (Eriksen, 2001, p. 2). "Ethnography" also derives from Greek and literally means the description of a people and its way of life (Angrosino, 2002). While older dictionaries use the word "race" in their definition of ethnography, the most recent edition of the *Concise Oxford English dictionary* defined it as a "scientific description of peoples and cultures with reference to their particular customs and characteristics" (2006, p. 490). Ethnography is a method of studying a person or a group of people in order to learn about them. Most often ethnographic studies are undertaken in order to gain information about unfamiliar groups' ways of life, and copious written records are typically the result (Angrosino, 2002; Aunger, 2004). Angrosino (2002) noted that in contemporary social science, ethnography refers both to the process of research and to the account (whether in writing or on film) that results from that research.

Ethnography has always involved not just the description of a particular society and culture, but an analysis that tries to respond to the question of why (Delaney, 2004). In writing ethnographies, "anthropologists utilize the theories and jargon of the discipline at the time of writing and hope to contribute new theoretical insights and knowledge" (Delaney, 2004, p. 21). In other words, ethnography is both about recording and interpreting other people's way of life (Keesing & Strathern, 1998). If anthropology is about humanity, then ethnography is about how we talk about humanity; Geertz (1973) commented that in anthropology, what practitioners do is ethnography. Ethnography can be thought of as a general strategy for conducting research, the end product of which is a description of sorts, but it is not in and of itself a way to gather information (Angrosino, 2002).

In the nineteenth century, when attempts were made to systematise the research process involved in ethnographic study, it became associated with the new discipline of cultural anthropology. This comparative analysis of the peoples of the world gave rise, Angrosino (2002) maintained, to the concept of culture itself: "the idea that people's behaviours, beliefs, interactions, and material productions were not random, but rather formed a 'complex whole' that was meaningful, logical, more or less consistent, and worthy of respect on its own terms" (p. 2). The whole discipline of anthropology, Geertz (1973) noted, arose around this concept of culture. Cultural anthropology, which is itself a wide-ranging discipline, is defined most simply as the comparative study of contemporary peoples throughout the world (Ferraro, 2004). Important for the present study is the idea here of conducting a study of living cultures, and specifically, in a process of comparison with other cultures. Ferraro (2004) noted that cultural anthropologists do not limit themselves to a single domain of activity, but study all aspects of "culture". By extension, one could say that cultural anthropology is interested in the way people differ.

The definition of culture is a central question in anthropology, and it is not a simple concept to define (Geertz, 1973, 2000). In fact, culture has been described as "one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language" (Williams, 1983, as quoted in Weldes et al., 1999). This reflects the transition that has taken place regarding the concept of culture in Western thought over the past century. The Latin root of the word (to cultivate) indicates that culture refers to that which is not "natural", but has been acquired by humans as members of society (Eriksen, 2001). Ferraro (2004), writing from a more traditionalist perspective, suggested that cultural anthropologists see culture as "the total lifeways of a group of people" (p. xiii). He claimed that it is this broad perspective which is "particularly effective at helping us better understand people different from ourselves" (p. xiii). By contrast, Auger (2004), citing Sapir (1934), noted that "cultures, as ordinarily dealt with, are merely abstracted configurations of idea and action patterns, which have endlessly different meanings for the various individuals in the group" (p. 64). In other words, the concept of culture is essentially a construction and is not as binding or homogeneous as is sometimes suggested. This makes it difficult to give a single, stable definition of culture. Clifford and Marcus (1986) noted that, in the postmodern view, "culture" is always relational, an inscription of communicative processes that exist, historically, between subjects in relations of power (citing Dwyer 1977; Tedlock 1979). On reflection, the historical predicament of ethnography is therefore that it has in fact always been caught up in the invention, and not the representation, of cultures (Wagner 1975, cited in Clifford, 1986). This has, however, not always been recognised in ethnographic practice.

A defining feature of cultural anthropology in contrast with other social sciences is its reliance not on secondary data, but on face-to-face contact between the researcher and the subject (Ferraro, 2004). Ethnography is a way of conducting research that happens in a "natural" as opposed to laboratory setting. Fieldwork is defined as "the study of people acting in the natural courses of their daily lives" (Emerson, 1983b, p. 1). By "natural" is meant that the ethnographer attempts to learn about people in their own environment. Fieldwork involves a deep immersion into the life of a people (Keesing & Strathern, 1998). Admittedly, the very presence of the ethnographer makes any "natural" setting somewhat unnatural. In more postmodern forms of ethnography, the whole notion of "natural" will be problematised.

Denzin (1997) outlined the history of anthropology as moving from a traditional or realist period to a modernist

phase and then a (current) postmodernist moment. Today it is regarded as "preposterous to generalise about entire societies" as it is recognised that no two individuals see the world in the same way (Eriksen, 2001, p. 22). R. Rosaldo (1989), among others, has since critiqued the way in which this moment in anthropology studied the other as alien, foreign and strange (cited in Denzin, 1997). Ethnography has undergone such change during the twentieth century that old definitions of it are thought to be no longer workable (Denzin, 1997). Postmodern ethnography has become a subversive tool through which new models of truth and method are being sought (R. Rosaldo, 1989, cited in Denzin, 1997). Below, a brief overview of the emergence of postmodernist thought in ethnography will be given.

4.3 Postmodern ethnography

4.3.1 A crisis of representation: overview

Postmodern ethnography developed as a result of a crisis in anthropology towards the end of the twentieth century (Aunger, 2004; Clifford & Marcus, 1986; Denzin, 1997; Eriksen, 2001; Eriksen & Nielsen, 2001). Denzin (1997) described this as a "crisis of representation which caused a profound rupture in the mid-1980s" (p. 17). The effect of postmodernism on ethnography has been to question the concept of producing a factual account of anything, including culture. Anthropology has subsequently become a changing and diverse arena in which questions both about who has produced and may legitimately produce ethnographic accounts, and how, are widely debated: "We are in a moment of discovery and rediscovery as new ways of looking, interpreting, arguing, and writing are debated and discussed" (Denzin, 1997, p. 19).

Clifford Geertz has played an instrumental role in the changing identity of anthropology by developing the theoretical approach called symbolic or interpretive anthropology, which first presented itself as an alternative to the structuralist approach in the 1960s and 1970s (Geertz, 2000). Sewell (1999) described Geertz as the most influential American anthropologist of his generation. Denzin (1997) cited Geertz's well-known work, *The interpretation of cultures* (1973) as signalling the beginning of the move out of the modernist phase. Geertz is accredited with turning anthropology toward a concern with the complex, established systems of meaning within which people live (a postmodern preoccupation). Geertz has said, in his inimitable tone, "If there's ever a place where you can't argue that you can put the facts over here and the text over there and see if they fit, it is surely in anthropology" (quoted in Olson, 1991, p. 192). Geertz has also helped to reconfigure the boundary between the social sciences and the humanities and to make anthropology more accessible and relevant to a range of humanist disciplines (Ortner, 1999). Geertz's work has also offered the social sciences "a powerful alternative to the seemingly irresistible juggernaut of (a certain kind of) science" (Ortner, 1999, p. 1). Anthropology, as practised by Geertz, offered "a means of reaching deeper" in the study of ordinary people's lives in a way in which quantitative methods borrowed from sociology could not (Sewell, 1999, p. 38).

A substantial critique of modernist ethnography has come from within feminism. Since the 1970s feminist anthropologists have shown how classic accounts of "societies" actually refer to male perspectives on them (Eriksen, 2001). Prior to 1974 there were only a "handful of ethnographies that take a woman's perspective" (M. Rosaldo & Lamphere, 1974, p. 1). Twenty years later Behar (1996) criticised Clifford and Marcus (1986) and other

male writers for still failing to recognise women's theoretical and literary contributions to anthropology. She noted the "maintenance of a prestige hierarchy within the discipline that has fixed a (male) canon of what counts as important knowledge" (Behar, 1996, p. 9). This has occurred despite the fact that there have always been larger numbers of women in anthropology than in many other disciplines in the academy (Cole, 2001). The personal is not only political, then, but also professional (Cole, 2001).

Women originally received minimal attention as the subjects of anthropological research (Lewin, 2006). Moore (1994) noted that the implicit model for the person in much ethnographic writing is, in fact, an adult male. Traditionally, men's place in society was described, but there was a lack of interest in female activities and roles, linked to the conception that women are biologically inferior to men (M. Rosaldo & Lamphere, 1974). Feminist anthropologists have begun to redress this imbalance by describing women's lives from a woman's point of view (M. Rosaldo & Lamphere, 1974). In summary, women's studies in the 1970s challenged the field of anthropology by asking "who was traditionally studied, by whom, and in what ways, and toward what end", and anthropology has reinvented itself in response to such criticisms (Cole, 2001, p. x). In an interview Geertz noted that there has also been feminist support for the drive to make anthropological discourse less "scientistical" (quoted in Olson, 1991, p. 200).

Margaret Mead (see, for example, 1935, 1949) contributed the most widely read and earliest argument for the viewpoint that, based on cross-cultural and social-psychological evidence, what Westerners take to be the "natural" endowment of men and women is "hardly necessary, natural or universal (as an ethnocentric perspective might lead one to expect)" (M. Rosaldo, 1974, p. 18). Her work therefore prepared the way for the feminist revival in the 1960s (Janiewski & Banner, 2004). Thereafter, within feminist anthropology, "the primary angle of attack has been on the project of creating universal explanations that will serve to neatly wrap up gender (or anything else) in a tidy bundle with no loose ends" (Lewin, 2006, p. 44). Clifford (1986) noted that feminist theorising is of great significance for rethinking ethnographic writing, because "it debates the historical, political construction of identities and self/other relations, and it probes the gendered positions that make all accounts of, or by, other people inescapably partial" (p. 19). Female authors who are consistently engaged in examining the cultural construction of gender and sexuality include Ortner, Whitehead, Strathern (Ortner & Whitehead, 1981) and Chodorow, Stack and Tanner (M. Rosaldo & Lamphere, 1974).

In summary, what recent authors have pointed to is the fact that ethnography is, in line with postmodern thinking, an essentially interpretive mode (Olson, 1991). Postmodern ethnography recognises the role of interpretation throughout the process of investigation, "from the inevitability of interpretation in the participants' accounts of themselves to the interpretations of the researchers who write about them" (K. Gibson, 2002b, p. 81).

4.3.2 Theoretical and practical implications

If postmodern ethnography admits that culture is an issue of interpretation, then the question of who is interpreting arises. The ethnographer herself suddenly becomes visible. Secondly, the issue of relationship between the ethnographer and her subject of study becomes interesting. How do they negotiate meanings, who represents them,

and in which ways? Such questions mean that the conceptualisation and practice of the ethnographic endeavour, including how we observe and write, necessarily changes.

4.3.2.1 Subjectivity and the interpretation of meanings: Who speaks?

Because postmodern ethnography recognises that there is no unitary truth to be sought or described, it instead emphasises poly-vocality or the multiplicity of meanings (Durrheim, 1997; Gavey, 1989). There are thought to be as many meanings as there are people. Hosking and Morley (2004) said that "the meanings of knowledge claims, and the tests of their validity, are inextricably bound up with the 'local' and 'situated' identities of those who formulate such claims and of those who evaluate them" (p. 327). In other words, in any ethnographic endeavour we need to pay attention to who is making claims, and why, at all times.

In comparison to more traditional definitions that are about descriptions of behaviour, Geertz has stressed meaning when it comes to culture. In 1973 he reviewed the definitions of culture given in the important anthropological work, *Mirror for man* (Kluckhohn, 1940). He noted that, among other definitions, culture can be seen as an abstraction from behaviour, a theory on the part of the anthropologist about the way in which a group of people in fact behave, or a behavioural map, sieve, or matrix. In other words, authors such as Geertz began to admit that the map is most certainly not the territory (Baudrillard, 1981). Clifford (1986) noted that culture is, on consideration, composed of seriously contested codes and representations. Geertz framed human behaviour as symbolic action that, like language, signifies something: "The thing to ask (of actions) is what their import is" (Geertz, 1973, p. 10). His position is perhaps most famously summarised in the following quote:

The concept of culture I espouse. . . is essentially a semiotic one. Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretative one in search of meaning. It is explication I am after... (Geertz, 1973, p. 5)

Geertz's semiotic concept of culture taught us that anthropologists need to interpret the guiding symbols of each culture (1973). Systems of meaning, Geertz argued, are the collective property of a group. Culture, according to Geertz (1973), is "a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which people communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life" (p. 89). Culture in this sense contributes to imposing meaning on the world; it is not something passive that we record. Geertz noted that he is comfortable being called a social constructionist because he believes that meaning is socially, historically and rhetorically constructed between people (Olson, 1991).

Geertz explained that when we say we do not understand the actions of people from a culture other than our own, we are acknowledging our "lack of familiarity with the imaginative universe within which their acts are signs" (1973, p. 13). Geertz stressed that, like literature, any ethnographic work is a product of time, place, and circumstance and that its context should not be ignored. He also compared cultural analysis to the literary criticism of a text. He advocated "sorting out the structures of signification...and determining their social ground and import...Doing ethnography is like trying to read (in the sense of 'construct a reading of') a manuscript..." (1973,

pp. 9-10).

It follows that case studies and ethnographic reports can more accurately be viewed as "account[s] of experience" (K. Gibson, 2002b, p. 81). K. Gibson (2002b) cited thick description as one effective way to locate and explain the experiences of participants in research. Generally, a thick description is understood as an account in close detail (Emerson, 1983c). Geertz (1973) defined this term, which he borrowed from Ryle, to describe his own specific mode of practice, as a "stratified hierarchy of meaningful structures" (p. 7). Geertz (1973) held that thick description is the very object of ethnography; it is not defined by its methods and techniques, but as an "elaborate venture" in thick description (1973, p. 6). When we unpack the concept of thick description as a stratified hierarchy of meaningful structures, several implications can be noted. Firstly, cultural and social activities will be targeted in such an account; secondly, context is important; thirdly, activities will be described with an emphasis on the complex connections between actions; and lastly, the meanings of events that are relevant to those involved in them will be presented.

In thick description context is therefore central and is always considered in trying to understand the meaning of actions. As context changes, Geertz argued (after Ryle), the meaning of human behaviour changes. A thin description, which may be very detailed and accurate, however, lacks meaning. Fieldnotes are thus written up in a way that makes sense of or analyses what has been observed. In this view the task of the anthropologist is specifically to contextualise a society's practices, so that they become meaningful to an outsider. The preoccupation with locally meaningful context is, as Emerson (1983c) and Mishler (1979) pointed out, antithetical to other social science procedures in which contextual meanings are reduced in the interests of standardisation and comparability.

Geertz (1976) wrote about developing "experience-near" concepts to describe culture (p. 223). By this he meant concepts which would "naturally and effortlessly" be used by members of a society to define what is seen, felt, thought, imagined, and so on (Geertz, 1976, quoted in Emerson, 1983c, p. 25). In other words, he advocated using concepts that would be readily understood by members of the society being described. As Emerson (1983c) put it, the focus is on what is "salient to the variety of local actors themselves" (p. 25). This means admitting and embracing the particular subjectivity of those people being studied.

However, Aunger (2004) wondered whether it is ever possible to achieve a view of personal meaning from the participants' perspective. Furthermore, psychoanalytic thinking suggests that some meanings may be hidden even from the participants themselves, because such meanings are in the realm of the unconscious. Nevertheless, the drive to uncover participants' subjective meanings, rather than to impose an outsider description of their way of life, remains important and will affect the researcher's stance and mode of enquiry. The complex question of whose experience is being represented arises along the way. The ethnographer may aim to capture the meanings of the people under study, but in effect she is always seeing them through her own lenses. Who the writer is therefore becomes something that must be considered in the text in some way.

Closely linked to the endeavour to be experience-near is the question of the researcher's role in the community being studied. Geertz railed against notions of ethnographic research that assume that researchers must be

objective, detached and scientifically uninvolved in the community under investigation (Olson, 1991). To represent ethnography "as though it were a laboratory study of some sort" is, according to Geertz, "almost in a kind of positivist sense false" (Olson, 1991, p. 188). Instead, he championed the idea of a studied self-reflexivity, or of the "positioned observer" (after R. Rosaldo) - a recognition that "you are somebody: you come out of a certain class; you come out of a certain place; you go into a certain country; you then go home; you do all of these things" (Olson, 1991, p. 205). Geertz eventually reconceptualised his life's work as research conducted not by an impersonal, objective scientist, but "by human hands - that is, mine" (Olson, 1991, p. 188). Chapter titles such as "Being There" and "Being Here" (Geertz, 1988) point to his awareness of distance, gaze and subjectivity in his dual roles of observer and author.

In other words, postmodern ethnographic texts recognise that what is being presented is far from objective fact and truths that have somehow been captured by one person viewing another. Geertz acknowledged that readers of ethnographic texts need to "either take it or leave it. You don't know anything about the place. You could read another couple of books and probably get more confused, but there's no way of matching it to 'reality'" (Olson, 1991, p. 192). Because postmodernism recognises the inevitability of interpretation in this way, the position of the researcher becomes central. Denzin (1997) held that the qualitative research act can no longer be viewed from within a neutral or objective positivist perspective. Upon consideration, class, race, gender and ethnicity are seen to shape the process of inquiry (Denzin, 1997). It is now recognised that researchers influence all aspects of their research in direct and indirect ways (Reason & Rowan, 1981, cited in K. Gibson, 2002b).

In conclusion, ethnography is increasingly seen to admit to subjectivities of all kinds. There is a new sensitivity to the concerns and experiences of those being described, as seen from their own perspective. This means considering context. Secondly, the role of the researcher in research necessarily becomes a key area for consideration. There is new recognition of the presence of the interpreting ethnographer.

4.3.2.2 Subjectivities and power: Who may speak?

Anthropology can be thought of as a relational practice in that it involves one person observing another, as concepts such as photographic ethnography and visual anthropology attest to. Yet Weldes et al. (1999) noted that it was more or less taboo in more traditional ethnography to explicitly explore the relationship of domination between "traditional" peoples and colonial states - "a relationship in which anthropologists themselves were implicated in complex and contradictory ways" (p. 7). Nowadays issues of power relations, the subject-object, the "other" and "power over" or "power to" are increasingly being thought about in the postmodern view. For example, Clifford (1986) acceded to the point that ethnographic work has always been enmeshed in a world of enduring and changing power inequalities and in fact enacts power relations. He commented that ethnography's function within these relationships is complex, often ambivalent, and potentially counter-hegemonic (Clifford, 1986).

Traditional ethnographic accounts often presented a negative portrait of "the ambitious social scientist making off with the tribal lore and giving nothing in return, imposing crude portraits on subtle peoples" (Clifford, 1986, p. 9). There is a particular gaze here that reflects the inherent inequality of power between observer and observed. The

interpretation of cultures is a political arena involving power and "one of the ways ethnographic writing is determined is politically - the authority to represent cultural realities is unequally shared and at times contested" (Clifford, 1986, p. 6). Thus Clifford (1986) has noted that it is important to stress the dangers of aestheticism and the constraints of institutional power. Some voices will invariably be privileged above others. Traditionally, polyvocality was restrained in traditional ethnographies by giving to one voice a pervasive authorial function and to others the role of sources, informants to be quoted or paraphrased. There is now a "general trend towards a specification of discourses in ethnography: who speaks? who writes? when and where? with or to whom? under what institutional and historical constraints?" (Clifford, 1986, p. 13). The issue of culture is thus problematised when seen through a postmodern lens - What is it? Who defines what it is? Through whose eyes is it being described? The inviolate authority of the ethnographic report has, over time, been turned upside down (Aunger, 2004).

Therefore "it soon becomes apparent that there is no 'complete' corpus of First-Time knowledge, that no one - least of all the visiting ethnographer - can know this lore except through an open-ended series of contingent, power-laden encounters" (Clifford, 1986, p. 8). Clifford (1986) suggested that the way to work with this is firstly to admit that in ethnography we constantly reconstitute others and ourselves through specific exclusions, conventions and discursive practices. Secondly, these processes need to be analysed in and of themselves.

4.3.2.3 Language and subjectivity: Writing culture

In their seminal text, *Writing culture*, Clifford and Marcus (1986) held that "Ethnography is not 'only literature'. It is, however, always writing" (Clifford, 1986, p. 26). In *Works and lives* Geertz (1988) also examined the notion that ethnography itself is overtly a kind of writing and an act of putting something on paper. Clifford and Marcus (1986) went as far as to claim that one of the principal activities of ethnographers is writing. Ethnographies were described as fictions, in that they were admitted to be something made or fashioned. Some authors have expressed this by saying that anthropologists do not find things at all, but make them, or even make them up (Trinh, 1989, cited in Denzin, 1997). In this sense, they have invented things that are not actually real. The partiality of cultural and historical truths thus urgently needs to be recognised.

Academic and literary genres invariably interpenetrate (Clifford, 1986). Metaphor, figuration and narrative are seen to affect the ways cultural phenomena are registered (Clifford, 1986). The maker of an ethnographic text, Clifford (1986) held, cannot avoid "expressive tropes, figures, and allegories that select and impose meaning as they translate it" (p. 7). This raises questions about the ethics of writing. All constructed truths are made possible by powerful "lies" of exclusion and rhetoric (Clifford, 1986, p. 7). Ethnographic texts are in this sense systems or economies of truth, and "power and history work through them, in ways their authors cannot fully control" (Clifford, 1986, p. 7). In 1986 Clifford and Marcus noted that the concept that literary procedures pervade any work of cultural representation is a recent idea in the discipline:

No longer a marginal, or occulted, dimension, writing has emerged as central to what anthropologists do both in the field and thereafter. The fact that it has not until recently been portrayed or seriously discussed reflects the persistence of an ideology claiming transparency of representation and immediacy of experience. Writing

reduced to method: keeping good field notes, making accurate maps, "writing up" results. (p. 2)

Clifford (1986) noted that in classical ethnographies the voice of the author was always manifest, but that conventions of textual presentation and reading forbade too close a connection between authorial style and the reality represented. The subjectivity of the author was separated from the objective referent of the text. At best, the author's personal voice was previously seen as a style in the weak sense: a tone, or embellishment of the facts. Clifford (1986) pointed out that the actual field of experience of the ethnographer was traditionally presented only in very stylised ways (such as arrival stories): "States of serious confusion, violent feelings or acts, censorships, important failures, changes of course, and excessive pleasures are excluded from the public account" (p. 13). Clifford and Marcus (1986) suggested that the ethnographer's troubles, hopes and confusions are mostly left out of traditional accounts, even when she is working under manifestly difficult circumstances. These authors asked what desires and confusions the overly confident and consistent ethnographic voice might be smoothing over and placed "an implicit mark of interrogation beside it" (Clifford, 1986, p. 14). They asked us to consider, in effect, how the "objectivity" of such a voice is created in the writing.

A focus on text making and rhetoric serves to highlight the constructed, artificial nature of cultural accounts. This involves undermining overly transparent modes of authority. Geertz expressed the wish for anthropology to be seen as "textual construction" (Olson, 1991, p. 193). As a result, he encouraged close readings of anthropological texts in which questions are asked about how we construct ethnographic images and how texts should look (1988). He held that by thinking of research reports as texts, we open them up to deeper interpretation, which leads to a broader understanding of the subject (Olson, 1991). Geertz recommended the same modes of inquiry for anthropology as for composition. In *Works and lives* (1988), for example, he examined the writings of four major anthropologists as if he were a literary critic explicating canonical texts. He wondered what makes a text in anthropology persuasive, noting that this varies from author to author (Olson, 1991). As he explained in an interview, it is not simply a matter of presenting a body of facts, but seems to have much more to do with the author's ethos, and the power of his or her presentation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Geertz began college as an English major, and initially wanted to be a novelist and journalist (Geertz, 2000). Olson (1991) commented that it has often been noted that his prose, even in more technical anthropological writings, is very readable - even, at times, entertaining, in the best sense of the word. Geertz held that he thought of himself as "a writer who happens to be doing his writing as an anthropologist" (Olson, 1991, p. 190). Perhaps it is this background that has assisted Geertz to work with the literary quality of ethnography.

Geertz's famous thick descriptions are, however, not to be confused with his fieldnotes. Delaney (2004) noted that traditionally an ethnography was thought of as that which anthropologists write up after completing their fieldwork. In fact, Geertz has said that he finds it impossible to produce ethnographic accounts in the field; "mostly, here I write and there research" (Olson, 1991, p. 190). In other words, most ethnographic writing is in fact second-level writing with the distinct purpose of synthesising and conveying what was noted in the field. What is noted in the field is, however, invariably selective and analytic in its own way. Therefore such clear distinctions will be problematised below, and in my discussion of the present case study in Chapters Six and Seven. We can no longer hold that we are able to record facts when we make fieldnotes about what we see. Fieldnotes are texts with specific

authors. They involve a further, and not a first, level of analysis (the first having been the observation itself). Self-reflexivity in ethnography thus becomes mandatory: "The writer can no longer presume to be able to present an objective, noncontested account of the other's experiences" (Denzin, 1997, p. xiii). Amusingly, Geertz has referred to older, more traditional anthropological accounts as being "written from the moon - the view from nowhere" (Olson, 1991, p. 204). From a postmodern perspective, Denzin (1997) newly defined ethnography as a form of enquiry and writing that produces descriptions and accounts not only about the ways of life those written about, but about the writer herself.

Considering feminist and postmodern ethnographic injunctions to "attend to representation, voice, and text" (Olesen, 2005, p. 257), how should or can we write about what we observe? There have been various responses to the critique that the ethnographer has been left out of accounts, sometimes resulting in what Marcus (1994) called "messy texts" (quoted in Denzin, 1997, p. xvii). This contrasts with "the tyranny of the finished text" that Parker wrote about (1992, p. 21). Experimental writing by feminist ethnographers is growing (Olesen, 2005). For example, Wolf (1992) presented three versions of voices from her anthropological fieldwork in Taiwan (cited in Olesen, 2005). Behar (1993) experimented with an extended double-voiced text in which she and her participant acted as co-creators in representing a life history (cited in Olesen, 2005). Some feminist anthropologists create performance pieces, dramatic readings, or plays performed at academic conferences (Olesen, 2005). Among the more experimental forms of writing Denzin (1997) reviewed are experiments in autoethnography, ethnographic poetics, anthropological and sociological poetry, evocative and layered accounts, short stories, ethnographic fictions and ethnographic novels, and narratives of the self. Not all authors agree that new forms of writing represent a way out of the representational crisis. Clough (1992), for example, held that simply by writing any fieldworker makes a claim to moral and scientific authority (cited in Denzin, 1997). Too often, Denzin held, experiments in writing "fail to fully engage with a new politics of textuality that would 'refuse the identity of empirical science' while openly engaging social criticism as the form of preferred discourse" (1997, p. 18). He added that nowadays the gaze that probes is anchored in the interactional experiences of the reflexive ethnographer, in other words, in relationships.

Geertz noted that writing style is in fact authorial signature, and is one way for the ethnographer to be represented in the text (Olson, 1991). Clifford (1986) noted that "it has become clear that every version of an 'other', wherever found, is also the construction of a 'self' and the making of ethnographic texts involves a process of self-fashioning" (pp. 23-24). In *Works and lives* (1988) Geertz noted how difficult it is to find somewhere to stand in the text that meets the injunction to give, at one and the same time, an intimate view and a cool assessment (Olson, 1991). Different ways of bringing ourselves in more are still being discovered and developed, and some seem unsatisfactory: "People take photographs with their own shadow in them; that doesn't seem to me to be a particularly marvellous solution. The whole question is how to do this without being awkward" (Olson, 1991, p. 204). Some authors have tried to get around the issue of subjectivity by reviewing their own roles in a short paragraph or page in the finished work (see, for example, Herbst de Villiers, 2006; Lesch, 2000). Such insertions can, however, be insufficient or unintegrated. Geertz stated that:

...we have to go further than that; we have to situate our selves within the text...It's not confessional

anthropology, and it's not about what I was feeling or something of that sort; it's trying to describe the work I've been doing with myself in the picture. (Olson, 1991, p. 204)

How exactly we do that is perhaps contingent on the particular situation. From a psychoanalytic perspective, it may indeed be about feeling. As discussed, emotion gives us important clues as to the unconscious aspects of any interaction. K. Gibson (2002b), citing Banister, Burman, Parker, Taylor and Tindall (1994), suggested that reflexivity is increasingly presented as perhaps a slightly too glib answer to the dilemma of the researcher's involvement in the research. She said, "If you reflect on your own role sufficiently and discuss these reflections openly in your research, the idea is that you can create a more transparent understanding of the way in which you, as the researcher, have shaped the research" (2002b, p. 86). She noted that this does not account for more unconscious motives, however. K. Gibson (2000b) held that the way to deal with the hidden parts of our identities is "with reflection and with the containment provided by theory and relationships" and even then we will only achieve "an approximate understanding of our own motives" (p. 86). This endeavour to understand that which is hidden is, however, what sets psychoanalysis apart from other disciplines, and it is in this that its potential contribution to ethnography lies. This idea will therefore be discussed more fully in the next section.

In conclusion, the interpretation of meaning(s) has become a central concept in postmodern ethnography (Geertz, 2000). The subjectivity of the researcher is addressed with increasing self-reflexivity. The ways in which power works throughout the production of ethnographic knowledge are increasingly examined. Language is seen as a site where meaning is constructed using signs rather than where facts are conveyed. Following on from these ideas, the character of fieldwork essentially also changes. In Chapter Six the nature and approach of postmodern fieldwork will be examined briefly in a consideration of the present study's methodology.

4.4 Ethnography and psychoanalysis

4.4.1 The contribution of psychoanalysis to ethnography

Keesing and Strathern (1998) noted that ethnographers increasingly have to recognise that they gather information on levels that cannot always be accessed by conscious methods. Much information "never goes into the notebooks...a knowledge of scenes and people and sounds and smells that cannot be captured in the written word" (Keesing & Strathern, 1998, p. 9). Psychoanalysis, as described in Chapter Two, offers a way to access and work with the unconscious. Ethnography is interested in gleaning the meaning of cultural manifestations for the subject being described, which is generally thought to be accessible via informants and observation. Psychoanalysis reminds us that, through the workings of the unconscious, the meaning of behaviour may be obscure, even to the subject herself. According to psychoanalysis, this is an essential part of the human make-up. It is felt that unconscious meanings are equally crucial to any understanding. A psychoanalytic ethnographic study will thus be interested both in what the subject can know and explain, and what she cannot. In this way psychoanalysis may make a contribution to unpacking "layers of meaning" in a postmodern ethnographic endeavour (K. Gibson, 2002b, p. 83). Postmodern ethnography has recognised, as Frosh (2000) put it, that "whenever a truth is found, there is another, alternative one underneath" (p. 66). This highlights the tremendous complexity of the ethnographic

endeavour to uncover and represent cultural meanings.

There is a great deal of subtle work necessary in order to access unconscious meanings, involving interpretation by the researcher. As K. Gibson (2002b) intimated, researchers also carry motivations that are hidden to themselves. Introspection can make these meanings clearer. Psychoanalysts are uniquely placed to work with their own subjectivities, because the analyst is considered the tool or instrument for analysis. Citing Frosh (1999), K. Gibson (2002b) noted that "the meanings that people produce are not simply arbitrary textual productions, but are emotionally instigated structures of meaning that govern how they live their lives" (p. 82). In other words, psychoanalysis offers a focus on emotion that may be helpful in coming to understand what is happening in any ethnographic exchange. The analyst, or psychodynamic researcher, is specifically attuned to counter-transference responses. Eriksen (2004) held that "anthropology is concerned with that which takes place between people, not their innermost feelings and thoughts" (p. 140). In the psychodynamic paradigm innermost feelings are thought to be key to working out what takes place between people.

Psychoanalysis has always been interested in relationship and connection. A psychoanalytic approach to ethnography can offer a deeper understanding of the unconscious emotional dynamics between researcher and researched. This accesses what is unsayable, unknown and unrepresentable in any ethnographic encounter. Some ethnographers have commented on a certain lack of theory in anthropology: Geertz said outright that "anthropological theory is not that impressive, in my view" (Olson, 1991, p. 192). Auger (2004) noted that "the irony is, therefore, that while there has been great sophistication in ethnographic descriptions of social behaviour, there has been little concern for the intricacies of human interaction during data collection in either ethnographic theory or practice" (p. 44). In other words, anthropology may lack the tools with which to theorise more deeply, in a postmodern sense, about the complex power play that is inevitably a part of any ethnographic endeavour. In this way psychoanalysis has a great deal to offer the reflexivity that postmodern ethnographers call for. It involves complex theorising, and is always interested in developing its theories, as laid out in previous chapters.

Ainslie and Brabeck (2003), writing in the United States from a position straddling these two paradigms, defined psychoanalysis as a framework that requires a particular kind of engagement, and hence, a particular kind of method. It can be argued that analysis has always been a playful field (some of Freud's early accounts and Winnicott's work attest to this). Psychoanalysis is contented to take its time, to reflect deeply, to wonder and to muse. Ainslie and Brabeck (2003) highlighted the way in which psychoanalysis is comfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity, and the way in which this can be an asset for the ethnographer who enters a community, being unsure about what it is that will be found there. They claimed that this is familiar and not unsettling to the analyst, being the very essence of a psychoanalytic approach to patients' stories or lives, as they are learnt about in the consulting room. They noted that this unstructured, open-ended attitude or orientation leads to extended engagements. In utilising this framework to approach three community studies, then, it followed that in each case the projects revolved around a core of long-term relationships: "Meaningful engagements take time to develop. Anthropologists and psychoanalysts know this well" (Ainslie & Brabeck, 2003, p. 43).

Interpretation of the unconscious thus seems the single most important contribution that psychoanalysis can make

to ethnography, and it is argued that this can add depth and detail to ethnographic projects. The interpretive process will emphasise subjectivity, emotion and relationship. Technically, reflection, uncertainty and playfulness are highlighted. In sum, psychoanalysis offers a way to theorise about the complexity of internal lives and human meetings.

4.4.2 Empirical examples

Internationally, there have been some interesting projects in the field of psychoanalytic ethnography. For example, for the past decade Ainslie, working in the Department of Educational Psychology at the University of Texas, has written about psychoanalytic ways of understanding ethnographic phenomena (Ainslie & Brabeck, 2003), as well as producing a documentary film and a photographic exhibit on community subjects such as school desegregation and race murder. His use of multiple modes of investigation and representation is relevant in the light of the current discussion, because it suggests that ethnography could lend new forms and techniques to a psychodynamic community psychology paradigm.

Ainslie and Brabeck (2003) called their approach a psychoanalytic ethnographic one, by which they meant that their work in specific Texan communities drew from both disciplines "to frame an understanding of the work and the processes observed, as well as using them as a methodological guide in approaching these communities and those who live within them" (p. 42). In other words, psychoanalysis influenced both their theorising and their methods. Their work, however, was about understanding and documenting certain community phenomena. They held that the concepts and assumptions of psychoanalysis about how the mind works, including unconscious dimensions, can also be a resource for attempts to understand community conflicts and group processes. For example, a psychoanalytic understanding of symptoms and their function as symbolic reference points to underlying conflicts, tensions, and anxieties within a community was used. This is not a new idea (it originated with Freud) but its application specifically to an ethnographic study is novel, and even contentious. Ainslie and Brabeck (2003) noted, for example, that Geertz had "sharp reservations" about psychoanalysis (p. 42). Nevertheless, these authors held that his ideas about symbolic interactionism fitted well with the emphasis in psychoanalysis on the symbolic. Ainslie (1995) used a psychoanalytic understanding of the restorative function of making what was once unconscious conscious, "that is, reintegrating into the public memory crucial elements of a largely disavowed or heretofore unspeakable history" (Ainslie & Brabeck, 2003, p. 42). Ainslie and Brabeck (2003) also made use of the psychoanalytic understanding of trauma, as well as the psychodynamics of defence, to understand how a community managed to absorb a profoundly disturbing racial murder.

Of the articulation between these fields, Ainslie and Brabeck (2003) have written:

Both disciplines work with the ambiguities of transference and countertransference manifestations and the complexities of establishing and maintaining working alliances, that is to say, the management of the psychodynamics of the interpersonal field. Both disciplines also require the practitioners to reflect on what it means to be entrusted with highly sensitive or confidential information. Of special importance is the fact that both disciplines share a similar sensibility, one that trusts the "material" to be guided by the lives engaged and to evolve in meaningful and unanticipated ways that can be grasped, understood. Both also require vigilance against the imposition of predigested frameworks and understandings, even if not always successful in their efforts to

ward off such. (p. 42)

The psychoanalytic emphasis on cure also lends a particular angle to psychoanalytic ethnographic projects. Ainslie and Brabeck (2003) incorporated psychoanalytically informed community interventions as part of their ethnographic work. They noted that what to do with what they learn from their ethnographies, namely "how we utilize our insights into people and communities to engage the issues that trouble them", is an important question (p. 43). Ainslie's documentary film was felt to provide a means to tell a story that had been repressed. His photographic exhibition specifically narrated the community's response to a murder in their midst, which had perhaps not been the focus in media representations of the event. Ainslie and Brabeck (2003) acknowledged, through these "interventions", that communities have powerful emotions. Both the film and the exhibit drew directly from the relationships and interviews developed over the course of the ethnographic work in each community. Their projects seemed to have significant impact. They concluded: "We believe, in other words, that what one learns in the course of doing ethnographies can lend itself to, or become the basis for, meaningful representation of a community's experience. Ethnography can be a form of therapeutic praxis" (Ainslie & Brabeck, 2003, p. 43).

Further authors have been interested in using psychodynamic constructs to analyse the relationship between ethnographers and their participants (Wengle, 1988). In an article entitled "What takes place in the dark", Cornell (1992) held that psychoanalysis must play a role in Geertz's science of "imagining difference" (p. 45). Anthropology, she noted, helps us to engage with difference without "the complacent superiority of ethnocentrism" (Cornell, 1992, p. 45).

4.4.3 The application of psychoanalytic ethnography in South African community work

In South African case studies using principles from ethnography, psychoanalysis and community work, the emphasis has been on observation and writing up in a way that is probing, exploratory and innovative. Practitioners have engaged with notions of difference, representation and power. The articulation of the two paradigms provides challenges to psychoanalytic ideas, which may help refine them for South African use.

Attempts at descriptive research into multicultural childcare practices have been problematised (Tomlinson, 2003). Who can speak for whom, and appropriate a voice on infancy (or culture)? (Tomlinson & L. Swartz, 2003b). Secondly, how do we "capture" or define "culture"? Tomlinson (2003) held that

...any analysis of practice or belief about infancy must locate its descriptions politically, socially and economically (and not simply individually) if it is to avoid becoming what Lewis (1999) aptly refers to as a fashionable literary pursuit, a dilettante traveller's *belles lettres*. (p. 45)

Tomlinson (2003) warned that asocial and apolitical cultural studies of infant care ignore the crucial interplay between culture and society. Descriptions need to work with intracultural variation, which at times can exceed intercultural differences: "unless this is factored in and acknowledged then the description of the care practice has no validity in the lived world" (p. 47). In other words, when we attempt ethnographic description, we must keep an

eye open for that which is unique and individual.

Tomlinson and L. Swartz (2003b) held that, when we try to describe culture, there are "important debates that must be entered into about power, control, and the construction of the other" (p. 495) in any attempt at increasing our knowledge about infancy and culture. Such debates are silenced at times. Tomlinson and L. Swartz (2003b) noted that diversity has been obscured and at times appropriated into a powerful and more familiar north American genre. This might be part of a defensive process, because "diversity feels dangerous for many people" (L. Swartz, 2002, p. iv):

Multiculturalism as an ideological position is quite easy to maintain from a position of strength and security in a society where there is enough to go around. When there is perceived threat and danger, however, the 'other', which the relativist enterprise in the social sciences has worked so hard to demythologise and to normalise, becomes the terrifying and frightening beast to be destroyed or to be kept out. And safety and security, of course, are to some extent in the eye of the beholder. (p. iv)

Multiculturalist ideas are tested, he maintained, when the other stops being "clearly far away or disempowered" (p. iv). When the boundaries become permeable between "us" and "them", a real or imagined threat to our own lives exists, and begins to test our tolerance (L. Swartz, 2002, p. iv). L. Swartz (2002) concluded with a call for psychologists who "understand pain, fear and intergenerational suffering, to contribute to thinking and action about diversity, and to link what we know about the personal with what we must learn about the collective and the global" (p. iv).

Using an ethnographic lens, Tomlinson and L. Swartz (2003b) argued for "detailed contextual interpretation of what may at first glance seem bizarre" (p. 489). Postmodern ethnography, they noted, is as much about transactions of power as it is about description (the gaze has turned). They urged practitioners not to obscure their own cultural positioning: "the act of making ethnography is not simply an act of recording the exotic - it is equally an act of presentation and of definition, by contrast, of the role of the ethnographer" (2003b, p. 491). These authors held that it is essential to problematise the extent to which we impose interpretation on data (the hidden authorial voice) as cultural outsiders. They noted a difference between the coherent account (the poetics of ethnography) and the discontinuities and contradictions of what goes on in the field. We are essentially involved in the production of knowledge about the other, and both author and reader participate in making meaning. The way in which we produce scientific knowledge about the other can involve othering, stereotyping, and the entrenching of power relations.

Tomlinson and L. Swartz (2003b) showed that in ethnographic accounts of childcare, the other can be repackaged as understandable and child-loving. Difference is neutralised and depoliticised. Fears and dangers associated with the "primitive" world are made safe and even homogenised. The strange is made to seem familiar, and the unacceptable is sanitised. Multiculturalism can give a gloss of respectability to local practices that are oppressive. The Westerner is positioned, "Dr Spock-like, as indulgently understanding the world of the 'other'" (Tomlinson & L. Swartz, 2003b, p. 495).

Tomlinson (2003) touched on the complexity inherent in trying to abstract a notion of culture when he described his abandoned intention to describe "the Xhosa infant" following a number of interviews in Khayelitsha. This work was part of the Thula Sana mother-infant project designed to improve maternal mood and thereby enhance the development of the early mother-infant relationship. An important part of this work, he noted, was "the assessment of conceptualisations of infancy and childhood" (2003, p. 46). He concluded that "the notion of 'A Xhosa infant' or 'A Xhosa mother' is simply not a tenable concept, despite the fact that much of the literature is replete with works implying a neat cultural package" (2003, p. 46). Tomlinson (2003) showed that great care must be taken when reporting an expressed belief system: other factors such as individual difference and temporality (how belief systems change over time) complicate the picture. A person might express a particular cultural belief out of deference to an older generation, and not because of his or her own conviction. It is easy to "conflate the cultural with the political and the personal" (Tomlinson, 2003, p. 46). Tomlinson (2003) argued that culture is fluid, that people actively collect specific cultural artefacts around them, and in so doing create unique, personal cultural systems around themselves. Even more care needs to be taken when someone outside the culture makes cultural statements following a process of observation. Moore (1994) noted that anthropologists have only recently begun to discuss and document the existence of multiple models and discourses within cultures. As a result, she argued, we are more aware than ever that it becomes impossible to talk of a particular culture as having one model of the person or conception of the self. Rather, dominant discourses, and discourses that are only appropriate to specific contexts, exist and what appears to be a dominant discourse on the self may turn out to be relatively divorced from everyday life and experience (Moore, 1994).

S. Swartz (2005, 2006a, 2006b) has extended this kind of thinking in a specific consideration of the role of power and difference in the South African clinical exchange: "the power between us never lies still" (2006a, p. 440). She commented that there is no easy moment of meeting with the other and that encounters across the divides in South Africa are extremely hard to bear (2005). She noted the traumatic impact of being named and of fixed identities, but suggested that in a clinical sense naming can often be an entry point and not a barrier. She concluded that we have no choice but to inhabit our subjectivity, but that by empathy, which is an act of the imagination, we are able to achieve a resonance of a likeness that can be a point of departure. True mutuality is thus achievable through some sort of process of recognition.

S. Swartz (2005) noted that what South Africa is sometimes thought to contribute to the development of international theory is the exotic concept of the "Native" or "African" mind. There is a long history of this in psychoanalysis, and it is relevant to the present study in that it indicates an attempt at describing something about an unknown (different) group of people. Maiello (1998), citing Freud (1921) and Jones (1924), reminded us that "in psychoanalytic thinking, the interest in ethology and anthropology derived initially from the wish to explore the 'archaic layers of the unconscious' for which the authors searched evidence in what they called 'primitive cultures'" (p. 16). Their objective was primarily that of a universal validation of the foundations of psychoanalytic theory. Western criteria became the yardstick for measuring mental health. In object relations theory, while interpersonal interaction did receive attention as one of the factors shaping internal worlds, cultural issues were not explicitly addressed. This is because psychoanalytic theory and practice was informed by clinical work with individuals in a shared Western cultural environment. The impact of cultural factors on both personality and theory formation,

Maiello (1998) maintained, is still a relatively neglected area in psychoanalytic discussion. The key question she raised is how Western psychoanalytic theory may need to undergo changes to become relevant in other cultural contexts, and how its practice "may have to adapt to reach patients with different cultural roots and become meaningful to them" (1998, p. 28).

Maiello (1998) cited Berenstein and Puget (1997), two authors writing in Argentina, where intercultural influences are prominent. These authors wrote of three dimensions of subjectivity in terms of an intrapsychic, an intersubjective and a trans-subjective level, the latter referring to the relations of an individual with the shared social environment. "The trans-subjective dimension", Maiello (1998) noted, "becomes a central issue whenever individuals belonging to different cultures meet" (p. 17):

Although we try to understand universally shared life situations and the psychic processes that underlie and accompany them, we must be alert to cultural aspects of both our own theoretical and methodological approach, and of differences in the forms of expression of psychic distress. (1998, p. 17)

Maiello (1998) cited L. Swartz (1996), who pointed out that in South Africa the notion of cultural difference has historically been synonymous with white supremacy, and that the universalist view of social phenomena that was meant to overcome apartheid ideology in past years contributed to the denial of profound cultural differences existing between ethnic groups.

K. Gibson (2002b) noted that in a long history in South Africa of using psychoanalytic ideas, Sachs's *Black Hamlet* (1937) is an early representative. Sachs was a Lithuanian psychoanalyst who trained in Europe and England, and settled in Johannesburg in 1922 (Dubow, 1996). He had a flourishing medical practice, but his pioneering spirit outran the conventions of a bourgeois existence. He became a pioneer of psychoanalysis in South Africa, becoming its first training analyst. Over a period of two and a half years Sachs "analysed" a Manyika healer-diviner (John Chavafambira), using the technique of free association. Chavafambira lived a precarious existence in the townships of Sophiatown and Orlando, and the "slumyards" of Doornfontein (Dubow, 1996). Sachs was interested in investigating whether Freudian psychoanalytic theory was applicable across different cultures. He became increasingly absorbed, however, by the psychological techniques employed in African traditional medicine.

This case study, which is essentially an early example of a pseudo-analysis in South Africa, is relevant to the present study in that it documents early cross-cultural contact within the framework of a psychoanalytic understanding. It can be seen as an ethnographic endeavour and a kind of observation (unusually, Sachs went into the subject's home). Sachs's study did not particularly aim at capturing cultural data about his subject in the respectful terms that postmodern ethnographers advocate. Rather, in the light of S. Swartz's (2005) comments, his aim was to ascertain how the "Native Mind" worked - specifically, whether it worked in the same way as the Western mind, or not. The issues that Sachs's study throws up, some nearly 60 years prior to the infant observation process that will be described here, are still resonant. Both studies represent, in retrospect, an attempt at coming to grips with the mental life of a proximal but unknown culture. It is telling that the same problems (and more) are still in evidence half a century later, and that so few cross-cultural studies of this nature lie between these two.

Sachs's study provides interesting points of comparison with the present one. Sachs studied a man living in poverty in segregationist South Africa, and he noted many aspects of Chavafambira's life and customs. His involvement with his subject was more than was traditionally advocated by the psychoanalytic framework of the time; these boundary-breaks included interventions in the subject's life and interviews with his associates. Sachs claimed that there were no therapeutic aims to the project, and no money changed hands. Instead, he framed his endeavour as an interchange in knowledge "in an atmosphere of friendliness and mutual interest" (Sachs, 1937, p. 74). As Dubow (1996) pointed out, it was in fact impossible to meet on a truly equal basis. Sachs (1937) claimed to record Chavafambira's story "unaltered in its essence" (p. 75), but wrote it in "standard" English as opposed to the broken English Chavafambira used. Sachs and Chavafambira had an "intriguing but fraught collaboration" (Dubow, 1996). Dubow (1996) also commented on the way the analytic situation invested Sachs with an enormous amount of power over Chavafambira.

What the two studies also share is a focus on methodology: what happens when we try to use a proven Western technique in Africa, and what does it tell us about the subjects it is used on? Sachs's great discovery was that the "native" thinks like us. His excitement at the time was fuelled by a liberal, humanistic stance, but can retrospectively be seen as another instance of racism that studied indigenous peoples like animal species. To some extent, it can be argued that this dynamic also exists in the present study, and that it testifies to the intractable power relations which had their origin in colonial times, and have since become entrenched and exacerbated by apartheid. However, Sachs also underwent a degree of change through his study. He was enriched by the contact (a contact which was very rare in his day). From his somewhat racist point of departure, and in an age where customary segregation would fast become law, Sachs's own political consciousness developed (Dubow, 1996). Dubow (1996) commented on Sachs's editorial changes between the first and second publications of the study. They indicate an increasing measure of respect and acceptance. For example, in the second version Sachs immediately refers to Chavafambira by his surname instead of calling him "John".

The differences between the two studies are also revealing, and speak about the socio-political and economic effects of the intervening apartheid era. Pure psychoanalysis has not been used much in community settings, as described in Chapter Three. "Community psychology" is, of course, a new concept that has come into being since Sachs's day, denoting an area of psychology that often deals with tremendous need, and warranting a particular approach that may use psychodynamic concepts, but cannot rely solely on techniques such as psychoanalysis. Therefore a modern South African practitioner or researcher in this area may not make the same assumption Sachs did, namely that psychoanalysis can be transported wholesale "to the colonies". In this sense the analogy with a canonical text such as *Hamlet* is itself very revealing (E. Hees, personal communication, June 25, 2007).

The present dissertation argues for flexibility and the development of the infant observation technique in an interdisciplinary way. There are several examples, both local and international, of informal "urban anthropology" projects that use visual means such as photography. Broadly speaking, such photographic essays, which are art, can also be seen as a kind of visual anthropology. They are often photographs of the ordinary, local or mundane. Yet they provide a deeper engagement with and understanding of what is being seen. There are interesting parallels between these photographic projects and the possible study of poverty, culture and race by means of infant

observation in South Africa. For example, in his book *Jo'burg*, photographer Guy Tillim spent several months, in the city's oldest block of flats, documenting life in the area of Joubert Park: "He rented a flat on Plein Street and moved into a place where most white people only end up if they get lost while driving through the city" (Hogg, 2005, p. 1). He observed prime areas that had become more like ghettos, inhabited by people whose only option was to live close to their employment. Tillim said that in entering these ghettos "there were a couple of scary moments, but nothing to write home about" (Hogg, 2005, p. 2). Hogg (2005) described Tillim meeting a tenant who showed him around so that he could tell people what he wanted to do:

The response was varied, with many dead ends, and he was often turned away. Some accepted his motives, others wanted an opinion of their lot. It took time and it took patience. His approach was low-key. He used a camera on a tripod, with a bit of distance, in gloomy enclaves and, at times, over a shared quart of beer, which resulted in this gently photographed essay of living on edge in the city. (p. 1)

Tillim said that some might regard his approach as intrusive, but "considering the hardships these people suffer, a wandering photographer is a benign interloper" (Hogg, 2005, p. 1). These were photographs of the ordinary, and Tillim purposefully avoided waiting for "iconic moments" or obvious ways of looking at people in poverty, instead letting "the environment speak for itself" (Hogg, 2005, pp. 1-2) Hogg (2005) noted that Tillim's aim was not do a portrait of the whole city, but to narrow the focus. Hogg (2005) pointed out that, while the *Jo'burg* photographs at times appear simple, the issues and solutions are not. Tillim held that his project helped to expand visual vocabulary - that we have become more articulate as image-makers. At the same time, viewers have also become more articulate. The project was described as "looking towards the inner city and coming out with a book" (Hogg, 2005, p. 3). The book was modest in size, but unusual in form - large foldout images, with what little text there was, at the back, and with thumbnails and captions:

It opens with a view of a darkly clouded skyline, looking towards Hillbrow, showing rooftops and the facades of buildings, then ventures inside to show that there are indeed people living there. Living in the most dire conditions, but allowing Tillim in to view and record...Tillim's approach to his subjects and their acceptance of him is evident, with pictures showing people in bed, their hopes, dreams and memories pasted erratically on the walls. Shebeen scenes, a card game, nothing raucous, just ordinary people waiting for a bit of certainty in life. (Hogg, 2005, pp. 2-3)

As in any new development, a South African infant observer who embraces previously neglected aspects of her observation may be called upon, like Tillim, to use creative ways of conveying her and others' experience.

4.5 Conclusion and key terms

Psychoanalysis offers a deeper way of considering ethnographic data, because of its ability to interpret the unconscious. By contrast, anthropological observations have been described by some as by their very nature rather atheoretical. The argument here has not been for an ethnographic lens instead of a psychoanalytic one, or vice versa, but for the enrichment of the one by the other. A postmodern psychoanalysis better equips us to investigate the relational aspects of any ethnographic study, using the tool of the unconscious. On the other hand, postmodern ethnography increases our tools for thinking about power in the anthropological space. It also lends a spirit of innovation, creativity and possibility.

In overview, contemporary ethnography has thoroughly operationalised postmodern ideas. It has grappled with the issue of subjectivity, and how that shapes what and how we write about "culture". Culture has been unmasked as a construction from a particular perspective. The concept of thick description urges us to think about observed behaviour as linked to a particular context, and to think about what meaning behaviour might have for the participant, rather than for the ethnographer who is describing what she sees from an outsider's position. This seems an important dictum when one sets out to assess needs in a community in order to empower. It has been shown that it is vital to consider power dynamics in community work, and postmodern ethnographers have done this in their contact with unknown communities. Concerns with practitioner reflexivity and subjectivity in postmodern ethnography also dovetail with the intersubjective focus delineated in Chapter Two. The postmodern ethnographic paradigm creates a platform from which I will critique the traditional practice of infant observation, which has not always engaged with these salient issues (see Chapter Five).

Ethnographic research has many tools, some of which have been subsumed into the practice of community psychology, such as fieldwork, participant observation and the single case study. A further area of overlap is psychoanalysis's extensive use of the single case study. These methods will be discussed as relevant ethnographic and psychoanalytic contributions to the methods of the present study in Chapter Six.

CHAPTER FIVE: Psychoanalytic infant observation

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter infant observation will be considered in terms of its history, basic tenets and new developments, including the role it has played in South Africa to date. The goal is to consider how it has developed since its inception, but also to argue that as a method it possesses potential that could still be developed further for use in new South African contexts. Any theory opens some aspects up and limits others. Reid (1997a) referred to the "limitless source of ideas" that infant observation provides (p. x). Its drawbacks could be said to have arisen out of its origins. In this chapter there will be an emphasis both on the potential of infant observation as well as a social constructionist critique of infant observation theory and practice.

The very rich literature on infant observation spans more than 40 years. Two traditions can be discerned in this field to date. The first most formal concept of the procedure came out of the Tavistock Clinic and was devised as a training tool. A review of this literature reveals published accounts that are full of detailed descriptions of mother and infant behaviour. The potential to describe wider phenomena in new kinds of contexts has not been fulfilled, however, because historically this form of infant observation focused on training. I will argue that the more classical model in fact blinds us to certain important issues, such as how power and subjectivity operate in observation. More recently, there have been some new developments in the field that are about using observation in more active, participatory ways. These developments suggest that infant observation has the potential to a) contribute a felt experience of a community's difficulties; b) reveal more about community needs; c) make conscious that which is unknown, unspoken, unexpected, or hidden, and that cannot be planned for or anticipated in community work; and d) provide cultural information.

While it has at times been likened to ethnographic study, infant observation has not explicitly been used to date to find out more about a group of people in an ethnographic sense. It will be shown here that infant observation has recently begun to focus tentatively on the social world, at times moving away from the dyad. This development can be extended. My argument is that a dialectic between psychodynamic community psychology, postmodern ethnography and psychoanalytic infant observation can lead to a deeper consideration of culture, poverty and difference in South African community work. This chapter presents the core of my argument and therefore I have tried to be comprehensive in my discussion of the literature.

5.2 A concise history of infant observation

There has been a volume devoted entirely to exploring observation in history and literature in *The International Journal of Infant Observation and its Applications* [(6)3; 2002]. Piontelli (1992) noted that Darwin published the first careful observation of an infant (his son, Doddy) in 1877, and Preyer, who initiated foetal studies, conducted a study on his son in 1882. Initially, then, infant observation was pursued as a way of gaining knowledge about humans. Observational accounts of children have done much for the growth of psychoanalysis. Conversely, it can be said that an observational stance by early analysts led to the development of more formal infant observation

practice. Freud (1920) observed his grandson playing (the "fort-da" game) and produced accounts of children's behaviour such as that of Little Hans (1909). Klein's observation of her own and other people's children (see, for example, 1932, 1952) are thought to have led to her revolutionary amplifications of psychoanalytic theory, and brought the woman's dimension into psychoanalytic theory and practice (L. Miller et al., 1997). In 1941 Winnicott noted that he had been observing infants in his clinic for twenty years. His *Piggle* (1977) recorded the psychoanalytic treatment of a little girl in narrative form, including dialogue. These theorists made careful records of how particular children behaved in case studies in order to advance both the theory and practice of psychoanalysis.

5.2.1 Traditional infant observation

The Tavistock Clinic pioneered the practice of infant observation when the child analyst Esther Bick first formally introduced it in 1948 as part of the training course she developed for child psychotherapists in the post-war period (A. Briggs, 2002; S. Miller, 1997). Later Martha Harris, her student, carried on Bick's work in the field of observation and also became one of its leading proponents (Covington, 1991). In the development of the most traditional form of the infant observation procedure, we can see two parallel concerns, namely an interest in studying infants and a concomitant interest in doing this in order to train psychoanalysts. Bick (1964) originally described infant observation as a way to help students "conceive vividly the infantile experience of their child patients" (p. 558). Recognition of infant mental functioning was central to this. S. Miller (1997) pointed out that Bick was influenced by Klein's view that object relations and an inner world begin from birth, that babies have greater capacities than originally thought, and that early infancy is crucial to later development. Klein supervised Bick's first child case and was also her analyst (A. Briggs, 2002). We can detect here a strong theoretical basis for Bick's idea that the infant is interesting to observe. In Bick's account we can see a desire to increase students' knowledge of how infants operate; she referred to the observation as a chance for students to gain "some practical experience of infants" (1964, p. 558). Bick (1964) stated that observation was meant to increase students' understanding of non-verbal behaviour and play, and of the mother's account of the child's history. The development of the child in the home was observed in relation to the family, as a learning experience, and compared to observations in other families via seminar groups. In this way individual differences, also in infant and parent temperament, could be noted (Harris, 1976).

This emphasis on training represents a shift from the research perspective pursued outside the Tavistock before 1948. Authors who described Bick's innovation as a way of learning something about the infant all made it clear that from the first she tied this kind of knowledge explicitly to the purpose of training (S. Miller, 1997; Reid, 1997a). Infant observation, Bick (1964) stated clearly, was "planned as an adjunct to the teaching of psychoanalysis and child therapy, rather than as a research instrument" (p. 558). Piontelli, who was supervised by Bick between 1975 and 1982, remembered that "research was not her main concern" (A. Briggs & Piontelli, 2006, p. 201). Hence the focus was from the first on increasing the understanding of clinicians who would be working with children. Later the method was also used in the training of adult psychotherapists (L. Miller et al., 1989; S. Miller, 1997). This represents a third shift, albeit a subtle one. S. Miller (1997) held that adult therapists could better understand the "child in the adult" when they studied infant observation (p. 166). Implicit here is the idea that the focus is not

so much on increasing one's knowledge of infantile life, but of recognising and learning to bear (in the sense of tolerate) infantile states in adult clients. Harris (1976) made explicit links about this in a way that Bick did not. Eventually, infant observation became a way of assisting in the development of an analytic attitude more generally (Covington, 1991). Bick (1964) had paved the way by pointing out that, in conjunction with clinical experience, infant observation could convince students "of the importance of observing patients' overall behaviour as part of the data of the analytic situation" (p. 566). Later, young child observation was introduced, in which a child between the ages of 2 and 5 is observed, either in the family or in day care (Fawcett, 1996; L. Miller et al., 1997). It was felt that there were particular developmental achievements (such as separating from parents and acquiring language) that would be of interest to observers.

In overview, infant observation has always been thought of as a useful method for learning about infants, but it explicitly became a tool for training, first for child therapists and then for all psychotherapists, in the 1940s. Below, the basic tenets of the classical Tavistock infant observation module will be described. Bick's most stringent recommendations will be noted, as well as the way in which there have been slight shifts in the more recent practice of observation. However, at the Tavistock and other psychoanalytic institutions, infant observation for training purposes is still based on Bick's model. Thus this procedure forms a kind of "gold standard" or "classical" form of infant observation (S. Miller, 1997, p. 165) with which more radical recent developments and applications in the field can be compared.

5.2.1.1 The "classical" Tavistock procedure: A description

5.2.1.1.1 The observations

Bick's (1964) original paper describing the method of psychoanalytic infant observation noted that it had in fact been refined over some years. As she described it, students are asked to make arrangements to visit a family in their home once a week up to about the end of the second year of the child's life, each observation normally lasting about an hour. Bick (1964) noted that some training observations end after the first year. Students leave their offices in a form of fieldwork, and Bick has been called a "naturalist" as a result (Waddell, 2006, p. 1105). Possibly through trial and error, it was thought best to give a simple explanation of the observation's purpose to parents; something such as the observer wanting to have some direct experience of babies as part of her professional development (Bick, 1964). Note-taking during sessions was dispensed with, as it was felt to interfere with the observer's free-floating attention and, interestingly, "prevented the student from responding easily to the emotional demands of the mother" (Bick, 1964, p. 558). By this was meant that the student had to be able to register the emotions (or the internal states) arising during the observation (Piontelli, 1992). From Bick's comment it also seems that from the first there was some recognition of the potentially beneficial effect of infant observation on participants, and implicitly that this could create quite a challenging situation for the observer.

The observer's attention in the classical form of infant observation is focused primarily on the infant within the nursing dyad. M.J. Rustin (1989) noted that "the intention is in the first instance to study the interaction of mother and baby as a whole, around the normal occasions and circumstances in which it occurs" (p. 54). The natural

setting is felt to be important: "Mothers are encouraged to make as little adaptation to their routine as possible...The observations seek to follow the natural development of an infant over time, and in its normal domestic surroundings" (M.J. Rustin, 1989, pp. 53-54). Observers record afterwards, in as much detail as possible and as soon after the observation as they can, what they have observed (M.E. Rustin, 1989). Recent authors from the Tavistock added that, as far as possible, the hourly visits are on the same day every week (Henry, 1984) and at the same time of day (Reid, 1997b). The regularity of the meeting time and the predictable framework are meant to convey respect for the family unit; the observer tries to behave in a considerate and thought-through way (M.E. Rustin, 1989). This is not an attempt to simulate clinical conditions (M.E. Rustin, 1989), but the parallel with a psychoanalytic framework does exist, and is certainly partly responsible for the way in which this procedure can potentially create a containing environment.

The role of the observer, Bick (1964) noted, initially had to be given much thought; in fact this was described as a "central problem" (p. 558). Being in the home with a new baby was bound, Bick (1964) noted, to have an intense emotional impact, intensified by projections from members of the family. Here the difficult question of objectivity/subjectivity in observation procedures is seen to arise for the first time in a written account. Bick (1964) claimed that the observer had to straddle a delicate divide: she needed to feel sufficiently inside the family to experience its emotional impact, but not committed to act out roles thrust upon her, such as giving advice or registering approval or disapproval. Being basically "helpful" as situations arose (holding the baby, bringing a gift) was not excluded. "In other words," she said, "he (*sic*) would be a privileged and therefore grateful participant observer" (Bick, 1964, p. 558). This is the first time the concept of participant observation was used in the infant observation literature. In order to observe, Bick (1964) held that the observer had to, and indeed that it was possible to, "attain detachment from what is going on" (p. 559). While the observer was clearly not uninvolved, getting *too* involved could result in the tensions of the situation "dominating" and "invading" the observer, especially in situations where childcare was inadequate (Bick, 1964, p. 559). Ultimately, it was stated that the goal of observations was to be more "objective" than familial accounts of an infant might be (Bick, 1964, p. 559).

Closely linked to this issue of role, Bick (1964) introduced the issue of the observer's personhood, noting that her conscious and unconscious attitudes were also problematic. The observer was bound to have her own "internal conflicts" (Bick, 1964, p. 559). The pervasive impact of her own personality, positioning and history were not overtly considered, however. Bick (1964) recommended that the observer "find a position that will introduce as little distortion as possible into what is going on in the family" (p. 559). In other words, she suggested that the observer could guard against affecting the family too much, and changing what was being observed. It was recommended that the observer resist actively establishing her own personality as a new addition to the family organisation. Rather, it was felt that the parents, particularly the mother, needed to find her own way to fit the observer into the household in some way. Twenty years later Henry (1984), also writing from the Tavistock, framed the subjective element in infant observation as an "unavoidable interference" which needed to be minimised (pp. 155-156). M.J. Rustin (1989), writing more recently from the Tavistock, conceded that the presence of the observer had to have some significance for the family; she could not be ignored altogether. He emphasised, however, that feelings evoked in the family by the observer only become a feature in some, and not all, observation

accounts. A perusal of the literature shows that the strength of responses to the observer can vary, depending on the needs, defensive style and emotional make-up of the family.

Ideally the observer, after initially being unknown to the family, meets both parents before the baby is born (Reid, 1997b). The family is found through an intermediary agent or network such as a general practitioner, gynaecologist or health visitor (Henry, 1984). In this sense random assignation of the family occurs, in that the observer does not interview or choose subjects. The intermediary in effect proposes them, and the first family that agrees to the observation participates. In this there is an element of self-selection (M.J. Rustin, 1989). A telephone call and visit from the observer normally follows. At this point some families change their minds. In fact, the observation process is more or less constantly under threat, because it relies on the willingness of the parent/s to continue with the contact. Some parents want feedback or to read the observation reports, which is discouraged. Sidoli (1983) recommended actively assessing the family's emotional stability and reliability (cited in Gering, 1994). In this way a degree of selection by the observer also occurs. Generally, there is an emphasis on observing an "ordinary child in an ordinary setting" (Youell, 1999). Infant observers look for "normal" families to observe (Covington, 1991, p. 74), for training and ethical reasons (M.J. Rustin, 1997). This concept will be problematised in my discussion. Henry (1984) used the unfortunate phrase "an observable baby" (p. 29). M.J. Rustin noted that, "while observers and seminar groups are aware of the potentially catastrophic effects on the development of infants of gross failure in early relationships, these are not usually major concerns in the observation of normal families" (M.J. Rustin, 1989, p. 60). Single-parent families or "families that show a high degree of disturbance" are not usually chosen on the grounds that it would place too great a strain on the observer and the viability of conducting an observation (Covington, 1991, p. 74). For this reason infant observation has traditionally avoided extreme situations of poverty and the potential relationship failures associated with this.

Infant observation, like all psychoanalytic technique, considers unconscious communication to be central. "In silence, with no recourse to challenge or question", the observer becomes a reservoir which absorbs a multiplicity of projections (Winship, 2000, p. 554). In other words, projective processes are thought to be as prevalent in an observation setting as in a clinical one. The observer is, however, less of a presence than in a therapy process, because she cannot use interpretation to work with projections (M.E. Rustin, 1989). In psychoanalytic thinking, processes such as projective identification are generally thought to mediate understanding and communication rather than to impede it (Winship, 2000). In the same vein, because psychoanalytic observation methods are closely related to, and have been developed from, the clinical method of psychoanalysis, "the central tool is an intimate, one-to-one personal contact whose transactions are subjected to self-reflective thought of as meticulous a nature as possible" (M.J. Rustin, 1989, p. 54).

The centrality of empathy and emotion in the infant observation technique is repeatedly asserted in recent texts (see, for example, A. Briggs, 2002; Layou-Lignos, 1997; L. Miller et al., 1989, Piontelli, 1992). M.J. Rustin (1989) held that "the primary contribution of psychoanalytic observation to the understanding of children lies in its sensitivity to (the emotional) dimension of experience, on which so much else depends" (p. 75). Therefore the subjective experience of the observer is thought to be a tool for considering what is being seen more deeply. However, Piontelli remembered that in the most traditional version of the model, counter-transference phenomena

203) - in other words, observable events. M.J. Rustin (1989) held that we are able to make and record observations in "everyday language, close to the immediate realities of the situation" (p. 52). Theoretical interpretations and categories are to be kept out of the reports: "Making and writing up observations is separated as far as possible from the later consideration of how they might be interpreted in more abstract terms" (M.J. Rustin, 1989, p. 52). In this way, it was felt that "the experience and evidence" could be made "directly available" to the supervisory seminar in which the observations are discussed (M.J. Rustin, 1989, p. 52).

M.J. Rustin (1989) held that the most useful reports are those that provide accounts of the baby's activity, records of conversation, and other transactions in the home. Observation reports do not focus in a central way on family or community dynamics unrelated to the baby, or on the personhood of the observer: "Inferences, speculations, and [students'] own personal reactions usually are not part of the recorded material" (M.E. Rustin, 1989, p. 7). Because of the injunction to observe the baby, traditional infant observation accounts do not dwell on details of physical, social, political and economic context. Even so, M.E. Rustin recently suggested that such perceptions must implicitly be a part of every observation undertaken (M.E. Rustin, personal communication, February 7, 2007).

Bick apparently insisted on very detailed, verbatim written observations for newly qualified or experienced colleagues alike (A. Briggs, 2002). The accounts that result typically constitute very rich material. The observer's interest in the minute details of physical movements, which is noticeable in many reports, is due to the holistic view of the links between mental and physical development from an early age (M.E. Rustin, 1989). Subtle and delicate representations of emotional and mental states can result (M.E. Rustin, 1989). Apparently Bick paid great attention to moment-to-moment interactions and sequences; "in this sense she wanted an analytic session or an infant observation to be photographed carefully" (A. Briggs & Piontelli, 2006, p. 201).

The fact that notes are taken after observations is felt to avoid interfering with the spontaneity of the interchanges (Piontelli, 1992). Reid (1997b) pointed out that the delayed making of notes parallels psychoanalytic technique. Referring to young child observation, Brenner (1992) spoke of recording the observations in writing as an opportunity for the observer and the child to have "a private visit" which enables the deepening of their ongoing relationship (quoted in Adamo & Magagna, 1998).

Although the practice and expansion of infant observation has produced "thousands" of observations (Reid, 1997b, p. 8), reports have not traditionally been used for any purpose other than consideration in seminars, inclusion in students' essays on their observations and, on occasion, publication.

5.2.1.1.3 The seminars

All infant observers meet weekly, mostly for an hour and a half, for mandatory group supervision. The seminars run concomitantly with the entire observation process. The origins of these seminars were in Bick's classes at the Tavistock. A group format is preferred for reasons of comparison between observations. Typically, the seminar comprises about five members and a seminar leader (S. Miller, 1997). Students in the seminar group take turns to present their most recent observation, by reading it out aloud. Photocopies of the report are distributed so that

everyone can read along. Discussion, led by the seminar leader, follows. M.E. Rustin (1989) stated that the seminars explore, on the basis of the available evidence, the emotional events between infant and mother and the other members of the family present during observations. The aim is "to describe the development of the relationship between infant and others, including the observer" (M.E. Rustin, 1989, p. 7).

The presented observations are looked at closely to generate thoughts and ideas, and to take note of themes, such as infantile reactions to changes, separations and loss (M.E. Rustin, 1989). The observation seminar thus provides a space in which reflection on the material can occur over time. This longitudinal view is thought to test tentative hypotheses about how the infant's internal world and characteristic way of being in the external world are developing. If the observer's function is to record factual information about what occurred in a time sequence, then the seminar's task is to "support the free associations, ruminations and speculations of the observer and seminar members, to see what other dimensions remain to be discovered" (Reid, 1997b, p. 4). In other words, the more "unconscious aspects of behavior and patterns of communication" are entertained in seminars (M.E. Rustin, 1989, p. 7).

Like the reports, the seminars are thought to deepen reflective practice in the training student. Adamo and Magagna (1998) held that the seminar "provides the observer with a private space which enables her to fulfil the dual task of observing the child's interactions with the family as well as understanding the depth and complexity of unconscious processes elicited in her" (p. 22). In other words, this is a space in which the observer's subjective responses can be examined more fully and explanations for it found. Nowadays, difficult and confusing emotions arising out of observations are reflected on and processed so that they can be used as additional data (Canham, McFadyen & Youell, 1997). This also helps to contain anxieties that are often evoked in the observation process. In other words, a well-functioning seminar group may act as a "container" for the observer's experiences (Shuttleworth, 1989, quoted in McFadyen, 1991, p. 13). For example, the seminar can help the observer to negotiate difficult events in the observations, such as when there is a great deal of projection from the mother (Adamo & Magagna, 1998). The seminar can help the observer to "make her voice heard, even in the absence of an interpretative function and to find a way of responding to what [is] being communicated to her" (Adamo & Magagna, 1998, p. 22).

The seminar group provides ethical support in that peer consultation ensures protection for the observed family (S. Miller, 1997). Because several different babies are being discussed in turn, cultural and other differences between families could theoretically be highlighted (King, 2002). More latterly, it has been noted that the development of and dynamics in the seminar group can parallel that of the infant observation process itself (Emanuel, 1997; Sternberg, 1998; Wittenberg, 1997). Like any group, it has a nature and task that needs to be defined over time (Bion, 1961). Yet it should be noted that in the most traditional form of observation, such group counter-transference effects were not focused on.

Bick's approach in seminar was intuitive and introspective, to the point that "her conclusions appeared as groundless, hanging by mid-air by threads of conviction" (Meltzer, 2002, p. xvi). A student who was in her class noted that Bick would savour what she heard, visibly think about it, and give her opinion in very carefully chosen, vivid words (A. Briggs, 2002, p. xxviii). Typically, she would interrupt the observer who was reading her report

represents the therapeutic application of "pure" infant observation in such fields as child psychiatry. Here, there are no adjustments or additions to the method. Observation occurs and is not discussed with parents. This is exciting work that suggests that any observation, when thoughtfully conducted, could be beneficial, even if its main purpose is research.

This has led to the development of the concept of "therapeutic infant observation" (Reid, 1997b, p. 11). It has been noted that consistent sympathetic observations can assist in situations where there are particular difficulties, for example, in separating (Maiello, 1997). In the latter case, the dyad was able to use the containing function of the experience of being thought about to make its own attempts at separation. Morra (1998) observed children in a nursery school with serious feeding difficulties and, while she did not set out to fulfil a participant role, she thought that her presence had a facilitating function in helping the children struggle with their conflicts and in one case temporarily overcome them.

Where observation is used with the active intention of producing benefit, it is also referred to as participant observation. These observation subjects are known to be in need or at risk before the observation process begins. Participant observations in a Russian orphanage (Bardyshevsky, 1998) showed that thoughtful attention permitted the child to progress, to the extent that autistic features receded. In this way, it could be said that autism was treated with relationship. Tarsoly (1998) observed in a Hungarian orphanage but noted that the limited length of observation "meant no marked improvement was brought about in the babies" (p. 3). At times, after a difficult classical observation process in which the mother seemed to have difficulties relating to the baby, the question has been posed whether a "participant therapeutic observation" might have been more helpful (S. Miller, 1998, p. 17).

Lazar, Roepke and Ermann (1998) referred to their study of premature infants in the specialist unit of a hospital as "a project in participant observational research into prematurity" (p. 22). They used counter-transference experience to understand and convey the world of premature babies. These were such unusual observations of unusual subjects that they were called "proto-observations" (1998, p. 22) and there was some resistance to the idea at first. For example, Lazar et al. (1998) were criticised for breaking the "cardinal rule" of observing both mother and baby from the start (p. 36). Their experience was also quite different from normal infant observation. It was said that nothing could be taken for granted - for example, breathing was a physical cataclysm in the infant, which resonated emotionally in the observer. The observer noted an inability to write notes from memory until the baby had reached a certain level of viability, relating to survival. Mendelsohn (2005), who supervised my first observation at the Tavistock in 2001, similarly worked in a hospital setting in London, where she observed premature neonates in intensive care. She found that her function was to provide an emotional connection to the premature baby's experience, facilitating its first attempts at communicating and participating in the world. In this sense, it could be argued that she indirectly served as a buffer and may have minimised the long-term effects of such early trauma. It is interesting to note that neonatal observations can be effective in this way even in the absence of parents. The possibility that this opens up is that observations could be therapeutic in situations where there are no parents.

The understanding gleaned from observations can also be fruitfully shared for therapeutic purposes. This can enhance caregivers' ability to give the baby what she needs, by sensitising them to the inner life of the infant, and

can also be immensely supportive. In this way, Tarsoly (1998) used her observations in a Hungarian orphanage to help carers build more meaningful relationships with the infants by acting and communicating more actively. This furthermore provided support for the carers. Infant observation processes can also be followed by feedback to parents. For example, Cardenal (1998) used infant observation for the treatment of clinically ill babies. She observed a baby at risk for retinal cancer. Her therapeutic objective was to contain the anxieties the parents could not bear thinking about. When these were addressed, there were remarkable transformations in the baby. An addition to the infant observation approach in this case was meetings with the parents for the purpose of discussing the observations and increasing their awareness of the baby's needs. This account showed that the observation of a child can be a way to help parents in ongoing distress, who might be defensive or despairing of other modes of intervention. It may provide a less threatening mode of intervention than advice-giving or even psychotherapy. These parents were able to transform or digest difficult feelings around the suffering of their baby. At the same time, the baby made progress.

Infant observation principles have also indirectly informed other more traditional psychotherapeutic encounters, either in terms of the practitioner's understanding, or technique. Carling (2003) used Piontelli's (1992) observations in utero (using ultrasound) as a way to understand a premature child client's difficulties at the age of 3 following birth trauma. Piontelli's (1992) vivid descriptions of observed life in utero helped the clinician to understand that the client had had his own consciousness through a forceps delivery and 6 weeks in a neonatal intensive care unit, and what the scale of the effect of this was on him. Observation principles have also been used to modify therapeutic technique in order to allow practitioners to work more innovatively with difficult clients: Pozzi (1999) created a modified psychotherapeutic technique in order to communicate emotionally with a 12-year-old boy diagnosed with Asperger's syndrome. She made the point that all analytic work is of course based on careful observation and awareness of the patient's behaviour, play and associations, and the therapist's emotional and mental state while receiving the patient's communication. In this case, where the child client spent long periods of his sessions without talking or playing at all, Pozzi verbalised her speculations and observations. The child rejected interpretations (made on the basis of observed material) but responded well to her thinking aloud and hypothetically linking something less structured, "such as a noise, a movement or a twitch, to which could be attributed many meanings" (1999, p. 1335). She found that this made a degree of contact with his infantile needs and lessened his sense of persecution. Pozzi (1999) also found this adapted technique useful in treating elective mutism. Alvarez (2004) similarly used a kind of observational receptiveness in her work with autism. In this way, infant observation provides a way to connect with more difficult or hard to reach clients, which is an important consideration when working with deprivation (Boston & Szur, 1983).

Infant observation principles have also been used to inform direct interventions with mothers and children. Murray (1997) cited Winnicott when she maintained that you cannot teach a mother to hold a baby, but a holding environment can facilitate parents' capacity to care for their infants. In an Under Fives centre in Virginia, Sorenson et al. (1997) sought to "expand parents' capacities for observation and reflection, helping them to bear their own and their children's anxieties long enough to work towards new and creative responses to the problems which trouble them" (p. 9). Ordinary, diverse problems were treated in a preventative way so that enduring relationship, behavioural and other developmental difficulties did not develop. Working in Oxford, Tucker (2006) described an

infant-led psychotherapy that invited the parents to become involved observers of, and responders to, their infant's play. The programme, called *Watch, Wait and Wonder*, allowed the child to initiate play activities and helped the mother find meaning in her infant's play - thus enabling change to come about in their relationship. Woodhead (2004) showed how the therapist's powers of observation were used to help a mother notice her little boy's communications to her regarding the loss of his father.

In 2003 Urwin showed that both the therapist's and the parents' "capacity to think rather than react when under pressure of anxiety" was particularly useful in an under-fours' counselling and parent support service run in a highly deprived and ethnically diverse neighbourhood in the United Kingdom (p. 391). The *Sure Start* programme was developed to promote developmental opportunities and parenting support, with the overall aim of eventually breaking cycles of deprivation and poverty. Reynolds (2003) similarly used applied infant observation in a therapeutic parent-infant group run from a community mental health agency in the United States. The *Mindful Parenting* programme aimed at enhancing reflective capacity in parents and infants, based on the premise that secure attachment is the foundation for adaptive infant mental health (Score, 2001, cited in Reynolds, 2003) and that the security of a child's attachment is predicated by the mother's capacity to reflect on her child's affective experience. Group members were primarily low to moderate risk.

Therefore it could be said that practitioners abroad have used infant observation in a variety of innovative ways to date to assist parents, caregivers and children, both by the actual practice of observing (and sometimes actively sharing an understanding), and by using observation principles to inform and structure interventions. It is noteworthy that the use of the counter-transference, which was initially minimised by Bick, has become an increasingly important tool in this endeavour.

5.4.2.4 Infant observation as research

There is a "valuable archive" of infant observation material from seminars, papers and dissertations (Emanuel, 1997, p. 166). Reid (1997b) has argued that there is a shortfall of research output compared to the amount of observation work carried out. In some ways, infant observation has failed to co-opt the research discipline of other academic courses. Psychoanalytic observation may seem to produce "non-scientific" conclusions because it is lacking in asepticity and is emotionally stirring (Piontelli, 1992). The question has arisen how to use it more formally for research purposes.

One of the most active and pragmatic contributors to this debate is M.J. Rustin, who taught me a module on the application of psychoanalytic theory at the Tavistock in 2001. It is interesting to note that he is a sociologist. M.J. Rustin (1989, 1997) discussed the drawback and benefits of the method for research, as well as making some suggestions about how to develop it. He noted that infant observation remains a naturalistic, open-ended approach and therefore foresaw an adaptation of the psychoanalytic method rather than an attempt to approximate laboratory conditions (M.J. Rustin, 1997). Because observations published from the Tavistock were produced as part of a training course in work with children, he argued, they were not designed for purpose of comparative study (M.J. Rustin, 1989). It is therefore not possible to make ambitious scientific claims for this material. The element of self-

selection that influences which mothers agree to be visited each week precludes any claim that families concerned are statistically representative of a larger population (M.J. Rustin, 1989). The network through which families are found provides a reasonable social range but the poorest sectors of the population will be left out - people who do not have access to general practitioners or gynaecologists, for example (M.J. Rustin, 1989). Observers, who are mostly middle class, tend to use sources close to them. Infant observation is an intensive process: much time and thinking is required and it also demands high levels of skill (Piontelli, 1989). Conditions cannot be pre-structured or controlled, and the observer's interests shift. Regular observation times provide a kind of sampling procedure since the same activities will be seen frequently (M.J. Rustin, 1989). The observation experience is not pre-coded or pre-sorted in any way (M.J. Rustin, 1989). Piontelli (1989) doubted whether it would ever be possible "with this type of research based on such detailed observations to gather numbers and figures comparable to those of medical or even psychological research" (p. 416). However, she felt that its detail and depth made up for its lack of breadth. M.J. Rustin (1989) held that

All that one can do to clarify and refine methodology in these conditions is to be as explicit and self-aware as possible about the point of view of observations, and about the ideas through which they are given meaning. Making available for scrutiny both literal observation reports, and the interpretive descriptions and commentaries constructed from them allows the procedure of interpretation to be as open to inspection as possible. The weekly frequency and two-year duration of these observations, and their firm technique, aiming for maximum consistency, and minimum obtrusiveness, are intended to provide the best conditions possible in the circumstances for disciplined thought. The facility for repeated observation at close intervals, and for joint reflection on findings, is by no means always achieved in social scientific field-studies, where situations may be too fluid and rapidly changing to be easily returned to in this way. (p. 61)

Infant observation is akin to psychoanalytical research in that it offers a slow and painstaking focus on a single individual (Piontelli, 1989). It is interested in thick description and not in causal correlations between variables (M.J. Rustin, 1997). In this sense, M.J. Rustin (1989) argued that it is a method well suited to discovery which can "take up whatever seems most important in [the] experience of the family" (p. 59). Case study methods such as this may be complementary to large-scale behavioural studies. The constant framework makes it possible to report variations in what is observed (M.J. Rustin, 1997). Reporting in untheorised language makes for ease of communication of findings. There is some independent measure of the accuracy of written records in discussion by the seminar and this also provides an opportunity to give repeated scrutiny to sequences of interaction.

Possible ways forward, M.J. Rustin (1989, 1997) suggested, include pre-selecting dyads sharing characteristics, undertaking concurrent and collaborative observations, and more standardised reporting formats. He also suggested more standardised data on social circumstances and follow-up later in childhood. He saw significant scope for greater codification and systematisation at the point of data analysis, such as rating procedures. Emanuel (1997) wondered whether using and describing infant observation reports in a more systematic way might lose the essential qualities. M.J. Rustin (1997) considered triangulating observations with assessments of the same infants made by laboratory-setting measures such as the Strange Situation Test (a tool for ascertaining attachment style).

In the same vein Winship (2001), also writing from the Tavistock, suggested that one way to supplement psychoanalytic infant observation was "a type of paradigm pluralism" (p. 254) such as the attachment theorists have used (drawing from ethology to develop standardised tests and measures). Like M.J. Rustin (1989, 1997), Winship (2000) suggested that we should process and draw inferences from observational material via a thematic analysis

that compares them to locate discernible patterns. He suggested the analysis of each on its own merits as a starting point. He advocated that the group forum of seminars could be structured more formally for research, in order to get collaborative data. Group members might be asked to read a report and make a note of their own responses to the data before discussion with the observer.

In 1997 Canham et al. attempted to rate a single infant observation in a pilot project. They worked as a sub-group of the Tavistock/University of East London Infant Observation Research Seminar, which aimed at discussing the possibilities of infant observation for research in an ongoing way. Canham et al. (1997) aimed at involving groups in looking at the same material to see what consensus might be achieved. In other words, they wanted to test the reliability of the judgements made about the content of the observational material by a number of different people. They worked both qualitatively, by designing a questionnaire for readers of the observation, and quantitatively, by producing a five-point rating scale. There was a high degree of agreement among respondents. They felt that this raised the level of confidence with which one might make useful predictions.

Barnett (2006), an anthropologist affiliated with the Tavistock, videoed the observation of a baby's development to show students who were unable to undertake their own observations (the *Sunday's Child* video series). She then went on to produce a series of videos about babies in Nepal, Finland and Western India in order to question "the rather mono-cultural theory we learned" (*Monday's, Tuesday's and Saturday's Child*) (Barnett, 2006, p. 182). Piontelli worked with immigrant populations such as gypsies and Nigerian prostitutes in Italy, working as a doctor and simultaneously studying behaviour using dialogue, photography and video (A. Briggs & Piontelli, 2006). She felt that her training in psychoanalysis and infant observation helped her to approach many people of different backgrounds.

The different kinds of knowledge produced by infant observation to date will be considered below. From a research perspective infant observation has primarily been interested in corroborating psychoanalytic theory and technique. Some exciting studies in the social realm have also been conducted.

5.4.2.4.1 Supporting theory

Beyond its initial training purpose, infant observation soon became a method of research for testing and formulating developmental theory (Covington, 1991). Some infant observation accounts are thus used as a way to provide legitimacy or proof for psychoanalytic theory, and much has been written about this possibility (see, for example, Covington, 1991; Seligman, 1993; Urban, 2003; Zuriff, 1992). While Seligman (1993) argued that observationally based and traditional views could be comfortably synthesised, Covington (1991) remained unconvinced about observation as a research tool, stating that infant observation does not provide supporting evidence, but merely evidence that corresponds with psychoanalytic theory: "In short, the findings reflect the method" (p. 69). While the effort to bring infant observation to bear on psychoanalytic knowledge has been criticised because of its speculative nature (Zuriff, 1992), Seligman (1993) pointed out that inferences about preverbal experience have always been used to establish fundamental psychoanalytic concepts (Freud's "fort-da"

vignette was seen as evidence for the repetition compulsion, for example). Observation has been a part of developing psychoanalytic theory from its inception.

Many theoretical papers have been produced and make up the bulk of infant observation literature. Specifically, infant observation has enhanced our understanding of the development of the mind and of early relationships, and has recorded and speculated about the emergence of early difficulties. In overview, one of the main themes is feeding difficulties (see, for example, S. Briggs, 1998; Magagna, 2002; Morra, 1998; Tarsoly, 1998), and in fact the first volume of the *International Journal of Infant Observation* dedicated to a specific theme chose this as a topic [1(3); 1998]. This is perhaps to be expected, considering the psychic importance of the breast and early feeding experiences in Kleinian thinking. Maternal depression and concomitant failures in containment comprise another dominant theme in the literature (Sorensen et al., 1997), as does the function of psychic skin, after Bick's (1968) seminal paper (Jackson & Nowers, 2002). Bick's (1968) paper, M.J. Rustin (1997) noted, is a classic example of a psychoanalytic discovery in infant observation. It relates an observable adaptation, namely of infantile pseudo-independence, to a deficit in mothering: Bick (1968) described how a "second skin" formation, manifesting either as a type of muscular shell or verbal muscularity, serves to hold the infant together in "transitory states of unintegration" (p. 486). Another common theme is failures in linking¹ (Alvarez, 2002), after Bion's (1967) work. One can thus see how published accounts use psychoanalytic concepts to orientate themselves, even though initially reports are said to be written free of theory.

A vast amount of observational data has been informally produced by infant observation accounts (M.J. Rustin, 1989, 1997). For example, as previous examples have shown, we have a better understanding of premature babies (Lazar et al., 1998), autistic children (Reid, 1997c), emotional deprivation in an orphanage (Tarsoly, 1998), and children's adjustment to school (Sorensen et al., 1997), among many other topics.

5.4.2.4.2 Fostering technique

Secondly, infant observation has been thought useful in supporting psychoanalytic technique, in other words, using increased knowledge about the worlds of infants in order to work more effectively in clinical settings, both with children and adults (Jacobson, 1993). Infant observation vignettes are often used to illuminate clinical moments: for example, "What for the infant was being cross, for the boy was being furious and humiliated, and for the man, furious, envious and doubly shamed" (Urban, 2003, p. 187).

The present study's aim was not, as is the case in many other recent infant observation accounts, to develop either psychotherapeutic practice or our knowledge of infants per se. Rather, it points out that other studies neglect broader contexts, and tries to use infant observation to engage and consider context in a new way. Otherwise, it will be argued, reified accounts of infant behaviour result. In this case, it is not so much a question of confirming psychoanalytic theory and practice with observationally based accounts (Seligman, 1993) as it is of asking what *else* infant observation would be able to tell us, if it were allowed to dwell more broadly on what is present in any observation.

¹ A defensive inability to convert raw data into meaningfully integrated experiences (Rycroft, 1995).

5.4.2.4.3 Exploring the social realm

Infant observation has much to offer research into the social realm, because it can be seen as an interactive method, with a focus on relationship and the internalisation of experience. Analysts have, to an extent, made forays into this realm in the observation of organisational dynamics and the study of the foetus in its first environment. However, it is social work practitioners who have chiefly used infant observation as a way to engage with the complexity of group processes in low-income and cross-cultural settings. This is perhaps unsurprising, considering that the nature of social work consistently brings the practitioner in contact with such settings. Infant observation in the social work field is in its early stages. The need to begin observing new kinds of subjects is advocated by social work practice and will be supported here. Some of the major contributions of infant observation to investigating the social realm will be considered below.

In analytic circles infant observation principles have been used to investigate organisations, often in order to facilitate their support, in turn, of the client body (see, for example, Hinshelwood & Skogstad, 2000). In Tarsoly's (1998) observation of babies in an orphanage it was shown that the infants taught the practitioner something about the organisation. Its structure was shown to undermine carers' intuition, capacity for reverie² and sense of initiative despite the well-intentioned thought that went into establishing routines. Training in organisational observation is offered at the Tavistock. It was shown in Chapter Three that South African community psychology has embraced these ideas in order to provide more containing and empowering consultative experiences when supporting organisations that work with children (K. Gibson, 2002b; Maw, 1996).

A second way in which observation has moved into the social realm is in the accounts produced by work discussion groups. As mentioned, these groups often try to make sense of tensions that arise in the workplace, such as between pupils and teachers or among staff members (S. Briggs & Ingall, 2005). Because the members are active participants in what they are observing, their accounts admit more readily to the subjectivity of the observer, who cannot be described as passive or neutral in this case. Such accounts also focus more on the relating between several members of a group. Work discussion groups could therefore be said to have resulted in observation accounts that are less about observing infants, and more about observing social and group processes.

There has never been an explicit drive to use infant observation as a way to discover what life is like in a very deprived and unknown community. In fact, in the previously mentioned Infant Observation Research Seminar at the Tavistock, seminar members decided that observing an infant in foster care as it made the transition to a new foster family constituted too sensitive a setting (Emanuel, 1997). Similarly, the suggestion to observe infants whose mothers are HIV positive was felt to be too fraught and so not viable either. Unfortunately, by marginalising subjects in need, what is also lost is the kind of information that could assist them by targeting their environment. For example, Kelly-Noel (1998) described the impact of observing in a neo-natal intensive care unit in the United States as leading to changes in the culture of infant care within neo-natal intensive care units. M.E. Rustin (1998)

² A concept used by Bion (1967) to describe the unstructured mental state of the mother that enables the infant to make sense of and tolerate states of anxiety (Reber, 1995; Rycroft, 1995).

noted that this was "a type of action research³ which seems to draw on the tradition of Infant Observation as an observation of the infant in its setting in a most fruitful way" (p. 4). An observation of an HIV positive mother in South Africa, for example, could assist in thinking about ways in which her environment needs to change, or be supported itself, in order to support her.

Below, contributions by leading innovators in the field of observation will be reviewed. What these authors have in common is that they all utilised observation as research. Secondly, they were all interested in the wider social milieu in different ways: from that which surrounds the infant, including situations that place the infant at risk, to that beyond the infants entirely. Thirdly, they all used slightly modified, applied versions of the "pure" infant observation procedure.

5.4.2.4.3.1 Piontelli

Piontelli (1992) pioneered a new field of observation, namely the observation of the unborn foetus by means of ultrasound. She linked this both with child observation (by observing the same children later) and psychoanalytic thinking. Piontelli's (1992) study is interesting because it adhered to research guidelines. It was submitted to an ethics committee, obtained informed consent, and mothers were told they were free to withdraw from the study at any point. There were no criteria for selection - the first mothers who were approached at the obstetric clinic and agreed to participate were selected. Of importance to the present study is the fact that Piontelli (1992) used a more systematic approach, and that the pre-birth observations necessarily meant more of a focus on what the baby "was being born into". As Piontelli put it, she knew more about the "material reality" of the individual pre-natal experience than in other observations (1992, p. 8). She recorded the parents' responses to the ultrasounds, and in this way one could say that there was substantial focus on the parents. Secondly, she used a very time-consuming, detailed, longitudinal study of individuals in order to say more about the link between intrauterine and infantile life. While her focus was on the mother-infant, her purpose was specifically investigative, in a very open-ended sense. She noted that she conducted the study with little idea of what she was looking for, and no idea of what she could expect to observe or find. Her previous, somewhat stereotyped vision of foetuses changed into one of increasing differentiation and personalisation. Therefore a further value of her study to the present one is that it demonstrated that infant observation can be used to investigate unknown territory, in an exploratory way that is not about testing hypotheses or confirming preconceptions.

Piontelli's fascinating twin studies (1989, 2002) considered the intrauterine environment as a place populated by a second person, with whom a relationship exists before birth. She also considered the impact of the "maternal fantasies, emotions and states of mind" on the foetuses (1989, p. 425) and how the capacity to live in the outside world could be correlated with their experience in the womb. In other words, she again gave due consideration to the impact of "intra-uterine environmental conditions" on the developing infant (1989, p. 416). This involved thinking about how sensations such as noises, sounds, pulsations and touch might influence the baby from early on. In summary, Piontelli explored the use of observation with previously neglected subjects, and considered them in a holistic way that took multiple levels of the environment into account.

³ An approach used in the community psychology paradigm as a way "to study things through changing them" (Banister et al., 1994, quoted in Willig, 1999, p. 6).

5.4.2.4.3.2 S. Briggs

S. Briggs (1996, 1997a, 1997b), who trained as a social worker, has been a pioneer in developing infant observation for research. His aim, as part of his PhD studies at the Tavistock, was to observe a small sample of infants at potential risk to see what this could tell us about the development of infants in such circumstances, and secondly, about the role of observation as a research tool (1996). He pre-selected a particular group to study (namely at-risk infants). Most broadly, it was difficulty with containment that S. Briggs conceptualised as constituting an "at-risk" situation for the infant. In each case parental response was less than optimal for different reasons. The sample came from a range of social class and cultural backgrounds, and thereby some cross-cultural study also resulted. Therefore S. Briggs's PhD can be seen as a precursor of the present study, which also sets out, on a smaller scale, to think about need more deeply, using psychoanalytic tools.

S. Briggs's comparative study is thought to be the most systematic and substantial research using the infant observation method that has been published to date (M.J. Rustin, 1997). S. Briggs simultaneously observed five infants from birth to two years, involving some 400 observations. His methodological work is summarised in *Growth and risk in infancy* (1997a). He assessed the nature of the fit between infant and mother, and the quality of the relationship in terms of "sensitivity, attentiveness, conflict, intimacy and understanding" (quoted in Trevarthen, 1998, p. 109). One of the areas of comparison he documented (1997b) was the mothers' capacity for reverie under stressful circumstances, and how infants responded to the quality of the parents' containment. Of importance to the present study is that in each case S. Briggs specifically documented the nature of the mother's external resources, professional support and relations with her partner, extended family and friends. Most of the mothers in S. Briggs's study "were isolated, undersupported and had a range of difficult experiences in their backgrounds which were very much alive in them at the time of the birth of the observed baby" (1998, p. 46).

S. Briggs's study problematised the use of infant observation in settings where there is risk of different sorts for the infant (1997a, 1997b). Of enormous importance is the fact that he thought about the role of the observer in these families. It seems that the pressure of the setting demanded this. S. Briggs noted that he found himself in "many difficult situations" as the observer (1998, p. 45). As discussed, many observation accounts highlight the family's appreciation of the observer, even in cross-cultural settings. By contrast, S. Briggs's work showed what kind of difficulties are encountered when the observer is a source of anxiety or reassurance, or presumed to be an expert on infancy, or the object of difficult unconscious dependency, for a particularly isolated parent (M.J. Rustin, 1989). These are issues that can arise when there are difficulties in the family, in situations of poverty, risk and unequal power relations, and in cross-cultural settings generally. By venturing into these more fraught settings, S. Briggs was able to engage with and uncover the complexity of the relationship to the observer in ways that infant observation literature had previously not done. M.J. Rustin (1997) noted, "taking full account of perceptions of and transference reactions to the observer seems a precondition of understanding these family situations" (p. 97). He added that this discovery paralleled the centrality of the transference in the clinical analytic situation. While this is true, phrasing it in this way somewhat minimises S. Briggs's important assertion that new settings may require new emphases and responses.

S. Briggs (1997a) showed that the subjectivity of the observer may become more important in such cases. His work led authors who had previously asserted that the observer could be neutral and passive to say "It is clear that in several of the families studied the relationship to the observer became a significant element in the observation, and needed to be considered as a fact in its own right" (M.J. Rustin, 1997, p. 96). S. Briggs studied the patterns of relationship between himself, the parents and the infant. He found that where there was risk, the containing function of observer became of paramount importance, and that he often ended up supporting a parent, as "parental container" (1997a, p. 212). Both the mothers and the children needed support and used him to get it. In other cases, his role developed along the lines of an "auxiliary parent" (S. Briggs, 1997b, p. 212), where he became more involved and interventionist in approach:

What made the task of analysis of the observer-observed relationship so difficult in this sample of infants is that the problems encountered...were so acute that, in the interests of concern for their welfare and development, I was obliged to adopt a more interventionist approach to observation than is traditionally assumed. The material generated by the observations of the infants in this sample of "at risk" infants illustrates the "containing" function performed by any observer in the task of "observing" an infant. (1997b, p. 208)

The siblings in one case (Hashmat) ganged up on the baby in the parents' absence and S. Briggs was forced at such times to actively intervene in order to physically protect either the observed baby or one of the younger siblings. The risk posed to the infant in this case was a physical threat by the siblings, who were under-supervised as the parental resources were stretched (they had nine children). He felt that "not to have responded in these ways would have been either unethical or dangerous" (1997b, p. 212). S. Briggs felt that a rigidly non-interventionist strategy within the group-style of parenting he encountered would also have been incomprehensible (1997b). His role of observer/parent figure had specific functions for the development of the baby, such as enabling Hashmat to share emotional states (especially in the second year). While the observer did not initiate interaction, a form of purposeful activity certainly emerged. I wondered what happened in the observation seminars S. Briggs attended, when all these new issues arose, only to discover that he had in fact had individual supervision for his infants at risk study (C. Urwin, personal communication, January 30, 2007).

S. Briggs used these very interesting observations to speculate about feeding difficulties (1998) as linked to the quality of containment received, and the function of the skin in psychosocial space (2002). In other words, he also used the observations for more traditional developments of psychoanalytic theory. He used Bick's (1968) seminal paper on psychic skin to suggest that her theory is an extremely important conceptual tool for thinking about observations in precarious or vulnerable social contexts. He also developed his own ideas about grip relations and flat, concave and convex parental relating (2002).

In summary, S. Briggs (1997a, 1997b) showed that divergences in his role as observer were a function of the child being at risk because of the mother being absent emotionally or physically, at least in part for social reasons, such as having many children. At times the cultural mode of parenting also played a role: shared parenting responsibilities led to sibling abuse, for example. He adjusted his role so that he could fulfil something for the child, but this was still in keeping with the traditional observational stance of a focus on the child's communications and emotional life. Poverty was implied, but not dealt with directly as a factor becoming part of internal life. The mother was still regarded as the most influential aspect of the environment. What is valuable to the present study is

isolation of these children in their accounts, thereby giving poignant insights into their worlds (Doyle, 2000). Organisations were observed specifically to contribute to child-protection training (Miles, 1999). Observation was used to show that a child was in considerable emotional need even though the abuse she had suffered had ostensibly been resolved some 6 years earlier (Mack, 1999). In 1999 S. Briggs and Canham pointed out that one of the functions of social work is to deal with the disturbed, the damaged and the distressed. They held that infant observation could assist the social worker to develop the capacity to tolerate the powerful emotional impact of this kind of work. It was shown that work discussion groups in which the details of interactions can be discussed, significantly support the work being done. Such discussion can give an appreciation in those involved in the work of its complexities and emotionally disturbing nature. The insinuation is that without a supervisory forum in which such thinking can occur, practitioners may not realise the weight of what they carry and inadequately digest it.

Covington (1991) commented that infant observation's emphasis on normality might in part be a response to the need to witness what is "good enough" (p. 74), in other words, that this might be a defensive process. Besides the huge anxieties generated in the observer by the experience of observing primitive emotional states (M.E. Rustin, 1989), S. Briggs and Canham (1999) noted that what one sees as a social worker goes beyond the "normal" pain of development. One sees the bleaker and more violent aspects of human nature, and in addition there are scarce resources to deal with it. S. Briggs and Canham (1999) also pointed to the difficulties of being able to see what is happening to children when what is happening is often abusive. They referred to a looking away that is compounded by a defensive organisational culture that has developed precisely in response to the painful nature of the work. They found that there is a general culture that serves to put a barrier between workers and children.

In the first book published on infant observation (Reid, 1997a) there is an important chapter focusing specifically on race, culture and context in infant observation (Ellis, 1997). It is interesting to note that Ellis began her career as a social worker and introduced child observation to social work training. She made the point that infant observation can be used, specifically by means of the seminar discussion, to understand how meaning is attributed to difference. Ellis (1997) observed a black baby born in Britain to West African parents. Both parents were professionals, but the family experienced serious financial difficulties when the father changed jobs and in fact had to move to a council flat in an area of considerable social deprivation, where racism existed. Thus the observation offered an opportunity to observe the effects of culture, racism and deprivation on the developing child. The seminar group often wondered about their own cultural assumptions and the observer admitted that it was hard for her to maintain a non-judgemental frame of mind. Fear of racism became an uncomfortable issue that paralysed the group at times. The child was seen to develop a strong capacity for survival despite a very absent mother who was struggling with her own dislocation. Ellis's (1997) account mentioned the difficulty of having all-white seminar groups and even acceded to power differentials impacting on consent to be observed. In her published account, however, the author again did not explicate the difficulties of relating cross-culturally to the mother.

By citing an observation by a student of a Nigerian family, S. Briggs (1999) showed the complexity of the interaction and the ambivalent feelings that arose. Two examples follow:

I started the observation with a variety of feelings: a sense of privilege (not to say relief) that I had found a family willing to be observed; and a vivid awareness of my own whiteness as well as social/class differences

anxieties, when being supervised by Bick, that if she "disrupted the peaceful community" of the group, she might end up being the "unwanted baby" (Sternberg, 2005, p. 101). Sternberg (1998) acknowledged that seminar leaders and group members might struggle to address certain aspects of the material. Despite this, it is interesting to note that comments about the "persecuting nature" of some seminar groups experienced by Tavistock staff and at the Institute of Psychoanalysis were made in discussion forums and via "personal communication", rather than in print (Sternberg, 2005, p. 103).

The issue of the impact on the observer, which is considerable even under favourable circumstances, potentially becomes even more important in settings where there are power differentials. I argue that this is an area that needs to be explored in greater depth. Infant observation accounts in at-risk situations, cited previously, have shown that the degree of involvement by the practitioner can of necessity vary. The intensity of the observer's experience can also increase under such circumstances. For example, I have discussed S. Briggs's extremely difficult observation process wherein Hashmat was tortured by his siblings in the absence of maternal watchfulness (1997a). Because the observer was often the only adult present, he had to intervene at times when there was a threat to life. Similarly, Adamo and Magagna (1998) documented a young child's search for a private space with the observer, physically separate from the intense intimate relationship with the mother together with her new baby. Transferential functions assigned to the father by the child were mediated through the observer. This emotional space provided a boundary around the primitive emotions experienced by the child, thus allowing the development of some capacity for self-observation and reflection. The observer had to shift from identifying with the child's infantile feelings to being available for the mother, "providing emotional space for her concerns and understanding of her anxieties" (Adamo & Magagna, 1998, p. 22). Here the observer performed the function of the father, becoming a support for the mother's relationship with the child. Thus there were strong convergent pressures from both the mother and child on the observer to fulfil some missing parental functions. The observer recognised that she could not be a father substitute but could and did respond, in her role as observer, in ways that provided for the child and mother a rescuing space, support and understanding:

In more favourable circumstances, the observer's role is an easier one. He (*sic*) is, so to speak, left comfortably sitting in his place, taking part, but only via his empathic attention, in the events which unfold. However this is not always the case. Sometimes the required cast is incomplete, some of the actors are missing and the observer is called more directly onto the stage. (Adamo & Magagna, 1998, p. 23)

At times the intensity of the relationship with the observer can affect the termination of the observation process. For example, in the above case the relationship with the observer had become extremely important for the young child, the mother, and other family members. There was a possibility that the child would act out destructively. "For this reason, it was felt that to keep rigidly to the pre-arranged conclusion of the observation after two years was inappropriate. A gradual weaning from the observer was therefore adopted" (Adamo & Magagna, 1998, p. 23). Monthly observations occurred for the subsequent year and sporadic visits and phone conversations after that.

Presumably infant observation would not be that popular or widespread if it were not generally felt to be a worthwhile experience. By this I mean that most observers find it sufficiently rewarding, enriching and educational, as well as not so uncomfortable as to terminate the process. Inherent in this are, of course, my own assumptions

that this represents a form of ethnographic investigation. In attempting to employ psychoanalytic infant observation as ethnographic community research, my study derived its methods from all three paradigms. These methods will be discussed in the next chapter.

framework for the discussion of the case material in the following two chapters. The findings will be reported in terms of the three goals stated at the outset of the study.

SECTION FOUR: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

CHAPTER SEVEN: Results

7.1 Introduction

The goal of the current dissertation was to explore the utility of infant observation as a tool for knowledge production about low-income communities. Specifically, the aims of the present study were to:

1. Provide a thick description of a single low-income mother-infant dyad (including their interaction);
2. Consider the potential contribution that such a description might make to a needs assessment process; and thus
3. Explore the utility of infant observation (a practice that is essentially informed by a theoretical framework constructed in Western contexts) as a tool for psychologists working in low-income communities in South Africa.

In my discussion of the results of my study in this chapter and the next, I will return to the secondary questions and operationalised goals as articulated in Chapter 6 by asking:

1. What did I find out about mothers and infants in poverty, using infant observation?
2. What was the impact of the observation process a) on myself as the observer? b) on the family?
3. Is infant observation a useful method for working in South African communities?

In order to answer these questions, the data will be presented as a case study and an evaluation in 6 parts over two chapters, namely:

1. A description of the participants and the setting;
2. An overview of the developments in the observation;
3. A description of the relationships in this context;
4. An analysis of the relationships in this context (discussion);
5. A summary of the findings of the case study (Chapter Eight);
6. An evaluation of the infant observation process (Chapter Eight).

This format came out of the analysis of the data, in which it became clear that context and relationship were central themes. I have chosen to focus on the mother in the analysis, and specifically on the relationship between the mother and myself as observer. The reasons for this are threefold. Theoretically, I consider the mother to be important. Practically, space for the discussion of the other figures is limited. But most importantly, the mother was a focal point in the observation process: personally, it was this relationship that felt the most compelling to me. Despite the prominence of my own subjectivity in the research process, this is not the focus of the dissertation. Therefore I will curtail the discussion of my own experience and explore it in detail in a separate paper.

In presenting the data I have become aware of the ways in which I have worked novelistically. Some of the concepts that guided my choices included "being kinder to the reader", "not giving the punchline away", "keeping

the through-line" and "maintaining the dramatic tension". A detailed consideration of the ways in which infant observation reports may similarly use language in order to manufacture a particular literary product is beyond the scope of the present dissertation and will be explored in a separate paper. However, it will be highlighted that much like any teller in a conversation, the observer "takes a listener into a past time or 'world' and recapitulates what happened then to make a point, often a moral one" (Riessman, 1993, p. 3). This is applicable to my retelling of the infant observation process here, now several steps removed by a multi-layered process of interpretation and representation.

7.1.1 A note about the extracts

As discussed in the previous chapter, the content presented here is the result of a close reading of several sources of written material, namely the observation reports, the notes taken in the infant observation seminars, my process reflections recorded at the time of the seminars, and the transcripts of the interviews with the parents. I have used coding procedures on all but the transcripts. It was my intention in the analysis to adhere as closely as possible to the written material produced during the observation process. As there is nothing else but data to prove the validity of my interpretations, it is necessary to quote the observation reports at some length. This is meant to give the reader access to the data (De Wet & Erasmus, 2005; M.J. Rustin, 1997; Katz, 1983). The 43 observation reports of themselves constitute a separate document 247 pages in length, which is also available for reading (cf. M.J. Rustin, 1997). The observations occurred over a period slightly longer than a calendar year, between December 2004 and January 2006. The first two pre-birth visits are marked as Observations 1 and 2; therefore Observation 3 is the first one at which the baby was present. In hindsight, I thought that it might be significant that I have chosen to mark the observations by numbers and dates, as opposed to indicating where in the observation process we were by citing the baby's age, which would be the case in an infant observation essay at the Tavistock. Although this was not a conscious decision, it suggests that what seems central in writing up this particular case study is not, as might be expected, only the baby, but more broadly the meaning of my connection with the family over 12 months.

Two further technical points:

As I was in two forms of supervision simultaneously, I will distinguish them by using separate terms. Here, "supervision" refers to the regular meetings I had with my thesis promoter ("Ms L" in the extracts, namely Professor Kruger)¹ and "seminars" refers to the weekly infant observation seminars I had with "Mrs K" over a year, either individually or (more often) in groups with other infant observers. As previously mentioned, a third kind of peer supervision was received via a monthly "research group" composed largely of doctoral students which was founded by my promoter, and of which I am a member.

Secondly, the extracts from the observations in many cases contain dialogue in Afrikaans. The interviews with the parents were also conducted in Afrikaans. The original language has been retained here in the observation extracts in order to remain faithful to the vernacular, but has also been translated in an English rendition, which follows it in brackets. However, the interviews have been translated in their entirety, in the interests of economy. Similarly, the

¹ Professor Kruger was originally given a pseudonym in the observation reports as part of the convention.

consent form and the three interview schedules (**Addenda C and E** respectively), which were originally in Afrikaans, have been translated. A professional translator did all translation work, after which I checked it. It will be noted in the observation extracts that I tried, at the time of their writing, to give some indication of the dialect used by participants; hence Afrikaans words are often spelt as they were used phonetically by the speaker. An example would be "babitjie" instead of "babatjie" (little baby). I also requested that the proofreader not alter the observation or interview extracts in any way, so that, apart from the translation, they appear here as they did in the original reports.

7.2 The cast of characters

In the following sections I will briefly describe the physical appearance as well as the typical mood and temperament of the participants in the observation, including myself. When I read the observation reports as a consecutive whole, it struck me that they formed a compelling story of events between people. Like a piece of theatre, there was a particular setting against which the action took place, there was conflict and a denouement of sorts. The people ("cast" or "characters") in this narrative had particular personalities, motivations and subtexts, discernible in subtle and complex ways. Relational developments occurred. There was also a sense in which all the people in the story were involved in presenting themselves to one another at different times, in a kind of performance (for example, the performance of observing and the performance of motherhood). In the reports words and images linked to the world of theatre even occurred occasionally, especially in early observations. One of the few dreams I had about the family also involved a theatre image:

There is a play on, a carnival atmosphere. The baby crawls into the lights; lots of family around. Oh, this is very pleasant I think - I will stay much longer. It is a show for me, for my benefit. They like me after all. (Journal entry, December 2005)

Citing Bakhtin, S. Swartz (2006a) noted that the concept of carnival captures the possibilities of "crowds and clowns; multiple messages and many voices...If the unconscious is carnival, then working with the unconscious is a kind of carnival too" (p. 435). Therefore I have chosen to present the observations as a "drama". I am not the first participant observer to describe the "dramatis personae" in a case study (see Whisson, 1990; Winship, 2001). Geertz's (1973) description of a passage from his "raw" fieldnotes as "this little drama" was meant to show, Greenblatt (1999) held, that "there is rather less observation and considerably more explication" in such notes than anthropologists generally admit to (p. 16). My use of the term hopes to point to the same. No doubt my experience as an actress also contributed to my choice to think about my participants and myself in a dramatic light. Centre stage is the mother and child, and other characters will be described more peripherally. I will start by describing the investigative team that set out to find this particular dyad. We formed a three-tiered system, resulting in two layers of containment around myself as the central observer. Because we lived in such segregated worlds, I will present the researchers and the participants in an "us and them" dichotomy. This frequent theme emerged in the coding of the observations.

7.2.1 The psychologists: Us

7.2.1.1 The observer: Jana Lazarus

I am tall, slender, pale, and have dark hair. Generally I prefer a harmonious environment in which there is not too much conflict. I am quite shy at times. I can be affronted when people do not treat me with some sensitivity and regard for my feelings. I do not readily enter debates with people unless I know them well and trust them. It is very rare for me to find a more public space where I feel safe enough to articulate my opinions freely without fear. I don't have a very thick skin. I tend to seek positive regard and acceptance in my close relationships. I am vigilant about abandonment as it has been a past theme in my life. My favourite kinds of interaction are those in which I feel very relaxed and as though I can be myself. I can be quite childlike, joyful and playful, and I like being funny. I prefer social situations that are light and humorous but where there is also a sense of closeness. At times I struggle to be assertive: I worry about forcing others to do things for my sake, against their own will. I would rather suffer by being more flexible and doing things I don't really want to, or missing out on things I do want. I have strong caretaking tendencies. I can get overly serious, internally persecuted and anxious, and dislike feeling like that: it makes me very stressed. I have a very strong work ethic. I function best when I actively put my wellbeing and pleasure first, although I sometimes suffer from guilt related to this.

I find that in my therapeutic work with clients I am able to overcome a lot of the aspects that hamper me in my personal life: I can be authoritative, assertive, convincing, conflictual, tolerate abandonment, meet and know my own anger in an appropriate way, and so on. I enjoy the depth of communication that happens in therapy. It is even tolerable for me not to be liked at all times. It is both a public and a private space, both intellectually challenging and emotionally engaging. I feel proud of the subtle and instinctual mode of my work. It is also nice when people get better. It is a kind of connection where the boundaries are very clear and that is important for me.

My experience with babies and children is limited to my work as a nanny to an infant in the first year of her life, as a therapist who sees children under 5 (among others), as well as to interaction with my nieces and nephews and the children of friends. Children seem to like me, perhaps because I enjoy playing with them.

In describing myself in this way, I am struck by how these "truths" about me are situational, and that I have many selves, some of which are quite contradictory to the information here, and some of which have been edited out. I am also aware of how my psychological understanding of myself shapes my discourse about myself.

7.2.1.2 Mrs K and the seminar group

I attended infant observation seminars with Mrs K, a clinical social worker and consultant child and adolescent psychotherapist, who is a member of the Tavistock Society of Psychotherapists and Allied Professionals (TSP). Mrs K was trained in infant observation procedures at the Tavistock by a teacher (Mirjana Renton) who herself had trained with Bick (M. Renton, personal communication, January 30, 2007). Mrs K would herself have needed to conduct at least one two-year observation in order to be able to teach. Mrs K is a member of the Cape Town

Society for Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy (CTSPP). She offered weekly infant observation seminars in Cape Town as one module in the Postgraduate Diploma in Therapeutic Communication with Children course accredited by the Tavistock. The module could also be taken as a stand-alone course for clinicians working with both children and adults. It was within the latter capacity that I joined. There were 6 members in our group. They were mostly clinical psychologists in private practice, working either with children or adults or both.

7.2.1.3 The research assistants and the promoter

Carol, James and my promoter (Ms L, in other words, Professor Kruger), together with another clinical psychologist (Sandy), formed the maternal mental health research group of which I was a member. All the members of the research group had worked in the community of Moretown and were familiar with it. All of them were also connected with the university. Sandy taught at the university and was employed as a therapist there. Ms L co-ordinated the MA programme in Clinical Psychology and Community Counselling and saw clients in a private capacity. Ms L, Carol and James were all directly connected with the university's WMHRP: Carol and James were employed as research assistants on the project, and Ms L had founded it. Sandy and Carol were both working towards submitting doctoral proposals linked to the WMHRP at the time, under Ms L's supervision. Therefore in total 6 people from the University supported me during the observation period.

At one point in the observation process, following a period in which I felt unsafe, a decision was taken in supervision that I should be accompanied to observations. This meant having someone drive into Moretown with me, who would then either wait in the car or be nearby, for example, at the local clinic. This solution was a temporary one that was soon refined, as I shall indicate below. There were several research assistants who actively entered the drama at this point. The people who accompanied me were James (the Psychology Honours graduate who also interviewed Piet), Carol (the clinical psychologist who interviewed Eve), Ms L (a clinical psychologist and my promoter), Frank (a Research Master's student) and Alice, a Psychology Honours student, who came with me most often in the 6-month period between May and October 2005.

7.2.2 The family: Them

In retrospect, our "camp" seems quite clearly defined: predominantly white, educated, middle-class, and female. We stood in sharp contrast to our observation subjects. Below, I will briefly give my general impression of each of the family members.

7.2.2.1 The mother: Eve Smit

Eve is short, with bad teeth and big eyes. She has spiky hair and caramel-coloured skin. She mostly wore trousers, T-shirts and sandals or tennis shoes during observations, and some kind of covering for her head like a scarf, stocking or woollen hat. Sometimes her hair was braided, highlighted, or in rollers. Her build was increasingly revealed to be quite slender as the observations progressed and she lost the weight related to bearing a child. Her nickname in the family is "Koekie" (Cookie, which in Afrikaans as in English has a sexual connotation).

Eve is not easily cowed: she has a degree of courage and a feisty or assertive quality. Generally, Eve seemed more easily to show displeasure, or a certain brusqueness, rather than tenderness. When she was around me she frowned so frequently that I identified this as a characteristic expression of hers. Eve could be quite withholding. I saw her in very limited interaction with people other than the baby. It was therefore difficult to know whether she behaved at all differently towards and around other people. However, there were indications that Eve could more generally be taciturn towards others as well. In Observation 37 I observed during a local welfare meeting:

Of course Eve gets asked [to introduce herself] first. Mrs B says, "Ek het jou sien inkom, en gesien dat jy bietjie af lyk vandag, maar ek is bly dat jy ten minste nou ook so bietjie glimlag!" ("I saw you come in, and saw that you looked a bit down today, but I am glad that you are at least smiling a bit too now!") A woman behind us says that this is just Eve's way. (Observation 37, November 2005)

It seems that Eve was quite isolated. I did, however, see her being friendly towards her close neighbours when she was at home, particularly towards the female back neighbour (Noelene), who lived in the same yard, also had a small child, and gave birth to a second near the end of the observation period:

As I enter the yard, I happen upon lots of activity: Eve is bending straight-legged over a bucket on the ground to my left, with a scrunched-up ball of wet washing in her hands. She is smiling and looking up as though in mid-interchange with someone. (Observation 8, March 2005)

Eve had a playful side to her and could be quite animated and teasing in her interactions:

A dark-skinned man with spiky, semi-dreadlocks comes around the corner and picks up a yellow plastic packet standing next to Eve's door. I greet him and he greets back, but he keeps his eyes down at the packet. Eve teasingly says, "En wat is nou daar in?" ("And what is in there?") and he replies as he leaves again, but I can't make it out. (Observation 10, March 2005)

She had a good sense of humour and I often heard her laughing in her characteristically guttural way. She also had a tendency to drift off in a rather dazed and vacant stare:

Then Eve vacantly watches TV without seeming to see what's on (it's a promotional show with a popular black actor about investing your money for your dreams). Eve's eyes glaze over and she stares out of the door, lost in thought. She does not seem aware of me at all in this moment. (Observation 5, February 2005)

[Eve] is staring out of the door and past me as though in a trance. (Observation 8, March 2005)

I observed Eve in some difficult situations in which she seemed resourceful and diplomatic while standing her ground. I thought I saw in Eve an ability to take things in her stride. She had, I felt, a cool head and a kind of resilience. She seemed able to speak her mind and did not seem a shy person. In summary, Eve had a sense of self-possession. I did not experience her as particularly warm or forthcoming, but rather as quite withholding. The possible reasons for this and the nuances of our interaction will be discussed later.

7.2.2.2 The baby: Maria Milla Smit

I saw Maria very regularly in the first year of her life, in which there were many changes in how she behaved and how she looked. I will sketch some of this progression as well as convey my sense of her as a developing

personality. I will make some comparison with recent Western (American) texts on infant development. Alice, Carol, Ms L and I found Maria a very beautiful child, with "slim ogies" (clever little eyes) (Observation 13, April 2005):

I see that she has a high forehead, plump, pear-shaped cheeks and full, pouty lips. (Observation 4, February 2005)

Maria increasingly looked like her father. She had a lot of dark hair from early on, which lay in soft curls on her head. She has long, dark eyelashes, a mole near her right ear, and a cute button nose. Her skin is darker than her mother's, especially on her arms and hands. Maria was always very well dressed when I went to observe her, in the sense of wearing what seemed to be her best or newest clothes. Yet sometimes the clothes were too big for her. She always looked better groomed than the rest of the family:

Maria is wearing a beautiful white cotton dress with little puff sleeves, a collar, and embroidered rosebuds on it. (Observation 8, March 2005)

Maria seemed to be a healthy child. During the observation period she had her vaccinations (at 4 weeks), which made her a bit grizzly, and a chesty cold, which her mother treated with paediatric syrup. She was also regularly and routinely fed gripe water (a carminative for babies containing alcohol), reportedly to help her sleep. Her most prominent physical symptom was eczema on her hands and feet. Her mother smeared a lotion on the itchy little bumps, which would form white peaks and weep when scratched, which Maria increasingly did, sometimes by rubbing her feet together.

At 23 days, when I saw her for the first time, Maria was asleep (Observation 3). She slept right through the observation hour at 4 and 6 weeks and at 3 months. Sleeping for several hours is considered normal for infants in the first 3 months (Lovejoy & Estridge, 1987). On a couple of occasions I even saw Maria sleeping on her stomach across her mother's knees. She seemed to fall asleep easily if rocked and patted quite vigorously, and especially if given the breast beforehand. From the first Eve commented that Maria was easy to settle after a bath and would generally sleep quite soundly for a predictable length of time. Her mother and a neighbour commented that she had a healthy appetite, and I also witnessed this. She was breastfed on demand and loved the breast, to the exclusion of bottles or dummies. She was given additional water and later some kind of milk (presumably formula) in a bottle, and was fed solids from very early on (9 weeks). Lovejoy and Estridge (1987) suggested, from a Western perspective, that solids are usually introduced into an infant's diet at 4 to 6 months of age. At the age of 1 year Maria was still being breastfed, but would also drink liquids from a cup when her mother was not available. Maria's great affection for "haar têtjie" (her breast) as it was called, was amusingly demonstrated to me when she was 6 months old:

"Hiers my têtjie, lekker têtjie..." ("Here's my booby, yummy booby...") Eve says, lifting her sweater and ducking her head in under it, towards her left breast. "Mwah-mwah-mwah!" Eve says, smacking her lips under the sweater, "Lekker têtjie!" ("Yummy booby!") Eve pops her head out again, still holding the material away from her body. Maria bends her knees, falling towards her mother's body, and grabs the neckline of the sweater. She puts her face in, so that only the top of her capped head is visible, and holds this position for several seconds, looking down inside the sweater. (Observation 21, July 2005)

Maria seemed to me to be quite a small baby at first. Despite this, my perception was that she had a surprising amount of strength from the beginning. In my early observations there are many references to her physical power. For example, at 23 days I observed:

Maria lets out a brief cry, then makes a burbling noise and seems to be smacking her lips or making sucking sounds. She lifts her head briefly, dropping it back on to the bed with some force. Then she sleeps again. (Observation 3, January 2005)

Weiten (2004) showed that 50% of infants can do this by 15 days, and 90% by a month; therefore Maria's motor development in this area was within normal limits in Western terms. However, Lovejoy and Estridge (1987) felt it was usual for infants to raise their heads only "slightly" at this age (p. 8). Maria seemed to grow stronger very quickly, as I observed at 8 weeks:

Maria is almost immediately restless, pulling her knees up under her so that her back forms a convex shape, and shuffling her head against the mattress. Then she forcefully lifts her head up; I am quite surprised by this increase in strength. She drops it again, turning to face me... She turns her head again so that she is lying on her face, and starts a mewling cry, while working her feet against the mattress and tossing her head. She is edging jerkily towards the wall with her head. She then freezes and lets out an energetic, elongated, calling cry, with a choking quality to it. It is surprisingly loud. (Observation 8, March 2005)

Lovejoy and Estridge (1987) noted that "undirected" movements are usual within the first 3 months. Here, at 8 weeks, Maria seemed to be actively moving in search of something (presumably her mother, or the breast) and then stopping to vocalise when the movement did not yield what she wanted. From early on, Maria had a characteristic robust physicality. She seemed to enjoy discovering independent movement, and exploring:

Maria jerks her body away a bit, and turns her head and eyes to the right to look out of the door. She looks like she is craning her neck a bit in order to do this, and fighting to pull away from her mother's body. Eve stands Maria up on the bed between us and I am surprised at how sturdy her legs seem. (Observation 9, March 2005)

This ability to look around, directly at things, and at objects at the point of disappearance, is a milestone that infants usually achieve at 3 months; therefore Maria was slightly ahead of the norm here, at just over 2 months (Lovejoy & Estridge, 1987). Similarly, I saw Maria reaching at 3 months, which is considered a response that develops between 3 and 6 months (Lovejoy & Estridge, 1987). I observed Maria turning herself over onto her tummy at 4 months, which is within the norm (3-5 months) (Lovejoy & Estridge, 1987; Weiten, 2004). As she struggled to become more mobile, I noticed both her excitement and her frustration. I saw her pulling herself into a standing position in her pushchair at 10 months, which is within normal range developmentally (Lovejoy & Estridge, 1987; Weiten, 2004).

Maria was emotionally both demonstrative and responsive. From early on she showed a variety of easily discernible emotions and moods, most predominantly joy and delight, sometimes in quick succession. She smiled in her sleep at 5 weeks. Lovejoy and Estridge (1987) noted that infants normally smile responsively within the first month, and that their behavioural responses reflect a widening range of feelings by 6 months. Maria had a generally sunny disposition, and a winning smile that often completely enveloped her face. Here, she was 6 months old:

Maria is looking at me and breaks into a slow, open-mouthed smile. Her chin drops, and both rows of gums and her tongue are visible. Her eyes crinkle up. Her whole face is suffused with warmth and softness. (Observation 21, July 2005)

Maria began to make a characteristic wrinkled-up nose, while snorting in and out with a smile. The family called this a "niessie" (a little sneeze-nose) and Maria would apparently produce it on demand by 7 months, when encouraged to "maak 'n niessie" (make a little sneeze-nose) (Observation 23). Lovejoy and Estridge (1987) suggested that infants understand simple words like this by 9 months. Maria showed subtle facial expressions early on, like a raised eyebrow (aged 3 months). I could readily see when she was cross, suspicious, in a miserable or irritated state, or in a daze. Already at 8 weeks her mother indicated that Maria showed displeasure by producing a "lang lip" (drooping bottom lip).

Maria was assertive and determined, and could be willful about what she wanted. She could be quite persistent when she wanted to touch something that she was not allowed to, and was vocal about being denied it. To everyone's amusement, she shook her head side to side in a "no" movement by 8 months (Observation 29). Lovejoy and Estridge (1987) suggested that infants begin to shake their heads at a year. A neighbour commented (after the observation process) that Maria had quite a temper. Another mentioned that she complained when she could not get her way:

[The neighbour] spoke energetically and humorously to Maria, saying that she could not go out in her "karretjie" (her little car, or pushchair) today because it was raining, that she had to stay inside and was cross about that, that the moment she could not go out she cried. (Observation 35, November 2005)

Her mother made frequent references to her being naughty or disobedient:

Maria's right arm embraces Eve's neck. Eve pulls Maria back so that she can look in her face and says, "Onbeskof! Onbeskofte kinders gewiese, Mammie!" ("Rude! I've been a rude child, Mommy!") She re-adjusts one of Maria's booties, which is half-off: "Djy skoppie skoene af!" ("You're kicking your shoes off!") (Observation 11, April 2005)

When she did not like something, she made it known:

To my surprise, Eve is feeding her pumpkin! Her chin and lips are wet with saliva. Maria scrunches her eyes up and pushes a solid-looking bit out with her tongue, and Eve scoops it back in again. It seems to go down. Maria starts crying in a sudden, spluttering way. (Observation 9, March 2005)

Maria also seemed very sensitive to adult moods. For example, at 10 weeks I noted her response to an inebriated old lady who came into the house:

Aunt Lil jiggles Maria up and down. Suddenly Maria lets out a very distressed, energetic cry, with her head facing Aunt Lil's chest. I am amazed. Eve takes Maria back. Maria stops crying. (Observation 10, March 2005)

She seemed to like moving around and being a part of what was going on:

Maria raises her gloved right hand to her mouth and sucks on it, with her eyes closing and her head moving back. Eve says, "Willie die handjies onder die komberse hou nie, en dis koud..." ("Don't want to keep the little hands under the blankets, and it's cold...") (Observation 13, April 2005)

Eve's interpretation on a few occasions was that Maria wanted to be awake, socialising, and that she was put to sleep against her will, so that she sometimes fought it:

Eve peeks at Maria: "Djy maak my aan die slaap, Mamma! Ek willie nou slaap nie, en jy maak jy slaap..." ("You are putting me to sleep, Mommy! I don't want to sleep now, and you are making me sleep...") Maria falls very deeply asleep instantly. (Observation 16, May 2005)

Maria loved being taken for walks, either in someone's arms or, later, in her "brm-brm" (pushchair, also referred to as a "pram"):

[Piet] stops rocking and sits Maria up again. She looks down at the egg in her hands. "Willie slaap nie! Sê nie-e, willie slaap nie!" ("Don't want to sleep! Say noooo, don't want to sleep!") he says with a smile. "Wat is dit? Nog niks karretjie gery vandag nie! Wil jy karretjie ry?" ("What is wrong? Haven't been riding in your pram/little car today yet! Want to ride in your pram?") he says to her, looking up at me. (Observation 29, September 2005)

Overall, Maria seemed to be a contented baby. She was never particularly tetchy or fractious, and if she was, she was able to be satisfied and soothed. Characteristically, she did not complain much when undressed for a nappy change or a bath. It was very rare to hear what I described as her "looping" cry, namely a cry that built in increasing distress. I never saw her so distressed that being picked up or given the breast could not quickly console her. Generally, I found her to be developing resourceful ways of managing difficult states without fragmenting. She seemed resilient, and able to self-soothe:

Maria has gone back to sucking the cell phone toy and at one point bangs it against her head accidentally, in one of her flailing arm moves. She frowns very slightly and pauses for a millisecond, looking at it, before going on with her movements and sucking. (Observation 29, September 2005)

In time, Maria developed the ability to entertain herself for long stretches of time, exploring her body in relation to the objects around her. She surprised me with her very social attitude. She began to make word-like utterances at around 9 months (Observation 33), which is considered typical (Lovejoy & Estridge, 1987). Some of her first words were the names of her sister, the extended family and neighbours (for instance, the back neighbour and her father's niece). She also said "Mamma" and "oppella" (all finished). She would sit in her pram and smile at people crossing the yard. She made clear signs that she wanted to go to people whom she knew, while her father said in interview that she was not happy going to strangers. This sense of independence, or of being able to move away from the mother, has been described in the literature as being a feature of secure attachment (Ainsworth, 1969; Bowlby, 1969).

In overview, my sense of Maria was that she was an easy baby and a fast developer, with a secure attachment style that enabled her to explore and form relationships with people other than her mother from early on. She was also particularly emotionally responsive. She had a generally sunny disposition but a strong will. The antenatal clinic in Moretown reports that malnourishment and developmental delay is rare; there were no cases reported in 2006, for example. Where an infant is borderline underweight, she will be seen monthly at the clinic for supplementation. Colic is also very rare. A recent case in 2007 in which a breastfed baby cried a great deal turned out to be misdiagnosed; when the baby's feed was supplemented with bottlefeeding, the crying stopped and the baby's weight increased: in other words, she had been hungry (C.R. Williams, personal communication, March 13, 2007).

7.2.2.3 The father: Piet Smit

Piet has neat, rounded features, soft brown eyes, dark skin and a beard. He is grey and balding. Because his one leg is shorter than the other he walks with a severe limp. I noticed that he always wore the same cracked army-style boots without socks or laces. One of the shoes had a built-up sole. His head was mostly covered either in a woollen

hat or a small round Eastern-style cap. He has several homemade-looking tattoos on his hands and forearms. He often smelt like sweat and tobacco. I found him to be polite and friendly but also assertive. He was invested in demarcating what was his, in a territorial sense, and in gaining respect. This was revealed both in his attitude towards me regarding the observations and towards his neighbours, whom he kept at bay. I found him to be an astute observer and a critic. His general mood seemed to be less dissatisfied than Eve's. He had a calm demeanour and twinkling eyes. Subjectively, I found this attractive, perhaps because he was more approachable than Eve. In an interview he said that he liked to talk. He had an insightful and analytical way about him. I saw him inebriated in the late morning on three occasions. When he abused alcohol, he became bolder and could be confrontational (in fact, more so than his wife). It seemed that his use of alcohol enabled him to be more assertive, and he could be verbally aggressive. For instance, at one point a neighbour suggested that Piet was unfaithful:

A man's voice outside and to the right shouts, "Djy! Wanneer gaan djy nou jou hol-naaiery los, djy's nou 'n getroude man!" ("You! When are you going to stop your ass-fucking/fooling around, you're a married man now!") and to my relief, Piet lurches up off the bed and out of the door to respond to this. There is the sound of an argument in the alleyway, which gradually gets softer as Piet and the neighbour seem to be moving towards the street. Piet is saying that no-one will talk to him that way in his yard. (Observation 5, February 2005)

My sense of finding Piet attractive is interesting in the light of his reputation, and of his sexualised attitude towards me, which I will discuss later (it turned out that the neighbour's "fooling around" comment related to me). In general, I found Piet to be approachable and friendly but with a strong sense of gate keeping with regard to his home and family. It seemed that while Eve was ready to show her dissatisfaction with situations, Piet would harbour his and then make them known explosively when he was drunk.

7.2.2.4 The sister: Natasha (surname unknown)

Natasha (who turned 6 during the observation) seemed to me to be big for her age and older in demeanour than she actually was. Her nickname in the family is "Tietie" (Booby). I mostly saw her in her school uniform, which extended to school-colour ribbons in the ponytails at the sides of her head. She was often dressed in a rather neglected way, for example, there were holes in her trousers. She was helpful with the baby and on the surface seemed quite independent. She seemed to play an adult role in her family, in that she took on a second mother role for the baby:

Maria is getting a bit grizzly and starting to cry. Eve says, "Nou ja, gaan Tietie toe" ("Well, go to Tietie then") and hands Maria over to Natasha, getting up off the bed. Natasha holds Maria up to her face, and talks like her mother: "Stoute kinders gewiesie, ver-verslape..." ("[You've been] a bad child, asleep for long...") She wags her chin for emphasis the way her mother does when talking to Maria, with the same wide eyes and slightly frozen smile. (Observation 18, June 2005)

Natasha could be quite cheeky towards her mother. She was interested in and verbal about what her mother would buy for her in terms of food, clothes and treats. She was quite territorial about things that were hers, related to what seemed to be feelings of jealousy towards Maria. She had a cruel streak, which I particularly saw at play towards the baby when her parents were not around. Generally, while being quite active and tending to "perform" for the baby and for me, she did not smile much. She could also be quite thoughtful in a subdued way. My sense of her was of a child who was rather sidelined and who often sought attention from adults, and who could be mean.

7.2.2.5 Conclusion

In writing and re-writing the foregoing descriptions I have become acutely aware that they constitute a subjective account, filtered through my own experiences and expectations, and that there must have been particular things I did and did not notice. In other words, in a sense I am authoring or constructing this drama, with these characters, and it is not a factual account. It is also based on what I was allowed to see. The extracts cited above and in the following sections are as revealing about me as they are about anyone I was attempting to observe. A further point is that these descriptions are predominantly based on how I perceived the participants in relationship with me. Even when I was observing their interactions with each other, they were still in my presence and I was still seeing them through my eyes. Lastly, it has felt extremely difficult to try to separate a description of "character" from a causal explanation (or hypothesis) as to why someone was behaving in a particular way at any one time. For example, in thinking about Eve as a taciturn person, one invariably wonders why she might be this way - how does this trait relate to her current situation and her past? How does it relate to my presence? Can one really describe Piet as a man who hides his feelings without considering why he might not be forthright with me in particular?

7.3 The observation setting

I had limited information about the Smit family. In my understanding of the observation framework, as described by Bick, not much discussion occurs unless the mother initiates it (Piontelli, 1992). In fact, the consent form pertinently stated that I would not be asking any questions (see **Addendum C**). In our relationship very little information was volunteered, and conversations were truncated. My curiosity led me to encourage the interviewers (James and Carol) to find out more about the Smit family.

7.3.1 Background: A low-income family

I learnt that Eve's family was originally from Ceres, which is a rural village 150 kilometres north-east of Cape Town, known for farming mainly deciduous fruit. Her mother came to work and live on a nearby farm in the Winelands region. When she married Piet, Eve moved to Moretown, which is also in the Winelands. Eve had been living in Moretown for two years at the time of the present study. The family seemed to live on Piet's disability grant (which paid out monthly) and on part-time rural work that Eve found. During the observation period Eve was unemployed and initially stayed home to take care of the child. She later had jobs clearing rubble in the building of a nearby dam and cleaning the local primary school gardens. In the past Eve had worked in the vineyards, picking fruit, and this sometimes involved hard physical labour. She described in interview that all the bending hurt her back. During the observation period Eve also hurt her shoulder during the dam-building project. This, together with a long working day in which transport home was difficult, contributed to her eventually leaving that job too. Piet made jewellery and leather items by hand such as belts, cell-phone pouches and key rings. These items he sold at the local primary school and spoke of selling at a café in Moretown. It seemed that he sometimes received belts from the school as well, which he polished and sold. There seemed to have been some friction with the school in the past, where he may have been more connected in a part-time capacity previously. Natasha's grandmother (Eve's

previous partner's mother) contributed towards her school fees in instalments. Money was also needed for extra activities such as compulsory "computer knowledge".

Eve told me that she used alcohol (mainly on weekends) when her first daughter was small. This had led to the child's father's family reporting her to social work services, which wanted to take the child away. Eve indicated that this was part of a struggle with his family for the child. She had stopped drinking at that point. She did not have continuing contact with Natasha's father, but felt that he and his family should contribute financially and materially towards the child. It was unclear what the nature of her relationship with him had been; she referred to him as "daai klong" (that boy) and did not seem to know his surname. She complained to me about the quality of his family's contributions to the child (empty promises, not enough money, and second-hand clothes as gifts). Natasha went to stay with her paternal grandmother on her own at times, such as during school holidays. This may have partly been the result of a custody issue and partly a way of contributing to child support.

The observation process brought home to me the lack of services in the area for a family in such need. Piet, for example, got his medical supplies from a tertiary hospital in Cape Town, about 70 kilometers away. Neither Piet nor Eve seemed able to access appropriate social work services via the local clinic, either due to a lack of motivation, means or information, or a combination of all three. My experience was corroborated by a comprehensive, published survey of mental health and related services (WMHRP, 2000) which revealed that there was not sufficient mental health care of any kind for low-income populations in this region (see **Addendum A**). Existing mental health care was found to be fragmented, replicated, gender-blind (with little attention paid to issues specific to women, for example reproductive health and domestic violence) and inaccessible (due to lack of childcare facilities, difficult opening hours, no transport available and high costs) (Kruger, J. Lazarus, De Villiers & Spedding, 2005).

Eve indicated that the children's needs came first when they spent Piet's disability grant. Clothes were almost certainly second-hand. Furniture, I discovered, was made, salvaged, ostensibly "given by Eve's employers" (according to Natasha), or bought on "lay-by" (in monthly instalments). Poverty meant a lack of food and the family may have made use of the "sopkar" (soup car). I saw the family eating rice, potatoes, pumpkin, onions, tomatoes, porridge, biscuits, puffed corn (crisps), bread and fruit. Eve both baked and bought bread.

Natasha told me that her school gave each family a "Christmas box" with treats. I often saw the family rationing food. For example, one person at a time would get a turn to drink coffee. Eve once would not let Natasha have coffee, because she had already had some that morning. Instead, she let her finish the cup Eve had recently made for herself. It seemed that the culture of sharing what you have was also being inculcated in Maria early on:

Maria sits up and smiles. She still has a bit of biscuit in her right hand, which she is studying. Now she leans towards Natasha, and holds it out. Some bits drop on the carpet, which Natasha picks up and holds in her hand. Natasha smiles at her softly. Maria eats the biscuit piece. "Giee stukkie, Maria! Ek wou stukkie gehad het!" ("Give a piece, Maria! I wanted a piece!") Natasha says but without much energy. (Observation 41, December 2005)

There was rivalry about material goods and food:

"Wêla-kapêla, jy't nie chips gekry nie..." ("Na-na-na-na-na, you didn't get any crisps...") Natasha says up at Maria. I wonder if she ate them on the way home. (Observation 18, June 2005)

Crisps and an Easter chocolate for the baby were saved in "haar kas" (her cupboard):

Natasha returns with a small white packet with blue bunny-like shapes on it and Eve takes out some documents and a small book in a hand-stitched brown leather cover, which I figure out is an ID book. Half an open packet of puffed corn, with the top folded over, also comes out. Eve puts all of this on the bed nearest me. "Mamma, wat is dit? Wat is dit?" ("Mommy, what is that? What is that?") Natasha asks urgently, immediately seeing the chips. "Nou ja, vat" ("Well then, take it") Eve says. "Wag," ("Wait,") Natasha says, moving past me, with a hand on my knee. "Mens sê nie 'wag' nie, mens sê 'Ekskuus'," ("One doesn't say 'wait', one says 'Pardon',") Eve says, with her chin pointing straight ahead and slightly up, her eyes widened. Natasha picks the chip packet up off the bed and hugs it to the far side of her chest, while looking at Maria, in a dramatic gesture of "This is mine". (Observation 22, July 2005)

Food for the children seemed a priority:

Lil asks where the R20 is that she gave Eve. Eve says it is right there, Lil can have it back. She doesn't want the soutvis (salted fish), it was Lil who wanted it. Lil says she wanted to get it for the children. (Observation 10, March 2005)

She takes a rectangular plastic Tupperware bowl out of the cabinet and flicks the latch down to close it again. She puts the bowl down on the sink unit at the window, goes to the door and calls, "Suzie! Bringie goed dat ek kan klaarmaak! Ek gaan die pap maak...niee, dis virrie kind." ("Suzie! Bring the stuff so that I can finish up! I'm going to make the porridge...no, it's for the child.") (Observation 11, April 2005)

In the above extracts it seems as though both adults were more comfortable talking about the consumption of food in relation to the children than about their own hunger. They made it clear that the food was not for the adults. Having little meant being careful about children wasting medicine and food. This was a recurring theme across observations:

When Eve puts her down again, Maria starts crying in a cross, spluttering fashion. I see the v-shape of her tongue, as it vibrates with the cry. "Maar jy mors dan die melk!" ("But you are wasting the milk!") Eve says, in a genuinely irritated tone. (Observation 16, May 2005)

Eve grips Maria's head in the crook of her left elbow, holding her securely, and brings the spoon back to Maria's mouth. Maria straightens her whole body and legs, flipping off the counter. Eve's body is close though, and holds her there. "MARIA! Jy mors, jy morsie goed!" ("MARIA! You're wasting, you're wasting the stuff!") Eve scolds seriously, in a cross tone, bringing the spoon to Maria's mouth again. (Observation 26, August 2005)

Previous interventions in Moretown where snacks were taken (The Play Group, 2002; The Mother-Infant Bonding Group, 2003) led to papers that theorised about how poverty resulted in a sense of internal deprivation. For example: "These needs often appeared to be expressed in symbolic ways, for example, at the end of each session when refreshments were served, some of the women seemed to 'store up' the biscuits that were provided, for later" (Burmeister-Nel et al., 2004, p. 10). In 2004 I similarly theorised that the children fought about the biscuits I brought to the Play Group because "nothing ever felt enough". I held that the teachers took home the "Koeksisters" (a type of doughnut) I brought to a feedback session because they were rejecting my advice to them (J. Lazarus, 2003). In the observation process I thought that at times not having enough could lead to a sense of preciousness even where the commodity (like breast milk) did not have a price on it:

Eve puts Maria back on the breast, and she seems to suck momentarily and then relax into sleep again. "Maria, jy mors my melk!" ("Maria, you are wasting my milk!") Eve says with some sternness, but also a laugh in her voice. "Kyk hier hoe loop dit! Ek gaan my tete wegvat...as jy nie my tete wil hê nie, sit ek hom weg..." ("Look how it is flowing! I am going to take my boob away... if you don't want my boob, I will put it away...") (Observation 9, March 2005)

While interpretations about emotional deprivation certainly have merit, the infant observation process made me aware that it is dangerous to exclude the reality of hunger in interpretations that focus on not having enough internally. Without breast milk, you have to feed a baby something bought in the store. Sometimes a cookie is just a cookie and sometimes saving biscuits is just saving biscuits (the external is real). Similarly, a middle-class mother may not worry about her infant's oral exploration, but in a poverty setting this can mean damage to items that cannot easily be replaced. For the Smit family it seemed that not having anything meant that preciousness developed about material goods, even items such as children's toys:

Maria's head is turned away to the wall and her fists are up at her mouth. "Hey, wat maak jy!" ("Hey, what are you doing!") Eve says, pulling Maria's arm down and towards her so that it moves away from her mouth. "Kou jy die klere!" ("Are you chewing the clothes!") she says. (Observation 14, May 2005)

Maria reached out a hand and touched the yellow plastic tablecloth covering the TV unit. "Los! Los my goed!" ("Leave it! Leave my stuff alone!") Eve said petulantly, but with serious intent. Maria grasped the plastic. "Jy gaan die ding skeur!" ("You are going to tear the thing!") Eve scolded, taking Maria's hand away. (Observation 36, November 2005)

In the latter example, it is interesting that Eve made a firm distinction between what was hers and what belonged to Maria, and was possessive about her things. This was a feature of the dynamic between all the females in the house: Eve and Maria, Maria and Natasha, and Eve and Natasha. "Alles gaan mond toe met haar" ("Everything goes to her mouth") was a sighed refrain I often heard from Maria's family. When I gave the children each a wrapped gift at the end of the observation period, Eve said that they would open them "later". At a post-observation visit some months later, I noticed that the cardboard in which Maria's toy had been packaged was preserved on a shelf against the wall. This is reminiscent of E. Gibson's (2002/3) observation in a low-income black family in which birthday gifts were saved for use later.

7.3.2 The physical environment: Three houses in one yard

A lack of money, education and opportunity translated into a particular living environment for the family, which I will describe here. The Smits' house was located in the back yard of Piet's niece's home (Lee). The latter was a small, established building: this was officially No. 90 Maroela Street. It belonged to Piet's deceased brother. Lee and her two brothers now lived there. Lee was a pretty, slender young woman in her twenties. Her one brother, whom I saw occasionally, was also of about the same age.

The house was set back from Maroela Street: there was another row of houses between it and the street. Access to the front yard was via a sandy space between two houses in the front row, where I used to park. A low wire fence and a small gate, which was always open when I was there, demarcated the front of the yard. There was a small, bent tree at the gate and a grassy verge along the inside of the fence, where some plants grew. Beyond this, the yard was constituted of a blackish sand, which was often raked. Barbed-wire fences taller than a person separated the plot from the neighbours on the left- and right-hand sides. **Addendum D** shows that there were 48 people living in 6 houses in the Smits' immediate neighbourhood (this information was gathered by interviewers working in the area during the latter half of the observation year).

Talking to another participant, I noted the way in which a certain image was being presented to me, as if for my sake:

Her husband sat slightly behind me, listening, nodding, and not saying anything. It was very peaceful in that house and I was loathe to leave. I felt like I was the Minister on a home visit and these people were showing me the gracious, grateful parts of themselves.

This image stood in contrast to a less controlled, more spontaneous way of being. In the same house:

The children told me what their toy animals' names were. They caused irritation in the 72 year-old above, by wrapping on her window while we were talking in the living-room. She broke her sanctified demeanour with a sudden reprimand.

Similarly, it seemed that in Eve's house I was for the most part to see sanctified caretaking.

7.7 Conclusion

In summary, there were many aspects to this South African infant observation in a low-income community that were unique to its context. Firstly, the physical setting was attended to and described in some detail. At times this led to the infant seeming somewhat irrelevant. Secondly, the relationships with the parents, the neighbours and the wider community were prominent and formed a significant source of information. In particular, the relationship with the mother was central. These were complex relationships with the observer, filled with ambivalence. In some respects they mirrored the ambivalence between family and community members themselves. In this discussion I have considered the influence of a poverty environment on all these relationships as a whole. On a deeper level, I highlighted the way in which the phenomenon of apartheid continues to shape the participants' experience of themselves and the world.

CHAPTER EIGHT: Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

In the following chapter I will evaluate the infant observation project. In this process I will summarise my findings. The present study set out to provide a thick description of a single low-income mother-infant dyad to consider the potential contribution that such a description might make to a needs assessment process, and to explore the utility of infant observation as a tool for psychologists working in low-income communities in South Africa. In overview, my findings relate to two main areas, namely a) the nature and content of the resultant description, and b) the effect of the process. I was surprised to discover that, in this context, the main object of my focus and description was not the infant. Nor was the primary mode of knowledge transmission observation; it was in fact relationship. Another surprise finding was the way in which the observation functioned therapeutically on a number of levels. In a first section I will consider what worked (the observation as intervention) as well as evaluating its usefulness for research and training. After that I will consider the ways in which it did not work (my struggle with the Tavistock gold standard) and the inherent limitations of the present study. I will conclude by making recommendations for practice and research.

8.2 The observation as an intervention

Observation and intervention are somewhat polarised in the literature, although it is recognised that an observation can be an intervention of itself. More active forms of "observing" have been reviewed. S. Miller claimed that if (even classical) infant observations are done with care, "the family almost invariably finds it beneficial although there is no direct therapeutic aim" (1997, p. 166). Barnett (2006) commented that few people, including fathers, are as interested in "the day-to-day minutiae" as infant observers are (p. 188). I have already discussed the ways in which the observation functioned as a therapeutic space. While it was not planned as a form of action research, there is evidence that the family benefited from the observation in a number of different ways. Below I will consider what the specific therapeutic outcomes were for the family. Some of these benefits were not just therapeutic, but practical. My proposal held that, if research can be beneficial as it gathers data, so much the better. It is felt that research in the tradition of community psychology should be for mutual benefit (K. Gibson, 2002b). The present study showed that ethnography can indeed be "a form of therapeutic praxis" (Ainslie & Brabeck, 2003, p. 43)

8.2.1 A positive experience

It seemed that the observation time was a valuable space for the parents. They may have experienced the hour as a time of interacting with the child and with me, in which we often laughed about what Maria did, and enjoyed her. The observations may have felt like time out from the day, in that they may have had a very different quality in an existence geared to survival. Both Eve and Piet expressed in interview that the observation was an almost exclusively positive experience. Piet said that he would agree to the observation procedure again. Eve wanted to return to the observations as soon as possible after the December break. This was also at a time near termination:

I: Yes.. Was there a time that you felt.. you don't like it, don't like it much?

Eve: The very first time.. it was quite long to me.. it went on so long for me (**I:** Yes..), because then.. she comes and then she sits now.. Sometimes then she sits. Then she sits here.. and then I keep myself busy and then.. if she then, then the child perhaps sleeps while she's here, and if the child.. when she goes the child is still sleeping, then.. she asks me if.. she can sit, then she asks me.. if she can sit, then I tell her she can sit, then I carry on with my work (**I:** Okay..). I ask her if.. I can finish my work, then she says I can finish my work, she'll sit. Then she watches the child.

I: So that very.. first one was difficult for you, it was..

Eve: The first time she was here yes.

I: Yes, felt a bit strange? Yes? Yes?

Eve: A different type of feeling. (Interview 3 with Eve, January 2006)

It is interesting that Eve credited herself with asking whether she could go on with her work when in fact I suggested this to her, in my own discomfort. It is possible that in this way her narrative to the interviewer disguised a painful aspect of the observation process, namely that I had more power. This first awkwardness was, however, the only negative she would discuss:

I: Mmm... Is he curious.. about what happened...? (**Eve:** Mmm..). How does he feel about it.. about the visits?

Eve: He feels all right..

I: Mmm.. Do you think it bothers him?

Eve: Uh-uh...

I: Does it ever bother you?

Eve: No... (She answers quickly. The baby is busy again in the background). (Interview 2 with Eve, June 2005)

Neither Piet nor Eve mentioned Piet's confrontation of me in interview. On the contrary, Eve presented it as an informative chat:

I: Okay... (There is a long silence, someone in the room shuffles around) Uhm.. What.. what does your husband think about it?

Eve: No, he said.. he's all right.. and I have already asked, and the woman who comes to me also asked him and so on (**I:** Mmm..), so he said it's all right.

I: And what.. what does he feel? How does he view it? How does he understand what happens?

Eve: I can't really tell Madam about it, how he understands what-do-you-call-it/things that happen.. but he did ask her.. what-do-you-call-it.. (**I:** Mmm..) about the child's things.. how it is and so on.. and then she explained [it] to him. The two of them can chat easily (**I:** Mmm..) and then he told [me] everything she said... (Interview 1 with Eve, March 2005)

We were constructed as getting on well. This may in part reflect the way in which the confrontation was contained and became a forum in which Piet could speak. But Eve's narrative about it also dove-tailed with my own on that day:

I say it was very interesting talking to him and he says, "Ek geniet u geselskap ook baie" ("I also enjoy your company a great deal"). (Observation 5, February 2005)

In other words, I had perhaps led the way in covering over the aggression and mistrust between us as soon as possible. In Eve's conversation with the interviewer, there is evidence of something that could not be put into words or said:

I: Mmm.. okay.. okay.. So if you.. if you.. uhm.. must see Jana again, what do you think.. is there something you'd like to tell her or.. Okay. Okay.. (It can be deduced that Eve shakes her head.) Okay Mrs Smit, thank you very much for your time. (Interview 3 with Eve, January 2006)

This reticence to talk is similar to what is heard in interviews in Moretown more generally (Kruger, in press; Kruger, 2003, 2005a; Kruger et al., 2005; Kruger & Van der Spuy, 2007). Eve may have been constrained by her

positioning in relation to the observer and the interviewer. This may have made it hard to discuss the observations in a relaxed way. But on the other hand, it may have also partly been a function of a community that did not speak very freely. In summary, the observation was portrayed as a positive experience, but it also seemed as though it was hard to talk about its more negative aspects. This is reminiscent of S. Briggs's (1999) discussion of an observation of a Nigerian family by a white observer, in which she wondered how free the mother might feel to make objections about the observation.

8.2.2 Being witnessed

A central outcome of the present study was realising the importance for the mother of being attended to. In several of Eve's comments in interview it is possible to detect what can be expressed as a need to be seen by someone else, or to have her life witnessed. For Eve this occurred within her relationship with me. In part, this was about my witnessing her struggle with her circumstances, sometimes in small ways, such as when I commented that the baby was keeping her busy (Observation 9). In part, it was about validating Eve as a person. For example, the photographs I took seemed to give her a pleasurable experience of being seen, and in this sense were a very decisive factor. It seemed that what was significant for Eve was that she too was being watched, while I watched the baby. In the first interview, she specifically linked her judgement of the observations as "something good" with the fact that I came to watch:

I: Okay.. okay.. And, and how do you feel about it.. that she.. that she came to you (**Eve:** No..) every week?

Eve: No, it's something quite good (**I:** Yes..). For me it's not what-do-you-call-it.. It's not hard for me that she has to come here.. here. It's something good.

I: What feels good to you?

Eve: That she just comes to see what.. how things.. how the child progresses and so on (**I:** Mmm..). She said she's coming to look... (Interview 1 with Eve, March 2005)

This surprised me, considering that my perception was that Eve found my gaze quite critical. Eve seemed to be indicating that the fact that I came to her in her home felt good and that in general it did not feel hard to be watched. It is possible that Eve did not have the power to say that it was not good. Coming to "look" was represented as an interest in the child's well being. Perhaps Eve felt, if one thinks about her comments related to her drinking, that on some level she needed an overseeing (white) eye to ensure that she would take care of the baby properly, despite her own struggles. I have previously hypothesised that my focus on the mother resulted from my unconsciously picking up her disavowed need to be seen in some way. This need seems corroborated by what Eve said in interview. When asked, she framed the visits as follows:

Eve: ..But he.. what-do-you-call-it that woman.. that.. what-do-you-call-it.. uhm uhm uhm.. that other woman.. that biggish one that works with her.. she has also been with that.. with that (**I:** Yes..), she came to look where I stay.. what the child does.. and those type of things..

I: Okay.. Okay... So what do you think about these people that come to visit you and...

Eve: I don't feel bad about it, I feel fine..

I: Mmm... Why do they think.. why do you think they want to come visit you...?

Eve: They want to.. they just feel.. probably... like visiting me and so on... (Baby noises are audible). (Interview 2 with Eve, June 2005)

It seemed that Ms L and I represented people who were genuinely interested in her, which was true, considering

that we were researchers. This may have been rare. Riessman (1993) noted that research interviewers can also bear witness. It may have been that our simply wanting to know about her and her child was affirming. The act of being there and attending felt important. Kohut (1971) commented on this when he wrote about the silent presence of the analyst that gives the patient a mirroring and twinship experience. Kohut's concept of mirroring is not, like Winnicott's, about responsive facial expressions reflecting emotion, but specifically about reflecting the child's grandiosity: the "'gleam in the mother's eye' reflects back the child's exhibitionistic display, confirms it, and provides the grounding for a secure sense of self-esteem" (Strozier, 2001, p. 211). I have commented on the way in which I felt Eve showed off her competence to me. Despite the potential for criticism I brought, I may in the end have mirrored her as a good mother. After the observation process, Eve articulated that what had been good about it was my interest in the baby (looking):

Eve: It was something good to me because she watched how [she] progressed, she came every time to see how the child progressed. (Interview 3 with Eve, January 2006)

Here she highlighted my sustained, ongoing interest in what the child was doing and whether she was all right. Implied in this is a kind of caring. This was also true of the WMHRP, where it was felt that less depression was seen than expected; mothers continually highlighted that the ongoing interviews were a positive experience, and one can speculate about their therapeutic effect (Kruger, in press; Storkey, 2006). In the Mother-Infant Bonding Group in the same community in 2003, it was felt that the group allowed mothers to see themselves through the eyes of other mothers and women (Burmeister-Nel et al., 2004). Being seen in this way, it is implied, can change one's perspective on oneself. In the Farmworkers' Project in 2001, a respondent commented:

It almost seems no one is interested in you. Or no one cares about you...Then you think..."No, the Lord can rather just take my child and I away. Because no one worries about me, or cares about me in that way."

It seems that specifically, privileged attention is important. Tomlinson et al. (2003) commented that our research projects send powerful messages, for example in terms of prevailing gender politics. The infant observation project telegraphed that "women who have recently given birth are entitled to special attention" (Tomlinson et al., 2003, p. 208). These authors referred to the "social significance" of research as a "worthy by-product" (p. 210). In other words, the infant observation project was empowering for the mother and may have had an impact on society. Kruger (2005b) commented that

in a still very modern world where control, autonomy, certainty and the unified subject are valued above everything else, the importance of simply attending to the moment of vulnerability cannot be stressed enough. This kind of attention seems to be unequivocally political. (p. 19)

8.2.3 Being heard

As described, there was very little talking during the observations. On the few occasions that Eve did speak to me at some length, it was about practical concerns, such as getting maintenance money for her eldest child. While Eve did not "talk about feelings" in a conventional sense, she did, however, share her problems with me in this way during the observation process. In retrospect, her approach for practical, material help became a way of talking

about what was causing her pain and preoccupying her. The act of reaching out to me to help her was a complex one, and she probably had mixed feelings about it. It did seem, however, that telling someone about what was troubling her might have benefited her.

I was surprised by the perception that both Piet and Eve had of me, expressed in interview, as someone who talked to them and someone whom they could talk to. From my perspective, we spoke very little. In fact, I felt that we could never really speak about what was hard for them, because they always said they were all right or fine when I asked. This was a common finding in the interviews conducted by the WMHRP in Moretown, the results of which are in the process of being collectively disseminated in a book on motherhood, poverty, race and culture (Kruger, in press). However, Eve, who herself struggled to speak at first in the interview process, commented that it felt to her that I (and the interviewer, and by inference also Ms L, who came to meet her), talked to her to find out how she was, which was not our express purpose at all:

I: Okay.. How does it feel to speak to me..?

Eve: It feels all right...

I: Okay... okay Eve... (There is the sound of someone paging through papers). Is there anything that is hard.. about the visits..?

Eve: No..

I: Anything that is nice..?

Eve: Anything that's nice for me.. the people.. speak to me (**I:** Mmm..), how am I.. how is the child (**I:** Mmm..). I feel fine about it. (Interview 2 with Eve, June 2005)

Here Eve was expressing that she enjoyed our asking after both her and her baby and that this meant something to her. What was nice was that people talked to her at all: Eve's expectations were perhaps not high. While I was frustrated with not being given full and open answers to the "How are you?" question, it seems that Eve experienced my enquiry, and the very fact that I was talking to her at all, as positive:

I: What changed for you.. since Jana started visiting..? Do you think things changed for you..?

Eve: Yes.

I: Yes. What do you think has changed..?

Eve: When she always speaks to me and so on (**I:** Yes..), asking me how I'm doing and.. asking me how my husband's doing. Then I say no it's still going fine (**I:** Mmm..). She speaks to us when she comes here..

I: Mmm.. And how does that feel to you?

Eve: Then I feel all right.. because she talks to a person..

I: Mmm.. It feels good to you?

Eve: Mmm...

I: She's someone you can talk to?

Eve: Mmm..mm... (There is a long silence, the baby starts making noises again). (Interview 2 with Eve, June 2005)

Here Eve seemed to be saying that I began talking more to her as the observation progressed. This may have been because I was being encouraged by Mrs K to do so. Yet Eve said I didn't ask many questions:

Eve: She just watches.. how the child progresses and (**I:** Mmm..) she says the child is big and (**I:** Mmm..) and what-do-you-call-it.. She doesn't ask so much.. so much... (The baby becomes restless again). (Interview 2 with Eve, June 2005)

The fact that my mostly silent presence had the impact of making the parents feel heard may suggest how seldom they experienced emotional responsiveness to distress. The observations took on the role of being a time for a kind of talking. In an amusing and revealing parapraxis (Freudian slip), Carol (also a clinical psychologist) referred to the observations as "interviews" on two separate occasions (Interviews 2 and 3 with Eve). The observations seemed

to have been experienced as a time specifically and predictably set aside for attentive interaction, rather like a therapy space. In the middle of the year Piet expressed the idea in interview that I was someone who could be trusted and spoken to confidentially when one had a problem, rather like a therapist:

Piet: ... she has also actually now, how can I say, for us uhm.. brought us closer to her do you understand (**I:** Mmm). Because, because.. there is someone you can speak to (**I:** Mmm), if, if.. if perhaps you have a problem (**I:** Mmm), you can contact her to say see, I feel I want to speak to you (**I:** Mmm), or I can phone you and tell you see, I have a problem or I want to, just speak to you about something or I want to (**I:** Mmm), perhaps I feel today uh, how can I say it (**I:** Mmm), feel depressed/downcast (**I:** Yes), do you understand (**I:** Yes), I just feel like speaking today (**I:** Yes..), then you have someone that you know, look here I can trust you because (**I:** Mmm), that which I tell you, is just for you (**I:** Mmm) and that which you tell me, is just for me (**I:** Mmm), do you understand? (Interview 2 with Piet, June 2005)

It is very interesting that Piet specifically talked about reaching out in order to talk about feeling depressed. The speaking and relating seemed to represent an important form of contact for him, in the context of experiencing distress. There was a distinctly therapeutic quality about this:

Piet: No, nothing has changed (**I:** It sounds as if you) For me it is, it's a joy to, to (**I:** Mmm) meet someone else (**I:** Mmm..). My.. I, am actually a, a, a how can I say, person who uh, loves other people or (**I:** Mmm) to speak to other people (**I:** Mmm, [a] people's person), yes. (Interview 2 with Piet, June 2005)

Here, Piet spoke about pleasure in reaching out. This should be seen against the background of the information that the family, following Piet's wishes, tended to isolate themselves quite deliberately. Talking about the child had the effect of making Eve feel good:

I: So there's something he still.. wants to ask Jana (**Eve:** Aah).. about Maria. Yes.. And what about you, anything you still want to (**Eve:** Uh-uh, I have nothing) want to say to her or
Eve: Nothing. I have nothing to say to her.
I: Okay, okay.
Eve: I feel fine.
I: Okay, yes.. And
Eve: She always talks to me when she sits here with me, then we chat (**I:** Yes..). She talks with me.
I: And what were the type of things that you ta.. talked about?
Eve: We speak about the child (**I:** Yes), and how the child is progressing (**I:** Yes) and all those things (**I:** Okay...). And I feel all right about her... It's actually something good to me. (Interview 3 with Eve, January 2006)

It is interesting that Eve gave the agency (the act of talking) to me. Here she seemed to be saying that she did not have anything more to ask me (unlike Piet), because we had spoken a lot during the observations already. When I got the chance, I reflected feeling during the observations. Here Eve was describing her difficulties with Natasha's father's family:

Sy [Eve] het mos gedrink (She [Eve] used to drink) (gesturing a chugging motion with her hand and looking in my eyes with chin ducked, checking to see if I remember?) - the klong's (young guy's) family reported her, social work was here and wanted to take Natasha (hulle wou haar van my afvat) (they wanted to take her away from me). I say sjoe (wow/gosh) a few times, and suck my breath in. I say she must have been angry. She says she was angry. She told them she only drinks on weekends, in die week is ek rustig (in the week I am quiet/peaceful). Her mother called social work and said it wasn't so - there are many other people around, taking care of the child. She gave up drinking. I say it must have been hard to give up. She says it was. (Observation 21, July 2005)

I believed Eve when she said that she had stopped drinking, but I wondered in post-observation visits whether she had started again. My therapeutic instinct was to attend to Eve's feelings and open them up more. This may have

been an unusual kind of space for the family. Besides the fact that therapy in this low-income community did not exist, there was evidence that people may not have spoken much to each other either. Therefore, while the interviews in the area provided an opportunity to talk, there might have been no expectation to be invited to do so, least of all by a white visitor. It struck me that in a low-income community, where everybody is struggling with the daily effects of poverty, this struggle perhaps becomes something that people do not commiserate about. When your struggle is a known fact, and is the same struggle as everyone else's around you, you may in fact end up talking less about how things are going - because it is the same daily. Talking about it becomes like talking about breathing. The theme of feelings being heard also came up in the Depression Survey in Moretown in 2002. For example, as an interviewer, I noticed about an elderly participant that

at first she was suspicious of me, but when she heard I wanted to hear about her feelings, she laughed shyly in a pleased way. This was often a response when people heard about the content of the survey.

This seems to lend some support for the idea that people did not enquire about feelings in this community; that such talk is a luxury under these circumstances, and is in fact a rather odd idea. Talking about feelings when there are more pressing concerns may also seem irrelevant. It is, however, a pleasing invitation, partly perhaps because it is so rare. I wondered in retrospect whether my declared intention as an observer not to talk much (and certainly not about poverty) may have felt particularly cruel: I was just here to watch the baby, in order to learn about babies. Unlike the interviewers I, who could see the family's suffering very starkly in an ongoing way, may have seemed to be ignoring it. It is interesting that Piet spoke to both me and to the interviewer at some length about his battle with haemophilia. There was some evidence in interview of how hard it was to talk about the experience of pervasive poverty:

I: Is it hard for you.. to speak to other people...?

Eve: How does Madam mean? What other people?

I: Well.. if.. if things are difficult for you.. is it hard to share those feelings..?

Eve: I don't always share it.. it's only sometimes...

I: Mmm... What do you think.. makes it hard to share it with me...? You can be honest.. I won't get angry or.. hard.. my feelings won't be hurt... (There is a very long silence. The baby is restless and Eve speaks softly to her, but she says nothing to the interviewer). Last time we spoke a bit about things that are hard for you... (**I:** Mmm..). Is it.. uhm... the same things that are hard for you [now]? (**I:** Mmm?). Is it the same.. that is hard for you.. or is there something else.. that bothers you...?

Eve: It's just.. what-do-you-call-it.. It's still the same... (Interview 2 with Eve, June 2005)

Eve made the point here that the same things that were troubling her several months ago in the first interview were still present now. Eve said here that she did not often (or always) share her concerns. It is interesting that when she struggled to talk about her difficulties to the interviewer, she suddenly communicated with the baby - perhaps a bit unnecessarily, telling her to sit still. I wondered whether this was another example of how the baby could become a conduit of sorts and a figure of hope in a difficult or painful situation.

While the first hour felt long, once Eve knew what to expect, it seemed that the hour often felt too short. This may have been one reason why Eve often looked surprised when I said that it was time for me to go:

I: We just sat here (**I:** Mmm..), then she laughed with the child and chatted.. But she's still all right.. otherwise (**I:** Mmm..). I can't complain about her being here.

I: Okay.. How does it feel to you.. in that hour?

Eve: It's.. it doesn't feel so.. what-do-you-call-it hard. It's just (**I:** Mmm..), that hour isn't so long, it goes by quickly.

I: Is that so? (**Eve:** Mmm..). So it feels as if.. it goes quickly? (**Eve:** Mmm..). Do you enjoy it that.. that..

Eve: Yes.. (There are thumping sounds in the nearby background and a baby sound). We also speak sometimes and so on (**I:** Mmm..), then we speak to each other in here.

I: And what do you speak about?

Eve: We just speak.. then she just sometimes asks.. how is the child and.. and how it is going with us here in the house and then I tell her it's going fine. (The thumping sounds continue. The baby seems to be restless). (Interview 2 with Eve, June 2005)

Again, it seems here that my interest in the family was enjoyable, and as though I was perceived as enjoying the child. It seems significant that when asked what was good about the observation, Eve said it was a time in which we could sit together and talk to one another in her home. Both Piet and Eve therefore commented that the "talking" was important. It is interesting that Eve remembers me as being very interactive (or more interactive than I was), and that what she mentioned in describing "what we did" (as the interview asked) was not primarily my sitting in a corner without saying much, but the more active aspects of my visits. Her refrain, of just sitting, just talking and just laughing conveys a sense of simple time spent with each other without any expressed task. The only task was watching. Eve seemed to look forward to this, and even cleared her other tasks out of the way to enjoy this "open" space in which just to be together:

I: Yes...? Okay... Uhm... Okay, so how do things feel different now that she's not coming anymore?

Eve: It feels different, yes.

I: Yes? And how does it feel different? What is different?

Eve: It's a.. it's a.. It makes a difference (**I:** Yes..). Every... every Wednesday she used to come then... I clean early.. and then when she comes it's done. If she then comes.. then she just sits and speaks to the child (**I:** Mmm) and she plays with the child and so on (**I:** Yes..). Then she says the child's progressing.. and the child's getting big (**I:** Yes) and I look after the child well and all those things.

I: Okay.. okay.. And when she.. said that type of thing to you, how did it make you feel? When she said *that* to you?

Eve: I feel fine about it. (Interview 3 with Eve, January 2006)

I wondered how much time Eve actually had where she was not performing tasks, but could just play with the child for an hour. I was surprised to hear her say in interview that it felt good to hear me commend her mothering, because my experience was, as described earlier, that she made me feel bad for having said that. It seems that she felt I mirrored her in a positive way after all. In an earlier interview she described me as coming to be with her in this time:

I: And how does it feel to you that she comes and sits here and looks and...

Eve: I don't feel bad about it or anything (**I:** Mmm..)... For me it is just something good.. Because she told me before.. when I still.. when I still was pregnant.. then she said.. that she'll come and be with me... she'll just come and see how I am... (**I:** Mmm..) how the child's progressing and so on... (Interview 1 with Eve, March 2005)

Here Eve seemed to portray me as someone who would come and support her after the birth. It sounded as though Eve experienced me as coming to see how she was; in other words, as someone who offered care, solidarity and a sense of being accompanied at a difficult time. It is possible that this may have led to her feeling less alone in her task of mothering under difficult conditions. This was, however, not something she could ever verbally acknowledge to me or even allow me to feel by her actions and attitude towards me, for the reasons discussed. But my sense, even before the observation period was over, was that it was indeed very important to have me there. In the last observation, in which I felt freer to respond more spontaneously to what I was observing and experiencing,

I wrote about "what really matters":

I hoped Maria would sleep the whole observation; this felt manageable. I would write about all her little detailed movements and the infant observers of the world would be happy. I can instead write a whole paragraph about what the radio was saying, and the interaction between the radio, Eve, and me. It was a station I had never heard of, a chat show with a religious bent, aimed at housewives, but also at poorer communities (the word "gemeenskap" was used) (community). The woman told you to take the phone off the hook and turn the pot off on the stove and put your feet in lukewarm water (the way some listeners told her they did). She seemed to know where they lived and how. She said if you didn't have a couch, like her, you should put your agterwêreld (backside) on one chair and your voetjies (feet) on another and relax in this way. Because this was the hour in which we focus on what really matters, on what's really going on. How true, I thought - maybe my visit is like that for Eve; it is for me. (Observation 43, January 2006)

In infant observation the infant matters, but what really seemed to matter here was giving Eve some time. Eve and I were not able to talk about "what really matters" in her life, but my mere presence there seemed to be fulfilling a function related to seeing her, or witnessing her life, and this felt to me to be an unspoken acknowledgement of the important things. My presence in effect said that the baby mattered and, by extension, that the mother of the baby mattered. This seems to be the most important outcome of the process. Similarly, in the Mother-Infant Bonding Group in the same community in 2003 sharing feelings was felt to be an important need. One of the goals was fostering support among the mothers through the voicing of experience in a group. It was felt that talking and being heard in this way strengthened these women (Burmeister-Nel et al., 2004). In the Farmworkers' Project in the area in 2001 a participant commented:

When you first came I thought you should tell Madiba (Nelson Mandela) everything I say. So that he knows how difficult things are. So that he can do something. But now after I have talked I think it's good you listen to all the people. Just listening is good.

Bick (1964) noted that mothers often welcome the observer specifically as someone to talk to regarding their baby's development and their feelings about it. It was found in the present observation that talking about the baby and about feelings in general was very restricted. Despite this, both parents experienced me as someone they could speak to about their feelings more generally, including depression, and related to their wider difficulties.

8.2.4 Shoring up the self

8.2.4.1 Emotional support

The process of being witnessed and heard may have resulted in an airing of existent distress and increased emotional well-being. Theoretically an attending presence can provide emotional support, which enables the receiver to be more herself. Already in the first interview Eve expressed the idea that in three months the observation had changed her personally in a positive way:

I: ... Okay.. so things have.. in a way.. changed for you. Maybe you could tell me.. did it become a bit worse.. or a bit better.. or a bit of both?

Eve: Better yes...

I: Do you think.. her visits have.. uhm.. in some way or another.. changed.. your relationship with.. Maria.. has changed it..?

Eve: Yes Madam... (A male voice and a small child are audible in the background).

I: Can you maybe tell me how.. how it has changed...?

Eve: Now that I.. have her now, hey.. (**I:** Mmm..) what-do-you-call-it.. now I'm not like I used to be..

I: How were you before?

Eve: I was.. what-do-you-call-it.. I always used to d... My child was already five years old... then we.. when we.. when we sat and drank here and so on.. then it's not.. then.. then.. then perhaps it's not for me.. what-do-you-call-it.. (**I:** Mmm..) like it always used to be.. it's not the same anymore and so on.. and now.. I stopped those things.. since I have had her it is.. I am normal like I should be...

I: So it feels.. like it helped you to make changes to your life?

Eve: Yes, I think so yes... (Interview 1 with Eve, March 2005)

Eve spoke with some hesitation about her past drinking behaviour. She seemed to be indicating that she drank after the birth of her first child, but that somehow having the second, in conjunction with the visits from the observer, had helped her not to drink after Maria's birth. Perhaps the period following the birth of a child was a particularly vulnerable time for a woman in Eve's position, when things felt particularly demanding and resources were insufficient. Her experience was that she was more able to be herself through this period. My hypothesis is that the observations enabled this, because they regularly provided interest in how she and the baby were doing and this was experienced as emotional support. Later in the infant observation year Eve went in search of work again. I wondered whether my being with her in small ways had strengthened her or alleviated some of her distress to a degree. Both parents in fact stopped drinking. After the observation period a friend of Piet's (who was himself inebriated at the time) complained to me that Piet, his drinking buddy, had recently given up drinking. Piet also reported that he had had a "nervous breakdown" in this time. It is possible that being attended to set in process a motion of attending to what was present in himself. Perhaps he hoped that telling me this would bring a return of my weekly visits, out of concern.

8.2.4.2 An increase in self-confidence

It was the transcriber's impression that Eve spoke louder and was more confident in her second interview. In the last interview Eve was also described as being "more confident" and speaking less hesitantly:

From the start there is quite a bit of noise in the background, especially voices speaking. Both the interviewer and Eve are speaking notably faster than the previous times, and Eve with more self-confidence. It's only towards the end that she keeps quiet for a long time when she's asked a question. (Interview 3 with Eve, January 2006)

In interview 3 Eve actually interrupted the interviewer to say something that felt important to her (something she was emotionally invested in). The third interview was also twice as long as the second. We can hypothesise that Eve was becoming more comfortable with the interviewer, but also that her sense of agency and power in this situation may have increased. It is possible that the observation process and the related interviews, both of which symbolically constituted empowering relationships with a past oppressor, may have counteracted some of the internalised oppression discussed. This may have come about because Eve actively took and wielded the power for a year, and I did not retaliate. These are speculations, but Eve's attitude right at the start of the first interview lends some credence to the idea that she was acting assertively towards us by this stage:

I: Okay, so this is our first interview. This is.. it's Carol and Eve. I don't know whether you'd like to choose a pseudonym for the tapes.. if you're concerned that other people will hear it. I will promise you that no one is going to hear it. Just me and.. at a later stage Jana.. but..

Eve: Yes, she said that Madam will (**I:** Mmm..) at a later.. (**I:** Mmm..) at a later.. at a later stage Madam will want to tell her everything.

I: Yes, but not now.

Eve: Yes, not now.

I: It's very important to me that you know that everything you say is confidential, so..
Eve: She told me that again yesterday..
I: Okay... So and only when she is done with the visits to you (**Eve:** Mmm..) will I.. (**Eve:** Give) give her the stuff. Okay..
Eve: She told me yes.
I: Okay...
Eve: That is, how I feel about her..
I: Yes..
Eve: And all those things she told me yesterday.. (Interview 1 with Eve, March 2005)

Here Eve said five times that she had been told before what Carol was telling her at the time. Therefore the issue of power between them was very prominent, with Eve battling a perception (internal and possibly real) that she was being patronised. But by the last interview, Eve took her power and spoke over the interviewer when she wanted to.

8.2.5 National healing

The implications of this kind of interracial contact for South Africa are pertinent, in the sense that the personal is political. Eve expressed her awareness that being in the township with her family was a new experience for me and something that had to I get used to. Here she spoke about me and the termination:

Eve: She'd become used to having to be here (**I:** Mmm). She's only been around Stellenbosch (**I:** Yes). She's not been around to many other places
I: Yes.. Okay. So it felt like it was special to her to be here? Yes.. (Interview 3 with Eve, January 2006)

It is interesting that Eve represented me as getting used to the child, specifically. The child was the reason for our meeting, the reason for my visits to the township and the reason I would miss the visits. It seemed, as I noted in the previous chapter, that the baby was the repository for all that was positive about my contact with this family. Like Eve, I was also aware that our contact represented something unusual:

And I have realised today that I am probably the only white person Eve has ever known. (Observation 37, November 2005)

By this I meant that I was the only white person to establish a relationship with her in her home. In retrospect it seemed that the child was invested with the possibility of creating a new kind of meeting across old racial divides. In other words, she symbolically became a figure of hope, not only in relation to me, but for a better future for the family on all levels. In this there was the seed of something healing. Because the family related to me as a person, and I to them, it could be said that in time a kind of rapprochement was reached. Piet seemed to highlight this in interview:

I: If you, if you think back about the visits, what will you remember most about the visits and about Jana..?
Piet: Her friendly, friendliness (**I:** Mmm) and polite[ness], and her patience and (**I:** Mmm).. Because they say if you don't have patience or aren't polite, then you'll never (Piet starts mumbling towards the end of the sentence and it is not clear what he is saying.)
I: So she was an easy person to
Piet: She was an easy person to get along with, because if she were a difficult person then I wouldn't have got along with her (**I:** Mmm), because I would have told her *hey* (The interviewer starts laughing heartily), to *here* and no further (**I:** Yes), do you understand (**I:** Yes). Because in all honesty, I'm going to be honest with a person, I'll tell him, that which I don't want to (**I:** Mmm) feel
I: Mmm, okay.. But it was, it was generally speaking easy.
Piet: It was a pleasure for me man. (Interview 3 with Piet, January 2006)

