

The relationship between terrorism and tourism in Egypt and Kenya

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Declaration

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Abstract

With increased globalisation allowing for relatively seamless cross-border interactions between people, several features and challenges have been accentuated. In this study, the relationship between two of these features – terrorism and tourism – is investigated within contexts where both materialise. The researcher, recognising the complexity inherent in the issue, considers the relationship from two different perspectives. Firstly, she examines the impact of terrorist attacks on the prospects for the tourism sector by paying attention to the terrorism context, and how it could promote conditions which may extend or worsen a negative impact on the tourism sector. Secondly, she analyses how tourism might, in turn, influence risk factors for terrorism to be sustained, if the industry is practised with minimal economic benefits to surrounding communities, or if it amplifies an unequal and unjust power dynamic between tourists and local people. This study utilises secondary source material to conduct exploratory research on the matter, with these factors examined in view of its two-case-study based approach, zeroing in on Egypt and Kenya. Importantly, both states have been impacted by terrorist attacks directly targeting the tourism sector: the Luxor attack of 1997 in Egypt and the Paradise Hotel attack of 2002 in Kenya as examples. Previous studies have tended to focus on the first dimension of this relationship (the impact of terrorism on tourism), often using quantitative measures to evaluate the impact of terrorist attacks on tourist arrivals or revenue. As important as this dimension may be, it is limited in view of the full spectrum of complexities that exist in the relationship. The chief contribution of the present study, therefore, is for the researcher to examine existing critical literature on Egypt and Kenya to identify and analyse risk factors in their tourism industries that may sustain terrorist attacks when other pre-conditions for terrorism are present. In agreement with the general tide of available literature – that terrorism negatively impacts tourism within these contexts – this study expands this notion by clarifying the specific considerations that may influence the effect of terrorism on tourism. This includes how the severity or the frequency of terrorist attacks may shape the tourism sector's reaction to them. In her findings, the candidate concludes that the relationship between terrorism and tourism should be interpreted according to both perspectives, noting that a lack of economic benefits for local people and an unequal power dynamic between them and tourists can influence the way that local people perceive the tourism sector. In turn, this can influence the possibility of radicalisation and partly explain those terrorist attacks that directly target tourists. The critical insights explored in this study can lead to policy recommendations which ensure that the tourism sector operates responsibly in host destinations; in a way that promotes,

rather than harms, local support for the sector. Further research on the topic, however, is required to elucidate this relationship in its totality.

Opsomming

Met toenemende globalisering wat relatief naatlose interaksie tussen mense oor grense heen moontlik maak, het verskeie eienskappe en uitdagings hiervan na vore getree. Hierdie studie ondersoek die verhouding tussen twee van hierdie eienskappe, terrorisme en toerisme, binne die kontekste waar beide materialiseer. Hierdeur word erkenning gegee aan die kompleksiteit inherent aan hierdie kwessie deur die verband vanuit twee verskillende perspektiewe te beskou. Eerstens ondersoek die navorser die impak van terreuraanvalle op die vooruitsigte van die toerismesektor deur aandag te skenk aan die spesifieke eienskappe van die terroristiese konteks en hoe dit toestande kan bevorder wat 'n algemeen negatiewe impak op die toerismesektor kan verleng of vererger. Tweedens ontleed sy hoe toerisme, daarenteen, die risikofaktore vir die voortsetting van terrorisme kan onderhou as die bedryf op 'n manier werk waar daar minimale ekonomiese voordele vir die omliggende gemeenskappe is, en of dit 'n ongelyke en onregmatige magsdinamiek tussen toeriste en plaaslike inwoners versterk. Hierdie studie fokus op sekondêre bronmateriaal om verkennende navorsing hieroor te doen. Hierdie faktore word ontleed in terme van 'n benadering wat bestaan uit twee gevallestudies wat fokus op Egipte en Kenia. Dit is noemenswaardig dat beide state al geaffekteer is deur terreuraanvalle wat die toerismesektor direk geteiken het, insluitend die Luxor-aanval van 1997 in Egipte en die Paradise Hotel-aanval van 2002 in Kenia. Vorige studies het geneig om slegs op die eerste dimensie van hierdie verband te fokus (die impak van terrorisme op toerisme), gewoonlik deur middel van kwantitatiewe maatstawwe wat die impak van terreuraanvalle op toeristebesoeke of -inkomste evalueer. Hoewel hierdie dimensie belangrik is, is dit beperk in die lig van die volle kompleksiteite van die verband wat tussen die twee elemente bestaan. Die hoofbydrae van hierdie studie is, vervolgens, 'n ontleding van bestaande kritiese literatuur oor Egipte en Kenia om die risikofaktore te identifiseer wat deur die toerismebedryf gedryf word en moontlik tot terreuraanvalle kan help aanleiding gee wanneer ander omstandighede bestaan wat bevorderlik is vir terreur. In ooreenstemming met die algemene trant van die literatuur – dat terrorisme in hierdie kontekste 'n negatiewe effek het op toerisme – neem hierdie studie die nosisie verder om te verstaan wat die spesifieke oorwegings is wat hierdie effek kan beïnvloed, insluitend hoe die intensiteit of die frekwensie van terreuraanvalle die toerismesektor se reaksie daarop kan vorm. Die kandidaat bevind dat die verband tussen terrorisme en toerisme vanuit

beide hoeke geïnterpreteer moet word, en noem ook dat 'n tekort aan ekonomiese voordeel vir die plaaslike inwoners of 'n ongelyke magsdinamiek tussen toeriste en plaaslike inwoners die manier kan beïnvloed waarop die plaaslike mense die sektor sien, wat ook tot gevolg het dat hulle moontlik geradikaliseer kan word om self in terreur teen die toerismesektor betrokke te raak. Vanuit hierdie kritiese insigte volg beleidsvoorstelle vir die manier waarop toerisme by hierdie bestemmings bedryf kan word om te verseker dat die toerismesektor verantwoordelik optree, en op 'n manier wat plaaslike steun vir die sektor sal bevorder eerder as om dit af te breek. Verdere navorsing oor die onderwerp is nodig om hierdie verhouding in die volle omvang daarvan toe te lig.

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List of acronyms and abbreviations

AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia
ATPU	Anti-Terrorism Police Unit
COVID-19	Coronavirus
EGP	Egyptian Pound
E-TRP	Egypt Tourism Reform Programme
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
G7	Group of Seven
GATS	General Agreement on Trade in Services
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICC	International Criminal Court
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
KANU	Kenya Africa National Union
KDF	Kenya Defence Force
NRC	National Rainbow Coalition
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SSIS	State Security Investigations Service
UK	United Kingdom
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNWTO	United Nations World Tourism Organisation
US	United States

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Introduction

The migration of people is a phenomenon that has existed throughout human history, advancing in recent years with increased globalisation. Terrorism and tourism are two features that have been emboldened by the growing ease of cross-border access and are, therefore, relevant phenomena to study in light of the interconnected world in which we operate. The relationship between terrorism and tourism, however, may not be as simple as one might expect, with both phenomena likely to influence each other in a host of small and large ways. It is, therefore, essential to question conventional ways of examining the terrorism-tourism nexus to encapsulate a broad picture of the relationship between the two, with the aim of garnering a deep understanding of the complexities inherent in such a relationship. In this study, the candidate will aim to investigate a seemingly progressive feature of our globalised world: tourism, in relation to a negative feature: terrorism. Both concepts will be explored critically in order for the relationship between the two to be illuminated in all its forms. Particular heed will be paid to the impact that terrorism might have on tourism, and furthermore, whether there is something about the manner in which tourism is conducted that may influence chances of radicalisation in the wider terrorism landscape.

1.2. Background and rationale

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a sense of optimism about the prospects for globalisation in creating a unified world. Butler and Mao (1996: 25) argue that positive peace can be built between peoples by using tourism as a medium to bridge divisions. Tourism has, therefore, been regarded as a source of soft power between states, since cultural exchanges take place between them (Nye, 2004: 13; Lisle, 2013: 130). It has also been identified as holding particular relevance to the Global South, given how an increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) via tourism revenues could be used toward development programmes in order to uplift people within these contexts (Thompson, 2011: 699). Growing descriptions, however, of a darker side to globalisation can be evidenced in the academic literature, media, and in conversations amongst people. Terrorism, for example, has become a buzzword in modern political discourse, representing something of a side-effect to the world in which we operate. Like tourism, terrorism is dependent on ‘temporary mobilities’, however, through these transnational connections, terrorism can embolden the transfer of

people, information, and weapons, which may be beneficial to undertaking violent acts (Coles & Church, 2007: 1).

When the concepts of terrorism and tourism are considered together, according to available literature, it is widely believed that terrorism influences the tourist sector in a myriad of worrying ways. Demonstrating the negative economic impact of terrorism on tourism has featured frequently in the world of academia since the 1990s (see Enders & Sandler, 1991; Enders, Sandler & Parise, 1992; Drakos & Kutan, 2003). Studies of this nature use both quantitative and qualitative research to document such an impact, with quantitative investigations, for example, often measuring changes to tourist flows after significant terror attacks. It is important to investigate such studies beyond face value and to question which particular features might influence the tourism sector more significantly than others. For instance, it may be true to say that a high frequency of attacks could have a greater negative impact on tourism than might be the case with a once-off fluke attack. As such, these features have the potential to extend the duration of the negative effect over the tourism sector, or provoke a more significant loss in tourism arrivals. In this study, the researcher will, therefore, aim to explore the specific conditions of terrorist attacks and how, given these differences, tourism markets may react in varied ways to the attack. This will be done with the aim of contributing to the literature on how the industry can best safeguard itself against various shocks, especially with reference to its two case studies of interest: Egypt and Kenya. In rationalising the selection of these two case studies, it can be argued that both are tourism-reliant states that have been impacted by high-profile terrorist attacks.

It is also important to note that the relationship between terror and tourism exists as a two-way process, and one needs to engage critically with tourism and how it may, too, influence terrorism in some contexts. This involves questioning whether tourism is a contributing factor in perpetuating power asymmetries, especially in a brand of tourism that involves attracting those from the Global North to visit the Global South (see de Kadt, 1979; Bianchi, 2002; Coles & Church, 2007). It is, therefore, significant to scrutinise tourism practices thoroughly in order to progress beyond an understanding of tourism as merely an economic prospect and, instead, to examine the social and political issues surrounding responsible tourism. Although it is difficult to posit causal relations, some scholars (see Aziz, 1995; Wynne-Hughes, 2012; Goldman & Neubauer-Shani, 2017) have highlighted how tourism may contribute to the terror landscape. Aziz (1995: 93), for instance, argues that being exposed to the excesses of tourism

and comparing these to the structural inequalities present in local settlements, may foster resentment amongst certain disenfranchised groups of people. In light of this, the present study will offer a critical analysis to question whether there are factors particular to tourism that may foster terrorism, with the ultimate aim of incorporating these insights into the wider conversation about the relationship between these two facets of our globalised world.

In considering the terrorism-tourism nexus further, it can be said that terrorist attacks may be directed against tourists in some cases, or the region may suffer from general incidences of terror which deter people from visiting the country for fear of becoming coincidental victims. Egypt, as one of the case studies of this thesis, epitomises both issues. Much of the country's economy has been founded on marketing itself as a tourist destination for international visitors, but in the same breath, the country has experienced terrorism on a large scale and moreover, has suffered through targeted attacks against tourists themselves. Illustrating this, the tragic events of 18 November 1997 will ring in the memory of people who contemplate visiting Egypt for a long time to come. On this day, 70 people, including 60 tourists, were killed by Islamic militants outside the Temple of Hatshepsut in Luxor – an attack which has aroused fear in the tourist market, and decreased subsequent tourist flows into the country (Jehl, 1997). This event is an excellent illustration of the issue, but several terrorism attacks that have targeted tourists in Egypt will be further highlighted in this study.

Kenya is another nation that has been plagued by high-profile terrorist attacks involving tourists. Amongst the most significant events used to study the potential terrorism-tourism link, are the coordinated terrorist attacks of 28 November 2002 in which the Paradise Hotel in Mombasa was bombed, and missiles were simultaneously launched at an Israeli *Arkia* passenger jet (Fighel, 2011: 1). Attacks on tourists and ordinary citizens represent strikes against *soft targets*, who remain relatively undefended from violence of this nature. Due to the danger of possible exposure to terrorist forces whilst travelling to certain destinations, feelings of vulnerability and risk are often intractably linked to tourism, and tourists may choose to visit alternative destinations to escape this risk (Neumayer & Plümper, 2016: 197). When examining the terror landscape in Kenya today, Al-Shabaab – a Somali-based Al-Qaeda affiliate group – is held liable for most of the terror attacks in the region, with these attacks predominantly taking place in Kenya's Coastal and North-Eastern provinces (Muna, 2017: 289). This group has spread its transnational wings from Somalia into Kenya, and has claimed responsibility for the 2013 terrorist attack on the Westgate shopping centre, as well as for the 2015 attack on the

Garissa University, which left close to 150 people dead (Sevenso, Karimi & Smith-Spark, 2019). Furthermore, specifically with regard to the terrorism-tourism nexus, Al-Shabaab carried out a terrorist attack on a hotel complex in Nairobi as recently as 15 January 2019. The recency of this act emphasises the validity of exploring these issues in the present.

Investigating the relationship between the two phenomena of terrorism and tourism is likely to be constructive in ensuring that effective strategies are put in place to mitigate the risks that terrorism might hold, particularly in relation to significant economic sectors such as tourism. This is especially relevant considering the policy implications that may be derived when investigating the shortfalls of current risk management, and counter-security strategies that have been implemented in diverse contexts across the world. For instance, when examining Egypt's current approach to terrorism, it becomes evident that the government's handling of terrorists has been controversial at best. Traditionally, states with high numbers of terror attacks (as is the case in both Egypt and Kenya), rely on instruments of force to combat the problem (Ragab, 2016: 17). Holding true to this, Egypt's security policy under Abdel el-Sisi has commonly involved sweeping arrests, heavy securitisation, and the widespread use of force (Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy: 2015: 16). Similarly, in Kenya, counter-security strategies have generally neglected individual civil and political rights, leading one to question the value of such strategies in view of the political grievances that terrorists often hold (Mogire & Agade, 2011: 473). Indeed, the politics inherent in the securitisation of the tourism sector, and moreover, how one may implicate tourism as part of the legitimisation of heavy-handed counter-security strategies, is a valuable contribution towards a well-rounded understanding of the relationship between terrorism and tourism (Lisle, 2013: 129).

The rationale for this study, therefore, is to delve into terrorism and its impact on tourism, using a nuanced understanding of both concepts, in the specific contexts of Egypt and Kenya. Additionally, research conducted here will aim to provide insight as to whether specific features of tourism may contribute to the terror landscapes in these states, thus building the available literature on this issue. Including these two specific states is relevant in responding to such queries, as both Egypt and Kenya have been affected by terror attacks generally carried out by Islamic militants. Both contexts, moreover, possess a strong economic reliance on tourism, with tourism being Kenya's second greatest supplier of foreign exchange (annual tourism earnings before the COVID-19 pandemic numbered approximately \$1.54 billion) (Gebre, 2019). The economic consequences can pave the way for a spill-over effect into the

political domain to occur, especially regarding the amount of capital available to be spent on development programmes. As a result, research on such a topic has consequences for the people within these contexts, and by interrogating ways of mitigating the impact of terrorism on tourism, this research could have policy implications for improving the situations for those operating within these environments. Conversely, a better understanding of tourism can help to comprehend tourism's potential role in perpetuating structural issues that may spark terror. This, in turn, could assist in grasping the relationship between terrorism and tourism more fully, and ultimately, would aim to provide insight in how best to move forward with the tourism sector so as to moderate these risks.

1.3. Problem statement and research question

With the entrenchment of an increasingly globalised world following the bipolar politics of the Cold War era, two features have gained traction. Tourism and terrorism both thrive on the amplified transnational connections between people from various states that such a world has engineered. From this perspective, the relationship between the two is worthy of study. Tourism, for instance, represents a lucrative economic sector with significant developmental potential, especially for countries in the Global South. In recent times, however, it has been threatened by a growing number of terror attacks experienced in diverse contexts across the globe. Many scholars have conducted research on the influence of terrorism on tourism and have generally concluded that terrorism negatively impacts tourism industry flows (see Llorca-Vivero (2008); Buckley & Klemm (1993); Enders & Sandler (1991); Drakos & Kutan (2003) for examples). Although there may be a general trend toward a negative economic impact, it is important to understand the specific features that may influence the duration of the effect on the sector or how severely the market initially reacts to the terrorist attack. This can include both objective and subjective features of the attack, such as the number of lives lost or the victims' identities. This candidate, therefore, will analyse the material impact of terrorist attacks on the tourism sector through available literature, to ascertain how terrorism influences tourism, as well as how it influences the wider economy, in the chosen contexts of Egypt and Kenya.

In this study, the researcher will, moreover, venture beyond this to engage with the practices of tourism itself. This will be an effort to explore whether tourism is merely a casualty of terrorism, or whether tourism can be held to account for perpetuating power asymmetries in

certain spaces, and so, may contribute toward the production of terror in particular ways. Indeed, this part of the question will explore the degree of responsibility that the tourism industry should take in the production of power in its relations with locals, but will also consider whether the sector economically benefits local people and surrounding communities. The latter issue can have implications for whether locals support the presence of the tourism sector in their countries, and may contribute toward their negative attitude toward tourism and the West, especially when tourism involves attracting tourists to the Global South. A study of the relationship between tourism and terrorism becomes especially relevant in view of the presence of terror attacks that directly target tourists, as can be witnessed in both Egypt and Kenya. Clarifying this issue may, furthermore, help to understand how the tourism sector can engage in more responsible tourism and ultimately, how to handle terrorism to deal with the roots of the issue, rather than engaging with it at a purely cursory level. Since this is an issue that has not been significantly investigated in available literature, this study is aimed at filling a potential gap in how individuals engage with the terrorism-tourism nexus.

The research question for this thesis, therefore, reads as follows:

What is the relationship between terrorism and tourism in the contexts of Egypt and Kenya?

In answering this question, the candidate will, firstly, aim to outline how literature dealing with the impact of terrorism on tourism applies to the two case studies at hand. Rather than illustrating an overarching negative impact, as has been commonly explored in literature, she will also seek to answer which specific contextual conditions will impact most severely on the tourism sector. Again, this will be applied to the cases of Egypt and Kenya. Lastly, this study will reflect an attempt to contend with the other side of the terrorism-tourism dynamic by exploring whether there are risk factors present in the tourism sector that can make the industry particularly vulnerable to terrorism. This study will not offer all the answers, but will, ultimately, be an attempt to clarify pathways for future research. It will, moreover, provide policy implications for the tourism sector's management of its affairs in the wake of terrorist attacks, but will also expose the sector's own vulnerabilities and responsibilities in perpetuating issues that might shape the terrorism landscape. This will contribute toward mitigating the fallout from terrorism and allow for pre-emptive possibilities that strengthen the industry's resilience against terrorism.

1.4. Research design and methodology

1.4.1. Research design

The research design of this study is a qualitative, multiple case-study based design, with Egypt and Kenya being considered exclusively. The case-study design was chosen, as it allows exploration of a phenomenon (the relationship between terrorism and tourism) in its context (in Egypt and Kenya, where both terrorism and tourism are present), ‘to ensure that the issue is not explored through one lens, but rather a variety of lenses which allows for multiple facets of the phenomenon to be revealed and understood’ (Baxter & Jack, 2008: 544). A two-country case-study method was chosen because this design can help to explore and investigate structures and phenomena comprehensively, allowing generalisability beyond that of merely a single case-study (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003: 8). This can assist in clarifying the relationship between the two variables more intricately than a single case-study would allow, as it minimises the impact resulting from the specificities of individual case studies (Burnham et. al., 2008: 69). Moreover, the case-study design allows for detail that large-N studies may not permit, which is important when investigating a topic as nuanced as this. In this study, however, only two countries will be examined due to limits in scope and resources. Therefore, proving theory will not be the priority, and widespread generalisability will be limited (Burnham et. al., 2008: 70). The priority, instead, will be to examine the case studies closely, and to pilot the way for future research into fundamental issues surrounding the topic.

1.4.2. Research methodology

Due to the time constraints of studying such a dense topic, the dominant methodology employed will be a desktop analysis, which will explore secondary literature as a basis for building arguments about the relationship between terrorism and tourism. This limits the ethical constraints, since no interviews will be conducted, or sensitive data used. Instead, the information which will ground this study will be gathered mainly through Stellenbosch University’s library e-databases, such as Academic Search Premier, as well as through books accessed at the library and by using public access tools, such as Google Scholar. Limited primary data will be used: for instance, statistics collected by other organisations (e.g. the Global Terrorism Index). This study is exploratory: exploring the relationship between terrorism and tourism, by questioning how terrorism impacts tourism, and questioning which conditions might promote a more severe reaction from the tourism sector. In recognising this

relationship as a two-way street, the candidate will also interrogate how (and whether) tourism might, in turn, influence the terror landscape in the contexts of Egypt and Kenya.

This style of study was chosen since quantitative research to determine the impact of terrorism on tourism can become costly, time-intensive and complex, due to differing schools of thought on how best to measure such an impact.¹ A large body of literature (for examples, see Llorca-Vivero (2008); Goldman & Neubauer-Shani (2017); Buckley & Klemm (1993); Enders & Sandler (1991); Drakos & Kutan (2003) concludes that terrorism, in general, negatively impacts tourism, and leads to drops in tourist flows. The aim of this study is not to contest the general tide of literature, but rather to examine this literature further, for clearer insights into the conditions that may exacerbate the impact of terrorism on the tourism sector and vice-versa. These factors will be examined as they appear within the study's chosen case-studies. As a result, this candidate does not seek to establish causal relationships between the two phenomena. She will, instead investigate the relationship between terrorism and tourism from two angles, grounded in research that has previously been conducted. The latter part of the relationship — how tourism can influence terrorism — lends itself specifically to a more critical, exploratory analysis, as this body of work is still in the discovery phase, where it is charting potential avenues for further study and testing (Swedberg, 2020: 17).

1.4.3. Choice of case studies

Egypt and Kenya were chosen as the case studies for this research, as they are two tourism-reliant economies, which are subject to an active presence by terrorist groups. Visiting Ancient Egyptian historical landmarks, such as the Pyramids of Giza, is a large draw-factor to the country. In Kenya, there is a significant eco-tourism sector, with a high demand for people to visit Kenya's national parks, including to view the annual wildebeest migrations in the Maasai Mara National Reserve. Terrorism, likewise, is apparent in both states, due to activities of groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Egypt, and the primacy of Al-Shabaab in and around Kenya. Given that the two states have shared experiences in terms of their geographical region (Africa), both possess a strong tourism sector, and since both are subject to the casualties of Islamic terrorism, a multiple case-study design using these particular states is a worthy choice, as each one can highlight key insights on the topic.

¹ The variety in the measures chosen varies greatly between studies, some using drops in Gross Domestic Product, or number of bookings to measure this impact.

1.5. Conceptual frameworks

1.5.1. *Terrorism*

Terrorism is a phenomenon that has existed since the beginning of time, evidenced in the state-driven Reign of Terror in France, and the National Liberation Front's use of terror tactics in Algeria. According to Richter and Waugh, Jr. (1986: 230), 'the use or threat of violence for its psychological impact as a means to achieve political ends may be as old as inter-communal conflict, certainly older than war'. There are many complexities in defining terrorism, which will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 2. For operational use in this thesis, however, *terrorism* will be defined as:

acts (or threats) of violence that are shocking in nature, and have an agenda to disrupt normal societal function, so as to enact certain political, ideological, social, or religious changes through the medium of fear or intimidation.²

In many studies, terrorism is regarded as an identity, with groups of people using this to justify *us vs them* rhetoric, particularly in the case of Islamic terrorism. More accurately, terrorism should be interpreted as a violent method for political change (Bjørge, 2005: 2). Terror attacks are often directed at soft targets, such as at civilians or strategic properties, in order to induce strong emotional reactions in an audience, and to encourage social and political change in the more powerful, indirect audience (often governmental agencies or institutions) (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2018: 1). A shock factor, and the media's willingness to spread it, is often used as leverage by terrorists, and this has precipitated a retaliatory reaction by governments across the world. Securitisation policies that have been implemented since the events of 11 September 2001 (9/11) have amplified efforts toward solving this threat, thereby piloting a path for the War on Terror to take a hold over society. This important dynamic will be explored to a certain degree within this study.

1.5.2. *Tourism*

Tourism, at its essence, is based on offering people from other places an experience which is orientated around leisure, business, amongst other travel requirements (Lepp, Gibson & Lane, 2011: 676). In distinguishing tourism from other forms of migration, tourism involves travelling to a destination for a limited time only, rather than indefinitely – usually premised

² See Hoffmann, 2006 for a review of terrorism definitions. Terrorism by non-state actors will be the primary focus of this study, as state terrorism is a markedly different issue.

around attaining goods and services which inspire pleasure in the consumer (Thompson, 2011: 693; Urry, 2002: 1). Given the globalised world in which we operate, it is critical to understand how connections between states can be harnessed for the betterment of society. In looking to the political sphere, tourism has commonly been framed as part of a programme that works toward producing a cultural currency, where soft power is produced through exchanges between people, and through projecting an image of one's country abroad (Nye, 2004, 13).

In addition, tourism, according to English, can provide a valuable 'source of foreign exchange, jobs, tax revenue and economic diversification' (1986: 81). Indeed, tourism globally accounts for a large economic sector, and has witnessed a general trend of growth in the last few years. The United Nations World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO) set a goal for 2020 – by which time they aimed for 1.4 billion tourists to arrive at international destinations annually (UNWTO, 2019). Surpassing such hopes, the data for the 2018 business year suggested that this target had been reached two years ahead of schedule (UNWTO, 2019). Harnessing this growth is regarded as especially important for states in the Global South, including Egypt and Kenya, which may be heavily reliant on the tourism sector to boost the state's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), or to provide jobs to local people (Thompson, 2011: 699). Moreover, these revenues, if utilised properly, have the potential to open up developmental possibilities, by freeing up capital for the purpose of societal upliftment, and so increasing access to education, health, and other basic human rights.

Tourism, however, should not be appraised as a wholly beneficial, or politically neutral undertaking. In viewing the history of tourism, for instance, Hunter (2004: 28) implicates tourism in imperial practices and relationships, with Europeans coming to other societies and 'lend[ing] money to local rulers, driv[ing] them into debt, and forc[ing] their governments into bankruptcy'. Moreover, according to Foucault (1980: 98), individuals are exposed to the impacts of power, but are also agents in constructing it. If one examines tourism with this in mind, one might notice how the 'tourist gaze'³ may establish a political *Other* by isolating the object of the *gaze* and connecting it to understandings of power relations between groups (Urry, 2002: 151; Coles & Church, 2007: 25-26). Although supposedly benign, in postcolonial settings this *gaze* can be particularly problematic, given how global patterns of exploitation and consumption are visible in the past, present, and probably, the future. As a consequence,

³ This term was inspired by Foucault's (2003) investigation of the *medical gaze*, in 'Birth of the clinic: An archaeology of medical perception'.

engaging with current practices of tourism, and furthermore, detailing how tourism should be responsibly carried out in future, is a useful avenue to explore in this study. This has the potential to shed light upon whether the possibility exists that tourist practices may be culpable in reinforcing power dynamics which could lead to political violence – in this case, terror.

1.5.3. *Terrorism and tourism*

When considering tourism in relation to terrorism, most studies confirm the notion that tourists would prefer to visit a destination that can offer them a certain level of safety (see Sönmez, Apostolopoulos & Tarlow, 1999; Krakover, 2000; Pizam & Fleischer, 2002; Richter & Waugh, 1986).⁴ Indeed, in the aftermath of terrorist incidences, the demand for tourism is thought to decrease, as tourists make a rational cost-benefit analysis when selecting their destination of choice (Enders, Sandler & Parise, 1992: 533). It can be said that because tourism is an economic sector that relies on attracting visitors, and further, because many tourist destinations can be replaced by others offering greater safety, the tourism sector is particularly vulnerable to the influences of terrorism (Aranã & León, 2008: 300). According to available literature, risk perception can enter this equation, as a part of this rational choice would be to assess the destination-safety based on available sources of information (see Sönmez & Graefe, 1998; Lepp, Gibson & Lane, 2011). Beyond rationality, however, Yang and Nair (2014: 325) explore how ‘emotional reaction[s] override cognitive evaluation[s]’ in response to terror, and as a result, an image of the risks involved in visiting a place may supersede the actual risks of the place. Playing into this, some accounts examine how Islamic terror is portrayed in the world and how this might impact tourism, through an increase in perceived risk spurred on by Islamophobia in the Western world (see Wynne-Hughes, 2012).

It is integral for studies of this nature to provide nuanced perspectives on how terrorism may impact tourism, rather than merely pointing to an overall negative impact. For instance, the severity and frequency of terrorist acts at the destination may influence how negatively the tourism sector is affected by a terrorist attack (see Pizam & Fleischer, 2002). Moreover, the reaction toward terrorism may be influenced by the kind of terror attack that is undertaken, and the motivation behind the attack. For instance, tourists might be the unwitting victims of attacks when they are *caught in the crossfire* of attacks, but perhaps the most damaging to the tourism sector is when tourists are the *direct target* of terrorism (Pizam & Mansfeld, 2006: 4;13). In

⁴ For an example of a counter-perspective on the Northern Ireland case, see Simone-Charteris & Boyd (2010).

these cases, other tourists visiting this destination may feel vulnerable to similar forces, or experience a sense of personal grievance that an attack on their demographic is symbolic of an attack on their unique culture (Neumayer & Plümper, 2016: 197). In this study, the candidate will not measure the impact of terrorism over tourism, but will point out some of the factors which may influence the tourism sector in this manner.

Some studies have examined the relationship between terrorism and tourism in an unconventional way. Wynne-Hughes (2012) and Goldman and Neubauer-Shani (2017), for instance, consider how tourism influences terrorism, rather than the inverse. In similar vein, Aziz (1995: 93) examines the inequalities present between tourists and local populations and how these may foster disharmony among these groups, nurturing feelings that may encourage terrorist acts to be undertaken. Somewhat reminiscent of an imperial past, this North to South tourism ‘injects the behaviour of a wasteful society in the midst of a society of want’, causing frustration amongst local peoples and potentially eliciting the phenomenon of relative deprivation, where inequality may lead to violence (Aziz, 1995:93; English, 1986: 48). As a consequence, an awareness of certain structural issues in Egypt and Kenya that may be sustained through the tourism sector will be investigated in this study. This will be in the hope of supporting the development of long-term strategies that can address the root causes of terrorism. Interrogating how terrorism influences tourism and how tourism influences terrorism is, therefore, central to understanding the relationship between the two concepts in greater detail. This study will present a review of the literature on this relationship, in order to give impetus to the debate on how best to tackle weaknesses in both dimensions. Undertaking this will assist in ensuring that the tourism sector can be a valuable economic sector in tourism-reliant states which, in turn, may also encounter security issues, and will provide policy implications in this regard.

1.6. Outline of the study

Chapter 1 is an introductory chapter to the research. It provides the aims of the study, the background, a brief conceptual and methodological framework, and states the research question.

Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature dealing with the impact of terrorism on tourism. Firstly, in this chapter, the candidate will examine the political literature on the subject of terrorism, in order to understand the tactics and motivations of terrorism itself. She will also

investigate the definitional issues of the concept. The review will then delve more deeply into the impact of terrorism on tourism, examining the general literature gleaned from a variety of case-studies and cross-country analyses, including literature based on data from the specific contexts of Egypt and Kenya. In this section, the candidate will compare the literature, pointing out strengths and limitations of arguments in relation to each other. This will set the stage for a thorough contextual analysis in Chapters 3 and 4, based on Egypt and Kenya.

Chapter 3 deals specifically with Egypt. Background information on Egypt will be provided, as well as an in-depth look at the Egyptian tourism industry and its terror landscape. The candidate will examine the links between terrorism and tourism in the Egyptian context, paying attention to certain cautions and caveats that the Egyptian milieu may provide. For instance, the specificity of many of Egypt's tourist sites make it difficult for other destinations to replace Egypt, thereby influencing the relationship between terrorism and tourism in the context.

Chapter 4 is an in-depth examination of Kenya: its background, tourism industry, terror landscape, and ultimately, how terror may impact tourism in the Kenyan context. A similar structure of the layout and themes will be implemented, as in Chapter 3, where the context-specific challenges of the Kenyan terrorism-tourism relationship will be explored, including how its geopolitical location influences the dynamic between the two features.

Chapter 5 is an evaluation and conclusion, based on the material covered in Chapters 1 to 4. In this chapter, the candidate will assess how the research question of this study has been answered. She will examine gaps identified in the literature, how this study has addressed these gaps, point the way for future directions that research on this subject could take in order to inform how a healthy tourism sector can be fostered in the face of terrorism. This study will ultimately make policy recommendations relating to the terrorism-tourism nexus.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1. Introduction

As a side-effect of our globalised world, terrorism has become largely transnational in nature, since people, money, information, and weapons can be spread across borders with increased ease. Globalisation, too, has allowed new tourism destinations to rise to the fore, as improved transport networks and increased access to information allow people to travel to a host of destinations, thus making the world seem closer and more connected. Exploring the relationship between terrorism and tourism has, therefore, gained more urgency in the modern world. Some consider this to be a simple relationship – incidents of terrorism negatively impact the tourism sector – but it can be argued that this relationship is far more complex. As such, it would be prudent to consider the relationship from both angles to study whether tourism, in turn, may create risk factors that could foster terrorism in some contexts.

This chapter will be an attempt to delve deeper into the concept of *terrorism*, so as to lay the foundations for understanding the relationship between terrorism and tourism, based on literature, rather than on abstract understandings of the concept. Next, tourism will be discussed, and what it means to be a responsible tourist when visiting a destination. This may dictate certain explicit and implicit rules that govern tourist behaviour, since practices in the tourism sector may contribute toward risk factors for terrorism to occur within the destination society. In examining this issue, the present study will not overtly aim to answer whether tourism impacts terrorism, but will provide a framing that can help to identify terrorism risk factors in the tourism sector. Lastly, in this chapter, the researcher will examine the relationship between terrorism and tourism and will consider both aspects of the question – how terrorism can impact the tourism sector and how tourism can influence the terrorism landscape. This will be explored in Chapters 3 and 4, when examining the context through the lens of the two case studies.

2.2. Terrorism

2.2.1. What is terrorism?

Despite scholarly attempts at defining a notion of terrorism, the concept has largely eluded classification, and remains one of the most challenging conceptual frameworks in Conflict Studies. A vague idea of terrorism has been ingrained into the fabric of everyday communication, with diverse acts of violence being correspondingly labelled (Hoffmann,

2006: 1). Laqueur (1977: 5), widely believed to be one of the most prominent terrorism scholars, thought that the absence of a definition does not exclude terrorism from being studied, as research into its characteristics could still be useful. Conversely, Gibbs (1989: 329), rejected Laqueur's (1977) argument on the premise that one would need some kind of basic definition in order to begin to make propositions about it. Building on Gibb's argument, it can be said that the implications of not having a definition are wide, especially given the policy changes that have emerged as part and parcel of the global *War on Terror*. According to former Lebanese President, Emile Lahoud, 'it is not enough to declare war on what one deems terrorism without giving a precise and exact definition' (quoted in Al Jazeera, 2004).

Attempting to provide a definition of terrorism is, therefore, expedient to dealing with its challenges. The first concern in defining terrorism is to distinguish it from other forms of violence. In a political sense, the chief areas of confusion lie in differentiating the concept from both *conventional war* and *guerrilla warfare*. Meraki's (1993: 227) work speaks to differences between these three concepts, with *terrorism* diverging from *conventional* and *guerrilla warfare* on the basis of unit size, weaponry, tactics, targets, and some other considerations. Unlike conventional and guerrilla warfare which are predominantly focused on military personnel, the targets of terrorism are 'state symbols, political opponents, and the public at large' (Meraki, 1993: 227). A preference for smaller unit sizes⁵ may also be factors that assist in distinguishing the concept from its counterparts. For a more conclusive look into the common ways that people have distinguished between these politically-motivated acts of violence, see Meraki (1993) or Ganor (2002).

Terrorism, itself, offers unique possibilities when studying tourism. As fear is terrorism's major source of capital, tourism may be especially hard-hit by terrorist acts of violence, as this is an industry that is reliant on sentiment (Weimann, 2005: 380). Although civil unrest, rioting, and wars may impact tourism inadvertently, tourists are not often directly targeted in the same way as they might be in terrorism. These acts of violence, moreover, may be restricted to certain areas, and there is arguably a larger degree of predictability about where and when they will occur, due to the logistics involved in organising large groups of people to demonstrate, or to engage in warfare. Terrorism, however, does not typically rely on large numbers of people, or extensive weaponry, and can consequently remain concealed long enough to impact even the

⁵ Suicide terrorism, for example, would only necessitate an individual actor.

most public of spaces, thereby giving rise to maximum shock value (Meraki, 1993: 227). This speaks to the relevance of studying this particular political phenomenon in relation to tourism. Exploring these features, and providing a workable definition of terrorism, becomes the task at hand. State terrorism will not be outlined in this thesis, since most states would not target tourists, thus making this unimportant to the discussion.⁶ Defining non-state terrorism is complex, given how the term has transformed over the years in response to the political agendas of the time (Schmid, 2004: 395; Hoffmann, 2006). Schmid and Jongman (1983) provide an outline of available terrorism definitions, with more than one hundred definitions surveyed in the process. These studies provide useful references for orientating oneself in the literature, but struggle to form a conclusion. There are, however, common elements featuring in most definitions, which can help to understand the crux of the concept. From the simple Chinese saying ‘kill one, frighten ten thousand’ (quoted in Schmid, 2004: 47), to the more complex chronologies offered by modern terrorism theorists (Hoffmann (2006) for example), it is evident that capitalising on fear is one of the common themes present in definitions.

In speaking to this sense of fear brought about by terrorism, the notion of an audience is important. An audience may not only be the immediate target of the attack (i.e. the victims killed), as governmental agencies may be the true target when tourists are attacked (Gibbs, 1989: 339; Ryan, 1993: 180).⁷ This notion of an audience denotes a political motive of terrorism that rejects definitional strains which attempt to construct terrorism as senseless violence (see Boudry (2018) for a critique on this perspective). Understanding that there is a motivation also helps to distinguish the topic from a purely criminal act, where violence is performed for personal gain (Hoffmann, 2006: 37). Targets, moreover, can be human or non-human. Aiming an attack at a non-human target is a strategic decision, with economic costs being the goal for such attacks. For instance, targeting an energy grid in a terror attack would mean that many industries lose out economically (Tichy & Eichler, 2018: 452). In our globalised world, terrorism has become increasingly transnational, and is rarely restricted to the domestic domain, as people, money, and weapons are able to move between states in the modern day with relative ease (Turk, 2004: 276).

⁶ Usually tourists would, in fact, bolster state power through improved economic clout, emerging from tourism revenues.

⁷ The media, then, can increase the number of people exposed to the terror attack, and thus might amplify the public reaction to it (see Altheide, 2006 for an account of media’s role in terrorism).

It can undeniably be argued, therefore, that terrorism is a complex subject. In referring back to Chapter 1 of this study, *terrorism* was operationalised as ‘*acts (or threat) of violence that are shocking in nature, and have an agenda to disrupt normal societal function, so as to enact certain political, ideological, social, or religious changes through the medium of fear or intimidation.*’ This definition incorporates important aspects of the terrorism debate. Firstly, it indicates how violence does not necessarily have to be conducted in order for terrorist goals to be met, as the threat alone may fulfil this function. Next, it distinguishes terrorism from other forms of violence by incorporating a psychological element of shock, or fear. In addition, it is differentiated from general acts of crime by highlighting the presence of a higher cause, for which purpose terrorists are taking action to advance. Lastly, in speaking to acts of violence, it allows for human and non-human targets to be incorporated into the discussion, thereby incorporating the destruction to property into the classification. Such a definition may exclude a degree of nuance in the concept, but uses previous literature as a basis to provide a workable definition by which the argument in this study might be framed.

2.2.2. *Causes of terrorism*

As terrorists may be motivated by disparate motivations, it can be said that there is ‘no single profile of a terrorist’ (Gupta, 2005: 16). In some cases, motivations may be political, in others, religious.⁸ Rather than becoming caught up in the specificities of each case, this section will provide an outline of the risk factors that have commonly been expounded upon in the literature, particularly focusing on socio-economic and political factors, rather than those such as individuals’ upbringings, nature, and psychology.⁹ In doing so, it is important to realise that theorising this is problematic, due to the complex nature of grievance, frustration, and motivation on a mass scale. Moreover, in generalising, the risk is that one may regard terrorists as passive entities, acted upon by their social and economic worlds (Bjørøgo, 2005: 3). Instead, their goals might be politically strategic, and subject to careful thought – even if grounded in their particular views of reality. Navigating the main schools of thought in the literature that are most relevant to the topic at hand will be the principal aim of this section, although no concrete answers into the causes of terrorism will be provided.

⁸ In relation to terrorism against tourist establishments, it can be either.

⁹ Individual factors differ to a significant level depending on individual personalities and radicalisation mechanisms. Examining a terrorist personality, however, can give way to interpretations which pathologise terrorism, labelling it as *senseless violence*. This, therefore, will not be explored in depth in this study.

Terrorism, for many, has historically been regarded as acts of senseless violence, and as a result, examining its roots was seen as less important. In providing a fuller account of the phenomenon, recent studies have interrogated the structural causes of terrorism. In line with this, poverty is a variable which has surfaced in academic and everyday discourse. In a statement made by United States President George W. Bush at the International Conference on Financing for Development, he asserted that ‘we will challenge the poverty and hopelessness and lack of education and failed governments that too often allow conditions that terrorists can seize and try to turn to their advantage’ (Bush, 2002). These words illustrate the speculative notion that poverty is tied to terrorism. Malecková (2005: 35), however, criticises the concept of an ‘impoverished’ terrorist by drawing on empirical research to suggest a weak causal relationship between poverty and terrorism (see Abadie, 2006; Krueger and Malecková, 2002 for similar studies). Indeed, Abadie (2006: 51) argues that when controlling for outside variables (such as political freedom), poverty is not regarded a significant factor in precipitating terrorism (Malecková, 2005: 37).

Recent literature, therefore, indicates that a direct relationship between the two is unlikely, but this does not necessarily mean that they are diametrically unrelated. Relative deprivation, especially in states undergoing large-scale economic changes, may result in an increase in expectations, from which frustration can arise if these expectations are not met. Indeed, several studies have probed the link between relative deprivation – the gap between what one thinks one should have and what one actually has – and collective violence (see Gurr, 1968; 1970). In relation to terror, being exposed to the excesses of tourism and comparing them to the structural inequalities present in the context of the Global South might lead to aggression (Pizam & Smith, 2000: 124). This is certainly true of Egypt and Kenya, where there are high levels of poverty, pitched against the backdrop of a well-developed luxury tourism sector. Building on the above argument, rapid economic growth through modernisation might increase the likelihood that relative deprivation would occur due to shifts in socio-economic standing of some people and not others, and so, would underline feelings of frustration (Goldman & Neubauer-Shani, 2016: 454). This, however, could also result from a cultural clash, where a notion of modernisation is pitched as a threat to traditional cultural or religious values, as might be the case in Islamic terror. One must also be careful in making such conclusions, however, as discussing Islam as anti-modern might play into the *us vs them* distinctions that could, in fact, perpetuate terrorism.

Other theories for the root causes of terror lie in globalisation: the increased ease with which the exchange of people, weapons, and ideals can occur may help to spread terrorism across borders at a rapid rate (Baregu, 2006: 104). Indeed, amplified transnationality has allowed for non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, to utilise this globalised economy to their advantage, with the illegal weapons trade prospering due to a high volume of goods crossing borders, and difficulties in monitoring them. Furthermore, financial capital can be interchanged with relative ease, allowing terrorist groups to remain under the radar and protected by international banks that promote secrecy, or through an unregulated rise of cyber-currency (Li & Schaub, 2004: 235). With cross-border connections increasing, this may lead to conflict in places beyond the original country, and therefore constitute a risk factor for regional spill-over (Goldman & Neubauer-Shani, 2016: 454). This is possibly true in the case of Al-Shabaab, where terrorism spread from Somalia into Kenya. It should be cautioned, however, that globalisation may increase the ease with which terrorism may be conducted, but there would still need to be underlying issues present. Although it is not in the scope of this study to conduct a full investigation into the other causes of terrorism, further risk factors for radicalisation, such as ethnic or political exclusion, are also relevant to the study at hand (see Choi & Piazza, 2016: 37). It must be noted, however, that the methodological costs of conducting generalised research on the causes of terrorism are high, given how there are different motivations across time and place (Crenshaw, 1981: 392). It is, therefore, prudent to adopt a contextually-based analysis which takes into account the specificities of the state, its people, the socio-political domain, as well as the direct motivations of established terrorist groups.

2.2.3. *Islamic terrorism*

Since Egypt and Kenya have both been subject to Islamic terrorism, there will be some discussion of the concept of *jihad* and other issues related to the rise of Islamic terrorism in the modern day, in this section. *Jihad*, in English, translates to *struggle*, which may denote some form of self-sacrifice for one's religion, whether it be through writing, preaching, or financing charity (Mohammad, 1985: 385; 386). Certain interpretations of *jihad*, however, are coupled with a belief that death whilst fighting to promote Islam, guarantees a place in paradise (Rapoport, 1988: 195). *Jihad*, from the perspectives of those using violence as a means to fulfil it, is usually in response to the imposition of Western-orientated secular rule on traditionally Islamic societies (Mohammad, 1985: 395-396). In both Egypt and Kenya, which are postcolonial societies, this is likely to be relevant. In these contexts, tourism can act as a visible

manifestation of this increasing Westernisation, which is perceived to be a threat to Islamic values, especially when tourists come from the primarily Western, Global North.

An examination of how Islamic terrorism is interpreted gives an insight into the reaction that can be seen toward Islam in many Western countries. After Fukuyama's (1989) seminal work which predicted an 'end of history', Huntington (1993) released an article which reflected a different hypothesis. His argument also premised itself around the post-Cold War milieu, but instead claimed that there would be a 'clash of civilisations', and that future war would be based on cultural differences, rather than on ideological or economic ones (Huntington, 1993: 1). As such, modern day religious terrorism is part of a fear of Western norms and values that have taken root in many societies, which has, in turn, sparked a fear of Islamic values, immigrants, and religious terrorism. Indeed, 9/11 was an influential incident in positioning Islamic acts of terror as a particularly dangerous brand of terrorism. As a result, a pervasive sense of fear emerged, and resulted in a slew of rhetoric which posed Islam to be the enemy of the Western neoliberal agenda (Sharify-Funk, 2013: 444). Against this backdrop, when deliberating on perceived risk amongst tourists, it would be useful consider the feelings of fear that Islamic terrorism may ignite in Western tourists. In turn, it may also be relevant to consider how this notion of a cultural clash impacts on the way that Islamic people perceive Western tourists.

2.2.4. Global counter-security approaches

A pervasive sense of fear regarding terrorism has emerged globally. The quality of such violence has given an impetus to various governments and their struggles to curb terrorism across the world, thereby igniting a War on Terror, which marked a new phase in global politics. In a globalised milieu, Islamic terrorism, for instance, is no longer only associated with the Middle East, but through transnationality and historical linkages, has come to be associated with new sites of radicalisation, which include Africa (Kagwanja, 2006: 73). Therefore, many countries in the West have begun to take a serious interest in the security interests of a host of *vulnerable* states, including Egypt and Kenya, and this has bolstered local counter-security measures in these contexts. There is, however, some confusion about what the root causes of terrorism are, and this has led to an unclear and inconsistent counter-security policy by most states. In enacting the War on Terror, states have engaged in war, used cyber-surveillance, invested in global development, constructed global military bases, provided

troops to other countries¹⁰, trained counter-security officers in order to meet their aims of countering terrorism on a global stage. These measures have addressed the symptoms, rather than the structural causes of terrorism, such as inequality. Many researchers suggest that coercive measures should be complemented by investment into development initiatives which aim to address these root causes of terrorism.

This, however, is a long-term strategy and is challenging to implement in practice, which leads to a preference toward employing coercive tools as a means to curb an immediate threat of terrorism. As a consequence, when observing countries that have a high frequency of terror attacks, one would generally find that states tend to rely on the use of force to control the threat of terrorism, which is not a sustainable solution to the issue (Ragab, 2016: 17). Indeed, both Egypt and Kenya have violent track records in responding to terrorism. According to Brysk (2007: 1), ‘terrorism has succeeded in destroying democracy when a national security state, without the knowledge or consent of its citizens, tortures and kills detainees, runs secret prisons, kidnaps foreign nationals and deports them to third countries to be abused’. Framing action as part of the War on Terror justifies a host of (largely illiberal) activities in the name of security (Flint & Falah, 2004: 1379).

The use of violence can, therefore, be seen to be applied discriminately, as certain groups are targeted and others are left to their own devices. Despite 2007 post-electoral violence in Kenya, no counter-security action was taken against groups with political connections. Instead, Somalian and Muslim people remained the target of counter-security interventions and were subject to state violence as a consequence (Amnesty International, 2005; Kimathi & Butt 2008, 37; Mogire & Agade, 2011: 477). As such, disproportionate power was given to forces that used their positions towards a political agenda. One must, therefore, question whether current practices are sufficient in addressing terrorism, especially when counter-security forces remain undertrained and resort to heavy-handed, sweeping approaches toward supposed *terrorists*. These initiatives should attempt to address the root causes of terrorism, rather than using repression to superficially curb it. If excessively violent, it could increase the chances of radicalisation, since harsh governmental blowback can create sympathy toward the cause, thereby bolstering the legitimacy of terrorist groups to the public (Pizam & Smith, 2000: 125).

¹⁰ See the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa in Djibouti, for an example.

2.3. Tourism

2.3.1. What is tourism?

As has been operationalised in Chapter 1 of this study, a *tourist* can be regarded as ‘*a temporarily leisured person who voluntarily visits a place away from home for the purpose of experiencing a change*’ (Smith, 1989:1). What is important about this definition is that tourism involves some kind of experience beyond that which may usually be offered, and touches on the notion that this would constitute a break from one’s ordinary routine. To speak of a generic notion of *tourist* might be limiting, due to the diverse reasons that people may hold for travelling, whether it be for business, leisure, religious pilgrimage, or other motivations requiring temporary movement to an alternate destination. In the traditional sense, this usually invokes pleasure in the consumer through participation in the consumption of goods and services (Thompson, 2011: 693; Urry, 2002: 1). The decision to travel and, importantly, the destination, involves a complex array of push and pull factors that may be personal in nature, or may involve shared understandings of what certain destinations can offer to tourists.

When one analyses the push factors that contribute toward a decision to leave home, many people are looking for a break from the responsibilities of their everyday lives. This is especially true of leisure tourism, where relaxation is thought to be the order of the day, and people are pushed to meet this need accordingly. According to Urry (2002: 4), people participate in tourism because this act represents their participation in the modern, liberal experience. Not participating in tourism would be likened to not possessing a house or car: an illustration of the privilege which many tourists enjoy. This is often juxtaposed with the lived experiences of the people in many of the destinations these tourists are visiting (Urry, 2002: 4). The pull factors for visiting a destination speak to why people would choose one particular destination over another. For instance, one person might want to visit a warmer, beach holiday destination, but another person might choose a destination for its historical value (Graburn, 2018: 18). Such typologies of tourism include environmental, cultural, or historical tourism, with Egypt predominantly representing a historical destination, and Kenya, an environmental one (Smith, 1989: 5). In some cases, there may be many destinations offering similar experiences, leading to people substituting one destination in favour of another (Liu & Pratt, 2017: 405-406). One might, for instance, choose a certain beach destination because it is closer to the holidaymaker’s home, or because it offers a higher degree of safety and security. This important concept will be discussed in more depth during the course of this study.

Tourism-related industries often contribute significantly to the economy: with employment, FDI, and GDP being some of the areas that are influenced. The link between tourism and economic growth has been documented by a range of scholars, and there is a shared understanding that tourism can bolster economic growth in countries (see Sequeira & Nunes, 2008; Ghali, 1974; Durbarry, 2004 for examples). If profits are used in a responsible way, this capital can be injected into development: building infrastructure, and improving services to local communities.¹¹ Furthermore, a reliance on a considerable labour force is often required for tourism to prosper, and therefore, people with various skills can be employed by the tourism sector, potentially contributing toward the livelihoods of local inhabitants in these destinations. Determining a true economic impact of the tourism sector is incredibly difficult, as there are many secondary industries involved in a tourist's destination experience, including hotels, restaurants, transport, energy, amongst others (Stabler, Papatheodorou & Sinclair, 2010: 5). As evidenced by terrorist attacks in Egypt or Kenya, terrorism has the potential to influence a broad spectrum of dependent sectors, beyond the tourism sector alone.

In developing countries, such as Egypt and Kenya, the impact of tourism on the economy is usually more dramatic than in developed countries where the economy may be more diversified (Durbarry, 2004: 391). Many developing states are more dependent on their land and natural resources for revenue, rather than on their manufacturing capacities. Tourism, however, creates a great balance: it markets a country's natural scenery, which then in turn acts as a springboard toward industrialisation, since infrastructure must be built to offer the necessary support to tourists. In developing countries, it has been found that in a third of states where tourism has been prioritised, it has become the principal source of foreign exchange, evidenced by the high rewards involved in investing in tourism (Nath, 1998, cited in Durbarry, 2004: 391). When viewing UNWTO statistics, and principally, *where* tourist arrivals are listed, these statistics reveal that Africa's tourist arrivals in 2018 totalled 67 million (a 7% growth from 2017) (UNWTO, 2019). Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, Africa's tourism sector had been, therefore, on an upturn, signifying a need to harness this resource properly so that the industry will continue on this trajectory once the pandemic-induced disruption has subsided.

¹¹ Although the tourism sector has the potential to contribute to such economic prospects, this is often not met in practice. For this reason, the notion of responsible tourism will be explored in the next section.

A further important dynamic for tourism in developing states is that it is often reliant on attracting visitors from abroad, particularly from developed states. People from such countries usually have more free capital available to spend on goods and activities in the destination they choose to visit, and consequently become important sources of revenue (Smith, 1989: 2).¹² The relations between Western tourists and their local hosts has, however, produced a complex dynamic.¹³ Part of this indicates how tourism has become embroiled in a soft power project, where cultural diplomacy is enacted through interactions between tourists and local people at destination sites (Nye, 2004: 13). President George W. Bush put it succinctly in a 2001 speech, ‘those who travel abroad for business or vacation can all be ambassadors of American values. Ours is a great story, and we must tell it, through our words and through our deeds’ (CNN, 2001). Whether this soft power currency is truly benign, however, is something that is open to interpretation and further discussion, given how the notion of responsible tourism is often neglected in common practice.

2.3.2. *Responsible tourism*

In view of the above economic and developmental potentialities that tourism can offer, an end to North-South tourism is unadvisable, even if it is accompanied by certain challenges. Tourism’s potential to perpetuate problematic power dynamics between tourists and local hosts (as will be explored later in this study), gives rise to a critical issue: examining the ethics surrounding tourism (Leslie, 2012: 1). According to Harrison and Price (1996: 2), tourism rests on an ability to transport persons to environments different from their own and to experience different cultures. In this way, culture becomes a pull factor, where people become invested in having an *exotic* experience, in which they can become a part of local traditions (Burns, 2001: 292). There is, however, a moral quandary for critical tourist practitioners about whether to market the performances of local cultures to an international viewership (Burns, 2001: 292). If tourists are framed as the purveyors of modernity and progress whilst the local hosts are represented as primitive, this dynamic becomes asymmetric, and inherently problematic (Harrison, 2001: 7). Consequently, when tourists are invested in a sharing between cultures that is unequal, damage might be inflicted, since understandings about power can be derived from seemingly benign interactions. These power relations shape the way that local people

¹² Local tourism – where people travel within their country – can also have a considerable economic impact, but this is not the focus of the study at hand.

¹³ For a critical understanding of this dynamic, refer to Wynne-Hughes, 2012; Urry, 2002. This dynamic, and its potential to foster problematic power relations, will also be explored further in this study.

view tourism, and (as will be explored later in this study), may contribute toward increased radicalisation potential when other risk factors for terrorism are present.

What it means to be a *responsible tourist* can be broad in nature. For instance, it may involve ensuring that tourism does not contribute to environmental degradation through ecologically unfriendly tourist practices. This, too, is political, due to patterns of imperial consumption and exploitation that are enshrined in the annals of history – for example, colonialists who typically used and abused resources from the colonies for their own gain can be likened to certain tourists who do the same (Pleumarom, 2012: 94). True to a large-scale mass tourism that has flooded the tourist market in recent years, many natural sites have been pillaged, vandalised, or undergone destructive environmental changes due to the actions of tourists and tourist practitioners (Leslie, 2012: 2). Unsustainable diving practices, for example, may destroy already-declining coral reefs. This harmful tourist behaviour can foster resentment amongst local people in cases where it is viewed as disrespect for the local environment. Combined with the visible inequality that is manifested through luxury tourist spaces and their juxtaposition with the lack of basic infrastructure of local people in developing countries, it has the potential to cause frustration amongst local groups (Aziz, 1995: 93). In regard to the theory of *relative deprivation*, which will be explored later, this inequality can foster political violence, including terrorism, under certain conditions.

It is, therefore, of critical importance to weigh up the costs and benefits of specific practices in the tourist sector, in order to interrogate their overall contribution. Regarding the developmental potential of tourism, profits from tourism can be harnessed toward building infrastructure and providing services for local people residing in host destinations. In practice, however, tourism rarely does so, since the capital usually is not directed in this manner, with investors and top executives more frequently benefiting. This can minimise the positive impact that tourism may have on local communities, and delegitimise a role for tourism in these societies. Attempts have been made to address this problem through provisions under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) that stresses infrastructure development in tourism, for instance (Pleumarom, 2012: 93). Lack of buy-in from governments and other relevant tourist stakeholders, however, can hamper these efforts toward tourism becoming a driver in development and poverty reduction.

2.4. The relationship between terrorism and tourism

2.4.1. Measurement of an impact of terrorism on the tourism sector

A common issue emerging from a study of available literature is how to measure the impact of terrorism on tourism in a way that allows for valid arguments. The varied nature of terrorist attacks means that generalisations can be problematic – with this being especially tenuous in studies where large-N, cross-country assumptions are made.¹⁴ Many studies (both quantitative and qualitative), have used various methodologies in investigating the role that terrorism may have on tourism, thereby allowing for a fuller picture of the situation, but also sowing division about a clear research path. This section will reflect an assessment of the ways in which an impact of terrorism on tourism has been measured in literature in order to inform the way these issues will be discussed in the present study.

It can be said that one of the most common methodologies in studies, especially in those of a quantitative nature, is to examine the number of international arrivals at tourist destinations before terrorist attacks are undertaken, and to compare these statistics to the number of arrivals after terror attacks have occurred (see Enders & Sandler, 1991; Llorca-Vivero, 2008; Bar-On, 1996). These studies usually rely on statistics provided by airline carriers, in order to gauge the number of tourists entering a state through international flights (Bar-On, 1996: 166). It is common to find a decrease in tourism in the aftermath of a terror attack, as safety is likely to be valued by tourists when choosing a destination (see Asongu, et al., 2019; Sönmez, Apostolopoulos & Tarlow, 1999, for examples). Llorca-Vivero (2008: 169) in particular, views arrival statistics as a means of deducing the impact of terrorism on tourism by delineating a difference between *normal* tourist flows and *post-terrorist* attack flows. In doing so, the study provides thorough cross-country quantitative-based accounts, with tourism arrivals between 2001-2003 from the G7¹⁵ countries to 134 destinations being used to evaluate tourist arrivals (Llorca-Vivero, 2008). This study concludes that terrorism influences tourism arrivals negatively, and moreover, suggests that the impact is more significant in developing countries (Llorca-Vivero, 2008: 184). Using quantitative measures in specific case studies, Enders & Sandler (1991: 49) confirm this finding in Spain, claiming that a typical terrorism incident

¹⁴ To mitigate this, this study uses the cases of Egypt and Kenya and their particular terror climates as its basis, thus allowing for more contextual details to be included.

¹⁵ The Group of Seven – a group of seven countries with advanced economies.

would reduce tourist arrivals by approximately 140 000 people. This could have a significant impact on a state's economy, and may lead to further social and political problems.

An issue inherent in using such a methodology to estimate the negative impact of terrorism on tourism is that there may be other factors leading to a decrease in tourist arrivals running simultaneously with incidences of terror.¹⁶ Further complications arise when using time-based studies – for instance, it has been suggested that it takes three to nine months before tourism arrivals decrease, and therefore measuring data directly after a terror attack may not be reflective of the true impact (Sönmez, 1994: 43-44). During the time directly preceding the attack, people would probably have paid for their trip, and may undergo significant expenses for cancelling at such a late stage, thus incentivising them to keep their travel plans (Neumayer & Plümper, 2016: 199; Pizam & Smith, 2000: 136). Enders and Sandler (1991) amongst others have, therefore, attempted to control for time by taking into account the delayed impact of terrorism on tourism arrivals. However, this can arguably interfere with causation, as more events occurring between the two measurements can increasingly blur the link between them.

Similar problems ensue with studies using time-series analyses to ascertain economic changes to tourism demand, market shares, or foreign exchange following terrorist attacks (see Enders, Sandler & Parise, 1992; Neumayer, 2004; Drakos & Kutan, 2003). This is regarded as another means to track the influence of terrorism on tourism, based on tourism being a significant economic sector. Due to tourism's position as an *invisible industry*, it is, however, challenging to measure an economic impact relative to supplementary services – such as transport or energy – that might be indirectly harmed by a decrease in tourism. In speaking to the utility of these studies, unlike arrival statistics alone, they incorporate awareness into the kind of tourist that might spend more money. For example, 'adventure tourists' will probably be less deterred by terror attacks, but on the other hand, are usually younger people with less spending power than the traditional mass tourist (Neumayer, 2004: 259).

Building on this, Fuchs et. al. (2012) examine the rationalisations that people make to justify visiting risky destinations, based on a statistical account of security risk perception amongst tourists. This study reflects one of many which use quantitative measures, specifically

¹⁶ This is likely to be true in regions where there is political instability that deters tourists from coming to a specific region. It is not within the scope of this study to evaluate different deterrent variables but Pizam and Mansfeld (2006) provide a useful reference in considering tourism security in general, and make headway in providing a theoretical framework for this purpose.

attitudinal surveys, to examine the decision to visit destinations which have experienced terror attacks and the perceived risk that arises (see Sönmez & Graefe, 1998; Roehl & Fesenmaier, 1992 for more). Similarly, Araña and Leon (2008) utilise a discrete choice model to assess people's perspectives on tourism before and after 9/11, according to specific attributes. They conclude that people value tourism less after terrorist attacks, due to the 'state of anxiety' that tourists experience in their aftermath (Araña & Leon, 2008: 311). These studies merge economic interests with the psychological domain in order to understand people's mentalities surrounding events that may produce risk, and furthermore, the extent to which risk affects their decision-making process.

According to Korstanje (2011: 225), 'risk was a term coined in a quantitative-related paradigm, [and] there is no room for qualitative studies in risk-perception theory'. Despite this scepticism, there *can* be space for qualitative studies in providing a comprehensive understanding of *risk*, *tourism*, and *terrorism*. Indeed, in view of post-modern understandings of the world, it is useful to use qualitative measures to investigate how risk is constructed when the threat of terrorism is no longer imminent, and furthermore, how it might be reconstructed through narratives and subjective understandings (Yang & Nair, 2014: 325). For example, Wynne-Hughes (2012: 615) uses discourse analysis to interrogate travel guidebook representations and how they produce terrorist risk in a way that reinforces tourism in Egypt, but also endows groups of people with value-laden identities, including 'bad Muslims' and 'liberal' tourists. Qualitative research methodologies have also used case-studies to uncover the impact of terrorism on tourism (see Wahab, 1996 for an Egyptian example). These are inherently useful in making sense of the data at hand and providing insight into the reasons behind the issue. Ultimately, qualitative and quantitative studies – with various methodologies and points of departure – should be considered together in order to understand the impact of terrorism on tourism.

2.4.2. Terrorism's impact on tourism

In view of the varying methodologies used to measure the impact of terrorism on tourism, it is critical to utilise these insights in order to gain a better understanding of the issue. In this section, the understandings that have been gained through studies utilising diverse methodologies, will, therefore, be used to consider the impact of terrorism on tourism. Most studies of this kind have concluded that the impact of terrorism is a negative one – leading to lowered tourist arrivals, a reduced GDP, amongst other unfavourable outcomes. It is important,

however, also to consider the specific conditions which may promote a lesser or greater impact of terrorism on tourism, rather than generalising about a universal negative impact. These caveats and considerations are important if one wishes to study the issue in a way that transcends lofty oversimplification.

As has been mentioned, most studies regard terrorism as a factor that influences the tourism sector in a negative way, including through the loss of GDP, FDI, tourism demand, opportunities for employment, infrastructure, development, or soft power. Indeed, literature is fairly conclusive, with Richter and Waugh (1986), Enders and Sandler (1991), Pizam and Fleischer (2002), amongst many others providing evidence of this negative impact. Terrorism influences tourism because people are usually drawn toward safety, even when embarking on travel adventures. Avoiding destinations where terrorism is thought to be a risk can, therefore, be considered rational (Enders, Sandler & Parise, 1992: 533). Moreover, tourist destinations are somewhat replaceable, in view of the substitutability debate which will be explored later in this study. When there is a terrorist attack in one destination, there are usually other destinations with similar attractions that can act as alternatives (Aranã & León, 2008: 300). As always, there are exceptions to the rule – Simone-Charteris and Boyd (2010) argue that political instability in Northern Ireland has brought about a form of political tourism which increases travel demand to the region. Moreover, with certain groups of tourists, a low price may be a significant determinant whether they visit the destination. Terrorism, therefore, would not impact their decision to the same extent as it might others. This, however, is not especially relevant to mass tourism, where terrorism would likely have a significant influence.

When examining the influence of terrorism over the tourism sector, it is important to consider what kind of terrorist attacks would most negatively impact the tourism sector. In early literature, the severity and frequency of terrorist acts were regarded as significant to tourism demand, but none had hypothesised which of these had the more significant impact (see Pizam, 1999: 6). *Severity* considers the magnitude of the terrorist event. The loss of life is usually the most significant benchmark in measuring this, but factors such as the motivation behind a terrorist act are also of interest. *Frequency*, on the other hand, examines the general terror landscape and considers how often terrorist activities take place in a specific context. Pizam

and Fleischer (2002: 338-339) met this gap, particularly in the case of terrorism¹⁷ in Israel, and concluded based on tourist arrival data and the data obtained by the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, that the frequency of terror attacks was a bigger determinant than their severity. This could be as a result of short attention spans, which allows severe attacks to fade from one's consciousness over time. With frequent attacks, however, potential tourists will be consistently reminded of the risks involved in visiting the destination, therefore act as a deterrent (Pizam & Fleischer, 2002: 338). The severity of the attack would still be significant, but with the right marketing strategy and assurances of future safety, a destination's tourism industry can recover with time.

It can, therefore, be said that both the severity and frequency of terrorism in specific destinations can have a bearing on the way that tourism may be impacted. In Pizam and Mansfeld's (2006) study, they provide a theoretical framework from which we can understand tourism security, and examine factors that may worsen the impact of terrorism on tourism. They consider the severity of the terror attack and, moreover, how motivations can shape how this is viewed. Social, political, religious, or economic motives, for instance, can lend themselves to different levels of risk in the eyes of the touring public (Pizam & Mansfeld, 2006: 5). As such, religiously-motivated Islamic terror may be a particularly fear-inducing brand of terrorism for many tourists, given how anti-Western sentiments towards Islamic terror can make it easier to fear Islam. Indeed, in the War on Terror, Islamism has been framed as the 'new enemy to replace the ex-Soviet bloc', thereby worsening perceptions of risk amongst tourists (Aziz, 1995: 92). Furthermore, many states in which Islam is the dominant religion may be painted by the same brush, and tourism in various Islamic states may be impacted by terrorism that did not take place within their borders (Asongu, et.al., 2019: 347). As an example of this phenomenon, conflict in Syria negatively influenced tourism in Jordan, as 'cluster images' of perceived risk allow for generalisations to be made about regions outside the original area of violence (Liu, et. al., 2016: 295). According to Pizam and Mansfeld (2006: 14), this is exacerbated by a geographical knowledge gap, where tourists' perceptions can be distorted through media which does not specify the particular areas of terrorism, or through a limited geographical understanding of the region, thus obscuring which areas are dangerous.

¹⁷ It is important to note that the case of Israel is complex, given how one may define terrorism. Some may consider violent acts by the Palestinian Liberation Front, for instance, as the acts of freedom fighters who are taking steps to ensure their right to sovereignty.

Moreover, in further addressing the severity of the terror attack, it can be hypothesised that the loss of human life would increase how severely the terrorist attack is perceived (Pizam & Fleischer, 2002: 338). By contrast, terror attacks that are aimed toward the destruction of property are less likely to ignite the same level of fear or relatability as the deaths of people might (Pizam & Smith, 2000: 132). Likewise, a terror attack will be perceived as more severe if multiple people lose their lives. In this sense, murder influences tourism to a lesser degree than acts of terror do (Pizam & Fleischer, 2002: 338). It, therefore, might be suggested that the number of people killed is important in determining the severity of the terrorist attack, but also *who* is killed would, similarly, influence tourist demand. The identity of the victims and specifically ascertaining whether tourists are the direct targets of terror, is likely to be useful in determining tourists' feelings of risk toward travelling to certain destinations.

Tourists make attractive targets for terror as they have economic relevance, which can ensure that attacks against them almost always become high-profile in nature (Pizam & Mansfeld, 2006: 13). A further incentive is derived from tourists being predominantly soft targets, where little preparation and resources are required to kill or harm (Neumayer & Plümper, 2016: 197). Media coverage of terror attacks affecting tourists often makes headlines due to the international profile of the victims and the shock factor involved in attacking people in their places of leisure. This coverage can give terrorist groups a wider audience for their cause, and so, reinforces the appeal of targeting tourists (Lisle, 2013: 135). In many instances, aiming attacks at tourists also means targeting governments indirectly, as a dip in tourist revenues may be regarded as a blow to the regime itself (Aziz, 1995: 92). In other cases, tourists may be directly targeted because they are regarded as being symbolic marks of states that are hostile to the values of such terrorist groups (Goldman & Neubauer-Shani, 2017: 455). For example, the 2002 attack on the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, and the simultaneous attack attempt on an Israeli airplane flight at Moi International Airport, reflects this issue. Led by Al-Qaeda senior representative in East Africa, Mohammed Fazul, this attack is an example of Islamic terrorism, with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict most likely being the trigger, caused by Israel's persecution of Muslims in these areas (Theuri, 2013; Lisle, 2013: 133). This attack took place on the Jewish holiday of Hannukah, further illustrating the symbolic value of the attack.

It would be qualitatively different to consider terror attacks where tourists are *caught in the crossfire* as having the same personal quality as those where tourists are *directly targeted* – in

the latter case worsening the attack in the eyes of the public. Tourists might, moreover, be inconvenienced by terrorist acts in which economic targets are hit which are functionally related to tourism – for instance, the energy sector – but it will not alter their behaviour to the same extent as a direct terror attack would (Pizam & Mansfeld, 2006: 4). A study by Gray and Wilson (2009) supports this viewpoint: they investigated how specific travel dangers, including natural disasters, might impact tourism to particular destinations. They discovered that the greatest deterrent lay with acts of political violence, such as terrorism (Gray & Wilson, 2009: 200). This is an indication of how a direct and personal danger, rather than one more random in nature, may contribute to an individual's subjective experience of risk.

Perceived versus *actual* risk, therefore, enters the debate when determining the impact of terrorism on tourism. Most literature considers risk in relation to destination images and the attitudes of tourists. Although tourists are regarded as being rational actors (see Enders, Sandler & Parise, 1992: 533), they may not make decisions to visit destinations in a wholly rational way, given biases in the media, or enhanced feelings of vulnerability based on their subjective identities. For instance, North Americans are thought to feel more 'highly selected' for terrorism after 9/11 and, consequently, will adjust their behaviour accordingly – with implications for the tourism sector (Pizam & Smith, 2000: 126; Wall, 1996: 143). Perceived risk is subjective – different people may react diversely toward similar events. This behaviour would usually not correspond with the actual statistical risk (which is generally far lower) of being victimised in a terror attack. Losses to the tourism sector are, nevertheless, bound to ensue from the perceived possibility of this happening.

The media is regarded as being a contributor in the perceived and actual risk debate, and can facilitate feelings of enhanced (and perhaps distorted) insecurity (Kapuściński & Richards, 2016: 234). How severe this impact would be, is dependent on the extent of the coverage, whether the framing is informative or interpretive, and whether the media aims its coverage at potential tourists (Pizam & Mansfeld, 2006: 9). Risk perception can, therefore, be based on 'a host of qualitative risk features or simplifying heuristics, which produce subjective biases and misjudgements of formal (quantitative) risk assessments' (Kapuściński & Richards, 2016: 235). As a consequence, it is unlikely that individuals would accurately calculate the likelihood of their exposure to certain events and, instead, might rely on simplifications to make their task easier. This has implications in the world – for instance, an absent source of tourism revenue might drastically weaken the host destination's economy. Crisis management strategies have,

therefore, commonly focused on media to attempt to release positive information about destinations, or use it to showcase new safety mechanisms that would protect tourists from terrorist threats. This is aimed at changing perceptions about the destination, and transforming how the risks are viewed.

Crisis management strategies are not always foolproof, and the frequency of terror attacks in a region can be detrimental to tourism, beyond what these strategies can manage. As per Pizam and Fleischer's (2002: 338) study, the frequency of terror attacks is more important than their severity. This makes a recovery of the tourism sector a complicated process – in many states, 'security incidents and security crises are not, unfortunately, a matter of a past episode but rather a stage in a perpetual cycle of crises and recoveries' (Pizam & Mansfeld, 2006: 9). If a severe terror event occurs, it may be largely forgotten with time, as media attention will fade, and so too will the memories of the specific terror attack (Neumayer & Plümper, 2016: 199; Pizam & Fleischer, 2002: 338). This is favourable to tourism in destinations which are hit by irregular terror attacks. According to Sönmez, Apostolopoulos, and Tarlow (1999), the recovery time, however, will depend on the use of crisis management strategies, which require rebuilding of tourist trust and feelings of safety. In circumstances where there are regular terror attacks, the tourism sector will consistently shrink, until the industry eventually reaches its end (Pizam & Fleischer, 2002: 337).

If the counter-security strategies are effective and attacks become less frequent, the destination is still thought to have a chance at recovery, but whilst there are constant reminders of the dangers involved, tourism will be throttled. Over time, good staff might be lost due to fear of terror attacks, thereby worsening the quality of the tourist experience and further reducing the chances of tourism's recovery (Pizam & Mansfeld, 2006: 16). With reduced capital emanating from the sector, tourist infrastructure may also not be maintained in the manner it would otherwise have been if tourism were a significant source of income. This reflects how destination governments and tourism stakeholders are faced with a decision when persistent terrorism occurs: they must either reduce their financial investment in tourism development, or make attempts to recover the tourism sector, through improving tourism security measures or tackling the risk factors of terrorism (Pizam & Mansfeld, 2006: 17). If left unchecked, a cycle can occur where less and less money is invested in tourism due to decreased demand, and this reduced demand means that a lesser tourist experience is provided due to lack of funds.

This is usually more often the case in developing countries, where a lesser amount of government capital would have multiple competing demands for its use – for instance, in the domains of healthcare, education, or infrastructure (Thompson, 2011: 694). Thompson (2011), therefore, compares the developed and developing world to provide an insight into the varied contexts in which terrorism might be expected to negatively impact tourism to a greater degree. He concludes that this impact is greater in developing contexts, as developed states would have more free capital available to recover after a terror attack. This recovery could be brought about by improving security measures, or by investing capital into groups that are vulnerable to radicalisation (Thompson, 2011: 699). Tying this into Pizam and Fleischer's (2002) argument, this can allow for the frequency of terror attacks in the developed world to be reduced, and thus, can spur tourism on, due to the market's capacity to recover from an isolated incident with time. Since Egypt and Kenya are both developing states, this has implications for the recovery prospects and strategies that are employed in the two contexts.

In view of all the above considerations, it can be seen that the contextual factors inherent in a destination and its visitors may lend itself toward a differential impact of terrorism on tourism. For instance, undergoing severe terror attacks, and at a high frequency, would impact the tourism in the host country to a greater degree than if they were less severe or infrequent (see Pizam & Fleischer, 2002; Pizam & Smith, 2000). The severity of the incident, however, is not always an objective yardstick for making a judgment. As a consequence of the framing which Islamic terror has received by policy-makers, the media, and the general public, this is regarded as a particularly dangerous form of terror. The identity of the victims of the terror attack is, likewise, important to the subjective experience of the attack's severity. If tourists are directly targeted, future tourists might perceive themselves to be at greater risk than if they were not. This fear which might not be an accurate reflection of the objective reality, still has a bearing on the way people behave, and is therefore worthy of investigation. The frequency of terrorist attacks aids this process, as more attacks mean that the destination is consistently in the limelight – thereby reminding people of the risk of visiting the destination. Improved tourist security measures, and engaging in marketing campaigns that change the way people think about these destinations, however, can help to mitigate this impact. These factors show that the influence of terrorism on tourism may not be as simple as one might imagine at first glance, where a general negative impact might be envisioned. Such an acknowledgement calls for an increasingly nuanced look into the specific terrorism factors that might impact tourism, and pilots the path for more exhaustive research on the subject in future.

2.4.3. *The second part of the relationship – does tourism influence terrorism?*

In order to provide a nuanced understanding of the topic at hand, one needs to question whether the tourism sector is an actor in the production of terrorism, so as to understand all the determinants in the terrorism-tourism nexus. In this section, the candidate will, therefore, aim at making one of her most significant contributions to the existing literature by questioning whether specific features of tourism might influence the terrorism landscape. In particular, she will study the direct targeting of tourists by terrorists, explore some critically-orientated literature on the subject, as well as interrogate the behaviours and attitudes of tourists in foreign spaces. The candidate will, further, deliberate on the behaviour of tourists and tour operators in facilitating terrorism, whilst also examining how tourists may become victims because of their strategic value to terrorists. Literature on this subject can help to engage with the risk factors that might exist in tourism as it is currently practised, with particular relevance to the developing world where a number of regions are increasingly trying to assert themselves as tourist destinations, and where terrorism is also commonly an issue.¹⁸

Interrogating everyday spaces in which people interact has become something of import in the modern age, especially pioneered through the post-modern movement. This post-modern trend involved rethinking and challenging knowledge and information as we know it (Seidman, 1994: 2). Drawing on Foucault's (2003) consideration of a *medical gaze* in health structures, some scholars have attempted to view other institutions that may be involved in this construction of power, including the tourism sector, through the same lens. Studying tourist behaviour may seem trivial to the weighty world of power and politics, but it can be said that true understandings about the power structures in the world can be revealed through interrogation of the so-called *mundane*. Indeed, Hunter (2004: 28) examines the history of tourism in Egypt and considers it to have had imperial motives. Said (2003: 49) reinforces this by analysing the constructions that the West has used to position itself as superior to those in its travel destinations, in what he deems to be *Orientalism*. Tourism is thought to be an act of modernity, according to Urry (2002: 2), and provides a lived education to the people who embark on it. In such spaces, there is said to be a *tourist gaze*, which relates to the lens with which tourists view the architecture, art, or inhabitants of a destination (Urry, 2002: 1). This is

¹⁸ Terrorism is an issue worldwide, due to its transnational nature, but literature suggests that developing countries are more vulnerable to the impact of terror than developed countries, and may have more risk factors that could promote terror (see Thompson, 2011).

a subjective experience, as there is no universal tourist experience, but shared understandings can still exist and may reinforce understandings about the local *Other* that exists in these tourist spaces.

Imperial in logic, tourists might imagine themselves as sources of modernity and that *Others* exist outside of this – as pre-modern, perhaps. This corresponds with Said's (2003: 49) argument where 'on the one hand there are Westerners, and on the other there are Arab-Orientals; the former are (in no particular order) rational, peaceful, liberal, logical, capable of holding real values, without natural suspicion; the latter are none of these things.' The identities of tourists may, therefore, become emboldened by the way they compare themselves to the local people at their destinations of choice – and in defining groups in binary ways, this can contribute to asymmetric power relations between such groups. This, in turn, has implications for the tourism sector itself, as locals may become weary of the boxes in which they are placed and the unequal foothold enshrined in relationships in these contexts. This is not necessarily related to terrorism in a causal way, but if feelings of frustration are supplemented by other structural risk factors, this could lead to an increased potential toward radicalisation.

Building on this, Wynne-Hughes (2012: 634) considers modern tourism in Egypt to be part of a nostalgia for a fictional, uncorrupted time where Britain was involved in an imperial project of discovering ancient artefacts, and where power relations between local inhabitants and Westerners were clearer. In the modern age, globalisation has brought about a shift in which there has been a migration of former colonial subjects into the West, and simultaneously, a desire to relive a past where Western identity was dominant may, too, have ensued (Wynne-Hughes, 2012: 635). She argues that guidebook representations of travel destinations reinforce such images in the imagination of those reading them (Wynne-Hughes, 2012: 615). At a structural level, this can be strengthened in tourist spaces where, given a history of exploitation of the colonised state, unequal relations between those who are privileged enough to travel and the local inhabitants who work for their bread-and-butter have ensued. For Aziz (1995: 93), the problem with tourism in Egypt is that the typical tourist experience involves establishing sites of luxury amidst the living spaces of local people, who often do not have access to such comforts, and may not even have access to basic services. This can foster resentment – especially if the tourism sector is elite-driven and the local people do not benefit from the industry. Although terrorism might not necessarily follow linearly, such resentment may be a risk factor that can contribute toward the grievances that underlie terrorism.

It has been suggested by Wynne-Hughes (2012: 615; 626) that risk is produced in a certain way by tourist practitioners and guidebooks so that distinctions are made between western tourists and ‘bad’ Muslims, whilst local governments, and the Egyptian elite might be posed as practising a rational form of Islam, which is dissimilar to that which the *bad* Muslims observe. This can cast aspersions on people who merely have beliefs about non-secular rule in their country, and paint them with the same brush as those who hold fundamentalist Islamic ideals which advocate for terrorist action. Understandings of this nature gain their power from defining people and attaching value judgments. This in turn, can legitimise harsh tools of repression by counter-security forces in the name of protecting the *good* Western tourists from the threat of terrorism, and so, might suspend the rights of supposedly *bad* Islamists. Wynne-Hughes (2012: 615), for instance, argues that the need to protect tourists because of their positions of power, has justified a host of heavy counter-security approaches in the name of protecting them. It can be said that a heavy-handed counter-security approach, in itself, is a risk factor for further embedding terrorism into a society, since excessive acts of violence can promote a wider understanding of the causes behind terrorist attacks and can foster retaliatory action, thereby, contributing toward terrorism.

As Wynne-Hughes (2012: 615) suggests, these discourses have power as they can enhance and justify counter-security policies and activities which may be unlawful by the standards of human rights and international law¹⁹, as those sectors of society that are considered *bad* may be thought to be deserving of such tactics. Found in guidebooks, such discourses serve to attract Western tourists to these spaces, as assurances are given that the *good* governments will protect them from harm. However, tourists often fail to realise their complicity in this programme (Wynne-Hughes, 2012: 629). Lisle (2013: 129) provides an interesting account of the securitisation of tourist spaces and how boundaries between tourists and local people are reinforced through the creation of ‘secure enclaves’ that separate groups of people through boom gates and high walls. In a binary way, those who are privileged are protected from those in the outside world, who might be considered dangerous by tourists based on their exclusion from these spaces of safety (Lisle, 2013: 29). Terrorism, furthermore, might be regarded as a way of reacting to heavy securitisation in public spaces, as it can provide evidence of the

¹⁹ The torture of suspected terrorists is an example of how the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment may be violated by counter-security practices.

coercive power of the enemy and can provide validity of their cause – potentially garnering them more supporters and financial backing in the process (Pizam & Smith, 2000: 125).

Moreover, a dangerous binary perspective is employed to justify such behaviour. People cannot and should not be classified as *good* or *bad* in this manner, due to the broad spectrum of qualities that make up individuals within groups. It also suggests that the neoliberal, democratic standard has been positioned as being synonymous with what it means to be good, while religious values are backward and, therefore, bad. This can alienate large groups of people who practise religion peacefully and are no threat to the safety and wellbeing of Western tourists. In investigating this and moreover, in responding to the rise of Islamophobia, Aziz (1995) reflects on whether Islam is unfriendly toward tourism, and, as a result, whether terrorism against tourists may be spurred on by this in cases where Islam is dominant, as is true of Egypt and certain regions in Kenya. In his findings, Aziz (1995: 91-92) draws on the tenets of Islam itself, which considers *pilgrimage* as one of its five pillars. This, coupled with beliefs that suffering or harm should not be caused, casts doubt on the notion that Islam is acting as a force against hospitality or tourism. Indeed, Islam is arguably congruent with tourism, as many Muslim people value cultural exchange and connection, and may even provide goods and services that directly support the enterprise (Aziz, 1995: 93).

It might be argued, therefore, that there are some *good* local people in the eyes of Western tourists. According to Lisle (2013: 131), these are people who ‘served them meals, cleaned their hotel rooms, danced for them, had sex with them and sold them souvenirs’. At surface level, this may involve a certain level of inclusion, but on the other hand, unequal settings for their interaction (i.e. the staff/guest power dynamic) may hamper the relationships that can occur in these environments. Moreover, resentments can arise when tourists pay no heed to the cultural or religious values of the destination, and the local people simultaneously do not receive any tangible developmental benefits from the expansion of this sector. On the other hand, the fact that tourists feel that they are providing revenue and development to local populations can also encourage their bad behaviour, as they may feel that their contribution entitles them to certain liberties. The way the tourists live whilst visiting these destinations may be seen by some as violating the principles, for instance, of Islam – which can worsen relations between host and guest if disrespect is displayed toward the culture of the host destination (Pizam & Smith, 2000: 124; Wynne-Hughes, 2012: 624).

Furthermore, when the lives of local inhabitants are portrayed as being part of the exotic lure of the tourist experience, this might degrade relationships between these groups further (Aziz, 1995: 93). Although terrorism against tourists cannot be considered to be a direct result of these barriers, such interactions can be reminiscent of a history of colonial domination, where forced secularisation, local exclusion, and economic exploitation were the order of the day. The *us vs. them* divisions that are perpetuated in the exoticism of local subjects, and in the discourses employed by guidebooks and tour operators, can make these imperial memories salient in the present day, and as such, might contribute to the terror landscape in certain destinations.

Moreover, in considering more closely why tourists are targeted in terrorism, having an audience to their acts of violence is often a primary motivation for terrorist groups. Therefore, targeting tourists might be a draw factor for terrorists, since the sector is well-placed for attracting mass media attention. Tourism is about relaxation and leisure, whilst terrorism relates to opposite outcomes: anxiety, fear, or shock. These feelings, when juxtaposed, have a sense of power, and arguably, foster an enhanced sense of perceived victimhood, as tourists are perceived as innocent, soft targets (Phipps, 2004: 83). Attacks on tourists are also inherently high-profile in nature, as they would usually involve international actors in the aftermath of an attack, and moreover, might hold significant economic clout (Neumayer & Plümper, 2016: 197). For these reasons, international media is likely to become involved in reporting on terror attacks targeted at tourists, and this level of coverage is a further incentive for terrorist groups – as awareness and funds can be garnered for their cause through this. Furthermore, targeting tourists is a way to put pressure on destination governments, as a fall in tourism revenues following bad press can induce governments to change their behaviour to meet terrorist demands, or to clamp down on terrorism through violent means, thereby spurring on the impetus behind the cause. In this way, tourists become targets for terrorism, and although terrorism will still exist without them, acting in this way can hold strategic value. This is because little planning and coordination is required to target tourists due to their status as soft targets, and moreover, media attention will probably increase by directing attacks against them.

In the literature, tourism is thought to foster conditions that lower barriers to organising terror attacks. According to Goldman and Neubauer-Shani (2017: 455), transnational terrorism can be aided by the movement of people between countries. This movement is necessitated by tourism's reliance on a certain level of porosity between international borders. These writers suggest, consequently, that a higher number of international tourists visiting a destination

means that more people can fall through the cracks, and border entry could inadvertently be granted to terrorists through the mechanisms that have been created to support mass tourism (Goldman & Neubauer-Shani, 2017: 455). When assessing suitable destinations for terror attacks, destinations with high traffic and low security might be regarded as the most fitting targets for attack (Sandler & Enders, 2004: 312). If there are a significant number of tourists, moreover, foreign terrorists are likely to be able to operate relatively unnoticed, as their foreign languages or physical features would not draw attention in the same way as in homogenous contexts. This shows how a successful tourism sector can provide ‘cover’ for terrorists and so can lower the risks associated with conducting terror (Richter & Waugh, 1986: 233).²⁰

In essence, the high number of terror attacks directed against tourists makes this a subject worthy of consideration, as one can ask which factors might influence their particular victimisation. In this section, the literature on the subject has been discussed. This will be further outlined with contextual implications in the chapters to come. In doing so, the candidate has highlighted that tourists can be targeted because of their positions as soft targets, having economic relevance, and having special media significance. The analysis in this section, and chapters to come, however, point to how the tourism sector may contribute toward dissatisfaction that could advance the cause of terror in certain contexts – with Aziz (1995: 93) speaking indirectly to the theory of *relative deprivation* and how the visible inequality between tourists and locals in Egypt could contribute toward terrorism. Moreover, it may be said that when local people do not receive any economic benefit from the sector, this can compound any existing resentment toward tourism. A combination of these tourism factors can contribute toward the terrorism landscape, both generally and in relation to targeted terrorist acts, by creating conditions which may increase the risk of acts of terror, in cases where other structural factors are at play.

2.5. Conclusion

The literature on the relationship between terrorism and tourism points to how this association may be more complex than meets the eye. Firstly, the impact of terrorism on the tourism sector may not influence the tourism sector in the same way in each case. It has been suggested that factors such as the severity and frequency of the terror attack/s, as well as the condition of the

²⁰ This, however, is not associated with tourism alone, as the wider process of globalisation can contribute to facilitating the conditions that would allow terrorism to be fostered.

state's financial resources, may influence if, and how quickly, the tourism sector may be able to recover (see Pizam & Fleischer, 2002; Thompson, 2011). This makes drawing conclusions about an absolute negative impact complex. Speaking further to complexity, one must also examine the other side of the coin: does tourism contribute to terrorism in certain contexts? This draws on critical literature to understand if there are risk factors for terrorism which are derived from the conduct and presence of tourists in specific contexts, but also considers the more general reasons why tourists may be seen as attractive targets for terrorists. Both these considerations, therefore, indicate that the terrorism-tourism nexus may not be as simple as might be initially imagined. This chapter has, therefore, begun to answer the research question by illustrating the pathways that the literature on terrorism and tourism has taken in a more general sense as it has materialised in diverse environments across the world.

In the following chapter, this theory will be applied to Egypt in order to understand the terrorism-tourism relationship contextually. Chapter 4 will expand on this theory in relation to Kenya.

Chapter 3: Egypt

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, both determinants of this study's research question will be analysed in relation to Egypt – this includes terrorism's impact on tourism, as well as tourism's potential role in terrorism. Such a chapter can be regarded as an attempt to flesh out the relationship between the two, and the precise conditions in which the relationship materialises in Egypt, so as to garner wider understandings about the subject matter in the future. As such, the chapter will include a brief introduction to the Egyptian context, a section on Egypt's terrorism landscape, elucidation of the tourism sector in the country and, lastly, will provide an analysis relevant to the central question of this thesis: the relationship between terrorism and tourism in Egypt. This investigation into the relationship will analyse the two dimensions: how terrorism impacts the tourism sector in Egypt and, in turn, how tourism influences risk factors for terrorism in the country in order to provide a holistic understanding of the terrorism-tourism relationship. This will, ultimately, point to insights that can be used to improve the tourism industry in Egypt, so as to lessen the likelihood of terrorism and, moreover, to reduce the chances that this will have a significant negative impact on the tourism sector. As such, the essential goals of this study will be to investigate a seemingly progressive feature of our globalised world: tourism, in relation to a negative feature: terrorism, as it relates to the context of Egypt.

3.2. Background to Egypt

3.2.1. Socio-political context through the years

Egypt became formally independent from Britain in 1922, but many changes in the regime were cosmetic: there was a guise of constitutional rule, but the state was ruled by London in all but name. Therefore, a political coup in 1952 ensued and Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser took over Egypt, with the help of the Egyptian Free Officers, and even the Muslim Brotherhood. This resulted in Egypt gaining Republican status in 1953, with a secular, militarised Pan-Arabism being the choice of rule thereafter. In response to this secularism, the Muslim Brotherhood began to oppose the Egyptian leaders and there was an attempted assassination of Nasser by factions in the group. Arguably, the crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood set into motion feelings of persecution within the group, with some being radicalised and joining more extreme groups ('Egypt', 2019: 'World War II and its aftermath'; Hessler, 2019). In the meantime, Egypt was also concerned with the ongoing conflict in Israel-Palestine, and increased tension with Israel over the Gaza region. The Six Day War between Israel and Egypt

was a manifestation of this tension, and resulted in Egypt's defeat, and a humiliation for Nasser (Al Jazeera, 2008).

After Nasser's death in 1970, Vice-President, Anwar Sadat, took over the top position in Egypt. He reinvigorated conflict with Israel by undertaking the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, eventually resulting in the momentous Camp David negotiations and a peace treaty signed between the leaders. Sadat was a market-orientated leader who propagated an economic *open door* policy of financial liberalisation. Despite the goal of economic advancement, inequality was prevalent. During this time, radical Islamist opposition groups gained momentum after having been quashed by Nasser's regime, and then released from prison under Sadat ('Egypt', 2019: 'The Sadat regime'). After Sadat's assassination in 1981, another military man, Hosni Mubarak, came into power. Mubarak, seeking to learn from Sadat's mistakes, instigated a State of Emergency to re-impose order, and to curb the threat of violence by Islamic militant groups. This, however, was not a temporary measure and continued throughout his reign, restricting freedom of expression, banning political groups, and using the police to crack down on resistance (Al Jazeera, 2017; BBC, 2018). This was one of the main grievances cited by those who engaged in the 2011 Arab Spring protests in Egypt, as people were weary of the erosion of civil liberties by the state.

Financially, Egypt struggled under Mubarak due to a reliance on loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and further long-term economic losses during Egypt's involvement in the Persian Gulf War. As a consequence, poverty and unemployment were familiar to many of those living in Egypt, especially prevalent amongst the young. Other grievances included corruption and neopatrimonialism by rulers, as well as Mubarak's secular approach and economic pandering to the West. During the Arab Spring, therefore, protestor demands can be encapsulated by the phrase (and protest mantra) of 'Bread, Liberty, and Social Justice' (Costello, Jenkins & Aly, 2015: 90). Speaking to this seminal event, the Arab Spring was a series of (violent and non-violent) protests that swept across North Africa and the Middle East with pleas for democratisation and reform. In Egypt, the protests manifested predominantly in urban hubs: Tahrir Square, for example, was an important focal point. The Egyptian government initially placed the blame on the Muslim Brotherhood; this group, however, denied its involvement (Al Jazeera, 2011). As in many other states, domestic and international pressure arose against Mubarak's rule, with him attempting to cling to power by arresting protestors, disrupting internet services, initiating curfews, and using security forces to kill 846 people

(BBC, 2011). After increasing international and domestic pressure, Mubarak stepped down on 11 February 2011 and the military took over temporarily.

After a democratic election, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, known as the Freedom and Justice Party, led by Muhammed Morsi, took over the running of the country. Political wrestling, again, ensued, as a battle between the ruling party and the transitional military government was waged. Morsi had been spearheading a bill which eroded the separation of power by collapsing the judiciary's oversight of the executive ('Mohammed Morsi', 2019: 'Biography'). This had led to criticism and protest by Egyptian liberals, as well as by the military. Under the pretext of undemocratic behaviour by Morsi, the military enacted a coup and Morsi was arrested to face trial. Since Morsi had lost much political traction before he was deposed by the military, the coup was not met with the same degree of outrage as it might otherwise have been. Thereafter, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi won the 2014 elections, but his tenure has been criticised for its heavy-handed approach toward enemies, which has materialised in the killing and detention of many of Morsi's supporters (BBC News, 2019).

3.2.2. Grievances in contemporary Egypt

Like his predecessor, General Al-Sisi invokes his power over the security forces to curb risks against him. This has been the subject of criticism by various human rights groups, domestic and abroad. His second term in office was also condemned for a lack of genuine competition – the only figure of opposition for the 2018 elections had been a fervent supporter of Al-Sisi. This cast doubt on the validity of the electoral results, in which Al-Sisi's party won 97.8 % of the popular vote (Michaelson, 2019). Since being elected, Al-Sisi has also attempted to change the constitution to allow for his leadership to persist until 2030 (Michaelson, 2019). This amendment was undertaken in the name of establishing a sense of stability in an environment that has undergone significant political volatility. When one examines the economic side, despite efforts to instigate radical economic change through an IMF-mandated economic agenda, inequality remains a fixture in Egypt's socio-economic dynamics. Austerity measures have helped to raise Egypt's export market, but have also contributed to citizens not being able to access basic state-subsidised services, such as schooling, or medical care (Hamed, 2019). The government has had to face insurmountable financial recovery odds, but remarkably, has managed to reduce the state's deficit from 5% to 2.5% (Shams El Din, 2019). In spite of this, focusing on debt-reduction has meant that other priorities are sacrificed. Inequality and a lack

of basic services, combined with political repression and increasing censorship, make the current socio-political situation in Egypt tenuous (Parise, 2019).

3.3. Terrorism landscape in Egypt

3.3.1. Islamism in Egypt

In light of the aforementioned grievances, it is important also to consider the politics of religion in Egypt, so as to provide a more conclusive account of the terrorism dynamics inherent in this context. According to Bowyer Bell (2002: 264), Islamists can be seen as ‘fundamentalists who support a jihad’, who do not form ‘a single global movement but rather thousands of small groups, often transient, quarrelling, various, and provincial.’ Many of these groups do not have the backing of popular support to pose significant political threats, or might be repressed by the state so that any chance of political power is obstructed. Since traditional avenues for political power are often barred to these groups, some members may resort to violence to close the gap. In Egypt, it can be said that most of the state’s rulers have been orientated toward a secularist approach to governance. Although Sadat flirted with the idea of Islamic rule, it is only in the election of the Muslim Brotherhood that religious ideals were prioritised in Egypt. It is important to mention here that the Muslim Brotherhood is certainly an Islamic-orientated organisation, but is not necessarily a jihadist one. As such, Morsi’s electoral win in 2012 shows that people were dissatisfied with the decades of exploitation enacted by the secular, military governance that had ruled Egypt, and that Islamic rule was seen as a viable alternative.

By contrast, once the military government was reinstated in Egypt, most groups with Islamist inclinations were suppressed by the regime. Such suppression can be dangerous since it can pave the way for moderate Islamic people to become radicalised, as they are subject to violence and to which they may feel they need to respond. Labelling the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group suited the agenda of Al-Sisi’s government, as it discredited the group and legitimised harsh tools of repression against them. This, however, denied their overall position as an Islamic revivalist group that had been founded to challenge Western imperialism by establishing an Islamic system of governance and offering welfare to people (Kirkpatrick, 2019). Indeed, the origin of the group was to challenge British colonialism in the 1940s. Some members, however, started a paramilitary wing that was partly responsible for assassinating the Egyptian Prime Minister of the time, an act which had been denounced by the group’s leadership, reflecting factionalism that can still be observed today. Hasm and Liwa al-Thawra,

for instance, are Muslim Brotherhood splinter-groups which have been widely classified as terrorist organisations (Kirkpatrick, 2019).

3.3.2. *Significant terror attacks in Egypt*

Historically, one of Egypt's most significant terror groups is thought to have been Al Jama'a Al-Islamiya – immortalised in the minds of Egyptians and those of the international community through the terrorist attack on the Temple of Hatshepsut on 18 November 1997. This attack resulted in the death of 70 people (60 of whom were tourists) in Luxor (Jehl, 1997). Not having significant political support, terrorism became a high impact, low resource way of gaining influence for the group. Al Jama'a Al-Islamiya targeted civilians but also 'prominent writers, intellectuals, and political figures' during its campaign of violence, which ended in 2003 (Stanford University, 2012). Linked to this group, and one of the co-conspirators involved in Sadat's assassination in 1981, is the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The group killed Sadat and eleven other people at a military parade in Cairo. In addition, they attempted attacks on various embassies²¹, including the truck bomb attack on the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad (Stanford Centre for International Security and Cooperation, 2019). The group was anti-Western but initially directed their attacks predominantly against the Egyptian state, as this was seen as the *close* enemy, whose secularism was at odds with the values of Islam and obstructed the creation of an Islamic state (Stanford Centre for International Security and Cooperation, 2019). As time passed, however, the group grew closer to Al-Qaeda²² and their violent Salafi jihadism became intrinsically tied to destabilising the West.

Another common motivation for Egyptian terrorist groups revolves around dissatisfaction with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This issue has been highly politicised in Egypt: The Six Day War, for example, recognises a time where the two states were at odds with each other. Sadat's assassination by the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, was also partially motivated by Sadat's approach to relations with Israel, and the Camp David negotiations. Today, Egypt and Israel have been coordinating their security issues in the Sinai, including the use of their respective militaries to curb the influence of the Islamic State (el-Shafey, 2019). Egypt has also been mediating peace talks between Israel, Hamas²³, and Israel's rival Palestinian group, Fatah (Alsaafin, 2018).

²¹ Their attack on the U.S. embassy in Albania, for example.

²² The current leader of Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri (Egyptian-born), had explicit connections with the group and was thought to have collaborated on Sadat's assassination.

²³ A group founded as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, who wishes to create an independent Palestine.

Terrorist attacks have targeted Israelis (as symbolic targets) in Egypt, to put pressure on various stakeholders (including the Egyptian government) about their strategic relationship with Israel. In expressing discontent at this relationship, especially relevant following the Iraq War where an anti-Western feeling became predominant in many Islamic states, there were some attacks that targeted Israelis due to their symbolism as anti-Islamic representatives. The attack on the Israeli-Egypt border town of Taba in 2004, for instance, killed 31 people when a truck drove into the lobby of the Hilton hotel and exploded. This was coordinated with another anti-Israeli attack, where campsites usually frequented by Israelis were bombed in the nearby town of Ras al-Shitan (The National, 2017).

Another attack that relates to terrorism and tourism is the Egyptian Revolution Day bombings on 23 July 2005 on the tourist hotspot town of Sharm El Sheikh. This resort town is known for its beaches, and is a popular diving site in the Red Sea. There were three coordinated attacks: car bombs which targeted the main hotel strip, the promenade alongside the beach, as well as an area popular with local people who service and work for the local hotels (Democracy Now, 2005). In the attack, 88 people were killed, and 150 were injured. It cannot definitively be said who was to blame for the attacks, since five groups (all Islamist) claimed responsibility, including Abdullah Azzam Brigades²⁴ and the Holy Warriors of Egypt. A similar incident took place the following year, also in a tourist area along the Sinai Peninsula. In this incident, 23 people were killed, this time by *Jama'at Al Tawhid Wal Jihad*, another Islamic jihadist group. These groups attacked tourists in their capacity as Western representatives, but, arguably, were also looking to indirectly target the Egyptian government.

Terrorism today – in most of the Islamic world and in Egypt itself – has been dominated by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)²⁵. The group began its tenure as *Al-Qaeda in Iraq* – an offshoot group that rose from the ashes of Al Qaeda (Holbrook, 2015: 93). Egypt is not exempt from its influence; the Egyptian branch of the group is known as *Wilayat Sinai* and has conducted several attacks over the years. Its rise was bolstered by the main jihadist terror group in the Sinai, *Ansar Bayt al Maqdis* ('Supporters of Jerusalem') declaring allegiance to ISIS, with militants being absorbed into the group (Gold, 2016: 1). As a Sunni Islamic group, ISIS

²⁴ A group with ties to Al-Qaeda (The National, 2017).

²⁵ This group may be known by other names, including the *Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)*, amongst others.

aims to establish a caliphate²⁶ which incorporates the territories from many Islamic states. Challenging existing governments in the Islamic world, especially those that are secular in nature, has therefore been one of the motivations for terrorism by this group. In exploring the terror events conducted by ISIS in Egypt specifically, the Sinai region can still be regarded as a hotbed of terror, and acts as a stronghold for ISIS terror activities today.

Illustrating this, in 2015, the group took down a Russian airplane, using a bomb planted on the plane. This took place at Sharm El Sheikh airport, a region which has been mentioned before for its popularity with tourists. There were 224 people on board the flight, most of whom were Russians, and all of whom died. Attacking tourists is, therefore, part of the repertoire of ISIS – a trend that helps the group receive maximal publicity. This event had a notable impact on the tourism sector in the state, as many flights to this destination were cancelled and international tourist bureaus advised people not to visit the destination. ISIS also claimed responsibility for an attack on the Bella Vista hotel in Hurghada (8 January 2016), where militants stabbed and killed two German tourists. Aside from ISIS, however, other terrorist groups are in operation in Egypt. Another important attack relevant to the tourism sector was the attack on a Vietnamese tour bus on 29 December 2018, which resulted in the deaths of three people. Although no group claimed official responsibility, the government targeted suspected Hasm members in the raids following the attack, which had killed high numbers of people under the guise of counter-security (Smith-Spark, 2018). As previously mentioned, Hasm is a splinter group originally started by Muslim Brotherhood members.

To summarise, some of the most significant terrorist attacks against tourists include the Luxor bombings of 1997; the Sinai bombings of 2004 which targeted the Hilton hotel in Taba and a campsite in Ras al-Shitan; the Sharm-el-Sheikh attacks of 2005, in which 88 people were reported to have been killed, including 11 British citizens and several tourists from Italy, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Israel, and the USA; the 2006 bombings of the resort town, Dahab; a 2008 tourist kidnapping in the Sahara desert; the killing of a French schoolgirl in a terror attack in Khan el-Khalili in 2009; the downing of Metrojet Flight 9268 ; the Red Sea resort

²⁶ A notion, popular with Sunni Muslims, that relates to establishing a caliphate akin to that which was instituted after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. The origins of the conflict between Sunnis and Shi'ites can be traced back to this first caliphate: Shi'ites believed that a relative of Muhammad should rule, whilst Sunnis believed that the caliphate should be succeeded by someone who represents the ideals of Muhammad (not necessarily a family member). Sunni Islam ideals dominated then, and a desire to return to this exists today.

attacks of 2016-2017; the 2018 bombing of a Vietnamese tour bus in Giza; and a more recent attack which involved a tour bus of predominantly South African tourists.

3.3.3. Counter-security in Egypt

Harsh counter-security measures have been implemented in Egypt, both historically and currently. At times, it has been unclear whether the government uses counter-security mechanisms to limit terrorism, or as a method to delegitimise political opponents. This is mostly true when considering how the Muslim Brotherhood has been forced to move underground because of harsh repression, as per the Cairo Court for Urgent Matters ruling in 2013 which labelled the group a terrorist organisation (Brooke, 2015: 1). Mubarak's rule, which implemented a permanent state of emergency in Egypt, arguably set the tone for repression of this nature. His regime used excessive force and granted security actors *carte blanche* powers, including suspending people's civil liberties, and holding them for several years in secret detention centres (Wynne-Hughes, 2012: 629). Under Mubarak, the enforcers of the counter-security policy were known as the State Security Investigations Service (SSIS) and were accused of torture by various international and civil society actors, including the United Nations Committee against Torture. After the coup of 2013, an organisation with a similar mandate was formed, known as Egyptian Homeland Security, which has been subject to comparable allegations of torture, as reported by groups such as the Egyptian Coordination for Rights and Freedoms group (Human Rights Watch, 2017).

In relation to the issue of terrorism and tourism, a prominent example of harsh counter-security measures enacted by the Egyptian state can be witnessed in their response to a terrorist attack on a Vietnamese tourist bus in Giza in December 2018. In a severe show of strength during the days following the attack, 40 people were killed by Egyptian security forces in a series of raids, aimed at suspected terrorists. Without fair judicial investigation, however, it is doubtful whether these were the true instigators of the attack. More recently, in response to a terrorist attack that targeted a bus with 25 South African tourists (with no casualties), Egyptian Homeland Security killed 12 suspected militants (Reuters, 2019). These incidences are part of a wider pattern of excessive securitisation, which goes against the grain of international human rights standards. In reference to this, Fielding and Shortland's (2011: 217) study will be considered in a later section of this chapter, where they illustrate how a violent counter-security policy and the excessive use of force can, itself, deter tourism or promote radicalisation.

3.4. Tourism in Egypt

3.4.1. Tourism attractions and the contribution of tourism to the economy

Tourism is one of the most significant drivers of the Egyptian economy. According to the most recent World Tourism Organisation statistics available, the annual number of tourists visiting Egypt numbered more than 13.6 million (United Nations World Tourism Organisation, 2019). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) figures on tourism in Egypt that measured the 2018-2019 period, show that tourism revenues reached 174.1 billion in Egyptian Pounds (EGP), marking a 15% GDP contribution toward the Egyptian economy in this period. As per the same OECD report, the tourism sector is one of the largest employers in Egypt, providing 3.1 million jobs and accounting for 9.5% of the total workforce (OECD, 2020). These figures have been dramatically impacted by the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, but can give an indication of what one might expect in future. Moreover, CNN Travel placed Egypt as a top holiday destination for 2019, Egypt also topped the Forbes 'Where to Next' list, and is, furthermore, home to seven United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) World Heritage Sites (CNN Travel, 2019; Forbes, 2020).

In a country where socio-economic challenges prevail, tourism brings in capital that can be used to boost the economy, build infrastructure, or provide employment to local people. Ensuring that the tourism sector runs smoothly in Egypt is, therefore, valued. The Ministry of Tourism, for instance, has dedicated two authorities to tackle issues in the sector: the first is the Tourism Development Authority that regulates tourism investments and infrastructure projects, and the second is the Egyptian Tourism Authority, which promotes domestic and international tourism into Egypt (OECD, 2020). The outbreak of COVID-19 has led to a significant global drop in the number of tourists. Egypt, as an economy with a strong tourism arm, is likely to be significantly affected with regard to tourist arrivals and revenues, as a result of travel bans and lockdowns. This represents a global challenge, rather than a more regional and localised challenge, as is the case with terrorism. People will probably return to the country relatively soon after the pandemic subsides and travel bans are lifted; a reaction which is potentially different to the reaction to terrorism, which is likely to be more sustained.

3.4.2. Responsible tourism in Egypt

In a world that is critical with regard to the way that power can interact in seemingly benign circumstances, there is an increasing awareness about the way that this power could manifest

in tourism scenarios. With this shift, global standards are also being remoulded to reflect a more responsible way of conducting tourism. The Global Code of Ethics for Tourism outlined by the United Nations World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO), for instance, provides ten fundamental principles relating to responsible global practice in tourism, which serves to 'promote international stability, mutual understanding, and economic development' (Kala, Abaydeldinov, Furman & Ponomarev, 2017: 552). These principles point to the idea that tourism should be a driver of sustainable development in the host country, which includes ensuring that it does not contribute to environmental degradation and that the sector fosters mutual understanding between local people and tourists. Understanding the degree to which Egypt's tourism industry practises responsible tourism, has implications for any investigation into whether risk factors that may promote or sustain terrorism, are inherent in the sector.

In a discussion on Egypt and its compliance with the principles of responsible tourism, the historical relationship between tourism and imperialism should be considered, to interrogate whether elements of this relationship are reinforced in the modern day. The historian, F. Robert Hunter (2004: 28), when examining Thomas Cook & Son Enterprise on the Nile, argues that 'tourism was inseparable from the West's conquest of the Middle East'. Arguably, tourism sustained the British empire by entrenching Egypt's economic dependence on Britain. It also advanced the empire's support at home, and fostered an increased British presence in Egypt (Hunter, 2004; Wynne-Hughes, 2012: 634). It is, therefore, important to consider the power and dependency relations at play in tourism in Egypt from an economic perspective. In Egypt, a free market neoliberal system began under Sadat's rule, but was further entrenched by the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme under Mubarak (Gray, 2006: 91). Tourism was positioned as a win-win for local inhabitants and foreigners, since bringing foreign capital into the country could help to boost the economy, whilst foreign populations could enjoy the Egyptian sites. Tourism compounds – where large amounts of money were pushed into particular areas, including the Luxor-Aswan river corridor, the west coast of the Red Sea, and the southern part of the Sinai Peninsula – were built to accommodate an increased focus on tourism (Aziz, 1995: 92). Moreover, an explicit goal of Sadat's 'Open Door Policy' of 1974 involved building a number of luxury five-star hotels in the country. On the downside, it can be argued that this deepened economic dependency on the West.

Aziz (1995: 93) questions the logic behind this neo-liberal notion that there is a natural relationship between tourism and development. He points to the Nile cruise liners, especially

present in the Luxor-Aswan corridor, noting that these liners offer little contribution to infrastructure accessible to local people. He, moreover, criticises the idea that tourism creates employment for local Egyptians in the areas in which these luxury developments crop up. Instead, Aziz (1995: 93) argues that tourism in Egypt has developed unsustainably because workforce is ‘imported’ from urban hubs into the rural areas where many of these luxury developments are housed. As a result, they do not contribute to local employment and micro-economies, causing Aziz (1995: 93) to argue that despite neoliberal logic that positions tourism as a means to uplift people, it would require changes to the sector for this to ring true. Another facet of practising responsible tourism is to ensure that tourists are cognisant of the social dynamics of the place they are visiting. In Egypt, a large proportion of the population practises Islam. Speaking of Egypt, Aziz (1995: 93) notes that in traditional societies, tourists practising specific behaviours, such as drinking in public places, can make locals feel disrespected on the basis of culture. Paying heed to norms surrounding dress and appropriate forms of conduct in the specific context can help to foster amicable relationships between various groups of locals and tourists in Egypt. Given the neoliberal agenda which has ascribed importance to certain values – including secularism, liberalism, democracy, amongst others – it is all the more important that local cultures are respected by tourists, rather than dismissing them as anti-modern. Doing so could jeopardise the chances that tourism would act as a cultural bridge toward increased understanding between these groups of people.

As such, Egypt has begun to put policies in place to ensure that tourism is practised in a way that is economically, environmentally and socially responsible. The Egypt Tourism Reform Programme (E-TRP), for example, aims at structural reform of the tourism sector in alignment with international standards, such as the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. The reform pillars focus on organisational structuring and uplifting the workforce; legislative reforms; marketing and promotion; infrastructure and tourism development, which aims to upgrade Egypt’s hotels and tourist infrastructure; and global tourism trends, which pertain to the branding of Egypt as a socially responsible destination (OECD, 2020). Although worthy goals and some gains, it is doubtful to whether enough has been done to ensure that tourism is operating in a fully equitable way. This will be interrogated further in this chapter in relation to the debate about whether the way tourism is practised in Egypt contributes to risk factors that sustain terrorism.

3.5. The relationship between terrorism and tourism in Egypt

3.5.1. The impact of terrorism on tourism in Egypt

3.5.1.1. Introduction

Research that has examined the impact of terrorism on tourism has commonly found that terrorism, generally, is damaging to the tourism industry. In Egypt in particular, the general hypothesis that terrorism is bad for tourism has been corroborated by the literature focusing on this context (see Fielding & Shortland, 2011; Wahab, 1996; Aly & Strazicich, 2000; Hall and O’Sullivan, 1996; Santana, 2001). Beyond the methodology used in these studies, the overall findings – that terrorism negatively influences tourism – are arguably consistent. In terms of the material impact that can be brought about by terrorist attacks, Wahab’s (1996: 182) publication noted that Egypt experienced a 43% drop in tourism arrivals following a set of terror attacks beginning in 1992. According to Santana (2001: 224), these attacks lost Egypt’s tourism industry approximately US\$ 2 billion, which would have had an undeniable impact on the finances available to the industry to sustain employment in the sector, maintain tourist infrastructure, and more generally, to invest in its growth. The debate becomes interesting when one begins to analyse the characteristics of the attacks, the terrorism landscape, and the profiles of various classes of tourists visiting the region, in order to understand how these nuances might produce different reactions. These reactions may alter the duration of an effect, its severity, or which tourists are most affected by the attack. In this section, the researcher will review the debates surrounding the severity versus frequency of attacks in determining whether attacks will have short or long-term implications for the tourism sector. She will analyse how the counter-security measures that may follow the actual attack may influence the sector. She will pose the theories of *substitutionality* and *generalisability* against one another in investigating the geopolitical landscape that Egypt occupies and how this may affect tourism.

3.5.1.2. Severity of terrorist attacks

Severity is a notion that has been explored in related literature, including through Pizam and Fleischer’s (2002) seminal article, which analyses the key debates surrounding whether severity or frequency of attacks is the key determinant in promoting a sustained reaction of the sector. The criteria for a terrorist attack to be considered severe were undeniably met by the 1997 Luxor attacks due to a high number of deaths. Indeed, death tolls are the most common metric used to classify the severity of an attack. The candidate will, however, argue that this is

a more complex phenomenon, playing not only into actual risk, but also operating at a psychological level to factor in tourists' risk perceptions. For example, Pizam and Smith (2000: 132) argue that 'acts of terrorism that victimised both tourists and residents had a stronger impact on tourism demand than those that victimised residents only.' Pizam and Mansfeld (2006:15) note that whether tourists or local residents fall victim to the attack will influence the number of tourists who are deterred by the attack. They argue that 'with the exception of very severe security incidents committed against local residents at tourist destinations..., acts committed against tourists have a stronger effect on tourism demand than those committed against local residents.' In Egypt, directly targeting tourists has been a relatively common phenomenon in terror attacks. One can argue that terrorism negatively impacts tourism to a greater degree when tourists rather than local people are targeted. Since media tends to zero in on attacks against foreigners, seeing terrorism of this nature reflected in the news can heighten individuals' fear that they will be subject to similar acts (Nellis & Savage, 2012: 748).

Despite terrorism occurring less frequently than other acts of violence, its tendency toward high-shock acts of violence, combined with emotive images which can spread quickly through the media, can raise the risk to which tourists feel they may be subject. Indeed, part of terrorism's success in the modern age is to gain media attention, allowing terrorist groups to secure awareness of their cause, to make new recruits, and to trade off the currency of fear to promote reform according to their ideals. Although it is not within the scope of this thesis to research deeper, from a critical point of view, power relations for a developing nation like Egypt may also dictate that local residents are valued less in the international media than if they were tourists, with the latter often having a greater degree of socio-economic leverage. In the case of Egypt, European tourists may see something of themselves reflected in other travellers from the continent. Moreover, when there are victims from a particular state, this country's national media will tend to focus on attacks, thereby influencing perceptions of risk in that particular nation. As such, attacks that involve victims from Egypt's significant tourist markets, such as the United Kingdom or Russia, will be particularly detrimental to Egypt's tourism outlook.

The content of the media coverage is also important. Media content that is interpretive, rather than purely informative, may elicit a stronger reaction from a tourist audience due to its emotive tones. An example of this is a BBC article written in the aftermath of the 2005 bombings on Sharm-el-Sheikh. The style of the piece incorporates emotive content, thereby precipitating a

potentially more significant reaction from the tourism sector. According to the article, a British family was staying at a resort when the bombings occurred. By chance, their baby was not sleeping in the crib that night, and so avoided death or injury when the window near the crib broke from a bomb's impact (BBC, 2005). A more intense reaction to a story such as this is likely, rather than one involving the bare facts: that a bomb went off in the vicinity of a family's holiday accommodation, breaking windows on the property. Giving this story a stronger context, particularly the context of a small child's involvement, helps to give the news a face, potentially amplifying the fall-out of the attack. This plays into risk perception. Kapuściński & Richards (2016: 235) state that risk perception can be based on 'a host of qualitative risk features or simplifying heuristics, which produce subjective biases and misjudgements of formal (quantitative) risk assessments'. As the tourists that were targeted in this particular attack were British, subjective biases can lead future British tourists to feel particularly vulnerable following an attack of this nature. There is a colonial history that may point to a heightened level of risk for Britons, but it is more likely, given the current political climate in Egypt where terrorists tend to focus on religious grievances, that the risk for this cohort is low.

A feeling of subjective risk for Israeli tourists visiting Egypt, however, may be more justifiable than that of the above British example. In Israel's case, tourists may be directly targeted because, drawing on Goldman and Neubauer-Shani's (2017:455) study, they are regarded as symbolic marks of states that are hostile to the values of certain terrorist groups. This has arguably culminated in terrorist attacks, such as the attack on campsites commonly frequented by Israelis in Ras al-Shitan. Israeli-Palestinian relationships and a long, religiously polarised history between Judaism and Islam, may contribute to a wider causal landscape for attacks against them. This is compounded by current relationships between the Israeli and Egyptian governments, which have seen increased military collaboration in the Sinai. As Pizam and Smith (2000: 132) explore in their study, the motivation behind an attack can elevate the reaction that tourists would have toward the attack, increasing its severity in the eyes of Israeli tourists. In the same way that North Americans may feel more 'highly selected' for terrorism after 9/11, Israelis may be subject to the same biases (Pizam & Smith, 2000: 126; Wall, 1996: 143). This could have implications for tourism prospects in Egypt, since Israel, as a nation that shares a border with Egypt, offers a potential tourist market of significance. Although Israelis may make more desirable targets than Britons, the actual risk to Israelis is still relatively low, since the majority of terrorists are not sufficiently organised to be able to select their targets based on nationality, but rather, will attack any soft targets.

In reviewing other features that may mould the perceived severity of attacks, Pizam and Smith (2000: 132) argue that whether the attack is responsible for destruction to property, injuries to people, or the deaths of victims, this will impact how tourists react. The former will not ignite the same level of fear that injuries might, and injuries, in turn, are unlikely to elicit as intense a reaction as tourist deaths might. In the case of Egypt, a recent attack on a South African tour bus, which saw a number of injuries but no deaths, garnered some press coverage, but only impacted the tourist figures marginally, whereas an event such as the Luxor attack of 1997 would probably come at a greater cost to the Egyptian tourist industry. Indeed, the short-term impact of a severe terrorist attack will be notable, with drops in tourism revenues and arrival statistics felt over the near future. This has the potential to influence employment in the tourism and hospitality sectors as well as secondary businesses relying on a steady influx of tourists into their neighbourhoods to sustain themselves. The overall impact of a severe terrorist attack, perceived both subjectively and objectively, can influence the psychological risk factors of fear to cause drops in tourist numbers in contexts like Egypt. There are, however, other factors such as the frequency of the attacks which arguably play a further role.

3.5.1.3. Frequency of terrorist attacks

As has been previously mentioned, Pizam and Fleischer (2002: 337) outline a debate that has emerged in the literature on whether the *severity* or the *frequency* of terrorist attacks will fuel a more significant economic negative impact on the tourism sector. Although their study focuses on the context of Israel to make their summations, it is likely that Egypt, as a similar destination with regard to its historical richness, geographic location, and high numbers of terrorist attacks, has some basis for comparison. So, Pizam and Fleischer's (2002: 337) findings that frequency is the most important factor in influencing the tourism sector in Israel, show that it is also important to pay attention to this factor in the case of Egypt.

When analysing the *severity* versus *frequency* debate in Egypt, the 1997 Luxor attack is significant. This attack is widely considered to be the deadliest and one of the most publicised attacks in Egypt's history. Fielding and Shortland (2011: 237) argue that it had a significant effect on tourist flows, due to a high shock value and a large number of casualties. The effect, however, was temporary rather than permanent. Aly and Strazicich's (2000) article examines trends in Egypt's tourism industry in response to terrorism between 1955 and 1997, and finds that the tourism industry rebounded from various shocks, including the Luxor temple attack.

Indeed, most general studies of this nature find that tourism returns to pre-attack levels within the space of one year (see Fielding & Shortland, 2011: 230). Egypt's tourism sector has experienced ebbs and flows in demand in response to attacks, with tourism rising again after the incident at Luxor. Over a more sustained period, constant attacks, however, could eat away at the prospects for the sector, causing job losses and a lack of investment.

According to Wahab (1996:180), while destinations such as the USA, and the UK experienced short-term decreases in inbound travel in response to terrorist acts, in Egypt, terrorism's effect on tourism demand was more marked. Relevant to the frequency debate, he noted that Egypt had developed a poor image due to sustained terrorism and related negative media coverage. This was not due to the high severity of attacks, since during the surveyed period (1992-1994), only nine tourists were killed in terror attacks in Egypt (Wahab, 1996: 180). However, there had been 127 terror attacks, which accounted for a high frequency, exaggerating the overall effect. Wahab (1996:180) noted that international media was 'overenthusiastic' about labelling Egypt as unsafe in response, thereby negatively impacting the tourist sector in a notable way.

Regarding the Luxor attacks, an exception can be made to the severity debate insofar as it involves the media. Because this attack was so shocking in nature and since the nature of the media is to play on events such as these – often in sensationalist ways – to bolster readership, the attack was kept alive in the minds of tourist markets through the use of superlative devices. Indeed, Santana (2001: 228) argues that the use of superlatives regarding this particular attack was high, with media using headlines for subsequent terror attacks such as, 'the worst terrorist attack against tourists since Luxor'. This reminded people of the severity of the Luxor attack and blurred the lines between the severity/frequency debate by making the attack appear current. Although time had passed after the 1997 attack, the illusion of frequency might be created due to the revisiting of a serious attack in relation to less deadly attacks. An impression of Egypt as an unsafe destination could, therefore, be reinforced by media tools of this nature. Should one view each variable independently, frequency influences the longer-term effects of terror attacks on the tourism sector. However, outside influences, such as media engagement with the subject matter, can erode the distinction between the two.

3.5.1.4. The substitution and generalisability debate in the Egyptian context

It has been illustrated in various studies that if tourists believe that they are at risk of terrorism, they will be less likely to visit a destination. Into this, comes the argument that people will

choose an alternative destination that provides a similar experience, should there be a risk of terrorism at their destination of preference (see Enders & Sandler, 1991; Gu & Martin, 1992). This phenomenon is known as *substitution* and in the case of Egypt, proves to be relevant to a certain degree. The specific nature of some of the attractions around which Egypt markets itself, however, does not lend itself to quite the same degree of substitution as do, for example, Egypt's beaches or diving destinations, which are general offerings, and more like those of Kenya, which will be discussed later in this study. This is because the Pharaonic pyramids and tombs can only be found at niche destinations, namely in Egypt or Sudan. Sudan is generally perceived to be a riskier security destination and therefore, is marketed less as a tourist attraction. Egyptology contains a historical element that is difficult to replicate; images of pharaohs, hieroglyphics, pyramids and the like are entrenched in a collective consciousness of Egypt as a historical site of significant proportions. Into this, comes a sense of mysticism that has spurred on fascination with the history of the pharaohs, and driven conspiracy theories that postulate that the Egyptian pyramids were designed and built by alien life forms.

In this sense, the Egyptian experience is not easily replicated in other destinations due to Egypt's historical importance. Tourists seeking this particular experience could not find it elsewhere, resulting in a lesser impact on tourism should a terrorist attack occur, since the ability to replace the destination would be limited. If one were to take a broader view and look at the appeal of Egypt at a mass tourism level, there are alternative, similarly regarded historical destinations, including Israel, Turkey, or even Greece. The first two destinations offer a glimpse into Middle Eastern historical (and particularly, religious) sites, whilst Greece might provide an alternative destination for classicists, interested in an ancient civilisation. The historical element can, therefore, be met by alternative destinations. Another significant appeal for many tourists are Egypt's beaches or its value as a diving spot. The Sinai Peninsula in both Egypt and Israel prove to be popular options for tourists, with popular Egyptian tourist resorts including El Gouna, Hurghada, Safaga, Marsa Alam, on the west shore of the Red Sea, and Sharm-el-Sheikh, Dahab, and Taba on the Egyptian side of the Sinai. This beach aspect could be replaced by alternative destinations. Whether this happens, is likely to be influenced by where the tourists, themselves, are from: Fielding and Shortland (2011: 220) note that Americans have a different attitude to risk than Europeans, as there are higher crime rates in their contexts of origin. Americans are also more likely to travel to Egypt chiefly for historical reasons which are difficult to substitute, whereas Europeans' primary reason is often the all-year-round warmer climate.

In paying particular attention to the geographic location of Egypt, a hypothesis has been suggested by Fielding and Shortland (2011: 237) that when terror attacks occur on the Israeli side of the Red Sea, an Egyptian resort can easily be substituted for the destination, and vice versa. Although this hypothesis is useful for understanding the way in which the dynamic between the two neighbours might play out, the reaction is likely to be more complex. In a phenomenon known as *generalisability*, tourists' perceptions of risk are shaped by their geographical knowledge, as well as by their perspectives of instability in the wider region. Drakos and Kutan (2003) have shown this in the cases of Greece, Israel and Turkey, noting that political instability in one of these destinations can discourage tourists from a wider area of destinations that are perceived to be similar. Researchers on the theory of *generalisability*, therefore, argue that although there may be different levels of terrorism risk across a geographic region, there is potential that people can be discouraged from visiting a number of states neighbouring the one where terrorism occurred. This is because 'cluster images' allow for generalisations to be made about regions outside the original area where the attack took place (Liu, et. al., 2016: 295)

Fielding and Shortland's (2011: 227) study argues that substitution must be understood in more specific terms: if a geographically dissimilar, and perhaps more politically stable, beach destination was regarded as an option for substitution, then that may be the more preferable option for a holiday-goer. As such, supporters of the *generalisability* theory might argue that in the face of a terrorist attack in either Egypt or Israel, a third destination, such as Thailand, may be selected. This would mean that any deterioration in the Israel/Palestinian conflict could have a knock-on effect on the Egyptian tourism industry due to geographical, or cultural similarities between the two destinations and result in a tendency for people to associate these destinations with each other. People, instead, might want to go further afield for their holidays to forego risk, thereby dismissing Egypt and Israel in their holiday decision-making process. It has been argued that a knowledge gap exists in many tourist markets that worsens this phenomenon – in the case of Egypt, terrorism in North Africa and the Middle East may affect tourism in the country, since media may offer scant coverage on the exact location of the attack, or because of 'tourists' lack of geographical knowledge, their geographical image of the conflict area' is distorted (Pizam & Mansfeld, 2006: 14).

In light of both the *substitution* and *generalisability* theories, the candidate would argue that an attack with the greatest negative impact on the tourism sector would be a targeted attack on

tourists occurring on Egyptian soil. An attack in a neighbouring country is likely to affect the wider region but a less severe reaction can be expected in Egypt itself, especially if tourists are cognisant of the particularities of each context. Substituting Egypt for Israel as a destination might occur for those who are aware of the political and social distinctions between these two contexts. On the other hand, when viewing generalisability, those that are less engaged and have more general interests that can be met elsewhere, may choose to forego visiting the region entirely to avoid a perceived sense of risk. This may not reflect a real risk to their personal safety but can be compelling in determining a suitable destination to fit their needs. This can have a real impact on the tourism sector in Egypt, as well as on the livelihood of the population.

3.5.1.5. Counter-security in Egypt

Building on the logic explored in this chapter regarding risk perception, one would have to acknowledge that the way terrorism is constructed in narratives surrounding Egypt can have material effects on tourists' perceptions of the severity of the terror attacks and their subjective levels of safety. This includes, but it is not limited to, the way that terrorism has been framed by governments, guidebooks and the media, to justify aggressive counter-security policies: often attempting to attract tourists with narratives that suggest that government has a zero-tolerance policy toward terrorism in order to create an impression of safety. An article found in *Egypt Today* reveals the construction of such narratives, noting that Egyptian armed forces had 'thwarted' a terrorist attack on a security post in the Bir al-Abd area in North Sinai and further highlights that this is an example of 'armed forces dutifully continuing their mission to uproot terrorism and maintain the security and safety of the homeland' (Al-Youm, 2020). Indeed, according to some, the use of force against terrorism would be a justified response and may even provide some semblance of safety for tourists (Fielding & Shortland, 2011: 220).

Conversely, in justifying this action, security forces may overemphasise the severity of the tourist attack, and so create a perception of Egypt as an unsafe destination for tourists. Moreover, in Egypt, where the state is known to approach counter-security with a heavy hand, counter-attacks by government forces can be violent in nature and can contribute to a perspective from the outside world that the region is unstable, thereby reducing demand for tourism. Practices of this nature violate principles of human rights and may elicit condemnation from international tourists that were considering visiting a destination. Due to the use of excessive force or torture, this often infringes on the liberal precepts to which many tourists in

the Western world subscribe (Fielding & Shortland, 2011: 217). As an example, the previously mentioned *Egypt Today* article states that eighteen suspected terrorists were killed in the raid, thereby violating liberal principles that criminals should have access to a judicial trial in the face of accusations, and furthermore, illustrating the excessive use of violence.

Further to this, the securitisation of tourist spaces can foster a climate of suspicion for tourists visiting the country. Lisle (2013: 129) notes that the securitisation of tourist spaces can make the country project a notion that ‘everyone is a potential terrorist, and everywhere is a potential target’. In Egypt, hotels and tourist sites commonly implement high security measures. For example, in 2016, Hisham Zazou, Egypt’s Minister of Tourism, noted that the government had set apart nearly \$32 million (250 million Egyptian pounds) to provide security to tourists visiting the country, including the purchase of metal detectors and new scanners, recruiting more security personnel in the tourism sector, and deploying a higher number of police dogs (Gore, 2016). Information between foreign tourists and their peers in their countries of origin – who are potential tourist markets for Egypt – is spread by word of mouth. If there is a pervasive feeling of suspicion that is cultivated through the design and securitisation of tourist spaces, this is likely to reflect in their understandings of the safety that the destination offers and the way that they talk about it, with potential implications for lower tourist numbers. Again, some may take comfort in enhanced securitisation, but others may be unnerved, speaking, once more, to subjective risk perceptions.

Despite the country positioning counter-security as an essential means of protection, it is important to recognise that counter-security measures often lead to cyclical sequences of events: a terrorist attack leads to a violent counter-security measure which, in turn, can fuel further resentment and lead to future radicalisation and attacks, thereby exaggerating an effect on the tourism industry. According to Aziz (1995:94), many attacks carried out by Islamists in Egypt are a ‘reaction to the government’s programme of attacks, capture, and actual imprisonment directed against these groups’. The severity of future attacks can, therefore, be shaped by counter-security measures and narratives surrounding this, and moreover, can contribute to the onset of terrorism if approaching counter-security in a heavy-handed manner. This candidate does not advocate the eradication of counter-security and securitisation measures, but rather cautions that counter-security should be a broader project than one which emphasises the use of violence as the only tool. Alternative measures, such as identifying vulnerable groups for radicalisation or creating open spaces for people to discuss grievances,

can also contribute towards a society with fewer terrorism risk factors. This can reduce the severity of attacks and contribute towards an environment which promotes positive peace.

3.5.1.6. Egypt as a developing state

As has been illustrated in the previous section on tourism, the Egyptian economy is dependent to a large extent on revenue from tourism, as per neoliberal policies that were implemented during Sadat's era. Thompson's (2011) research analyses whether terrorism affects tourism to a greater extent in developing versus developed countries by using cross-sectional data from across 60 countries. The findings confirmed that a developing state will experience a greater negative impact on its tourism sector than a developed one will. Egypt, as a country with a significant number of people living below the breadline with many of these being unemployed, is therefore likely to be more adversely affected (Llorca-Vivero, 2008: 172). This is due to dependency on the sector as a contributor toward GDP, but also relates to Egypt's available resources to invest capital into securing tourist environments against future attacks and practising effective counter-security measures (Thompson, 2011: 699). Indeed, in Egypt's case, it has tended to rely on brute force, rather than on making meaningful changes that address the root causes of terrorism. A further factor that differentiates between developing and developed states is the government's ability to invest capital into crisis management techniques to foster the return of tourists. This will be discussed in more detail in the section below.

3.5.1.7. Crisis management techniques

An effective crisis management strategy has the power to influence the prospects for recovery of the tourism sector in the wake of a terrorist attack. According to Wahab (1996:182), Egypt's marketing budget has, historically, not been competitive on a global stage, with a very small budget having been allocated toward promoting the country abroad in a nuanced way. Egypt's strategy has evolved into one that prioritises increased security, coupled with aggressive marketing techniques to promote Egypt abroad (Sönmez, Apostolopoulos & Tarlow, 1999: 15). Security measures include placing civil police officers on transportation vehicles used by tourists. As has been discussed previously in this chapter, this increased securitisation has the potential to create a climate of suspicion that counteracts the atmosphere of relaxation sought by many tourists. Marketing strategies materialised in response to terror attacks in the 1990s, and saw the Egyptian government actively host several international events to divert attention from terrorism (Sönmez, Apostolopoulos & Tarlow, 1999: 15).

As discussed in previous sections, these recoveries could be expected to happen anyway, since the tourism industry in Egypt has shown its resilience and ability to rebound. The role of an effective marketing strategy is to accelerate this process, speeding up the recovery of the sector in response to particular attacks. One, must, however, bear in mind that in order for a true recovery of the sector to occur, marketing strategies should be combined with structural reforms to address the root of the problem. In the case of attacks at regular intervals, using aggressive marketing strategies may be seen as cosmetic changes that do not foster true reformation of the sector, with foreigners viewing these marketing strategies with suspicion. In spite of this, and used in combination with structural reforms, an effective crisis management marketing strategy could strengthen Egypt's tourism sector. This will, nevertheless, be limited by the material conditions on the ground, with high numbers of severe terror attacks undermining any public relations exercises employed by the government.

3.5.1.8. Conclusion

As has been illustrated above, there are numerous factors at play when analysing the effect of terrorism on tourism in the context of Egypt. These nuances can mean that various audiences may respond in diverse manners to counter-security measures, for instance. This is a factor which creates a mixed effect on the tourism sector, depending on the audience. The motivation behind the attack, whether the targets are symbolic, as well as the severity of the attack, are found to be significant in the Egyptian case. The tourism sector in Egypt, however, has proved itself to be resilient – bouncing back from many of its most significant attacks, including the 1997 attacks in Luxor. When there is a high frequency of attacks at regular intervals, it is evident that Egypt, like many other contexts, experiences greater difficulty in restoring its image to one that is favourable to tourism. In essence, one must acknowledge that the stakes are high for a tourist industry that is not optimised to deal with terrorism at a structural level. Crisis management strategies may reduce the problem in the short-term, but long-term, more sustainable solutions must be found. If the sector is not transformed, there is the potential for fewer tourist arrivals and spending, significant job losses, and the slow erosion of tourism amenities through a lack of investment. This can impact the livelihood and wellbeing of the Egyptian people as a whole, and hinder the country's developmental opportunities. The COVID-19 pandemic has made the impetus to address the structural causes of terrorism in Egypt even more pressing, since there is less money available globally to travel, and therefore,

Egypt must compete to make itself an attractive holiday destination for tourists in both the short and long-term.

3.5.2. The influence of tourism on terrorism in Egypt

3.5.2.1. Introduction

The debate on terrorism and tourism has transcended its original foundations, which focused on the economic impact of terrorism on tourism, to incorporate a more critical way of assessing the relationship. Ryan (1993: 177) questions whether there is ‘something inherent in the tourist location that creates special opportunities’ which can be connected to organised terrorist attacks against tourists. Implicit in this is an understanding that tourists may be highly selected targets for terrorism in Egypt, partly due to tourists’ status as soft targets, their political relevance, but perhaps also due to some of the structural issues in the tourism sector that exacerbate risk factors for terrorism. In the following section this relationship will be investigated, challenging the neoliberal logic that tourism is an essential component in ensuring the development of a country and, further, that it would necessarily lead to positive outcomes for the state (in this case Egypt). As Paul (2012: 500) has shown, tourism displays both positive and negative effects in an economic, socio-cultural and environmental sense. This does not undermine the positive influence that tourism can have for cultural exchange and the economy, but is rather a cautionary word that tourism should be practised in a responsible manner to reap its full benefits and, ultimately, minimise risk. Several academics have criticised tourism practices in Egypt, to demonstrate the wider trend of irresponsible tourist development in the state. These will be analysed in this study to demonstrate fault-lines in the industry that may contribute toward resentment toward tourists. Questions about who benefits from tourism development, whether tourists respect local traditions when visiting Egypt, how locals are portrayed in the eyes of tourists and the impact of the securitisation of tourist spaces, will be addressed in this section to further explore the research question at hand.

3.5.2.2. Economic benefits to local populations

An important notion in the case of Egypt is to investigate where the profits made from tourism ultimately go, how employment patterns are organised, and whether tourism generally contributes to the upliftment of neighbouring communities. This upliftment may involve local infrastructure development, employing local people in the tourism sector, as well as broader measures that can be put in place to support communities. Eraqi (2007: 195) notes that the

Egyptian government has offered the private sector a host of incentives for investment in the tourism sector, including ‘tax exemptions, low-cost land, and ownership rights for foreigners’. Since the government is incentivising investment, there should be a public interest dimension that seeks to benefit the local communities in these engagements. If neighbouring communities are actively involved in the tourism sector and have a vested interest in making it work, this is more likely to yield positive results for the sector and reduce terrorism risk factors. The way that tourism in Egypt has, structurally, been approached is regarded as noteworthy in the eyes of several academics, who feel that tourism has developed irresponsibly in the state.

Aziz (1995: 93), in particular, argues that the government uses public funds to improve tourism infrastructure, while the basic needs of many surrounding communities are ignored. He points to the formation of ‘luxury ghettos’ where lavish hotels geared for tourists are placed in close proximity to the poor of Egyptian society. Significant investment has been put into these sites, with Egypt having built new airports to support the sector, as well as ambitious projects to develop sites for conference centres, hotels and the significant project of building a National Cultural Centre in Cairo (Aziz, 1995: 93). Recently, tourism has enjoyed a further bout of investment, including the 2018 development of the Sphinx International Airport, which services the Giza Plateau. Developments like this can bolster the Egyptian economy through foreign capital being brought into the country, but when not combined with reforms to the benefit of the people, they can become problematic for the social dimensions of tourism.

Indeed, in contrast to luxury tourism facilities, much of the local Egyptian populace struggles to access basic water, sewerage, and power infrastructure. Building on Aziz’ analysis and in examining risk factors that could foster terrorism, this scenario where the opulence of tourist infrastructure is juxtaposed with the poor conditions that many locals experience, can lead one to consider the theory of relative deprivation in analysing this case. Pioneers of this theory, such as Gurr (1968; 1970), amongst other scholars, argue that it is not poverty alone that can cause feelings of discontent amongst groups of people, but that inequality would be more likely to do so. There is an element of social comparison inherent in inequality that makes one feel of lesser value for having less money, or living in poorer conditions, which in turn can fuel discontent. This is especially true of states that are undergoing large-scale economic changes, such as Egypt, which may result in an increase in expectation, from which frustration can arise if these expectations are not met. This is not a linear relationship that terrorism will necessarily emanate from, but when certain other factors (radicalisation, political grievances) are present,

animosity can be fostered, which can bolster the chances that tourists will be targeted in terrorist attacks.

In Egypt, there are several nodes that operate in this manner, with luxury pitted against poverty around tourist sites, including in the Luxor-Aswan river corridor, the west coast of the Red Sea, and the southern part of the Sinai Peninsula (Aziz, 1995: 91). Popular with tourists, the Nile cruisers that travel along the river are certainly another instance where this can materially be seen – in this case, local inhabitants along the river do not see the benefits of infrastructural development, despite tourist boats travelling through their regions and utilising the environmental commons for profit. Tourist companies and hotel owners, instead, would be the most likely to reap the majority of the benefits, perpetuating a cycle of inequality that can exacerbate political tensions with government, as well as resentment toward the wider tourism industry, which manifests as a symbol of power. Aziz (1995: 93) uses the example of attacks on tourist establishments in April 1986, where a group of soldiers was stationed in poor conditions, close to the pyramids in Giza and near to a number of luxury hotels and expensive restaurants and bars. These soldiers were consistently exposed to the indulgence of these establishments. Resentment was present due to their poor living conditions, which erupted when they set fire to a number of tourist spots in the area in an act of terror (Aziz, 1995: 93).

Another important variable in promoting responsible tourism development is employment. The reasons for government investment in tourism often centre around the industry's capacity to absorb a significant proportion of the workforce. Whether tourism contributes meaningfully to employment is widely regarded as a significant factor in determining whether a state's tourism industry operates in a responsible manner. On paper, the geography of many of Egypt's tourist sites – located in rural areas – would offer prospects for employment in under-developed sites, giving local people the option of gaining valuable skills in the tourism and hospitality sector. In practice, however, Egypt has historically imported labour from its urban centres, where the people are more likely to be already trained in hospitality, thereby neglecting the job-seekers in local communities (Aziz, 1995: 93). Moreover, as per Eraqi's (2007: 193) study, many people working in Egypt's Red Sea resorts are foreign, since there is a language barrier between tourists and many local personnel. As such, Egypt, with its youth bulge, has a significant population of young and disaffected local people who are out of work.

Employment may also refer to indirect employment through sectors not immediately related to tourism. Indeed, determining a reflective economic impact of terrorism attacks on the tourism sector is a complex task, as there are many secondary industries involved in a tourist's destination experience: hotels, restaurants, transport, energy, amongst others (Stabler, Papatheodorou & Sinclair, 2010: 5). Many of these sectors in Egypt, however, do not offer ownership opportunities for local people. An exception is the informal sector where local people receive some revenue by making and selling local crafts, for instance. As a note, however, when viewing the scale of many of these luxury resorts in Egypt, this is minimal by comparison. There are also some indirect ways in which people benefit, through increased demand for local agricultural produce, for instance, but there is an absence of a concerted plan to incorporate local unemployed people into the tourist sector. It may, however, be argued that slow progress is being made – when viewing the latest Egypt Tourism Reform Programme (E-TRP) which was launched in 2018, some advances have been made in employing and skilling Egyptian citizens to work in the tourism sector. This includes an increased number of women being hired in tourism roles, resulting from a historical gendered hiring pattern in the sector.²⁷ Although collecting independent data on the matter is not in the scope of this study, it would be interesting, however, to research further the hiring patterns that have emerged from the E-TRP, especially whether hiring patterns still favour those from the urban centres.

3.5.2.3. Social relations

Although the economic relations between tourists and local residents can influence the social realm, a closer look will be taken in this section at how the groups interact at tourist sites and how various social constructions shape the social dynamic. In this section, the researcher will interrogate the notion that tourism automatically acts as a cultural bridge, as is explored in Butler and Mao (1996: 25). Despite not explicitly looking to be a Foucauldian analysis, this argument draws on ideas explored in Foucault's work (1977; 2003) that power relations exist in everyday spaces – in this case, at tourist sites. Investigating issues surrounding the presence of power dynamics in tourism, and questioning whether tourism is involved in perpetuating certain power asymmetries becomes important in the Egypt case, as it involves attracting individuals from the Global North to visit the Global South (see de Kadt, 1979; Bianchi, 2002; Coles & Church, 2007 for analysis on power in North-South tourism). This starts with the way

²⁷ It is not of relevance to this thesis to examine these, but the gains made here can influence the wider systemic health of the sector, so contributing to the implementation of responsible tourism.

that tourists think and talk about local people, how they think of themselves in relation to locals, and then progresses to incorporate the way that these two groups interact within such spaces. Moreover, Egypt, as a predominantly Islamic country, has a different cultural profile from many of the tourists visiting the region: Russia, the United Kingdom, Germany, amongst others, make up some of the country's largest tourist markets. Awareness of and respect for local customs toward the aim of practising responsible tourism, can help to foster a sense of positive peace for more harmonious relationships between the groups (Eraqi, 2007: 194). In doing so, it reduces the risk factors that may sustain a programme of terrorism against tourists.

Moreover, there are numerous rules, big and small, that tourists can heed regarding their behaviour in public spaces. Aziz (1995: 93) articulates the risk factors inherent in the sector which could foster discontent, should locals not be actively engaged in the tourism sector and see wider benefit from it. He points out that tourists may engage in public activities which include 'the consumption of alcohol and pork, gambling, prostitution, disrespect towards dress and codes of behaviour' which may cultivate a perception of disrespect toward Islamic culture (Aziz, 1995: 93). It can, however, be reasoned that when local people do not benefit from the sector, there is increased potential for radicalisation, since it 'injects the behaviour of a wasteful society in the midst of the society of want' and certain behaviours may, further, violate some of the region's cultural norms (Aziz, 1995: 93).

Tourists and wealthy local residents often interact in Egypt in upmarket bars and urban-based restaurants. There is, however, a barrier that exists between them and many of the poorer classes of locals, which manifests in the exclusion of locals from tourist spaces. An example of this is illustrated in Wynne-Hughes (2012: 692) study, where she notes that the pyramids have, at times, been closed on local Egyptian public holidays to avoid high crowd numbers, and so, restrict access for local people to these historical sites. This creates an exclusionary quality to these tourist sites, where local people are not able to enjoy them, but tourists have the privilege to do so. Again, although not overtly causing terrorism against tourists, this can foster resentment of the privileged position that tourists are offered over locals, even in national sites which are the Egyptian people's cultural property. This plays into the notion of *ownership*, which will be explored in greater depth later in this section, with a focus on a tenuous colonial history revolving around cultural property in Egypt.

In examining the relations between tourists and many local residents, it is important to consider the way that locals are often constructed in the minds of tourists, and moreover, how tourists see themselves within such a context. As illustration of the former point, Wynne-Hughes (2012) examines how guidebooks construct certain local residents as ‘*Other*’, delineating between what she names ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims, and so, constructs risk in a very particular way. She argues that in order to attract tourists to Egypt, but still to justify heavy counter-security measures, guidebooks construct an extreme in Egyptian society: the ‘bad’ Muslims, who adhere to Islam in a stricter manner, posed against the ‘good’ Muslims who are looking to establish a secular society and who protect tourists from the ‘bad’ forces. Wynne-Hughes (2012), therefore, argues that, in the name of protecting the historically privileged Western subjects, ‘bad’ Muslims exist in a state of exception that justifies brutal policies against them. As has been illustrated throughout this study, the brutalisation of subjects by counter-security forces can lead to radicalisation by providing people with a cause behind which they can rally, thereby sustaining terrorism.

Inherent in this understanding of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims is a notion that local people who practise their Islamic religious and cultural beliefs are inferior. Such a narrative oversimplifies the dynamics of Egyptian society, where individuals and groups — the Muslim Brotherhood, for example — are posed as being dangerous largely because of their religious beliefs. As was discussed on page 45, the group actually has a large degree of popular support and incorporates many moderates into its base, albeit with more traditional Islamic ideals. Aziz (1995: 94) highlights that the Muslim Brotherhood, in fact, has condemned violent attacks on tourists and tourist establishments. The ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ dichotomy is, therefore, flawed at its chief premise. The narrative, however, has power as it plays into notions that have implications for the power dynamics between tourists and local residents, namely that those who practise traditional Islamic beliefs are backward, anti-modern, and inferior. Their failure to fully embrace the Western neoliberal values and model is considered to be evidence of this backwardness, whilst ‘good’ Muslims who are more orientated toward the secular model, are praised as superior due to their conformity with these ideals.

Part of the impetus behind tourism, as has been epitomised by the previously mentioned words by President George W. Bush, in a 2001 speech, ‘those who travel abroad for business or vacation can all be ambassadors of American values. Ours is a great story, and we must tell it – through our words and through our deeds’ (CNN, 2001). This plays into a sense of ego and

ascribes value to an American and Western neoliberal culture over local cultures, which can further alienate supposedly ‘bad’ Muslims. This notion of ‘bad’ Muslims is enshrined in guidebooks and in the fear that many tourists have toward traditional local people; in this way dividing people and placing value judgments on local beliefs. These constructions can dictate relationships in the tourist landscapes of Egypt and, moreover, have implications for how tourists treat local citizens. This can foster a feeling of *Otherness* for traditional Muslims, where they feel a lack of belonging in their own country, which can increase animosity toward the West, as well as provide the potential for radicalisation.

As a remnant of colonialism, Western foreigners in Egypt have typically invoked the narrative of an exciting and intrepid past, often involving the image of a Western explorer discovering Ancient Egyptian artefacts and tombs. According to Wynne-Hughes (2012: 631), guidebooks ‘invite tourists to take on the role of colonial explorers’, so tying Egypt’s historical monuments intricately to that of the West in a manner that elicits a degree of cultural appropriation. In examining tourism in Egypt using this lens, one might notice how a ‘tourist gaze’ is inherent in these narratives that may establish a political ‘*Other*’ by isolating the object of the gaze and connecting it to understandings about power relations between groups (Urry, 2002: 151; Coles & Church, 2007: 25-26). Although supposedly benign, in postcolonial settings, this gaze can be problematic, given how global patterns of exploitation and consumption are visible in the past, present, and probably, the future. In this way, it can be said that this situation offers an opportunity for tourists to ignore the historical relationship between tourism and empire in Egypt and rather, to focus on a nostalgic Egyptian *golden age*, where important historical discoveries were made through British influence (Wynne-Hughes, 2012: 634). This narrative ignores, however, that many of these historical conquests involved claiming some of Egypt’s most precious and important historical monuments. The Rosetta Stone, for instance, still holds prime of place in the British Museum in London.

Tourists, when located in Egypt’s tourist spaces, therefore communicate and are communicated subtle messages about themselves when visiting the country, showing that their ancestors, home countries or cultures played pivotal roles in the history of Egypt. This legacy is maintained in their imagination through depictions in guidebooks and in tourist marketing. In much of this imagination, the West is placed centrally in Egypt’s history, with local agency and involvement in the discovery of tombs often dismissed. Relating this to the terrorism debate, a belief in such identities can dictate the way that tourists interact with local people.

There is the potential for a feeling of superiority to subtly influence their engagements with local citizens, amplified by Western tourists framing their experience through the past and ignoring some of the controversial elements of the history of the tourism enterprise in Egypt, such as the conquest of many of Egypt's prized assets. Critical tourist practitioners in Egypt, therefore, may have to evaluate whether the performative aspects of the tourist experience should be encouraged, since these narratives engaging the colonial imagination can be harmful to the prospects for the development of genuine relationships between the groups.

Living in the past, also limits the depth of the relationships that can emerge between tourists and local people in the present day – with many tourists ignoring current hopes, grievances and customs that Egyptian people might have and thereby, restricting their engagement and the wider potential to foster genuine relationships by engaging at a deeper level with locals.²⁸ According to Mathieson and Wall (1990, quoted in Aziz, 1995: 93), in cases where there is interaction, it often involves tourists 'using (or abusing) [locals'] land, heritage, culture and even their lifestyle as an exotic attraction'. This can demonstrate an element of cultural appropriation that is evident in tourist-local interactions. Although not the cause of terrorism, these factors can inhibit relationships between locals and tourists, since the groups do not interact on an equal plane where power relationships can be considered level. If these uneven relationships, moreover, are not tied to material economic benefits for local residents, this has the potential to contribute to increased frustration toward the presence of tourists in their region. This, in turn, can promote certain risk factors that contribute directly toward increased incidences of terrorist attacks against tourists or the tourism sector.

Moreover, creating and sustaining these identities can further promote a sense of privilege for tourists from the West. In positioning themselves as superior, they send subtle messages that their lives are of a greater value than those of local people. As is argued by Wynne-Hughes (2012: 620), through these narratives which are entrenched in guidebooks about Egypt, harsh and violent counter-security measures by the Egyptian state are justified in the name of protecting tourists, with little international condemnation offered. In fact, these measures are often supported by international security mandates, such as the United Kingdom's CONTEST (Wynne-Hughes, 2012: 619). In terms of the value of local versus tourists' lives, the same degree of securitisation is certainly not evident in places that locals frequent in comparison to those visited by tourists. Counter-terror and securitisation is, therefore, sustained through

²⁸ This, of course, is compounded by a number of additional barriers, including language.

tourism, as tourists are deemed to be particularly worthy of protection. If this is related to the terrorism debate, it was argued earlier in this chapter that counter-security measures which are repressive and violent in nature can bolster the cause which radicals can use to radicalise people, in this way sustaining terrorism. Since there is little condemnation from outside states for Egypt's security apparatus caused by an explicit impetus to protect tourist lives, this may reduce the likelihood that the Egyptian state will feel the need to reign in violent behaviour, thereby increasing the chances of radicalisation of the local Egyptian populace.

3.5.2.4. Conclusion

Tourism does not cause terrorism and, in fact, may uplift local people by providing them with opportunities to gain skills and employment, while improving local infrastructure and the region's prospects for development. Given this circumstance, one must question why there is a specific agenda to target tourists in attacks in Egypt, evidenced by many high-profile cases including the Luxor attacks of 1997, and the Metrojet attack on Russian tourists in 2015. Partly, this can be explained through tourists' value as economic marks, which can be used to put pressure on wider actors, such as the Egyptian government. Beyond this, however, it may be argued that the way in which tourism has developed in Egypt has led to greater risk factors for terrorist attacks which directly target tourists. This is due, in part, to the way the industry historically has restricted local people from reaping the economic benefits in the sector – with labour in rural resorts often being 'imported' from urban hubs, rather than resorts hiring and training local people from the immediate communities, for example. Moreover, improving tourism facilities in Egypt has often been prioritised over providing basic services and infrastructure to surrounding communities, which could cause further dissatisfaction and resentment towards tourists as visible representatives of the inequalities they face.

At a social level, the relationships between tourists and local people have generally been poor, given both the way that local people have been framed in the eyes of tourists and the superiority that many tourists feel about their own positioning in the world. An example is the *explorer* narrative that locates Western tourists within a glorified past that is constantly re-imagined in guidebooks. This narrative conveniently neglects the local people, as well as the role that the West played in colonial exploitation of local historical sites. As such, the way in which power is constructed and reconstructed through representations of tourists and locals has the potential to degrade these relations, again contributing toward increased resentment. If left to fester,

these may boost the chances for radicalisation to occur and may also explain the direct targeting of tourists in terrorist attacks. Essentially, one can argue that if these power imbalances are sustained in interactions between tourists and local citizens, and if there is no economic benefit for locals from tourists utilising local land, historical sites, rivers, and other resources, it may sustain the resentments that can lead to terrorism under particular socio-political circumstances.

3.6. Conclusion

It is important to forego one-dimensional thinking when it comes to assessing the relationship between terrorism and tourism in Egypt – terrorism impacts tourism in this context, but so too, tourism can influence the risk factors that sustain terrorism. To complicate the picture further, within these two dimensions, there are various caveats which see the effect on tourism differing in terms of the severity of the tourism sector's reaction or in the duration of the effect. For instance, whether the destination can be replaced by a similar one will impact how long tourists avoid a particular destination. In a similarly complex manner, if economic benefits are not provided to people in the local communities through tourism, and if this is combined with poor social relations between tourists and local people, this can increase the risk factors that may produce or sustain terrorism. The tourism sector, therefore, must ensure that changes are made to the sector, so that locals are meaningfully included and that tourists are better prepared to respect local customs and traditions, to foster a broader understanding between the groups. The E-TRP process discussed in this chapter is a good foundational policy, which promotes responsible tourism practices (such as greater gender inclusivity in the sector), and could be further expanded to account for the nuances of the context – such as integrating local communities into the tourism sector within rural areas, rather than predominantly importing labour from urban hubs. Measures such as these, combined with a counter-terrorism policy which addresses the structural roots of terrorism, has the potential to reduce the frequency of terror attacks in Egypt – thereby playing into the other side of the relationship and improving the prospects for a recovery of the tourist sector.

The next chapter of this study will provide a contextual analysis of this terrorism and tourism nexus, as it applies to Kenya.

Chapter 4: Kenya

4.1. Introduction

Like Egypt, Kenya is a state in which there is a heavy reliance on tourism for revenues, often attracting tourists from the Northern Hemisphere. The same globalisation that has fostered transnational links to promote tourism has further spurred the rise of terrorism in Kenya's context, with Al-Shabaab's extremist networks having expanded from its neighbour, Somalia. In investigating the terrorism and tourism relationship, the candidate will examine the main terror attacks that have afflicted the country, including the embassy attacks of the late 1990s, and the attack on Paradise Hotel. In this analysis, she will examine similar factors to those explored in Chapter 3, such as the severity and frequency debate, but will zero in on those factors most relevant to this context. In doing so, this study will focus on the specific features of a terrorist attack that might elicit a worse or more permanent effect on the tourism sector in Kenya, rather than attempting to prove an overarching effect, as has been done in other studies, including in Buigut's (2018) seminal research. As with the previous chapter, whether tourism creates risk factors that sustain terrorism will be explored, especially in light of Kenya's focus on eco-tourism that has historically contributed towards exploitation in the surrounding environment. Again, whether local people are meaningfully incorporated into the sector and, moreover, whether they benefit from it, will be analysed to provide an understanding of the terrorism risk factors that may be emboldened by flaws in the tourism sector. As such, Chapter 4 will be an attempt to answer the research question of this study by applying many of the precepts explored in the literature to the case study of Kenya. The researcher will analyse the specific terrorism features that may promote a more severe impact on the tourism sector in Kenya, and, moreover, will investigate Kenya's tourism practices and how they might promote risk factors for terrorism. Ultimately, this chapter will be an attempt to understand the nexus between terrorism and tourism in Kenya, so as to chart paths forward for future research.

4.2. Background to Kenya

4.2.1. Historical context

Although a vibrant historical landscape existed prior to colonial rule in Kenya, this section will briefly chart Kenya's historical dimensions from colonial rule to the present day.²⁹ Colonialism

²⁹ This timeframe is deemed most relevant to the study at hand, since it can help to engage with the determinants of terrorism in Kenya.

in Kenya was cemented through the 1884/85 Berlin Conference, where borders were divided so that over forty independent communities became conjoined into a single territorial unit (Ogot, 2000, cited in Ndege, 2009: 3). In 1895, the British government proclaimed the area as the East Africa Protectorate and encouraged white settlers to relocate there, employing policies to favour settlers. Many local people became disenfranchised from the land, with the creation of national parks in 1945 being preferred over providing cultivation rights to local people (Akama, 2004: 143). Regarding resistance to colonialism in Kenya, the Kikuyu Central Association under Jomo Kenyatta was formed in 1928. This, however, was seen as a slow process and some groups, including the Mau Mau, proposed a violent approach to political change. The movement accelerated and harsh counter-measures were enacted by the state, including the resettlement of people to rural detention camps (“Kenya”, 2020: “World War II to independence”). In 1963, Kenya gained independence from Britain, and the Kenya Africa National Union (KANU) ruled with Kenyatta as Prime Minister. In becoming a republic a year later, Kenyatta became president and Oginga Odinga, vice-president, in a power-sharing reform between ethnic groups.

Kenyatta’s rule favoured a pro-Western, capitalistic model, which was opposed by Odinga, who broke away to form an opposition party. Kenyatta looked for military help from the British government against resistance to his rule by the army, thereby cementing ties between the two states (“Kenya”, 2020: “The Republic of Kenya”). Ethnic divisions grew in Kenya and mirrored the political divide between Kenyatta (a Kikuyu) and Odinga (a Luo). During the 1974 electoral processes, Kenyatta became more repressive, with non-KANU members barred from running. When Kenyatta died, his deputy Daniel Arap Moi, took over. Western aid began to be tied to political reform in Kenya, thereby pressurising Moi to reopen multiparty elections. In 2002, opposition parties coalesced to form the National Rainbow Coalition (NRC) under Mwai Kibaki, who won at the polls. In the 2007 election, it seemed that a new coalition of several opposition parties was set to win due to high levels of corruption in Kibaki’s regime, but after a counting delay, the final result showed that he had retained power in a heavily disputed election (“Kenya”, 2020: “Kenya in the 21st Century”).

Protests followed, as well as post-election violence in which 1000 people were killed and more than 600 000 displaced. A political stalemate arose between Kibaki and Odinga which called for intervention from the United Nations, who attempted mediation efforts between the two parties. In 2008, a power-sharing plan was initiated where both the NRC and the ODM had

representation in government. By 2010, after significant gains in limiting the powers of the President and ensuing corruption, the International Criminal Court (ICC) published a list of suspects responsible for inciting the post-election violence, which included Uhuru Kenyatta (Jomo's son), as well as individuals from both Kibaki and Odinga's political camps. The violence was found to have an ethnic bias, where individuals from opposing ethnic groups were targeted. As such, electoral interference was at the top of mind for the 2013 and 2017 elections, which Kenyatta won, despite rumblings regarding a lack of transparency.

4.2.2. Social, economic and political considerations today

The Kenyan economy is predominantly reliant on agriculture and tourism for its revenues, and this is an indicator of the importance of tourism for the state's development (Mohajan, 2013: 72). As will be discussed briefly in the following section, Kenya is one of the strongest economies in the region and is a preferred partner for many international investors interested in conducting business with an East African nation. Some have criticised Kenya for its economic reliance on Western powers, which is one of the potential risk factors for Islamic terrorism in the state, since an anti-Western sentiment is commonly expressed by groups operating in Kenya, such as the Al-Qaeda affiliate, Al-Shabaab. Despite the strong relationships between Kenya and international powers, this has not translated into material gains for the population, with 36.1% of Kenyans living below the poverty line according to the most recent World Bank statistics that were reported in 2015 (World Bank, 2015a). According to Akama (2004: 145), the colonial economy showed a tendency for more business being held in the hands of Western expatriates even after independence in 1963, which complicated an equitable distribution of wealth due to continued foreign dominance in various industries.

In terms of further social considerations, an ethnic rift in Kenya has fuelled discontent among local people. In part, this relates to the ethnic violence enacted in response to the outcome of the 2007 elections, where the ICC accused high-profile members of the Kenyan government of spurring on ethnic division and facilitating this violence. This divided political factions according to ethnic lines (in this case, the discontent was predominantly between Kikuyu and Luo people, although a number of other groups, including Muslim leaders in the coastal provinces were co-opted to join coalitions). Regarding the demographic make-up of the population, the country is predominantly Christian, while Muslims mainly occupy the Coastal and North-Western provinces and make up 6-10% of the population in Kenya (Otiso, 2009:

114). Corruption and lack of institutional trust is also a commonly cited problem, and has elicited criticism by international organisations and Kenyan citizens.

4.2.3. Geopolitical dynamics

Kenya is an important country in its regional bloc, the East African Community, since it enjoys a strong economy and a more stable political situation relative to its neighbour states. Kenya's neighbouring states, Somalia and South Sudan, have been historically unstable, due to civil war and fragile political structures. Moreover, conflict in Northern Uganda, spurred on by the Lord's Resistance Army, as well as growing tension in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, are other dynamics which may lend themselves to future conflict spill-over risks. In considering geopolitical dynamics, Kenya's military involvement in Somalia, through Operation Linda Nchi, is relevant, since Al-Shabaab's increased attacks on Kenya are regarded as retaliation for its presence in Somalia and may put pressure on the government to remove its forces (Muna, 2017: 295). The aim of the operation was to capture the port town of Kismayo from Al-Shabaab in order to create a security buffer zone. As part of the rationale for the Kenya Defence Force's (KDF) invasion, there had been a spill-over of attacks into Kenya, which, prior to the invasion, saw French and British tourists kidnapped and killed by Al-Shabaab (Rice, 2011a). The offensive lasted only a few months, but the forces still remain active after being absorbed by African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). The KDF, with AMISOM, was successful in capturing Kismayo but failed to stabilise the wider region. It is a mark of Al-Shabaab's ability to adapt to changing circumstances that, after having been pushed out of parts of Somalia, the group shifted its focus to a wider territory which included Kenya (Anderson & McKnight, 2014: 2). Several commentators through the years have reasoned that a withdrawal of KDF forces might reduce Al-Shabaab attacks, although the entrenchment of the group's networks in Kenya since then, makes this outcome unlikely.

4.3. Terrorism in Kenya

4.3.1. Determinants of terrorism in Kenya

The predominant terrorist group operating in Kenya is Al-Qaeda affiliate, Al-Shabaab. However, this section will aim for a more general analysis, with relevance beyond a single group. Although it would be limiting to point to overarching aims and goals of independent terror groups, one might still analyse the risk factors for terrorism within the context. Because of the dominance of Al-Shabaab in Kenya's terrorism landscape, one of the primary

motivations for terrorism in the state revolves around religious grievances, with Islamic terrorism holding particular resonance in the context. Terrorism has been present in the state for many years, but became more frequent from around 2011, with a flashpoint being the KDF invasion into Somalia. This discussion will be framed according to external and internal causes of terrorism, since Kenya is both part of a wider global terrorist network, but also has domestic factors that make attacks more likely. An analysis of Kenya's geopolitical location in regard to terrorism will be provided, including its relationships with Western states, as well as the KDF invasion into Somalia. Relevant to the domestic sphere, it will also briefly outline how unemployment, ethnic tensions, the status of Muslims in Kenya, and other economic and social grievances present in the Kenyan context can contribute to the causes of terrorism in the state.

In considering the external factors, several studies have argued that the KDF invasion of Somalia in 2011 angered Al-Shabaab and caused them to increase terrorist attacks in Kenya (see Onyango, 2015: 2; Muna, 2017: 295; Buigut, 2018: 30). According to Buigut (2018: 30), terrorism numbers increased from twelve attacks in 2010 (pre-invasion) to 74 in 2013 (post-invasion). As further evidence, it can be argued that Al-Shabaab has not expanded into other countries neighbouring Somalia in the same way that it has done into Kenya, thus hinting toward an outside variable that makes Kenya particularly attractive to attacks by Al-Shabaab. It can, therefore, be said that the KDF invasion and the subsequent absorption of troops into the AMISOM mission are probable contributing factors to Al-Shabaab's transnational push into Kenya. There may, however, be other external factors that also contribute to increased incidences of terror in Kenya. In terms of geopolitical location, Kenya shares a border with South Sudan, which gained independence from Sudan in 2011. The newly-formed country was, then, thrown into a violent and bitter civil war, with a peace deal only being brokered as recently as February 2020. Furthermore, Kenya borders Uganda, where the Lord's Resistance Army, a Christian terrorist group, has destabilised Uganda for many years.

Furthermore, Kenya's relationship with outside states, particularly Western ones, may bolster the symbolic power in conducting attacks on Kenyan soil. This is relevant given Al-Shabaab's connections to Al-Qaeda, who have explicitly aimed to wage a global terror movement to protest the erosion of Islamic values in favour of Western ones. Of the East African states, Kenya has arguably followed the Western capitalist model most consistently by propagating a free market economy, with neoliberal industries such as tourism being historically popular (Muna, 2017: 294). Otiso (2009:107) notes that Kenya has especially close ties to the United

States, which is Kenya's third largest export destination after Uganda and Pakistan (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2018). The US has historically been seen by many jihadist groups as being a threat to Islam and a pioneer of the Global War on Terrorism. Moreover, in having strong relations with the US, Kenya's association with Israel has become a point of fragmentation with certain Islamists, to which the Paradise Hotel bombing and Arkia Airline missile launch can be linked. This will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, when the terrorism-tourism nexus in Kenya is examined.

Geopolitical instability blends into the domestic sphere when considering Kenya's porous borders, seeing the increased ease with which arms, people, and ideas can spread, thereby creating conditions that may facilitate terrorism's spread (Otiso, 2009: 107). The marginalisation of Muslim people in certain parts of the country, including the coastal region, moreover, can create risk factors for terrorism (Muna, 2017: 295; Bachman & Hönke, 2010: 7). This area has not enjoyed the same level of economic development as other parts of the country and Muna (2017: 295) argues that 'their representation in high political structures of power is very insignificant'. As such, this political and economic exclusion in Kenya has given them fewer political options by which to pursue reform. As Al-Shabaab is an Islamic jihadist group, this has relevance to its potential to radicalise disaffected people. In looking further at the domestic level's role in facilitating terror, other general conditions, such as high levels of corruption, poverty, unemployment, land injustice, amongst others, can also explain the grievances that allow for higher risk factors for terrorism. This study does not have the scope to examine each of these individually but they will be referred to in the chapter.

4.3.2. Al-Shabaab's origins and influence

In this section, Al-Shabaab's origins in Somalia, its connection to international terrorist organisations, as well as its expansion into Kenya, will be highlighted. Although other terrorist groups operate in Kenya, this is one of the state's most deadly and prolific groups, thereby warranting special consideration. Al-Shabaab can be classified as a jihadist group, which was formed in Somalia to defend the Islamic Courts Union in Mogadishu. These courts enjoyed significant power in Somalia due to the historical weakness of state apparatus that had left the country factionalised, with divided sources of governance after the collapse of Mohamed Siad Barre's government in 1991. In this context, Al-Shabaab began operating as the defence wing of the Islamic courts, assimilating fighters from disbanded Islamic armies, as well as some

militants trained by Al-Qaeda, and carrying out armed operations against powerful warlords in the area. This later transitioned into violence against the Transitional Federal Government ('Crime, terrorism and counter-terrorism', 2020: 'Al-Shabaab').

With regards to its ties to Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab's leadership in its early years came from Aden Hashi Farah Ayro, allegedly trained in Afghanistan by Al-Qaeda, as well as from Al-Shabaab's allegiance pledge to Al-Qaeda in September 2009 (Ibrahim, 2010: 286). Al-Shabaab held Mogadishu for a part of 2006, sparking an Ethiopian invasion, where Al-Shabaab was pushed out of the city and, accordingly, began to spread across rural regions, with its stronghold being in Southern Somalia and its occupation of the port city, Kismayo, having acted as a notable base between 2008 and 2012 (Anderson & McKnight, 2015: 537). As previously mentioned, the KDF's absorption into AMISOM helped to chase Al-Shabaab from Kismayo, causing the group to cement itself in the rural surroundings and adapt its strategies further, to include a transnational spread into Kenya. In the process, the group has been able to radicalise a number of Kenya's Islamic youth, and is responsible for a number of significant terror attacks in Kenya, as will be outlined below.

4.3.3. Significant terror attacks in Kenya

Although this will not attempt to be a conclusive list of attacks, some of the attacks most relevant to the topic of this study will be outlined in this section. Prior to the dominance of Al-Shabaab on Kenya's terrorist landscape, there were other terrorist attacks that put Kenya on the global radar for terrorism. One of the most fatal was the 1998 attack by Al-Qaeda, targeting the US embassy in Nairobi along with a parallel attack on the US embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Approximately 219 people were killed in the Nairobi blast, and many more were injured (Fletcher & Morakabati, 2008: 548). Despite the symbolic value of targeting the US embassy, which is seen as a bastion of the West, the vast majority of those killed were local Kenyan staff (Muna, 2017: 295). This, however, was not the first attack to target foreigners in Kenya, with the 1980 attack on the Israeli-owned Norfolk Hotel by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation being a seminal attack in shaping the terrorism landscape in Kenya (Masinde, Buigut & Mung'atu, 2016: 10). Twenty people were killed in the attack and more injured. The suicide bombing on the Paradise Hotel in Kikambala, near Mombasa in 2002 was another significant moment in Kenya's history. Similar circumstances to the bombing of the Norfolk Hotel could be witnessed, since the Paradise Hotel was also Israeli-owned. The attack was

coordinated with another on Israeli airline, Arkia, where two missiles were fired at the plane as it left Moi International Airport. The Paradise Hotel attack killed 15 people and injured 80, while the missile attack narrowly missed the airplane, leading to no casualties, but causing a significant decline in tourist arrivals. While it is inconclusive who the perpetrators of the attacks were, American intelligence suggested that Al-Qaeda affiliates in Somalia were responsible (Fletcher & Morakabati, 2008: 549).³⁰

Regarding the rise of Al-Shabaab in Kenya: prior to the invasion of the KDF into Somalia, there were a number of incidences which partly spurred on the invasion. This includes increased incidences of kidnappings of foreigners by Al-Shabaab in Kenya's coastal regions which sparked international condemnation. A differently-abled French woman, for example, was kidnapped by Al-Shabaab on 1 October 2011, dying in their custody (Odhiambo, Onkware & Leshan, 2015: 48). Al-Shabaab was also responsible for kidnapping two Spanish Médecins sans Frontières aid workers working in the Dadaab refugee camp, who were moved to Somalia and held there for 21 months until their release in 2013. After the KDF's military operation in late 2011, however, attacks increased dramatically (Nyongesa, 2017: 35). In keeping with Al-Shabaab's kidnapping tradition, there were several small-scale events, such as a British hostage being taken, and her husband killed, by Al-Shabaab in 2011. After negotiations, she was returned to her family six months later (BBC, 2012).

The frequency of terror attacks in Kenya increased in the years following the KDF's invasion into Somalia, with Kenya having faced roughly 321 terror attacks since 2011 (Atellah, 2019). Indeed, some of the deadliest attacks conducted by Al-Shabaab in Kenya occurred in the subsequent years, including the attack on the upmarket Westgate Mall, which had been frequented by tourists, but also by wealthy locals and expatriates. Of the 67 people killed in the attack, 18 were foreigners (Schroeder, Pennington-Gray & Bricker, 2014: 28). A coastal attack on Mpeketoni in Lamu County in June 2014 saw 57 people killed and an attack on Garissa University on 2 April 2015 was responsible for the deaths of 148 people – mostly students – leading to significant press coverage on the incident. In January 2019, Al-Shabaab conducted an attack on an office block in Nairobi which also hosts the Dusit D2 luxury hotel. In the attack, 21 people were killed and 28 injured, with Al-Shabaab noting that this action was taken in protest over the US decision to move its embassy to Jerusalem.

³⁰ Although Al-Shabaab had not formed at the point, one could reason that similar networks might be involved.

4.3.4. Counter-security in Kenya

The Prevention of Terrorism Act (2012) and the Prevention of Terrorism (Amendment) Bill (2018) are the main pillars through which Kenya's counter-terrorism policies are funnelled. Due to Kenya's position as a bulwark of relative stability in Africa and as a result of its strategic location in the Global War on Terror, Kenya's counter-terrorism efforts have been funded by a host of international powers, most notably the United Kingdom, United States and Denmark (Mwangi, 2017: 1045). Most recent policy efforts in Kenya have attempted to blend both hard and soft power initiatives as counter-security measures to align with global best practice standards, so as to develop positive peace in the state (Bachmann & Hönke, 2010: 97). Some of these soft initiatives refer to prioritising development in vulnerable communities or focusing on conflict resolution, rather than resorting to brute force to curb terrorism. These softer solutions, however, are most effective long term, while counter-security violence, on the other hand, is seen as a quick fix in response to terrorist attacks.

Indeed, counter-security in Kenya has been met with certain challenges in practice, which have given rise to a violent police presence in Kenya. According to Bachmann and Hönke (2010: 99), this includes 'controversial security practices against sections of the population suspected to be prone to terrorist activities, namely the Muslim minority'. In reference to broader notions of violence, the Kenyan state's repressive security architecture has been exposed by non-governmental organisations, with reference to extra-judicial killings by police during the post-election violence in 2017, and in response to breaches of lockdown curfew during the Coronavirus pandemic, where many people were injured by police and some were killed (Namwaya, 2020). Such actions, as well as a general trend of violence in counter-security practices, can be regarded as an infringement of international human rights standards, which, in turn, can lead to increased potential for radicalisation to occur.

The most controversial instrument in Kenya's counter-security arsenal is the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU), which has been accused of religious discrimination in its targeting of Muslims. Mwangi (2017: 1050) argues that this has led to ethnic Somalians in Kenya becoming scapegoats for terrorist attacks such as for an attack in Eastleigh, Nairobi on 31 March 2014. Following this event, *Operation Usalama Watch*, led by the ATPU, targeted Somalis in a blanket manner, and resulted in many of them being forcibly removed to refugee camps or deported back to Somalia. The Open Society Foundation (2013: 12), moreover, has alleged

that the ATPU has conducted extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrary detentions, and other crimes, demonstrating inherent violence in the security infrastructure. Apart from discrimination and physical violence, the police and related institutions are widely criticised as some of the most corrupt in the state's infrastructure. Analysing the counter-security architecture in Kenya is important, since factors such as religious discrimination against Muslims can lead to enhanced radicalisation within certain vulnerable communities.

4.4. Tourism in Kenya

4.4.1. Overview of tourism in Kenya

Tourism has historically been the second largest contributor to the Kenyan economy, following the agricultural sector (Fletcher & Morakabati, 2008: 547). The most recent research on Kenya from the World Tourism and Travel Council (2019) highlights that the tourism sector is responsible for 8.2% of the state's overall GDP, contributing 8.5% to Kenya's total employment figures. Beyond the official employment figures, many people work in supportive industries that are indirectly bolstered by tourism. This research also suggests that its primary tourist markets (arranged from highest to lowest in number of tourist arrivals) are the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States, Italy and Tanzania. Therefore, one can reason that the state predominantly relies on attracting tourists from the West to support the tourism industry. This is especially true given the predominance of luxury hotel developments in Kenya, which are generally most accessible to high-earners from the West, rather than regional or domestic travellers, due to generally lower GDP per capita in these areas (De Saumarez, 2013: 800). Kenya's primary attractions lie in the domain of eco-tourism, since the country boasts a number of impressive natural attractions, as well as wildlife, a tropical climate, and coastal retreats.

Safari tourism, in particular, offers something quite unique that is only replicable in places like South Africa, Tanzania, or Botswana. This form of tourism dates back to 1930s, when it became popular for tourists to come to Kenya for big-game hunting expeditions (Fletcher & Morakabati, 2008: 547). The Maasai Mara National Park is one of Kenya's top safari destinations and many people choose this reserve, and Kenya, over other destinations to see the annual Great Migration, which is otherwise only experienced in the Serengeti National Park in Tanzania. Safaris outside South Africa, including in Kenya, are also seen as less commercialised (Akama, 2004: 147). Some tourists combine their trips to Kenya's national parks and beaches with trips to other close regional destinations, such as Uganda or Rwanda to

see the mountain gorillas, or Zanzibar for more of a beach experience (De Sausmarez, 2013: 805). Kenya also offers some forms of cultural tourism, where people pay to see some performative aspects of local cultures, such as dances by Maasai tribesman wearing their traditional clothing (Akama, 2004: 148).

Tourist infrastructure has conventionally been dominated by international developers, who are still the major shareholders in most Kenyan hotels. This began with famous Kenyan hotels such as the Stanley Hotel, which was built in 1890 by British investors, but extends into the present day with new developments, including a recent 123-room development in Nairobi by the international Radisson Hotel Group, which opened in 2019 (Akama, 2004: 142; Africa Research Bulletin, 2018: 22345). Recent investments have been driven by the Kenyan government, who have aimed at making Kenya attractive as a destination by, for instance, renovating Jomo Kenyatta International Airport and Moi International Airport, (Africa Research Bulletin, 2018: 22345). As in Egypt, this has been part of an explicit neoliberal agenda pursued by the government to promote economic development in the region through tourism. It can be said that Kenya, as a state with significant Western ties, has fostered the growth of its tourism sector in line with this agenda, thereby incentivising the development of large-scale tourism facilities (Akama, 2004: 145).

4.4.2. Responsible tourism in Kenya

Unlike Egypt, Kenya's chief tourism proposition revolves around nature and the environment. For this reason, when considering Kenya's adherence to practices of responsible tourism, it is important to pay attention to how tourism practitioners safeguard the environment, so as not to cause environmental degradation by unsustainable tourism practices. This has implications for those who share this common space with tourism practitioners, including local people who may farm commercially or through subsistence and who share water sources and other natural resources with commercial tourist companies. This is also integral to ensuring the survival of wildlife and prioritising the environmental integrity of national parks. Some critics have pointed out that the Kenya Wildlife Service needs a greater push from government to do more, including implementing an environmental policy, which will address energy use and waste disposal, amongst other goals (De Sausmarez, 2013: 802).

De Sausmarez (2013: 800) argues that many tour companies in Kenya are falling short in terms of the environment. Effective checks and balances on tour companies are needed to ensure that

they operate in a sustainable manner, which in turn, may call for increased regulation. Moreover, due to tourism's popularity in Kenya, parks have become significantly congested and increased development has been needed to service this demand. This has led to land clearance for new developments. With high population numbers in areas surrounding the parks, however, there is also a greater need for grazing and farming lands for local people, often leading to competing demands for the space (De Sausmarez, 2013: 800). Re-evaluating the mass tourism model at regular intervals is, therefore, important for balancing economic development with environmental concerns, as well as with local demands for land usage.

Community participation in tourism projects is imperative for this, as this can increase local buy-in to tourism activities and ensure that community demands are being considered when embarking on any expansion project. Currently, hotels and tourism developments are predominantly funded by international investors, including a significant number of developments coming from South African and Middle Eastern businesspeople (De Sausmarez, 2013: 800). This echoes a historic trend of local population exclusion from tourism enterprises, despite much of the land belonging to locals. For instance, despite the Maasai culture acting as one attraction to tourists, there is often conflict between the Maasai and stakeholders in the tourism sector, since state parks are often built on land that was traditionally owned by Maasai, thereby leading to tension over grazing rights (Akama, 2004: 148). It is, therefore, important that there should be a degree of community ownership in tourism today in order to right some of the wrongs of the past. There are other benefits that the tourism sector can offer, such as infrastructure development of communities surrounding tourist sites, as well as employment and training for local people. This kind of participation can ensure that material gains are offered to locals, thereby bolstering the strength of the relationship between tourists and local residents and contributing toward positive developmental outcomes.

Another facet of Kenya's tourism sector that is worthy of mention when considering the notion of responsible tourism, is how culture is treated by tourist practitioners. This includes the commodification of Maasai culture as well as a phenomenon popular in Nairobi, known as slum tourism. Both of these have implications for power relations between tourists and local people. Regarding the Maasai, Akama (2004: 148) argues that they are portrayed and marketed by tour operators as the only culture present in Kenya, despite the presence of more than 40 diverse ethnic groups. Focusing on the Maasai only, therefore, excludes a large proportion of the population, with their unique cultures and experiences. It, moreover, frames the traditional

elements of Maasai culture as an exotic attraction, thereby commodifying culture to line the pockets of tour operators. Akama (2004:148) also argues that the way Maasai are portrayed through this tourist lens is problematic, since it places the Maasai hand-in-hand with the wildlife of the destination, thereby simplifying the motivations of the group and cementing power relations between them and tourists, who come to observe wildlife. Slum tourism, similarly, involves the *tourist gaze* to commodify the lifestyle of the poor who live in informal settlements in developing countries. Although some argue that this brings capital into these settlements, it also has the potential to infringe on the consent and privacy of those living in these circumstances. Indeed, according to Kieti and Magio (2013:49), who surveyed the Kibera slum residents in Nairobi, many of these residents felt negative towards slum visits by tourists. This suggests that one should examine current practice in the Kenyan tourism sector with a critical eye, to understand how this can shape power relations between tourists and local people, and so, how it may influence the degree of responsibility that the tourism sector has in sustaining risk factors that, in certain conditions, might lead to radicalisation and terrorism.

4.5. Relationship between terrorism and tourism in Kenya

4.5.1. Introduction

Kenya, like Egypt, relies to a significant degree on tourism revenues to sustain and grow its economy. Significant terrorist attacks include the seminal 1998 bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi, but more recent attacks by Al-Shabaab have put the country at a disadvantage when trying to attract international tourists in the present day. In this section, the impact of these terrorist attacks on Kenya's tourism landscape will be explored, tapping into similar notions to those explored in the chapter on Egypt. This includes *perceived* versus *actual* risk, the *frequency* versus *severity* debate, and *substitutionality* versus *generalisability*, to understand more closely the nuances surrounding the degree of the effect. The latter comparison of substitutionality versus generalisability will be of special significance, given Kenya's particular geopolitical location, where a number of neighbouring states are involved in conflict. On the other side of the coin, Kenya will be examined through a critical lens, where the determinants of terrorism in the context will be examined closely to determine whether tourism contributes toward enhanced risk factors for terrorism. This will play into notions surrounding responsible tourism, and will attempt to discover why tourists make attractive targets for terrorist groups.

4.5.2. *The impact of terrorism on tourism in Kenya*

4.5.2.1. Introduction

There are a number of studies that consider the impact of terrorism on tourism in Kenya. For instance, Masinde, Buigut and Mung'atu (2016) use data from the Global Terrorism Database for information on terror attacks and data from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics on tourism arrivals, to find that there is a significant negative economic impact on the tourism sector in the face of terrorist attacks. Moreover, Buigut and Amendah (2016) analyse data from terrorist attacks which took place between 2010 and 2013, as well as further data detailing tourist arrivals into Kenya from 124 different countries measured during this same time period. With reference to tourism, they discover a decrease of 2,507 visitors per year and a roughly 157.1 million Kenya shilling reduction in tourism revenue per year for every fatality. Most available studies examining the impact of terrorism on tourism in Kenya confer with the global literature on the subject, confirming that terrorism has a negative impact on tourist arrivals, revenues and other related metrics. In this section, a deeper analysis of the factors that influence the length of the effect and the intensity of the effect will be presented, in order to explore the nuances of this negative economic impact.

4.5.2.2. Severity of terrorist attacks in Kenya

Although the severity of a terrorist attack may be determined by objective features, such as the extent of the damage to property, the number of people injured or how many lives are lost, there are also a host of factors influencing the risk that a tourist may feel when contemplating visiting a destination. Kenya is no exception to this claim and, therefore, the role of perceived versus actual risk will be explored in this section, as it relates to how people understand the severity of terrorist attacks in this context. Many studies on the impact of terrorist attacks in Kenya consider the number of fatalities as the quintessential element in determining the severity of an attack. Buigut and Amendah (2016), for instance, situate their study around connecting the number of fatalities of a terrorist attack to a decrease in tourist arrivals and revenues. Although useful in providing a quantitative framework to understand this impact in Kenya, it does not provide insight into the role that perceived risk can play in this, as well as which factors might influence the perception of risk beyond objective features such as fatalities.

The first factor that will be discussed is the role of travel advisories by international foreign services in shaping the perception of risk in international audiences following a terrorist attack.

This is especially relevant to Kenya, since the literature on the context documents the adverse effect that international governmental warnings have had on its tourism prospects, arguing that this is disproportionate to the actual risks to tourists (Fletcher & Morakabati, 2008: 537). This is illustrated by Figure 1: a cartoon published in Kenyan newspaper, *Daily Nation*, showing that the actual threats might be significantly lower than how other countries may position them. Another criticism that has been levelled against these warnings is that they are out of sync with those offered in response to terrorist attacks in Western countries, thereby addressing bias in how Kenya is portrayed in the international sphere in the face of terror attacks. This is discussed in more detail in Otiso's (2009: 124) study.



Source: James 'Kham' Kamawira. Editorial Cartoon, *Daily Nation*, June 24, 2003

As mentioned previously, one of the most popular attractions for the Kenyan tourism sector is its safari tourism. Fletcher and Morakabati (2008: 550) cite Jake Grieves-Cook, chairman of the Kenya Tourism Federation, stating that 'for tourists on safari in Kenya's parks, the risk of a terrorist attack must be much lower than in British cities.' This points to an element of bias against developing contexts in the way that travel advisories are processed, which may offer an explanation of why the effect of terrorism in these contexts is usually more pronounced than that of attacks in the developed world (see Thompson, 2011). Kuto and Groves (2004: 89-90) argue that the terrorist attacks directed at the Paradise Hotel and Moi International Airport led to travel advisories against visiting Kenya in the immediate aftermath of the attack which, in turn, caused a number of airlines operating in Kenya to be suspended, resulting in a weekly loss of 1 billion Kenyan shillings.

Fletcher and Morakabati (2008: 550) concur, noting that when Britain banned all aircraft from entering the country, this automatically led to a 20% drop in tourism arrivals, since the UK is Kenya's largest tourist market. It also spurred other countries to behave similarly, with

Germany and Australia also issuing travel warnings to its citizens, thereby amplifying the effect on the tourism sector (Fletcher & Morakabati, 2008: 550). This can exaggerate risk perception in international tourists, with the potential for government warnings to be more resilient than warnings from other sources, due to institutional trust. Future research on this subject could investigate whether this is the case, and how travel warnings, rather than terrorist attacks themselves, might influence the tourism landscape.

Related to this is the role of the media in shaping the risk perceptions of international audiences, which, in turn, moulds their subjective notions of the severity of a terrorist attack. As was discussed in the Egypt case study, the impact of an attack may be greater if potential tourists relate to the victims of the attack, or if they feel as if their cohort has been particularly targeted (Pizam & Smith, 2000: 132). If attacks are symbolic, this can be something on which the media focus, since it can create a dramatic story to sell to audiences. Symbolic attacks may target tourists from states hostile to the cause of the terrorist organisation, or tourists that are representative in another way (Goldman & Neubauer-Shani, 2017: 455). In Kenya, several terrorist attacks have been framed in the media as attacks on the West, contributing to an enhanced sense of threat for those visiting from a broad array of countries that identify as Western, many of which constitute Kenya's main tourist markets. The attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam are significant in this regard, since the attacks were regarded as a rejection of neoliberal ideologies. Most victims of the Nairobi attack, however, were not US citizens, but local Kenyans. This speaks to the relevance of symbolism in this case, since locals, not foreigners, were most at risk (Muna, 2017: 295).

Likewise, the terrorist attacks the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel and the attempted attack on an Israeli passenger aircraft in 2002, advanced the notion that this was an attack on Western interests. This was especially relevant, since it took place in the aftermath of 9/11, where there was heightened awareness of the threat posed by Islamic terrorism to the West. Tarlow (2005, 2006) argues that many Westerners believe that terrorists target tourists because they represent modernity and, therefore, the West. By targeting a Western identity, it can create an enhanced perception of a security threat for Western tourists visiting the region, amplifying the economic effect of the attack. Indeed, when considering statements made by Al-Qaeda about the attack, it is evident that the group aimed to link Israel to the US through this Western connection, therefore amplifying fear and spreading it to a global audience of potential tourists. These statements include that the 2002 attack 'comes as a challenge to the American enemy and to

let it know [we are] capable of reaching any place in the world' (Wallace, Wedeman, MacVicar & McIntyre, 2002). Due to the context in which this occurs, part of the resonance of this statement is an implicit understanding, not only of the geographical region, but the fact that civilians can be attacked in places of leisure, thereby contributing to the shock factor that can intensify a reaction in the tourism sector.

Shock may not only be relevant to terrorism's reference to a Western identity, as other notions of identity are also salient. Similar to the way that Israel was targeted in Egypt's Ras-al-Shitan attacks, the Paradise Hotel attack and Arkia missile launch show that Israeli tourists were particularly targeted in Kenya as well. It can be said that Israel's political relationship with Islam, with reference to the conflict between the Israeli state and Palestinians, fosters a sense of animosity toward Israel in some factions of the Islamic community. Islamic terrorists targeting Israeli citizens abroad can put pressure on the Israeli government regarding their actions in the conflict with Palestine, while also offering retaliation for these actions. As a side-effect of the terrorist attack, it may also worsen relationships between the Kenyan state and Israel, and may pressurise the Kenyan government to loosen its ties with the state, speaking to the motivation of the attack. It can be argued that the severity of the attack is likely to be perceived as great by Israelis who feel that they are targeted because of their identities, thereby amplifying the fall-out of tourists from the Israeli state in particular. Lisle (2012: 131), moreover, argues that attacks on Israelis position them as double victims: 'first by the "Palestinian militants" who target their everyday lives at home, and now by terrorists who target them when they are on holiday.' This, arguably, amplifies a sense of victimhood which can be utilised for media attention.

Media, moreover, can provide an emotive element to stories about terrorist attacks. Al-Shabaab's initial strategy of targeting individuals in kidnappings was ideal for this sort of media coverage, since some individuals (predominantly international) returned with emotional stories to tell about their time imprisoned by the group. A particularly disturbing story was a story of a tetraplegic French woman who was abducted in the Lamu coastal region of Kenya by Al-Shabaab, where she was, then, denied medication, and died in Al-Shabaab's custody (Rice, 2011b). Since she was vulnerable due to her disability, the story was widely reported in international media, thereby deterring tourists. In spite of this, it can be said that although having recognisable victims from Western countries can amplify the effect of an attack on the tourism sector, there are other ways in which attacks on local victims can garner media

attention. The terrorist attack on Garissa University is one such example, since images and videos of the attack were shared online by students present at the event. This element of citizen journalism gave the attack a human face and granted the images a sense of authority, since the information of the attack came from a direct source, thereby amplifying its emotional power. Similar to attacks on tourists, these students were soft targets, attempting to gain an education and innocent of any violence waged against them. This could enhance the tragedy of the situation and the perceived severity of it in the international community, and so, could influence the perception of risk involved in travelling to Kenya.

4.5.2.3. Frequency of terrorist attacks in Kenya

Kenya's terrorism landscape in the late 1990s and early-to-mid 2000s can be characterised by infrequent, yet severe attacks, such as that on the US embassy in 1998, or on Paradise Hotel in 2002. This, however, changed with the KDF's invasion of Somalia in 2011, which marked a significant increase in the frequency of Al-Shabaab's attacks in Kenya. Indeed, using Global Terrorism Index data, Masinde, Buigut and Mung'atu (2016: 10) estimate that terrorism progressively increased from 0.362 to reach 6.66 in their zero to ten score index during the period 2013/2014. The same study finds that the long-term impact of terrorism on the tourism sector is low in Kenya when measured between 1994 to 2014 and, instead, points to a more intense short-term influence in response to terrorist attacks with a higher fatality count (severe attacks) (Masinde, Buigut & Mung'atu, 2016: 18). At face value, this leads one to question the validity of the frequency debate in the Kenyan case. In the discussion of the study, however, the writers suggest that the spike in terrorism in Kenya from 2011, which made attacks more frequent, has probably changed this state of affairs and might show a longer-term impact when studied in isolation from the historical data. The information on which this study relies, therefore, is skewed by a longer trend of high-severity, low-frequency attacks that was the norm until 2011. Later higher frequency attacks in Kenya have not been studied in great detail in the literature, suggesting a future research prospect. It is likely, however, that data on the frequency of terrorist attacks and its particular impact on tourism would correlate with that of global data, which points to a more sustained negative impact on the tourism sector in response to frequent terrorist attacks (Pizam & Fleischer, 2002: 337).

Although there is probably an impact on the tourism sector following high severity attacks, the frequency of terrorist attacks can influence the duration of this effect, since constant reminders

of the risk involved in visiting Kenya may be carried more consistently in the media. This is different to shocking attacks that are perceived as *once-off* or *fluke* occurrences which would likely elicit a temporary, severe response, especially when travel advisories and media offer extensive coverage on the risks involved in visiting the destination. As a general rule, Fletcher and Morakabati (2008: 554) note that a high frequency of terrorist attacks has a more long-lasting effect on the tourism sector than once-off attacks. These severe attacks, however, may be invoked by the media in reference to later attacks as a frame of comparison for the number of lives lost in this future attack, thereby keeping these attacks alive in one's imagination of the tourism destination, as has been described in the previous chapter. Moreover, having high-frequency attacks also impacts on recovery strategies that promote destinations like Kenya as safe in the months following a terrorist attack. Should another attack happen while in the midst of a recovery campaign, fewer people would believe that there is truth in such a campaign, since discrediting information causes them to dismiss whole campaigns as mere marketing strategies.

4.5.2.4. The substitution and generalisability debate in the Kenyan context

As has been explained in previous chapters, *substitution* is the ease with which a destination can be replaced by another in the wake of a terrorist attack or series of attacks. Kenya is one of several safari and beach destinations offered in Africa. Although it has specific qualities that may draw people to Kenya in particular, including the Great Migration (which only takes place in Kenya and Tanzania) or Maasai cultural experiences, it does not offer the same unique experience that a destination like Egypt might, with its ancient pyramids and tombs. Indeed, in the wake of terrorist attacks, it is evident that Kenya is replaceable by a number of its competitor destinations which offer safari and beach tourism, including South Africa and Tanzania. Beach tourism, specifically, can be replaced by a host of African and non-African destinations and, as such, can be considered as particularly vulnerable to terrorist attacks, since there are several alternatives should this be the primary reason for visiting Kenya. De Sausmarez (2013: 793), therefore, argues that recovery of the tourism sector following an attack takes considerable time in the Kenyan case, due to an ability to substitute alternative destinations. South Africa, for example, has a high level of crime, but comparatively few instances of terrorism. The politically-motivated nature of terrorism is usually far more high-profile on the international stage than acts of crime, thereby making Kenya's terrorism more damaging than crime in South Africa, given that fewer people would be likely to hear of instances of criminal activity (especially petty) than they would of terrorism.

Kenya has a lesser ability to put itself forward as the only option for many eco-tourism experiences and, therefore, must market itself in other ways. Its game parks are regarded as less commercialised than the Kruger National Park in South Africa, for example, and concurrently, may attract a more adventurous traveller (De Sausmarez, 2013: 801). The competition architecture is also not as developed as it could be, since many of Kenya's most immediate neighbours are not viable tourist destinations due to conflict or lack of tourism infrastructure. This, however, can have a mixed effect on the tourism prospects for Kenya because of the generalisability effect, which argues that instability and terrorist attacks in neighbouring countries can impact Kenya's tourism prospects. For this reason, substitution would be relevant in this case, but if one were to heed the influence of generalisability, it is most likely that Kenya would be replaced by another country further afield, such as South Africa (Fielding & Shortland, 2011: 227). Indeed, people may be less likely to choose Tanzania to replace Kenya as their preferred safari destination, given the two nations' proximity and the potential for spill-over of conflict from one to the other. Fletcher and Morakabati (2008: 538) draw on this, arguing that it is not even specific instances of conflict that elicit such a reaction, but that general notions of instability in an area can cause people to avoid it. They note that the Middle East is seen as dangerous in people's eyes, making any destination in the region 'high risk [to] potential tourists simply because it is in the region rather than any factors relating to the specific destination' (Fletcher & Morakabati, 2008: 538). Similarly, Kenya's geopolitical location in an unstable East Africa poses a challenge to the country, since it is likely that persistent conflict and terrorism in Somalia and other parts of East Africa impede Kenya's ability to project a vision of stability to international tourist markets, thereby impeding the tourism sector's growth due to perceived risk.

Indeed, tourism in Kenya often works complementarily with neighbouring destinations, which means that general regional instability and instances of terrorism can negatively affect East Africa as a whole. De Sausmarez (2013: 805) argues that in response to the 2007/2008 electoral violence in Kenya, Rwanda and Tanzania reported a decline in tourism numbers for several months. So, rather than regarding each other as competition, other East African countries have a vested interest in their neighbours' recovery in the face of political instability and, relevant to this study, in the face of terrorism. Rwanda, for instance, gets a significant proportion of its tourism from those who visit it as an add-on destination to a bigger trip. According to De Sausmarez (2013: 805), those who visit Kenya for its safari tourism may combine this with a

trip to see the gorillas in Rwanda, or a trip to Zanzibar for its famous beaches. Furthermore, most international flights in the East African region pass through Nairobi, thereby making it likely that people will choose Kenya as their primary destination, and visit other places thereafter. In essence, substituting Kenya for another East African destination is unlikely due to the generalisability effect. The substitution theory, however, may still be relevant for destinations further afield, with South Africa for instance, acting as a replacement destination in the face of terrorist attacks in countries like Kenya.

4.5.2.5. The impact of counter-security measures on tourism in Kenya

Although the literature on the impact that counter-security has on the tourism sector is not as developed for Kenya as that which relates to Egypt, one can make theoretical comparisons and apply them to the Kenyan case. To begin by outlining the Kenyan counter-security landscape: Kuto and Groves (2004: 91) note that in response to the US embassy attacks in Nairobi, the Kenyan government tripled its security mechanisms in the tourism sector. This is confirmed by Lisle's (2012) study which critically examines the heightened securitisation of tourist spaces in Mombasa, Kenya, following the Paradise Hotel attacks of 2002. According to the wider literature, increased security measures provide a sense of comfort to certain cohorts of tourists, since they regard this as increased protection against terrorists, and therefore, more safety for them. Who these tourists are is important, since Fielding and Shortland (2011: 219) argue that a greater sense of comfort is seen in visitors from the US rather than those from Europe, since US tourists may be more acclimatised to a heavy police presence and have come to associate this with increased security. Although this study did not analyse Kenya's case in particular, this could be a useful pathway to explore in the case by examining Kenya's largest tourist markets – the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States – to determine whether an enhanced counter-security presence would be a promising strategy to reassure the majority of Kenya's tourists.

This is necessary because markets may react diversely to a heavy counter-security arsenal. Indeed, Neumayer (2004: 278) argues that human rights violations through harsh counter-security measures are a statistically significant deterrent against tourists visiting that country. Kenya, like Egypt, has a violent human rights record with regard to counter-security, with the controversies of the KTPU having been discussed in the background section of this chapter. As such, certain groups of tourists, especially from Western states which subscribe to a liberal

agenda, might be deterred from visiting Kenya in the face of a violent security architecture. In a sense, this can be understood as a boycott of the country's tourism sector due to repressive governmental actions, but may also be a means of avoiding being caught in the crossfire of an attack. They may also be deterred by a pervasive feeling of anxiety due to being in a heavily securitised environment whilst trying to relax on holiday. Kuto and Groves (2004: 91) argue that training for security personnel in dealing with tourists is needed to allow these personnel to treat the sector more sensitively than they might do with other industries, so as to limit the negative effects of increased securitisation on the tourism sector. As always, these measures should be combined with counter-security measures which aim to address the structural roots of terrorism.

4.5.2.6. Crisis management techniques in Kenya

Kenya, as a developing country with little free income to invest in crisis management strategies in the wake of terrorist attacks, has the potential to be hit harder by crisis events than more developed states (Thompson, 2011: 699). Indeed, Kenya's Foreign Minister during the time of the 2002 Paradise Hotel attacks wrote an open letter to the British government, pleading with them to revoke their travel advisories due to the financial effect of these warnings on the local economy (Fletcher & Morakabati, 2008: 552). This activism to remove travel bans was useful in spurring awareness on how developing countries may be treated differently to developed countries in the face of a terrorist attack, since the actual risk of becoming victim to a terrorist attack was probably very low in Kenya.³¹ Moreover, compared to other nations in Africa, such as South Africa and Egypt, Kenya already has a significantly lower budget to offer the tourism sector (De Sausmarez, 2013: 803). This hinders Kenya from engaging in best practice solutions to ensure the recovery of the sector over the shortest term possible, and, therefore, the duration of the effect of terrorist attacks over the tourism sector may be prolonged. In a cyclical manner, the tourism sector may have to take cost-cutting measures to mitigate drops in revenue in the face of terrorism, in turn causing price increases for tourists. De Sausmarez (2013: 799) argues that to absorb some of the sector's losses, visitors had to pay additional costs for experiences that had previously been free. Terrorism can, therefore, have a long-term impact on the viability of the tourism sector if budgetary constraints are too severe to deal adequately with crises.

³¹ This effectiveness of lobbying in this regard could be a useful avenue to consider in future research.

A further challenge facing Kenya's approach to terrorism, according to De Sausmarez (2013: 794), is that it does not have a dedicated organisation and plan to deal with crisis management in the tourism sector following terrorist attacks. The Kenyan government's Vision 2030 includes tourism protection on its agenda, but excludes crisis management strategies to safeguard the industry itself from the fall-out of terrorist attacks (De Sausmarez, 2013: 794). In spite of this, there have been some ad-hoc initiatives that have been used in crisis management strategies by tourism stakeholders. As an example, in response to electoral violence in 2007, the Kenyan Tourism Federation flew representatives from media outlets in Kenya's main tourism markets to the country to showcase the improvement in the security situation to an international market (De Sausmarez, 2013: 798). Some commented that they had only been brought to Kenya's game parks, thus avoiding the more dangerous areas. As such, it did not improve the overall situation for the Kenyan tourism industry because it was viewed as a public relations campaign rather than an effort to show genuine improvement. Although this move was in response to post-electoral violence, it points to the need for crisis management strategies to be rooted in truth: addressing, rather than ignoring, issues that have the potential to deter tourists in the wake of a terror attack.

As previously discussed, the effect of Kenya's focus on increased securitisation and harsh counter-security measures can, in fact, have an undesirable impact on tourism by deterring visitors from visiting Kenya due to moral objections against practices that degrade human rights standards (Neumayer, 2004: 278). Addressing the structural causes of terrorism through ally-based development initiatives will probably stabilise terrorism in the long-term. When combined with international branding campaigns, this could assist with restoring the reputation of the tourism sector. A further dynamic to consider is how various markets tend to react to terrorist attacks in Kenya. To this end, Buigut (2018: 36) suggests that Kenya prioritises attracting emerging market tourists since, according to his study, tourists from emerging countries are less deterred by terrorist attacks occurring in Kenya than are those from developed countries. This could be a future marketing avenue to consider for crisis management strategies, given Kenya's increase in terrorist attacks since 2011.

4.5.2.7. Conclusion

The above sections have argued that the impact of terrorism on tourism in Kenya has generally been negative, but that specific circumstances have the ability to extend the duration of the

impact or worsen the severity of the impact. This points to the necessity of an increasingly nuanced understanding of the topic: investigating specific features that shape international tourists' perceptions of risk, beyond merely the objective features of the attack. In Kenya's case, foreign government travel advisories have been particularly detrimental to tourist outlook in the wake of terrorist attacks, for instance, by negatively influencing foreign audiences' subjective views of the severity of a terrorist attack. For this reason, paying attention to how these factors affect the tourism sector is important, since it paves a path to understanding the areas for prioritisation when attempting to restore the tourism sector in Kenya. This is significant when devising crisis management strategies to bolster tourism in the wake of terrorist attacks, but can also be useful when interrogating interrelated issues such as *actual* versus *perceived* risk, how the counter-security architecture engages with tourists, the possibilities for regional cooperation to boost tourism (in view of generalisability concerns), amongst other relevant issues that could be charted in future research.

4.5.3. *The influence of tourism on terrorism in Kenya*

4.5.3.1. Introduction

As has been described above, terrorist attacks can have a complex effect on Kenya's tourism sector, since specific features of the attack can influence the duration of the effect, or its intensity. This is the most commonly researched angle of the relationship between terrorism and tourism in Kenya. By applying points raised in critical studies about the development of Kenya's tourism sector, however, the researcher will also review in this section whether tourism promotes risk factors that could lead to terrorism. Again, it is important to emphasise that tourism does not cause terrorism, but could aggravate some of the tensions that may contribute to terrorism, including through the development of harsh counter-security measures geared at protecting tourists. It must be noted that this, in fact, could exacerbate tension between the state and extremists. A host of dynamics that are present in Kenya's tourism sector will be outlined, including amongst other relevant issues, the extent to which local people benefit economically from the sector, the historical dimensions of land used for tourism, the power dynamics inherent in interactions between tourists and locals. This, ultimately, will lead to an attempt to understand why tourists are targeted in terrorist attacks in Kenya, especially the risk factors inherent in the sector that may bolster existing threats for radicalisation. In this section, no deep examination of the risk factors behind every terrorist attack will be presented, but rather, insight will be provided into the general issues pervading the tourism sector. These

will be analysed to understand how practices in the sector have the potential to deteriorate relationships between locals and tourists, thereby charting a potential path for terrorism against tourists to occur.

4.5.3.2. Economic benefits to local populations

One of the most common elements explored in critical studies on the tourism sector globally is whether locals are meaningfully incorporated into the industry, including in ownership structures, amongst other benchmarks. Historically in Kenya, most tourist establishments have been owned by international investors. In the past, these would probably have been European investors. However, in a more contemporary analysis, the majority of tourist developments are owned and funded by South African, Indian and Middle Eastern investors, indicating the prevalence of diverse markets in Kenya's investment landscape (De Sausmarez, 2013: 800). Although seen as useful for developing Kenya's infrastructure, this also means that there are high leakages of revenue, with much of this capital returning into international hands rather than into those of the general Kenyan population (Akama, 2004: 141). In terms of the economic benefits to locals, this is likely to be minimal and can, therefore, foster an inequitable tourism industry which has a potentially negative impact on how local stakeholders view the tourism sector since they have little personal investment in seeing the industry thrive. Although this does not cause terrorism, it can increase the resentment felt against the industry, which can spiral into terrorism under certain conditions.

In addition, since international investment is something that the Kenyan government has traditionally prioritised, international companies are less likely to be subject to the same checks and balances to which local companies need to subscribe. This is due to regulatory allowances given to companies that promise economic development, as well as international companies' ability to negotiate holes in the legislation (De Sausmarez, 2013: 800). This has led to environmental issues – including land clearance prior to the building of tourist developments – but extends to social issues, such as foreign non-adherence to fair labour practices. Although not directly causing terrorism, this can foster resentment against an industry that uses Kenyan land and resources, yet yields few material benefits for Kenyans. It is important that locals should be consulted in, for instance, new tourism developments in light of competing demands for land and the growth of local communities on the borders of national parks (De Sausmarez, 2013: 803). Moreover, ensuring that environmental degradation does not occur through such

projects is a significant factor because it increases the invisible cost to local residents brought about by the tourism sector in terms of, for example, proper waste disposal from tourist facilities or the safeguarding of wildlife for future generations. It is also important that the environmental commons shared by tourists and locals are protected rather than degraded by the tourism industry. This cost to the local residents is likely to foster resentment toward the wider tourism sector and, therefore, could prove to be a risk factor for terrorism, since the sector impacts people's access to sanitation, land, or other environmental resources.

Beyond this, historical injustice regarding the distribution of land is important here, since many tourist developments are built on contested tracts of land, which has brought about tension between local people and developers over the years. As an example, Akama (2004: 148) notes that the Maasai ethnic group are in constant conflict with the Kenyan Parks Board about grazing and water rights. This land was previously used freely by the Maasai until man-made fences were erected to protect the wildlife zones. The Maasai, however, are not traditionally a group that is vulnerable to radicalisation and are of less importance individually to this study. Their exclusion from tourism resource management, however, is indicative of a wider risk factor present in the structure of the tourism sector, where local stakeholders are excluded from decision-making in areas that are of direct concern to them. This may, moreover, extend to incorporate exclusion with regard to employment structures, including the types of positions that local people hold and whether they are adequately trained for growth in the sector to reach managerial levels. Indeed, Akama (2004: 145) argues that the ways in which the tourism industry in Kenya has developed to focus only on luxury, five-star lodges 'tend to preclude local participation in tourism project design and management', since this is an incredibly capital-intensive process. Local people, instead, are usually utilised in more menial tourism roles, where Akama (2004: 142) argues that the traditional *master-servant* dynamic that was common in the past is still often present.

Community-orientated initiatives in Kenya have tended to fall flat or be have been met with significant challenges that derail their potential to contribute to the livelihoods of local residents. For example, the Kenya Wildlife Service has, since the 1980s, put into action community-based wildlife tourism projects in areas around some of the state's national parks, including Amboseli National Park and Maasai Mara National Park. Akama (2004: 150), however, has argued that these have tended not to reflect wider population interests, as they have come to be dominated by local elites and this sways the narratives and policies

surrounding this in a particular way. In terms of wider challenges presented to local stakeholders, De Sausmarez (2013: 804) outlines how local Kenyan tour operators often lose a significant proportion of their business to larger foreign mass tourism operators, who tend to have existing access to partners in international markets. This can be a demoralising experience for local operators who are, therefore, unable to break into the tourism sector. Again, this is unlikely to cause terrorism, but speaks to a pattern of exclusion which is a significant risk factor for the sector.

In terms of radicalisation, exclusion has been highlighted as one of the theories for the rise of terrorism in the modern age (see Choi & Piazza, 2016). The predominance of Muslim people in Kenya's coastal regions makes this especially important for seaside resorts, given that there have been increased incidences of radicalisation within these communities due to the existing exclusion of Muslim people from local and national political structures because of their minority status. Otiso (2009: 112) argues that Muslims in the coastal region are restricted from working in the tourism sector at seaside resorts for a number of reasons, including that Muslim people in Kenya are often educated in Islamic schools, rather than in the mainstream schooling system. As such, their education does not tend to include the study of English, which makes them unsuited to many tourism positions that require interaction with tourists, as English is the dominant language of communication (Otiso, 2009: 112). Although inadvertent, this excludes many Muslim people from reaping the benefits of Kenya's thriving coastal tourism industry, in an area which is more highly populated by Muslims than the rest of the country. This, arguably, can pave the way for increased radicalisation potential, given Al-Shabaab's predominance and its desire to foster an Islamic brand of terrorism. Increased sensitivity to this issue, for example in the employment of vulnerable groups in non-client-facing roles within the tourism sector, while offering opportunities to upskill through language initiatives, may ameliorate some of these issues.

In Akama's (2004: 144) study, he considers exclusion historically, highlighting the injustice of how foreign tourists were authorised to hunt game for sport in Kenya, but when local people did so on land they had previously owned, this was considered to be poaching. This, arguably, laid the foundations for the current exclusion of local residents from the tourism sector, since locals do not benefit economically from the sector, and are unable to access the national parks due to prohibitively high entrance fees. Despite the logic of tourism's developmental impetus, this can foster a poor image of the tourism sector by predominantly catering for the elite.

Targeting tourists in terrorist attacks, therefore, may be viewed as a symbolic attack on these inequitable structures that sustain and symbolise economic disparities. Tourism in Kenya must pay heed to these historical and contemporary challenges to ensure that the industry is practised in an inclusive manner. This can ensure that local people benefit from employment and infrastructure investment, and reduce the risk factors for terrorism by transforming the way in which they view the industry.

4.5.3.3. Social relations

It is a commonly held belief that tourism gives rise to forms of cultural exchange that can increase connection between tourists and local populations by giving them a platform to interact. In practice, however, this may be more complex, since social dynamics, such as the power relations between tourists and local people, come into play. The phenomenon of tourists being targeted in terrorist attacks in Kenya, as is evidenced in the kidnapping trend of foreigners by Al-Shabaab from 2011, is testament to the need to study this issue through a critical lens. In doing so, one should examine the reasons, as well as the wider risk factors, that may spur on discontent in vulnerable groups. Tourism is not a direct cause of terrorism, since tourists are often selected by terrorists for their status as soft targets, which is accompanied by an amplified media reaction should they be killed. There are, however, ways that the tourism sector should be held to account for its role in cementing power relations between locals and tourists in Kenya, and the extent to which it meaningfully incorporates locals so that they can materially benefit from the presence of the sector in their communities. Into this come critical issues such as the prioritisation of tourists in counter-security measures, the mitigation of tourism's symbolic association to the West, analysing how tourists understand their position in relation to local residents, tourism's status as a visible manifestation of inequality in Kenyan society.

Power relations between tourists and local populations will always be an issue for critical exploration in cases where the predominant tourism dynamic is to attract people from the Global North to the Global South. Akama's (2004) study is useful for understanding the foundations of tourism as they relate to power in Kenya. As an example, he uses big-game hunting, which was seen for many years as a symbol of socio-economic status, and he argues, as a means to exert Western dominance over nature and local people (Akama, 2004: 141). Although colonialism has ended, the Kenyan tourism sector still draws on colonial imagery in

marketing the destination in the same way as is the case in Egypt. The 1985 film, *Out of Africa*, for instance, harked back to the colonial times in Kenya and drew on a certain sense of nostalgia. Many references to Kenya's tourism sector in the media, particularly the media from the UK, tend to draw on this film to understand the Kenyan landscape.³² This nostalgia positions Kenya as a natural Eden, thereby simplifying the diversity of the place and its occupants. The Maasai, for instance, are often pictured as the only ethnic group in Kenya living off the land and co-existing with wildlife. This, however, ignores the diversity of Kenya's ethnic composition and harks back to a time when Kenya was less developed. This returns the destination to a time in which Westerners believed they were pioneers in the region, charting out a sense of civilisation in a pre-modern society.

Romanticising the past can erase accountability for some of the wrongs that were committed during colonial times. Moreover, by portraying the country as an Eden of sorts – untouched by man – tourist practitioners also erase the complexities of the people currently working and living in the country, simultaneously simplifying their unique socio-economic struggles. This power dynamic might have a negative effect on interaction between tourists and locals, since it does not pave the way for genuine interaction between them. Moreover, a lack of understanding of the local people and cultural dynamics in a destination can foster some disrespect in the way that tourists behave when visiting Kenya. As was previously mentioned, the Kenyan coastal regions have a significant Muslim population relative to many of the country's other provinces. For this reason, Otiso (2009: 112) argues that 'tourism, as it is practiced in the country's coastal beaches, is at odds with the local Islamic culture and customs'. He notes that this is because tourism has contributed to a rise in prostitution and drug use along the coast. Alcohol is also consumed freely by tourists and foreign women are often found in revealing dress along Kenya's public beaches. Although not necessarily a problem in itself, it is important for tourists to adopt a culturally sensitive approach to the way that they interact with locals. Not engaging with the norms of the area has the potential to foster resentment against tourists and against the wider tourism sector in Kenya, perhaps pointing to a risk factor that could raise the chance of attacks on tourist establishments.

³² For an example of how this *Out of Africa* imagery has been invoked today, see a 2015 article carried in British newspaper, *The Telegraph*, which details the writer's journey to Kenya today by visiting spots that were iconic in the film (*The Telegraph*, 2015). Many of the images invoked in the article are reminiscent of colonial understandings of the country as a Garden of Eden, as discussed in the body of the paragraph.

Similar to the case of Egypt, the tourism sector in Kenya has developed in such a way that tourism is practised in areas that are in close proximity to poorer settlements. These include communities living on the borders of national parks and in coastal regions. Kenya, without tourism, is already an unequal society as per the metrics of the GINI co-efficient, and is subject to increased risk for terrorism if one were to use the theory of relative deprivation as a basis (World Bank, 2015b). This theory denotes that it is not poverty that creates political violence, but that high levels of inequality might be a contributor (Gurr, 1968; 1970). In Kenya, having very visible manifestations of luxury in close proximity to individuals living in poor conditions who are without access to basic services, is a risk factor for terrorism, since it can foster resentment, especially if the surrounding community does not benefit from tourism. This is not always the case: South Africa, for instance, has one of the highest scores on the GINI co-efficient in the world, yet it is plagued by fewer instances of terrorism. Kenya, however, is already at risk due to its relationship with Al-Shabaab and other political features. Inequality, and tourism as a symbol of it, might accelerate or exacerbate terrorism in a context which is already vulnerable. This is bolstered by how rare it is for Kenyan tourist establishments to be visited by local tourists. Instead, international tourists are more able to afford the high prices of hotels and parks (De Sausmarez, 2013: 800). The sector is, therefore, restrictive, exclusionary and may be regarded as a symbol of a lack of upward mobility in Kenya, potentially fostering further resentment. When other conditions are in place, this resentment would have the potential to spiral into forms of political violence.

As another factor, the power dynamic between tourists and local residents is reinforced by counter-security measures and increased securitisation of tourism facilities, which can implicitly communicate messages about who is worthy of protection and who is not, thereby shaping understandings about relative power for both locals and tourists. Lisle's (2013:127) study is especially relevant to this issue, since it considers the 2002 Paradise Hotel bombings in Mombasa and discusses the physical transformation of hotel infrastructure in response to these attacks and similar ones in Bali. She discusses how 'responses to the targeting of tourists on Bali and Mombasa reinforced and reproduced the discourse of exceptionalism, which in turn enabled a more intense securitisation of tourists, tourist workers and tourist infrastructure', thereby contributing to enhanced counter-security (Lisle, 2013: 129). This exceptionalism places tourists in a privileged station, perhaps given their positions as purveyors of the neoliberal, cosmopolitan order. On the inverse, it communicates subtle messages about who is worthy of protection, since the same degree of securitisation is not commonly offered to local

residents, thereby endorsing judgements about the value of tourist lives relative to those of locals. So doing, it charts a path of division between tourists and locals, epitomised through the securitisation of space, including high walls and armed guards which essentially create a barrier between the two groups. Regarding terrorism, tourists and tourist infrastructure may, therefore, be seen as visible manifestations of inequality. Moreover, the physical barriers between tourists and locals may give rise to additional mental barriers, thereby impeding the potential for genuine communication between tourists and local people. Although not directly causing terrorism, these barriers do little to foster goodwill toward Kenya's tourism sector in certain factions already vulnerable to terrorism.

As has been discussed throughout this study and this chapter: tourism demands especial protection from counter-security forces, since attacks against tourists tend to be more high-profile in the media than attacks on locals. As such, it has become commonplace for international states to bolster local Kenyan counter-security measures so as to protect tourists from political violence, in this case, terrorism.³³ This is witnessed through an increased security presence in tourism hotspots, for instance. The importance of protecting tourists is economically significant to Kenya, since they bring in essential revenue, thereby providing the thrust for counter-security practitioners to engage in violent acts against suspected terrorists in the name of protecting tourists. This is relevant when making the argument for the impact that tourism can have on terrorism, since many scholars have argued that harsh counter-security practices can fuel increased terrorism, as sweeping approaches that persecute innocent people can provide a cause for people to rally. In Kenya, this is often the case with counter-security forces targeting Islamic people in the coastal regions, which can create a greater cause for terrorism to occur, since religious discrimination is at play (Mwangi, 2017: 1050). The tourism sector in Kenya, therefore, implicitly emboldens counter-security measures and, in turn, can promote terrorism within this context.

4.5.3.4. Conclusion

Although tourism is commonly thought to be a cultural bridge between tourists and local populations, if not practiced responsibly, it has the potential to damage such relationships. In the above section, an attempt has been made to delineate how the tourism sector might promote

³³ For a review on international involvement in Kenya's counter-security landscape, see Bachmann & Hönke (2010).

better tourist-local relationships in Kenya, emphasising the need for tourism to benefit local communities economically in order to mitigate risk factors that may foster terrorism in vulnerable groups. It is important to emphasise that tourism may not cause terrorism, but when other conditions are at play, it has the potential to increase the chances of an attack. This is especially important when considering that the tourism sector in Kenya, like Egypt, is particularly vulnerable to terrorist attacks, such as the Paradise Hotel attack of 2002 and the Dusit D2 luxury hotel attack of 2019. Indeed, in Kenya, it can be argued that the tourism sector may exacerbate a power imbalance between tourists and locals if culturally sensitive measures are not in place in the sector and, crucially, if tourism does not benefit the wider community. It is, therefore, essential that the practices of the tourism sector in Kenya should be examined at regular intervals to ensure that best practice, with reference to Kenya's contextual specificities, is implemented.

4.6. Conclusion

As in the chapter on Egypt, this contextual chapter has attempted to answer the research question of how terrorism and tourism may influence each other by firstly, analysing how the differential features of terrorist attacks, including the profile of the victims of the attack, may elicit diverse responses from international tourist markets specifically in Kenya. Although the general literature (globally and contextually in the Kenyan case study) concurs that there is an overall negative effect on the tourism sector in the wake of terrorism, it is important to consider particular features which may exacerbate this effect. As has been discussed, attention should be paid to issues such as the profile of victims, how to develop crisis management strategies that pay heed to Kenya's geopolitical locale, whether international travel advisories are issued in an equitable way, amongst other issues that demand more research. Developing the literature on this issue is essential, since it could assist Kenya's tourism sector and related governmental agencies to best secure the industry in the wake of terrorist attacks and can address any pre-existing risks that could intensify the effect of terrorist attacks on the Kenyan economy.

Secondly the discussion has been an attempt to answer the research question by arguing that the relationship between terrorism and tourism in Kenya is a two-way street, in which certain practices within the tourism sector in Kenya might influence the risk landscape if not practised responsibly. It can be argued that tourism, itself, can act as a perpetuator of a risk of terrorism in Kenya, since there are issues in the sector which impede a genuine connection between

tourists and locals, including a power imbalance between the groups. Compounding this, if there are minimal economic benefits of the tourism sector for local communities, there are likely to be fewer individuals with a stake in the outcomes of the tourism sector in Kenya. This lack of investment in the sector by the wider population makes people more likely to act in violence against it, especially since the tourism sector can highlight, and sometimes exacerbate, a number of existing inequalities between the two groups. Although this is unlikely to cause terrorism, it can worsen some of the risk factors for terrorism. For this reason, the tourism sector should attempt to incorporate local people into the sector meaningfully, through job provision and upskilling of the local employment force, to educate tourists on issues and complexities that are present in the Kenyan context, and ultimately, to ensure that the tourism sector contributes to Kenya's developmental prospects. This should be done whilst keeping a critical eye on tourism practices, so that tourism operates in an ethical manner by maintaining best practice within the relevant context. If ignored, the tourism sector has the potential to augment existing risk factors for terrorism and, in a vicious cycle, may slowly degrade the industry by contributing to terrorism, which then in turn, reduces the prospects for tourism. For this reason, the relationship between terrorism and tourism should be analysed from both perspectives to ensure the long-term continuity of the sector.

The insights garnered from Chapters 3 and 4 will be further explored in the following chapter, which will highlight the study's key findings on the terrorism-tourism relationship, the policy implications that arise from the study, as well as pathways for further research.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

5.1. Introduction

In this study, the candidate has built on existing literature to further clarify the relationship between terrorism and tourism, using a two case-study design to do so. Her discussion of the terrorism-tourism nexus in Egypt and Kenya has advanced the literature on the subject by not only examining the effect of terrorism on tourism, but by applying various theories to the case studies at hand to ascertain how certain features of terrorist attacks might promote a longer or more negative economic impact over the tourism sector. She has also considered the oft-neglected dimension of the terrorism-tourism nexus by examining how tourism itself might perpetuate certain risk factors that sustain terrorism in the given contexts. This study does not reflect a causal approach, but rather, an exploratory one in order to grasp fully the linkages between these two features that have emerged from a globalised world. In this chapter, the research on the subject will be concluded by summarising the key insights that have been learned from the study, how these apply to future policy, and by investigating avenues for further research. It will present an analysis of these insights with reference to the case studies at hand. There is, however, a possibility of broader applicability to other contexts that might be explored in future.

5.2. Reflecting on the research question

As a reminder, the research question for this study stands as follows: *What is the relationship between terrorism and tourism in the contexts of Egypt and Kenya?*

The writer has answered the research question by analysing the literature on the impact of terrorism on tourism with reference to two case studies. In doing so, she has not sought to prove that terrorism negatively impacts the economy and developmental prospects for countries in the Global South, such as Egypt and Kenya, but rather, has concurred with the general tide of literature that has studied this issue quantitatively and qualitatively to show that there is a negative impact on the tourism sector and on the wider economy in the wake of terrorism. The contribution of this study is to consider factors that have been explored in large-N or theoretical research to clarify the conditions in which the duration of an effect over the tourism sector might be sustained for a longer period, or those in which the economic impact might be more extreme. Ultimately, the researcher has applied this thinking to two cases to understand how these issues might materialise there.

The contextual chapters are best suited to answering this question, as the candidate employs contextual nuances to analyse how these factors might materialise differently in different spaces. Issues that emerged in the cases of both Egypt and Kenya include how important the *severity* of the terrorist attack is for the impact which the attack has on tourism. Indeed, when there is a loss of life, media have more to write about, thereby amplifying the tourist reaction. It was, however, also suggested that a single, severe attack is unlikely to influence the long-term prospects of the sector on its own, as recovery organically takes place within a year if this is perceived as a fluke or a once-off attack. However, things change when the attacks are frequent, since having continual reminders of the danger of a destination can influence a potential tourist's perceived risk of visiting the destination. This speaks to a nuance in the debate that is not encapsulated by many studies which merely consider whether there is an overarching negative economic effect in the wake of terrorist attack(s). The candidate, therefore, concludes that a terrorist attack may not impact the tourism sector in a linear or predictable way, but that the features (both objective and subjective) of the attack have a bearing on the duration of the effect and its severity, with future implications for tourism crisis management strategies in contexts vulnerable to terrorism.

The candidate also concludes that it is only possible to comprehend the full scope of the relationship between terrorism and tourism by being open to the possibility that it is a two-way relationship, in which each phenomenon may influence the other in small and large ways. In speaking to the other dimension of this research question, a further contribution of this study is to consider how the Egyptian and Kenyan tourism contexts may influence the terrorism landscape. To this effect, Chapter 2 provided a basis of critical thinking as to how tourism has been practised irresponsibly in many cases, thus restricting it from meeting the developmental prospects that have been much touted in neoliberal rhetoric about the benefits of tourism in the Global South. In Chapters 3 and 4, such thinking was applied to the case studies at hand, seeking to understand what the impact of tourism on terrorism might be within these contexts. Although one cannot say that tourism causes terrorism, one may reason that in contexts where terrorism is already prevalent and when tourism is founded on attracting tourists from the Global North to the Global South (as is true of both case studies), tourism, if practised irresponsibly, may enhance risk factors for terrorism to be sustained.

This is not a universal condition, since some contexts may promote active community participation in tourism initiatives, thereby increasing local support for the tourism sector due

to its economic benefits, and so, can reduce resentment that is felt against the sector. In Egypt and Kenya, however, the tourism industry is dominated by global firms or local elites who may not prioritise the meaningful participation of local communities in receiving the economic fruits that the sector can offer. The tourism sector may, itself, also perpetuate power dynamics between tourists and locals, thereby stunting tourism's opportunity to foster genuine connections between the groups. An example of this is the continued use of colonially-inspired marketing strategies to market tourism destinations to international audiences. This is evident in both case studies and can sustain harmful stereotypes about local people and shape the way tourists interact with locals. Again, this is unlikely to cause terrorism, but may foster resentment against the sector and the West, increasing the likelihood that the tourism sector may become a target of terrorist attacks. Ultimately, this candidate has suggested that tourism has the potential to influence the terrorism landscape when there is a lack of responsible tourism practice, but only if other risk factors for terrorism are present.

5.3. Summary of key findings

Chapters 1 and 2 were the foundational chapters of this study, in which the application and analysis of further chapters was rooted. Indeed, in attempting to answer the research question, *Chapter 1* set out the theoretical frameworks of the concepts of *terrorism* and *tourism* in order to establish the basis for operationalising the relationship between the two phenomena. *Chapter 2* built on this by providing a review of the literature on terrorism and tourism. In charting the debates on the subject matter, the researcher engaged with arguments relevant to both the global environment and to those directly applicable to Egypt and Kenya, thereby paving the way forward for the case study chapters to follow.

Chapter 3 provided an analysis of terrorism and tourism in the context of the first case study, Egypt. In doing so, it considered the complexities of the particular environment, zeroing in on the issues most relevant to the context. It also provided a broader discussion of the relationship between terrorism and tourism. The contextual analysis included how some of Egypt's historic landmarks may have a lesser degree of *substitutionality* than may be witnessed in other countries. This can influence the impact that is felt on the tourism sector due to particular needs not being met by other destinations. Issues particular to the way that Egypt has typically approached fostering a responsible tourism sector were discussed, relating to employment patterns in the sector, and other critical issues surrounding the power dynamics between local

hosts and tourists. The chapter also presented a discussion of factors that are not particular to the Egypt case alone, but have more general applicability, such as the *severity vs frequency* debate. These, however, were applied to the specific case study to understand how they might materially affect the context.

Likewise, *Chapter 4* reflected an analysis of the terrorism-tourism nexus focused on the dynamics of the Kenyan context. Kenya has particular features, too, that were explored in this chapter, including how Kenya's geopolitical location and its proximity to Somalia might affect tourism regionally, through the *generalisability* phenomenon. Other issues that were discussed included the particular dynamics that had been brought about by land-intensive eco-tourism initiatives. Ignoring local land-use needs in a postcolonial society such as Kenya may foster resentment against the wider tourism industry, perhaps leading to radicalisation in cases where other terrorism risk factors are present. In this chapter, general issues pertaining to many tourist-orientated countries in the Global South were explored. In keeping with the case-study based approach, these were applied to the Kenyan landscape for an in-depth understanding of its contextual implications, which includes how the tourism sector has developed in Kenya with reference to competing demands for land use, for instance. In both contextual chapters, similarities were found that allowed for some insights into the relationship between terrorism and tourism. The contribution of *Chapter 5* is, therefore, to tie the information garnered in the previous four chapters into potential insights to clarify the relationship between the two. Some general insights on the subject will be summarised below, but these will be expanded later in the chapter with a view to developing some policy-related lessons emerging from this research.

Previous research has found that there is generally a negative impact on the tourism sector following a terrorist attack. In this study, an argument is posited that the duration and severity of this impact can be shaped by the features of the attack and other contextual factors. The researcher, moreover, argues that both subjective and objective features have the power to shift the outcomes for the tourism sector in the wake of a terrorist attack. This is because terrorism is often based on fear, which is subjectively shaped by factors such as the framing of terrorist attacks by the media, the identity of victims, whether the targets in the attack were perceived as being symbolic. These are relevant factors that tap into the psychological domain. This means that perceived risk and actual risk are sometimes at odds with each other, since the actual risks of being targeted in a terrorist attack are relatively low. Out of this, however, there are implications for the tourism landscape, including severe economic consequences.

Both the severity and frequency of terrorism can influence the magnitude of the effect on the tourism sector. This study concurs with Pizam and Fleischer's (2002: 337) research that although both factors have their effect, the frequency of terrorist attacks may be the more decisive factor in shaping the impact on the tourism sector, due to a persistent image of insecurity that is sustained by constant negative media attention. This succeeds by issuing frequent reminders of the dangers involved in visiting a destination, which has a protracted impact on the sector, since it does not allow the memory of an attack to fade over time. A key contribution of this study, however, is a recognition that the lines between severity and frequency can be blurred in cases where constant reminders of past terrorist attacks are issued in the media when smaller attacks receive media attention. This can keep the memory of severe attacks present in the minds of the international community over time, thereby exerting a detrimental effect on prospects for the tourism sector.

This researcher posits the argument that *substitutionality* and *generalisability* have a bearing on the tourism sector, with these theories not necessarily being incompatible with each other. In both Egypt and Kenya, there is a degree of substitutionality for tourist markets seeking sunshine and beaches, but the more specific features of the destinations, such as Egypt's pyramids and Kenya's safari tourism are more difficult to replicate (more so in Egypt's case). Regarding generalisability, this study has shown that not only terrorist attacks on the home territory affect a country's tourism. Attacks on neighbouring countries may affect the home country by deterring tourists, as has been seen in both the Egypt/Israel and the Kenya/Somalia dynamic. The candidate has concluded that these destinations may be replaced by outside countries, as per the substitutionality theory, but these alternative destinations are likely to be states further afield with little association with Egypt or Kenya, as per the generalisability theory.

Findings of this study indicate that in both case studies, the tourism sector faces challenges in the meaningful inclusion of local communities in its economic structures. Although not a direct cause of terrorism, this can minimise local support for the tourism sector and may even foster resentment toward tourism patrons (and the West), increasing the risk factors for terrorism. Moreover, a lack of economic benefits from tourism for local populations can invoke the theory of relative deprivation, where political violence, in this case terrorism, may be more likely when high levels of inequality are present. Tourists, especially in the North to South dynamic,

enjoy luxurious accommodation, sometimes in close proximity to local residents who have to work hard to meet their bread and butter needs. This can potentially foster resentment against the lavishness, and often wastefulness, of the tourism sector in comparison with the lived realities of the locals. In this case, it is not poverty that increases the risk factors for terrorism, but rather, inequality. In part, this might explain why tourists are particularly targeted in attacks, although their positions as soft targets, with economic and political clout, are also worthy of note. Along with a lack of economic benefits to locals, unequal power structures between tourists and local populations can be reinforced by certain tourism practices. This can cause a lack of respect for local customs and the formation of harmful stereotypes, which can culminate in barriers to genuine connection between tourists and locals. In extreme cases, a lack of cultural respect can build up to antagonism toward tourists and the wider sector, which ultimately, and when other features are present, may increase the risk factors for terrorism to occur against the industry.

This researcher, moreover, has argued that due to power dynamics prevalent in these contexts, tourists have been framed as particularly worthy of protection in counter-security measures, which includes increased securitisation in the sector. This programme of specific protection of the tourism sector through harsh counter-security measures may have a negative effect on the terrorism landscape, since repression can contribute to distrust of the government, and perhaps toward increased radicalisation potential. Particular types of counter-security measures may also give rise to diverse effects on the tourism sector. Tourists from more culturally liberal and less securitised countries may, in fact, be deterred by harsh counter-security measures to a greater degree than those who are more acclimatised to a strong police presence. This study, therefore, reflects the argument that the terrorism-tourism nexus is more complicated than one might imagine at first glance, with terrorism and tourism mutually reinforcing each other in a plethora of complex ways.

5.4. Policy implications

In this section, policy implications drawn from this study will be collated. The candidate will point out areas for improvement in the tourism sector, how crisis management strategies can best be utilised in response to terrorism (or as a preventative measure), amongst other issues. These insights are useful for safeguarding the tourism sector against future attacks, but also for reducing tourism's role in perpetuating any risk factors for terrorism. Although these policy

implications have direct consequences for the tourism sectors in Egypt and Kenya, many of these lessons may be applied on a case-by-case basis to other contexts. This is not a full account of all the lessons that can be derived from the study, but summarises those that can help to understand, and ultimately reform, the terrorism-tourism nexus.

- An important insight gained from this study is that terrorism does not necessarily create a negative effect over the tourism industry to the same degree in each attack. Instead, depending on the features of the attack, different outcomes for tourism may be seen. From a policy perspective, this means that mitigating the conditions extending the duration of the effect over the tourism sector, or the severity of tourist response to the attack, is important for the recovery of the sector. Using the *severity* versus *frequency* debate as an example, it may be prudent to prioritise addressing the issue of frequent rather than severe attacks to manage the economic fall-out in the tourism sector, since constant reminders of risk have been found to be more damaging than once-off severe attacks.
- Regarding the substitution effect, it is vital to market the unique features of each destination, so that it is less easily replaceable. This is particularly important in Kenya, given the presence of several foreign safari and beach destinations which are in competition with it.
- It may be important for diplomats and other actors to lobby against travel bans biased against countries from the Global South (Fletcher & Morakabati, 2008: 552). As has been pointed out in the case of Kenya particularly, travel bans can have a detrimental economic impact on the tourism sector and are not always grounded in objective risk.
- Marketing campaigns in the wake of terrorist attacks should be grounded in fact. Marketing a destination as a low-risk destination, in the face of facts that disprove this, can cause international audiences to distrust these campaigns (De Sausmarez, 2013: 798).
- Given diverse reactions from various markets toward terrorism, turning to unexplored markets for post-attack marketing campaigns, including other countries in the Global South or domestic tourist markets, is a valuable way to strengthen the tourism sector following a terrorist attack (Buigut, 2018: 36).
- Since diverse markets engage differently with violent counter-security measures, being aware of what the dominant market is and how it will react to terrorism is important when planning a counter-security strategy that is tourism-sensitive. In some European contexts, violent counter-security measures are a deterrent to tourists (Fielding & Shortland, 2011:

217). If this is a dominant market, engaging in longer-term, soft approaches toward countering terrorism may have preferable outcomes for the tourism sector.

- However, regardless of the market, security personnel should receive adequate training for dealing sensitively with tourists (Kuto & Groves, 2004: 91). Counter-security personnel acting aggressively may enhance tourists' negative feelings about the trip, and increase their perceived sense of risk in visiting a destination.
- The previous measures are all aimed at mitigating the effect of terrorism on the outcomes of the tourism sector. The measures that follow will aim to recommend initiatives that reduce tourism's culpability in sustaining the risk factors for terrorism by promoting best practice in the use of responsible tourism principles. The first of these is to meaningfully include local residents from surrounding communities in the tourism sector. In both Egypt and Kenya, there has traditionally been a preference for international hotels or tour companies to run tourist activities. Prioritising community-based tourism initiatives and entrepreneurship, while employing local people at various managerial levels, can help to increase support for tourism within local populations. Although this will not stop terrorism, having fewer unemployed and disaffected residents can reduce terrorism risk factors, as well as any resentment that is felt toward the sector.
- It is important for the tourism sector to brief tourists on arrival about culturally appropriate behaviour in the contexts of host destinations. This will proactively promote increased respect between tourists and local residents. In Kenya, it has been argued that the tourism sector along the coast has contributed toward a marked increase in prostitution, potentially fostering resentment toward tourism in the region by Islamic occupants, due to a violation of Islamic cultural values (Otiso, 2009: 112).

5.5. Pathways for further research

- Despite there being a handful of studies that conduct empirical research into the impact of terrorism on tourism in Kenya, it is still an underdeveloped region in comparison to the available literature on Egypt. Many existing studies on the subject in Kenya are rooted in analyses of older attacks. Researchers should, therefore, aim to offer contemporary analyses, especially given the increase in terrorist attacks in Kenya since 2011.
- Other research pathways could examine not only the impact of terrorism on tourism but also how travel warnings and bans by foreign countries impact the tourism landscape and whether there is bias against the Global South when these bans are made.

- Although Fielding and Shortland's (2011: 219) study is a good basis for understanding how harsh counter-security measures may deter tourists from certain contexts, it would be useful to expand this research, identifying markets in which this impact is mainly felt and the reasoning behind this. This could help to formulate tourism-sensitive counter-security approaches and might inform cost-benefit calculations when considering how counter-security forces react to terrorism.
- In general, there is a lack of literature on how tourism might affect terrorism in these contexts (particularly in Kenya). To fill this gap, it could be useful for further studies to advance the existing literature on responsible tourism and apply this to the terrorism dynamic to improve understanding of the relationship between the two in all its forms.
- Further studies could conduct qualitative research to determine how local people perceive tourism campaigns that draw on colonial imagery to market postcolonial destinations to international audiences. Studies might also explore local experiences about the power dynamic between tourists and local people to get a sense of how this might materialise in their eyes. This research could help to gauge on-the-ground reactions to the tourism sector for a critical understanding of how relationships in the tourism sector could potentially exacerbate resentment felt toward tourists. Such research could be instrumental in grounding existing critical literature on the terrorism-tourism nexus in empirical insights.

5.6. Limitations of the study

Due to time constraints, it has not been in the scope of this study to conduct a comparative analysis between the two countries of concern. Instead, this study has opted for a case-study based approach from which some lessons may be garnered about the case studies at hand, with potential application to the wider global terrorism-tourism nexus. A comparative study may have been useful if one were to derive more concrete lessons about how differences in the terrorism landscape could shape the tourism sector and vice versa, which points to a potential avenue for further research. As another limitation, Egypt and Kenya have different contextual features, such as Egypt's focus on historical tourism and Kenya's focus on eco-tourism, which could offer different outcomes for the tourism sector in the wake of a terrorist attack. Moreover, it did not fall within the scope of this study to conduct a quantitative analysis of the impact of terrorism on tourism. In both case studies, but especially the Kenyan, there would be a great benefit in conducting a contemporary quantitative analysis, given that a significant proportion of the literature is grounded in post-9/11 studies of the early 2000s. Other limitations in the

study include that it did not consider the impact that terrorism has on local tourism, as this study was more critically engaged with the North-South tourism dynamic in its scope. Focusing on local tourism could be a meaningful alternative in the face of terrorist attacks, making studies on this subject especially useful. This is already starting to happen in response to the shift to local tourism during the global Coronavirus pandemic, but research that investigates local perspectives on the contextual threat of terrorism could be similarly fruitful.

5.7. Conclusion

In this study, the researcher sought to uncover the relationship between terrorism and tourism by interrogating how terrorism impacts tourism and how tourism, too, may be an active participant in the terrorism landscape within its two chosen contexts, Egypt and Kenya. Although this study does not offer all the answers, the researcher has argued that specific contextual features, or features of the terrorist attack, have the power to shape outcomes for the tourism sector. It is, therefore, not only true to say that terrorism has a negative impact on tourism, but that specific contextual features can prolong the recovery process for the tourism sector, or increase the severity of the tourism sector's reaction to terrorist attacks. The inverse of this has also been explored in this study by considering whether and how tourism influences terrorism. When investigating the roots of terrorism in a full-rounded manner, the candidate has concluded that it is important to turn one's gaze to seemingly benign institutions, like the tourism sector. Although it cannot be said that tourism causes terrorism, tourism does have the power to promote risk factors that sustain terrorism, including a lack of engagement with local communities on tourism initiatives and inequitable power dynamics that have the potential to foster local ill-will toward the tourism industry. Conducting further research on the subject could boost the resilience of the tourism sector against the shock of terrorism in particular contexts, and moreover, could raise awareness in the tourism sector about its culpability in sustaining the terrorism landscape. Ultimately, this study has drawn on the work of existing literature to highlight some of the issues present in the terrorism-tourism nexus, and it paves the way for future research on the subject in order to clarify this relationship further.

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