


EARLY EFFECTS AND LEGACIES OF CAPE COLONY LEGISLATION ON BLACK DISENFRANCHISEMENT, EDUCATION AND MIGRATION

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DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

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ABSTRACT

The Cape Colony adopted a universal male franchise in 1853, which was subject to income and property qualifications. This decision created tensions amongst the white settler community. After several annexations of black territories had enlarged the Cape Parliament's sphere of control, black people were deemed a political threat and could eventually rule the Cape Colony as they far outnumbered white people. The Cape Parliament subsequently passed laws that aimed to disenfranchise black voters, restructure local government and segregate black people in the Transkei and drove them into migrant labour.

In this dissertation, I analysed the impact of two legislative Acts that were aimed at curtailing black suffrage, (1887 Cape Parliamentary Registration Act and the 1892 Franchise and Ballot Act) on the number of voter registrations. I used the transcribed and digitised Cape Colony voters' rolls to question the accuracy of claims made by several writers about the numbers of black people who lost the right to vote. I found that the number of black people removed from the rolls to be much smaller than is claimed by the literature.

I also studied the impact of the 1894 Glen Grey Act which was passed to restructure black local government by creating black administered District Councils. I studied the impact of District Councils on black education in the Transkei and showed that black primary school attendance and enrolment rose faster in districts that established Councils than in districts that did not.

Finally, as the Glen Grey Act contributed to the phenomenon of migrant labour from the Transkei, I studied the long-run consequences of the legislation. I did this by examining the relationship between internal migration and non-migrant primary and secondary completion in four South African provinces a century after the introduction of the legislation. I found some evidence of long-run persistence.

This dissertation makes new contributions to the literature on South African political and economic history, colonial and present-day education.

OPSOMMING

Die Britse Kaapkolonie het stemreg vir mans met sekere inkomste en eiendomsvereistes in 1853 aanvaar. Hierdie besluit het konflik in die wit setlaarsgemeenskap veroorsaak. Die anneksasie van grensgebiede het die hoeveelheid swart inwoners wat deur die Kaapse parlement verteenwoordig word beduidend laat toeneem. Wit kiesers het dit as 'n bedreiging gesien. Verskeie wette is dus afgedwing om die getal swart kiesers te verminder.

In hierdie verhandeling ondersoek ek die impak van twee wette wat ten doel gehad het om die getal swart kiesers te verminder. Ek gebruik gedigitiseerde en getranskribeerde Kaapkolonie stemrolle om die bestaande literatuur oor die getal swart kiesers wat van die stemrolle verwyder is te bevraagteken. Met die stemrolle tot my beskikking vind ek dat die getal swart kiesers wat van die rolle verwyder is baie kleiner was as die konsensus in die bestaande literatuur.

Die 1894 Glen Grey Wetsontwerp is deurgevoer om die bestuur van plaaslike owerhede in swart distrikte te herstruktureer. Dit het spesifiek 'n klousule ingesluit om distriksrade te skep. Ek ondersoek die impak van hierdie distriksrade op onderwys in die Transkei. Ek vind dat bywoningssyfers van swart kinders in laerskole vinniger toegeneem het in distrikte met distriksrade.

Laastens ondersoek ek die verwantskap tussen hierdie historiese migrasiepatrone en nie-migrasie primêre en sekondêre onderrig in vier provinsies van Suid-Afrika. Dit is omdat die Glen Grey Wetsontwerp bygedra het tot arbeidsmigrasie uit die Transkei. Ek vind beduidende bewyse van die langtermyn effek van die Glen Grey Wetsontwerp op onderwysuitkomst vandag.

Die verhandeling maak bydraes tot die literatuur oor Suid-Afrikaanse politieke en ekonomiese geskiedenis en die verwantskap tussen koloniale en onlangse onderwysuitkomste.

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INTRODUCTION

Background to the dissertation

Globally, democratic gains are increasingly being eroded and sometimes even reversed by anti-democratic processes such as voter disenfranchisement, autocratisation, populist movements and illiberal policies. Some notable examples include the banning of opposition parties in several African countries, Turkey and Russia. Instead of military coups d'état, it has become increasingly common to see democratic processes being subverted by ballot rigging, attacks on media freedom, voter disenfranchisement and even the mass incarceration of people (e.g. China) (Bermeo, 2016; Waldner and Lust, 2018: 1096). This is evident in both established and transitioning democracies.

While as of 2017, only 12% of all nations were considered full autocracies in which elections were never held (compared to 50% in 1980) and in a world of binary outcomes, most countries that experience democratic reversals are still democratic. But instead of thinking in terms of binary outcomes it is perhaps more useful to think of political systems as existing on a continuum, ranging from closed autocracies to full-fledged democracies. This will suggest that what we have been witnessing is a shift along a continuum, from full-fledged democracies to countries using various means to frustrate the democratic process by reducing competitiveness within the electoral system (Schedler, 2015; Lührmann, Tannenberg and Lindberg, 2018).

History teaches us that democratic reversals often occur during periods of democratisation and enfranchisement (Huntington, 1991; Lührmann et al. 2018; Schenoni & Mainwaring, 2019). Such mass enfranchisement episodes or 'waves,' can be considered "a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes "that occur within a specified period and significantly outnumber" the democratic reversals that occur afterward (Huntington 1991: 15). In the United States of America, the process of mass enfranchisement and

democratisation accelerated from the 1820s onwards after the removal of electoral property requirements, leading to nearly all white males being enfranchised. During the post-Civil War reconstruction effort, black American males were also enfranchised by the 15th Amendment, although their enfranchisement was accompanied by property and literacy requirements aimed at limiting the extent of their electoral participation (Zinkina et al. 2017: 581). The Cape Colony, several European countries, Canada and Argentina also established democratic institutions before 1900.¹

In the midst of what appeared to have been a global democratisation process, several countries underwent a reversal of their democracies during the nineteenth century. In the USA, Southern disenfranchisement began in the 1870s and by 1908, nearly all black American males had been removed from electoral rolls through a combination of fraud, violence, taxes, property requirements and literacy tests (Tuck, 2007).² By the late 1800s, Canada, Australia and New Zealand all had restricted or banned indigenous people from voting (Martin, 2005; Australian Electoral Commission, 2016) while the Cape Colony reversed its democracy by disenfranchising black men through three legislative Acts in 1887, 1892 and 1894 (DHA, 1891, 329).

The Cape's democratic reversal began after some of its leaders voiced their concerns about the large number of black people who had become citizens after black territories were annexed into the Cape. Several Cape leaders feared that black people who vastly outnumbered white people, would win parliamentary elections. The 1887 Cape Parliamentary Registration Act introduced private land ownership and prevented black men from using communally owned land in order to register for the qualified franchise. The 1892 Franchise and Ballot Act introduced a reading and writing test as a voting registration requirement. Many black men

² Southern disenfranchisement literature is the most widely known.

were disenfranchised as they were largely illiterate in comparison to white men.

Cape Colony democratic reversal went beyond removing voters from rolls. The Cape Parliament also passed the Glen Grey Act that segregated black people and created institutions that were the pre-cursor to those common during apartheid (Edgecombe, 1976; Lacey, 1981; (Rotberg 1988, 467, 477). According to Thompson and Nicholls (1993: 58), the Glen Grey Act “addressed the questions of land tenure, political administration and representation, labour extraction.” Part III of the Act required traditional black communally owned land to be replaced by individual titles, but these individual titles could not be used to register for the Cape’s parliamentary elections.

Part V of the Glen Grey Act created local District Councils that had broad administrative and taxation powers and black men were to vote for district councillors instead of Cape parliamentarians. The law also required individual land titles to be inherited by primogeniture (to force younger men to seek white employment) and introduced a hut tax for all black men who had not worked for white employers for at least three months in a year. These clauses had the effect of stimulating migrant labour from the Transkei to work in mining, industry and agriculture in the northern and western parts of the Cape. Taxes raised by DCs were used to fund administration, the development and upkeep of various types of infrastructure, schools and veterinary services.

Previous research on the economic effects of democratic reversal

Democratic reversal invariably has economic consequences. Since the work done by Kousser (1974; 1980) and Margo (1986; 1990) on Southern disenfranchisement and education, these consequences have generally received little attention. That said, the past decade has witnessed renewed interest in economic history related to democratic reversals. In what follows, I briefly discuss some of the most salient of these recent analyses.

Naidu (2012) documents the effects that franchise restrictions had on black Americans

and poor white people in the period 1870 to 1910. He found that property owners in disenfranchised counties benefitted as land values rose significantly more than in counties that were not disenfranchised. He also found that after disenfranchisement, the teacher-student ratio increased for black people while it remained unchanged for white people.

Henderson (2017) explores the effects that disenfranchisement had on immigrants to the United States in the period 1864 to 1926, finding that disenfranchisement had a negative effect on immigrant children's education. Immigrants' chances of finding work diminished and their wages were ten percentage points lower than those of citizens.

Finally, Jensen and Yntiso (2019) have studied the impact of democratic reversal on taxation by focusing on the disenfranchisement of black Americans in the late 19th century southern United States. Their results show a negative correlation between disenfranchisement measures (such as literacy tests and poll taxes) and state taxation revenues.

Research problem

All the studies referred to above provide evidence of the effects of democratic reversal in the southern United States - a region which, during the nineteenth century, had similar formal and informal institutions to those of the Cape Colony. To the best of my knowledge, the economic effects of the Cape's democratic reversal, the effect of the Cape's restructuring of black local government, and the legacy of the Glen Grey Act have not been studied. I believe that the Cape Colony provides a useful case study of (some of) the economic effects that democratic reversals have for understanding the consequences of similar processes today.

Scant attention has been paid to the Transkei in much of the empirical work that has been done on the development of the Cape Colony. Although the historical work done by Bundy and Beinart in the 1970s and 80s and that of Ntsebeza (2005) inform my analysis, little econometric work has been done on black people in the Transkei.

The lack of research on the Cape is surprising given the fact that its non-racial franchise

had existed for thirty-three years before the process of disenfranchisement was initiated. By comparison, black Americans were permitted to vote for only six years before disenfranchisement began in 1876. Cape democratic reversal is further of interest since it occurred after a period of significant democratic consolidation which demonstrates the important fact that established democratic orders are prone to democratic reversals.

The aim of this dissertation is to investigate more fully Cape Colony's democratic reversal, economic and political exclusion, and the general immediate and persistent effects this had on the education and migration of black people.

Research objectives

Against this background, the research objectives of this study are threefold. In the first instance, it will critically review the literature on Cape Colony disenfranchisement with reference to, among others, the Cape Colony voters' rolls and, through an analysis of the number of black and white voters on the rolls, measure the extent of the disenfranchisement that was implemented for the period 1886 to 1909. In the second instance, it will analyse the effects that District Councils had on primary school outcomes (enrolment and attendance) in the Transkei for the period 1886 to 1909. In the third and last instance it will investigate the relationship (if any) between post-1994 education outcomes (both primary and secondary) and internal migration for the period 2000 to 2013, with specific focus paid to the persistence of migration as a channel through which the legacy of the Glen Grey Act might be assessed.

Motivating the choice of the Transkei as the main study area

There are several reasons why this dissertation focuses on the Transkei region of the Cape Colony. Firstly, the vast majority of black people lived in that part of the country between 1887 to 1909. Secondly, it was also during this period that great political, educational and economic changes occurred as the Transkei expanded due to the addition of annexed 'black territories' to

the Cape Colony. Finally, the focus on the Transkei is also due to the fact that there is relatively more colonial data available on the education of black people.

Research design and methodology

In terms of the design of this research project, I use the historical method of analysis. This involves the “systematic and objective location, evaluation and synthesis of evidence in order to establish facts and draw conclusions about past events” (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2007: 191). Many modern economics dissertations make use mainly of quantitative methods. Given the nature of the three research objectives listed above, I chose to employ a mixed-methods approach which combines quantitative and qualitative methods. This integration while time-consuming, produces reliable insights as the two methods are complementary and allow for the convergence of research results (Sabharwal and Malish, 2018; Johnson, 2006).

While quantitative methods use statistical and econometric tests to assist in the analysis of numerical data in an attempt to identify hidden patterns through the application of deductive reasoning (Kamga, 2018), qualitative methods rely on the researcher’s skills to make sense of different narratives that were constructed by individuals who applied their own interpretation to certain phenomena (Kalof et al. 2008). In this study, qualitative research involved reviewing books, archival material and political debates in order to provide the contextual background to certain events discussed in the dissertation. While the qualitative approach is used to address the research question raised in Chapter One, econometric modelling is used to address the research question raised in Chapters Two and Three respectively. In the following section I briefly elaborate on each of these research questions.

Research questions

The first research question addressed in Chapter One can be formulated as: How effective was disenfranchisement legislation in removing black men from the Cape Colony’s voters’ rolls? I

review and challenge the literature on black disenfranchisement in the late nineteenth century Cape Colony. The consensus view of disenfranchisement legislation is that it was largely successful in what it set out to achieve, i.e. to significantly reduce the number of black people who were eligible to vote. But, as I argue, the empirical support for this consensus is weak. I use a matching formula for names and surnames in combination with manual matching to count the number of black people listed on the Cape Colony voters' rolls in the period 1887 to 1909. I argue that black voters targeted by changes in legislation may have responded in unforeseen ways and that disenfranchisement was not as 'effective' as previously claimed since the numbers in the literature on disenfranchisement appear to be exaggerated. The number of black people I identify who have lost the right to vote is substantially lower than the number suggested by existing literature.

This is an important contribution because it essentially challenges the veracity of claims made about the effectiveness of disenfranchisement. To date, no scholar has systematically gone through the voters' rolls in order, either to provide empirical evidence for the general consensus, or to advance and substantiate counter-claims about disenfranchisement. If the numbers were indeed lower than had previously been claimed, then that could be argued to say something more about black people's response to sustained attacks on the franchise than about the legislation itself. I therefore also elaborate on black peoples' efforts to resist removal from the voters' rolls.

The second research objective is to provide an answer to the following question: How did disenfranchisement indirectly affect black primary schooling in the Transkei? In order to answer this question, I explore the impact the Transkeian District Councils (DCs) had on black education in the Cape Colony's Transkeian Territories.³ DCs were established by the Cape

³ The 'Transkeian Territories' include all the districts located between the Kei and Umzimkhulu Rivers as in the Cape Colony's demarcations (Archives of Government House (G.H.), Cape Archives, Cape Town, Gazette No. 8456, II July 1902, Proclamation 11211902, 3 July 1902).

government to partly recompense black people who had been disenfranchised by the Glen Grey Act of 1894.

I also test the claim, made by Rhodes in 1893 and again by several school principals and inspectors in the 1908 Select Committee on Native Education (SCONE) hearings, that DCs would improve black education. These principals and inspectors stated that districts which received council status had higher enrolment and attendance figures than districts without such status. Chapter Two uses difference-in-difference (DID) estimation with fixed effects to determine the impact that councils may have had on enrolment and attendance figures. In my analysis I use districts that established councils (DCs) as the treatment group and districts that did not (non-DCs) as the control group. Leads and lags of the timing of the intervention are included given a staggered introduction of DCs.

The regression results show that the former recorded higher enrolment and attendance figures than the latter. Since black people led these councils, improved organisation and administration of education led to improved enrolment and attendance. This highlights the issue of co-payment and the demand for education: DCs collected funds for school fees, but non-DCs did not. Increased spending on education in DCs (with additional money raised by families) meant better-funded schooling and better outcomes. Government spending on education remained stable over the period covered by this chapter and yet outcomes improved. I also argue that education was used as a means of marketing a policy (DCs) to black people; a policy which ostensibly offered them increased autonomy but which in reality was part of a broader political strategy designed to assist Rhodes in retaining power.

The third and final research objective is to address the following question: What is the long term effect of the Glen Grey Act on internal migration, and what are the implications of this channel of historical persistence on education outcomes today? This is where the Eastern Cape *qua* case study is assumed to provide the researcher with the data necessary to project

general trends between internal migration and completion rates. As contemporary South Africa struggles with relatively low school completion rates compared to other nations of similar development (i.e. high middle-income), it is necessary to consider all factors that may be contributing to this problem. There is an abundance of literature on the causes of school dropouts in South Africa, but none of the studies have investigated the possible effects of internal migration on school completion rates.

Historically, labour migration was strongly influenced by interventions such as the Glen Grey Act and other apartheid era measures, with the Eastern Cape being the largest sender province. One of the Glen Grey Act's provisions was to levy a hut tax on all black males, in order to force black men to move from the Transkei and seek work in the mines, farms and industries. In the years following the Act, labour migration from Transkei accelerated. Chapter Three of this thesis, therefore, argues that present day migration from the Transkei is an indirect legacy of migration influenced by the Glen Grey Act.

In Chapter Three I use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), First Difference and Generalised Method of Moments System (GMM-SYS) regressions to test the effect of internal migration on primary and secondary completion rates of non-migrants in KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng, the Western Province and Eastern Cape. The main results are as follows: I did not find any relationship between internal migration and primary and secondary completion rates in the Eastern Cape. Primary and secondary school completion rates are also found to be lowest in former DC regions when compared to regions of the Eastern Cape that did not receive council status.

Data sources

In this study I made extensive use of secondary sources, including books, theses and dissertations. The Cape Colonial Blue Books, Statistical Registers, Cape Colony Censuses (1891, 1904 and 1909), Cape Hansard Parliamentary Debates of the House of Parliament and

the Cape Colony voters' rolls are the primary sources used. The annual Blue Books, Censuses and Statistical Registers are part of the Stellenbosch University library holdings.

The Blue Books recorded almost all economic and social data on Cape citizens with a special section dedicated to black people, titled Native Affairs. I read the Native Affairs section to discover the views of the magistrates about the socio-economic developments in the Transkei districts that they governed. The Blue Books also contain the annual reports on education expenditure and school attendance and enrolment figures for the whole Cape Colony. I used the education reports to gather data for the analysis in Chapter Two.

The Cape Colony Statistical Registers were mini-censuses conducted in non-census years. As there were three censuses (1891, 1904 and 1911) that fall within the time period demarcated for this study, the Statistical Registers were used to provide information on population and voter registrations for non-census years. In addition, I found valuable information on the workings of the Transkei Territories General Council in the Statistical Registers. The majority of the voters' rolls' eastern electoral divisions and magisterial districts (those from 1886 to 1896 and 1909) were digitised and transcribed to Excel and the information extracted. I transcribed much of the 1909 voter registrations to use for surname matching (Chapter One). The voters' rolls are housed in the Western Cape Archives and Records in Gardens, Cape Town. A local photographer digitised the entire series for the period 1872 to 1909 on my behalf.

In Chapter Three I use publicly available nationally representative data sets, namely, the 1996, 2001 and 2011 national censuses and the 1996 to 2013 SNAP surveys of Ordinary Schools.

Research limitations

As with all research projects this study, too, has its limitations. Firstly, due to time and financial constraints, I was unable to complete the digitisation of the voters' rolls for all the districts in

the eastern part of the Cape Colony for the entire period that I cover in this dissertation. In Chapter One, for instance, I did not have at my disposal transcriptions of districts to use in conjunction with a matching algorithm that links names and surnames over time. Instead, I manually identified and recorded the selected information (non-white names and surnames) necessary to complete the analysis. I do not believe that this impacts significantly on the validity of the results because isiXhosa names are easily identifiable. On the contrary, manual checking is a form of robustness checking and helps to identify possible false positive matching of non-white names and surnames. The task of digitising the Western and Northern electoral divisions and magisterial districts in the Cape Colony voters' rolls must fall to future research.

Secondly, in Chapter Two I have aggregated school attendance and enrolment figures at a district level. Ideally, I would have preferred to keep the data at school level in order to increase the statistical power of the model I used but still interpret the results at district level, as I do in Chapter Three. Owing to the rapidly changing nature of primary education in the Cape Colony in the 1890s, many schools were opening and closing soon after, making it difficult to collect data for the same school over the entire period. The Cape Colony also changed the way it reported data by aggregating all enrolment and attendance figures after the South African War, whereas it had previously been available at school level. As my main concern has been with establishing trends in educational outcomes, the data pooling approach that I have used will not negatively bias the direction of the results.

Main contributions of the dissertation

In my estimation, this dissertation makes an important data collection and methodological contribution by using micro-level observations from a previously unused source. The information gathered from the voters' rolls suggests a different narrative to the widely accepted black disenfranchisement narrative. Through empirical means, I highlight the role of black resistance and agency which previous scholars have not done. As the Cape Colony government

did not record detailed data for black people to the same extent that they did for white people, economic historians have to be creative in identifying useful sources for their research (Fourie, 2016). This dissertation also draws attention to the role of mass actors, that is, black citizens of the British Cape Colony, in the organisation and improvement of their children's education outcomes despite the Cape government cutting back funding of black education. This demonstrates that black people were not simply passive recipients of colonial education. Finally, this dissertation shows the long term economic effects of Cape colonial policies, highlighting the importance of history for development. Broad reaching policies such as Rhodes' Glen Grey Act can have indirect persistent effects and the channels through which they persist are important to study. This dissertation focuses on one channel of persistence (migration) while other important studies do not or are unable to do so.

CHAPTER ONE: CHALLENGING THE NARRATIVE OF CAPE COLONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT⁴

1.1 Introduction

In order to limit the black franchise in the Cape Colony, successive governments under Sir Gordon Sprigg (Prime Minister, 1886–90) and Cecil John Rhodes (Prime Minister, 1890–96) passed two Acts: The Cape Parliamentary Registration Act of 1887 and the Cape Franchise and Ballot Act of 1892.⁵ These Acts raised the requirements for voter eligibility and, according to contemporary commentators and subsequently, historians of the period, were clearly designed to remove black voters from the Cape Colony voters' rolls. The literature on disenfranchisement produced in response to these two Acts is riddled with contradictory and inaccurate claims about the effectiveness of the legislation. Some estimates of the number of disenfranchised black voters are based on scant empirical evidence; other commentaries cite no evidence or recycle statistics from older sources. Over time, the estimates have come to be accepted without question. In this chapter, I point out discrepancies between accepted estimates and I recalculate the number of black people who were removed from the voters' rolls. I find these discrepancies surprising given the fact that the voters' rolls, which include the names of the voters and, from 1902 to 1909, their race, are easily accessible in the Cape Town Archives. This chapter is the first to offer a detailed analysis of the relevant statistics based on these voters' rolls.

To challenge the accounts in existing literature, I examined the voters' rolls for the period 1886 to 1895 to see how voter registrations changed over those years, that is, directly before

⁴ A version of this chapter has been published as follows: Nyika, F. & Fourie., J. 2020. Black Disenfranchisement in the Cape Colony, c.1887–1909: Challenging the Numbers, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 46(3): 455-469. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2020.1741177>.

⁵ A third Act, the Glen Grey Act of 1894, had a clause that prevented black owned plots from being used to meet property requirements for the franchise qualifications. As disenfranchisement was a secondary focus of the Glen Grey Act, I do not consider it for purposes of this chapter. The two Acts I discuss in this chapter contributed to the removal of voters from the rolls, while the Glen Grey Act prevented new registrations.

and after the two disenfranchisement Acts were passed. I used computing software for matching surnames to count the number of black voters in each voter registration year for each electoral division. This enabled me to produce a more accurate estimate of the true extent of black voter disenfranchisement.

In existing literature, one strand of writing is represented by three left-wing writers who published during the early years of apartheid. According to Roux (1964: 67), 'Ausi' (1956: 11) and Mbeki (1964, 23-4), the 1887 Act disenfranchised 30,000 black voters or between 90 and 95 percent of the black electorate. None of these authors were academic historians. Roux was a botanist, Mbeki a journalist and activist and 'Ausi' remains anonymous. Although these authors may well have had a political motive for overstating the effect of disenfranchisement there also exists, within historical scholarship proper, a tendency to repeat certain figures and in general to overstate the impact of the 1887 and 1892 Acts. Some of this scholarship is discussed in the section 'Disagreements over Numbers Disenfranchised' below.

My findings suggest that the actual number of disenfranchised voters was significantly smaller than most accounts claim. I estimate that the 1887 Act reduced black voter registrations by between 2,800 and 3,000. My findings also indicate that the same Act disenfranchised more white and coloured than black voters.

Mills (2005) has questioned the idea that the Registration Act of 1887 removed 20,000 black people from the voters' rolls and estimates that black voter numbers fell from around 6,000–9,000 to 3,000–5,000 after introduction of the Act, that is, by some 50 percent. He based his estimation on extrapolations from the 1891 census numbers of registered white and coloured voters, as well as some voter registration numbers presented to the Cape parliament for six eastern electoral divisions for the years 1884 and 1886. In this study I extend Mills' analysis by counting voter registrations from a broader set of data sources (the voters' rolls), from a wider area (all 15 Eastern Cape electoral divisions, as well as Kimberley, in the Northern

Cape, because many black people were employed in the diamond mines). In the 1880s and '90s, the majority of black people in the Cape Colony resided in the 15 electoral divisions. I also extended the time frame (1886–1895), covering disenfranchisement by the 1892 Act as well as the 1887 Act.

This chapter complements the work by Feinberg and Horn (2009: 41–60) and Feinberg (2015) on black land purchases after the introduction of the Natives Land Act of 1913. Feinberg and Horn examine the extent to which black people succeeded in acquiring land outside the reserves by making use of an exception clause in the Land Act. Using previously unexplored sources such as the Governor General's Reports to Parliament, property transfers and registration data and geo-referenced datasets of rural landholdings in the Transvaal, they found that between 1913 and 1936, black people purchased more than 3,200 farms and plots. They therefore argue that this Act did not succeed in significantly curtailing black land ownership in the Transvaal and that it failed to segregate black and white farmers who continued to live next to each other. This chapter shares with Feinberg et al. the assumption that one should not equate the outcome of legislation with its stated objectives.

1.2 The Cape liberal tradition

The nineteenth century Cape Colony's franchise differed from that of Natal and the Boer Republics in its treatment of black people in the sense that it was the only non-racial, though qualified, franchise. All black and coloured men in the Cape could vote if they met certain stipulated thresholds of property and income. The Transvaal and the Orange Free State restricted the franchise to white men and Natal set the franchise qualifications so high that few non-white people ever attained it (Williams and Elliot, 1921: 205). In Natal, Africans were largely excluded from a common franchise by the stringent requirements of legislation enacted in 1865, and Indians were denied the vote altogether in 1896. By contrast, an inconsistent and contradictory tradition often referred to as 'Cape Liberalism' prevailed in the Cape Colony

which 'is best known for the suffrage it created [in 1853]. This suffrage allowed people of African origins, initially Khoisan and then Nguni, to participate in colonial politics (Trapido, 1980: 248) – this, no doubt, in part, because of the Cape's Ordinance 50 of 1828 which prohibited racially discriminatory legislation (Ross, 1993: 131–48). The Cape maintained this principle of racial equality before the law after 1854 and for much of the nineteenth century although the franchise was not extended to women until 1930 - and then only to white women. The black franchise in the Cape ended with the passing of the Representation of Natives Act of 1936, which placed black people on a different voters' roll.

Class distinction in the Cape largely coincided with race. What we today call racially discriminatory legislation, British politics labelled class legislation and it was biased against lower classes. Race and racial conflict in the Cape Colony were mostly discussed in terms of the white races, the English and Dutch, while many who belonged to the coloured classes became a subordinate working class ultimately to be culturally assimilated into the dominant white class.

Black people predominantly inhabited the regions that were annexed to the Cape Colony's territory in 1848, 1879 and 1885 and which became known as the Ciskei and Transkei. After the annexations, hundreds of thousands of black people were incorporated into the Cape Colony. Many black people were more socially and economically independent than the majority of coloured people and the non-racial franchise did not raise much concern until large numbers of black people began to register as voters in the late 1870s and early '80s. The 1880s Cape Hansard parliamentary debates show that many white politicians, including those who considered themselves liberals, were concerned about the black franchise (H.O.A, 1884, 64–72). While some argued that black people should be placed on a separate register entirely, others wanted only 'educated' or 'civilised' black people to be allowed to vote, while yet others argued that black people should never have been allowed to register at all (H.O.A, 1884, 64–

72).

Cape liberalism was not ‘liberalism’ in the sense in which the term is used today. It was at best a conservative worldview leavened with a dash of Enlightenment humanism, which meant that it was more than mere tokenism. This is demonstrated by the 1853 Constitution which left Cape black people politically better off than other black people in the rest of South Africa. Davenport (1966) notes that many Cape white people considered themselves superior to black people, while Lewsen (1971: 65–80) comments that the Cape liberal tradition was ‘not universally accepted’ and Rich criticises what he refers to as a ‘static perception’ of Cape liberalism (1981: 33). What is clear, is that white people were divided over how to deal with black people in several spheres of Cape society and not just with regards the franchise, as a result of which Cape liberalism is now generally accepted to have a more complex meaning than previously thought.

1.3. Representative and Responsible Government

The British governed the Cape Colony from 1806. In 1834, a Legislative Council was formed to replace a weak Advisory Council which, since 1826, had advised the Governor who consistently side-lined it. The Legislative Council comprised the same members as the Advisory Council but had power to consent to laws introduced by the Governor (Macmillan: 1936). It was widely resented by many colonists, who instead demanded a parliament that could reduce the unchecked authority of the Governor. The following decades saw many English colonists frequently petitioning for representative government. Constitution Ordinance No. 29 (1852) established the Cape of Good Hope parliament and a Legislative Council of elected representatives.

Between 1853 and 1891, in order to qualify for the franchise in the Cape Colony, a man was required to have occupied property valued at a minimum of £25 for at least 12 months, or to earn an annual salary of at least £50 (a salary of £25 would suffice if it included food and

accommodation). It has been argued that the Dutch only agreed to a low qualification franchise because it would give many of them the vote and thus a representative government to counter British political dominance (du Toit, 1987: 35–63; Giliomee, 1984: 1–10).

The Cape Colony nearly split over the issue of self-government, but Britain would not consent to the split (Swiegers, 2014: 35). A faction in the eastern half of the colony opposed responsible government because they feared being dominated economically by the western faction which supported self-government (Swiegers, 2014: 35). The eastern faction also worried that the withdrawal of British troops would leave them defenceless. Responsible government was granted in 1872 after John Molteno's Responsible Government Party successfully agitated for it. It shifted administrative authority from an appointed Governor to an elected prime minister who would appoint cabinet members who were accountable to parliament (Grundlingh, 1945: 43–7). Responsible government also gave the Cape Colony greater control over its finances and spending.

1.4. Black political activity

Low levels of black political activity from the introduction of the franchise in 1853 to the last quarter of the century can be attributed to a failure to meet voter requirements and a general lack of knowledge about the franchise (Imvo, 1988; Mills, 1985: 236). White candidates often bought black voter support in exchange for blankets (Roux, 1948: 54). Black people who adopted European ways were referred to as the school people, while red, blanket people referred to black people who maintained their traditional lifestyles and painted their bodies with red ochre (Davis, 1979).

By the 1860s and '70s black people increasingly desired an unprejudiced and impartial social order that would not discriminate on the basis of colour when opportunities to contribute to the formal economy became available (Odendaal, 1984: 3). Missionaries in the colony played an important role in educating future black leaders, who then engaged in the politics of

the day (Odendaal, 1984; Mills, 1976: 117). Black people saw missionary-driven Christianity as a way to attain ‘civilised’ status and education as a fundamental first step to progress (Mills, 1976: 117). They generally believed that white racial prejudice was based on paranoia and that it would be reversed if white people encountered civilised black people. They therefore saw their engagement in political affairs as a necessary step to overturn unjust white legislation. Mills (1978: 54) notes that the optimism of the mission-educated black people was sadly misplaced as authorities soon took exception to the black vote.

Educated isiXhosa young men were eager for information and in 1870, gladly welcomed the first widely disseminated publication that did not focus on religious issues. The paper was called *Isigidimi sama-Xhosa* and was printed at Lovedale College. It appeared in both English and isiXhosa and included articles that reflected on the economic and political issues of the day (Odendaal, 2012: 35). It was widely read and groups of individuals would meet to analyse and discuss the issues raised in its pages. John Tengo Jabavu, a prominent black writer, editor and activist, frequently wrote for the paper and in so doing, contributed to awakening black political consciousness.

In the constituencies, the most politically engaged black leaders were elected into supervisory or advisory committees in order to represent and pursue the interests of white candidates. They would select a white candidate to support and communicate decisions to the rest of the politically conscious black electorate. By canvassing for votes, a second black committee would then help the white candidate to be elected to parliament (Trapido, 1968: 87).

Jabavu saw it as essential to cultivate alliances with white politicians who would promote the black agenda, and he urged black voters to support liberal candidates (Odendaal, 2012: 35). He took over the editorship of *Isigidimi* in 1881 and soon clashed with missionaries and the publisher of the paper because of his strong convictions (Davenport, 2000: 111). His criticisms of the colony’s ruling authorities caused tensions, eventually compelling him to leave *Isigidimi*

and to set up a new paper in 1884 called *Imvo Zabatsundu* (Odendaal, 2012: 104). Jabavu angered many white candidates who lost to candidates he publicly supported and he was accused of writing ‘seditious articles’ (H.O.A. 1887: 95).

1.5. Disenfranchisement

From the 1860s onwards, Dutch candidates became increasingly frustrated with the non-racial Cape franchise because black people tended to support English candidates (Giliomee, 1984: 5). In the 1884 elections, for example, *Isigidimi* ‘agents’ influenced the majority of the black voters of Victoria East to vote for English candidate James Rose-Innes (Odendaal, 2012: 99). As a result, the defeated candidate vowed to push for the removal of black voters from the voters’ rolls. Responsible government emboldened Cape parliamentarians to explore means for limiting the black franchise that were not colour-specific and therefore less likely to be vetoed by London.

The Afrikaner Bond had long wanted to restrict the black franchise. In 1882, at meetings held in Graaff-Reinet (March) and Cradock (September), its members called for an increase in the property and income qualifications, for prospective voters to be obliged to take a reading test and for black communal tenure to be removed as a valid franchise qualification (*Cape Argus*, 1882). In the June 1884 parliamentary session, Bond members of parliament (MP) Mr Venter called for an increase in the franchise qualification and Mr Hofmeyr requested that the register be ‘improved and simplified’ (H.O.A, 1884: 231). The Afrikaner Bond, headed by Jan Hofmeyr, grew rapidly as a political power after merging with the Farmers’ Protection Association (Boeren Bescherminings Vereeniging) in 1882 (Giliomee, 1987: 44).

In an 1887 parliamentary session, Bond MP Le Roux reiterated the Bond’s request for a literacy test (H.O.A, 1887: 118). During the second reading of the Parliamentary Registration Bill, Cape premier Sir John Gordon Sprigg warned that between 1882 and 1886 black voter registration had increased substantially in six eastern electoral divisions (H.O.A, 1887, 68). For

instance, black voter registration had increased from 14 percent to 51 percent of the total number of voter registrations in Victoria East and from 3.5 percent to 49 per cent in Wodehouse.

The Bill's seventeenth clause removed communal tenure of land as a valid qualification for the franchise. Sprigg argued that this clause was meant to promote titled *individual* tenure of land which, he stated, had long been government policy and did not promote any hidden agenda. He further argued that allowing communal tenure as a qualification for the franchise actually contradicted the eighth clause of the Constitution Ordinance of 1853, which had introduced the income and property qualifications. According to Sprigg, if one took into account the value of the land held under tribal tenure and divided it by the number of black male adults living on the land, the value of individual holdings would not qualify any one of them for the vote (H.O.A, 1887: 70). The same Bill also introduced provisions that required a potential voter to have resided in a constituency for a period of 12 months in addition to which it also removed deceased voters from the rolls (H.O.A, 1887, 72). Sprigg later admitted that the Bill was intended to 'purify' the register (H.O.A, 1886: 95). Other parliamentarians, including future Cape Colony prime minister John X. Merriman, defended the black franchise, arguing that disenfranchisement legislation was intended to punish black people for electing English members 'who did not agree with the government' (H.O.A, 1887: 93–5, 100).

There was a significant political response from black people to the threat of disenfranchisement posed by the Bill, which 'was known by Africans as tung'ulomo (the sewing up of the mouth) (Odendaal, 2012: 114). When the news broke that the Bill had been passed, Jabavu increased his political awareness campaign. A conference held in King William's Town in October 1887 to discuss the legislation was historic for bringing together a wide range of black organisations. The newly founded Native Vigilance Associations organised large black mobilisation campaigns in several towns in the eastern part of the colony

to encourage voter registrations (Odendaal, 2012: 112–28). They met frequently and submitted signed petitions to parliament in protest against the Bill. As secretary of the Associations, Jabavu led a small delegation that entreated the British Crown to veto the Act. In July 1887 the Registration Bill was passed into law after the Governor assented to it and became the first legislation to disenfranchise significant numbers of black voters (Odendaal, 2012: 195, 274). Lawyers acting on behalf of black voters managed to ensure that several hundred voters retained their franchise (Odendaal, 2012: 124). Other voters managed to convince registration officials that the value of their livestock and homesteads qualified them for the vote (Trapido, 1968: 82).

The incorporation of very large numbers of black people into the Cape over this period substantially changed the ratio of black to white inhabitants and resulted in white voters increasingly becoming worried about the possibility of being ‘swamped by barbarians,’ as Jan Hofmeyr claimed in 1891 (H.O.A, 1891: 95). Apart from the annexations, black voter numbers had also risen because the discovery of diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1884 raised both income and property values, thereby enabling more black people to meet the franchise qualification requirements (Mills, 2005).

In August 1891, Hofmeyr tabled a motion that the franchise be amended on the basis of literacy or education, noting in the process that he was not the first to make such a suggestion since Bond MP De Smidt made similar pleas in 1869, 1872, 1880 and 1883 (H.O.A, 1891: 327). Hofmeyr noted that over a six-year period the Transkei black population had risen from 260,000 (in 1879) to 417,000 (in 1885). He also argued that if annexations of black territories continued, the black population would soon be “four or five times” the size of the white population.

Under political pressure to remain in power Cecil John Rhodes, who desired to unite the country under his government and whose ministry was propped up by the Bond, supported the

Franchise and Ballot Bill of 1892 (Jenkins, 1951: 20; Thompson, 1960: 116). He decried the fact that black people were already the kind of force that could decide elections and wanted them to exercise the vote only once they had received adequate “political education” (Jenkins, 1951: 21; Magubane, 1996: 108). For Rhodes, the Cape black franchise was a major complicating factor in his pursuit of union given that the Boer Republics resisted requests to allow for a black franchise in their territories (Fuller, 1910: 152; Walker, 1928: 438).

In parliament, Hofmeyr maintained the Cape franchise would be the ‘great cause of separation’ in efforts to form a united South Africa (H.O.A, 1891: 329). The Afrikaner Bond tried to defend their support of the Franchise Bill, with MP Theron arguing the Bill was non-racial and that it merely sought to prevent ‘illegal’ voters from exercising the franchise (H.O.A, 1892: 178). Theron further stated that the Bond was ‘fighting’ a certain class of ‘native’ and quoted at length from an unnamed book written by an American on the ‘native question,’ reported on as follows by Hansard:

[g]ood common sense and character were more to be desired in a Native than a smattering of schooling, which was often his ruin, causing him to eschew manual labour and take to preaching or laziness, imagining his little education made him equal to the best educated white man. To give him the franchise was dangerous and an exception was only made in the case of the truly industrious and wage-earning Natives, of whom there was no complaint to make (H.O.A, 1892: 178).

The 1892 Act was an attempt to ‘fix’ what the 1887 law had failed to achieve (Trapido, 1968: 55). It applied only to new voter registrations and previously registered voters were exempt from the law if they remained in their districts (H.O.A, 1892: 154). The requirements now included literacy (the ability to write one’s name, address and occupation) and raised the income qualification from £25 to £75. The new literacy and income requirements did not affect those who had registered before 1892 or those who had been employed as miners in Kimberley for six months preceding their registration (Trapido, 1968: 81). Rhodes and the Afrikaner Bond were satisfied with the Act because while it increased the income qualification, it left the

landholding qualification unchanged which qualified many white people for the vote (Fuller, 1910: 207).

1.6 Disagreements over numbers disenfranchised

As mentioned earlier, Roux claimed in 1948 that 30,000 black voters were removed from the voters' rolls through the 1887 Act and that 'Ausi' as well as Mbeki repeated this figure. Roux appears to be the first person to have quoted the figure but he does not explain how he arrived at it. He was a founding member of the Young Communist League in 1921 (a structure that opposed the white government of South Africa of the time), an active member of the Communist Party of South Africa from 1923 to 1936 and worked as political editor for the Communist newspaper, *Umsebenzi*, from 1930 to 1935. It is quite possible that his political views and political activities may have contributed to his inflating the number of disenfranchised black voters. Additionally, Roux, 'Ausi' and Mbeki all fail to mention the effect of the legislation on white voters.

Although historians' estimates of the number of disenfranchised black voters vary, they all appear to inflate the number by conflating the *overall impact* of the 1887 Act (the removal of c. 18,000 - 20,000 voters in total) with the impact on black voters which, I argue, was much lower. The situation is made worse by the fact that historians seem to perpetually refer to previously quoted figures instead of basing their analyses on actual research. Thus, as we shall see, Switzer and Stapleton quote figures used by Odendaal who, in turn, adopted figures used by Trapido and so on.

McCracken states that the Registration Act of 1887 removed 24 percent of voters in the colony from the voters' rolls with the total number of registrations falling from 80,924 (in 1886) to 61,195 (in 1887) (McCracken, 1967: 92). While Hofmeyr was the first to quote these figures in an 1891 parliamentary session (H.O.A, 1891: 328) and while Trapido (1970: 133) estimates the total number of disenfranchised people at 'around 20,000,' neither Trapido nor

McCracken distinguishes between the number of black and white voters disenfranchised by the legislation. Odendaal, too, estimates the number at 20,000 or ‘25 percent of the electorate,’ and states that most of those disenfranchised were black (Odendaal, 1984: 13; Odendaal, 2012: 126); Switzer (1997: 62), citing Odendaal’s PhD thesis as his source, claims that the 1887 Act ‘eliminated about 20,000 voters, most of whom were African’; Magubane (1996: 237), in his discussion of the Acts of 1887 and 1892, concludes that ‘the outcome of these changes was the elimination of 30,000 Africans from the voters’ rolls’ (it is unclear whether he attributes the number of disenfranchised black voters to one or both the Acts). Stapleton (2004) also restates the claim that the 1887 Act disenfranchised 20,000 black voters.

Contradicting Hofmeyr’s numbers (80,924 voters in 1886 to 61,195 voters in 1887, i.e. a reduction of 19,729), the Statistical Register of the Cape Colony for 1887 records that 88,648 voters were registered in 1886 and that the number fell to 70,305 in the following year. This means that there were 18,343 fewer voters after the introduction of the Registration Act of 1887 – a number that is close to Trapido’s total of 20,000 and very far from Roux’s number of 30,000 black voters. Simply subtracting 70,305 voters from a total of 88,648 does not in fact tell us how many voters were disenfranchised by the Act of 1887 since new voters may have registered during that year in addition to which the 18,343 may have included some voters who had died, moved to a different district or left the country.

Williams and Elliot (1921: 207) claim that the 1892 Act reduced ‘non-European’ voters by 3,348 and increased European voters by 4,506 and attribute the numbers to the Statistical Registers. Roux (1948: 64), ‘Ausi’ (1956: 11), Jenkins (1951: 24) and McCracken (1967) all quote these same numbers while McCracken cites Hofmeyr’s biography (1913: 437) as his source. Rotberg (1988: 368) writes that “3,000 Africans, Coloureds and Asians were dropped” by the 1892 Franchise Act, not because of the higher qualification requirements but “presumably” because they had moved to different electoral divisions and were disqualified –

in other words, that the higher qualification requirements, including the literacy clause, had no effect at all. Even when no figures are provided, historians contribute to the exaggerated assessment of the legislation's impact with generalised claims. Davenport (1991: 97), for instance, comments on the Acts of 1892 and 1894 that they 'made severe inroads into the black electorate,' without quantifying this judgement. It is also worth noting that claims about the number of disenfranchised do not distinguish between black people, coloured and Asians when they refer to 'non-European' voters. A more informative racial breakdown is provided later in this study where I distinguish between black, white and coloured voters.

1.6.1 Methodology

Methodologically, I proceeded in two stages. In the first stage I transcribed the voter registrations of several eastern territories for the years 1886, 1887, 1889, 1891, 1893 and 1895. Because 1886 immediately preceded the implementation of the Act of 1887, I can compare the number of registered voters before and after the first disenfranchisement law. Similarly, I can compare the number of registered voters in 1891 to those for 1893 to evaluate the impact of the 1892 Act. Shortage of funding and time limitations prevented me from transcribing the data from all the colony's electoral divisions for the period under investigation. I excluded Cape Town and all the other western electoral divisions of the Cape Colony from the analysis, since the majority of black people resided in the eastern electoral divisions (Trapido, 1968: 80).

The second stage consisted of identifying black voters in the voters' rolls. From 1872 to 1886 the Cape Colony voters' rolls chronicled the first names, surnames and addresses of each registered voter. In 1887 the rolls began to capture the means by which the voter qualified to vote – that is, by virtue of income or property holding. Because race was not recorded before 1903, I transcribed 53,000 records from the 1909 voters' rolls which include both surname and racial classification, in effect providing me with a database of black surnames. Using this database and applying the relevant computing software, I retrospectively identified black voters

in the voters' rolls of 1886, 1887, 1889, 1891, 1893 and 1895. The software isolates each surname and its corresponding racial classification from the 1909 rolls and searches for a match in the voters' rolls of 1886, 1887, 1889, 1891, 1893 and 1895. By way of example, Figure 1.1 below represents an extract from the voters' roll of 1909 for the electoral division of Wodehouse in which a black voter named Sergeant Bekwa, a gaol guard, whose race is classified as 'F' which stands for 'Mfengu' (see no. 10 in Figure 1.1).⁶

1.6.2 Counting black voters

Using data from the Cape Colony Statistical Registers, Figure 1.2 shows the total number of voter registrations for all races in all the electoral divisions in the Cape Colony from 1886 to 1909. While there is a substantial drop in total registrations between 1886 and 1887, the numbers indicate a clear recovery again by 1891. On the basis of data gathered in the second stage of research described above and with reference to the number of registered voters from the voters' rolls (1886–95), I counted the number of black people in each electoral division over a period of several years. Table 1.1 shows the number of black voters that I successfully matched with the aid of the computing software. In interpreting these research results, the following two points should be borne in mind: firstly, that there are no voters' rolls for Griqualand East and Thembuland for 1886 since these divisions had then only recently been annexed; secondly, that because data for some divisions (those that appear italicised in Table 1.1) could not be transcribed (due to time and resource constraints), their voters were counted manually.

⁶ Black people appear in the voters' rolls as 'Mfengu' or 'Fengu', 'Pondo', 'Thembu' or 'Kaffir'.

In "Qualification" Column "W" denotes Wages, "O" denotes Occupation, "S" denotes Salary and "P" denotes Pension.

No.	Surname in full.	Christian Names (if any) in full.	Profession, Trade, or other description.	Qualification.	Situation of Property in respect of which qualification exists, or present address if qualification be not in respect of Property.	(a) Name and address of Employer, or of Salary or Pension. (b) When qualification is in respect of Occupation state whether occupancy is as owner, tenant or otherwise; and if as tenant, whether as sole or joint tenant.	Race distinction
1	Adkins	William	Contractor	O	Dordrecht	Owner	E
2	Anderson	Bertram Claude Jessop	Clerk	S	Dordrecht	Morum Bros.	E
3	Anderson	Laurence Albertus P.	Farmer	O	Dordrecht	Owner	E
4	Armstrong	George	Hairdresser	O	Dordrecht	Tenant	E
5	Badger	Thomas	Clerk	S	Dordrecht	Morum Bros.	E
6	Backace	Maclear	C.M.P.	S	Dordrecht	Cape Govt.	E
7	Bam	Paul	Farmer	O	Dordrecht	Tenant	E
8	Bekker	Barend Johannes	Clerk	O	Dordrecht	Owner	E
9	Bekker	Christian J.	Farmer	O	Dordrecht	Owner	E
10	Bekwa	Sergeant	Gaol Guard	S	Dordrecht	Cape Govt.	F

Electoral Division of Wodehouse. Fig. 2

Figure 1.1. Wodehouse voters' roll, 1909




Figure 1.2 Changes in voter registrations, 1886–1909.

Source: Cape Colony Statistical Registers, 1886–1909.

My research confirmed that for the period 1886-1887, most electoral divisions indeed recorded a decline in the number of black voter registrations, with the greatest decline recorded in Wodehouse, where the number dropped by 85 percent. After implementation of the 1887 Act, the total number of black voters fell from 7,159 to 4,334, which means that the total number of black voters dropped by 2,825, that is, by less than a tenth of the figure (30,000 or 90 percent

of the black electorate) claimed by Roux, ‘Ausi’ and Mbeki.

Given that the divisions I tallied represent regions with a majority of black people, it is highly unlikely that the total number of disenfranchised black voters would have been much larger. I therefore argue that the figure of 30,000, repeated uncritically over the years, is an exaggeration. The correct number is probably closer to 3,000.

The table also shows that the Act of 1892 had the greatest impact in Fort Beaufort and Griqualand East and that the total number of black voters in the 15 divisions (16 including Kimberley) declined by just over 1,000. The figure of 3,348 non-Europeans said to have been disenfranchised by the Franchise Act of 1892 is reasonably accurate, given that there were many coloured people living in the western half of the Cape – divisions that I did not examine – who were likely to have been disenfranchised along with the roughly 1,000 black people calculated here (Williams and Elliot, 1921: 207).

Table 1.1 Black voter registrations, 1886–95.

Electoral division	1886	1887	1889	1891	1893	1895
Aliwal North	<i>670</i>	<i>299</i>	<i>300</i>	<i>473</i>	<i>463</i>	<i>458</i>
Cradock	<i>185</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>103</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>8</i>
East London	<i>16</i>	<i>117</i>	<i>36</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>34</i>
Fort Beaufort	<i>437</i>	<i>144</i>	<i>174</i>	<i>658</i>	<i>288</i>	<i>300</i>
Graaff Reinet	<i>48</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>4</i>
Grahamstown	<i>81</i>	<i>41</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>38</i>	<i>39</i>	<i>48</i>
Griqualand East	N/A	598	305	515	161	136
Kimberley	175	50	77	88	144	144
King William’s Town	1,183	903	862	1136	905	743
Port Elizabeth	517	326	340	651	683	743
Queenstown	1,665	950	825	887	855	788
Somerset East	156	65	45	<i>191</i>	223	141
Thembuland	N/A	375	466	<i>711</i>	690	610
Uitenhage	331	<i>94</i>	<i>98</i>	<i>178</i>	88	45
Victoria East	461	<i>158</i>	<i>165</i>	<i>229</i>	223	205
Wodehouse	1,234	184	434	601	580	560
Total	7,159	4,334	4,281	6,426	5,396	4,967

Source: Cape Colony voters’ rolls with authors’ calculations.
Numbers in italics are for districts that were counted manually.

Rotberg's claim that the Act of 1892 was ineffective has merit. The South African Native Affairs Committee (1905: 139) asked if black people were being taught to read and write specifically to pass the literacy requirement introduced in the Franchise and Ballot Act of 1892 and found that a 'few' black people had been so trained. The committee did not specify the exact number but it appears that such training had a positive effect on black voter numbers.

Table 1.2. White and coloured voter registrations, 1886–95

Electoral division	1886	1887	1889	1891	1893	1895
Aliwal North	816	779	837	1,076	1,130	1,060
Cradock	2,051	1,583	1,609	1,957	2,101	2,028
East London	1,593	1,141	1,177	1,561	1,939	1,856
Fort Beaufort	1,385	1,095	1,148	832	1,123	1,019
Graaff Reinet	2,985	1,972	1,887	2,130	2,196	2,132
Grahamstown	2,194	1,282	1,277	1,616	1,662	1,475
Griqualand East	N/A	1,149	775	1,056	1,165	969
Kimberley	6,037	3,733	4,376	5,582	4,322	4,385
King William's Town	2,149	1,380	2,013	2,315	2,169	2,158
Port Elizabeth	5,242	3,489	3,322	4,448	4,857	4,821
Queenstown	2,104	1,661	1,772	1,999	1,970	2,005
Somerset East	1,748	1,685	1,600	2,379	2,315	2,299
Thembuland	N/A	1,106	963	1,100	1,181	1,297
Uitenhage	4,670	3,237	3,443	4,322	4,172	4,418
Victoria East	562	548	493	513	527	556
Wodehouse	1,477	1,239	1,321	1,563	1,720	1,690
Total	35,013	27,079	28,013	34,449	34,549	34,168

Source: Cape Colony voters' rolls with authors' calculations.

Lovedale College and the *Isigidimi* newspaper were located in Alice, about 64 kilometres from King William's Town and 165 kilometres from Queenstown. This could have contributed to both King William's Town and Queenstown having the highest level of black political activity of all the electoral divisions in the colony, as is evidenced by the size of the voter registrations in those two divisions. Thembuland, by comparison, had fewer black voter registrations over the period of study even though this division had the largest black population in the colony, which is probably due to the fact that Thembuland was annexed to the colony much later (1886) than King William's Town and Queenstown (1848). It could also mean that black people in Thembuland were less well off than those in other electoral divisions, meaning

that fewer would have qualified for the vote.

1.6.3 Counting white and coloured voters

In order to calculate white and coloured voters for each year by electoral division, I subtracted the black voters I had identified from the total number of voters who had registered. The results are shown in Table 1.2. As disenfranchisement targeted black rather than coloured voters, including coloured and white voters does not affect my argument in this chapter (i.e. the lower than expected number of black voters who were disenfranchised). I found more disenfranchised white people and coloureds than expected. Many white and coloured voters were removed from the voters' rolls after the Act of 1887. The number of registered white and coloured voters fell from 35,013 in 1886 to 27,079 in 1887, a difference of 7,934. It is likely that a large section of this number comprises voters who were disenfranchised by the Act of 1887, even when the effects of natural attrition and migration have been taken into consideration.

The Act of 1892 had no substantial effect on white and coloured voters, probably because their income, property and literacy levels were higher than those of black voters. The total number of white and coloured voters are roughly the same, as the 1893 voters' rolls show an increase of only 100 voters following the implementation of the Act of 1892. It is not impossible to separate white people from coloured voters, but that is beyond the scope of this study.

1.7 Implications and Conclusions

Micro-level data and technological advances mean that we can now exploit archives more efficiently (Fourie, 2016). The voters' rolls and the methods I applied to analysing them make it possible for us to reinterpret a long accepted aspect of black political, social and economic history. I found that fewer than 3,000 black people were disenfranchised by the Act of 1887. This number is much smaller than the 30,000 black people that several authors claim to have been disenfranchised. These new findings tell us a number of things about the effectiveness of

disenfranchisement.

Firstly, it is clear that black voters were not simply the passive victims they were previously imagined to have been (a story well told by Odendaal, 2012: 112-28). Attempts by colonial politicians to disenfranchise black voters were widely resisted. As can be seen from the evidence presented here, black people responded to this legislation in a variety of ways: with political activism; by recruiting more qualifying black men to vote; by attaining literacy specifically for the purpose of accessing the franchise and by pursuing the very education that was being used to prevent them from voting. Importantly, my estimates of black voter numbers reveal that black resistance to disenfranchisement was much more effective, and the legislation much less effective, than existing literature claims.

Secondly, I note that both white and coloured voters were also affected by the Act of 1887. This seems counter-intuitive, particularly in the case of white people, since the Act targeted communal ownership of land and white voters were largely private landowners. The reason for this reduction in white and coloured voter numbers is unclear. It may be that, because of the recession experienced in the Cape Colony in the mid-1880s, white and coloured voters' incomes declined, pushing them below the minimum level for the franchise qualification (Mabin, 1986: 275–303). Future research could explore reasons to explain these declining voter registration numbers.

Thirdly, Colin Bundy's account of 'the emergence and decline of a South Africanpeasantry' in the last decades of the nineteenth century may go some way to explaining black resistance to disenfranchisement legislation (Bundy, 1972: 369–88). Most black people on the voters' rolls were engaged in some form of agricultural activity (as we can see from the voters' rolls from 1903 onwards where a voter's occupation or trade is also listed). Black people were more prosperous than may have been previously imagined, as they enjoyed the benefits that the market economy provided. Indeed, as Trapido (1980: 255) has argued, 'the defence of

the franchise was closely related to the defence of the peasantry.’ The Act of 1892, which increased the minimum income and literacy requirement, scarcely affected black people since many of them met the new qualifications. That the 1892 Act only applied to new registrations, excluding those who were already on the rolls, may also help to explain the low numbers of Africans who were disenfranchised.

In the fourth instance, the large number of white people who were disenfranchised by the Act of 1887 may be attributed to what would later be called the ‘poor white problem.’ The Afrikaner Bond in the early 1880s and the Dutch Reformed Church Conference in 1886 highlighted this phenomenon of mainly rural white people struggling to make a living because they tended to have low levels of education (Fourie, 2007: 1270–96). Many white farmers were struggling to adapt to a changing economy that required innovative techniques while previously abundant land was becoming scarce (Giliomee, 1992). Losing their access to land may have led to the inability of impoverished white people to register for the franchise since they would not have met the property qualification (Bundy, 1968: 108-12).

Raising the 1892 franchise qualification from £25 to £75 and introducing the literacy requirement inadvertently exposed lower income white people to legislation that was intended for black people. This had severe economic consequences for black people; the Afrikaner Bond advocated an improved and eventually compulsory education for white children after supporting Rhodes’s government in the 1890s, while black schooling was underfunded (Duff, 2011a: 261–82). Therefore, although, as my numbers show, disenfranchisement legislation was not very effective in directly reducing black voter numbers, it had the indirect effect in later years of depriving black people of education and economic opportunities.

CHAPTER TWO: DISTRICT COUNCILS AND BLACK EDUCATION IN THE TRANSKEI (1887 TO 1909)

2.1. Introduction

One important feature of the 1880s and '90s democratic reversal was that the Cape government established the Transkeian Territories District Councils (DCs) as a means of compensating black people for the franchise restrictions introduced by the Glen Grey Act of 1894 (Walker, 1925: 256; Hammond-Tooke, 1968: 460). These councils were to ensure that black people focused on local politics and to reduce their participation in national elections (Stoch, 1984: 17). As this chapter will show, DCs were also very important for the development of black education in the Transkei between 1893 and 1909.

As discussed in the previous chapter, from the mid-1800s Cape politicians expressed the desire to be relieved of the 'burden' of governing the large tracts of lands that had been annexed and the DCs allowed them to do so (Thompson, 1991). The Cape government wanted black people to pay for their own education with the result that white educational administrators recommended compulsory taxation for education in all the black territories as well as the extension of the Transkeian Councils to several districts (SCONE, 1908: 28). Former Cape Prime Minister Spriggs emphasised the fact that the Cape Colony was paying much more for the upkeep of black districts than these districts were contributing to their own economic development through taxation (Kenyon, 1939: 32).

DCs also gave black people partial administrative authority over their territories in the Transkei, Thembuland and Pondoland (Brownlee, 1937: 346). These councils were an early attempt at separate development and black self-governance and served as a tool for adapting black social and political norms (Brookes, 1927: 114).

Several influential individuals believed that the creation of DCs in the 1890s had led to an increase in black primary school attendance and enrolment figures in the Transkei. Here,

three observations seem relevant. Firstly, Sir Walter Stanford, former Chief Magistrate of the Transkei, observed that in 1893 Rhodes stressed to missionaries that teacher salaries would increase if the missionaries accepted the provision the Glen Grey Act made for DCs (Stanford, 1962: 166-7). Rhodes furthermore stated to headmen that their children would receive better-quality education (Stanford, 1962: 166-7). Secondly, several respondents at the Parliamentary Select Committee on Native Education (1908) claimed that rising enrolment and attendance figures was a sign of the DCs' success (SCONE, 1908). Finally, Fuller (1910: 178) claims that the Glen Grey Act was successful as Rhodes had projected that DCs would build new schools and improve education in their districts. Fuller further states that DC schools were performing better than some white schools.

This chapter aims to empirically test the claim that the rising enrolment and attendance figures of black schoolchildren were consequences of the introduction of the Transkei DCs. The literature on the Glen Grey Act has largely ignored Rhodes' objective of improving certain aspects of black schooling. I am unaware of any author who has investigated that objective and its outcome. Additionally, there are few works on the Transkei DCs for the period under investigation here. One example is Hammond-Tooke (1968) who evaluates the councils' conception, aims and objectives and who concludes that the council system was unsuccessful in making a significant contribution to the socio-economic development of the Transkeian Territories. The methods used by Hammond-Tooke, however, do not allow for causal analysis. Kerr (1976: 359) proposes that the standard for evaluating policy effectiveness should be whether the policy (or legislation) in question accomplished the purpose it set out to achieve, which is what I seek to do with regard to DCs in relation to education in the Transkei.

This chapter is in the first instance a contribution to the economic history literature focused on the growth and development of education in the Cape Colony and the history of British Africa colonial education in general (e.g. Davis, 1969; Paterson, 1992; Duff, 2011;

Frankema, 2012; Woodberry, 2012). I briefly summarise some of the major contributions to this literature next. Davis (1969) describes the growth of black education and the challenges that black people endured in their pursuit of schooling; Paterson (1992) highlights the important role that missionaries and independent African churches played in the provision of black education, while Duff (2011b) explains how the Cape government improved white education in an attempt to address white poverty while marginalising black education.

While this literature provides insights into the development of black schooling, little attention has been paid to education outcomes as affected by DCs in the Transkei and no analysis has focus ed on political reasons for the provision of education in DCs.

It is my contention that the literature on colonial education has largely ignored black agency in the provision of education (exceptions being Cogneau and Moradi, 2014; Meier zu Selhausen, 2019). I highlight this agency by demonstrating how black people took it upon themselves to ensure that their children enrolled and attended schools in the Transkei. My work also supports Frankema (2012) who claims that the role of British colonialism in improving education outcomes has been overstated. He found that variation in enrolment rates in both British and European colonies can be explained by the selective location of mission stations and their acceptance by black people. Maxwell (2016) critiques the tendency to attribute mass African education solely to white missionary efforts, because it ignores the role played by black missionaries and black teachers in funding schools and paying for the education of millions.

In the second instance, this chapter contributes to the literature on the political economy of colonial education (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008; Bryant, 2018). Education has always been an important means of exclusion in severely unequal societies (Sokoloff and Engerman, 2002; Mncube and Harber, 2012). In the USA, for instance, the ‘common school movement,’ which demanded, ‘free’ public schooling for all began in the 1830s and transformed American education by the mid-nineteenth century (Marshall, 2012; Fife, 2016). The movement reflected

the broader cry for democratisation from large parts of the population at the time. The franchise was extended just before the introduction of public schools that were funded by local property taxes, which demonstrates the impact democratisation had on education in the U.S. (Sokoloff et al. 2002: 908).

Democratisation has been shown to precede mass education reforms and income redistribution – for example, by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) in reference to several European countries and Acemoglu et. al (2014) for Latin America.⁷ In this chapter I argue the opposite, namely that democratic reversal occurred just prior to the expansion of education in the Transkei. My work is also related to Paglayan (2020) who studies education access across many autocratic and democratic political systems with data that covers 200 years. Paglayan did not find any evidence of a relationship between democratisation and enrolment.

In the third instance, this chapter also adds to the literature on local government that focuses specifically on the decentralisation of fiscal and education administration.⁸ The empirical findings presented in this chapter support the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis: DCs encouraged decentralised local governmental decision-making through the exercise of fiscal and administrative powers (Pal and Wahhaj, 2017). Similar to Bartolini et al. (2016) and Lakomaa and Wahlund (2019), I show the advantages decentralisation had for increasing the efficiency of local resource allocation. Such decentralisation has not received much attention

⁷ Many studies have linked democratisation to education with most finding that the former precedes the latter. For overviews of this literature see Lindert (2004) and Gift and Wibbels (2014). Harding and Stasavage (2014) is also important as it illustrates how education can be manipulated in a democracy. The authors show how Kenyan politicians requested votes in exchange for no-fee schools. There are far fewer studies that question the relationship between democratisation and education. For example, Dahlum and Knutsen (2017) study international student outcomes for 128 countries over the period 1965 to 2010 and show that democratisation is associated with increased quantity, but not quality, of schooling.

⁸ In a seminal article, Tiebout (1956) contends that, due to individual choice of where to live, improved local government resource allocation could accurately mirror local preferences, tastes and demand for goods and services. This ‘sorting’ (or migration) theory, however, does not always align with reality because evidence of the benefits of decentralisation for service delivery has been mixed. For example, Caselli and Michaels (2013) found that despite greater expenditure on education and health by Brazilian municipalities, outcomes in these sectors did not improve. Similarly, Kim (2019) argues that inadequate skills and capacity deficiencies of bureaucrats limit the effectiveness of decentralisation, resulting in expenditure inefficiencies.

in scholarship on Africa.

An important contribution to this literature related to Africa is from Acemoglu et al. (2014) who found a negative correlation between the presence of the traditional chiefs' institution and primary and secondary school outcomes in Sierra Leone. They also speculate that traditional chiefs (who had the authority to raise taxes) may have diverted funds intended for education and may also intentionally have sabotaged schooling in order to reduce the likelihood of educated subjects challenging their rule. My findings suggest the opposite, i.e. a positive correlation between the DC institution and education outcomes. My results also reveal the need for more empirical work to be done on the political economy of colonial education outcomes.

2.2. Black education in the Cape Colony prior to the Union

The creation of a formal education system in the Cape Colony arguably began with the establishment of a Department of Education and the appointment of the first Superintendent General of Education in 1839. The push specifically for black education only came about fifteen years later, particularly from Governor Sir George Grey. Education was considered vital for the subjugation of the native population and border pacification and under the Grey Plan £55,046 was spent on black education (primarily offered by missions) between 1855 and 1863. However, this funding of black education did not last. The Education Commission of 1863 recommended different categories of schools (Moleté, 1995: 48), as indicated in Table 2.1. Aborigine or Order C schools were the only segregated institutions exclusively reserved for black children. They were located in the Transkei, Griqualand East and Pondoland and typically provided elementary education only.

Table 2.1: Types of schools in the Cape

School order	Location of schools	
ORDER A	1st Class	Main towns
	2nd Class	Towns & villages
	3rd Class	Farms
ORDER B	Mission schools	Urban and rural
ORDER C	Aborigines	Native territories
ORDER D	District boarding schools	Farms

Source: Cape Education Act, No. 13 of 1865. Cited in Molete (1995: 48).

In his review of nineteenth century black education, Davis (1969) argues that an important shift in the Cape's educational policy took place after 1864. With an expansion in black education as a result of the additional territorial annexation that brought the Ciskei into the colony and a lack of resources amongst missionaries and black people themselves, came an increased dependency on colonial financing of black education. In addition, starting in 1863, the government began to focus on white education and from the late 1880s major policy changes in education followed increasingly vocal criticism of black education by white people.

Table 2.2 shows the rapid expansion of black education between 1890 and 1910, with enrolment and attendance figures increasing almost fourfold over the period. This, despite the fact that between 1895 and 1910 white schools received substantially more funding than black schools. Beginning from a relatively similar base in 1880, the allocation to white education increased by a factor of 12 over the period 1895-1915 (£50,131 to £652,110), compared with an increase in the allocation to black education by only a factor of three (£34,972 to £144,738) (Paterson, 1992: 72).

Black primary school attendance continued to grow as white hostility increased. In her account of black educational policy from 1652 to 1948, Babb-Bracey (1984) argues that the various governments of the Cape Colony made decisions relating to black education based on ideologies of white superiority and their accompanying political and economic agendas, with the education of black people increasingly neglected as the education of the white population

was prioritised. Although overt racist thinking was already evident among educational stakeholders, active segregation only became common from 1891 onwards.

Table 2.2: The growth of black education in Order C schools

Year	Number of schools	Enrolment	Attendance
1890	256	14718	11318
1895	337	19483	13590
1900	547	39028	29615
1905	701	44843	35855
1910	846	51850	42826

Source: Loram (1917: 53)

Black enrolment over the period 1890 to 1910 grew at a significantly faster pace than white enrolment with the expansion of black schooling occurring almost exclusively in the Transkeian regions (Paterson, 1992: 68-70). Black school attendance in the Transkei increased despite rising conflict between the educational interests of white and black people. This can be explained by the fact that there was less vocal opposition to black education given that there were fewer white residents in the Transkei than in other parts of the Colony (Paterson, 1992: 70). Paterson (1992: 84-86) further emphasises that, although enrolment figures increased in the Transkei, black attendance was erratic owing to their engagement in traditional ceremonies and agricultural labour as well as the contagious diseases that plagued the region at different times.

The discovery of gold and diamonds in the late nineteenth century spurred industrialisation which in turn motivated urbanisation and a growth in migrant labour. That said, the increase in black schooling numbers did not originally stem from industrial demand for skilled labour since most skills required on farms and mines could be learnt on the job. Rather, land appropriation, drought and rinderpest in the late 1890s meant that education was increasingly being seen as a means of acquiring or securing work other than agricultural labour. Furthermore, the passing of numerous restrictive Acts since the 1870s increased the need to

acquire educational qualifications in order to qualify for the vote and better defend black political rights (Paterson, 1992: 65). Babb-Bracey (1984) specifically highlights the various ways in which black people pushed back and adapted to ‘cultural imperialism’ as they conceded that white education was important not only for their own economic prospects but also for their political freedom from oppression.

2.2.1 Mission schools

Colonial economic and political expansion was tied to christian evangelisation and educational provisions carried out by missionaries (Neill, 1966: 35-39). Despite the liberal humanist notions associated with Protestantism, attitudes of Christian and racial superiority as well as the need for acculturation to western norms and values extended to the education provided and pedagogies adopted by missionaries (Du Plessis, 1911; Behr, 1963; Gray, 1990: 59). For example, some mission schools presented lessons on the virtue of public sobriety and how to build western-style houses (Fourie and Swanepoel, 2015: 8). In the context of decisive changes in colonial notions of what constituted a ‘good’ black education, missionaries increasingly adopted an industrial education model which, although still aligned with their aim of converting black people to Christianity, increasingly aimed at improving the manual labour skills and work capacity of black people (Paterson, 1992: 106).

The collusion between missionaries and colonial government emerged most clearly from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards. Missions had limited material resources at their disposal and requested financial assistance from government. Cook (1934), for example, discusses the history of black education in the largely neglected Elliotdale district between 1885 and 1929 where missionary education emerged with very little government funding.⁹

⁹ A study closely related to Cook’s is that of Van Dyk (1964) who studied the education of the Griqua and Bantu people in Griqualand East. His is a good account of the development of their educational system, detailing the development of missionaries becoming less active in the provision of education in the region as government aid to their schools increased.

Arguments in favour of black funding of education, particularly the wages of black teachers in mission schools, were frequently made. Due to the poverty of many of these regions, however, parents could not afford to cover tuition fees.

Over time the increased financial dependency of missions brought missionary education increasingly under the political and social control of government, a development particularly despised by black independent churches (Etherington, 1982: 193-194; Paterson, 1992). The social and political influence of government funding was most acutely felt in the curriculum: where once mission education had reflected a classic curriculum, focus shifted dramatically towards industrial education and training. This was aimed at providing “a docile and efficient labour force which would accept both white religions and political authority, as well as white social superiority” (De Kock, 1996: 70-71). As discussed earlier, mission schools eventually succumbed to segregated schooling despite some resistance by a number of clergy.

Discussions of the expansion of black education, however, have largely ignored the growth in educational provision driven by black initiatives through independent black churches (Brownlee, 1937: 341; Paterson, 1992: 57). Independent black mission institutions emerged in response to increased segregation, lower spending on black (mission) schooling and a lack of community control in schools. Brock (1974), for example, notes the Mfengu’s determination to ensure greater educational provision for their people in addition to both urban and rural black communities being vocal about a range of educational needs that were not being met by mission schools. Although missionaries and the school inspectorate were concerned about the establishment of these “independent” church schools by black people, there was not much the Education Department could do to interfere (Paterson, 1992: 133). One example of an independent church establishing schools was the black Presbyterian Church (APC) which was formed in 1898 as a breakaway from the United Free Church of Scotland. Although the establishment of APC schools was predominantly a response to growing demands for schooling

in the Victoria East region, its reach eventually extended beyond the borders of that region so that by the beginning of 1903 the APC reportedly controlled forty schools with a total of 2,024 enrollees.

2.2.2 The Glen Grey Act and DCs

In 1894, Rhodes pushed for approval of the Glen Grey Act after “extensive consultations” with Hofmeyer (Rotberg, 1988: 469). Rhodes wanted to use the Act’s provisions to draw labour from the Transkei and Griqualand East for work in the mining industry, manufacturing and on farms in the western half of the Cape (Thompson, 1991; Rotberg, 1988: 470-71). The Act stipulated that DCs were to consist of 12 black representatives, six of whom were to be appointed by the Governor-general and six elected by black people (Ntsebeza, 2005: 66). DCs were created so that, as Rhodes put it, black people would “employ their minds on simple questions in connection with local affairs” (cited in Tabata 1950: 106) and not on parliamentary issues.

Black men in the Glen Grey district paid a tax if they did not own land allotments and had not worked outside Glen Grey for a certain period each year. DCs charged each adult male a tax of ten shillings per annum, multiplied by the number of wives he had (Beinart, 1982: 43) and spent funds raised on the development of roads and other public infrastructure as well as schooling (Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1885; Brownlee, 1923: vi; Brookes, 1927: 254). Under the chairmanship and guidance of the Chief Magistrate at Umtata, the Transkeian Territories General Council in 1903 became the umbrella body for all the DCs (Hammond-Tooke, 1968: 457; Ntsebeza, 2005: 95). Magistrates of the different districts as well as several Black councillors from the districts had positions on the General Council’s board (Cape Native Blue Book, 1896: 93-4). This council transferred funds to individual districts and gave grants to mainly government-aided schools intended to supplement expenditure on teachers’ salaries and furniture (Brookes, 1927: 260).

2.2.3 Support for DCs: Select Committee on Native Education

The Report of the Select Committee on Native Education of 1908 published interviews that were conducted with several influential men in the Cape educational sector including the principals of top schools, overseers and the Superintendent General of Education. When asked about school attendance, most of the respondents claimed that the improved attendance in Transkeian schools was due to the Glen Grey Act and the DCs (SCONE, 1908: 110, 213). They stated that it would have been very difficult to collect fees without the Glen Grey Act and argued for the Act's expansion, though not in its entirety since black people had rejected several of its clauses. Reverend Sihlali, Chief Missionary Superintendent of ten schools in Engcobo, St Mark's, Nqamakwe, Thembuland and Xalanga (four districts in Mfenguland) advocated for the council system, stating that "Council schools were more effective than non-Council schools" (SCONE, 1908: 110). This was because council schools could better attract teachers since their salaries had a better chance of being paid which he believed to be a result of the fact that councils contributed financially to the running of the schools. Council schools also had a committee that assisted teachers which in turn led to higher attendance. Sihlali highlighted the fact that Mfenguland had very good attendance (SCONE, 1908: 110). Parents in DCs contributed financially to a fund that supplemented government school grants while schools outside the council system had difficulty collecting fees and generally had less revenue than those in DCs (SCONE, 1908: 112).

Dr Rubusana oversaw sixteen schools in East London, Stutterheim and King William's Town (all Ciskei towns) and supported the council system in districts which he was responsible for since it assisted with the collection of school fees (SCONE, 1908: 212). He also called for a tax similar to what existed in several Transkei districts for the purpose of funding education. The magistrate of Kentani, Mr Thompson, similarly claimed that the Transkeian councils had improved the quality of education for black people and attributed the growth in the number of

schools to the council. He gave evidence that black people were paying towards their own education (SCONE, 1908: 68). Mr Thompson also agreed with Mr Schreiner that the Mfengu had become educated at a faster rate than other groups which had come under control of the Cape authorities at a later stage (SCONE, 1908: 87). Mr McClaren, education inspector for Butterworth, Nqamakwe and Tsomo, also encouraged the adoption of the council system, saying that teachers received higher pay and that the system encouraged parents to take a greater interest in the education of their children.

2.2.4 Determining whether or not a district got Council status

Despite these favourable reports black residents of the Transkei generally resisted DCs, especially during the early years of implementation (Brookes, 1927: 115). The first councils were nevertheless set up in Glen Grey locations and expanded across the Kei River to Butterworth, Idutywa, Nqamakwe and Tsomo (Mfenguland) in late 1894. Kentani received the council system in 1899 with more districts in Thembuland and East Griqualand receiving councils in 1903 (Cape Native Blue Book, 1899: 72, 81; Brookes, 1927: 114).

The 1891 census provides racial classifications for all the Transkei districts and shows that the four early adopters of district councils had the largest numbers of Mfengu people in the Transkei. This fact is important because the Mfengu had developed close ties with the colonial government from the 1860s onwards. In the secondary literature an explanation is offered for why the above-named districts received council status in 1895. In a dissertation on the history of the Thembu people, Wagenaar (1988: 318) claims that the Mfengu were more willing than the Thembu to accept the Glen Grey Act's land tenure provisions. Magistrates falsely claimed that (all) black people had agreed to the Glen Grey Act's provisions when in fact they were frustrated by how land was being governed and allocated under traditional chiefs and the headmen and the government wanted to destroy tribal society. Ally (1985: 126-146) also shows that the magistrates of the four Mfenguland districts agitated for the Glen Grey

Act's implementation and twisted the views of black people who strongly opposed the Act. Based on the available evidence, I argue that the colonial government decided to pilot DCs in the four Mfengu districts because they believed that DCs would be more readily accepted by the local inhabitants. That said, I also examine other possible reasons for the DCs' being piloted in the four Mfengu districts.

Figure 2.1 below is a map that shows where the Transkei districts were located in the Cape Colony and Table 2.3 lists the year in which a district received a council. Twelve districts did not get councils before 1909 while Butterworth, Idutywa, Kentani and Nqamakwe were early adopters, all receiving councils prior to 1900. A possible criticism of my empirical approach could be that the four above-named districts already had a higher demand for education and higher levels of literacy than other districts and that this may explain their early adoption of councils. The 1891 Cape Colony census provides literacy (reading and writing) and population information on 21 of the 27 Transkei districts whose populations were mainly black. These are listed in Table 2.3 below. In 1891 the proportion of literate people in Butterworth and Nqamakwe was about nine percent while Maclear, Mount Currie and Xalanga had proportions of literacy exceeding 20 percent without having adopted council status during the period of study. One can therefore not argue that high literacy contributed to the early adoption of DCs.



Figure 2.1: Map of Transkei, 1895 - Eastern Cape
 Source: Visagie and Bergh (1985: 65)

Table 2.3: DCs and non-DCs

District	Council	District	Council
Bizana	No Council	Mt Frere	No Council
Butterworth	1895	Mqanduli	1903
Elliot	No Council	Ngqeleni	No Council
Elliotdale	1903	Ntabankulu	No Council
Engcobo	1903	Qumbu	1903
Idutywa	1895	St Mark	1903
Kentani	1899	Tsolo	1903
Libode	No Council	Tsomo	1895
Maclear	No Council	Umsikaba	No Council
Matatiele	No Council	Umtata	1903
Mt Ayliff	No Council	Willowvale	1903
Mt Currie	No Council	Xalanga	No Council
Mt Fletcher	1903	Umzimkulu	1903
Nqamakwe	1895		

Source: Ntsebeza (2005)

An important consideration is whether the urbanisation status of districts played a significant role in the establishment of councils. Urbanisation means that more people live closer to schools and so should cause an increase in enrolment. Theoretically, urbanisation would also drive the building of new schools. For reasons discussed below, urbanisation however seemed to have played no part in determining whether or not a district received council status in 1895. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the Cape Colony census (1891: 470) shows that East Griqualand, Tembuland and Transkei (ETT) had four steam engines among them while East London had 48, Port Elizabeth, 121 and Cape Town, 487. The main industries in the colony were breweries, tobacco, soap, brickyards, tanneries and potteries. East Griqualand, Tembuland and Transkei had none of these industries while Cape Town, East London and Port Elizabeth had several hundred. In 1892 ETT were very rural areas, with over two-thirds of their populations employed in agriculture, as is shown in Table 2.4 below. The Cape Parliamentary debates (1887 to 1897) and secondary literature (e.g. Bundy, 1972 and Ntsebeza, 2005) always refer to ETT as rural areas. Another indicator of urbanisation is the establishment of railways and in 1895 there were none in ETT.

Table 2.4: Percentage of population employed in different sectors, 1904

District	Professional	Domestic	Commercial	Agricultural	Industrial
Maclear	1.8	7.14	1.54	45.11	5.38
Matatiele	0.58	1.89	0.65	62.92	1.11
Mount Ayliff	0.5	0.6	0.17	72.07	0.56
Mount Currie	2.14	9.77	1.67	46.06	6.9
Mount Fletcher	0.37	0.49	0.17	65.73	0.35
Mount Frere	0.64	0.83	0.19	60.38	0.44
Qumbu	0.45	0.51	0.19	64.24	0.39
Tsolo	0.41	0.64	0.2	66.06	0.59
Umzimkhulu	0.63	1.24	0.36	68.18	1.07
Elliot	1.08	7.65	1.3	39.76	13.56
Elliotdale	0.2	0.42	0.21	75.44	0.21
Engcobo	0.29	0.48	0.15	67.46	0.3
Mqanduli	0.28	0.37	0.11	72.7	0.22
St. Mark's	0.25	0.62	0.23	67.27	0.29
Umtata	1.34	2.07	0.56	66.19	0.81
Xalanga	1.05	3.68	0.84	55	1.25
Willowvale	0.31	0.47	0.17	66.12	0.11

Bizana	0.24	0.19	0.16	71.34	0.48
Flagstaff	0.22	0.37	0.23	73.6	0.32
Libode	0.2	0.41	0.19	73.89	0.22
Lusikisiki	0.27	0.38	0.14	73.21	0.42
Ngqeleni	0.3	0.5	0.21	71.28	0.21
Port St John	0.57	1.77	0.83	71.01	1.39
Tabankulu	0.26	0.28	0.08	70.78	0.3

Note: own calculations using data from the Cape Colony Censuses (1891 and 1904).

2.3 Data description

In this study, annual summary statistics on education in the Transkei and the Cape Colony provided in the Blue Books were recorded for different categories of schools located in each census division. The number of black students (enrolment and attendance) for 27 districts for the period 1893 to 1909 was derived from Aborigine school data in the Superintendent of Education's annual reports.¹⁰ Mission schools that accommodated all races and therefore taught black children were excluded from the analysis in this chapter since it is impossible to separate the number of white children from black children. It is highly unlikely that the exclusion of these mission schools affected the final results since by 1910 all but a few of them had become fully racially segregated.

From 1896 to 1899, the Blue Books combined the districts of Lusikisiki and Flagstaff under the name 'Umsikaba' but listed them separately from 1900 onwards. In this study I combined the districts as 'Umsikaba' for the period 1900-1909. Additionally, some districts in Pondoland do not have educational data for 1893 and 1894 since they were only annexed to the Cape Colony in 1894. The final sample consists of 413 cross-time and cross-district observations.

¹⁰ Before 1893 the Blue Books did not record Transkeian attendance or enrolment by district. Instead, they simply listed each school without specifying to which district it belonged. The reports include white (public Order A) schools, but for the purposes of this paper they have been excluded.

2.3.1 Methodology: Difference-in-difference estimator

The difference-in-difference (DID) method is an empirical technique that can be used to measure the causal effects or impact of policy changes on different groups (Lechner, 2010: 167). DID is particularly suitable when it is not possible to control certain confounding factors or to make use of instrumental variables due to data unavailability (McNamee, 2005: 501). A successful DID identification strategy requires the existence of two main groups (Pischke, 2005): a treated group (affected by the policy change) and a control group (unaffected by the policy change). The DID estimator measures the difference in mean outcomes of the treated group, pre- and post-treatment, minus the difference in mean outcomes in the control group, pre- and post-treatment (Wooldridge, 2012: 3). Furthermore, pre- and post-treatment groups should be observed within both the treatment and control groups (Fricke, 2017), allowing for external trends in the outcome that could be correlated with the treatment to be separated from the treatment impact. This implies estimation as per the following equation:

$$Y_{dt} = \gamma_d + \lambda_t + \beta' DC_d * T_t + \delta POP_d + \varepsilon_{dt} \quad [1]$$

where Y represents black enrolment (attendance) within district d in year t , γ_d and λ_t are fixed effects for district and time, respectively, POP is a continuous variable representing population growth in a district, and ε_{dt} represents a normally distributed random error with zero mean. DC is a dummy variable equal to one if the district represents one that received a council (treated group) and zero otherwise (control group). T_t represents time dummies such that λ captures any time trends that are common to both district groups. The coefficient β therefore represents the impact on black enrolment and attendance figures of receiving a council.

As already indicated in Table 2.4 above, however, the establishment of DCs corresponded to three treatment phases, namely 1895, 1899 and 1903. Therefore, DCs will not have an immediate but rather a staggered effect on attendance and enrolment. Many periods, treatment and control groups are addressed, as per Autor (2003), by estimation of the equation:

$$Y_{dt} = \gamma_d + \lambda_t + \sum_{j=-m}^q \beta_j DC_{t+j} + \delta POP_{dt} + \varepsilon_{dt} \quad [2]$$

with Y , POP and ε_{dt} as defined above. The parameter of interest is now β_j on DC , which represents whether treatment (receiving a DC) was switched on in year t , with q representing leads and m lags of the treatment. The most critical identifying assumption of DID is that of parallel trends, which require that both treated and control groups maintain their movement paths as if no intervention has occurred (Mora and Reggio, 2017). A test of this assumption would be that $\beta_j = 0$ for all $j < 0$ (zero coefficients on leads) and that β_j for $j \geq 0$ may not be identical (treatment accrues over time). Figures 2.2 and 2.3 below show aggregated district enrolment and attendance trends for black schools between 1893 and 1909 according to DC status. In line with discussions in earlier sections of this chapter, the general rise in black enrolment and attendance figures between 1890 and 1910 is clear. Furthermore, schooling outcomes show similar trends for treated (DC) and control (non-DC) groups before earlier introductions of councils in 1895 and 1899 with a notable gap emerging from 1898 onwards.

A further concern for estimation is omitted variable bias, that is, non-zero covariance between the error term and treatment status. Unfortunately, the model specification is unable to include controls for expenditure on black education since data is unreliable for a number of reasons, including missing information as well as the haphazard manner in which educational funding was allocated at the time (government school grants for each pupil enrolled were not allocated transparently). For example, the bishop of Grahamstown complained that funding for schools was significantly skewed, with some public schools receiving ten times as much as mission schools that taught mainly low-income black pupils (Education Commission, 1891).

These payments could have been unrelated to the number of learners. Therefore, the expenditure per child in Order C schools, reported as equal amounts across Transkei districts irrespective of council status, may not be the only source of financial support received from government at the time. What is evident, however, is that, in line with racial attitudes of the

time and policies favouring so-called ‘poor white people,’ the grant per black child decreased over the period 1896 to 1900, reaching pre-1896 levels again in 1906 and stagnating thereafter as depicted in Figure 2.4. The inclusion of district fixed effects is anticipated to capture unobservable, district-invariant factors, including expenditure on education.




Figure 2.2: Enrolments in Transkei black primary schools

Source: Authors’ calculations based on Blue Book data, using the Cape Colony Superintendent-General’s annual reports on education.

Notes: I combined the enrolment of the four districts that became DCs in 1895 with the one district that also became a DC in 1899 (DC 1895/99). DC 1903 represents the enrolment of all the districts that became DCs in 1903.




Figure 2.3 Attendance in Transkei - black pupils

Source: Calculations based on Blue Book data using Cape Colony Superintendent-General’s annual reports



Figure 2.4 Government grant per child in Order C schools

Source: Author's calculations based on Blue Book data using the Cape Colony Superintendent-General's annual reports on education.

It is also unclear from the available data exactly how much funding (taxes and government subsidies) DCs raised towards education. From secondary literature however, it appears that school funding in DCs was higher than in non-DCs (non-DC schools received government subsidies only). Therefore, should a positive impact of DCs on enrolment and attendance emerge from the empirical results that follow, it is arguably partly through the mechanism of higher expenditure and educational expansion allowed for by the tax funds collected.

2.3.2 Empirical estimation: difference-in-difference results

Table 2.5 presents DID regression estimates, based on equation [1], for the two schooling outcome variables separately. The primary coefficients of interest representing the time trends (λ) and treatment impact (β) on black school enrolment are shown in columns (1) and (2) respectively and, similarly, for columns (3) and (4) for black school attendance. Overall, the enrolment and attendance of black learners in Order C schools increased significantly over the period with the average number enrolled and in attendance at Transkei district schools showing an estimated increase of 500 to 600 learners over the 15 years in question. In addition, the

increase in absolute numbers of enrolment and attendance in DC districts was significantly higher than in non-DC districts from 1902 and 1903 onwards, respectively. DC districts are estimated to have had 660 more learners enrolled in Aborigine (Order C) schools than non-DC districts in 1909 and 510 more learners in attendance.

Table 2.5: Difference-in-difference regression results based on equation [1]

<i>Dependent variable:</i> <i>Coefficient:</i>	(1) Enrolment		(3) Attendance				(4)		
	λ	β	β	λ	β	λ	$\lambda\beta$	β	β
1894	19.38 (39.32)			9.58 (30.32)					
1895	156.49*** (56.45)	-265.46 (217.56)		111.44** (53.05)			-321.26 (273.46)		
1896	239.69*** (71.61)	-210.97 (248.82)		200.71*** (65.61)			-357.40 (276.73)		
1897	274.10*** (82.90)	-160.97 (246.41)		243.22*** (74.00)			-333.63 (278.76)		
1898	441.61*** (86.23)	86.24 (150.40)		370.29*** (76.90)			-145.64 (213.83)		
1899	533.10*** (101.94)	-3.19 (206.48)		435.83*** (91.69)			59.10 (127.32)		
1900	582.31*** (104.61)	85.40 (104.76)		448.30*** (90.01)			-90.37 (148.41)		
1902	611.59*** (116.00)	278.31** (114.67)		532.51*** (104.31)			139.43 (82.39)		
1903	552.49*** (112.28)	317.27** (127.68)		480.73*** (99.75)			171.93* (93.07)		
1904	555.60*** (140.53)	514.15*** (165.66)		485.28*** (122.21)			368.17** (138.96)		
1905	639.85*** (154.99)	546.38*** (168.26)		576.48*** (142.45)			384.65** (151.41)		
1906	648.55*** (152.75)	498.61** (163.08)		649.50*** (153.26)			534.33*** (186.68)		
1907	652.63*** (167.74)	592.28*** (176.63)		667.11*** (167.24)			619.02*** (188.58)		
1908	646.39*** (164.42)	543.41** (198.09)		649.64*** (164.56)			523.32** (228.64)		
1909	660.69*** (182.02)	431.53* (227.51)		650.33*** (180.23)			510.46** (242.37)		
Population	0.021** (0.008)			0.020** (0.008)					
Observations	413			413					
R-squared	0.26			0.27					

Notes: robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** Significant at 1 percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level; * significant at 10 percent level.

The positive effect of DCs on enrolment and attendance is graphically represented in

Figures 2.5 and 2.6 using linear combinations of the coefficients shown in Table 2.5. Both DCs and non-DCs show increases in attendance over the period. However, from 1898 onwards enrolment and attendance amongst DCs start to pull away from those of non-DCs so that by the end of the period in question both enrolment and attendance in DCs are significantly higher than in non-DCs. In order to incorporate the staggered effect of a multiple-phased roll-out of DCs on attendance and enrolment as well as to formally test the parallel trends assumption, I estimate equation 2 for both enrolment and attendance in Figure 2.7, presenting plots of the DID impact parameters β_j from estimating equation [2].

I find support for the parallel trends assumption since all instances of β_j for $j < 0$ are not significantly different from zero. The positive effect of the introduction of DC's impact is both significant and increasing for both enrolment and attendance, though the magnitude of the impact on attendance appears to lag by several years. Overall, the empirical findings indicate that DCs had significant, non-fading effects on the schooling outcomes of black learners in the Transkei.




Figure 2.5: Enrolment trends – DCs and non-DCs

Note: dashed lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals determined using the delta method.




Figure 2.6: Attendance trends – DCs and non-DCs

Note: dashed lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals determined using the delta method.




Figure 2.7: Difference-in-difference regression results (leads and lags) based on equation [2]

Note: dashed lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals determined using the delta method.

2.3.3 The missionary influence

The discussion so far has shown that the history of black education in South Africa is intimately entwined with the history of missions. Therefore, as a robustness check on the main findings of section 2.3.2, an empirical investigation of the influence of missions on enrolment and attendance in interaction with DCs is necessary.

Table 2.6 summarises the average number of mission schools by DC group (DC introduced prior to 1900, DC introduced in 1903 and DC introduced after 1910) as well as the average annual growth in enrolment and attendance over the period 1893 to 1909. It is evident that districts where DCs were introduced early have a higher density of mission schools compared to districts where councils were only adopted later. This is plausible given the support missions had from the DCs (which included financial assistance for mission-established schools). Enrolment and attendance are also positively related to an earlier introduction of a DC, although average annual growth in enrolments and attendance is estimated to have been higher among districts that established councils in 1903.

Table 2.6: Mission schools and annual growth in enrolment and attendance according to the year of establishing DCs

DC status	Number of mission schools			Enrolment annual growth rate	Attendance annual growth rate
	mean	min	max	1893-1909	1893-1909
Councils prior to 1900 (Number of districts)	21.2	14 (5)	35	5.7%	7.9%
Councils in 1903 (Number of districts)	13.6	2 (10)	28	7.6%	9.1%
No Council prior to 1909 (Number of districts)	8.6	2 (12)	19	2.2%	3.5%
All	12.7	2	35	3.3%	5.8%

Source: Cape Colony Superintendent's Reports on Education, 1893-1909

Figures 2.8 and 2.9 graphically illustrate the estimated parameters λ_e and β_j from equation [2]. The estimates are for two separate samples of districts: those with the average

number of mission schools, or fewer, in 1893 and those with more than the average number of mission schools in 1893. Table 2.6 shows that districts in which DCs were introduced prior to 1900 all fall in the latter sample.

As indicated by Figure 2.8, enrolment numbers in districts with above average number of mission schools (AMS) witnessed a significant general expansion (i.e. both non-DC and DC) from 1898 onwards, whereas the general trend in enrolment numbers in below-AMS districts indicates a slower upward movement and even stagnation. By 1905, average enrolment in above-AMS districts had grown by 800 to 1000 students, compared to 350 learners in below-AMS districts. With regard to attendance numbers (see Figure 2.9), the difference in the general trends between below and above-AMS districts is more striking as from 1905 onwards attendance numbers are estimated to have increased by between 900 and 1000 learners in above-AMS districts whereas learner numbers in below-AMS districts increased by around 350 when compared to their levels in 1894.




Figure 2.8: General enrolment trends

Note: Dashed lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals determined using the delta method.




Figure 2.9: General attendance trends

Note: Dashed lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals determined using the delta method.

Figures 2.10 and 2.11 indicate the lead and lag estimates on enrolment and attendance for AMS-DC districts only. In contrast to Figures 2.8 and 2.9, it is estimated that both below and above-AMS-DC districts witnessed significant growth in enrolment numbers after the introduction of DCs although the immediate response to the intervention is more noticeable amongst the latter. With regard to attendance numbers, there is a significant immediate response to the introduction of DCs in below-AMS-DC districts which grow to approximately 900 learners six years post-DC introduction. However, in the case of above-AMS DC districts, numbers were slower to respond to the intervention.

Taking the estimates of Figures 2.9 to 2.10 together it can be concluded that although enrolment and attendance numbers in below-AMS districts grew at a slower pace more generally (an average gap of approximately 500 to 600 learners by 1909) – this gap had halved by 1909. The findings here suggest that a greater presence of mission schools is positively related to black enrolment and attendance in schools but that the introduction of DCs where missionary presence was more limited had a significant positive impact on schooling outcomes.




Figure 2.10: Lead and lag DID estimates on enrolment numbers for below-AMS and above-AMS districts
 Note: lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals determined using the delta method.




Figure 2.11: Lead and lag DID estimates on attendance numbers for below-AMS and above-AMS districts
 Note: Dashed lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals determined using the delta method.

2.4 Empirical results in broader context

Colonial education in the late nineteenth century Cape Colony can be viewed as a conflict between the interests of white authorities, missionaries and black people (Ball 1983: 236). Missionaries attached education to religious conversion and ‘civilisation’ while black people desired schooling in order to advance in society, placing pressure on Rhodes to act on this. The changing nature of the economy due to industrialisation and the mineral revolution meant that educated labourers were needed. Black people were of economic value as they provided labour in the colony, but their numbers posed a political threat to the Cape government. The Cape government therefore permitted black people to acquire some education but the level of black educational attainment was kept low. Increased access to education seemed to appease black demands for more schooling.

It is also necessary to consider how DCs related to the parliamentary politics of the day. Rhodes’ Glen Grey Act and DCs emerged as part of a solution to the Glen Grey district ‘problem’. There was a strong sentiment amongst Rhodes’ supporters (mainly the Afrikaner Bond) that the Glen Grey district was overcrowded, overgrazed and that its residents were both lazy and thieves (Glen Grey Commission, 1893; Hofmeyer, 1931). The district was also seen as a potential pool of labour supply for an expanding economy. Rhodes also had severe budget constraints since the Cape Colony debt was spiralling out of control (Gwaindepi and Fourie, 2020). These financial pressures may have also contributed to the establishment of DCs that would finance themselves, relieving the Cape parliament of that responsibility.

Finally, as Rhodes struggled to remain in power, he decided to press ahead with the Glen Grey Act since it pleased his supporters in parliament (Davenport, 1966; Tamarkin, 1996). Furthermore, limiting the education of black pupils to early grades was a strategy devised to suppress political mobilization and unrest (Ball 1983, 249). The growth in education outcomes was therefore just as Rhodes intended and definitely benefitted his political objectives.

2.5. Conclusion

In thinking about the ways through which DCs achieved these educational outcomes, it is important to consider the literature on accountability and local government. As black people demanded more education, expenditure on schooling followed. This was not unique to the Transkei, as Loram (1917) notes this relationship also in Basutoland, where people taxed themselves for education and subsequently recorded the highest per capita output expenditure on education. As argued by Conyers (1990: 18), Transkei DCs increased engagement in economic and political activity at a local level. Tiebout (1956) also notes how consumer spatial mobility, commonly referred to as ‘voting with their feet,’ influences local governments’ resource allocation since information is more accessible locally than nationally (Oates, 1993: 238; Martinez-Vazquez, 2017; Abimbola et al. 2019). The finding that there was a stronger positive impact of DC introduction in districts with a lower missionary presence in the beginning of the period (1893) supports this. Schools serving black populations that received grants-in-aid – attached to increased racial segregation and the advancement of an industrialised curriculum for black people – were in a better position to expand. However, funds were allocated on a pound-for-pound basis depending on local contributions (Paterson, 1992), the impact of which was felt most strongly by rural communities where teachers were not getting paid regularly (Paterson, 2005: 385). Support for the Glen Grey Act and the establishment of DCs would therefore have served to advance the educational program of the missions. However, in districts with only a limited number of mission schools and therefore less access to funds, the introduction of a DC would have meant a significant injection of funds to support educational provision.

The Cape government, black people and missionaries played different roles in the provision of education in the Transkei. By taking a back seat in the administration of the Transkei and defunding its education, Rhodes solved several of the Cape government’s

political and financial challenges. He marketed DCs to black people by linking DCs to increased education provision. The Transkei case is interesting because it was DCs working alongside missionaries in some cases that improved access and not the Cape government.

This chapter has shown the important role black agency played in improving black education outcomes. It was not necessary for the colonial government to spend more in order to improve attendance and enrolment since black people desired to improve their children's socio-economic prospects by, for instance, contributing education tax from their relatively lower incomes. This challenges the conventional view of a benevolent colonial government and supports the work of other scholars such as Frankema (2012), Cogneau and Moradi (2014), Maxwell (2016) and Meier zu Selhausen (2019).

The reversal of democratisation need not be associated with a regression or withdrawal of education provision. Improved black education outcomes occurred in a context of democratic reversal and in contrast to the literature that links democratisation to the expansion of education expansion (e.g. Lindert, 2004; Acemoglu et. al, 2014; Hoffman, 2015; Dahlum et al. 2017). This challenges the large consensus on the importance of democratisation for education access and shows that the role of democracy may be overstated in the literature (Paglayan, 2020). DCs also solved a coordination problem where less education was provided before their introduction. In as much as the quality of black Transkei education was inferior to that of white schools (mainly due to funding issues), the counterfactual was probably no education at all.

CHAPTER THREE: MIGRATION PERSISTENCE AND THE GLEN GREY ACT

3.1 Introduction

A central aim of Cecil John Rhodes' Glen Grey Act of 1894 was to recruit black labour from the Transkei to work in industries, Kimberley and Transvaal mines and farms in the Western Cape (Rotberg, 1988; Nattrass, 1981; Lacey, 1981; Davenport, 1987: 106-8, 141). Rhodes' premiership was dependent upon receiving support from the Afrikaner Bond, who represented farmers in the western parts of the Cape Colony (Nicholls, 1993). These farmers, along with mining houses and industry, had complained for many years prior to the Glen Grey Acts' enactment, that Cape Colony labour was in short supply (Glen Grey Commission, 1892; Newton-King, 1980). For example, in the 1890s, the Transvaal Chamber of Mines desired to remove black people from peasant farming and coerce them to work underground (Cooper, 1979: 35; Bundy, 1979: 135-138).

The Glen Grey Act's provisions of a labour tax on all black men and the division of communal land into small surveyed plots of four morgens (3.2 hectares) applied to Transkei districts where District Councils were established. These provisions were designed to pressure black men into leaving their land and work for white employers (Ntsebeza, 2005: 66). The hope was to turn the area into what would effectively become a labour reserve for various industries and, combined with land restrictions, guaranteed Transkei's economic dependence on South Africa (Hammond-Tooke, 1968: 455; Kalule-Sabiti & Kahimbaara, 1995: 81). It is the persistent economic effect of these colonial policies that this chapter investigates.

One of legacies of the Glen Grey Act is persistent migration from the Eastern Cape (Gelderblom, 1987). This suggests that the Glen Grey Act may be a helpful case study to study how colonial policies have varying persistent effects on present day migration patterns (Mayblin, 2017; Brankamp and Daley 2020). A large literature has developed over the last two decades that

show the persistent economic consequences of historical institutions and policy interventions on present day economic outcomes (see Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2018 for an extensive review). For example, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2016) find a higher prevalence and intensity of civil conflict that lasts longer in the original territories of partitioned African ethnic groups than in territories of groups that were not divided by colonial borders. Dell and Olken (2020) find that areas close to sugar factories established by the Dutch in Java in the 1800s, have better infrastructure and higher rates of employment today than areas where factories did not exist. The positive long term persistence of mission stations on present day education has also been shown by Caicedo (2019).

However, persistence studies often struggle to deal with, or neglect migration, an important channel of persistence. For example, Dell (2010) found a negative long term impact of the Peru mining forced labour system (*mita*) on household consumption and childhood growth in areas where the system was used by colonial authorities from 1573 to 1812. Dell lacked data to test her hypothesis that the coercive labour system triggered male migration out of affected areas, leading to a decline in output potential as the best educated or those with more means were more likely to migrate. Acemoglu et al (2012) find negative long term effects of slavery in 1843 on present day poverty, education and public good provision in Colombia. The authors use 1843 slaves as a proxy for later colonial slavery, but were unable to control for possible migration of the 1843 slaves. Thus, the negative effects they report may be overstated. As Fourie and Swanepoel (2015) show, the positive coefficient they report for the persistent effect of missionary schooling is reduced and no longer significant after controlling for migration. Thus, many institutional persistence findings may be inaccurate if selection is not accounted for.

The importance of this chapter for the persistence literature is that it addresses the issue of selection by arguing that a culture of migration emanating from the institution of forced migration engendered by colonial policy, has persisted through its impacts on educational

attainment. Most migratory decisions are motivated by employment and educational opportunities, and the link between migration and education outcomes is well-established within the migration economics literature (see Borjas, 1999; Dustmann and Glitz, 2011; Fasani, Lull and Tealdi, 2020). Recent contributions to that literature have turned to the effects for non-migrant education (e.g. Berker, 2009; Hermansen and Birkelund, 2015; Hunt, 2017), particularly as the spatial distribution of the school-age population changes the educational opportunities and net benefits for non-migrant children in both destination and origin areas (Berker, 2009; Betts, 1998; Borjas and Katz, 2007; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012). For example, a strain on the local school system may be due to an inflow of migrant children and an increase in the average number of learners per input (e.g. teachers), but also to a higher density of less-educated parents among in-migrants. However, benefits to non-migrant residents may arise from a shift in relative skills that will allow for higher labour market returns to those with higher levels of education and therefore incentivise investment in education (Betts, 1998). It is this approach that I follow in my analysis.

I study the impact of historical shocks on present-day migration and its impact on non-migrant primary school and secondary school completion rates, as well as secondary school enrolment rates, at the local municipality and district levels. The first key variable of interest is the share of recent migrants in the population for a given municipality, and the second key variable is an indicator of the previous District Council and former homeland statuses of municipalities within the EC. This latter variable will allow me to make inferences about the hypothesised persistence of the Glen Grey Act. Dynamic least squares and Generalised Method of Moments System (SYS-GMM) analyses are used in combination with several waves (1996, 2001 and 2011) of the South African national census data to model the municipality/district level educational attainment of non-migrant youth in the Eastern Cape (EC), Kwa-Zulu Natal, Western Cape and Gauteng provinces. This methodological approach is chosen to deal with endogeneity bias due to municipality fixed effects, bi-directionality, autocorrelation and persistence in

education outcomes over time.

The empirical analysis of this paper finds no significant relationship between present-day internal migration and primary school completion rates of non-migrants. I also do not find a relationship between internal migration and secondary school enrolment, although I do find a positive effect of internal migration on the secondary school completion rates of non-migrants. These findings contribute to the literature on migration and education outcomes such as Hermansen and Birkelund (2015) and Hunt (2017), all of whom reported positive effects of migration on secondary school completion.

In my specifications of interest, I show that former DC regions of the former Transkei have the lowest school completion rates when compared to other regions of the EC that did not receive DCs - this after controlling for differences in socio-economic development, persistence in educational attainment outcomes and migration. Similar to a literature in which it is claimed that historical interventions have persistent institutional effects on present day outcomes (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2014; Okoye and Pongou, 2014; Chaudhary and Garg, 2015; Waldinger, 2017 and Caicedo, 2018), I argue that these lower completion rates are an indirect consequence of the Glen Grey Act operating through persistent out-migration.

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The DC findings also contribute to the literature that studies the persistence of norms and

cultural traits specifically (Nunn 2020). For example, Bisin and Verdier (2017) examine conditions under which culture and institutions develop and are linked while Giuliano and Nunn (2017) study why certain societies change cultural traits and norms, finding that the role of environmental stability plays an important role in the transfer of culture.

3.2 Migration persistence - evidence from previous studies

According to Mabogunje (1970), migration patterns are path dependent as migrants are likely to move in a similar direction to their predecessors. Migration can persist as information flows from migrants to those they left behind (who may later follow) as migrants report on conditions in their destinations to those who remained (Mabogunje, 1970). Non-migrants may also be motivated to relocate when observing remittance payments from migrants to their families, increasing incentives for non-migrants to relocate (Quinn, 2006). Levitt (1998) discusses a form of cultural diffusion that is led by migration where ideas, behavioural patterns and identities impact ambitions and views of people to drive sustained migration, thus normalising or creating a culture of migration

Migration also persists in a manner that is independent of the initial reasons or factors that caused initial migrants to relocate (cumulative causation) (Simon, 2019). After cumulative causation is established, migration is strongly determined by social and familial networks that eclipse the role of macroeconomic factors or policies that also influence migration patterns (Massey et al. 1993).

Empirical studies of migration path dependency by Tumbe (2012, 2015) showed that remittance-based (male dominated) migrations in India persisted over the period 1870 to 2010 in several Indian regions. This culture of migration developed due to the role that men play as providers in Indian societies, and the dual agriculture-urban economy where men work in cities and send money back to their families in the rural areas. Tumbe finds that areas with historically

high levels of outmigration offer higher wages to males and employ a larger percentage of women than men in agriculture. Rodríguez-Pose and von Berlepsch (2020) also find that Hispanic migration to U.S. cities in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries mirrors patterns of mass European migration to the same cities. Giuliano and Nunn (2020) claim that if environments are similar between generations, then the next generation would find the previous generations' traditions to be of value.

Persistence of norms and values of migrant families have also been shown by Ramey (2019), who finds that mass migration triggered by severe drought from the southern States (especially from Oklahoma) to the western States in the 1930s has a persistent effect on political outcomes today. "Okie migrants created a cultural setting that has subsequently affected everyone living in the former Okie heartland, irrespective of ethnic background". Oklahoman migrants continue to vote Republican even though the areas that they migrated to have overwhelmingly become Hispanic – Hispanics in California generally vote for Democrats.

Historical migration has also been shown to affect human capital. For instance, Carpio and Guerrero (2020) use district level surnames of people living in *mita* and non-*mita* districts to support Dell's (2010) hypothesis that migration caused by the Peru *mita* has persisted and contributed to lowering development outcomes in Peru today. Applying a regression discontinuity design to study whether differences in the prevalence of surnames shows migration, Carpio and Guerrero (2020) find that *mita* districts have nearly half the number of surnames present in non-*mita* districts. Similarly, Becker et al. (2020) use 2015 Polish survey data to study the effects of forced Polish migration caused by the Second World War on present day education outcomes. They find that Polish descendants of forced migrants from the Kresy region higher levels of education attainment than the rest of Polish citizens. The authors claim their findings indicate a large change in cultural preferences of migrant descendants toward accumulating higher levels of schooling than non-migrants. They state that, relative to their incomes, Polish

migrant descendants value education more than they do acquiring material goods.

Persistent effects of migration on present day economic outcomes have also been recently shown by Sequiera, Nunn and Qian (2020) who study the economic impact of the wave of European migration into the U.S. that occurred from around 1850 to 1920. They find that migration led to faster industrialisation, greater levels of education, agricultural productivity and incomes in today with no negative spill over effects on neighbouring counties that did not receive fewer migrants.

3.2.1 Persistent institutions and development outcomes

History, institutions, geography and policies have been shown to determine cultural persistence. Becker et al. (2016) finds that well run historical institutions from the Habsburg Empire that ruled in Europe from 1273 to 1918, are associated with higher trust in government today in areas where the institutions were located. They further claim that these values persisted even though large migration waves occurred. Buggle et al. (2017) show that areas with a high climatic variability exhibit greater political cooperation that was fostered by the need to overcome the elements. Finally Guiso et al. (2016) find that Italian cities that achieved self-government show greater independence values and self-sufficiency beliefs for self-governance today when compared to cities in the same regions that did not become self-governing.

One example of a study that investigated institutional persistence in Africa is Merrouche (2007: 3). Using instrumental variables to analyse the relationship between foreign settlement in Algeria in 1954 and literacy for the period 1977 to 1998, Merrouche finds a persistent effect. Specifically, literacy rates in Algeria rose much faster after independence from the French in regions that had received greater settler educational spending and had better infrastructures. Furthermore, these effects lost magnitude as migration increased to settlement areas which were more developed than other regions where foreigners did not settle.

Other examples of persistent institutions are found in Chaudhary and Garg (2015) who study the impact colonial spending had on educational outcomes in the 1970s and 1980s for nearly 150 Indian districts. Their instrumental variable approach shows that colonial spending on primary schools in 1911 had a persistent influence on literacy until the 1970s. This effect becomes insignificant by 1981, as the Indian government increased public expenditure on education. However, evidence contrary to the literature on institutions does exist (c.f. North and Weingast, 1989; Schäfer and Wulf, 2014; Spruk and Kovac, 2020). For example, Spruk and Mitja (2020) argue that the districts closer to the Audiencia Real, a colonial legal institution in Peru, show lower levels of schooling, infrastructure and private ownership of land than those regions further from the legal control of the Audiencia. They argue that under-provision of education could be the result of decreased migration to Audiencia districts, which reduced the development of human capital, compared to non-Audiencia districts.

3.2.2 Missionaries and education

Important recent literature on the relationship between missionaries and educational outcomes in the American and (predominantly West) African contexts include Becker and Woessmann (2009), Gallego and Woodberry (2010), Woodberry (2012), Okoye and Pongou (2014), Wantchekon, Klačnja and Novta (2015), and Caicedo (2018). Although these studies have made use of varying methodologies, all find evidence of a strong persistence of missionary work on schooling outcomes, economic development and democracy. Areas where missionaries settled are found to have higher levels of literacy, pass rates, infrastructure and agricultural innovation amongst other economic outcomes.

Okoye and Pongou (2014) provide evidence for the African context by measuring the persistence effect of historical missionary education in Nigeria on recent schooling outcomes. They control for the endogeneity of missions' location relative to ethnic group characteristics.

Their results show that individuals belonging to ethnic groups from areas with more mission stations in 1928 achieve higher schooling levels in the present day. Huillery (2009) similarly shows strong persistence patterns in the former French West Africa, with inequality in education, infrastructure and health investments between districts in the colonial era accounting for one-third of present day school attendance. Finally, Wantchekon et al. (2015) find that Benin villages with missionary schools in the colonial period have higher levels of schooling today, compared to neighbouring villages with no missionary schools.

An example of a study of Latin American missionary persistence is that of Waldinger (2017), who compares present-day schooling outcomes for Mexican regions where mendicant orders and Jesuits established missions to those that never had missions. Using a dataset with exact locations of the missions' sites, Waldinger finds that children in areas that had mendicant missions spent 0.69 years longer in school than those in areas with no missions. Additionally, literacy levels are currently three per cent greater in former mendicant mission areas, whilst no differences in educational outcomes between former Jesuit mission areas and those that did not have missions are found.

Recent criticism of long-term missionary studies has come from Jedwab, et al. (2018), who argue against the empirical strategies common in the literature. Specifically, they argue that the methodological approaches do not address the endogeneity of missions, as missionaries chose locations for selective reasons that can lead to bias in the impact estimates. Furthermore, they highlight the issues arising from using old atlases for mission locations, as these tend to be grossly inaccurate, exclude multiple mission stations, and generate noisy variables. Their study found that the non-random nature of mission station selection can explain many of the results in the literature that show persistent effects, as neglecting to control adequately for early mission selection results in over-emphasised persistent effects of missionaries on present-day outcomes.

Of all the well cited missionary persistence studies discussed above, only Becker and

Woessmann (2009) and Caicedo (2018) control for migration and do not find any difference in their results after doing so. Caicedo's South American missionary persistence study does not find evidence of people sorting themselves into former missionary areas in the present era. Becker et al study of the spread of Protestantism during the middle Ages and its effects on late nineteenth century education in Prussia and they control for the migration of the 1871 population whose census data they study.

3.3. The education context

One of the motivations for internal migration by household with children is educational quality. Therefore, to better understand education outcomes, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the schooling system in South Africa generally, and the Transkei specifically, in historical and contemporary context, as well as an investigation of enrolment numbers since the amalgamation of the schooling system post-1994.

The education system inherited by the ANC led government in 1994 was racially segregated and highly unequal. In 1953, the apartheid government introduced Bantu Education for South African students of colour (black, coloured, and Indian) that offered an education far inferior to what which white learners received (Christie and Collins, 1982: 171; Rakometsi 2008: 2; Ndimande, 2013: 22). Although the advent of Bantu Education can be seen as a formalisation of segregationist schooling practices in South Africa, these practices already existed long before 1953. As discussed in Chapter Two, the racial segregation of schools was actively encouraged from 1891 onwards, with the result that from 1910 to 1953 white students enjoyed an education far superior to what was provided, mainly by mission schools, to black learners (Giliomee, 2009: 197).¹¹

¹¹ This can be seen most acutely in the fact that the ratio of spending on education for white as opposed to black children in 1910 was 10:1 (Davis, 1969: 133), increasing to almost 13:1 by 1945 (see Table 4.1 below). This is

While white primary education was compulsory and free under apartheid, black education was neither. Between 1953 and 1961 the amount spent on each black learner fell from R17 to R12 at the same time that enrolment rose from over 900 000 to just over 1.5 million. By 1970, 2.75 million black learners were attending school (Giliomee, 2012: 79). By comparison, white learners in 1960 numbered 712 300 yet an amount of R145 was allocated to each learner, 12-times greater than that allocated to black learners.¹² A period of schooling expansion occurred under the presidency of P.W. Botha, mainly in response to growing demands for human capital and the aftermath of the violent student protests of 1976 where black students in Soweto refused to study in Afrikaans. As a result, the number of secondary students increased four-fold between 1975 and 1985. This was accompanied by a narrowing of the gap between white and black spending per learner with the ratio in 1994 dropping to 2.7:1 from 7:1 ten years earlier.¹³

Unlike other provinces, the Eastern Cape and Transkei follow a system according to which learners complete Grades one to nine in one school and Grades 10 to 12 in another. In 2013, more than 40 percent of all learners in the EC were enrolled in schools offering this particular grade configuration compared to less than 10 percent nationally. This spatial distribution of schools was clearly inherited from the Bantu Education system.

linked to a stagnation in central government funding for black schools combined with rising scholar numbers and severe teacher shortages from the 1920s through to the advent of Bantu Education (Christie and Collins, 1982: 62).

¹² The higher spending on white education was partly driven by the higher remuneration for white teachers who, on average, had superior qualifications and benefited from a discriminatory system.

¹³ Giliomee (2012: 78-79) argues that per capita spending on black education would have been higher had the apartheid government not funded large outlays on black school infrastructure from the Public Works instead of the Education Department's budget. Giliomee argues that the reason for this was to avoid a backlash from the white electorate. He further states that attempts to bridge the per capita spending gaps were frustrated by the birth rate in the middle of the century which was twice as high among the black population as it was among the white population.

Table 3.1: Grade configurations in 2013 according to province

Grades	EC	FS	GP	KZN	LP	MP	NC	NW	WC	SA
1 to 7	21	36	51	42	48	39	36	46	52	42
8 to 12	13	23	31	36	42	28	20	21	32	29
1 to 9	42	9	1	5	1	6	6	3	4	9
1 to 12	3	6	7	5	3	5	5	4	4	5
10 to 12	11	5	1	1	0	3	3	5	0	3
Other	10	21	9	11	6	19	30	21	8	12
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Gustafson (2016). Figures represent the percentages of learners within a province in the range Grade one to Grade 12

Between 1999 and 2013, the Transkei experienced a notable decline in learner density with annual decreases in Grade two enrolments of three to five percent across most districts.¹⁴ Hall (2017) similarly shows a loss in enrolments of approximately 350 000 learners in the EC over the period 2002 to 2017. In order to understand the extent to which changes in learner distribution are related to urbanisation, Gustafson (2016) compares changes in Grade two enrolments across metro and non-metro areas of the country. He found an average annual gain of 2 368 learners in metros and an average annual loss of 8 000 learners in non-metros. However, the two metro areas of the EC, namely Nelson Mandela Bay and Buffalo City, experienced declines. A contributing factor to these decline in learner numbers can be the generally poor performance of schools in the province. According to one of the most recent nationally representative school surveys, the 2016 Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), South African Grade 4 learners ranked last out of all 50 participating countries. EC performance was only marginally above that of Limpopo, the weakest performing province in South Africa. Furthermore, 85 percent of EC learners assessed could not read for meaning compared to 55 percent of learners in the WC (Howie et al., 2016: 76).

According to Venkat and Spaull (2015) poor teacher content knowledge limits efforts to improve education quality and learner performance. EC teacher knowledge is shown to be

¹⁴ See Table A1 in the appendix for more detail on changes in learner numbers across Eastern Cape districts between 2000 and 2013.

amongst the lowest in the country (Venkat & Spaul, 2015). The EC has also been recorded as having the second highest rates of teacher absenteeism among all provinces, with 12 percent of teachers failing to show up to teach on any given day. EC teachers also spend the least number of hours per year on professional development, three-times lower than teachers in the WC (DBE, 2017). Similar trends are observed for school principals who spend half the amount of time on capacity development than their Gauteng and WC counterparts. School infrastructure in the EC is also among the worst in South Africa. According to the ECDoE, in 2009, just less than half of all provincial schools were regarded as being in a weak or very weak condition. Failure to provide suitable infrastructure in rural areas has contributed to the pace of de-ruralisation, as well-resourced urban areas exert a 'pull' on learners and their parents (Hendricks & Wright, 2012).

Figure 3.1 below indicates the change in Grade two enrolment over the period 2002 to 2013, across the different former education departments of the ECDoE, adjusted for endogeneity and selection linked to unobserved school quality and other unobservable factors.¹⁵ The enrolment data has been normalised to base year 2002, so that the plotted coefficients represent the percentage point change in enrolment from a baseline of 100 percent.

All former education systems experienced disenrollment from 2006 onwards, with the Ciskei showing a much higher disenrollment than the Transkei until 2010. By 2010, Grade two enrolment numbers in the Ciskei were 25 percent lower than eight years earlier, and 20 and 18 percent lower in the former Transkei and DET departments, respectively. However, although a downward trend is observed for the former HOA, HOD and HOR departments until 2009, Grade two disenrollment figures never extend beyond 4 percent and return again to their 2005 level in 2012. By 2013, disenrollment in the former Ciskei and DET departments also recover to 10

¹⁵ As argued by Gustafson (2016), Grade two enrolments are a better indicator of enrolments than Grade one since the latter has continually been the primary grade level with the greatest degree of repetition.

percent but remains stable in the Transkei at 20 percent.

Disenrollment has been strongest among the former Transkei proper and Thembuland (see Figure 3.2). For the moment it is difficult to say what accounts for these differences. Performance in the Transkei has historically been weaker compared to the rest of the EC; for example, Lemon (2004) provides evidence of worsening Senior Certificate (school-leaving) pass rates in a third of the 24 Transkei districts between 1999 and 2001. Over the same period the rate of matriculation exemption passes that allow access to tertiary education dropped in 21 districts – this, compared to an improvement in performance in the majority (80 percent) of school districts in the Ciskei. There is, therefore, a strong east-west contrast in performance across the EC which correlates with urbanisation and population density. In the Transkei only the urban centres of Umtata and Butterworth achieved matriculation exemption rates on par with those of the Ciskei and the more sparsely populated areas of the non-homeland EC.




Figure 3.1: Grade two enrolment trends across all former Eastern Cape education departments, 2002-2013

Notes: These are my own calculations based on SNAPS 2002-2013 data. Only those schools that appeared in all years of the SNAPS data are considered to account for the effect of school closure on enrolment. Dashed lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals derived from standard errors that are computed using the delta method. HOA, HOD and HOR represent the former House of Assembly (white), House of Democrats (coloured) and House of Representatives (Indian) education systems, respectively. DET represents the former Department of Education and Training which provided education to black students outside the former homelands.




Figure 3.2: Grade two enrolment trends across the former Transkei, 2002-2013

Notes: These are my own calculations based on SNAPS 2002-2013 data. Only those schools that appeared in all years of the SNAPS data are considered to account for the effect of school closure on enrolment. Dashed lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals derived from standard errors that are computed using the delta method.

3.4 Migration in historical context

Historically, the creation of the former homelands played a significant role in the migrant labour system of South Africa. According to Delius (2017), reserves were established as a means to draw cheap labour for white owned farms and mines. The perennial labour shortage problems of farmers in both the WC and Natal were solved by migrant labour from the Transkei and Ciskei.

White farmers and Anglo-controlled mining companies advocated for the creation of black reserves through the 1913 Land Act and early pass laws (Schierup, 2016: 1053). The result was the establishment of ‘influx control’ which not only increased labour supply, but also reduced the cost of unskilled labourers who otherwise would have sought higher-wage employment in urban areas (Mncube and Harber, 2013).

It was, however, under the apartheid regime that labour regulation took prominence as an “extreme extra-economic coercion of the majority of the workforce” (Legassick, 1974: 255). Several investigations on urbanisation between 1939 and 1947, such as the Native Laws (Fagan)

Commission, concluded that black movement to urban centres was inevitable (Nattrass, 1983: 13). The National Party government elected soon afterwards rejected these findings, choosing instead to return to the 1922 Stallard Commission that concluded that the right to reside in towns was the sole prerogative of white people, as well as the Native Economic Commission of 1930-1932 that identified black urbanisation as cause of higher levels of unemployment among the unskilled white population (Beinart, 2001: 122).

Building upon existing legislation such as the Development Trust and Land Act of 1936, the migrant labour system and spatial allocation of labour became permanently institutionalised following the 1945 Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, the 1967 Physical Planning Act and the 1968 Promotion of the Economic Development of the Homelands Act. Former non-migrants were now reclassified as foreigners which, along with the establishment of centralised labour bureaus set up to monitor the movement of this non-migrant labour force, set in motion a “permanent condition of rural-urban migrancy” (Schierup, 2016: 1053).

Legislation served to resettle hundreds of thousands of black people not only from urban centres (Muller, 1984) but also from white rural areas to overcrowded villages that were severely lacking in economic activity. Bundy and Beinart (1987: 275) describe how the Transkei’s economic development was neglected from the turn of the century until the official onset of apartheid in order to drive productivity down and increase the general level of indebtedness in order to ensure a readily available labour pool.

Without productive land to farm there was no other choice for workers but to seek work as temporary/contract migrant labourers in urban areas. Muller (1984), citing Nattrass (1976) and Benso (1982), notes that the number of migrants from rural homeland areas increased three-fold between 1938 and 1980. As argued by Nattrass (1983: 17) such a migrant labour system becomes self-perpetuating since economic participation outside the homelands, particularly by the youth who tend to be innovators of change, undermines economic development inside the homeland.

As a result, oscillating migration tripled in scope from around 500 000 in 1936 to just over 1.3 million workers by 1980 (Natrass, 1976; Benso, 1982).

In the early 1980s, 66 percent of all Transkei workers were working outside the Transkei in the mining sector (Muller, 1983a; 1984: 16) and already by 1976, 75 percent of a typical Transkei family's income came from migrant remittances, which contributed significantly to the decline in subsistence agriculture (Boulle, 1982).¹⁶

Labour migrancy also contributed to an age and gender imbalance inside the former homelands. For instance, the 1970 Transkei census estimated that at least half the male population were either below or above working age, and at least half of the remaining population were absent migrants (Wilson, 1972). In a study of life-time migration in the former Transkei, Kalule-Sabiti and Kahimbaara (1993) found that prior to 1970 the Transkei experienced net-out migration to the mines. However, migration dynamics were reversed in the 1970s following internal self-rule and political independence.

Between 1980 and 1990 in-migration occurred at a faster pace. Two-thirds of all migrants were aged 15-44, whereas 68 percent of non-migrants were younger than 15 years of age. They also found that most internal Transkei migration was from rural to urban centres with the largest share of these migration inflows coming from South Africa and comprised people aged 55 years and older. Finally, the authors state that internal rural to urban migration had risen with a disproportionate level of inflow targeting the urban centres of Umtata, Butterworth and Lady Frere.

In the mid-to-late 1980s some of the most salient features of South Africa included

¹⁶ A mining labour supply crunch in the late 1970s caused by the withdrawal of Malawian and Mozambican mine workers from South Africa increased demand for domestic labour to replace the foreign workers. The number of Transkei mine labour recruits rose from 85,345 in 1975 to 167,271 by 1977 (Crush et al. 1991, 236–37). Mariotti (2015) found that Transkei men born in 1975 and 1976 are on average about one centimetre taller than men from other homelands that were not impacted on by this recruitment drive. This demonstrates the positive effect of the additional income generated by migrant fathers.

recession, international sanctions, as well as large migration flows (Schierup, 2016: 1053). The exclusion of a majority of black people from the skilled labour force could no longer be economically or socially justified. Restrictions on the mobility of black people were lifted between 1986 and 1991 and represented the first instances of freedom of movement in more than four decades. Despite growing representation of black people in top-tier occupations and the middle and upper-middle classes, a large reserve of cheap, precarious labour continues to exist, especially among black women, youth and internal migrants (Gentle, 2011). Additionally, whilst poverty and unemployment continue to be significantly concentrated in former homeland areas, living conditions in the densely populated peri-urban informal settlements are similarly dire, with high inflows of internal migrants (Schierup, 2016: 1055).

Casale et. al (2003, 2006) show that circular labour migration and the reliance of households on remittances from migrant workers remained significant during the first decade of democracy. At the onset of democracy, the EC and its former homelands continued to be one of the largest senders of migrants to other provinces. Between 1992 and 1996, close to 250 000 people left the EC, 80 percent of whom moved to Kwa-Zulu Natal, WC and Gauteng. Using the 1996 Census, Kok et al. (1999: 42) show the clear “dominance of the former homeland areas as a reservoir of migrant workers.” They found that in several districts of the Transkei, the size of the ex-migrant population is almost equivalent to that of the population who did not migrate. As argued by Posel (2010), the continued prevalence of temporary migrant labour post-apartheid might be indicative of deeply entrenched migration patterns that could over time be supplanted by the permanent settlement of individuals and/or households. She refers to the studies by Bekker (2001) and Van der Berg et al. (2004) that found lower return migration from the WC to the EC. Similar trends are identified using the 2008 National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) which indicates significantly lower estimates of labour migration and remittances compared with the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2002 to 2005 (Posel, 2010).

3.5. Data description

Observations in this chapter are based on the three post-apartheid South African Population Censuses (1996, 2001, and 2011) which capture information on change of residence between census years that is important for distinguishing migrant from non-migrant individuals and households. From this data, I constructed a panel of district and local municipalities. The nine South Africa provinces are divided into metropolitan and district municipalities which are then subdivided into local municipalities. For the purpose of this study, district municipalities and local municipalities will be referred to as districts and municipalities respectively. To construct the EC local municipality-level panel data, local municipality codes in all relevant datasets are recoded based on the structure of the administrative divisions in the 2011 census. The result is a total of 35 municipalities in the Eastern Cape.¹⁷ These municipalities are then grouped into three regions that represent non-homeland and former tribal authority areas: /

- i. Transkei (TR): Elundini, Engcobo, Ingquza Hill, Intsika Yethu, King Sabata Dalindyebo, Mbashe, Mbizana, Mhlontlo, Mnquma, Ntabankulu, Nyandeni, Port St Johns, Sakhisizwe and Umzimvubu.
- ii. Ciskei (CIS): Amahlathi, Buffalo City, Emalahleni, Enoch Mgijima, Ngqushwa, Raymond Mhlaba, Inkwanca and Senqu.
- iii. Rest of the Eastern Cape (ROEC): Blue Crane Route, Dr Beyers Naudé, Great Kei, Inxuba Yethemba, Kouga, Kou-Kamma, Makana, Ndlambe, Nelson Mandela Bay, Sundays River Valley, Tsolwana, Walter Sisulu.

¹⁷ These are: Amahlathi, Blue Crane Route, Buffalo City, Dr Beyers Naudé (Camdeboo, Ikwezi and Baviaans grouped), Elundini, Emalahleni, Engcobo, Great Kei, Ingquza Hill, Inkwanca, Intsika Yethu, Inxuba Yethemba, King Sabata Dalindyebo, Kou-Kamma, Kouga, Lukhanji, Makana, Mbashe, Mbizana, Mhlontlo, Mnquuma, Ndlambe, Nelson Mandela Bay, Ngqushwa, Ntabankulu, Nyandeni, Port St Johns, Raymond Mhlaba (Nkonkobe and Nxuba grouped), Sakhisizwe, Senqu, Sundays River Valley, Tsolwana, Umzimvubu and Walter Sisulu (Maletswai and Gariiep grouped).

The Transkei municipalities from group (i) above are further subdivided into two groups (according to the colonial definitions of the boundaries of the Transkei):¹⁸

- iv. Districts that made up the former Chief Magistrates of Transkei Proper and Thembuland and comprised the earliest adopters (between 1893 and 1909) of the District Council (DC) system, including: Elundini, Engcobo, Intsika Yethu, King Sabata Dalindyebo, Mbhashe, Mhlontlo, Mnquma, and UMzimkhulu. The only exception is Sakhisizwe, which resisted the adoption of a District Council and joined the Transkeian Territories General Council (or *Bunga*) until 1925.
- v. Districts that made up the Eastern and Western Phondoland and comprised those districts that adopted District Councils (under the Phondoland General Council) after 1911 but before 1927, including: Ingquza Hill, Mbizana, Ntabankulu, Nyandeni and Port St Johns.
- vi. A final group includes those districts formerly administered by the Ciskei but partly transferred to Transkei upon independence in 1976, namely Emalahleni, Enoch Mgijima and Senqu.

Migration external to the EC focuses on the districts of three receiving provinces, that account for just more than half of all destination regions of individuals migrating (internally and externally) from the EC. Twenty-two districts are included, namely: Cape Town Metro, Central Karoo, Eden, Overberg, West Coast, Winelands districts of the Western Cape province; Ekurhuleni, Johannesburg Metro, Sedibeng, Tshwane Metro, West Rand districts of the Gauteng province; and, Amajuba, eThekweni, iLembe, Harry Gwala, King Cetshwayo, Ugu, Umgungundlovu, Umkhanyakude, Umzinyathi, Uthukela and Zululand districts of the Kwa-Zulu Natal province.

¹⁸ Specifically, the Transkei includes districts located between the Great Kei River and the Umtamvuna River, which now forms the boundary between KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) and the Eastern Cape (EC). See Figure A1 of the Appendix.

The non-migrant and migrant status of individuals older than 5 years¹⁹ is determined using information about mobility across municipalities within five years prior to the census. Non-migrant residents are defined as individuals reporting to reside in the same municipality five years prior to and at the time of the census. Recent migrants (from this point on referred to simply as migrants) are defined as individuals residing in a different municipality to that of their current residence at least five years prior to and at the time of the census. For example, a migrant in the 2001 (2011) census would be defined as an individual whose district or municipality changed sometime between 1996 and 2001 (2006 and 2011). A distinction is also made between those migrants who moved at least three years prior to the census; that is, between 1996 and 1998 in the case of the 2001 census, or 2006 and 2008 in the case of the 2011 census.

In South Africa, education is compulsory up to and including grade 9. The primary school-age population usually consists of children aged 6 to 13 years, whilst the secondary school-age population usually consists of children aged 14 to 18 years. In the empirical analysis, I focus on three educational outcomes at the municipal and district levels: primary-school completion, secondary-school enrolment, and secondary-school completion. This follows closely the approach taken by Berker (2009) and Hunt (2017).

None of the data sets under consideration provide information on where individuals lived when they received education. To increase the chances of matching information on the place of residence and education of children, primary-school completion rates are calculated for children aged 15 to 18 years — who would have been 10 to 13 years old five years prior to the census data being collected — whilst secondary-school completion rates are computed for 19 to 21 year-olds — who would have been 14 to 16 years old five years prior to the census data being

¹⁹ Given the timeframe in which recent migration is considered, the sample of individuals aged 5 years and younger are likely to contain a substantial proportion of individuals who were born in the destination region subsequent to migration.

collected. Secondary school enrolment at the time of the census survey is computed for individuals aged 15 to 17 years.

3.5.1 Migration trends

Table 3.2 presents the migrant to non-migrant ratio by age group within the different regions of the EC (as defined by groups i-vi), and the Gauteng, Kwa-Zulu Natal and WC provinces. Several trends are evident. Firstly, municipalities in the early DC and Pondoland areas display dramatically lower migrant to non-migrant ratios compared to the rest of the EC, particularly among groups younger than 21 years of age. Secondly, the migrant to non-migrant ratios in the WC and Gauteng provinces are two- to six-times higher than in the EC with the highest differences observed amongst school-going age groups. Thirdly, migrant to non-migrant ratios in the EC increased between 2001 and 2011. In the fourth and final instance, excluding the Transkei regions, migrant to non-migrant ratios are observed to have been higher in 1996 than in 2001 and 2011.

Panel A of Tables 3.3 and 3.4 (pages 94 and 95) provides information for recent movements into and out of the EC. Internal migration within the EC, where the focus is exclusively on those who changed their municipality of residence, has generally declined over time. At the same time, migration to Gauteng and Kwa-Zulu Natal have increased, most notably among individuals originating from the former homelands. Approximately 30-40 percent of all migrants originating in municipalities of the Pondoland moved to Kwa-Zulu Natal whereas approximately half of the migrants originating in municipalities of the Transkei moved to Gauteng and the WC. Combined with the information contained in panel B of Tables 3.3 and 3.4, the inter-regional and inter-provincial patterns suggest that mobility is related to better economic and social opportunities.

Table 3.2: Migrant to non-migrant ratio (%) by region and age group

Census: Age group (years):	1996			2001			2011		
	6 – 13	14 – 21	22 – 64	6 – 13	14 – 21	22 – 64	6 – 13	14 – 21	22 – 64
Non-former homeland	7.54	7.75	9.57	4.80	6.28	6.87	3.97	5.89	7.37
Ciskei	6.10	6.47	8.51	4.46	5.20	6.92	4.56	6.26	7.81
Transkei early District Council	1.72	3.34	5.78	1.76	2.73	5.28	2.26	3.88	6.16
Transkei Pondoland	0.95	1.98	3.02	1.14	2.00	3.15	1.24	2.34	4.08
Ciskei transferred to Transkei	3.09	4.80	7.20	2.50	3.95	6.54	3.71	5.23	7.95
Eastern Cape	3.46	4.78	7.28	2.66	3.93	5.98	2.87	4.54	6.82
Gauteng	24.14	24.65	28.27	10.46	14.96	15.25	9.23	14.97	16.40
Kwa-Zulu Natal	8.76	10.42	14.69	3.14	4.36	5.74	3.04	4.83	6.82
Western Cape	17.34	18.77	21.88	7.11	10.23	10.92	6.46	9.45	10.83

Note: migrants are defined as individuals who changed their municipality of residence in the five years prior to the census.

Table A2 of the appendix shows that a significant amount of mobility occurs within municipalities, particularly in the Ciskei and non-homeland areas of the EC. This matches what was observed by Gustafson (2016) in terms of learner enrolment volatility within districts. In fact, approximately 50 percent of individuals originating in municipalities of the Ciskei and non-homeland EC who changed their place of residence in the five years prior to each census, relocated within the same municipality. This is opposed to less than 30 percent of migrants originating in the areas of the Transkei.

Table 3.3: Distribution of Eastern Cape migrants changing municipality of residence and socio-economic indicators

	Destination regions in the Eastern Cape														
	Non-homeland			Ciskei			Transkei						Ciskei transferred to Transkei		
	1996	2001	2011	1996	2001	2011	Early District Council			Pondoland			1996	2001	2011
<i>A: Regional migration patterns</i>	1996	2001	2011	1996	2001	2011	1996	2001	2011	1996	2001	2011	1996	2001	2011
Non-homeland	39.19	19.62	18.89	11.45	9.59	12.51	0.88	2.12	7.64	0.17	1.25	2.36	2.56	2.60	4.08
Ciskei	23.38	19.15	15.46	24.46	12.63	9.18	2.04	3.48	7.19	0.38	2.06	2.73	5.86	3.39	3.15
Origin regions:															
Transkei:															
Early District Council	2.24	4.48	2.84	7.31	7.37	5.81	14.30	9.41	8.61	3.42	3.29	2.70	5.26	4.34	2.98
Pondoland	1.64	2.14	1.41	1.76	2.25	1.83	19.66	13.36	7.79	10.74	8.08	8.87	5.78	4.07	2.00
Ciskei transferred to Transkei	5.98	6.36	5.44	6.95	4.81	4.53	8.18	6.15	4.56	1.80	1.92	3.04	9.56	3.99	5.27
<i>B: Socio-economic indicators</i>	1996	2001	2011	1996	2001	2011	1996	2001	2011	1996	2001	2011	1996	2001	2011
Average per capita income	1 694	2 158	2 645	1 188	1 605	2 305	532	694	1 068	389	556	746	555	710	1 231
Population in rural areas	11.6	12.4	9.5	46.6	43.5	32.8	90.8	89.0	83.6	98.6	97.8	97.4	79.1	77.1	67.8

Source: Migration patterns and socioeconomic indicators are from own calculations using the 1996, 2001 and 2011 national censuses.

Note: migrants are defined as individuals who changed their municipality of residence in the five years prior to the census.

Table 3.4: Distribution of Eastern Cape migrants changing municipality of residence and regional human development index scores

	Destination provinces														
	Eastern Cape			Western Cape			Gauteng			Kwa-Zulu Natal			Remaining provinces		
	1996	2001	2011	1996	2001	2011	1996	2001	2011	1996	2001	2011	1996	2001	2011
<i>A: Regional migration patterns</i>															
Non-homeland	54.3	35.2	45.5	25.65	26.68	19.25	10.32	19.85	16.90	2.78	6.85	8.55	7.00	11.43	9.83
Origin regions:															
Ciskei	56.1	40.7	37.7	26.71	27.40	30.56	9.90	14.65	17.85	2.74	7.53	5.01	4.53	9.71	8.86
Transkei:															
Early District Council	32.5	28.9	22.9	34.02	35.45	28.11	16.72	17.14	22.24	7.93	8.87	10.85	8.80	9.66	15.87
Pondoland	39.6	29.9	21.9	6.37	8.46	9.25	10.60	11.44	13.56	32.53	34.45	37.42	10.91	15.74	17.88
Ciskei transferred to Transkei	32.5	23.2	22.8	35.54	32.51	26.33	16.59	21.67	28.25	5.19	12.22	9.06	10.22	10.36	13.53
<i>B: Socio-economic indicators</i>	1995	2000	2010	1995	2000	2010	1995	2000	2010	1995	2000	2010	1995	2000	2010
Human Development Index	0.60	0.58	0.62	0.73	0.70	0.70	0.72	0.69	0.70	0.61	0.59	0.64	0.64	0.62	0.65

Source: Migration patterns from own calculations using the 1996, 2001 and 2011 national censuses. HDI values from the Sub-National HDI Area Database of the Global Data Lab (hdi.globaldata.org)

Note: migrants are defined as individuals who changed their municipality of residence in the five years prior to the census.

3.5.2 Trends in educational attainment

Tables 3.5 and 3.6 indicate that regardless of children's migrant status, educational attainment improved significantly between 1996 and 2011. Non-migrant resident children tend to have lower rates of school completion than their migrant counterparts. It is also evident that school completion rates in the former Transkei regions of the EC are lower than those in either the former Ciskei or non-homeland regions, and secondary-school completion rates in the EC are as much as half that of Kwa-Zulu Natal, Gauteng and the WC. That said, the rate of increase in completion rates over time has been higher among non-migrant residents which suggests that the non-migrant-to-migrant ratio has declined over time. This is especially the case in areas of the former Transkei where the gaps in primary and secondary-school completion rates have been halved. Conversely, the non-migrant to migrant gap in secondary-school completion rates doubled in the non-homeland and Ciskei municipalities of the EC over the time period under consideration.

Table 3.5: Primary-school attainment by migrant status and region: 1996, 2001 and 2011 censuses

	Primary schooling					
	1996	2001	1996 – 2001 (%Δ)	2011	2001 – 2011 (%Δ)	1996 – 2011 (%Δ)
Eastern Cape						
Non-migrants	0.623 (0.485)	0.678 (0.467)	11.5	0.836 (0.370)	22.7	36.8
Recent migrants	0.758 (0.429)	0.808 (0.394)	6.5	0.900 (0.300)	11.6	18.8
Gauteng						
Non-migrants	0.845 (0.362)	0.884 (0.320)	4.6	0.964 (0.186)	9.0	14.1
Recent migrants	0.789 (0.408)	0.874 (0.331)	10.8	0.940 (0.237)	7.6	19.1
Kwa-Zulu Natal						
Non-migrants	0.718 (0.450)	0.800 (0.400)	11.4	0.908 (0.289)	13.5	26.5
Recent migrants	0.774 (0.418)	0.836 (0.370)	8.0	0.911 (0.285)	9.0	17.7
Western Cape						
Non-migrants	0.840 (0.367)	0.891 (0.312)	6.1	0.937 (0.243)	5.2	11.5
Recent migrants	0.816 (0.388)	0.862 (0.345)	5.6	0.931 (0.254)	8.0	14.1
Eastern Cape region:						
Non-homeland						
Non-migrants	0.770 (0.421)	0.816 (0.387)	6.0	0.905 (0.293)	10.9	17.5
Recent migrants	0.778 (0.416)	0.844 (0.363)	8.5	0.933 (0.250)	10.5	19.9
Ciskei						
Non-migrants	0.750 (0.433)	0.813 (0.390)	8.4	0.913 (0.282)	12.3	21.7
Recent migrants	0.742 (0.438)	0.836 (0.380)	10.0	0.931 (0.254)	11.4	25.4
Transkei: early District Council						
Non-migrants	0.547 (0.498)	0.619 (0.486)	13.2	0.799 (0.401)	29.1	46.1
Recent migrants	0.766 (0.424)	0.799 (0.401)	4.3	0.882 (0.323)	10.4	15.1
Transkei: Pondoland						
Non-migrants	0.493 (0.500)	0.538 (0.499)	9.1	0.764 (0.424)	42.0	55.0
Recent migrants	0.738 (0.441)	0.737 (0.441)	-0.0	0.814 (0.390)	10.4	10.3
Ciskei transferred to Transkei						
Non-migrants	0.585 (0.493)	0.662 (0.473)	13.2	0.841 (0.366)	27.0	43.8
Recent migrants	0.726 (0.446)	0.751 (0.433)	3.4	0.879 (0.327)	17.0	21.1

Note: The sample of analysis for complete primary-school education is individuals aged 15 to 18-years. Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses.

Table 3.6: Secondary school attainment by migrant status and region: 1996, 2001 and 2011 censuses

	Secondary schooling					
	1996	2001	1996 – 2001 (%Δ)	2011	2001 – 2011 (%Δ)	1996 – 2011 (%Δ)
Eastern Cape						
Non-migrants	0.130 (0.337)	0.188 (0.391)	56.9	0.266 (0.442)	41.2	121.6
Recent migrants	0.257 (0.437)	0.367 (0.482)	43.5	0.443 (0.497)	19.8	71.9
Gauteng						
Non-migrants	0.385 (0.487)	0.443 (0.497)	15.1	0.585 (0.493)	32.1	51.9
Recent migrants	0.352 (0.478)	0.367 (0.482)	4.3	0.574 (0.495)	56.0	63.1
Kwa-Zulu Natal						
Non-migrants	0.224 (0.418)	0.299 (0.458)	33.5	0.458 (0.498)	53.2	104.5
Recent migrants	0.306 (0.461)	0.401 (0.490)	31.0	0.525 (0.499)	30.9	71.6
Western Cape						
Non-migrants	0.363 (0.481)	0.407 (0.491)	12.1	0.458 (0.498)	12.5	26.2
Recent migrants	0.362 (0.481)	0.427 (0.495)	18.0	0.503 (0.500)	17.8	39.0
Eastern Cape region:						
Non-homeland						
Non-migrants	0.250 (0.433)	0.308 (0.462)	23.2	0.378 (0.485)	22.7	51.2
Recent migrants	0.317 (0.466)	0.486 (0.500)	53.3	0.544 (0.498)	11.9	71.6
Ciskei						
Non-migrants	0.172 (0.378)	0.248 (0.432)	44.2	0.343 (0.475)	38.3	99.4
Recent migrants	0.244 (0.430)	0.442 (0.497)	81.1	0.515 (0.500)	16.5	111.1
Transkei: early District Council						
Non-migrants	0.065 (0.247)	0.121 (0.326)	86.2	0.180 (0.384)	48.8	176.9
Recent migrants	0.186 (0.390)	0.217 (0.412)	16.7	0.357 (0.480)	64.5	91.9
Transkei: Pondoland						
Non-migrants	0.053 (0.225)	0.119 (0.324)	124.5	0.160 (0.367)	34.5	201.9
Recent migrants	0.189 (0.393)	0.219 (0.415)	15.9	0.269 (0.445)	22.8	42.3
Ciskei transferred to Transkei						
Non-migrants	0.074 (0.262)	0.090 (0.286)	21.6	0.217 (0.412)	141.1	193.2
Recent migrants	0.259 (0.439)	0.198 (0.399)	-23.6	0.278 (0.449)	40.4	7.3

Note: The sample of analysis for complete secondary school education is individuals aged 19 to 21-years. Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses.

That said, the rate of increase in completion rates over time has been higher among non-migrant residents, which suggests that the non-migrant-to-migrant ratio has declined over time. This is especially the case in areas of the former Transkei where the gaps in primary and secondary-school completion rates have been halved. Conversely, the non-migrant-to-migrant gap in secondary-school completion rates doubled in the non-homeland and Ciskei municipalities of the EC over the time period under consideration.

3.6. Estimation framework

Following the approaches of Berker (2009) and Hunt (2017), I estimate, as an initial first step, regression models at the individual-level to calculate district and municipality education outcomes adjusted for the characteristics of non-migrants and migrants. Specifically, the following linear probability regressions are estimated:

$$P(E_{ijt} \geq 7) = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 F_{ijt} + \alpha_2 R_{ijt} + \alpha_3 \sum_{a=15}^{18} A_{ijt}^a + \alpha_4 X_{ijt} + \sum_j \sum_t \theta_{jt} (\delta_j \times v_t) + \omega_{ijt} \quad [3.1]$$

$$P(E_{ijt} \geq 12) = \phi_0 + \phi_1 F_{ijt} + \phi_2 R_{ijt} + \phi_3 \sum_{a=19}^{21} A_{ijt}^a + \sum_j \sum_t \lambda_{jt} (\delta_j \times v_t) + \eta_{ijt} \quad [3.2]$$

$$P(Enroll_{ijt}) = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 F_{ijt} + \gamma_2 R_{ijt} + \gamma_3 \sum_{a=15}^{17} A_{ijt}^a + \gamma_4 X_{ijt} + \sum_j \sum_t \pi_{jt} (\delta_j \times v_t) + \xi_{ijt} \quad [3.3]$$

where E_{ijt} and $Enroll_{ijt}$ are the educational attainment and enrolment status of individual i in municipality/district j at time t , respectively, F is a gender dummy, R are race dummies, A^a are age dummy variables, δ_j are municipality/district dummies and v_t are time dummies. The vector X contains household-level covariates including the educational attainment of the household head, the household composition (number of children, working-aged adults and retired persons) and per capita income.²⁰ Regressions [3.1] to [3.3] are weighted using census person weights.

²⁰ Tables AX and AX of the appendix to this chapter provide descriptive statistics of these control variables.

In a second step, the coefficients $\hat{\theta}_{jt}$, $\hat{\lambda}_{jt}$ and $\hat{\pi}_{jt}$ are used as the dependent variable in a municipality/district panel analysis:

$$\hat{\theta}_{jt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 I_{jt}^{15-18} + \beta_2 I_{jt}^E + \beta_3 X_{jt} + \delta_j + \nu_t + \varepsilon_{jt} \quad [3.4]$$

$$\hat{\lambda}_{jt} = \kappa_0 + \kappa_1 I_{jt}^{19-21} + \kappa_2 I_{jt}^E + \kappa_3 X_{jt} + \delta_j + \nu_t + \varepsilon_{jt} \quad [3.5]$$

$$\hat{\pi}_{jt} = \mu_0 + \mu_1 I_{jt}^{15-17} + \mu_2 I_{jt}^E + \mu_3 X_{jt} + \delta_j + \nu_t + \varepsilon_{jt} \quad [3.6]$$

$I^{a_1-a_2}$ and I^E represent the primary variables of interest, with the former representing the share of the population aged $a_1 - a_2$ in municipality/district j that are migrants, and the latter the share of the working-age population who were migrants with educational attainment E ($E < 12$, $E = 12$ and $E > 12$). In order to capture non-migrant's exposure to migrant classmates (peer effects), equations [4.4] and [4.5] make use of migrants who changed their municipality/district at least three years prior to the time of the census while [4.6] makes use of migrants who changed their municipality/district at any time during the five years prior to the time of the census.

Although a positive correlation between $I^{a_1-a_2}$ and I^E is expected (most migrant children move with their parents), it should be possible to identify their effects separately as not all working age migrants have children. X_{jt} is a vector of municipality/district-level characteristics that might be related to educational outcomes, including the: the unemployment rate; average per capita income; proportion of the population living in overcrowded households;²¹ proportion of the population that is male; and proportion of the population living in rural areas. All of these controls are entered in log form so as to allow for non-linearity. Regressions [3.4] – [3.6] are estimated using weights, w_{jt} , computed as the inverse of the squared standard errors on $\hat{\theta}_{jt}$, $\hat{\lambda}_{jt}$ and $\hat{\pi}_{jt}$ from equations [3.1] – [3.3].

²¹ Defined as a household in which the ratio of the household size to number of rooms is larger than two.

The regressions above are likely to suffer from endogeneity problems. For example, there are likely to be municipality/district factors that influence both migrant choice and educational outcomes, as well as a bidirectional relationship migration inflows and educational attainment. Including a lagged dependent variable as a control addresses issues of persistence and autocorrelation, yielding dynamic models:

$$\hat{\theta}_{jt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 I_{jt}^{15-18} + \beta_2 I_{jt}^E + \beta_3 X_{jt} + \beta_4 \hat{\theta}_{jt-1} + \delta_j + \nu_t + \varepsilon_{jt} \quad [3.7]$$

$$\hat{\lambda}_{jt} = \kappa_0 + \kappa_1 I_{jt}^{19-21} + \kappa_2 I_{jt}^E + \kappa_3 X_{jt} + \kappa_4 \hat{\lambda}_{jt-1} + \delta_j + \nu_t + \varepsilon_{jt} \quad [3.8]$$

$$\hat{\pi}_{jt} = \mu_0 + \mu_1 I_{jt}^{15-17} + \mu_2 I_{jt}^E + \mu_3 X_{jt} + \mu_4 \hat{\pi}_{jt-1} + \delta_j + \nu_t + \varepsilon_{jt} \quad [3.9]$$

An immediate problem with applying ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation to equations [3.7] to [3.9] is dynamic panel bias (Nickell, 1981), that is, the lagged dependent variable is correlated with time-invariant municipality/district factors.²² This can be corrected by purging the fixed effects using a first difference (FD) estimator:

$$\Delta \hat{\theta}_{jt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta I_{jt}^{15-18} + \beta_2 \Delta I_{jt}^E + \beta_3 \Delta X_{jt} + \beta_4 \Delta \hat{\theta}_{jt-1} + \nu_t + \Delta \varepsilon_{jt} \quad [3.10]$$

$$\Delta \hat{\lambda}_{jt} = \kappa_0 + \kappa_1 \Delta I_{jt}^{19-21} + \kappa_2 \Delta I_{jt}^E + \kappa_3 \Delta X_{jt} + \kappa_4 \Delta \hat{\lambda}_{jt-1} + \nu_t + \Delta \varepsilon_{jt} \quad [3.11]$$

$$\Delta \hat{\pi}_{jt} = \mu_0 + \mu_1 \Delta I_{jt}^{15-17} + \mu_2 \Delta I_{jt}^E + \mu_3 \Delta X_{jt} + \mu_4 \Delta \hat{\pi}_{jt-1} + \nu_t + \Delta \varepsilon_{jt} \quad [3.12]$$

The FD specifications use $1/\left(\frac{1}{w_{jt}} + \frac{1}{w_{jt-1}}\right)$ as weights.

However, even though fixed effects have been eliminated, the lagged dependent variable continues to be potentially endogenous through its correlation with $\Delta \varepsilon_{jt}$. Further endogeneity bias may also arise due to simultaneity between educational outcomes and migrant inflows, as well as the predetermined nature of several variables included in X (that is,

²² Keele and Kelly (2006), however, show through means of Monte Carlo simulation that OLS with LDV produces the best estimates for modest ($N = 50 - 150$) samples sizes.

correlated with past and potentially current realisations of ε_{jt}). These issues are addressed using an Anderson and Hsiao (1982) levels estimator which takes first differences (FD) and then instruments potentially endogenous variables using lags of their own levels. However, lagged levels are often shown to be poor instruments if variables are close to a random walk (Roodman, 2009). To improve efficiency the Arellano-Bover/ Blundell-Bond (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998, 2000) System Generalised Method of Moments (GMM-SYS) estimator introduces more instruments by combining a system in the difference estimator (equations [3.10] – [3.12]) with levels as instruments, with the estimator in levels (equation [3.7] – [3.9]) with first differences as instruments.²³

3.6.1 Empirical results – effects of migrants on completion

Tables 3.7 to 3.9 show results for the impact of the migrant share of a municipality/district population aged 6 to 64 years using the adjusted education outcomes as dependent variables. I begin with weighted least squares (WLS) estimation of equations [3.4] to [3.6]. Controlling for area and year fixed effects (column 1) and unemployment rates and non-migrant cohort (column 2), the coefficient on migration is estimated to be positive and statistically significant for primary school completion and secondary school enrolment, but small and statistically insignificant for secondary school completion. These coefficients remain robust to the inclusion of further controls for municipality/district level characteristics (column 3).

The coefficients on both the youth and prime age unemployment rates are statistically significant in the case of the school completion rates, but not in the case of secondary school enrolment. As expected, indicators of wealthier and more economically developed municipalities/districts (log per capita income) are positively and significantly correlated with educational outcomes, although we can expect an upward bias in these coefficients due to bi-

²³ This is the same estimation approach adopted by Kollamparambil (2017) who analyses the impact of internal migration on income inequality.

directionality.

A dynamic process in the LS regression is allowed for by including a lagged dependent variable, as in equations [3.7] to [3.9]. The results of this dynamic LS estimation are indicated in column 4 of Tables 3.7 – 3.9. The coefficient on migration is significantly decreased in the case of primary school completion and secondary school enrolment, with a significant negative coefficient emerging in the former. Following first-differencing that addresses endogeneity bias linked to time-invariant fixed effects (column 5), several coefficients increase in magnitude and significance.

The estimates of the final model (equations [3.10] to [3.12]) that aims to address endogeneity issues linked to bi-directional causal relationships are indicated in column 6 of Tables 3.7 to 3.9. In all cases, the models pass the Hansen J-test of over identifying restrictions and the difference in Hansen test of exogeneity of instrument subsets. The positive and significant coefficient on the lagged dependent variable in all three models gives support for the persistent nature of regional education outcomes. No significant relationship between either primary-school completion or secondary-school enrolment and migration is estimated. However, the results in Table 3.8 indicate that a higher migrant share is related to significantly higher secondary school completion rates among non-migrants aged 19 to 21. Specifically, a percentage point increase in the migrant share is related to an increase in the secondary school completion rate of 1.8 percentage points. Furthermore, a positive and significant (at the 10% level) effect of the youth unemployment rate (ages 15-24) on the secondary school enrolment of non-migrant residents aged 15 to 17 is observed.

3.6.2 The 'Transkei effect'

Municipalities that incorporate districts of the former Transkei proper — the early adopters of the Glen Grey district council system — and districts in the former Pondoland are estimated to have significantly lower rates of primary school completion and secondary school

enrolment compared to the rest of the EC, including the former Ciskei, and the three other provinces under consideration (see columns 1 through 4 of Tables 3.7 to 3.9). Furthermore, parts of the Transkei that were transferred from the Ciskei decades after the establishment of the Transkeian Council System do not show significantly different educational outcomes from the Ciskei or non-homeland Eastern Cape.

It is evident from comparing the results of the weighted LS regressions that some of the difference in educational outcomes between parts of the former Transkei and other regions can be explained by differences in demographic and socio-economic differences —noting that these too could be legacies of past policy; for example, high levels of unemployment linked to historical underdevelopment. The direction of change in the coefficients on the regional dummies indicate a positive correlation between socio-economic development and the Gauteng and WC regions, and a negative correlations with the Eastern Cape former homeland areas and parts of Kwa-Zulu Natal.

Therefore, after accounting for all observed municipality/district heterogeneity (including migrant shares), persistence in educational outcomes, as well as adjusting educational outcomes at the individual level to account for home background factors, there remains a significant 'unexplained' Transkei direct effect on the educational outcomes of children and youth resident in the Transkei. It is unsurprising that, unlike Chapter 3, no significant difference is found between the estimated coefficient on the early and later adopters of DCs, since by 1927 all 27 Transkei districts had DCs. Therefore, it is not the timing of DC introduction that has persisted through time, but rather the long-lasting effect that the Glen Grey Act and succeeding policy had on the channel of migrant labour. In the case of secondary school completion rates, very little difference is observed across different regions, aside from Kwa-Zulu Natal that significantly outperforms all other regions. Following first-differencing that addresses endogeneity bias linked to time-invariant fixed effects (column 5), several

coefficients on variables of interest increase in magnitude and significance.

Table 3.7: Regression results: dependent variable primary school completion rate of non-migrant 15-18 year-olds (regression adjusted)

Variables:	OLS			Dynamic	First	GMM-SYS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	OLS	difference	(6)
Share population ages 6 to 64 that is migrant	0.538*** (0.068)	0.481*** (0.076)	0.349*** (0.073)	-0.495*** (0.280)	-0.770* (0.419)	0.063 (0.284)
Unemployment rate ages 15-24		0.526*** (0.131)	0.270** (0.118)	0.102 (0.108)	0.325** (0.153)	0.104 (0.095)
Unemployment rate ages 25-54		-0.301*** (0.092)	-0.190** (0.527)	-0.103 (0.092)	-0.305** (0.134)	-0.045 (0.069)
Share of non-migrant population ages 15-18		1.56*** (0.484)	2.43*** (0.527)	1.413*** (0.464)	1.413* (0.748)	1.304*** (0.411)
Log pc income			0.047*** (0.014)	0.014 (0.011)	0.078* (0.045)	-0.012 (0.017)
Log overcrowding			-0.018 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.012 (0.028)	0.004 (0.013)
Log male			0.290* (0.170)	0.288** (0.141)	1.018** (0.422)	0.252 (0.159)
Log rural			-0.001 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	-0.009 (0.010)	0.002 (0.003)
Ciskei	0.033* (0.018)		0.056*** (0.018)	0.012 (0.017)		
Ciskei transferred to Transkei	-0.045** (0.019)		-0.027 (0.019)	-0.013 (0.015)		
Transkei early DC	-0.074*** (0.014)		-0.055*** (0.017)	-0.033** (0.014)		
Transkei Pondoland	-0.105*** (0.017)		-0.077*** (0.016)	-0.052*** (0.017)		
Western Cape	0.005 (0.015)		-0.008 (0.013)	0.008 (0.011)		
Kwa-Zulu Natal	0.035*** (0.013)		0.041*** (0.014)	0.018 (0.011)		
Gauteng	0.014 (0.015)		0.008 (0.015)	0.038*** (0.038)		
Lagged dependent variable				0.425*** (0.067)	0.250 (0.152)	0.742*** (0.102)
Observations	171	171	171	114	57	114
F	78.90***	67.25***	70.49***	86.45***	6.37***	94.21***
R-squared	0.783	0.800	0.828	0.897	0.473	
# of groups						57
# of instruments						14
p-value Hansen test						0.617
p-value Diff Hansen						0.543

Notes: Estimation is by weighted least squares with weights w the inverse of the squared standard errors on the district/municipality-year interaction coefficients in the individual regression for columns 1-4 and 6, and $1/(1/w_t + 1/w_{t-1})$ for column 5. All specifications include census year dummies. The instruments in column 6 include: the levels and first differences of lagged dependent variable and the share population ages 6 to 64 that is migrant; levels of: unemployment rate ages 15-24; unemployment rate, ages 25-54; share of non-migrant population, ages 15-18; log per capita income; log overcrowding; log male; log rural; and year dummies. Robust standard errors are indicated in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Table 3.8: Regression results: dependent variable secondary school completion rate of non-migrant 19-21 year-olds (regression adjusted)

Variables:	(1)	OLS (2)	(3)	Dynamic OLS (4)	First difference (5)	GMM- SYS (6)
Share population ages 6 to 64 that is migrant	0.093 (0.106)	0.145 (0.114)	-0.054 (0.068)	0.360 (0.325)	1.720*** (0.586)	1.797*** (0.747)
Unemployment rate ages 15-24		0.676*** (0.167)	-0.234* (0.120)	-0.120 (0.159)	-0.251 (0.187)	0.278 (0.200)
Unemployment rate ages 25-54		-0.047 (0.111)	0.222** (0.092)	0.040 (0.110)	-0.244 (0.147)	0.024 (0.108)
Share of non-migrant population ages 19-21		3.13*** (1.106)	1.24 (0.806)	0.781 (0.931)	-1.514 (1.776)	4.00*** (1.206)
Log pc income			0.096*** (0.013)	0.022 (0.019)	-0.037 (0.041)	-0.009 (0.025)
Log overcrowding			-0.033** (0.014)	-0.002 (0.015)	-0.009 (0.023)	-0.002 (0.021)
Log male			-0.129 (0.202)	0.012 (0.239)	0.197 (0.535)	-0.638** (0.283)
Log rural			-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.012** (0.005)	0.024 (0.024)	-0.002 (0.009)
Ciskei	0.024 (0.024)	0.027 (0.022)	0.050*** (0.015)	0.037** (0.016)		
Ciskei transferred to Transkei	-0.046** (0.021)	-0.013 (0.022)	0.026 (0.016)	0.018 (0.015)		
Transkei early DC	-0.060*** (0.020)	-0.014 (0.019)	0.038** (0.016)	0.019 (0.017)		
Transkei Pondoland	-0.076*** (0.020)	-0.041 (0.018)	0.041** (0.017)	0.019 (0.018)		
Western Cape	0.059** (0.025)	0.078*** (0.020)	0.037** (0.016)	-0.011 (0.020)		
Kwa-Zulu Natal	0.064*** (0.021)	0.052*** (0.019)	0.116*** (0.015)	0.096*** (0.016)		
Gauteng	0.193*** (0.025)	0.167*** (0.025)	0.109*** (0.018)	0.041 (0.026)		
Lagged dependent variable				0.722*** (0.099)	0.126 (0.181)	0.862*** (0.154)
Observations	171	171	171	114	57	114
F	69.64***	65.19***	98.71***	109.55***	2.57**	55.30***
R-squared	0.806	0.835	0.914	0.938	0.319	
# of groups						57
# of instruments						14
p-value Hansen test						0.234
p-value Diff Hansen						0.211

Notes: Estimation is by weighted least squares with weights w the inverse of the squared standard errors on the district/municipality-year interaction coefficients in the individual regression for columns 1-4 and 6, and $1/(1/w_t + 1/w_{t-1})$ for column 5. All specifications include census year dummies. The instruments in column 6 include: the levels and first differences of lagged dependent variable and share population ages 6 to 64 that is migrant; levels of: unemployment rate ages 15-24; unemployment rate ages 25-54; share of non-migrant population ages 19-21; log per capita income; log overcrowding; log male; log rural; and year dummies. Robust standard errors are indicated in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 3.9: Regression results: dependent variable secondary school enrolment rate of non-migrant 15-17 year-olds (regression adjusted)

Variables:	Dependent variable: Secondary-school enrolment of 19-21 year-olds					
	(1)	OLS (2)	(3)	Dynamic OLS (4)	First difference (5)	GMM-SYS (6)
Share population ages 6 to 64 that is migrant	0.361*** (0.050)	0.377*** (0.058)	0.300*** (0.060)	-0.067 (0.136)	-0.120 (0.169)	-0.031 (0.320)
Unemployment rate ages 15-24		0.437*** (0.144)	0.169 (0.150)	0.011 (0.147)	0.396* (0.208)	0.524* (0.269)
Unemployment rate ages 25-54		-0.077 (0.102)	-0.036 (0.108)	0.204* (0.106)	-0.135 (0.173)	0.088 (0.110)
Share of non-migrant population ages 15-17		2.02*** (0.558)	2.72*** (0.631)	1.864*** (0.600)	1.038 (0.948)	1.790** (0.806)
Log pc income			0.034** (0.015)	0.002 (0.014)	0.115** (0.050)	-0.014 (0.025)
Log overcrowding			-0.030 (0.018)	0.010 (0.014)	0.015 (0.032)	0.012 (0.017)
Log male			0.105 (0.190)	0.261 (0.172)	1.106** (0.526)	0.339 (0.282)
Log rural			-0.006 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.016)	0.003 (0.003)
Ciskei	0.052*** (0.019)	0.048** (0.019)	0.062*** (0.019)	0.004 (0.021)		
Ciskei transferred to Transkei	-0.035 (0.023)	-0.050** (0.025)	-0.034 (0.023)	-0.024 (0.019)		
Transkei early DC	-0.056*** (0.018)	-0.078*** (0.022)	-0.054*** (0.020)	-0.052*** (0.017)		
Transkei Pondoland	-0.090*** (0.020)	-0.112*** (0.022)	-0.079*** (0.020)	-0.072*** (0.020)		
Western Cape	-0.020 (0.019)	-0.007 (0.019)	-0.013 (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)		
Kwa-Zulu Natal	0.039** (0.017)	0.015 (0.018)	0.039** (0.017)	0.005 (0.017)		
Gauteng	0.020 (0.018)	0.031 (0.019)	0.018 (0.018)	0.041** (0.017)		
Lagged dependent variable				0.507*** (0.068)	0.013 (0.227)	0.678*** (0.110)
Observations	171	171	171	114	57	114
F	158.49	135.05***	126.78***	71.61***	4.13***	48.45***
R-squared	0.890	0.898	0.908	0.877	0.321	
# of groups						57
# of instruments						16
p-value Hansen test						0.107
p-value Diff Hansen						0.785

Notes: Estimation is by weighted least squares with weights w the inverse of the squared standard errors on the district/municipality-year interaction coefficients in the individual regression for columns 1, 2, 3 and 5, and $1/(1/w_t + 1/w_{t-1})$ for column 4. All specifications include census year dummies. The instruments in column 5 include: the levels and first differences of: lagged dependent variable, share population ages 6 to 64 that is migrant and unemployment rate ages 15-24; levels of: unemployment rate ages 25-54; share of non-migrant population ages 15-17; log per capita income; log overcrowding; log male; log rural; and year dummies. Robust standard errors are indicated in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter investigated the relationship between internal migration and primary and secondary completion rates in several South African provinces with an emphasis on the Eastern Cape (EC). Following accepted practice, I used an instrumental variables approach to address endogeneity concerns of local internal migration and to control for possible environmental influences related to family socio-economic backgrounds.

This chapter provides evidence that internal migration does affect non-migrant education outcomes, although the overall effects are indistinct, as is indicated in the relevant literature (e.g. Ballatore, et al. 2018; Schneeweis, 2015; Hunt, 2017). Specifically, I have shown that 15 to 18 year-old non-migrants' probability of completing primary school and 15 to 17 year-old non-migrants' probability of being enrolled are not affected by the migration of 6 to 64 year-olds.

Table 3.9 shows that education outcomes are not only affected by recent migration but also by historical shocks: the dummy variable for DCs reveal a large, negative and statistically significant coefficient. In other words, the regions where DCs existed (Transkei DC and Transkei Pondoland) are shown to have the weakest completion performance compared to Ciskei and the rest of the EC.

Previous scholars have noted the large discrepancies in quality between Transkei and white education (e.g. Davis, 1968; Paterson, 1992; Duff, 2011). Despite the fact that DCs contributed to raising enrolment and attendance, white schools still had better pass rates (Blue Books, 1893-1909). It may, therefore, not be surprising that this chapter found that non-migrants in early DCs have the lowest completion rates of all four EC regions, and that even when conditioning on socioeconomic factors at the local municipal and district levels, the weakest school completion rates are estimated for former-DC regions.

The Glen Grey Act may have prompted waves of migration as people left the area in

order to raise money to pay the labour tax, thereby reducing the number of labourers, human capital and potential production capacity in former DCs. Selective migration could have occurred as healthier, stronger and more educated people left the DC regions. Because health and aptitude amongst other characteristics tend to be inherited, the early differences created in DCs could have continued over time. Therefore migration is hypothesised as a potential pathway through which the Glen Grey Act may have indirectly impacted present day education outcomes in former DCs and in other regions where migrants have moved to over time.

Least squares regression results showed that even after controlling for migration and other socio-economic factors that affect migration and education, there is still an unexplained effect that is impacting education outcomes in the Transkei completion. This unexplained part could be historical migration, although I am unable to confirm this as I do not accurate historical data showing patterns of migration to and from the Transkei. Nonetheless, the data that I do have on current migration is not able to explain the full DC effect.

This chapter has also shown the importance of history in analysing present day economic outcomes. The persistent migration seen today in South Africa generally, and the Transkei specifically, has been influenced by colonial policies that can be traced back to the passage of the Glen Grey Act. These policies have been argued to have influenced cultural norms that explain the persistence of migration from the Eastern Cape. The findings that former DCs have the highest levels of migration and lowest completion rates are important as they add to works that emphasize the importance of historical policy shocks for long-term development outcomes. The findings also add to the works that consider migration as a channel of policy shock persistence and emphasise the role of selection in influencing economic outcomes (e.g. Fourie et al., 2015; Becker et al., 2016; Caicedo, 2018).

CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, I examined three research questions relating to Cape Colony democratic reversal, Transkei black colonial education and the relationship between migration and present day education outcomes. The three chapters of this dissertation are linked by policies related to democratic reversal and political and economic exclusion. The Cape Parliamentary Registration Act and Franchise and Ballot Act were clear attempts by the Cape Parliament to reduce black voter numbers, in response to a large increase in the black population that had recently become Cape citizens.

Summary of main findings

The dissertation's first contribution was to exploit an individual-level source of cross-sectional and time series information – the Cape Colony voters' rolls – to extract basic biographical data, mainly on black males and question the accuracy of the literature on black disenfranchisement in the Cape Colony. The objective of the chapter was to draw a definitive conclusion as to how many were removed from the Cape Colony voters' rolls. Debates on the effectiveness of late nineteenth-century Cape Colony black voter disenfranchisement continued throughout much of the twentieth century. Historians and political commentators all contributed to the discourse, with varying claims being made regarding the effectiveness of the measures. The problem with these claims is that they are not supported by evidence.

I used the Cape Colony voters' rolls, Cape Colony Blue Books and Statistical Registers to investigate the changing accounts of mass voter disenfranchisement. Previous authors maintained that 30,000 black voters had been disqualified by the 1887 Parliamentary Registration Act. By analysing the Eastern electoral division's voters' rolls, I showed the number of black people disenfranchised by the 1887 Act to be less than 4,000.

The burden of these suffrage attacks falls overwhelmingly on black people, but I found that poor white people were also affected. As the Cape was dealing with what it termed

the ‘poor white problem’ it seems some of these white people were inadvertently on the wrong end of legislation not meant for them. This may have given rise to the racialized thinking that would become a hallmark of South Africa’s twentieth century.

I also showed that, while the legislation was effective in reducing the number of black voters in the short term, black voter numbers rose again after a few years. I argued that this may be because black voters reacted to the higher qualifications in various ways; one of those strategies was to acquire literacy, a topic I developed further in Chapter 3.

In Chapter Two, I investigated the effects of DCs on black primary school enrolment and attendance. I showed that black education outcomes in DC areas experienced growth over and above that of non-council districts. These DCs increased cooperation at a local level between parents, missionaries and the Cape government, as black parents were proactive in the development of better schools for their children. The findings of the chapter contribute to our understanding of fiscal decentralisation and local government, black colonial education and black agency.

In Chapter Three, I investigated the relationship between internal migration and primary and secondary school completion rates. I found that contemporary migration has no impact on non-migrant primary completion but has both positive effects on non-migrant secondary completion and secondary enrolment. Chapter 3 also argued that persistent migration is one the legacies of the Glen Grey Act. I also showed that persistence of migration as a cultural norm was triggered by the passage of the Glen Grey Act and shows a persistent effect of the Glen Grey Act on education outcomes today.

The Glen Grey Act was key in disenfranchising black people, segregating them, and restructuring their local governance structures, whilst creating mechanisms that generated a pool of oscillating migrant labourers/ labour reserves. These labourers needed to possess a certain level of skills that were required in the economy. The Transkei today is still the biggest

source of migration in the country, with migration mainly driven by job searches and the desire to access better schooling. Though there was an increase in education access for black people in the Transkei, the curriculum was determined by the Cape education department. Thus black education quality remained inferior to that of white pupils in the rest of the Cape Colony. However, black education in the Transkei was better than it was for black people in the rest of South Africa. Black people in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal had inferior access education to black people in the Transkei (Seroto, 1999). The persistence of policies can occur through mediating channels. Although the District Council institutions have not persisted, I argue that out-migration has. We cannot measure the direct effects of the Glen Grey on education outcomes, but we can hypothesise about indirect, alternative pathways that colonial policy impacts outcomes today. Inequality in education completion in various parts of South Africa can be partly explained by migration as colonial policies have had indirect lasting effects on present day outcomes.

Main contributions of the dissertation

This dissertation highlights the importance of empirical work in economic history. It provides new evidence to correct a longstanding false narrative about the scale of black disenfranchisement. My extensive and accurate review of the work of past historians reveals the error that has led historians to take a false position on the past. We need to question historical accounts of colonial events as doing so can contribute to decolonising long accepted narratives about African development.

The dissertation also makes important contributions to a number of literatures, namely the link between democracy and education, the literature on fiscal decentralisation, and a literature of historical persistence of events. The interdisciplinary approaches used in this paper has allowed me to provide new insights across diverse fields of study.

This dissertation has also highlighted the need to preserve democratic participation in

the political process. Democracy should be treasured; disenfranchisement not only hurts those that are excluded from the vote, but, as this dissertation has shown, could lead to unexpected and unforeseen long-run consequences that is detrimental to development. The reversal of democratisation need not have large disenfranchising effects if the targeted population mobilised in resistance as was seen in the Cape Colony.

The dissertation has also contributed to changing previously static perceptions of colonial education policy in the Transkei – the narrative is changing to emphasise black agency in improving their own education outcomes. Though institutions (DCs) are at times created for self-serving purposes (by the Cape government), they can be used by those receiving them for progress and development (black primary education). Thus democratic reversal need not lead to regression in the education of those disenfranchised.

Chapter 2 made unique contributions to the literature that studies democratisation and education. Several studies find a positive link between democratisation and increased access to education (e.g. Ansell, 2010; Harding and Stasavage 2014). Paglayan's (2020) cross country study that used data spanning 200 years produced a null finding that "democratisation had no or little impact on primary school enrolment rates" because education expansion can occur under autocratic regimes. I believe that by studying a shorter time frame in Chapter 2, I added to the debates on the relationship between democratisation and education. That is, in the short term at least, democratic reversal can be associated with education expansion. Thus my education expansion finding is contrary to Naidu (2012) and Henderson (2017) who found that disenfranchisement negatively impacted education.

Several recent works (e.g. Bartolini et al. 2016, Kim et al. 2018 Lakomaa et al. 2019 and Stegarescu, 2020) have highlighted the importance of local taxation powers for decentralised regions for increasing efficiency of resource allocation, improves the speed at which local policy is implemented. I add to this literature by showing the effectiveness of local government

fiscal under conditions of democratic reversal - District Councils increased choice for Transkei residents regards to how their taxes were spent – taxes raised were used for what residents wanted, which was more education.

Chapter 2 also makes contributions to the literature that studies political and fiscal decentralisation under different types of regimes. By decentralising, governments cede a certain amount of political and financial control regions and increases their risk of losing power (Busygina et al 2018). I show that incumbent political authority can decentralise and retain power as they prevent certain regions from participating in elections.

Chapter 3 makes contributions to several literatures. Firstly, I showed the importance of migration for education outcomes (e.g. Hunt, 2017).

Secondly, I showed how migration persistence in South Africa is linked to Cape Colony policy (Glen Grey Act) that was passed to generate a pool of migrant labour for the colonial economy (e.g. Carpio et al 2020 and Sequiera, 2020). This migration is shown to impact education outcomes in the present day.

Suggestions for future research

I suggest three topics for future research. Firstly, I used the Cape Parliament debates to give context, specifically on the issue of disenfranchisement. These debates are rich in statistics and information about the policy positions of legislators. The debates, however, have not been used for empirical political-economic analysis. The names of the legislators of both the House of Assembly and the Legislative Council are available and their voting decisions could be analysed. One could investigate whether legislators represent their own constituencies, or are acting on behalf of specific interest groups.

One can also determine if the legislator's background or political party affiliation plays any part in his voting behaviour. Some of the models in the literature have been used to predict future voting behaviour and help us understand the reasons why legislators voted in certain

ways. These are issues addressed in the literature on political economy but there is little if any evidence for Africa at all, let alone for the colonial period.

Secondly, the Superintendent's Reports on Education contain detailed information for the whole Cape Colony on pass rates, by grade, of primary-school pupils for a number of years between 1893 and 1903. If transcribed, they could be used to compare trends in pass rates by district or town. One could also test the effect of shocks such as the South African War, drought, or disease on a student's performance. Finally, as education policy and curriculum changed in the 1890s, regression discontinuity models could be used to analyse the pass rates.

Thirdly, the Transkei Territories Council's financial statements and income and expenditure accounts are available in the Statistical Registers and Cape Colony Blue Books and in the Umtata Archives Repository in the Eastern Cape. The Archives hold the majority of the Councils' records. The records in the repository are in poor condition due to years of neglect and using them would be challenging. They could, however, be used to study the fiscal history of the councils and provide insights on the sustainability of Rhodes' experiment. A study of the councils' finances could be undertaken for the entire history of their existence (nearly 60 years). We could also get a better understanding of the administrative dynamics between the Union government and the DCs.

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APPENDIX

Table A1: Changes in learner numbers and school numbers, 2000 and 2013

	Number of learners			Average annual growth rate	Number of schools		
	2000	2006	2013		2000	2006	2013
<i>Eastern Cape Municipalities and Metropoles:</i>							
Alfred Nzo	225 765	217 205	188 469	-1.38%	715	721	742
Chris Hani	212 327	187 271	145 308	-2.88%	741	760	768
Amathole	216 818	205 958	146 058	-2.99%	943	976	990
OR Tambo	352 640	355 650	299 605	-1.25%	1 063	1 082	1 090
Joe Gqabi	84 790	72 498	59 769	-2.65%	293	295	294
Sarah Baartman	56 492	54 736	56 901	0.06%	202	208	210
Nelson Mandela Bay	135 190	130 184	129 358	-0.34%	212	233	234
Buffalo City	116 211	106 329	102 041	-1.00%	304	322	332
Missing/unspecified	97 169	28 139	10 362	-15.82%	837	419	177
<i>All Eastern Cape</i>	1 497 402	1 357 970	1 137 871	-2.09%	5 310	5 016	4 847
<i>Transkei magisterial districts:</i>							
Bizana	59 263	61 362	56 772	-0.33%	142	143	147
Butterworth	21 602	20 603	14 681	-2.93%	103	110	104
Cala	15 812	12 585	8 898	-4.33%	59	59	58
Cofimvaba	30 824	27 217	17 279	-4.35%	116	114	107
Elliot	4 032	4 388	3 731	-0.60%	14	17	16
Elliotdale	21 888	26 482	23 257	0.47%	83	86	86
Engcobo	52 680	49 282	38 502	-2.38%	181	178	174
Flagstaff	51 929	55 595	48 937	-0.46%	152	153	151
Idutywa	30 591	29 889	21 552	-2.66%	123	126	125
Kentani	27 084	26 540	15 323	-4.29%	98	107	107
Lady Frere/Glen Grey	34 107	26 418	18 628	-4.55%	151	137	128
Libode	111 648	117 857	105 200	-0.46%	334	330	341
Maclear	5 226	5 184	5 098	-0.19%	17	17	17
Maluti	30 428	28 084	26 019	-1.20%	97	97	101
Mount Ayliff	23 300	24 271	19 973	-1.18%	86	88	88
Mount Fletcher	40 244	34 221	23 903	-3.93%	175	172	162
Mount Frere	43 572	38 688	28 336	-3.26%	174	173	175
Mqanduli	31 618	33 025	25 333	-1.69%	96	98	97
Ngqeleni	44 363	43 732	35 167	-1.77%	132	131	130
Nqamakwe	22 672	20 675	12 523	-4.46%	115	121	121
Qumbu	33 877	28 794	19 519	-4.15%	133	131	130
Tabankulu	42 399	38 332	31 352	-2.30%	131	133	133
Tsolo	30 385	24 887	18 436	-3.77%	114	114	113
Tsomo	16 849	15 108	9 190	-4.56%	87	88	87
Umtata	63 213	61 780	53 821	-1.23%	178	191	194
Umzimkulu	50 848	424	456		149	2	3
Willowvale	33 082	34 028	18 015	-4.57%	133	136	135
<i>All Transkei</i>	922 064	889 027	699 445	-2.11%	3 224	3 250	3 227

Notes: own calculations using SNAP Survey data for 2000, 2006 and 2013.

Table A2: Descriptive statistics of variables included in first stage regression analysis of probability of completing primary school (age group 15–18)

	Eastern Cape						Gauteng, Kwa-Zulu Natal and Western Cape					
	Non-migrants			Recent migrants			Non-migrants			Recent migrants		
	1996	2001	2011	1996	2001	2011	1996	2001	2011	1996	2001	2011
Age	16.43 (1.11)	16.43 (1.12)	16.47 (1.11)	16.58 (1.11)	16.59 (1.10)	16.63 (1.11)	16.47 (1.11)	16.49 (1.12)	16.50 (1.12)	16.54 (1.13)	16.65 (1.13)	16.70 (1.13)
Female	0.49 (0.50)	0.50 (0.50)	0.49 (0.50)	0.56 (0.50)	0.56 (0.50)	0.54 (0.50)	0.51 (0.49)	0.51 (0.50)	0.50 (0.50)	0.52 (0.50)	0.55 (0.50)	0.53 (0.50)
Household head employed	0.23 (0.42)	0.20 (0.40)	0.24 (0.43)	0.48 (0.50)	0.43 (0.49)	0.48 (0.50)	0.50 (0.50)	0.44 (0.50)	0.45 (0.50)	0.69 (0.46)	0.60 (0.49)	0.65 (0.48)
Household head occupation												
Legislators/senior officials/managers	0.05 (0.22)	0.05 (0.22)	0.07 (0.25)	0.08 (0.27)	0.10 (0.30)	0.09 (0.28)	0.07 (0.25)	0.09 (0.28)	0.10 (0.31)	0.08 (0.26)	0.11 (0.32)	0.12 (0.33)
Professionals	0.12 (0.33)	0.07 (0.26)	0.08 (0.27)	0.16 (0.37)	0.11 (0.31)	0.11 (0.31)	0.10 (0.29)	0.07 (0.26)	0.08 (0.27)	0.10 (0.30)	0.10 (0.31)	0.10 (0.30)
Technicians/associate professionals	0.06 (0.24)	0.14 (0.34)	0.13 (0.34)	0.07 (0.25)	0.14 (0.35)	0.19 (0.39)	0.07 (0.26)	0.10 (0.30)	0.10 (0.31)	0.08 (0.27)	0.11 (0.31)	0.10 (0.30)
Clerks	0.05 (0.21)	0.08 (0.27)	0.10 (0.30)	0.07 (0.26)	0.10 (0.30)	0.10 (0.30)	0.06 (0.25)	0.10 (0.31)	0.12 (0.33)	0.07 (0.25)	0.10 (0.29)	0.12 (0.33)
Service/shop/market sales workers	0.09 (0.28)	0.10 (0.31)	0.17 (0.38)	0.13 (0.34)	0.14 (0.35)	0.16 (0.37)	0.09 (0.28)	0.10 (0.30)	0.18 (0.38)	0.10 (0.30)	0.11 (0.32)	0.18 (0.38)
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers	0.05 (0.21)	0.03 (0.16)	0.01 (0.12)	0.04 (0.21)	0.02 (0.15)	0.02 (0.14)	0.03 (0.18)	0.02 (0.13)	0.01 (0.09)	0.03 (0.16)	0.02 (0.13)	0.01 (0.10)
Craft and related trade workers	0.16 (0.36)	0.12 (0.33)	0.11 (0.32)	0.11 (0.32)	0.09 (0.28)	0.11 (0.31)	0.19 (0.39)	0.15 (0.36)	0.14 (0.35)	0.20 (0.40)	0.13 (0.34)	0.13 (0.34)
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	0.11 (0.31)	0.11 (0.31)	0.07 (0.26)	0.07 (0.25)	0.07 (0.25)	0.06 (0.23)	0.14 (0.35)	0.13 (0.33)	0.07 (0.26)	0.12 (0.33)	0.08 (0.28)	0.06 (0.24)
Elementary occupations	0.32 (0.47)	0.30 (0.46)	0.26 (0.44)	0.26 (0.44)	0.24 (0.42)	0.17 (0.38)	0.25 (0.43)	0.24 (0.43)	0.19 (0.39)	0.23 (0.42)	0.23 (0.42)	0.17 (0.38)
Household head's education												
Complete primary	0.34 (0.47)	0.29 (0.46)	0.31 (0.46)	0.23 (0.42)	0.21 (0.41)	0.17 (0.37)	0.26 (0.44)	0.26 (0.44)	0.23 (0.42)	0.23 (0.42)	0.20 (0.40)	0.14 (0.34)
Complete secondary	0.30 (0.46)	0.30 (0.46)	0.41 (0.49)	0.49 (0.50)	0.51 (0.50)	0.56 (0.50)	0.39 (0.49)	0.42 (0.49)	0.51 (0.50)	0.49 (0.50)	0.55 (0.50)	0.61 (0.49)

	Eastern Cape						Gauteng, Kwa-Zulu Natal and Western Cape					
	Non-migrants			Recent migrants			Non-migrants			Recent migrants		
	1996	2001	2011	1996	2001	2011	1996	2001	2011	1996	2001	2011
Post-secondary	0.02 (0.14)	0.03 (0.16)	0.02 (0.15)	0.06 (0.24)	0.07 (0.25)	0.06 (0.24)	0.03 (0.17)	0.04 (0.20)	0.04 (0.19)	0.05 (0.21)	0.08 (0.27)	0.07 (0.25)
Bachelor's degree and higher	0.01 (0.08)	0.01 (0.11)	0.04 (0.35)	0.03 (0.16)	0.05 (0.23)	0.12 (0.33)	0.02 (0.15)	0.03 (0.17)	0.06 (0.23)	0.04 (0.19)	0.07 (0.25)	0.13 (0.34)
Household composition												
Household members 5-years and younger	0.80 (1.00)	0.72 (0.94)	0.80 (1.01)	0.52 (0.83)	0.47 (0.75)	0.48 (0.78)	0.71 (1.04)	0.67 (0.96)	0.69 (0.97)	0.52 (0.81)	0.43 (0.72)	0.45 (0.76)
Household members 6- to 20-years	3.39 (1.72)	3.31 (1.72)	2.94 (1.59)	2.78 (1.68)	2.62 (1.54)	2.45 (1.51)	3.22 (1.88)	3.08 (1.75)	2.72 (1.54)	2.67 (2.02)	2.40 (1.43)	2.14 (1.28)
Household members 21- to 64-years	1.98 (1.40)	1.96 (1.34)	1.97 (1.31)	1.88 (1.40)	1.68 (1.20)	1.65 (1.16)	2.57 (1.51)	2.47 (1.43)	2.39 (1.37)	2.17 (1.23)	1.97 (1.16)	1.86 (1.17)
Household members 65-years plus	0.34 (0.58)	0.33 (0.57)	0.30 (0.55)	0.16 (0.44)	0.15 (0.41)	0.14 (0.38)	0.23 (0.51)	0.22 (0.48)	0.21 (0.48)	0.10 (0.33)	0.08 (0.30)	0.07 (0.30)
Household income	1 210 (2 949)	2 264 (12 670)	5 095 (1 6338)	2 295 (4 350)	3 845 (11 473)	10 611 (28 582)	2 684 (4 816)	5 026 (18 089)	9 811 (25 612)	3 494 (5 722)	7 049 (21 386)	14 618 (32 880)
Number of observations	50 300	53 426	47 903	2 187	1 859	1 827	107 299	135 880	152 300	18 658	10 594	11 299

Notes: own calculations using Census 1996, 2001 and 2011. The variables listed are used to estimate municipal and district average primary-school completion rates in the first-stage estimation. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Table A3: Descriptive statistics of variables included in first stage regression analysis of probability of completing secondary school (age group 19–21)

	Eastern Cape						Gauteng, Kwa-Zulu Natal and Western Cape					
	Non-migrants			Recent migrants			Non-migrants			Recent migrants		
	1996	2001	2011	1996	2001	2011	1996	2001	2011	1996	2001	2011
Age	19.96 (0.81)	19.93 (0.82)	19.95 (0.82)	20.03 (0.81)	20.05 (0.82)	20.10 (0.81)	20.02 (0.81)	19.98 (0.82)	20.01 (0.82)	20.09 (0.81)	20.09 (0.81)	20.11 (0.81)
Female	0.52 (0.50)	0.51 (0.50)	0.49 (0.50)	0.58 (0.51)	0.59 (0.51)	0.52 (0.50)	0.52 (0.50)	0.52 (0.50)	0.51 (0.50)	0.53 (0.50)	0.54 (0.51)	0.51 (0.50)
Household head employed	0.25 (0.43)	0.22 (0.41)	0.27 (0.44)	0.46 (0.50)	0.42 (0.49)	0.44 (0.50)	0.50 (0.50)	0.44 (0.50)	0.47 (0.50)	0.67 (0.47)	0.56 (0.50)	0.60 (0.49)
Household head occupation												
Legislators/senior officials/managers	0.05 (0.22)	0.04 (0.20)	0.07 (0.25)	0.04 (0.20)	0.07 (0.25)	0.12 (0.32)	0.06 (0.244)	0.08 (0.27)	0.10 (0.30)	0.06 (0.24)	0.08 (0.27)	0.10 (0.29)
Professionals	0.11 (0.32)	0.06 (0.23)	0.07 (0.25)	0.13 (0.34)	0.09 (0.28)	0.05 (0.22)	0.08 (0.27)	0.06 (0.25)	0.08 (0.26)	0.08 (0.27)	0.08 (0.28)	0.08 (0.27)
Technicians/associate professionals	0.06 (0.23)	0.12 (0.32)	0.12 (0.33)	0.07 (0.26)	0.14 (0.35)	0.13 (0.34)	0.07 (0.26)	0.09 (0.28)	0.10 (0.30)	0.07 (0.25)	0.08 (0.28)	0.09 (0.28)
Clerks	0.05 (0.21)	0.09 (0.28)	0.11 (0.31)	0.06 (0.23)	0.09 (0.29)	0.11 (0.31)	0.07 (0.25)	0.10 (0.30)	0.12 (0.33)	0.06 (0.25)	0.10 (0.30)	0.12 (0.33)
Service/shop/market sales workers	0.09 (0.29)	0.10 (0.30)	0.16 (0.37)	0.13 (0.34)	0.13 (0.34)	0.16 (0.37)	0.10 (0.29)	0.11 (0.31)	0.19 (0.39)	0.12 (0.32)	0.15 (0.36)	0.20 (0.40)
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers	0.05 (0.22)	0.03 (0.16)	0.01 (0.10)	0.04 (0.21)	0.04 (0.20)	0.02 (0.15)	0.03 (0.18)	0.02 (0.14)	0.01 (0.09)	0.03 (0.18)	0.02 (0.14)	0.01 (0.09)
Craft and related trade workers	0.15 (0.36)	0.13 (0.34)	0.13 (0.33)	0.13 (0.33)	0.10 (0.30)	0.11 (0.31)	0.18 (0.39)	0.16 (0.36)	0.14 (0.35)	0.20 (0.40)	0.15 (0.35)	0.16 (0.37)
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	0.10 (0.30)	0.11 (0.31)	0.08 (0.27)	0.07 (0.25)	0.09 (0.29)	0.06 (0.23)	0.14 (0.35)	0.13 (0.33)	0.08 (0.26)	0.11 (0.31)	0.09 (0.29)	0.07 (0.25)
Elementary occupations	0.34 (0.47)	0.33 (0.47)	0.25 (0.43)	0.32 (0.47)	0.25 (0.43)	0.24 (0.43)	0.27 (0.44)	0.26 (0.44)	0.19 (0.39)	0.27 (0.44)	0.26 (0.44)	0.19 (0.39)
Household head's education												
Complete primary	0.32 (0.47)	0.28 (0.45)	0.29 (0.45)	0.19 (0.39)	0.17 (0.37)	0.13 (0.33)	0.26 (0.44)	0.25 (0.44)	0.21 (0.41)	0.23 (0.42)	0.17 (0.37)	0.11 (0.31)
Complete secondary	0.34 (0.47)	0.34 (0.47)	0.47 (0.50)	0.56 (0.50)	0.58 (0.49)	0.67 (0.47)	0.41 (0.49)	0.45 (0.50)	0.55 (0.50)	0.53 (0.50)	0.61 (0.49)	0.68 (0.47)

	Eastern Cape						Gauteng, Kwa-Zulu Natal and Western Cape					
	Non-migrants			Recent migrants			Non-migrants			Recent migrants		
	1996	2001	2011	1996	2001	2011	1996	2001	2011	1996	2001	2011
Post-secondary	0.02 (0.15)	0.03 (0.16)	0.02 (0.15)	0.05 (0.22)	0.08 (0.28)	0.07 (0.25)	0.03 (0.16)	0.04 (0.19)	0.04 (0.20)	0.04 (0.20)	0.09 (0.29)	0.07 (0.26)
Bachelor's degree and higher	0.01 (0.08)	0.01 (0.10)	0.03 (0.18)	0.02 (0.15)	0.05 (0.21)	0.08 (0.27)	0.02 (0.13)	0.02 (0.15)	0.05 (0.22)	0.03 (0.16)	0.05 (0.21)	0.09 (0.29)
Household composition												
Household members 5-years and younger	0.81 (1.04)	0.72 (0.96)	0.81 (1.03)	0.49 (0.91)	0.43 (0.76)	0.38 (0.75)	0.73 (1.05)	0.69 (0.97)	0.70 (0.99)	0.48 (0.80)	0.37 (0.69)	0.34 (0.68)
Household members 6- to 20-years	2.89 (1.85)	2.87 (1.86)	2.41 (1.67)	1.99 (1.66)	1.82 (1.58)	1.49 (1.40)	2.59 (1.93)	2.52 (1.83)	2.15 (1.60)	1.76 (1.81)	1.52 (1.39)	1.25 (1.17)
Household members 21- to 64-years	2.33 (1.53)	2.31 (1.47)	2.28 (1.45)	2.07 (1.59)	1.87 (1.43)	1.66 (1.35)	2.91 (1.67)	2.79 (1.55)	2.65 (1.50)	2.29 (1.49)	2.07 (1.38)	1.82 (1.35)
Household members 65-years plus	0.32 (0.57)	0.31 (0.56)	0.28 (0.53)	0.13 (0.40)	0.10 (0.35)	0.08 (0.30)	0.22 (0.49)	0.20 (0.46)	0.19 (0.46)	0.08 (0.30)	0.05 (0.26)	0.04 (0.23)
Household income	1 281 (2 988)	2 323 (12 866)	4 794 (15 092)	1 876 (3.444)	3 719 (13 828)	5 931 (17 616)	2 715 (4 272)	4 879 (17 405)	9 233 (23 213)	2 969 (5 047)	5 060 (15 300)	8 912 (23 653)
Number of observations	30 601	30 915	30 262	2 059	1 812	2 114	77 754	94 625	117 908	19 398	13 843	19 009

Notes: own calculations using Census 1996, 2001 and 2011. The variables listed are used to estimate municipal and district average secondary-school completion rates in the first-stage estimation. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Table A4: Effect of migrant-age on non-migrant probability of secondary school enrolment, by household head education

	OLS		Dynamic OLS	First difference	GMM- SYS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Coefficient on share of population ages 6-64 migrant (migrancy in general)</i>					
Household head has...					
...<12 years of education	0.343*** (0.061)	0.265*** (0.063)	-0.111 (0.171)	-0.101 (0.183)	-0.045 (0.424)
...12 years of education	0.232*** (0.088)	0.243*** (0.081)	0.232 (0.189)	-0.059 (0.202)	0.064 (0.482)
...>12 years of education	0.357*** (0.118)	0.257*** (0.094)	0.291* (0.152)	0.028 (0.122)	-1.083 (1.288)
<i>Coefficient on share of population ages 6-17 migrant (school aged migrants)</i>					
Household head has...					
...<12 years of education	0.363*** (0.064)	0.286*** (0.065)	-0.134 (0.211)	-0.093 (0.218)	-0.029 (0.404)
...12 years of education	0.226** (0.099)	0.245*** (0.088)	0.372 (0.237)	-0.033 (0.232)	0.163 (0.457)
...>12 years of education	0.393*** (0.136)	0.281*** (0.088)	0.371** (0.169)	0.115 (0.140)	-0.974 (1.517)
Unemployment rates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Share of non-migrant population ages 15-17	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Area dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Economic/sociodemographic indicators	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged dependent variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable is the share of non-migrants ages 15 to 17 who are enrolled in secondary schooling, adjusted at the individual level for age, gender, race and household characteristics. Estimation is by weighted least squares with weights w the inverse of the squared standard errors on the district/municipality-year interaction coefficients in the individual regression for Columns 1-3 and 5, and $1/(1/w_t + 1/w_{t-1})$ for Column 4. All specifications include census year dummies. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.




Figure A1: Topographic map of the Transkei

Source: Htonl (2010)