

**Military internal security operations in Plateau State, North Central  
Nigeria: Ameliorating or exacerbating insecurity?**

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## **DECLARATION**

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## ABSTRACT

The primary responsibility of a state is the protection of its citizens against external aggression and internal violence and disturbances. Conventionally, the latter is normally the duty of the police. However, in Nigeria as in many African states, as violence erupts and the security situation worsens, government often relies on deploying the military to enforce orderliness and the return of peace. This action is largely due to the inability of the police to contain violent conflicts, especially where the security of the citizenry is threatened by armed groups. This is the situation in Plateau State, Nigeria where the military is used for military internal security operations since violence broke out between Christians and Muslims in Jos, on 7 September 2001.

Several studies have indicated support for the use of the military as a 'necessary evil' to enforce ceasefires and ensure the return to peace. However, this study finds that using the military evokes several challenges which undermine both the legitimacy of the military mission and its professional image. Along with this is the concern that the conduct of soldiers adds to worsen the security situation of the citizenry, which in turn strains civil-military relations (CMR). Two factors were identified as responsible for the problems: a lack of military professionalism, and the cultural disposition of soldiers in terms of the unsuitability of military habitus with civilian values. Whereas the problems could be addressed with effective civil control of the military, the study argues that civil control is weak in Nigeria, despite the existence of a legal framework that could ensure this.

To understand the problem, the study reviewed the separation, integration, agency, and concordance theories, and it argues that they are limited in scope and application. As such, they are unable to fully explain CMR in Nigeria. In this regard, a quadrumvirate interaction theory which upholds aspects of concordance theory explanation of CMR was proposed to fill the void. The theory contends that CMR is a tripartite relationship, with interactions among the partners occurring as a quadrumvirate along a major intersecting level and three different subunits. The theory introduced a typology indicating that the citizenry can exert agency in CMR in four different ways: compliance, contestation, collaboration, and confrontation against demands, policies, actions or inactions of the other partners.

The aim of the study was to understand whether the Nigerian State is exercising adequate civil control of the military to ensure that it does not become a threat to the citizenry and exacerbate insecurity. 55 one-on-one interviews with civilians across different social categories were conducted in six local government areas in Plateau State to understand this. The study found that the military acts unprofessionally and soldiers abuse of civilians is a recurring phenomenon, hence civilians are dissatisfied with the military. This has affected CMR, and civilians are exerting their agency including using confrontation that has resulted to the killing of some personnel, because they see the military as exacerbating insecurity.

## OPSOMMING

Die primêre verantwoordelikheid van 'n staat is die beskerming van sy burgers teen eksterne aggressie, asook interne geweld en oproeringe. Laasgenoemde is volgens konvensie normaalweg die plig van die polisie, maar in Nigerië – soos in baie ander Afrika-state – maak die regering dikwels staat op die ontplooiing van die weermag om orde en vrede te herstel wanneer geweld uitbreek en die veiligheidsituasie versleg. Hierdie optrede kan grootliks toegeskryf word aan die onvermoë van die polisie om gewelddadige konflikte te beheer, veral wanneer die veiligheid van inwoners bedreig word deur gewapende groepe. Dit is die geval in die Plateau-Staat in Nigerië, waar die weermag gebruik word vir interne militêre veiligheidsoperasies sedert geweld op 7 September 2001 uitbreek het tussen Christene en Moslems in Jos.

Verskeie studies ondersteun die gebruik van die weermag as 'n 'noodsaaklike euwel' om 'n wapenstilstand af te dwing en om vrede te herstel. Hierdie studie bevind egter dat die gebruik van die weermag aanleiding gee tot verskeie uitdagings, ten opsigte van die legitimiteit van die militêre operasie as die professionele beeld van die weermag. Tesame hiermee, is daar die bekommernis dat die optrede van soldate die veiligheid van burgers verder in gevaar stel, wat weer aanleiding gee tot gespanne siviël-militêre betrekkinge (SMB). Twee oorsake vir hierdie probleme is geïdentifiseer: 'n gebrek aan militêre professionaliteit, en die onversoenbaarheid van militêre gewoontes met siviele waardes weens die kulturele dispoisies van soldate. Hierdie studie voer aan dat hoewel dit moontlik sou wees om dié probleme suksesvol aan te spreek met effektiewe siviele beheer oor die weermag, siviele beheer in Nigerië swak is, ten spyte van die bestaan van 'n regstelsel wat dit sou kon verseker.

Die studie het die probleem ondersoek aan die hand van verskeie SMB teorieë, naamlik die skeidings-integrasie-, agentskap-, en ooreenkomsteorieë, en argumenteer dat hierdie teorieë beperk is ten opsigte van omvang en toepassing, en kan daarom nie die situasie in Nigerië ten volle verduidelik nie. 'n Viermanskapsmodel, 'n aanpassing van ooreenkoms-teorie en die oorvleuelende sferes in 'n staatsbewind, is voorgestel om die gaping te vul. Dié model voer aan dat SMB 'n drieparty-vennootskap is, waar interaksies tussen die vennote geskied as 'n viermanskapsmodel by 'n belangrike snyvlak en drie verskillende sub-eenhede. As 'n selfstandige vennoot kan die inwoners die SMB beïnvloed wanneer burgers hulle agentskap uitoefen deur gehoorsaamheid aan instruksies, samewerking met die weermag, en teenstand teen gewelddadige en vyandige militêre optrede.

Die studie het gepoog om te bepaal of die Nigeriese staat genoegsame siviele beheer oor die weermag uitoefen om te verseker dat dit nie 'n bedreiging word vir inwoners wat hul veiligheid verder in gedrang kan bring nie. Vyf-en-vyftig individuele onderhoude is gevoer met burgers uit verskillende sosiale kategorieë in ses plaaslike regeringsgebiede van die Plateau-staat. Resultate dui daarop dat burgers ontevrede is met die weermag en dat hulle voel dat magsmisbruik en hardhandige optrede deur soldate hul veiligheidsituasie versleg. In geval van militêre magsmisbruik gee baie burgers gehoor aan militêre instruksies en strafmaatreëls. Sommige werk saam met gekompromitteerde soldate om onwettige doelwitte na te streef, terwyl ander hul agentskap uitoefen en weerstand bied teen magsmisbruik.

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## **DEDICATION**

*For all the victims of military abuse, those displaced by violence, and the professional soldier serving and defending Nigeria with dignity.*

**LIST OF ACRONYMS**

AU	African Union
CAQDAS	Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software
CJTF	Civilian Joint Task Force
CMR	Civil-Military Relations
COIN	Counter-Insurgency
COW	Correlates of War
FCC	Federal Character Commission
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
IGP	Inspector General of Police
IPOB	Indigenous People of Biafra
ISOP(s)	Military Internal Security Operations
JTF	Joint Task Force
LGAs	Local Government Area(s)
MACA	Military Aid to Civil Authority
MASSOB	Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
NDA	Niger Delta Avengers
NDDB	Niger Delta Development Board
NDDC	Niger Delta Development Commission
NDPVF	Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force
NDV	Niger Delta Vigilante
NPC	Northern People's Congress
NPF	Nigeria Police Force
OMPADEC	Oils Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission
OSH	Operation Safe Haven
PLSG	Plateau State Government

PMCs	Private Military and Security Companies
PMF or MOPOL	Nigeria Police Mobile Force
PSOs	Peace Support Operations
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based-Violence
STF	Special Task Force
TCO(s)	Transnational Criminal Organisations
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UN	United Nations

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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 BACKGROUND

One primary responsibility of a state is the protection of its citizens against external aggression, and internal violence and disturbances. The latter is normally the duty of the police in liberal democracies (Bigo, 2000; Lioe, 2011).<sup>1</sup> However, in Nigeria, as in many African States, as violence erupts and the security situation worsens, governments often rely on deploying the military to enforce orderliness and the return of peace (Enloe, 1977; Collier, 1999; Howe, 2001). This is largely because the police are unable to contain violent conflicts, especially where the security of the citizenry is threatened by armed groups<sup>2</sup> (Nwolise, 2007; Omede, 2012). As a consequence, Herbst (2004) and Baker (2010) argue that most African police forces are generally not well equipped or trained to deal with the challenges that armed groups and internal armed conflicts evoke. Consequently, the government is often compelled to use the military in an internal role as it is the only state organ with the requisite coercive capacity to suppress violence, disorderliness or insurgency (Peterside, 2014b). The ability to contain such violence is a challenge facing many African states in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This is especially true where the conflicts escalate, and plunge the country into a state of internal warfare (Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010b).

The causes of these violent conflicts in Africa can be ascribed to numerous factors (see for example Gurr, Marshall & Khosla, 2000; Sarkees, Wayman & Singer, 2003). These include high income inequality, manipulation and exploitation of ethnic and religious differences, greed, and lack of judicial remedies to address these grievances (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002, 2004). Other factors include government failure to deliver basic public goods, grievances arising from the marginalisation of minority ethnic groups, and the inability of the citizenry to gain access to economic, political, or social privileges in society. Typically, these situations are exploited by armed groups, a majority of which are driven by political motives, economic intent, and extremist religious ideologies (Fearon & Laitin, 2003: 75; Vreÿ, 2010: 59). The proliferation of these armed groups in their various forms is currently occupying a critical position in international politics and security sector reforms in the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Vinci, 2008). In this regard, one cannot help but agree with Thompson (2014: 60) that their mere existence poses

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<sup>1</sup> The study approaches state security from the conventional viewpoint which sees state security as broadly divided into two realms: the internal and external realm (see Bigo, 2000, 2006; Eriksson & Rhinard, 2009; Lioe, 2011; Weiss, 2011). Conventionally, the internal realm focuses on public safety, public order, and law enforcement, while the external realm focuses on fighting wars and defence (Bigo, 2006; Eriksson & Rhinard, 2009; Weiss, 2011). In this regard, the police and other civil security agencies are in charge of internal security services, while the military defends the state against external aggression (Lutterbeck, 2004).

<sup>2</sup> Unless stated otherwise, the concept of 'armed groups' is used in this study to refer to non-state armed actors. See Thompson (2014: 54) for a detailed distinction between armed groups and state militaries.



a major security threat, “whether or not they are active in the country or only just using it as a safe haven.”<sup>3</sup> This is essentially because to accomplish their goals, they intimidate and harass the citizenry and use coercive violence and crime to achieve their goals (Shultz, Farah & Lochard, 2004; Thompson, 2014).

Typically, armed groups are “classical spoilers or trouble-makers for state-building and peace-building efforts” (Schneckener, 2006: 35). They threaten the security of the citizenry and the delivery of public goods by exploiting existing grievances and disrupting the core functions of states, thereby undermining state legitimacy (Stewart, 2002, 2004). This is especially true when they launch coordinated attacks on civilian groups, critical infrastructures, or state forces and are able to gain territorial control of parts of a state (Thompson, 2014: 61–62). To this end, it is argued that dealing with or curtailing armed groups is immensely difficult, and requires high levels of force to contain the threats they pose to society (Ogah, 2011; Peterside, 2014b). The result is that states turn to the military to assist the police in maintaining internal security and to contain the threats armed groups evoke.<sup>4</sup>

Using the military for internal security operations (ISOPs), otherwise known as military aid to civil authority (MACA), comes with its own challenges. One relates to the training of military personnel, which is not suited for use in an internal role in society. The orientation of the military is focused on defence, war and the infliction of collective violence, unlike the police whose main function is law enforcement (Harris, 2003; Weiss, 2012). Where they work in collaborative units, or as a hybrid security forces with the police and other civilian agencies, the military tends to dominate. Typically, this occurs in states that have no constabulary forces or gendarmeries. Hybrid forces consisting of joint police and military units create several problems in terms of command and control, the nature of operations, and organisational culture. Several scholars have pointed out that numerous difficulties emerge when personnel of different combat orientation strategies, tactics, training and instructions have to work together as a team (Clausewitz, 1976; Crelinsten, 1998; O’Hanlon, 2000; Weiss, 2012).

There are several other concerns pertaining to the internal use of the military in society. Key among these are the military’s excessive use of force, militarism and the militarisation of society, as well as the restriction of civil liberties (Nwolise, 2007; Odoemene, 2012). Often, the problems arise because military training and the combat orientation of soldiers are not suited for crowd control and law

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<sup>3</sup> A recent instance of this is the case of the Boko Haram group which started its operations in the border town of Maiduguri in Nigeria (Azumah, 2015). As pressure mounted on the groups from Nigeria’s security forces, the group sought refuge in the poorly-controlled border territories between Cameroon and Nigeria. Today, the group has not only used Cameroon as a safe haven but also as an operational base, and has carried out numerous attacks which have claimed a number of lives, including Cameroonian soldiers (Blair, 2015).

<sup>4</sup> For contextual clarity, the concept ‘armed forces’ refers to one or all the units of state-owned militaries – army, navy (marine), and the air force. It also denotes the military, and these are used interchangeably in this study.


enforcement purposes (Weiss, 2012). In fact, Weiss (2012: 462) argues that while it is “capable of controlling crowds, the military still remains a force to fight wars, which is very distinct from the police.” Typically, this is because, “the most core competency of soldiers is skill in inflicting pain, killing people, and breaking things” (Gray, 2007: 37). Given the incompatibility of this with internal security duties in society, it accounts for numerous challenges when the military is deployed in an internal role, especially when this entails the use of force. Nonetheless, as Enloe (1977), Dasuki (2013) and Okoli & Orinya (2013) argue, the state often has no choice but to use the military in this way to protect its citizens against external and internal ‘enemies’ where they threaten social and political stability.

Given the capacity of the military to suppress violence and insurgency, military sociologists and other security strategists see the military as an essential tool for “conflict de-escalation in order to reinstall peace and order” (Von Bredow, 2006: 97). In several African states, the use of the military in an internal role in society has become the norm because “when violence breaks out policy-makers and society-at-large assume that the military should be brought in” (José & Rasmussen, 1999: 5). This is the situation in Nigeria, where the military is constantly deployed to combat the threat posed by civil violence and armed groups that destabilise the country (Omede, 2012; Dambazau, 2014). While this is typically sanctioned by the legislature, a problem often arises where there is not sufficient control over the armed forces’ excessive use of force, or where they abuse their power when interacting with the general population. A consequence can be that instead of increasing the security of citizens, it has the opposite effect as citizens become the victims of both the state security forces and the armed groups. In Nigeria, some have even described the military as a “group of monsters... maltreating the populace” (Ojo-Ade, 2004: 293), and requiring taming because of their abuse of power (Ojo, 2006). Citizens who are faced by this may even be compelled into joining or seeking protection from opposition groups, thereby creating a further security dilemma (Collier, 1999: 10).

In this regard, Buzan points out that “for perhaps a majority of the world’s people, threats from the state are among the major sources of insecurity in their lives” (1991: 45). Peterside reaffirmed this argument when she noted that “an average Nigerian encountering soldiers on the road is likely to be subjected to unnecessary and unwarranted fear” (2014b: 1306). Although her argument presents an account of the experiences of Nigerians with the military, the study does not explain how citizens experience the internal use of the armed forces in society. A recent study on the Plateau incident by Abdullahi, Wika & Abdul-Qadir (2016) examines public perception of internal security management. They established that the citizenry lacks confidence in the military, and the military’s ability to address insecurity in the State (Abdullahi *et al.*, 2016: 23–24). Other studies, such as those conducted by Oghah (2011), Dode (2012), Omede (2012), Okoli & Orinya (2013) and Dambazau (2014), highlight the level of military abuse, but do not evaluate whether the military decreases or exacerbates insecurity.

To fill this void, this study examines the internal use of the military in Plateau State, Nigeria, which has been experiencing intermittent violence since 7 September 2001, when conflict broke out between aggrieved Christians and Muslims in Jos.

**Figure 1. I Map of Plateau State, Nigeria**



Source: Ekong, Ducheyne, Carpenter, Owolodun, Oladokun, *et al.*, (2012: 171) and Adese, Saiki, Okonkwo & Vassa (2016).

In Plateau State, military ISOPs and heavy military presence has failed to end attacks on civilians by numerous criminal and ethnic militias, and particularly attacks by rampaging Fulani herdsmen. On the contrary, accusations of complicity, bias, unprofessional conduct, and abuse of human rights of citizens are associated with the presence of the military.<sup>5</sup> Research examining why the use of the military in an internal role in Nigeria has become problematic is largely lacking. For example, Azinge has argued that one of the explanations may be that “soldiers do not mingle with the day to day life of the people unlike the police” (2013: 29). This argument supports the critique of Huntington’s theory of separation as detaching and isolating the military, and the integration theory of Janowitz for the military to reflect the values of society. However, over 29 years of military praetorianism and numerous military ISOPs in Nigeria have seen the military assuming an active role in society and politics (Omede, 2012: 296). As such, there is very little substantive evidence to explain why the military appears to be exacerbating tensions in Plateau State.

This study attempts to fill this gap by investigating the experiences of civilians with the military ISOPs in Plateau State to understand whether the Nigerian state exercises adequate civil control over the use of coercive force by the military, and how this affects the security of citizens. Thus, the study aims to uncover whether the Nigerian military is in fact contributing to the insecurity in Plateau State. Lange & Balian (2008) argue that the use of coercive force by states perpetuates insecurity by inciting violence, especially where there is regular abuse of power and where the liberties of citizens are

<sup>5</sup> The armed conflict in Plateau State and the military ISOPs to suppress the conflict are discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of this study.

eroded. Clearly, it undermines civil-military relations (CMR) when the government fails to curb the military when they act unprofessionally or beyond their legal mandate. When effective civil control of the military is lacking, it results in a civil-military problematique (Feaver, 1996),<sup>6</sup> and hence the need to interrogate this.

## **1.2 RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY**

Using the military in an internal role to suppress violence and enforce law and order has been the subject of much debate among scholars, given the consequences it holds for the state and its citizens (José & Rasmussen, 1999; Lutterbeck, 2004, 2013; Nwolise, 2007; Ojo, 2009a; Weiss, 2012). While the literature shows that the problems often recur, few studies have examined how civilians experience the use of coercive force by the military. This study aims to provide a deeper understanding of the use of the military in ISOPs, the effect on civil-military relations, and the security of citizens, with a focus on Plateau State, an ethnically heterogeneous society in Nigeria.

Few studies have examined the interaction of the military and civilians in military ISOPs from a CMR perspective, and this study argues that it presents a shortcoming in the CMR literature. The field suffers theoretical weaknesses and inadequacies on several fronts, especially in the ‘civil’ (social) sphere. Studies in the field have focused extensively on preventing the military from intervening in politics while important aspects, such as how the ‘civilian’ (social) sphere affects the relationship, have received little attention. In fact, scholars have made little attempt to integrate the citizenry and civil society as actors in CMR whose agency influences the relationship.<sup>7</sup> This also means that it is difficult to know if the internal use of the military for security enforcement is productive or counter-effective, potentially worsening the security situation after a ceasefire. Hence, this study tries to bridge the gap by advancing the theoretical debate beyond the traditional focus on preventing domestic military intervention in politics. This can increase our understanding of the interaction between the military institution and citizens, especially when it acts in an internal role for which it neither trained nor specialises in. This is important because it provide a means to examine how the interaction affects the professional stature of the military.

## **1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION**

This study seeks to investigate (1) the experiences of civilians during military ISOPs to understand whether the state exercises adequate control over the military; and (2) whether using the military improves or exacerbates the security situation of the citizenry. Accordingly, the research question of

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<sup>6</sup> ‘Civil-military problematique’ refers to a situation in which the military becomes a threat to its society, or when it disobeys instructions from legitimate civilian authority, and when it intervenes in the domestic politics of its nation (Feaver, 1996: 150–153).

<sup>7</sup> A notable exception, as discussed in Chapter Three of this study, is Rebecca Schiff’s concordance theory, which argues for the integration of the citizenry as a third partner with agency in CMR (Schiff, 1995, 2009).

the study is: Does the Nigerian state exercise adequate civil control of the armed forces, to ensure that it does not become a threat to the citizenry, and exacerbate insecurity?

#### **1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES**

The study aims to achieve the following objectives:

1. Understand the nature and type of threats armed groups pose to states, how these impact on the ability of the state to protect its citizens, and the subsequent use of the military in an internal role.
2. Explore the current threats posed by armed groups in Nigeria and the conditions that have necessitated the use of the military in an internal role, with specific reference to Plateau State.
3. Examine the nature of civil control of the armed forces and how Nigeria regulates and controls the military.
4. Explore the perception and experiences of civilians in Plateau State to determine whether they believe the military is improving or undermining their security.

#### **1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY**

This study examines the lived experiences of Nigerians who interact with military personnel conducting ISOPs in a society that has been subject to violent conflict. As this study examines the perceptions, attitudes, and experiences of people, it uses a qualitative approach. This is because understanding how the citizenry experiences the internal use of the military requires an approach that allows the participants to narrate their individual accounts of incidences. Several scholars have indicated that a qualitative approach is most suitable when one is seeking to understand and discover how people make sense of their circumstances (see for example, Berg, 2007; Creswell, 2007; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Denzin & Lincoln, 2008; Bryman, 2012). A quantitative research design would have been limited to quantification and generalisation, rather than exploring the issues in-depth. As there is little research on the interaction of the military with civilians, this was the best approach for this study.

Interviews were conducted with a total of 55 participants. The interviews were conducted with persons from diverse walks of life until saturation was reached. The interviews were audio recorded and subsequently transcribed and analysed using thematic analysis, with the help of Atlas.ti computer aided qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS). In line with the precepts of inductive studies of Braun & Clarke (2006: 87), themes emerged from the fieldwork data following the phases of thematic analysis. The methodology is discussed in more detail in Chapter Five.

#### **1.6 DEFINITION OF TERMINOLOGIES**

##### **1.6.1 Civil-Military Relations**

CMR is typically, the interrelationship between the political elite/institutions, the military, and society. As a field of study, CMR focusses on the complex interaction “between the military and the state,

societal structures, and institutions” (Rukavishnikov & Pugh, 2006: 134). Feaver (2003a: 58) considers CMR as simply, “a game of strategic interaction” between military players and political leaders, each acting based on preference and the expected reaction from the other player. This study approaches CMR from this lens of rationality of interaction between the military, political elites, and the citizenry, where each player exercises some level of agency that can influence the relationship.

### **1.6.2 Civil/Civilian Control of the Military**

The concept ‘civilian control’ of the military is widely used in the civil-military relations literature to mean the loyalty of the military to the state through obedience to legitimate or recognised civilian representatives/elites. In other words, ‘civilian’ denotes “the pre-eminence of civilian institutions, based on popular sovereignty, in the decision-making process... The control of the instruments of violence must be firmly in the hands of legitimate civilian authorities” (Rukavishnikov & Pugh, 2006: 134). However, some have critiqued the use of the concept ‘civilian’ as inappropriate, misleading, confusing, and a clear case of “an accident of language” (Chuter, 2000: 27). They argue that whereas scholars and theorists have severally used the concept ‘civilian’ in the right context, in numerous instances, it is wrongly applied. For instance,

[I]n practice, it is likely that the agencies of the state which the military obeys will be staffed wholly or mainly by civilians. But this duty is owed, for example, by an attaché to an ambassador, not because the latter is a civilian, but because he or she represents the state in its entirety for this purpose. In the event of a defence minister being a serving officer (which is quite common in certain parts of the world), the military would, of course, owe obedience to him or her, but in his or her capacity as a minister, not as a serving officer (Chuter, 2000: 28).

The implication of using ‘civilian’ is that it places the authority to certain individuals rather than the official position they occupy which capacitates them to act as the representatives of the state. Given this, critiques argue that the concept ‘civil’ rather than ‘civilian’ which does not necessarily depict obedience to the *civis* (state) is more appropriate (Chuter, 2000: 23–34). This study adopts the concept ‘civil’ control rather than ‘civilian’, where the latter is used, it only signifies the original usage by scholars/theorist cited.

### **1.6.3 Quadrumvirate Interaction**

Quadrumvirate interaction as used in this study refers to the four levels of interaction (major intersection level and the three subunit levels of interaction) in CMR between the three partners (political elites, military, and the citizenry). As the concept quadrumvirate signifies, four distinct levels or units of interaction occurs in CMR. These are interaction at: the major level of intersection among the three partners; the subunit of interaction between the political elites and the military; the subunit of interaction between the political elites and the citizenry; and the subunit of interaction between the military and the citizenry. As consequently discussed in Section 3.6, although the levels of interaction are distinct, the degree of distinctness does not preclude the possibility of an overlap in the interaction.

Reasons for this includes factors such as the domestic deployment status of the military and the level of political involvement of the military in the state. As the concept is a novel contribution of this study to the CMR debate, it is later used in this study as a theory which advances beyond the extant theories of CMR.

#### **1.6.4 Armed Groups**

Armed groups are groups of individuals or organisations who use threats and violence to achieve their goals which could be political, economic, ideological, or religious in nature (Shultz *et al.*, 2004). They are mostly outlawed and non-state actors. However, it is possible to have some state-sponsored, state-backed or state-owned armed groups that are established to carry out extra-legal missions they do not want to be accountable for (Vinci, 2009: 4; Thompson, 2014: 5).

### **1.7 CHAPTER OUTLINE**

The study contains seven chapters presented in the following structure:

Chapter One introduced the background of the study, and it has explained the rationale for the study, the research question, and objectives. The chapter provides a brief overview of the design and methodology, which is discussed in detail in Chapter Five.

Chapter Two discusses armed groups using the frame of new wars vis-à-vis conflict theory. The chapter examined four types of armed groups, focusing on their goals, actors and membership, pattern of warfare, and sources of finance. The chapter uses the new wars paradigm to describe the nature and effect that armed groups have on society.

Chapter Three reviews the debates on civil control of the armed forces, using the classical CMR theories of Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, and other contemporary theories such as agency theory (Peter Feaver) and concordance theory (Rebecca Schiff). The discussion illuminates the contributions and the major shortcomings of these theories in relation to this study. It also presents the quadrumvirate interaction theory explanation of CMR as an alternative which fills the void identified with the extant theories.

Chapter Four focuses on Nigeria and the use of the military in an internal role. The chapter explores in detail the numerous security threats troubling Nigeria, and the various armed groups responsible for this. It examines the state's response to the threats, and why the Nigerian government often relies on the military for ISOPs to counter hostilities, force orderliness and restore peace. The impact of such internal deployment of the military on the professional posture of the military, CMR and civil control of the armed forces in Nigeria are evaluated.

Chapter Five discusses the methodology of this research study. It addresses the philosophical assumptions of the study, research design and strategy, as well as the ethical concerns. Also included in the Chapter are the limitations of the study and a reflection on the research process.

Chapter Six presents the findings of the study in terms of the perception, reactions and experiences of civilians of the internal use of the military in society and how it affects their security situation.

Chapter Seven is the discussion and conclusion of the dissertation. It discusses the research findings in relation to extant CMR literatures. The discussion follows the indicators of military professionalism to understand the reasons for the strained relationship between civilians and the military, and why peace and security is elusive in Plateau State.



## CHAPTER TWO

### NEW WARS, ARMED GROUPS, AND THE THREATS THEY POSE

#### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War saw a surge in internal armed violence in several countries, especially in Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe (Snyder & Jervis, 1999; Earl, 2004). Numerous factors contributed to this, key among which was access to a stock-pile of arms and weapons by aggrieved groups who had become dissatisfied with their authoritarian regimes (Kaldor, 1999: 4). Other factors included the withdrawal of 'super-powers' from their former colonies, the independence struggles and political turmoil in several African States, declining state economies, high unemployment, increasing criminality, widespread corruption, and the loss of political legitimacy of these states (Kaldor, 1999: 4–5, 101; Thoms & Ron, 2007: 675). Failure to address these by respective governments contributed to a rising security gap, as low-intensity conflicts, civil wars, and organised collective violence escalated (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Mueller, 2009). In several African states, an increased cycle of internal violence emerged creating renewed internal security and political instability (Münkler, 2005; Spears, 2010). This chapter aims to explore and understand these contemporary security challenges, the different types of armed groups that pose a threat to states, and how these affect the ability of states to protect the populace.

#### 2.2 AUTHORITY AND CONFLICT

In every society, there are structures of authority which set the rules for exerting power and authority, with the expectation that the populace will comply and obey these rules, regulations, and commands. However, over the course of history, the structures of authority and control have altered, due to the changing pattern of human association and relationships. Max Weber, arguably the most influential sociological theorist and one of the founding fathers of sociology, identified three such structures of authority (Haralambos & Holborn, 2008: 874; Ritzer, 2011: 112). In a typical traditional society, authority rests on the established and existing traditions of a people, and this serves as the basis for exercising social power, authority, and control over people. In other societies, authority rests on the exceptional and charismatic attributes of a leader, and in modern industrial society, the enacted laws of a state serve as the basis for the legitimacy of power and authority, or their legal-rational authority (Weber, 1978: 215).

While the structures of authority legitimise the power of leaders to make decisions and expect obedience, compliance is determined by diverse motives, and this has certain sociological implications. In some instances, obedience is a product of routine habituation, while in others it could be based on the consideration of "interest (based on ulterior or genuine acceptance)" and benefits (Weber, 1978: 212). In terms of the latter, irrespective of the legitimacy of authority, political decisions (be they laws, rules, or the norms guiding the conduct of human relationships and association) do not necessarily

favour every individual or group. Where legitimate authority marginalises or deprives a section of the population, it can create conflict. Aggrieved individuals or groups could choose to simply conform and comply, or to challenge this authority through several means, including the use of violence. While Weber recognises the centrality of authority in power relations, he is critiqued for not developing a theory to explain how this works, or bring about a constructive change in society (Turner, 1981, 1996; Ritzer, 2011: 155).

To fully understand the relationship between authority and conflict, it is useful to draw on conflict theory, which was developed to explain the tensions and incompatibilities in the structures and institutions of society, particularly with respect to the role of authority relations within society (Dahrendorf, 1958). Ralf Dahrendorf is considered one of the most influential conflict theorists (Ritzer, 2011: 216), and he argues that the social structures of society make conflict ubiquitous in social life (Dahrendorf, 1958: 126). For him, the authority attached to positions and how it is exercised leads to the development of different interests, which results in conflict in organisations and society. Often, the conflict of interest is about “the maintenance or modification of a status quo” (Dahrendorf, 1959: 176). Those in positions of authority (dominant or superordinate) desire to maintain existing social structures which convey their authority, while subordinates are interested in disrupting and changing the existing order. In other words, as subordinates become dissatisfied with the position and influence of authority, particularly how policy decisions affect them, they feel compelled to seek social change.

Dahrendorf contends that conflict ensues when ‘incompatible’ or aggrieved subjects form groups to actively pursue their interest and concerns and come to challenge existing authority. The first group to emerge is a quasi-group, which he describes as “the aggregates of incumbents of positions with identical role interests” (Dahrendorf, 1959: 180). The Ogoni people of the Niger Delta oil-producing region in Nigeria, who are dissatisfied with the failure of government to provide basic public goods and services, are a typical instance of a quasi-group. Dahrendorf notes that two other groups emerge from this group: the first are interest groups, which are the “real agents of group conflict ... have a structure, a form of organisation, a program or goal, and a personnel of members” (Dahrendorf, 1959: 180). In the case of the Ogoni people, farmers, fishermen, and aggrieved youths whose sources of livelihoods were affected by oil spillage, environmental degradation, and lack of alternatives formed numerous interest groups to influence policy and development. However, this failed as peaceful protests and activism were suppressed and treated as dissent by the government, and many activists were sentenced to death for treason.

The interest group coordinates and makes known the concern of the quasi-group. However, if the group feels its concerns are not being addressed, it creates the third group, the conflict group, which uses violence as a means to achieve the aims and concerns of the parent group. The conflict group serves as the primary agent of social change it uses conflict to impel changes. Where it uses intense

and violent conflict, it causes radical disruptions that facilitate rapid change. In the case of the Ogoni people of the Niger Delta, numerous armed groups emerged, disrupting oil production and threatening political stability and the ability of the government to function effectively. Typical examples are the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) and the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA). The example of the Ogoni people supports the position of conflict theory that incompatible groups form groups to pursue their interests, and challenge existing authority over unaddressed grievances. However, although the theory notes that conflict is not always violent, "the first task of conflict analysis, is to identify various authority roles within society" and examine how they evoke conflict (Ritzer, 2011: 267).

Conflict theory is relevant to our understanding of the widespread upsurge of conflicts, and particularly armed conflicts, in society. The structural and institutional view of the theory focuses on the position of authority and its exercise, especially in contemporary societies, and is incisive to our understanding of contemporary armed conflicts and insurrections. It shows why some sections of the citizenry resort to armed conflict when they feel marginalised, or where government is seen to abuse their authority by imposing unfavourable policies, legislation, or other forms of suppression. While this theory is relevant to our understanding of why conflict erupts, it fails to explain social order and is critiqued for being macroscopic and ignoring individual thoughts and actions (Ritzer, 2011: 269). The theory has several other shortcomings, including its inability to explain why some will defer to authority, strike and protest, while others do not (Weingart, 1969; Craib, 1984). By implication, the theory is not adequate to explain the complexity of conflicts in relation to actors, their motivation, finances, and methods of warfare, especially concerning contemporary security challenges in Africa. In this regard, it is necessary to examine conflict from a perspective that allows deeper understanding of these dynamics. One way to do this is through the new war paradigm.

### **2.3 NEW WARS AND THE INCIDENCE OF ARMED GROUPS**

Since the end of the 20th century, scholars studying armed conflict and war have observed that interstate conflicts were decreasing, while a new wave of intrastate violence was emerging (Duffield, 1998, 2001; Kaldor, 1999; Münkler, 2005). Several concepts have been used to describe the new wave of violence, and how this is affecting state authority and their monopoly over collective violence, given the asymmetric nature of these conflicts. Some call it hybrid wars (Hoffman, 2007), degenerate warfare (Shaw, 2003), or remnants of war (Mueller, 2004), while others simply define it as new wars (Kaldor, 1999, 2012; Münkler, 2005). Among the scholars, some political sociologists and social theorists approached the study of this emerging wave of violence from a macro-level sociological perspective (Kaldor, 1999, 2012, Bauman, 2001, 2002, Shaw, 2002, 2003). They attribute the violence to the "transformative power of economic globalisation" (Malešević, 2010: 315), a situation which undermines the ability of a state to "provide welfare, to defend its borders, or to represent a people"

(Vinci, 2009: 11). When this occurs, it threatens the power, autonomy, and legitimacy of the state to govern its people. The consequence, which is also a typical cause of armed conflict, is the loss of monopoly of the legitimate use of force, a situation which gives rise to the spread and proliferation of armed groups who wreak violence in society (Kaldor, 2013: 2).

Mary Kaldor, one of the influential advocates of the new war thesis, argues that the new wars bear elements that are distinct from conventional warfare in terms of the actors, goals, methods, and sources of finance (Kaldor, 1999: 6, 2013: 2). Unlike conventional interstate warfare, which has clarity in terms of actors, motive, type of warfare, and sources of finances, the new wars blur these distinctions. Typically, the “new wars are a mixture of war, crime and human rights violations,” and these factors distinguish it from the conventional sense of wars between states (Kaldor, 1999: 11). The literature identifies two forms of new war. One is a highly-technologically advanced Western-style warfare which minimises both civilian and personnel casualties, and the second is a predatory warfare which is “concentrated in Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia” (Kaldor, 1999, 2012: 13, Bauman, 2001, 2002; Shaw, 2003). The latter forms the primary focus of Kaldor’s work and is more relevant to this study given that it is widespread in several African states and it influences governance and political instability. Studies show that marginalisation from exclusionary politics, judicial weakness, growing economic greed of illegitimate profit seeking groups, and grievances influence the spread of the new wars (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002, 2004; Kaldor, 2012: 12).

Notwithstanding the contribution of the new wars thesis, it is heavily criticised on several aspects. One is that the new wars are not necessarily ‘new’, as many features of the new wars are found in conventional (old) warfare (Henderson & Singer, 2002; Mundy, 2011). Malešević (2010: 319–324) engaged in a critical review of the new war thesis, faulting several assumptions of the paradigm. He contends that, contrary to the central claim, economic globalisation does not undermine the autonomy of nation states. He notes further that war has not changed, and neither has the privatisation of violence and the involvement of non-state actors, both of which are not a new phenomenon. Kaldor (2012: 202–221, 2013) defended her claim by clarifying the ‘newness’ of the new wars, whether new wars qualify as ‘wars,’ whether data supports the claim of new wars, and whether new wars are post-Clausewitzian. As the broader literature has already addressed these concerns, this study will not restate the debate.

In terms of this study, the new war thesis provides a useful lens through which to examine the causes and consequences of internal armed conflicts. As Malešević (2010: 312) states, “the new-wars paradigm has proved highly beneficial in highlighting some distinctive features of civil wars” and internal conflicts more generally. The indication that new actors, particularly non-state armed groups, are the key perpetrators of violence and criminality in new wars is relevant for our understanding of internal conflicts. Studying these actors from the perspective of the new wars paradigm provides us with

important insights through which to understand the nature, goals/motivations, modes of warfare and sources of their finances. Given this, it is important to examine the actors whom the literature describes as armed groups. The following discussion provides an overview of armed groups and their distinct characteristics.

There is no universal definition of armed groups, but in general it is non-state actors who use violence or the threat of violence as the means to achieve their goals (Vinci, 2009: 4; Thompson, 2014: 5).<sup>8</sup> In part, the lack of concrete definition is because armed groups are clandestine, and they transform, hybridise, or evolve from one form to another. Another reason is that the concept embodies a myriad of arms-wielding groups whose aims are fluid and whose motives change between economic, political, or ideological objectives. For this reason, scholars, analysts, and policy makers use various working definitions to operationalise the concept. The International Review of the Red Cross defines armed groups as “organisations that are party to an armed conflict, but do not answer to, and are not commanded by, one or more states” (Bernard, 2011: 262). This is similar to that of Thompson (2014: 4), who defines armed groups as “coherent, autonomous, non-state actors that rely on the threat of or use of force to achieve their objectives.” Similarly, the United Nations Office of Humanitarian Affairs considers armed groups as having:

[T]he potential to employ arms in the use of force to achieve political, ideological or economic objectives; are not within the formal military structures of states, state-alliances or intergovernmental organisations; and are not under the control of the state(s) in which they operate (Mc Hugh & Bessler, 2006: 6).

Although these definitions appear different, they share similar characteristics. Firstly, armed groups consist of groups of individuals who have the capacity and the determination to use the threat of violence to achieve set aims. Secondly, they are rational actors with definite goals, which could change or increase as they pursue their initial or earlier goals. Thirdly, they do not have legal backing and are often outlawed as non-state entities. Fourth, they can set up international links that help them gain support from the international community, particularly foreign diaspora, and sympathetic donors. A fifth feature is that armed groups are capable of eroding public support for government by creating situations of distrust and a legitimacy crisis through security threats and use of violence (Shultz *et al.*, 2004).

Armed groups present an existential security threat to both the citizenry and the state they operate in (Vreÿ, 2010). Some are well organised with defined chains of command and authority, while others operate as bands of loose groups with no specific structure or command system (Holsti, 1996: 19–20). Examples of such groups include mercenaries, rebel groups, self-help ethnic militias, criminal gangs,

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<sup>8</sup> It is possible to also have state-owned, state-sponsored, or state-backed armed groups, who have no legal qualification as legitimate state armed forces.

warlords and several other small-scale belligerents (Porto, 2002: 19). They threaten the monopoly of organised violence of the state through their use of sustained violence through direct combat, guerrilla or irregular warfare against state security forces (Vinci, 2008: 295). They can transform, evolve, or hybridise from one type to another, while adopting different operational structures as they wage protracted armed conflict. This hinders the ability of the state to define or categorise the groups to figure out their goals and develop the right strategy to suppress or counter the threats they pose. This has compelled several state to rely on the military to deal with the threats posed by these groups (José & Rasmussen, 1999: 5).

There are several reasons why armed groups resort to violence. The common causes include poor economic conditions; unequal access to scarce resources; weak, failed or oppressive government; environmental or ecological degradation; a weak justice system; easy access to arms and weapons; and identity cleavages (Gurr *et al.*, 2000; Smith, 2004; Maclean, 2008). By implication, high income inequality, the manipulation and exploitation of ethnic and religious differences by political elites, environmental depletion, greed, and lack of judicial remedy to address these grievances triggers the use of violence (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002, 2004). Other factors include grievances arising from marginalisation by the state, and the denial or failure to resolve legitimate concerns of marginalised ethnic and religious minority groups. These concerns could include the inability to gain access to economic and political benefits, such as government contracts to provide services (roads, potable water, electricity) and the political appointment of members of ethnic minority groups in society. This makes individuals and groups more prone to take up arms to forcefully pursue their goals or resolve these problems.

A myriad of armed groups exists, ranging from small loose bands, to complex and highly structured groups. These include rebel movements, militias, marauders, mafias, criminal organisations, religious armed groups, ethnic warlords, pirates, insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists, mercenaries and fraternities (Schneckener, 2006: 25–28; Shultz & Dew, 2006: 10–11; Vinci, 2006: 49). Several analysts and scholars have tried to classify these groups into archetypes or typologies to understand the operational drive, motivation, and the action plans of each group. However, because armed groups are flexible and easily change when faced with coercion from state forces, the archetypes present a fluid category. Some have also cautioned that making a typology could be misleading as armed groups easily transform (Petrasek, 2005: 8). Despite this critique, it is possible to categorise armed groups based on their aim and organisational structure. For example, Shultz *et al.* (2004: 16), Shultz & Dew (2006: 10) and Thompson (2014: 10) developed a comprehensive typology that categorised armed groups into insurgents, terrorists, militias and criminal organisations. Following the new wars theory, I discuss the goals, method of warfare, and sources of finances of these non-state actors to understand the groups and the threats they pose to the state.

### 2.3.1 Insurgents

Insurgents are non-ruling groups who consciously seek to undermine, “destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics” through violent insurgency (O’Neill, 1990: 13). Typically, insurgent armed groups are politically motivated groups who aim to influence policy, to disintegrate, weaken, or overthrow and replace a government. They aim to exert political control or to seize control of territorial boundaries of a state, and to form an alternative government in its place (Shultz *et al.*, 2004; Thompson, 2014). One possible reason is the desire to redress existing political inequalities and structural imbalances that the state seems unwilling or unable to address. Another reason is the desire to compel the government not to retract or change certain policies that are beneficial to a section of the population.

Currently, several armed groups are classified as insurgents. The People’s Liberation Movement and the People’s Liberation Army in Sudan, and the Patriotic Union and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan are some examples (Shultz *et al.*, 2004: 19). Others include the Islamic State of Iraq, Syria, and the Levant, which have seized territories and been engaged in prolonged warfare with state and multinational forces. Most insurgent armed groups attract membership, followers, and their support base from the population group that the insurgents represent. This is because the interest groups (ethnic, religious, etc.) stand to benefit from the political changes that the insurgents advocate. This makes it easier for charismatic leaders to exploit religious, racial or ethnic differences to mobilise followers and the foot soldiers of the group (Fearon & Laitin, 2003).

To achieve their objectives, insurgents make their support base the groups whose interest they represent, and therefore do not use violence against these groups (Thompson, 2014: 78). They win the trust of their interest groups to ensure that they do not denounce or alienate them from society. They focus their violent attacks on state forces and other population groups who oppose their goals, or on those who reveal the identity of their members to state security forces. This makes the ability to counter the activities of insurgent groups difficult, as people are unlikely to report such information to the state security forces out of fear that they themselves might become the targets of the insurgents. Members of the community are also less inclined to denounce the insurgents where they are seen to advance and protect their interests or address their grievances.

Given the motivation of insurgent groups, they often challenge the legitimacy of the government and their actions can destabilize a country if the military is unable to suppress insurgents. Their use of hit-and-run tactics, terrorist attacks, guerrilla warfare, and their clandestine nature makes it difficult for state forces to counter them, despite their being outnumbered by state forces (Smith, 2006). Ultimately, their aim is to gradually weaken the state forces’ ability to counteract their attacks (Joel, 1992: 5), as this presents the state as weak and unable to provide one of the most important public goods, that of security and the ability to protect the population.



To sustain the group and prolong its warfare, insurgents are mostly self-financing, heavily reliant on external support from foreign diaspora and other illicit income-generating activities. The financial support insurgents attract from external sources could be from “foreign states, diasporas, *other* armed groups, international organisations, and corrupt individuals”<sup>9</sup> (Thompson, 2014: 79). Insurgents also often engage in one or more forms of illegal extraction, such as mining and the sales of natural resources, high-profile bank robberies, and other economically predatory activities on civilian groups who do not support their cause. This makes some argue that “insurgency is both an act of war and a criminal activity” (Baker & O’Neill, 2010: 5). When insurgents engage in predatory activities, particularly bank robberies, it often blurs the line between criminal organisations and insurgent groups, making it difficult to distinguish between the two. However, as we shall see, criminal armed groups differ from insurgents because of their motivation. Criminal armed groups seek economic or profit gains, while insurgents only become predatory in an attempt to sustain the needs of the group and its demands for weapons and ammunitions in pursuit of political goals.

### 2.3.2 Terrorists

Much like armed groups, terrorism is difficult to define, given the many different forms of terrorist groups that exist (Fletcher, 2006: 907). These range from single/lone actors, to loose cells, and organised groups having defined chains of command and authority through which to further their cause (Best & Nocella, 2004: 9–14). The working definition by the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999, which was adopted by the Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004), defines terrorism as follows:

Terrorism is any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act (United Nations, 1999, l. 38).

Thus, terrorists seek to achieve political goals such as overthrowing or replacing a government, or more goals of forcing policy changes or influencing political decisions. The political motive could be ideological, such as the desire to influence or change a government or its policies, and not necessarily to seize and control a territory, as with insurgents (Thompson, 2014: 85). In other instances, terrorists advocate for the inclusion and granting of better access for a minority or politically marginalised groups in society. Where this is the case, they mobilise along identity lines, such as ethnic, racial, interest or religious affiliation (Shultz *et al.*, 2004). However, several contemporary terrorist groups advocate for a form of religious or mystical goal that is interwoven with the political aim of establishing a religious state, or replacing the secular laws of a state with religious laws (Laqueur, 1990; Hoffman, 2006: 87;

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<sup>9</sup> Word in italics added for emphasis.



Kurtulus, 2011: 478). A few examples include Al Qaeda operating in the Middle East, the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Islamic State (IS), which is active in about 28 countries. In Africa, the Al Shabab terrorist group operates in Somalia and Kenya, and Boko Haram in Nigeria and its neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015).

Targets of terrorist attacks are usually civilian groups that are neither related to their interest group, nor supporting their cause. Other non-human targets, such as critical state infrastructures (airports, train stations, water sources, etc.) that could cause serious disruption, fear or panic among the population, are also attacked (Shultz *et al.*, 2004: 21; Thompson, 2014: 82). Unlike insurgents, terrorists rarely engage in any form of warfare with state forces, unless directly confronted and seeking to escape. For this reason, terrorists mostly direct their attacks at civilian targets and critical state infrastructures (soft targets). Thus, given that the primary targets of terrorists are non-combatant civilians, the civilian casualty from its attacks are usually high. Attacking soft-targets also helps terrorists create fear and panic, which they advance through media propaganda, aimed at eroding the legitimacy of the state by presenting it as incapable of defending its population.

Terrorism thrives on media publicity disseminate knowledge and information about their activities. Through this, they reinforce fear and insecurity, and highlight the excesses and atrocities of state forces confronting them (Fletcher, 2006: 909). This publicity plays a vital role in placing the government under intense pressure to avert terrorists' attacks, or to comply with the demands of the terrorists. However, as terrorists attack civilian targets, they often lack the popular support from the citizenry, even when the concerns of the terrorist groups are legitimate. The deliberate and indiscriminate attacks on civilians makes them lose the support of both the local population, and the state. When terrorists continue to attack civilian populations, it affects their existential security. Countering terrorist attacks is often a challenging task for state security forces. Where the state is unable to counter the threats and violence from terrorist and other armed groups, citizens are likely to resort to militias who could provide them with needed security. In fact, Thompson (2014: 89) argues that civilians often join militias primarily for protection from state forces, or attacks from other armed groups.

Unlike insurgents, terrorists often lack a popular support base and do not enjoy the same material and financial support from civilian populations as insurgents. Typically, terrorists' finances come from predatory and criminal activities, and they often prey on the livelihood of civilians in their strongholds through the imposition of levies and taxes. Others attack and rob banks, and some engage in high-profile kidnapping for ransom collection. Another source of funding is from other foreign groups who share similar aims (Shultz *et al.*, 2004). For example, in "the 1990s, al Qaeda created an elaborate set of connections with ... likeminded terrorist groups in as many as 60 countries... It also developed a

sophisticated financial network for collecting and transferring money for the organisation and its operations” (Shultz *et al.*, 2004: 22). Through this means, they elicit financial assistance from individuals sympathetic to their cause, and from groups they have established linkages with.

Although the consensus is that terrorism displays the abovementioned characteristics, many claim that we are seeing a new form of terrorism emerge (Laqueur, 1990; Hoffman, 2006; Kurtulus, 2011). New terrorism differs in many ways from old terrorism and has been called super-terrorism (Schweitzer & Dorsch, 1998), post-modern terrorism (Laqueur, 1990), and catastrophic terrorism (Carter, Deutch & Zelikow, 1998). It has been argued that “there has been a radical transformation, if not a revolution, in the character of terrorism” (Laqueur, 1990: 4). The main argument is that a change or transformation has occurred in the motivation, organisation, instruments of violence, and target selection. This involves a shift from an ethno-nationalist motivation to a mix of religious and political motivation; a change from hierarchical structures to horizontal networks of cells; a change from selective targets to indiscriminate attacks; and a change from crude implements to sophisticated weaponry and the potential to acquire weapons of mass destructions (Laqueur, 1990; Hoffman, 2006; Kurtulus, 2011). Concisely, Kurtulus (2011: 477) calls this “a qualitative change in the nature of terrorism, which has allegedly taken place during the 1990s.”

While this provides us with an insight into the transformation and sophistication of terrorism, critics argue that the features of the ‘new’ terrorism do not differ from what was previously known, and should rather be seen as new waves of terrorism (Copeland, 2001; Tucker, 2001; Kurtulus, 2011). However, terrorists and insurgents are not the only armed groups whose activities requires attention. Other armed groups such as militias equally pose significant threats and security challenges that could destabilise a state and undermine the provision of public goods and services, hence the need to understand the militia armed group.

### **2.3.3 Militias**

Militias are the most common type of armed groups. They are both a product and a cause of failed and failing states. Given this, various forms of militias exist, and a multiplicity of definitions attempt to describe them. One such definition presents militias as small units of *de facto* non-state armed groups who use violence to achieve their goals, but this does not account for state-backed militias (Zahar, 2000: 108). Others define militias “as a recognisable irregular armed force operating within the territory of a weak and/or failing state” (Shultz *et al.*, 2004: 23). Militias often occur where the state security forces are unable to protect citizens and where leaders lack political legitimacy and the support of the populace.

When a state is unable to provide security, rule of law and basic essential public goods, this vacuum is often filled by militias (Shultz *et al.*, 2004: 23; Carey, Mitchell & Lowe, 2012: 250). However, different

militias pursue different causes and their operations mostly occur within specific local communities. For some, their operations aim to provide security to an ethnic or religious group that are part of. Other militias are economically motivated, where their activities and operations are focussed on reaping financial gains for the group and its leaders, mostly through illegitimate and predatory means (Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010b: 4). Others are simply a political tool of desperate politicians or 'warlords' with various political ambitions.

When a state is unable to provide basic public goods, including security, individuals, groups, and communities often unite along identity or interest lines to seek alternatives. Often, given the absence of the rule of law, this evokes hostilities as the pursuit of the interests of one group threaten the interests of other groups. Militias fill this vacuum as the armed extension of the group to protect, fight, and defend their interests (Vinci, 2009: 5). Typically, they rely on small arms and light weapons to carry out their operations, but as their threat levels increase, they could acquire more advanced weaponry and improvised explosive devices that could cause maximum damage to their opposition. Their pattern of violence is mostly unconventional surprise attacks on unsuspecting opponents. Unlike insurgents, they rarely challenge state forces.

Although different militia groups follow different aims, they share some common features. One is that they are comprised of mostly private and informal irregular forces, consisting of unemployed young men with little or no conventional military training (Shultz *et al.*, 2004: 23). They are often small in size and typically a product of circumstance and opportunity (Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010b: 13). Their activities revolve around a leader, or leaders, who exert control over the group through a system of patronage. They tend to be highly disciplined due to members' communal feeling of togetherness, and the need to defend or preserve certain values and ideologies (Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010b: 4). As such, it is common for militias to use violence in pursuit of their goals and also direct violence against those opposing their values and ideologies. Given this, "militias have a more predatory relationship with the population than other armed groups" (Thompson, 2014: 89).

While civilians can form militias, there are numerous examples of state-sponsored, state-patronised, or state-supported militias (Stanton, 2015). Such militias act as a *de facto* coercive tool for repressive regimes, and a typical example is the Janjaweed militia in Sudan. Their *de facto* status does not confer legal recognition to the group, and their existence and activities are often largely illegitimate (Zahar, 2000: 108; Thompson, 2014: 90). State-sponsored militias are commonly used by authoritarian and oppressive governments wishing to avoid international sanctions, in order to crackdown on opposition, inflict electoral thuggery, and other human rights abuses (Carey *et al.*, 2012; Stanton, 2015). State-sponsored militias are highly clandestine and their sponsors, suppliers of arms, and funders are secret and often not known to recruits. As militias are often a product of a weak, failed or failing state,

it explains why both state-sponsored and non-state militias are the most common armed groups in Africa today (Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010c,a; Carey *et al.*, 2012: 250).

As numerous forms of militias exist, so one finds that their sources of funding differ. For local ethnic, religious, or community-based militias serving the interest of a specific population group, the members may provide the necessary funding. This could be in the form of voluntary contributions, levies, or other forced contributions. Warlord militias whose motives range from the “advancement of clan, tribe, or ethnic goals to political ambition, localised power, and personal wealth” may simply receive funding from the income of the group leader (Shultz *et al.*, 2004: 25–26). State-sponsored militias, in turn, receive funding from undisclosed state sources that may not be known to the foot-soldiers of the group.

### **2.3.4 Organised Criminal Groups and Transnational Criminal Organisations**

Criminal and transnational criminal organisations (TCOs) are typically income/profit oriented armed groups. They are often a private conglomerate owned and controlled by a leader who directs the activities of the group towards making financial profit. Although such groups are income/profit oriented, they are illegitimate for several reasons (Giddens, 2009: 970). One is the activities, product, or service the groups deal in. These can include human trafficking (of mostly women and children), illegal migration and prostitution, drug trafficking, kidnapping, smuggling, piracy, robbery, intimidation, and blackmail (Schneckener, 2006: 27). Others include poaching and illegal mining and exploitation of natural resources. Due to the criminal nature of their activities, they evade and avoid tax payments and are typically involved in money laundering and financial racketeering. As such, criminal armed groups do not require financial support, as their operations aim at maximising profit, albeit illegitimately. They are illegitimate as their operations are in direct violation of the laws of most states.

Given this, criminal armed groups steer away from actions that draw attention to their activities and operations in order to avoid alerting authorities. They tend to operate on a low profile using threats, blackmail, and other non-coercive means to achieve their aims (Schneckener, 2006: 27). Some groups also collaborate with members of state forces through bribery and other corrupt means, to keep security agencies away from their trading and business routes. Typically, this is because some TCOs have the capability to seize and take hold of market territories, where they can enforce their authority and dominance. Where this fails, they resort to violence and coercion to achieve their goals. However, their use of violence is mainly directed against rival groups “to either intimidate or eliminate them as competitors,” though violence is also used to enforce internal discipline among members and to prevent defection (Shultz *et al.*, 2004: 28–29; Thompson, 2014: 87).

Similarly, TCOs also use threats and violence against state forces and competitors that disrupt their illegitimate business activities, especially when non-violence fails (Shultz *et al.*, 2004: 28). This can

involve cross-fire exchanges when there is a threat of being arrested and prosecuted. However, to ensure their survival, strong and powerful TCOs can also extend their activities and influence into politics through direct or indirect means. Through direct means, they influence policy decisions by sponsoring a political candidate into power or placing stooges to help limit government interference in their activities. Indirectly, as noted above, they use bribery, blackmail, intimidation, and threat as a means of reducing state interference. In turn, this provides them and their illicit businesses with a level of immunity from state crackdown and prosecution (Mackinlay, 2000: 60; Schneckener, 2006: 27).

Most criminal armed groups share similar characteristics. A common feature is that they are highly clandestine and, unlike terrorist groups, want to avoid media attention. They only use violence when non-coercive options fail to provide the desired outcome, unlike insurgents, militias, and terrorist groups. Another common feature of criminal armed groups is their ability to create global networks to facilitate illegal trade. Poor governance, global networks and effective transport and communication systems facilitate their ability to illegally exploit crude natural resources, poach wildlife, and transport these products (Mackinlay, 2000: 60; Shultz *et al.*, 2004: 28).

In terms of organisational structure, criminal organisations such as drug cartels, mafias, gangs, and criminal syndicates are highly clandestine and have an organised chain of command. Examples of such armed groups include the Irish Mafia, Indian Mafia, the Chinese Triads, *Primeiro Comando da Capital* (PCC), and the *Mara Salvatrucha* (MS-13). One interesting feature of these groups is that many of them “began not as deliberately criminal groups but as protective-benevolent or secret societies for the welfare of persecuted ethnic or political groups” (Godson & Olson, 1995: 20–21). Over time, they metamorphose into criminal groups, with the objective of economic dominance over transacting or distributing certain unlawful products and services. In terms of recruitment of members, patronage and lineage play a role in generating a support base. The use of this “tight-knit community” ensures the secretiveness of the organisation, its activities, leaders, and areas of operation (Godson & Olson, 1995: 21).

Reflecting on the discussion in this section, one can argue that an armed group could simultaneously fit into all the categories, as it is possible for a group to engage in the various activities described. For example, the activities of Hezbollah in Lebanon shows it is possible to be classified as a transnational criminal organisation, a militia, and a terrorist organisation, all at the same time (Shultz, 2013: 103). This demonstrates the difficulty in classifying and distinguishing between armed groups, and the fluidity and flexibility of their operations. Notwithstanding, they all present a significant threat to human security, because of their ability to evoke political instability and create humanitarian crises. This links back to the new war thesis, in terms of how contemporary violence blurs the distinction between war and crime (Kaldor, 2012: 2). To a greater or lesser extent, these non-state actors pose a threat to state security, legitimacy, and the protection of citizens.

## 2.4 EFFECTS OF NEW WARS

New wars are associated with internal violence that involves all the actors discussed in the previous sections. Since the end of the Cold War, armed groups in their various forms have become a major security threat and challenge to individuals, states, and the international community. They have the ability to conduct coordinated attacks on high-value, critical, and strategic infrastructures in both weak and strong nations. Understanding the goals of an armed group, as well as the danger and threats they pose, are essential to a state's ability to respond (Shultz *et al.*, 2004: 36). Failure to do so could plunge the state into normlessness and anomie, which erodes not only the legitimacy of the state, but also their ability to govern (Merton, 1938; Durkheim, 1952). These challenges are discussed as a precursor to understanding why some states feel compelled to use the military in an internal role to address the security concerns armed groups evoke.

### 2.4.1 Posing Threat of Violence and Undermining Security

Armed groups are violent by nature and because they have access to weapons, they pose serious security challenges to both states and citizens. When they resort to collective violence, armed groups challenge the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, and in so doing evoke serious security challenges for both citizens and the state. Armed groups threaten the life of citizens through various violent and predatory activities, but also threaten the state when they destroy valuable infrastructure such as power grids, water supply bases, airports, and military installations. This results in a redirection of valuable state resources to security, which affects the provision of other public goods and services to citizens, like education, health services and infrastructural development.


The result of any single successful attack by an armed group extends beyond the primary target, and often results in several consequences. For example, when a tribal militia attacks another ethnic group or community, the immediate and direct consequence of this is the loss of several lives, properties, and other sources of livelihood. Typically it evokes reprisal attacks that increase the level of fear and accelerate the breakdown of social cohesion within societies (Alimba, 2014: 191). This is exacerbated when distrust and intolerance emerge along religious and ethnic fault lines. As with the conflict in Plateau State in Nigeria, this can plunge a state into a vicious cycle of reprisal attacks that threaten insecurity (Kalu, 2011). It is important to recognise that armed groups use violence to achieve specific goals. For some, it serves as a means of getting rid of competitors, in order to gain monopoly over market territories. Whatever the aims and objectives, ordinary civilians bear the brunt of the violence and suffer the consequences of the breakdown of social order, and the provision of public goods and services. Where a government is unable to contain the threats and violence caused by armed groups, this may give rise to other groups emerging to counter existing threats.

In times of ethnic or religious conflict, the victim population might resort to taking up arms, setting up a militia, or joining and strengthening such groups if they feel the government is not doing enough to

protect them. A typical example is the incident leading to the United States' intervention in Iraq following the deadly cycles of attacks and reprisals by Al-Qaeda on the civilian population in the Sunnis Triangle (see Shultz, 2013: 98). In this regard, it becomes clear that increasing insecurity and minimal state control creates the environment for escalating violence. In turn, it could increase skirmishes, community invasion, ethnic cleansing, human rights abuses, hostage taking, forceful displacement, sexual abuses, and predation (Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010b: 2; Podder, 2012: 10).

This often results in high levels of injuries, and physical and health threats to the victim civilian population. Terrorist attacks by militia groups, such as religious fundamentalist and clan or ethnic militias, typically cause high human casualties. The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development reported that about 508,000 people were killed in non-war violence in the period 2007 – 2012 (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015). Relatedly, data from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) reveals that about two million fatalities resulted from armed conflict between the period 1989-2014 (Melander, 2015: 2). A breakdown of the figures reveals that although violence including state actors contributed to most of the fatalities, attacks by non-state actors contributed about 39% of the recorded casualties. This shows that violence from armed groups occurs frequently, and is highly likely to extend over a long period (Eck & Hultman, 2007: 237).

**Figure 2. 1 Non-State Conflicts by Region, 1989-2016**



Source: Allansson, Melander & Themnér (2017) Organised violence, 1989-2016.

When one looks at the distribution of the violence across geographical areas of occurrence, it provides interesting indicators on the incidence of armed conflicts perpetrated by armed groups (see Figure 2.1 above). The graph shows the incidence of non-state violence by region (Europe, Middle East, Asia, Africa, and the Americas). The diagram indicates that Africa persistently accounts for the highest incidences of violence by non-state actors, supporting the claim of the new war thesis that predatory warfare is ubiquitous in this region (Kaldor, 1999, 2012: 13, Bauman, 2001, 2002; Shaw, 2003). Although there is indication of a decrease in some years, violence in the continent is yet to subside.



### 2.4.2 Instigating Political Instability

The activities of armed groups create political instability when they interfere with the effective functioning of a state. This is especially the case when they gain control of territory within the country (Shultz *et al.*, 2004: 44; Ikelegbe, 2010: 129; Shultz, 2013: 95), or aim to influence government policies. Terrorist attacks on civilians and strategic targets place governments under immense pressure to prevent future attacks from occurring. This not only creates doubt in the ability of the state to protect the citizenry, but compels individuals into cooperating with or joining militias that can protect them (Hoeffler, 2011: 278). In turn, the insecurity created hinders and cripples the ability of the state to effectively plan and implement its policies and developmental action plans. From another angle, militias instigate critical divisions that undermine the social fabric of society and worsen in-group/out-group disparity.

In several African states, militias have not only undermined developmental efforts and the provision of basic services, but they threaten state sovereignty too. What is important to note is that militias are often used as political tools to seek or cling to power (Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010a: vi). This explains why election periods in several African countries are often associated with increased conflict and political violence, thuggery, and electoral malpractices (Cilliers & Schünemann, 2013; Cilliers, 2015). Similarly, collaboration between armed groups, state officials and political elites occur with organised criminal armed groups, especially TCOs. Such collaboration is described as the “political-criminal nexus” (Shultz *et al.*, 2004: 43). It presents a further opportunity for the upsurge and proliferation of several rival armed groups. Thus, it is unsurprising that Africa alone encountered about 52% of global armed conflicts in 2014 (Cilliers, 2015: 4).

### 2.4.3 Economic Consequences

The activities of armed groups be it illicit business, threat of violence, intimidation or the actual use of violence, pose serious challenges to the economy of a state. Through violence, armed groups create chaos and disorder that disrupt the peaceful environment necessary for economic activities to thrive. To continue operating, government and business enterprises have to bear the costs of protection through increased security budgets, or contracting private security firms (Pattison, 2011; Adeyeri, 2012: 102; Aghalino, 2012: 148). This not only increases the cost of production and cost of doing business but also affects profit margins, especially when infrastructure is disrupted, damaged, or destroyed. For example, in the wake of the 9/11 attack, the cost of clearing up the rubble, replacing lost assets, replacing the destroyed World Trade Centre and adjacent buildings, and restoring the transport, power and telecommunication facilities was estimated at about US\$36.9 billion (Shultz *et al.*, 2004: 39–40).

In terms of the costs of violence to both individuals and corporate organisations, it is often difficult to quantify the extent of loss and damages evoked (Sköns, 2005; Rose, 2009; Rose & Bloomberg, 2009,



2010; Virgo, 2009; Smith, 2014). On an individual level, persons affected by violence risk losing their jobs and becoming unemployed. As properties are destroyed and business premises vandalised, the fear of insecurity heightens, and people are unable to continue with economic activities such as farming and trading. Typically, the first to flee violent-prone environments are skilled and qualified persons, and this situation leads to a brain drain. Business enterprises and corporate organisations are more likely to stop operations or move to safer environments, impeding economic growth (Collier, Elliot, Hegre, Hoeffler, Reynal-Querol, *et al.*, 2003: 13–19). An economic recession could also occur because the state must allocate more resources or a higher proportion of its income to combatting violence, rather than to productive activities (Collier *et al.*, 2003: 19–23).

When a state apports most of its resources towards combatting violence, it means a reduction in their investment on other public infrastructures. Where such diversion of resources occurs, the state could encounter a “double loss: the loss from what the resources were previously contributing and the loss from the damage that they now inflict such as destruction of infrastructure in the cause of repression”<sup>10</sup> (Collier *et al.*, 2003: 13). Given this, it is obvious that security and development are interrelated, and that an increase in one enhances the other (Stewart, 2004: 261; Collier, 2006: 10). By implication, this means that weak and underdeveloped nations are more likely to face security challenges, as armed groups thrive in societies with little government presence, weak law enforcement and ineffective criminal justice systems (Fearon & Laitin, 2003).

#### **2.4.4 Overburdening the Police**

The police are primarily responsible for providing internal security services (Baker, 2004: 204). This makes them the principal government agency responsible for law enforcement, maintaining internal security, detecting threats, and preventing crime, public disorderliness and civil violence (Herbst, 2004: 367). However, the multiplicity of threats and violence from armed groups has proven overwhelming for African countries facing recurrent violent conflicts (Soeters & Van Ouytsel, 2014: 253). Several factors account for the inability of the police to effectively curtail these threats. Key is that most African police forces are poorly equipped and trained to deal with the challenges armed groups pose (Baker, 2010: 2). In addition, several police forces have lost public trust and legitimacy due to their brutality, corruption, and exploitation of the citizenry (Baker, 2008: 31–332, 2010: 3; Hills, 2011). Citizens become unwilling to cooperate or share useful information that could aid in the arrest or prevention of armed groups from succeeding with their plans (Wambua, 2015: 15). The fact that several African police forces tend to serve and protect the elites, while subjecting the general populace to untold hardship, extortion and harassment, makes this worse (Hills, 2007: 403, 2008: 219).

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<sup>10</sup> Words in italics added for emphasis and clarity.

Another challenge undermining the ability of the police to suppress armed groups is the shortage of personnel (Baker, 2010). Several African and Asian nations have low ratios of police to civilians. Added to this, most police work in the cities and towns, while the rural areas have little or no security personnel. Rural areas act as a place where armed groups camp, recruit and train, and a safety zone to which they withdraw (Okenyodo, 2016). As these areas may be difficult to reach, armed groups are able to establish a stronghold long before the state even becomes aware of their presence and activities (Herbst, 2004: 361). As these groups operate clandestinely, their activities only become noticeable when civilians are no longer able to bear the exploitation, torture, or extortion. Once they have become a stronghold, it becomes difficult for the police to combat them, especially where state revenues do not allow for an increase in personnel to overcome the challenge.

Lack of funding and insufficient equipment pose another challenge undermining the ability of the police to effectively contain the hostilities (Baker, 2010), along with corruption and mismanagement within the ranks (Alemika, 2007; Hills, 2007, 2008). In several African States, widespread bribery, corruption and intimidation of civilians has become the norm associated with the police (Baker, 2008: 31–332, 2010: 3, Hills, 2008: 219, 2011). Clearly, this undermines state control and the ability to check the rise and proliferation of armed groups. Added to this, police are easily susceptible to bribery or to collaboration with armed groups because they are often poorly paid. As a result, many African States resort to using the military in an internal role as a neutral arbiter to force a ceasefire and mediate conflicts. Given this, it is important to understand the dynamics of conflict resolution and the challenges the military is likely to encounter when it acts in this capacity in society.

## **2.5 CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION**

Conflict resolution refers to different techniques of managing, settling, negotiating, mediating, or bringing to an end, various forms/types of conflict situations (Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, 1999: 21). The aim of conflict resolution is to provide alternatives to violence, and to end the use of violence by armed groups or hostile belligerents. Several scholars, analysts, policy makers, and mediators have proposed models and frameworks for managing and resolving conflicts of interpersonal, group or interstate nature, depending on the context in which conflicts manifest (Kriesberg, 2009). This made Hansen (2008: 414) describe the field as a “pluralistic discipline requiring a number of conceptions and methods to address different kinds of conflict.” However, one framework which provides important insight for understanding the resolution of new wars using military might, such as the Plateau incidence in this study, is third-party intervention, a common approach in contemporary conflict resolution (Fisher, 2011: 158).

Third-party intervention involves an external actor acting in various capacities such as conciliation, mediation, arbitration or as a peacekeeper (Fisher, 2011: 165–166). In recent times, “there has been a shift from seeing third-party intervention as the primary responsibility of external agencies towards

appreciating the role of internal ‘third parties’ or indigenous peacemakers” (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011: 28). Often this includes the use of the military to suppress violence and force the return to peace. Contemporary counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, and the fight against criminal and transnational armed groups are militarised and executed by the armed forces with little support from the police and other intelligence agents (Ferreya & Segura, 2000; Vreÿ, 2010; Weiss, 2012).

Using the military to suppress conflict can be successful, but can also exacerbate insecurity where military power is not effectively controlled, or when it becomes “sucked into the conflict as a full party” (Miall *et al.*, 1999: 221; Ramsbotham *et al.*, 2011: 22). The military is hardly a neutral arbiter in the resolution of internal conflicts, and this situation can be worsened when it misuses or abuses its power (Enloe, 1977, 1978; Desch, 1996; Ouédraogo, 2014). The three categories of power (destructive, productive, and integrative) advanced by Boulding (1989: 25–29) explain this most aptly. Boulding contends that a combination of the various ways power is used produces three different categories of power. The first is love, which works on the principle of respect and esteem towards others. The second category, exchange power, involves negotiation and reciprocity with both parties shifting to accommodate the other where a positively valued stimuli or goal is introduced. The third category of power, which is the most insightful for this study, is threat power.

For Boulding (1989: 25), threat power is “when A says to B, ‘you do something I want or I will do something you do not want’ because A possesses destructive power against persons or structures that B values.” Threat power is therefore destructive, unproductive, and a less integrative use of power, especially when state forces act as conflict mediators. Threat power lacks general support because it is coercive, and it may lack legal legitimacy when it is not used judiciously. Notwithstanding, intimidation and coercion are common strategies used by the military in the arena of warfare and armed conflict to force a ceasefire and to pacify a conflict situation. Coercion in this case means the “blocking of the capacity of one side (A) to implement its will because of preventive actions of the other side (B), despite the continuing efforts of the blocked side (A) to implement its will” (Sharp, 2012: 89).

In this context, coercion cripples the ability of one or more conflict parties from continuing with their objectives while protecting the other party/parties – often, the weaker side. While this measure could be highly effective in forcing a ceasefire and suppressing violence, it is a difficult strategy to implement because it can raise the suspicion of third-party bias and further erode public trust. Thus, it is common for the military to employ both coercion and intimidation to force a ceasefire and bring episodes of conflict to an end. Typically, intimidation involves using “sanctions, or the threat to use sanctions, to induce others to take, or not to take, certain actions because of their fear of the likely consequences if they do not comply” (Sharp, 2012: 162). Such sanctions involves the use of “punishments, pressures,

and means of action used to penalize, thwart, and alter the behaviour of other persons, groups, or institutions ... for failure to behave in the expected or desired manner” (Sharp, 2012: 259).

From the foregoing, one sees that both coercion and intimidation are legitimate strategies used by State forces when managing a conflict situation to forestall further outbreak or the worsening of violence. However, several studies indicate that the use of these tools by state institutions could also be questionable and illegitimate (see Collier, 1999; Mitchell, 2012). This is especially so in cases where it results in the violation of human rights and the extrajudicial killings of suspects without following the normal judicial process. Typically, where the military is abusive, it elicits several reactions from those subjected to it. Victims could submit and obey the illegitimate abuse when they lack the means or capacity to counteract the threat.

When the victims have access to similar threat power, they could be defiant, or elect to challenge and counter the threat. One way this could happen is through collaborating or forming alliances with armed groups that could help them confront and retaliate against the threat they face. The recent violence which forced the Rohingya Muslims to flee Burma to a region of safety (Bangladesh) is a good example of victims choosing to flee conflict zones when the threat power from state forces undermines their security (see Human Rights Watch, 2017). A last possible reaction is a ‘disarming behaviour’ which basically involves collaborating with the threatener (Boulding, 1989: 27). Where a party to a conflict adopts this, insecurity could worsen as this could threaten all possible peace efforts and undermine the role of the third-party intervener, which in this case is the military.

From the discussion, we see that using the military in society for peace enforcement operations as third-party interveners could serve as a useful strategy, particularly when hostility overwhelms the police, but its activities require close monitoring. This is because the military has ‘destructive’ power, which can be abused when they support a particular ethnic or religious group. Instead of promoting peace and the smooth resolution of conflict, this can generate further insecurities and threaten the already fragile situation. This made Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999: 10) conclude that “hard power has always been important in violent conflict, but soft power may be more important in conflict *management*.”<sup>11</sup> Given this, it is important to understand the ambiguity that arises when the military is used internally to suppress and contain the threats they pose.

## **2.6 THE AMBIGUITY OF THE INTERNAL USE OF THE MILITARY IN SOCIETY**

The inability of the police to deal with the threats armed groups pose has compelled several states to use their military to aid the police (José & Rasmussen, 1999: 5). Using the military in this capacity has evoked several concerns, as it blurs the distinction between internal and external security spheres

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<sup>11</sup> Words in italics added for emphasis.

(Bigo, 2000; Eriksson & Rhinard, 2009). Typically, the police are responsible for internal security problems, such as crime control and law enforcement duties. The military is responsible for the external sphere, which involves defending the territorial sovereignty of the state against external threats and enemies (Ferreyra & Segura, 2000: 19; Howe, 2001: 30). Therefore, using the military in policing functions for which they are not trained is problematic. Essentially, the police are trained for law and order duties which requires minimum use of force, while the military are trained for warfare, requiring maximum use of force. Along with this, the police are typically reactive, while the military is proactive in deterring threats<sup>12</sup> (Bigo, 2006; Dambazau, 2014: 70).

Given that the police are ill-equipped to suppress the threats posed by armed groups or to counter insurrections, ideally a constabulary (gendarmerie) force should be used for this (Lutterbeck, 2004; Bigo, 2006). However, in several instances, the only alternative has been to use the military to protect the lives and property of citizens. Failure to do so could result in the citizens shifting their allegiance and aligning themselves with factions or armed groups that can offer them security and protection. This occurs because both government and armed groups wield arms, and are able to achieve political control over the population through the use of violence (International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2000: 34–35).

Unlike the police, the military is a coercive force that is sanctioned to use legitimate violence to protect the state (Nwolise, 2007; Peterside, 2014b). Given that armed groups make use of high powered-weapons and ammunitions, the military is often the only way a government can deal with the threat they pose (Vinci, 2006; Krause & Milliken, 2009; Peterside, 2014b). Victory over armed groups is achievable through military means because they can force a ceasefire, the de-escalation of violence, or an immediate victory over belligerents.<sup>13</sup> For this reason, the internal use of the military becomes a necessity given that the police are generally not able to perform such combat duties.

In this regard, a military presence is capable of restoring relative peace to volatile societies (Ferreyra & Segura, 2000: 19). In fact, it is on this basis that international systems such as the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) deploy troops for international peacekeeping or peace-enforcement duties (Olonisakin, 2000). However, the problem with this arrangement, as is the case in Nigeria, is that alternatives towards peaceful resolution are neither explored nor used to address the root causes of conflicts. Rather, the state relies on the presence of the military to force peaceful coexistence, and for the prevention of further escalation of violence. This entails deploying the military on active duty

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<sup>12</sup> See the arguments put forward by Enloe (1977, 1978), Lutterbeck (2004) and Weiss (2011, 2012).

for a prolonged or permanent basis to forestall aggrieved groups from reprisal and returning to violence.

In addition to the problem of excessive reliance on military presence to forcefully compel belligerents towards tolerance and peaceful coexistence, several reasons explain why internal violence protracts and is prevalent in Africa. These include but are not limited to stalled peace agreements, indecisive victory, failed ceasefire agreements, and the alteration of existing power structures through a change of policies, especially by a new government (Kreutz, 2010). Another significant factor is the role that peacekeeping or military forces play in managing the conflict and citizens' perceptions of their security situation. When civilians feel their security is threatened by belligerents and the coercive force of the state, they are likely to resort to arms, or join armed groups whom they feel can guarantee their security (Regehr, 2011: 6). This plunges the state into a conflict trap of spiralling violence. Instances of these are seen in the many inter-communal or interethnic conflicts and civil wars occurring in Africa, where several states have become conflict-prone and likely to return to violence (Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000: 244). This raises the need to carefully explore the challenges of the internal use of the military and the effect this has on civil-military relations (CMR).

## **2.7 CONCLUSION**

Various datasets indicate that armed conflicts are a ubiquitous security challenge in many African countries. Characteristically, these conflicts are new wars, a distinct warfare perpetrated by numerous armed groups protesting or attempting to influence state policies, overthrow a government, or simply seek personal interests such as protection or profit. Given the numerous motives and actors, these new wars combine a mixture of war, crime, and human rights violations, which undermines the autonomy and legitimacy of states. Armed groups pose a major security challenge to states due to the mode and pattern of operations they adopt. Not only are they a threat to the security of citizens, but their destruction of property and infrastructure places a huge burden on any government due to the fear, panic, tension, division, and insecurity they create. The threat and use of violence makes it immensely difficult for the police to deal with the level of hostilities they evoke.

The problems in dealing with armed groups are enormous. Unlike conventional warfare where there are few actors and the objective is concise, both the actors and goals of warfare in the new wars are numerous, and this makes attempts at conflict resolution difficult. The effect on governance, delivery of public goods, protection of civilians, and legitimacy of the state are insurmountable. To curb the violence, states typically adopt a third-party intervention strategy that involves using the military to counter the threats as the only alternative means to suppress violent armed conflict. For both the police and military, this is a challenge given the fluid, flexible and clandestine nature of armed groups. Waging war against them is difficult, especially where they hide and seek refuge within civilian

populations who are unaware, unable, or even unwilling to report, expose, or reveal their identity to state forces.

In this regard, military campaigns against armed groups come with several challenges. Key among this is the excessive focus on achieving military victory, with little effort to address the root causes of the violence and restore peaceful coexistence among belligerents. When the military themselves become abusive or responsible for extrajudicial killings, and this goes unchecked and unpunished, their legitimacy is called into question. In such instances, citizens may resort to arms, seek protection from armed groups, or revolt against the state security forces. In turn, this situation could plunge the state into even more violence, where the military does not act impartially and professionally, and where there is insufficient civil control of the military. Thus, there is a need to understand how states exercise civil control over the military, especially when the military is deployed in an internal role to protect citizens. The next chapter focuses on this subject.

## CHAPTER THREE

### CIVIL CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES

#### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter examined the threat that armed groups pose and why governments resort to using the military for ISOPs to suppress the violence and insurgencies. The focus of this chapter is how the state exercises control over the military to ensure its professional conduct and to curtail the excessive use of force. Accordingly, this chapter presents the theoretical foundation of the study. The chapter examines the theoretical debate on civil control of the military, how this impact on CMR, and the control and regulation of the military. It also looks at the complex interaction between the citizenry, political elites, and the armed forces to highlight the problems and issues at stake. These issues are central to CMR, a subject which has solicited widespread debate (Feaver, 1999: 211).

The chapter begins with an overview of the literature on military professionalism, culture, socialisation, and training. Next is a review of CMR to understand the interaction between the military institution, the state, and the citizenry, especially when the military conducts ISOPs. Following this is a discussion on why democratic civil control of the armed forces is necessary and important in present-day democracies, be they strong, weak or emerging democracies. From here, the chapter reviews the contributions of some early and other key theories of CMR, noting their shortcomings and the limitations they pose for this study. The CMR debate concludes with a discussion on how this study addresses the shortcomings of extant theories.

#### 3.2 MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM, CULTURE, SOCIALISATION, AND TRAINING

Several scholars have attempted to explain what makes the military a profession or a professional organisation? One explanation indicates that as a profession, the military must have (1) formal training to equip personnel with the requisite skills to perform the job and engage in military missions (2) the military must have a cultural tradition that is distinct from society, a culture that promotes unity and strength to enable it maintain a force that is strong enough to wage sustained combat and be successful in warfare and (3) the military must be socially responsible to the state which is its client (Parsons, 1968, 1980: 29–30). For Perlmutter & Bennett (1980: 3) a professional military is one which recognises and respects the primacy of the civilian institution over the military. Accordingly, the professional military does not intervene in politics, but where it does, it is for a short duration. Perlmutter & Bennett note further that the professional military is not necessarily removed from politics. As such, the military can be involved in the political decision-making process through a fusion of “bureaucracy and politics, government and administration experts, and politicians” (Perlmutter & Bennett, 1980: 13). However, to maintain its professionalism, the military does not engage in active partisanship, and it does not abuse its power position to influence policy decisions.



### 3.2.1 Military Professionalism and the Consequences of Unprofessionalism

Given that the military is a professional institution, it is necessary to understand the debate on military professionalism, what it means for the armed forces, and the consequences of unprofessionalism. In this respect, I examine some key indicators of military professionalism and the consequences of the loss, or a lack of such professional attributes.

The task of protecting a nation against serious threats and external ‘enemies,’ and enhancing “the military security of the state” is the sole responsibility of the military (Huntington, 1980: 47). As such, the military holds the monopoly of knowledge and expert skills on the use and management of the coercive violence of the state. Traditionally, disseminating the knowledge has been the exclusive role of the military, and it does this through the numerous military training institutions that have been established for this purpose. To be effective, the military instils the knowledge through “prolonged education and experience” by training and also engaging in warfare missions to consolidate theoretical knowledge with practical skills (Huntington, 1957: 8). However, numerous studies indicate that the military no longer holds this exclusive control as an increase in outsourcing of military duties to private military and security companies is undermining this monopoly (Schreier & Caparini, 2005; Singer, 2005; Hedahl, 2009; Schaub, 2010).

The problem with the loss of monopoly is that, it challenges a fundamental feature of the military profession, given that “control over knowledge is what gives the profession its status and power” (Heinecken, 2013a: 7). Without this, Volti (2012: 159) claims, the profession could lose aspects of ‘professionalization as a means of control,’ thereby making it unable to determine those who perform the training, the preparation for the work/course, and the evaluation of the job. Certainly, this has implications for the military profession. A typical example is a reduction or a loss of income and power as military roles are outsourced to private contractors, many whom pay their personnel higher than the military (Latham, 2009; Hammes, 2011; Barnes, 2017). Ultimately, this entails the military could become a consumer of this service. Other concerns includes the likelihood of a ‘competition’ with the military, and an increasing tendency for attrition as personnel may resign from military service to take up higher paying jobs with private providers (Heinecken, 2013a: 8). In states facing recurring armed conflicts, the profit motive of private military and security companies (PMSC) forms another source of concern that requires close monitoring. Some have observed that without strict regulation, PMSCs could deploy employees as mercenaries or tools for political violence (Avant, 2005: 22–25; McCoy, 2010: 675). Even where there is strict regulation, there is the tendency that employees who are relieved of their duty could become a potential army for armed groups given the ‘military’ skills they have acquired.

A second indicator of military professionalism concerns military autonomy, a dimension which refers to the degree of self-governance and the relative independence of the military over the institutional

decision-making process (see Stepan, 1978; Agtiero, 1989). As Heinecken (2013a: 8) aptly notes, military autonomy entails “the authority to decide who is allowed into the profession and to specify the requirements that legitimise their members to perform certain duties.” This means that a professional military is one which exerts “greater control over their internal decisions and less control over ostensibly political ones” (Pion-Berlin, 1992: 84). In theory, it is possible for the military to maintain and exercise a high degree of institutional autonomy on issues affecting the institution. The military can restrict entry into the profession, determine the process of training, define the organizational hierarchy and command, and define and enforce certain rules and regulations which sets it apart from other institutions.

In practice, several factors interfere with this institutional autonomy of the military. The emergence of private military and security companies for instance has meant a loss of monopoly over the knowledge and skills of the institution. As states outsource public security, it affects the decision-making process of the military on several areas that undermine the institutional autonomy of the military. Whereas judgement “on matters such as the size, organization, recruitment and equipment of the forces were the sole responsibility of top military leaders” (Finer, 1962: 27), outsourcing has undermined this institutional prerogative of the military. This is mainly because military leaders must now make decisions together with PMSCs when they are both deployed to serve on the same mission. In other instances, where there is much reliance on PMSCs, their influence affects the ability of the military to make “decisions on staffing, equipment, training, and even how the military conducts operations” (Heinecken, 2013a: 8–9). However, the problem with institutional autonomy of the military is that it could lead to ‘military political autonomy,’ a situation which results from military accumulation and protecting acquired interests/power over civilian leaders (Stepan, 1988). The problem is more likely in countries where civilian supremacy over the military is not the tradition and where there is weak institutionalisation of the military. Hence, “the more valuable and entrenched their interests are, the more vigorously they will resist the transfer of control over these to democratic leaders” (Pion-Berlin, 1992: 85). Where officers begin cultivating such interests, it affects military corporateness, an important indicator of military professionalism.

For Huntington (1957: 10), corporateness entails that “members of a profession share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group.” As an institution distinct from other societal institutions, the military requires a high degree of unity, teamwork, and interdependence, across the rank and file of the service. The corporateness of the institution serves as the basic functional imperative for the military to succeed and to be effective during combat missions (Downes, 1985; Heinecken, 2013a: 11). The importance is that it ensures loyalty and obedience to command, and commitment to achieving mission objectives which would not have been possible where personnel involved are not committed to the task.

Where corporateness is lacking, it signifies that the bond and cohesion which glues personnel together as one and an indivisible force is eroded, and disunity and dissent could result. In such situations, it is difficult for the military to be successful in missions, especially because a lack of cohesion means the likelihood for insubordination and disobeying commands. The discussion of the Nigerian Civil War in the following chapter presents a typical example of the danger of the loss of corporateness and a lack of cohesion within the military. A major consequence is that it undermines the way of life of the military. Also, given the instruments of violence available to the military, where the problem is not addressed promptly, it could become a threat to both society and the political stability of the state. This points to another important dimension of military professionalism, the service ethic and social responsibility of the military.

As Feaver aptly observes, the responsibility of the military is to protect the state against threats and attacks from enemies and competing nation states (Feaver, 1996). Although “the client of every profession is society, individually or collectively,” what distinguishes the military apart from other professionals is the fact that the service of the military is “essential to its immediate existence and functioning” (Huntington, 1957: 9). Also, as the military wields the superior coercive instruments of the state, it is important that it shows a deep level of commitment to serving and protecting the state. The importance of this is that it provides the basis for the legitimacy of the military to maintain “its monopoly over the profession” (Downes, 1985: 159). Clearly, this has implication for this study, which seeks to examine the experiences of civilians with military ISOPs to understand whether the military is upholding this professional ethic as it interacts with the civilian population. Where the military fails to uphold this professional standard, it affects interaction with civilians and the state of CMR, thereby creating room for questions on the behaviour of personnel and the legitimacy of the existence of the institution.

When the military performs ISOPs in society, it can create problems where the sense of selfless service ethic is not engrained within the service. Ideally, serving in the military is considered as an institutional calling for the military man, “the responsibility to serve and devotion to his skill furnishes the professional motive” and provides the necessary job satisfaction (Huntington, 1957: 13). However, studies have since shown that personnel join the military for a variety of reasons which are not necessarily connected with the institutional calling to serve (Battistelli, 1997; Manigart, 2005; Heinecken, 2013a: 13). The problem arises where the motive for joining the service is based on ‘occupational’ incentives such as pay and benefits and not on altruistic values of selfless service. In other words, where it is seen as a job rather than a calling (Janowitz, 1960: 117; Moskos, 1986: 378). Under such conditions, self-interest as against defending the interest of the group/society tends to trump and this weakens team spirit, interdependence, and corporateness. Given this, the service ethic of the military requires the subordination of individual interest to the interest of the group as the key

to success, and to achieving the required professional posture (Huntington, 1957: 63, 1980: 48). These professional values signify that the military is a collectivist institution where individual interests are subjugated for the unit and are necessary for achieving military tasks and objectives.

At this point, it is essential to emphasise that the nature of military work is completely different from those of civilian institutions, including the normal police forces whose duty is the enforcement of law and order (Von Bredow, 2006: 89). Typically, the logic of military strategy follows the extremes of warfighting which has no limit on the use of force (Clausewitz, 1989: 77). As such, the tasks and roles of the military revolves around “the use of maximum force in order to defeat the power and will of the opponent as quickly as possible with minimum costs” (Weiss, 2011: 401). Huntington earlier stressed this when he states that:

The function of a military force is successful armed combat. The duties of the military officer include: (1) the organising, equipping, and training of this force; (2) the planning of its activities; and (3) the direction of its operation in and out of combat (Huntington, 1957: 11).

What this indicates is that the primary mission of the military is warfighting and combat missions as typical in the pre-Cold War era. However, while the traditional work of the military focuses on external defence, in the post-Cold War period characterised by ‘new wars’, there is an increase in the involvement of the military in the internal security sphere to suppress violence and contain the threats posed by armed groups (Ferreyra & Segura, 2000; Lutterbeck, 2004; Weiss, 2012). State militaries have needed to adapt to the new security environment by equipping personnel, or sections of the military with the requisite skills to deal with the threats posed by armed groups. However, military have continued to train for war, as their primary mission and purpose is to use these skills in collateral roles (Dunivin, 1997; Heinecken, 2013b: 251). Warfighting continues to define military culture (Winslow, 1997: 261), norms and practices and this has a profound impact when the military is deployed in internal roles designed to protect the population.

### **3.2.2 Military Culture**

As Volti (2012: 133) aptly states, “the workplace is not just a place for accomplishing job-related tasks and earning a living in the process. It is a repository of values, attitudes, norms, and accepted procedures.” Most organisations/institutions have a culture that guides and shapes the actions and behaviour of workers, and how the work should be done. The military has a distinct culture unlike civilian institutions and organisations which influences their behaviour, norms and values (Collins, 1998). As such, “military culture eventually directs, shapes, informs and provides the context to every single military action, whether of an organisational or operational nature, and irrespective of how big or small such action is” (Esterhuyse, Vreÿ & Mandrup, 2013: xvi).

Several scholars have attempted to define military culture and how this affects institutional functioning and the conduct of military personnel (Dunivin, 1997; Burk, 1999; King, 2006; Soeters, Winslow & Weibull, 2006; Esterhuysen *et al.*, 2013; Okros, 2013). For Lang (1965), military culture consists of three organizational aspects that are necessary for the survival of the organization: communal life, a clearly defined organizational hierarchy, and discipline. Burk (1999: 447) viewed the elements from a different angle, adding to military discipline, cohesion, esprit de corps, etiquette, ceremonies and, professional ethos. In a similar manner, Sun, Sung & Chu (2007: 602) conceptualise military culture as “characterised by authoritarianism (discipline and subordination), hypermasculinity (profession of arms and military ethos), formalism (ceremonial display and etiquette), and a siege mentality (cohesion and esprit de corps).” For clarity and a coherent discussion, I briefly explain the elements of military culture in line with the four elements conceptualised by Sun *et al.* (2007: 602).

As the above definitions highlight, military culture is typified by high elements of authoritarianism in aspects of military discipline, subordination to command, and strict adherence to institutionalised hierarchical structures. Discipline is a core element of military culture, and it encompasses both discipline at individual level and discipline as a unit, on a group level. As Burk explains:

Military discipline refers to the orderly conduct of military personnel – whether individually or in formation, in battle, or in garrison – most often as prescribed by their officers in command ... This may explain why many believe that the military is an institution that requires uncritical and instant obedience to orders. This belief is exaggerated (Burk, 1999: 448).

Whereas Burk dismisses the belief that the military institution requires a level of ‘blind obedience’ to orders from personnel, one fact is that the military treats disobedience as insubordination, and this is often punished by harsh military codes. Such punishments are also swift to serve as an example and a deterrent for other personnel in order to discourage disobedience and the spread of insubordination across the organisation (Heinecken, 2013b: 253). The norm for the military is for personnel – whether individually or as a unit to strictly obey orders from superior without asking questions. Where they have concerns, it is channelled through superior officers as prescribed in the military hierarchy of command.

A second element of military culture is the masculine nature of the working environment. Traditionally, military culture is male dominated, combat focussed or warriorlike, and dominated with masculine values and norms. Masculine traits such as dominance, aggression, toughness, physical strength, risk-taking, crude behaviour and the concealment of emotion is embodied in military culture. Such militarized masculinities are ‘highly functional in an organization whose *raison d’être* is combat, which requires the killing of enemy forces (Enloe, 1993; Williams, 1994; Bulmer & Eichler, 2007). However, it does give rise to a culture of hypermasculinity that legitimises the dominance of men and use of violence. In turn, this subjugates femininity as women are perceived as weak, thereby reinforcing a

misogynistic institutional practice of warriorism and bravery, the consequences which is depersonifying women as 'weak', and in combat situations, objects. As a result, personnel reproduce this in combat situations, especially by abusing women as 'spoils of war' (Morris, 1996; Odoemene, 2012: 229).

Another element of military culture pertains to formalism in terms of ceremonies, display of military artefacts and etiquette of the armed forces. This component of military culture is one of the most visible aspect of the military as it pervades the everyday life of personnel across the rank and file of the military (Burk, 1999: 451). Typical example of military artefacts and military displays includes wearing of military uniforms, saluting as a sign of deference, military marches, and bugle calls. In the same way, the military performs many ceremonies to mark different functions and occasions. There are "ceremonies of induction and promotion or change of command, for military weddings, retirements, and funeral" (Burk, 1999: 452). Other ceremonies include routine practices for everyday work, typical here is ceremonies to "mark the life cycle of soldiers as formations at dawn and dusk, ceremonies for changing the guard, marching in review, and periodic inspections to mark the passing of the soldier's working day" (Burk, 1999: 452). This also serves to distinguish the military from civilians, and to indicate their status, importance and influence within society.

As the military is a collectivist institution where individual interests are subjugated for the unit, cohesion is important for achieving mission objectives. Several scholars have defined how cohesion should be understood, approached and measured. One approach considers cohesion as "the bonding together of members of an organization/unit in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their unit, and the mission" (Vennesson, 2015: 235). Buckingham (1999: 33) considers cohesion as "predicated by mutual confidence between members of a unit in each other's skill, physical ability and courage." Burk sees it as "the feelings of identity and comradeship that soldiers hold for those in their immediate military unit; it is an outgrowth of face-to-face or primary group relations or, in formal terms, of horizontal integration" (Burk, 1999: 453). Siebold (2007: 288) conceptualises it "as an ongoing process of social integration among the members of a primary group, with group leaders, and with the larger secondary organizations to which they belong." For King (2007: 643), cohesion is about social relations such as tasks and 'collective military practices' that unites soldiers as members of a group. The definitions illustrate the importance of cohesion as the military requires a shared commitment for achieving mission objectives.

However, while cohesion is necessary for effectiveness and success in missions, the solidarity, bonding, and loyalty it creates in units or primary groups can be problematic. Winslow (2000: 298) for example observed that "group bonding is a double-edged sword." While it is necessary for achieving organisational goals, it can impede same when some unit refuse to work towards achieving the goals, or when mission objectives are not well articulated (Janowitz, 1974). In mission field or during operations, this becomes the more critical because small units are deployed at various locations, with

some isolated from the command authority (Winslow, 2000: 298). Under this condition, where some unit members decide to derelict, disobey or act contrary to mission objectives, the danger is that other unit members may not report this as it may pose certain consequences for them. This is because military units/groups are inflexible for members to move from one to another, hence, the fear of been ostracised can hinder some from reporting misconducts (Rampton, 1970; Peck, 1983). Some have also observed that because the behaviour of unit members affects the entire group/unit, it is expected that group loyalty, bonding, and solidarity would hinder some group members from reporting unprofessional conducts (Brotz & Wilson, 1946; Winslow, 1997, 2000).

### 3.2.3 Military Socialisation and Habitus

Having examined military professionalism and military culture, one sees that although the values of the military profession differs from those of civilian society, they are necessary for military effectiveness and successes in missions. Given this, one question that immediately comes to mind is, how does the military transfer these values and skills to new recruits whose civilian values are different from those of the military? The question can be answered through military socialisation using military education and training. Socialisation is the process through which individuals are equipped and empowered with the norms and requisite skills and knowledge about the culture, training and skills, and the traditions of a workplace (Soeters *et al.*, 2006: 249–250). As different organisations have different cultures, socialising new members becomes necessary “because nobody chooses an occupation or takes on a job knowing everything he or she needs to know about doing the work” (Volti, 2012: 135). As such, socialisation is an important part of indoctrinating the workforce to learn the basics and values of the institution. For the military, socialisation is crucial given the difference between military culture and civilian values, and the need to transform new recruits from civilians into becoming soldiers. Typically, military training for new recruits occurs within the framework of what Goffman considers as a total institution. For him:

A total institution may be defined as a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together *they* lead an enclosed formally administered round of life (Goffman, 1961: xii).<sup>14</sup>

The military trains new recruits in camps and training bases separate from society in order to reconstruct civilians into soldiers and to inculcate a different value system which is functional to military effectiveness (Ricks, 1997). In other words, military training is an enculturation process which involves reconstructing recruits into becoming soldiers (Winslow, 2000: 298). As they are enclosed and trained in units, it further ensures “that everyone does what he has been clearly told is required of him, under certain conditions where one person’s infraction is likely to stand out in relief against

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<sup>14</sup> Words in italics not in original text.



the visible, constantly examined compliance of the others” (Goffman, 1961: 7). During military training for example, recruits live a regimented life, they have little or no control over their daily routine and are provided with little or no information about this. In return, the military provides them with feeding and caters for their basic needs and when to have access to this. The aim of this training and relative deprivation is to transform the civilian recruits from their liberal civilian values into obedient soldiers who do not question superior command or authority.

The problem with military culture and indoctrination is that the deep-seated militarisation is embodied in the soldiers and for many, it affects their relationship when they interact with civilians in society. As Bergman (2014: 63) explains, few serving, and mostly, senior personnel get to reintegrate in civilian society where they get exposed with the liberal norms of society. As such, the study of the newly recruited American marines during and after their training remains salient here (Ricks, 1997). Ricks described how military training and socialisation affected the reintegration of marines after 11 weeks training in a military camp. Upon the completion of the training and their reintegration with society, the marines’ found their home (civilian) culture appalling, they loath civilian life, and some experienced difficulty in reintegrating with family members and civilian friends. This situation considered as the re-entry or reverse culture shock, a situation in which recruits/members of a culture find it difficult in adjusting to their parent culture when they return because of the exposure they had with other cultures (Sussman, 1986; Bergman *et al.*, 2014: 63). Typically, through the process of military socialisation, soldiers acquire a military habitus that makes it difficult for the personnel to maintain healthy relationship with civilians. Bourdieu defines habitus as:

[S]ystems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them (Bourdieu, 1990: 53).

The definition illustrates that people develop a habitus based on the groups they belong to (for example working class families, elites). Thus, as the habitus exists in the human body, it guides the way people act or behave throughout their life course (Jenkins, 1992: 45–46; Reed-Danahay, 2005: 23). Habitus embodies people “into a permanent disposition, a durable way of standing, speaking, walking, and thereby of feeling and thinking” (Bourdieu, 1990: 69–70). Important to note is that just as habitus is learnt, it can also be unlearned because people have agency (Vest, 2012: 605). However, what is important for this study is that where the military acquires a harmful military habitus, through its behaviour and conduct which has become normalised, it requires a process of re-socialisation and enculturation to change this (Vest, 2012). At this point it is necessary to make some crucial observations as it relates to this study.



One is that where culture of the military is in stark contrast with those of society, it can become very problematic when soldiers are deployed for military ISOPs. This could be caused by a failure to understand and strike a balance between military values (discipline, obedience, timeliness, prompt to use violence, etc.) and the liberal values of society (permissive, discussion and compromise, comfort, etc.). As such, it is possible that they could engage in numerous human rights violations while attempting to enforce discipline, law and orderliness. The implication is that the military habitus of soldiers, especially where they have acquired a culture of abuse can undermine and strain interactions between the military with society and this can have impact on CMR. Given this, it is important to understand CMR, and how the civil control of the military can ensure the military remains professional and not pose a threat to society.

### **3.3 OVERVIEW OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS**

CMR looks at the relationship between the military, political decision makers and its host society. In other words, it encompasses the “relationship between the military and the state, societal structures, and institutions” (Rukavishnikov & Pugh, 2006: 134). It also covers several other issues that connect the military with the state and society in general. However, over the years debates in the field have largely focussed on two broad areas: political control over the institutional and operational use of the military, and how to maintain a military that is apolitical so that it does not intervene in the domestic politics of its state (Feaver, 1999: 211). This is mainly because, as an agent of the state, the military holds the monopoly on collective violence, which it can use either in the interests of the state and citizens, or against them. Hence, the main aim of CMR is to unravel “the meaning, nature and the importance of the phrase” ‘civilian control of the military’ (Eccles, 1979: 125).

Studies on the interaction between the military, society and political leadership only evolved in the 20<sup>th</sup> century when scholars began studying the institution from different perspectives (Rukavishnikov & Pugh, 2006: 131). Much of the literature arose from the American theory of separation of powers, the use of objective control, and from the theory of integrating the military into society (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960; Feaver, 2003a). These different approaches are examined in the latter part of the chapter. However, having looked at what CMR entails, it is necessary to examine the contributions it has made in understanding the interaction of the military with society, especially when it is acting in an internal role. This helps to understand how civilians experience this interaction and how it affects the state of CMR. This is important because in several states the military has become more involved in an internal role of law enforcement and internal security maintenance (Enloe, 1977, 1978; José & Rasmussen, 1999: 5).

### **3.4 CIVIL CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES**

The 20<sup>th</sup> century saw an increasing shift from autocracy to democratic rule in several states across the world. The move entailed civilians becoming the key policy makers whose decisions are final and

binding on all state institutions, including the military. Democracy, therefore, confers control over the military to elite civilian political leaders. In the same way, civil control is the right of legitimately-elected civilian authorities to make key decisions on issues concerning the duties and operational use of the military, and expect compliance from the military (Kohn, 2002; Collins, 2009: 178). As such, the military is the servant of its society, and is subject to the authority of elected civilian representatives (Kohn, 1997: 147). This has implications for democracies and states that have previously been subject to military rule. In such states, the culture of civilian supremacy over the military is not yet an institutionalised principle, or the extent of such institutionalisation may still be feeble (Cilliers, 1995; Bellin, 2004; Baker, 2007). Where the military has previously held political power, it often retains certain significant prerogatives which gives it an edge over civilian leaders. These could be in the form of diplomacy and negotiations, technical skills, and influence over the use of the coercive power of the state. Stepan (1988) defines the prerogatives as:

[T]hose areas where, the military as an institution assumes they have an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within extra military areas within the state apparatus, or even to structure relationships between the state and political or civil society (1988: 93).

These assumed rights make the subordination of the military to civilian authority difficult to achieve, particularly in emerging democracies. When the military perceives itself as a law unto itself, or above the law of the state, this can pose a threat to the civil liberty of citizens and the democracy of the state. Another concern is that the military could abuse their power by threatening to intervene in politics, given their possession of the superior coercive power of the state. Other prerogatives include the possession of funds that were ill-acquired, and the unofficial role of 'anointing' loyal civilians or retired servicemen who would continue to obey the military when 'elected' to positions of authority (Adeakin, 2015: 77–79).

Some have argued that the threat of a military coup in emerging democracies is the greatest challenge facing political leaders (Collier, 2009: 8). In Africa, by the early 1990s about half of civilian governments in the continent had been supplanted by military coups (Cammack, Pool & Tordoff, 1993: 135). Further data shows that, since 1945, out of the 357 successful coups globally, 82 were in Africa, along with 109 failed attempts and 145 plots that were uncovered before execution (Collier, 2009: 8). The data indicates the importance of understanding the nature of CMR and civil control of the military (Rukavishnikov & Pugh, 2006: 136).

Civil control of the military attempts to solve the problem of having to guard the guardians against excesses and self-serving actions, which is particularly crucial in emerging democracies where civil control over the military is not an institutionalised value. Civil control curbs the coercive might of the military to ensure that it does not threaten the social, political, and economic development of the state. A professional military should exist as the agent or servant of its civilian society, and respect

democratic principles such as civilian supremacy and the rights and liberty of citizens. As such, democratic civil control includes overseeing and making the final decisions on the budgets, the operational use, and national security policies of the military. It also ensures that the actions of the military are effectively under check to ensure that it acts within acceptable limits, and not beyond its mission and mandate (Pelle & Schendelen, 1991).

Another crucial reason for democratic civil control of the armed forces is that the military is typically undemocratic in terms of its culture and values (Kohn, 1997: 141; Born, 2006: 154). Military indoctrination and socialisation make it difficult for personnel to adapt to civilian values when deployed into society. While these values are important for the military to function effectively, they set the military apart from society and civilian culture, and this is problematic as it could result in tensions between the military and society. Hence, civil control is a fundamental framework to guide and define the interaction between the military, the citizenry, and the civilian government. The importance of this is that it ensures the military is not predatory on civilians, and that it does not interfere with, or intervene in the political decision-making processes. This serves as the mechanism for ensuring the military remains apolitical, a view that Sarkesian (1981) argues is impossible as no military can be completely politically insular and, to a lesser extent, without self-serving interest. Thus, it is important to examine the theoretical debates on CMR to understand how to effectively deal with this and other issues concerning civil control of the armed forces.

### **3.5 THEORETICAL DEBATES**

Several CMR theories have attempted to explain how states could exercise civil control over the military. Key among these are the classical political separation theory of Samuel Huntington, and the opposing integration approach of Morris Janowitz. Both address issues of the primacy of civil control and maintaining a professional military institution (Nielsen, 2005: 63). Other contemporary theories include Peter Feaver's agency theory, which interrogates the day-to-day control dynamics between the military and elite civilian leaders, and Rebecca Schiff's concordance theory which introduced new perspectives, including cultural and historical variables to the topic. These theories are reviewed in this section to understand how civilian governments control the military in a democratic setting, how the citizenry experiences the action of the military, and the consequence this holds for the state. This chapter is limited to these four theories due to their theoretical relevance, wide usage, and 'acceptability' in the CMR discourse. However, it is important to acknowledge that other contributions abound, some of which have attempted to unify extant theories.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> See Rukavishnikov & Pugh (2006: 132–135) and Lambert (2009: 35) for details of these contributions.

### 3.5.1 The Separation Theory

Samuel Huntington, a political scientist, developed this classical theoretical approach to civil control of the military. To Huntington, the key focus of civil control is how to minimise the power of the military so that it does not become disobedient and a threat to the state (Huntington, 1957: 80). This aligns with similar problems earlier posed by Plato and Juvenile when they asked who ‘guards the guardians’ or who ‘watches the activities of the watchmen?’ (Lambert, 2009: 35). This problem forms the major theoretical concern of Huntington who identified two strategies to minimise the power of the military, to ensure that it does not lose its professional posture or become a threat to the state. These strategies are the use of “subjective civilian control to maximise civilian power; *and* the use of objective civilian control to maximise military professionalism”<sup>16</sup> (Huntington, 1957: 80–83). The subjective civilian control mechanism focuses on minimising the power of the military, while maximising the political power of civilian leadership. By minimising the power of the military and its professional capacity, it reduces the military to a political tool serving the interests of one or more civilian groups in a position of political or economic power. In turn, this enhances the interest of the government ruling the state.

Subjective civilian control has several setbacks that can undermine the security of states seeking to implement it. One is that it civilianises the military and denies it the opportunity for professional advancement and political neutrality (Huntington, 1957: 83). The implication is that it reduces military power to an extent that the military becomes unable to defend the state against external threats and attacks. As Huntington (1957: 80) observed, “subjective civilian control involves the power relations among civilian groups... it is advanced by one civilian group ... to enhance its power at the expense of other civilian groups.” In conflict situations, for instance, the ruling political elite can seize power and direct the military to coerce or raid opposition and opposing communities. Such incidences are more likely to occur when recruitment into the military is biased, or not representative of class, ethnic, racial, or religious backgrounds.

Additionally, subjective civilian control means that a political party or an individual ruler could hold power indefinitely without resolving to handover or allow for a tenure system. With the support and backing of the military, the ruling political elite can direct the military to clamp down on agitators and opposition to ensure the survival of the regime (see Lutterbeck, 2013). In such situations, hostility is likely to erupt as certain groups feel disadvantaged by the power exercised by the ruling political elite, and this can affect the legitimacy of the military. As Lambert (2009: 41) makes it clear, political interference with the military by the ruling political elite means that the military becomes a political

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<sup>16</sup> My emphasis.

tool. Typically, this occurs because subjective civilian control presupposes military involvement and engaging in divisive actions that favour the ruling class, or some groups at the expense of others.

Given the challenges with subjective civilian control, Huntington proposed the use of objective control to ensure that the military acts professionally, within the confines of its political mandate to protect society. Objective civilian control aims at militarising the military as a tool of the state, which is “politically sterile and neutral” (Huntington, 1957: 83–84). In effect, objective civilian control is an insular model based on the separation of the military from the policy decisions of the state. Huntington maintained that the key to effective civilian control is to separate the military from the civilian sphere, and to professionalise the military as experts in the collective management of violence of the state. To achieve this professionalism, the theory proposes the use of incentives to motivate the military into adopting and behaving in certain professional standards. These incentives include an increase in military budget and keeping the military busy with external missions. Other mechanisms involve the use of laws and statutes, with clear lines about how the military receives command from civilian authority, where and how to channel its concerns, and maintaining adequate civilian oversight (Rukavishnikov & Pugh, 2006: 133).

As the key to achieving objective civilian control is increasing military professionalism, Huntington (1957: 11–18) outlined three indicators of military professionalism. One is the expertise of officership, which distinguishes the military from civilians due to their specialisation in the management of violence. Accordingly, this involves the monopoly on the legitimate use of coercive violence, and developing and possessing the skills and knowledge required for this (Huntington, 1957: 8). Personnel acquire these skills by learning, training, and experience from serving in missions and combat operations. However, as armed groups have also developed the capacity to obtain and use arms, what distinguishes professional militaries from armed groups is the purpose for which the skills and knowledge are used. This points to a second indicator of military professionalism – responsibility of officership to the state.

Beyond doubt, states create militaries to serve their interest, and to protect and defend the state against threats and aggression from predominantly external enemies (Feaver, 1996: 150). Under this condition, a professional military must exhibit high levels of selflessness and a deep commitment to service by using its expert skills and knowledge for the good of society. The third indicator, “the corporate character of officership,” distinguishes the military from other professional and non-professional organisations (Huntington, 1957: 16). For Huntington, corporateness entails a shared “sense of organic unity and consciousness... a common bond of work, and the sharing of a unique social responsibility” which makes members distinct from laymen (Huntington, 1957: 10). Because of this, Huntington argues that a professional military “lives and works apart from the rest of society; physically and socially... has fewer unprofessional contacts than most other professional men” (Huntington, 1957: 16). In effect, a professional military is characterised by a strong bond and internal

cohesion amongst its members. However, Huntington emphasised that the best condition for this is when the military is separated from civilian society.

One important contribution objective civilian control provides is its emphasis on professionalising the military because it benefits the state when the military focuses on its core functions, professionalism, and effectiveness. Considering this, Eva Bellin's notion of 'institutionalisation' and 'patrimonialism' of coercive apparatus immediately comes to mind. In her examination of transformation from military and authoritarian regimes to democracies in the Middle East, Bellin (2004) emphasises that military professionalism is critical to CMR. She argues that this affects the action of the military in society and the polity in general, especially when the state faces unpopular protests and agitations. Bellin defines the attributes of an institutionalised professional military thus:

An institutionalised coercive apparatus is one that is rule-governed, predictable, and meritocratic. It has established paths of career advancement and recruitment; promotion is based on performance, not politics; there is a clear delineation between public and private that forbids predatory behaviour vis-à-vis society; and discipline is maintained through the inculcation of a service ethic and strict enforcement of a merit-based hierarchy (Bellin, 2004: 145).

Certainly, these qualities are embodied in the principles of objective civilian control. Conversely, a military could be patrimonial, where decisions on recruitment are "ruled by cronyism; the distinction between public and private mission is blurred, leading to widespread corruption and abuse of power; and discipline is maintained through the exploitation of primordial cleavage, often relying on balanced rivalry between different ethnic/sectarian groups" (Bellin, 2004: 145). Lutterbeck (2013) adds to this when he points out that the relationship of the military with society has a significant impact on CMR, as it affects how the military acts in cases of popular uprisings. While Lutterbeck's focus was on anti-regime/reform protests, he clearly pointed out that the more professional and institutionalised the military, the more it is likely to act in a manner that does not bring harm to society or threaten the political stability of the state. Thus, a weakness in Huntington's theory of CMR was that the interaction of the military with society was not considered, nor the agency of the citizenry.

From the preceding discussion, it is apparent that objective civilian control does not only seek to further militarise the military, but to separate the military from politics and society. This results in an autonomous military, with a division of labour between civilian representatives that formulate military policy, and the military that executes this for the greater good of providing security to the state and the citizenry. While the military provides professional and operational advice in this process, civilians can choose to adopt or reject this when they formulate policies. This includes when and how to deploy the military for any mission. Ideally, this would make the military focus on its core responsibilities: acquiring the essential skills for fighting wars, combat operations and the total destruction or elimination of the 'enemies', but removed from the political realm (Gray, 2007: 37). This ensures that

the military focuses on preparation for military operations, and not on diplomacy and international relations. However, with the decrease in contemporary warfare and an increase of new wars (Kaldor, 2005), the military has become more involved in internal constabulary roles, which undermines the separation theory (José & Rasmussen, 1999: 5).

Huntington's classic theory provides an important lens through which we can understand CMR by examining the separation of responsibilities in democratic states. In states where civilian supremacy is not an institutionalised value, adopting this separation theory could be an important starting point for developing healthy CMR. However, the theory has several shortcomings related to the separation theory. Nielsen & Snider (2009: 291) argue that the separation of the military, especially the officer corps, at the level of policymaking is neither feasible nor realistic. This is because the military is represented by its leadership at the highest level of decision-making with political leaders for security meetings (Nielsen & Snider, 2009: 302). Their contribution is therefore significant, and the possibility of self-serving interest cannot be completely ruled out at this level. Even when the military assumes a non-partisan posture, the fact that it has a registered presence with one or more 'permanent seat' means that Huntington's separation thesis can work in theory, but not in practice. In effect, this theory can pave the way for "unanticipated militarism" in states where civilian institutions and control are weak (Janowitz, 1960: 14).

Another problem with Huntington's objective civilian control separation thesis pertains to the supremacy of civilian government, or its representatives. Although civilian supremacy may be normative and an institutionalised value in the USA, this is not the case in several African countries, where decades of military rule and praetorianism testify to this (Cilliers, 1995: 38; Baker, 2007: 116). The fact that military coups are still being experienced in the 21<sup>st</sup> century highlights that establishing and re-establishing civilian supremacy over the military is a daunting task, as the military is not a passive actor (Chick & Mazrui, 1971: 294). Thus, one can argue that this key assumption of civilian supremacy has undermined the value of the theory as it does not apply universally. From another angle, as the officer corps has become more involved in areas of decision-making, it stands to challenge the supremacy of civilians in decision and policy-making (Kohn, 1997: 141). This raises questions regarding what the reaction of the military would be should civilians prefer different alternatives, and how to protect democracy in such circumstances (Burk, 2002: 13).

In addition, some have argued that civilian supremacy is not only an acquired value, but a product of the cultural and historical politics of a nation (Finer, 1962: 226,240; Born, 2006: 151). In several African states, because warriorism has been held in high esteem, the military is prone to intervene in politics. This is especially the case in situations where the military feels that civilians not accountable and transparent, and where they feel the state is failing to provide public goods and services, including security to the citizenry (Chick & Mazrui, 1971: 281; Welch, 1995). One would imagine that



professionalising the military as Huntington proposes would make the officer corps more answerable to the political authority, but historical experiences in several countries show otherwise. In Nigeria, although the senior officer corps received several international professional education and training, it has not deterred them from intervening in politics (Luckham, 1971; Auma-Osolo, 1980). Because of this, Auma-Osolo argues that “professionalisation of the military alone would not deter the military from intervening, unless it is accompanied by the military's complete satisfaction with civilian control” (1980: 29). This implies that the military has to first recognise and consider civilian supremacy as the accepted norm.

### **3.5.2 The Integration Theory**

The integration theory developed by Morris Janowitz, a military sociologist, focuses on the professional stature of the military and its changing role in society. He views the military as a profession which has defined structures, rules and self-imposed professional standards (Janowitz, 1960: 420). This ensures that the military remains obedient to the rule of law, and he asserts that civilian control of the military can only be achieved when the military is integrated into society and the political decision-making process. Janowitz proposes that common civilian, social, institutional and cultural values must be shared, so that the military does not develop a sub-culture and risk becoming a “state-within-the-state” (Lambert, 2009: 42). He puts forward several arguments why this is crucial to ensure civil control of the military. One of these is the changing pattern of security problems, which has meant that the military is used increasingly in constabulary roles. This means that the military is used in an internal role in several states, blurring the lines between policing and military functions, and between peace and war. He predicted that the military will become more involved in constabulary roles and come to act as “the reserve instrument of ultimate legitimate force” (Janowitz, 1960: 420).

Given this, it is imperative that the military shares and embraces the democratic values of society, and respects the supremacy conferred upon political leaders. Where the military shares the democratic values of society, it will be more committed to achieving the political goals of the state (Janowitz, 1977: 73). Once more, this is dependent on the balance of power between the military and political sphere. Especially in weak and autocratic states, where the military is not completely satisfied with the civilian leadership and where it influences the political decision-making unduly, this can be problematic (Auma-Osolo, 1980: 29; Perlmutter & Bennett, 1980: 3).

When military leaders become more politically conscious due to their internal role and importance in providing political stability and security, it exposes the state to the risk of domestic military intervention in politics. The more the officer corps becomes politicised, the more it develops the desire to seize political power when dissatisfied with the decisions or actions of civilian political authorities. This is particularly true in states where civilian supremacy is not institutionalised, and in states with weak democratic structures and institutions. Perlmutter & Bennett rightly observe this



when they note that “the modern military officer is oriented toward maximising his influence in politics and/or policy” (1980: 3). Thus, because military leaders understand the political decision-making processes, it is easy to motivate self-serving interest using the failure and shortcomings of civilian leaders to intervene in the governance of the state, unless this is curtailed (Feaver, 2003a: 298).

From another angle, while Janowitz’ idea of constabulary forces appears relevant as it concerns the use of the military in constabulary roles, it does not address aspects of CMR that deal with the interaction of the military with the citizenry. This includes areas such as the incidence of military abuse and excesses as witnessed in several internal security and peacekeeping operations. Using the Nigerian context for instance, since the independence of the country in 1960, the military has been involved in several internal security and law enforcement operations (Okoli & Orinya, 2013; Dambazau, 2014). It has also been a major player in politics as Nigeria has been under military rule for about 29 years (Ojo, 2006; Omede, 2012; Adeakin, 2015). However, this has not resulted in the military internalising social values that uphold civilian supremacy and respecting the rule of law or democratic values (Agbu, 2004; Amnesty International, 2015). My reading of Janowitz is that he overlooked how the military can militarise the state in terms of their military culture and professionalism, which affects the way they perform constabulary type roles.

Key among the concerns of using the military internally are military excesses, militarism and the militarisation of society, and the violation of the human rights and civil liberties of the citizenry (Nwolise, 2007; Odoemene, 2012). Often, the problems arise because military training and combat orientation are not suited for law enforcement and crowd-control purposes (Weiss, 2012). Also, while it is “capable of controlling crowds, the military still remains a force to fight wars and is very distinct from the police” (Weiss, 2012: 462). Its basic and most important skill is the ability to incapacitate, destroy and inflict grievous pain on the enemy (Gray, 2007). This accounts for the numerous challenges and discrepancies experienced when it is deployed in an internal role, especially where this entails the use of force. In states where victims of military abuse and excesses are not subject to judicial remedy, this can affect the military’s legitimacy and relationship with the citizenry. What one can deduce from this is that neither the separationist nor integration theories are sufficient to explain CMR, especially in authoritarian states, or states with weak institutions of civil control.

### **3.5.3 Agency Theory**

This brings us to the work of Peter Feaver, who developed the agency theory to address the shortcomings discussed above (Feaver, 2003a: 2). Feaver observed that these theories failed to address issues which transcend beyond military professionalism and domestic military intervention in politics, an issue brought about by the civil-military problematique. The civil-military problematique is a situation where there is the fear that the military would become too powerful and pose a threat to society and the state (Feaver, 1996: 150). This situation arises because, to be effective, the military is

required to be strong enough to engage in sustained combat to defend the state and citizens from external attacks (Feaver, 1996: 151–152). However, as the military is strengthened to cope with security threats (external or internal), the state becomes vulnerable to the coercive force of the military, including seizing of political power.

One possible explanation for the civil-military problematique is the existence of a dysfunctional civil-military gap, with that is, differences in opinions, attitude, and values between the military and the civilian population, particularly policy-makers (Feaver, 1999: 230). Basically, the gap results from the pressure for the military to adapt to systemic forces, such as the changing security environment since the end of the Cold War, and numerous other social, moral, and demographic changes (Feaver, 2003b: 2). Some have argued that the gap could be categorised into distinct (though not often) mutually exclusive types.<sup>17</sup> One of this is a cultural gap which has to do with the differences in “the attitudes and values of civilian and military population” (Rahbek-Clemmensen, Archer, Barr, Belkin, Guerrero, *et al.*, 2012: 671). Typically, this includes differences between military values of patriotism, courage, loyalty, “unity, discipline, and sacrifice, and the civilian life of individuality, hedonism, and self-gain” (Ricks, 1997; Rahbek-Clemmensen *et al.*, 2012: 672).

A second gap is a demographic or functional gap which relates to the representativeness of the military, and whether the military conforms with social, political, and moral societal imperatives. Some of the issues here include whether the military reflects the different population groups (such as ethnic, racial, social classes), and issues of rights and gender equality (Feaver & Kohn, 1999; Rahbek-Clemmensen *et al.*, 2012). Policy preference, the third gap, focuses on the differences of the opinions of civilians and the military on the execution of public policy issues. This includes questions such as whether the military should be deployed in non-traditional military missions, and the amount of force to be used when it assumes such roles (Feaver & Kohn, 1999: 3; Gelpi & Feaver, 2002: 779–780). The fourth gap, knowledge or institutional gap, concerns the level of understanding or harmony between the military and the civilian society, and the effect this has on decisions and support on matters affecting the military (Feaver & Kohn, 1999: 3; Rahbek-Clemmensen *et al.*, 2012: 673). Here, “questions relating to civil control of the military, the influence of the media and the status of the military reflect the implications a growing knowledge gap has for civil-military relations” (Heinecken, Gueli & Neethling, 2005: 128).

The problems with the gap are numerous and of utmost significance for civil control of the military. When the differences grow too wide, the military could become too isolated from society and develop or retain values that are counter to those of society. This becomes problematic, firstly because civilian society cannot influence defence policy, and secondly because the military becomes irritated because

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<sup>17</sup> Heinecken, Gueli & Neethling (2005) discussed the South African civil-military gap using the *Egromas* questionnaire along three levels: cultural, functional, and knowledge gaps.

politicians do not understand the military and the effect that their policies have on the professionalism of the military. As such, this can undermine civil control of the military and “threaten the effectiveness of the armed forces and civil-military cooperation” as officers may resist subordinating to civilian authority (Cohn, 1999: 1; Feaver, Kohn & Cohn, 2001: 1). Accordingly, Feaver developed the agency theory to explain the day-to-day interactions of the state with the military and how political leaders can influence civil control of the military to avoid this problematic.

Agency theory argues that theories of CMR need to take into consideration the day-to-day control over policy decisions that affect the military and its interaction with civilian society (Feaver, 2003a: 2). Thus, while both Huntington and Janowitz considered military professionalism as key to subordination to civilian authority, Feaver (1999: 235) considered this a faultline, and that the rationality of the actions of the actors is a more important explanation of CMR than military professionalism. Feaver developed and modelled his agency theory along the rational choice theory to show how the day-to-day control over policy and decision-making between civilian political authorities and the military occurs. Agency theory considers CMR from a principal-agent perspective, in which the principal (civilian political elites) “seeks ways to assure appropriate behaviour from his military – agent” (Feaver, 1998: 409). The principal chooses a mix of monitoring mechanisms – whether to monitor the military intrusively through numerous parliamentary investigations and having many civilian staff in the defence office. The aim is to allow the military agent to choose how to act, either to comply and obey instructions from the principal, or to shirk by refusing to obey or by acting in ways that undermine the authority of the principal.

Unlike Huntington and Janowitz, Feaver introduced proactive control strategies to ensure that the military carries out legitimate tasks assigned to it by the civilian principal. What this implies are measures to ensure that the military always acts in the interests of the state (Feaver, 2003a: 284). When they fail to do so, the measure proposed by Feaver is to use rewards to recognise and encourage obedience, and sanctions to punish disobedience and wrongdoing. The rewards can range from granting autonomy to the military to make decisions on less critical issues and operational matters, to granting certain benefits such as special recognition and providing pension and gratuity upon retirement. Sanctions can take the form of punishment in several ways, such as a reduced budget, honourable and dishonourable discharge from service, demotion to discharge an erring officer at a lower rank, as well as dismissing high-ranking military officers (Feaver, 2003a: 89–93).

Thus, rewards and sanctions play a key role in his conceptualisation of the agency theory. Feaver claims that CMR is “an ongoing game of strategic interaction, in which civilian principals vary the intrusiveness of their monitoring of military agents and military agents vary their compliance with civilian preferences” (Feaver, 2003a: 282). Agency theory therefore considers both civilian leadership and the military institution as rational actors whose actions are based on expectations of the reaction of each

other, with both parties constantly seeking to exploit the weakness of the other to their advantage. Feaver (2003a: 89) observes this as a limitation of the theory, when he notes that the theory really only applies to societies where civilian supremacy is an institutionalised value and the military accepts its position as an agent of the state, as it is in the USA. Notwithstanding, it is unclear even in such societies whether serious sanctions from political leaders would not create a rift that could affect the state of CMR.<sup>18</sup>

Feaver offers an important lens through which we can understand CMR, especially the contribution on the rationality of actors, and the argument that the action of actors is premeditated upon expected reaction. However, agency theory, just like the separation and integration theories, focuses extensively on civil control, while giving little attention to the citizenry as an important autonomous partner with its own agency. Although Feaver studied the civil-military gap extensively, he emphasises how the civilian society loses their agency and becomes detached from the military (see for instance Feaver, 1999, 2003a,b, Feaver & Kohn, 1999, 2001; Feaver *et al.*, 2001; Feaver & Gelpi, 2004). But what about where the opposite occurs, where societies experience a high level of militarisation due to the presence of the military within society? Agency fails to address how the citizenry experiences their interaction with the military, especially where this is experienced in a negative light due to the violation of the rule of law, or lack of professionalism. Under such conditions, to what extent can the citizenry exert pressure on the state to address the violations of the military?

This raises an important question about the role of civil-society organisations such as NGO's, social movements, churches/mosques, political think tanks, and trade unions on CMR. According to my assessment, it is grossly inadequate for the citizenry to be lumped together with political leadership or its representatives, because citizens play an active role in reacting to or protesting policies, human rights violation committed by the military. Given this, it is necessary to engage with other theories on CMR that may fill this void. One such approach is the concordance theory of CMR developed by Rebecca Schiff.

### **3.5.4 Concordance Theory**

Unlike the separation, integration, and agency theories of Huntington, Janowitz, and Feaver, concordance theory sees the citizenry as an autonomous actor in CMR. Rather than subsuming the citizenry with political leaders or its representatives, it highlights the agency of the citizenry as one of three partners in CMR (Schiff, 2009: 32). This theory has made an important contribution to the debate on civil control by exploring why the military intervenes in the governance of its state, and the

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<sup>18</sup> See for instance the debate on the alleged American CMR crisis during the Clinton era (Weigley, 1993; Kohn, 1994; Feaver, 1996: 170–171, 1998).

conditions that promote or inhibit this.<sup>19</sup> The key argument against Huntington's separation thesis is that for effective civil control to be achieved, there must be a cooperative relationship, and not necessarily a detachment of the military from society and the political decision-making processes (Schiff, 1995: 7). Schiff argues that separating the military from the civil sphere would not necessarily make it apolitical or prevent it from intervening in politics. Rather, it is cooperation and agreement on shared values that inhibits it from intervening in the domestic politics of its state (Schiff, 1995: 12, 2009: 13). In this way, concordance theory favours neither the integration nor separation of the military but it considers both as part of the distinct existing cultural elements that the partners must cooperate and agree upon.

The primary concern of concordance theory is the factors that promote or inhibit military intervention in the politics of its state. The theory proposes that the institutional and cultural conditions of the state and society impact on its CMR. Irrespective of the form of government, concordance can be achieved in a state if some key conditions are met (Schiff, 1995: 12). These conditions are the cooperation, dialogue, accommodation, and sharing of common values among the three partners on four key indicators – the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, method of recruitment, and the style of the military (Schiff, 2009: 44). These indicators are the key elements that the government, military, and citizenry must agree upon. Thus, concordance argues that what inhibits the military from intervening in domestic politics is compliance with the terms of this agreement on the four indicators.

On the first indicator, the social composition of the officer corps, Schiff (1995: 13) maintains that the officer corps forms the managerial and top leadership positions of the military. They handle decisions at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels that affect the functioning of the military. Ultimately, it is senior leadership that provides the link to government and the citizenry. Therefore, the three partners must agree on its social composition for concordance to be achieved. In a democratic state, for example, having an officer corps that is representative of the electoral regions/groupings or the demographic profile of the population is a necessary condition for concordance to take place. This could be through deliberate recruitment and promotion of individuals from the different groupings (be it ethnic, religious, or social classes) to the ranks of the officer corps in the military. However, for concordance to be achieved, this must be done in the context of the cultural and historical tradition of the nation. Concordance theory recognises the peculiarity of diverse cultures, their historical antecedents, and the effects these could have on the composition of officer corps of different states. Especially in deeply-divided heterogeneous nations this is crucial and even more critical in states that

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<sup>19</sup> Domestic intervention in politics, as defined by Schiff (2009: 2), "include forcible actions like *coups d'état*, palace revolts, or other forms of takeover by a nation's armed forces."

have previously had communal conflicts, and military coups that are ethnically biased. For this reason, the three partners need to agree on the size and composition of the military in order to avoid disaffection or marginalisation. Failure to do so could result in discordance that affects the legitimacy of the military and even evoke protest and civil disobedience.

The second indicator, the political decision-making process, comprises of individuals occupying positions of leadership, and the processes involved in deciding the needs of the military, and what to apportion to it (Schiff, 2009: 45). As concordance theory is not limited to any form or system of government, the political decision-making process takes different patterns across different countries. In some, it involves the participation of military officer corps, while in others, the military only has to present its needs and budgets through an assigned government channel. However, irrespective of the form it takes, what is important is that partners reach agreement on the best political processes that meet the needs of the armed forces. The importance of this indicator cannot be overstated. Especially in states where the culture of civilian supremacy over the military is not the norm, this is crucial in order to ensure that the military concurs with political decisions and to prevent it from intervening in politics (Auma-Osolo, 1980: 29). Hence dialogue, agreement, and accommodation are critical when it concerns political decision-making to forestall the risk of military intervention.

The method used to recruit civilians into the armed forces is the third indicator of concordance. As concordance theory is not limited to any particular system of government, it argues that the three partners must agree on what recruitment method serves the state best.<sup>20</sup> Schiff (2009: 46) argues that concordance is only achieved between the military and the citizenry when the state uses non-coercive methods of recruitment to enlist civilians into the military. Concordance theory therefore considers persuasive recruitment as a form of agreement between the three partners on how to conscript or enlist volunteers into military service. This may pose a challenge for all-volunteer forces who may fail to attract certain ethnic or religious groups into its ranks, making it unrepresentative of society.<sup>21</sup>

The composition of the military is a critical factor underpinning the legitimacy of the armed forces in society. Where for instance recruits are not a fair representation of the diverse social groups (religious, class, ethnic or racial), it could undermine its general acceptance and the cooperation it is likely to receive from 'marginalised' groups. In this regard, concordance argues that targets for enlistment, and the persons attracted and recruited, should be a fair representation of the diversity in society. To achieve this, it requires that the three partners agree on the recruitment pattern, the

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<sup>20</sup> For an expanded discussion on the styles and cycle of military recruitment, see Finer (1975: 95–96).

<sup>21</sup> The persuasive non-voluntary conscription into the Israeli Defence Force and many others are notable exception (Schiff, 2009: 120).

composition, and the characteristics of the recruits to ensure that it does not result in dissatisfaction from the citizenry or 'marginalised' members of the armed forces.

Military style is the final indicator of concordance, and it relates to the human and cultural aspects of the armed forces. It covers broad issues affecting the external characteristics of the military and how other partners think about it, such as how the military relates to society, its status, the perception of the citizenry, and the symbols that distinguishes it from the rest of society (Schiff, 1995: 15–16, 2009: 47). However, as Schiff maintains that the primary goal of concordance theory is to predict the conditions that promote or inhibit domestic intervention (Schiff, 1995: 8,12, 2009: 42–43), concordance theory, generally, failed to account for the everyday implication of military style. The theory is limited by its inability to reflect on the effect of military style on society. It did not account for the implication of othering of civilians and extolling military values over those of society, especially where the military has a pervasive presence in society. Thus, although Schiff highlighted the importance of the human and cultural aspects of the armed forces, she failed to consider its negative implication for society when she developed concordance as a predictive theory. Where civilians are dissatisfied by their othering from the military, they can exercise their agency in ways that can affect CMR, however, concordance theory failed to explain this.

Overall, concordance theory has made important contributions that could help us understand why the use of the military has become problematic in Plateau State, Nigeria. This is particularly because of the specific recognition it gives to the citizenry as an important partner in CMR. With this, it is possible to understand some of the tensions that emerge in relation to the interaction and experience of the citizenry with the military. The four indicators also reflect issues of interest in a deeply divided state, such as Nigeria, where the daily presence and impact of the military on civilian life is constantly felt, which is discussed in the following chapter. However, it oversimplifies the complex relationship between these actors as a given (Ali, 2014: 544). Schiff simply presumed that dialogue, accommodation, and sharing of common values among the three partners would lead to concordance and inhibit military intervention, as though this is a very simple and an established process across diverse cultures and societies (Ali, 2014: 549). However, as this study will show, this process is not a given and several other factors affect CMR, despite agreement on the indicators.

In emerging democracies where governance institutions are weak or non-existent, civil societies are generally either weak, crippled, or self-serving, it is difficult to imagine how the citizenry could be an influential partner. Along with this, the opinions of citizens are only heard during elections in such societies, making it even more difficult to assume that a cooperative relationship could easily be



achieved. In the states of the 'Bottom Billion',<sup>22</sup> because the voices and opinions of the citizenry do not necessarily matter, their votes do not count and are not a guarantee for electoral victory. We see the citizenry further overshadowed by both the political and the military partners (Collier, 2009: 36). As Collier (2007: 46) makes it clear, because these states derive a significant portion of their revenue from natural resources and not from the taxation of citizens, it undermines the ability of the citizens to demand delivery of public goods and services. It also undermines the influence of the citizenry to demand accountability and transparency from elected officials. Thus, concordance suffers from another weakness, which is the inability to explain 'how' and 'the ways' in which the citizenry could influence or exercise agency in the relationship.

Although Schiff noted that concordance applies across different systems of government, the theory made no attempt to show how the citizenry could exert influence in the decision-making process. Whilst the citizenry could organise collectively into civil-society organisations, social movements, or interest groups to petition government using several platforms, these avenues are limited, and less effective especially in praetorian, authoritarian and weak democracies. From another angle, empirical evidence has shown that in several societies, especially in Africa, multi-cultural diversity and religious identity has been divisive, affecting social cohesion and often leading to conflict when the state is unable to contain this (Fearon & Laitin, 1996, 2003; Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000). In societies where communal violence continues to manifest along these dividing lines, conflict, distrust, and disunity inhibit the ability of the citizenry to collectively act as an important collaborative partner, as concordance theory suggests. Rather, the citizenry becomes deeply divided, weakened and incapable of acting as a partner with the ability to influence the decisions that affect their security.

Another major weakness of concordance theory, as with the other theories, is its limited focus in terms of scope and application. The theory explains why the military intervenes in domestic politics, and the conditions that promote or inhibit this intervention (Schiff, 1995: 7). As this study explores the interaction of the citizenry with the military and how they experience its presence in their daily lives, concordance is useful but limited. This is because of the failure of the theory to advance beyond the traditional focus of CMR, which is how to prevent the military from intervening in domestic politics. Schiff acknowledges this limitation when she says that concordance "is limited by its causal objective, which is to predict the prevention or occurrence of domestic military intervention" (2009: 42). Concordance theory thus fails to provide an adequate lens through which to study the interaction of the military with the populace, and how this affects the delivery of the most important public good of all - the security of citizens.

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<sup>22</sup> 'The Bottom Billion' is a concept referring to a combination of several African and Central Asian and other countries characterized by high incidences of civil war, plagues, ignorance and high economic dependencies (Collier, 2007: 3).



In conclusion, although dialogue, accommodation, and sharing of common values among the three partners could lead to a cooperative relationship, it does not guarantee that the military will act professionally. While agreement on the indicators of concordance are important, they are not sufficient to guarantee that the military will uphold professional ethics and not prey on citizens, seek self-serving interests, or engage in excesses and human rights violations. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, concordance makes an important contribution to CMR by introducing the citizenry as an autonomous partner with agency, but not in the context of the conduct of the military in its interaction with the citizenry. My argument is that aspects of CMR dealing with the interaction of the military with citizenry have not received adequate attention. Therefore, there is a need for theoretical reconsideration and modification to explain this, especially because of the frequency of internal conflicts caused by armed groups, and the increasing internal use of the military. The following section tries to clarify this in terms of the agency and impact of the citizenry on CMR.

### **3.6 CMR BEYOND DICHOTOMY: A QUADRUMVIRATE INTERACTION THEORY**

In the previous section, some key theories of CMR were reviewed, and the shortcomings highlighted. One of these is that the theories focus mainly on the prevention of military intervention in politics and civil control of the military, while largely ignoring the role of the citizenry. A second shortcoming concerns the dichotomous approach which lumped the citizenry together with the political sphere, while disregarding the agency of the citizenry as a partner in the relationship. Thus, the interaction of the military with the citizenry, how it experiences the military, how this affects CMR, and the numerous ways the citizenry could influence the relations is still largely undertheorized. What this means is that studies which focus on the interaction of civilians with the military, their experiences, and reaction to military actions suffer theoretical limitations.

Given this, there is a need to advance beyond the political-military dichotomy, as concordance has shown, but also beyond focusing on preventing domestic military intervention in politics, which limits concordance theory. This section advances a quadrumvirate interaction theory as an alternative that could help to fill this void. My assessment of the CMR literatures is that the concordance theory is the most relevant theory that can be applicable to any state, irrespective of the system of government it practices. Chiefly, this is because concordance recognises the agency of the citizenry (even though it did not explain how they exercise this), and it adopts both institutional and cultural explanations (Schiff, 1995: 12). Given this, the quadrumvirate interaction theory upholds a significant aspect of concordance theory explanation of CMR.

In Chapter One (section 1.6.3), quadrumvirate interaction in CMR was defined as a fourfold interaction occurring between three partners, namely, the military, political elites, and the citizenry. As a theory, quadrumvirate interaction in CMR aims to achieve two objectives. The first is to provide a theory of CMR that is both descriptive and predictive to explain the conditions that promote or hinder domestic

military intervention in politics. The theory achieves this by explaining the complex everyday interaction between the partners in CMR using both micro level issues and institutional explanations at policy decision-making level. The second objective is to identify the indicators necessary for a healthy state of CMR, the sources of an unhealthy or strained CMR, and how the citizenry exercise agency in ways that influences the state of CMR.

### **3.6.1 Indicators of Concordance/Agreement**

To maintain a healthy CMR and prevent the likelihood of a domestic military intervention in politics, the quadrumvirate interaction theory holds that the partners have to share common values, agree, and cooperate on five indicators. Schiff (2009: 44) identified four of these indicators as – the composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and the military style. As these four indicators have been discussed, I focus on the fifth indicator advanced by the quadrumvirate interaction theory. The fifth indicator, namely the ‘military approach’ is the reflective and interactive aspect of military style which considers both human and relational variables which affects the military’s interaction with society.


Military approach recognises that the military style, that is the status, symbols, and military culture can affect its conduct and (ab)use of power can have a dysfunctional effect on society. Hence, the military approach serves as the reflective and interactive indicator of how military personnel act or behave in terms of their professionalism and the authority it wields. However, where the military’s approach undermines the culture, tradition, and values of society, it is likely to create a gap between the military and the citizenry. As with the separation approach of Huntington, the challenge is that the military can become isolated from society, and this could result in several negative effects to the state. As earlier discussed in section 3.5.3 this can result to the abuse or misuse of power (see Ricks, 1997; Cohn, 1999; Feaver *et al.*, 2001; Feaver, 2003b; Heinecken *et al.*, 2005).

Another challenge is the likelihood that the military could develop a sub-culture different from that of society. Typically, this is based on the effects of military socialisation and the attributes assigned to the military as a profession and an institution (Lambert, 2009: 42). In states where the military conducts frequent internal security duties, the problem could be worsened where personnel take advantage of their position to ‘other’ civilians or to engage in other forms of unprofessional conduct. Therefore, as the reflective and practical aspect of the military style indicator, military approach ensures that personnel inculcate and respect the values of society. The importance of sharing the values and traditions of society is that it promotes a cordial relationship between the military and society, and also fosters high degree of institutionalisation of the military in society (Bellin, 2004: 145; Lutterbeck, 2013: 33).

### 3.6.2 Quadrumvirate Levels of Interaction


In terms of the partners in CMR, the quadrumvirate interaction theory holds that CMR comprises of the interaction of three partners who have the capacity to exercise some level of autonomy. The partners are the military, civilian political elites, and the citizenry. As with concordance theory, quadrumvirate interaction theory recognises the autonomy of the citizenry, and it further explains how they exert their agency in the relationship. It maintains that the citizenry is separate from elite civilian political leaders who act as the representative of the people, and exercise civil control over the military. This way, the theory presents a holistic account of CMR showing the distinct interactions between the military and the citizenry, the military with the political elites, and the political elites with the citizenry. Zeki Sarigil illustrated this relationship between the three partners in what he calls “the three intersecting spheres in a polity” (Sarigil, 2011: 267).

**Figure 3.1 Sarigil’s Three Intersecting Spheres in a Polity**



Source: Sarigil (2011: 267) Civil-military relations beyond dichotomy

Figure 3.1 above shows how the interaction in CMR occurs in society. For Sarigil, three levels of interaction occur between (1) the military and political elite, (2) the military and society, and (3) the political elite and society. Here, the military sphere, the political sphere, and the sphere of the citizenry/society (social) are in a discontinuous interaction in society, which is influenced by several factors. This includes the political system in place, the presence of the military in society in peace and conflict, and the role of the military in both social and political spheres. However, as Figure 3.2 shows, a fourth level of interaction exists to make it a ‘quadrumvirate interaction’ among the three partners, and not three levels as Sarigil identified. Accordingly, the quadrumvirate interaction comprises of one major level of intersection among the three partners, represented with the number ‘1’, and three other subunits of interaction, represented with the numbers ‘2’, ‘3’, and ‘4’ in Figure 3.2.

**Figure 3. 2 The Quadrumvirate Interaction in Civil-Military Relations**

Source: Modification of Sarigil's three intersecting spheres in a polity<sup>23</sup>

Although all the units of interactions are distinct levels of interaction, they could overlap in real life situations, and this means that they are not always mutually exclusive. Important to note also is that the subunits of interaction have a crucial determinant role that indicates the sources of strained CMR that can lead to a domestic military intervention in politics. Understanding the nature and pattern of interaction at each subunit is thus important. Where for instance, a relational problem exists in one or more subunit, failing to address it could create a problem that can alter any understanding or cooperation reached at the major level of intersection. The concern as historical evidence has shown in various countries is that this can in the long run act as the condition that favours/instigate some personnel to seize political power in order to save the situation. For conceptual clarity, I discuss these levels.

### 3.6.2.1 The major intersecting level

Interaction at this level takes place among all the partners – the military, the social (citizenry) and the political sphere. This is the level of interaction Schiff describes in concordance theory while not emphasising the three-subunit level of interaction. Schiff argues that concordance occurs when the three partners enter a cooperative relationship of mutual accommodation, which in turn lessens the likelihood of domestic military intervention in politics. However, while there could be an agreement at this level as Figure 3.2 shows, there are three other levels of interaction with a causal impact on the relationship which concordance did not explore. Similarly, it is also possible to relate this level of interaction with Janowitz's theory, which posits that the key to civil control of the military is integrating it into society and the political decision-making process. However, although Janowitz did not recognise the agency and causal role of the citizenry, his proposition for integrating the military produces the intersection of the three spheres of CMR.

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<sup>23</sup> The quadrumvirate interaction, my modification of Sarigil's three intersecting spheres in a polity.

As with Schiff's concordance theory, because Janowitz did not consider CMR from this tripartite partnership, his theory did not envisage the likelihood of problems outside this intersecting level. When he argues that sharing common institutional and cultural values would help prevent the military from forming other sub-cultures outside of the state, he did not consider the distinct level of interaction between the citizenry and the military in peace and conflict. He also did not consider that a distinct interaction exists between the military and the political elite, and between the political elite and the citizenry. This has meant that his theory did not discuss the causal effect these subunits have on CMR at this intersecting level. This supports Schiff's contention that failing to theorise CMR from this tripartite partnership "reflects only a partial story of CMR" (Schiff, 1995: 13). While we can make the same conclusion with Huntington's separation theory, his proposition for detaching the military sphere from the political sphere differs significantly in terms of the intersection of the partners in this level. Thus, his theory explains neither the causal relationship at this level, nor the subunits of interaction and their causal effect at the major level of interaction. This raises the need to understand the subunits of interaction between the partners.

### **3.6.2.2 Interaction between the military and citizenry**

This level of interaction between the military and the citizenry (one of the three subunits) is represented with the number '2' in Figure 3.2. Together with the two other interaction levels ('3' and '4'), I consider these levels as the subunit because interaction at the level occurs outside of the centre or the intersecting level. In this subunit of interaction between the military and the citizenry, the interaction is between the military institution, made up of recruits, privates, and officer corps, and the citizenry (civilians and different civilian and civil society groups). Some of the interactions in this subunit occur because of the decisions made at the intersecting level. These include decisions to recruit citizens into the military, which requires enlisting civilians either by conscription or voluntary enlistment. Another instance is the decision to deploy the military internally for law enforcement and security duties in times of conflict, or the decision to site a military infrastructure such as a military base within a local community. These present instances which bring the military into close and frequent interaction with civilian society, and the interaction between the military and citizens occurs outside of the major intersecting level of interaction.

In this subunit, it is possible to see the interplay of human and relational variables as the military interacts with the citizenry. The military and the citizenry could have a cordial or a strained relationship, which can affect the general state of CMR at the intersecting level. As Bellin (2004: 145) and Lutterbeck (2013: 33) illustrate, where there is high degree of institutionalisation of the military, the military upholds professional standards in its interaction with civilians when it acts internally. However, when the military has no firm relationship with society, it can result in predatory actions on civilians, especially in deeply divided societies facing communal conflicts. In such a situation, one can

only but agree with Buzan (1991: 45) that the state and its institutions constitute a major source of threat and insecurity to the citizenry.

Faced with military abuse and violation of their human rights, the citizenry can retaliate against the abuse, and certainly, when civilians revolt against the military, it affects CMR. In societies where chastity is esteemed, and ‘immoral’ behaviours are culturally proscribed, issues such as sexual involvement of soldiers with unmarried women could evoke condemnation, tension, and hostility towards the military. Where the citizenry perceives the military as biased in military ISOPs, or predatory on civilians, discontent and hostility could result. When such incidences occur outside the major intersecting level, they could be dismissed as merely society-military issues, and not necessarily CMR issues, but CMR is concerned with the “relationship between the military and the state, societal structures, and institutions,” so this cannot be overlooked (Rukavishnikov & Pugh, 2006: 134). Discontent and hostility between the military and citizens could affect and undermine the interaction and relations at the major intersecting level. When there is distrust and hostility towards the military’s role in addressing internal conflict, it whittles away the legitimacy of the military and its professional stature. Thus, the relationship and interaction of the military with its civilian population is an important aspect of CMR that needs careful attention.

There is no doubt that basic aspects of military culture differ from those of civilian society, as the military is authoritarian and, as Finer (1962: 5) argues, it enjoys some advantages over civilian organisations. However, it becomes problematic when they abuse this power and authority to intimidate or denigrate and ‘other’ civilians (Jamieson & McEvoy, 2005; Brons, 2015). For example, ‘othering’ extends beyond the differences between persons or groups, it encompasses strategic actions such as denying privileges and fundamental human rights of the othered persons/groups, such as civilians, or those of other ethnicities, religions, classes or races. Thus, it paves the way for further exploitation, coercion, and intimidation. Instead of protecting the citizenry, soldiers engage in abusive behaviours when they depersonalise civilians, and this could result in mass atrocities such as genocide, collaborating with armed groups to attack the othered population, and gender-based violence (GBV) (see Enloe, 2004; Kelly, 2010; Odoemene, 2012). When this occurs, it erodes the legitimacy of the military, weakens professionalism and strains CMR, especially where civilians react or retaliate.

### **3.6.2.3 Interaction between civilian political elites and the citizenry**

Interaction at this level is represented with the number ‘3’ in Figure 3.2. It depicts the interaction between the political institution and the citizenry. At this level of interaction between the polity and society, several factors influence the relationship at both the subunit and the level of intersection. One key factor is the ability of the political elite to constantly maintain the supply of public goods and services, including the security and welfare needs of the citizenry. When the state is unable to provide this, and the citizenry has a general perception that the political elite are unable to guarantee their

needs and safety, it creates dissatisfaction. In other instances, pro-reform movements and agitation movements by opposition emerge from outright dissatisfaction with the political elite or political system in an authoritarian regime. A typical example here is the recent waves of anti-regime protest in the Middle East (the Arab spring, or Arab renaissance) (Lynch, 2012; Nepstad, 2013).

The point here is that the political elite or the political level of policy and decision making differ from the general population, in contrast to the view of several CMR theories. Political elites make policy decisions for the state, while expecting compliance from the citizenry (Stepan, 1978: xii). However, although the state defines social relationships through its political institutions, it derives legitimacy and ability to govern through the approval and support of its citizens. As such, the citizenry as a collective play a significant role in this level of interaction when it exercises its agency. Thus, irrespective of the system of governance, if the state enjoys a growing approval and legitimacy amongst the citizenry, it is likely to obtain their loyalty, support, and allegiance (Boudon, 2017: 287–288). This forms the necessary conditions for the state to not only extend its presence, but also its ability to govern its people (Mann, 1984; Yashar, 2005: 6).

The process of legitimising or disregarding political decisions makes up a crucial aspect of CMR, especially when these decisions revolve around the operational use of the military and other military matters. Key among these options is the collective action of the citizenry using civil-society organisations to influence political decisions. Lobbying, protest actions, strikes and demonstrations are common tactics used to influence or oppose political decisions. However, while this option follows legitimate and non-violent means, the citizenry may also use violence to protest or react to abusive state actions. Often, social movements and interest groups metamorphose into armed groups with clear political goals to compel governments to concede to their demands. This sphere of interaction in CMR between the political and social realms holds crucial indicators for the state, its security, and its economic, political, and social stability. Not only does wide disaffection result in the loss of political legitimacy, but historical evidence shows that growing insecurity, hostility, and dissatisfaction with a government does lure the military into intervening in politics to ‘salvage the situation’ (Ojo, 2009a; Cohen, 2012: 464; Sarigil, 2015: 286).

#### **3.6.2.4 Interaction between the civilian political elites and the military**

In the last level, marked number ‘4’ in Figure 3.2, the interaction occurs between the political elites and the military. Here, most of the interaction occurs between political elites occupying political positions of authority and military officer corps. However, in contrast to what extant theories argue (with concordance as an exception), this level is only a subunit and not the major level of interaction, given that the citizenry is not involved. What occurs at this level is the interplay between political actors and military officer corps on several issues concerning the day-to-day control over the military, and its roles and functions (see Feaver, 1997, 2003). However, as the military is not a passive actor, it

also tries to influence the political sphere on several issues through various mechanisms. As Feaver (2003a: 57–62) indicates, the options available to the military include working diligently or shirking.

In societies where civilian supremacy is not an institutionalised value, heightened discontent and dissatisfaction by the military could result in military coups or other forms of forceful intervention in politics (Feaver, 2003a: 58–60). Also, as we have previously seen, in states where the military has previously intervened in politics, it is likely to have acquired certain prerogatives that provide a firm grip on the political sphere (Adeakin, 2015). Among others, these include the “constitutionally sanctioned independent role of the military in the political system, special military relationship to the chief executive, coordination of defence budget, and military operation outside of civil and criminal laws” (Stepan, 1988: 94–97). Such prerogatives and influence of the military could lead to a situation of “unequal civilian accommodation” of the military, thereby undermining the ability of the legislature to carry out effective oversight (Stepan, 1988: 101). In such circumstances, the military’s predation can be overlooked or unchallenged, or the ruling elites could be the ones sanctioning or supporting such predatory action. Several instances of this are discussed in the following chapter.

### **3.6.3 A Typology of the Exertion of Agency by the Citizenry in CMR**

As a partner in CMR, the citizenry exerts their own agency that can influence the relationship with the military. However, extant theories have failed to explain the various ways the citizenry does this. Typically, this is because most of the theories have lumped the citizenry with the civilian political elite, hence, the dichotomous approach which only recognised the military and political elites has undermined this recognition. Also, concordance theory which recognised the citizenry as a partner in CMR failed to do so because the theory is overly predictive by design, a limitation which undermines its general value and application in different countries. The problem with a predictive theory such as concordance, is that it does not account for the agency of the citizenry in CMR. It simply indicates that the cooperation of the citizenry is required to deter the military from intervening. Hence the need to indicate how the citizenry exert agency and influence CMR is needed. The citizenry can exert agency in CMR in four different ways. Verweijen (2015: 191–192) identified three of these ways as compliance, contestation and collaboration, to which I add confrontation to this.

#### **3.6.3.1 Compliance**

One way the citizenry exercise agency in CMR is through compliance. Compliance simply denotes obedience to instructions, demands, agreements reached on the nature of CMR at the major intersection level, a policy instruction or an order from either of the other partners. In other words, compliance is “a form of behaviour that implies fulfilling a demand” (Verweijen, 2015: 191). However, the demands or instructions issued can be a legitimate instruction or an illegitimate order. Hence, compliance from the citizenry can either be willingly because the citizenry are law abiding or unwillingly because they wish to avoid stiffer sanctions or punishments for non-complying. For example, the



citizenry could comply to instructions such as an imposition of a curfew by the civilian political elite to restrict movement in times of serious internal threats. They could also comply to the instruction out of fear of running into trouble with the military where they are deployed internally to enforce such regulations, and not necessarily because they wish to comply.

A typical example of an illegitimate instruction is the demand for money by soldiers at checkpoints, which can also attract willing or unwilling compliance. Usually, those issuing the instructions/demand are in a higher position of power than the citizenry, hence, the citizenry tends to comply even where it causes them some dissatisfaction. The consequence of this is that it reinforces the dominance of the military, and where the demands are illegitimate, it promotes the culture of impunity and a lack of transparency and accountability. However, as the citizenry obeys and complies to such instructions and demands, it tends to have little impact on the state of CMR.

### **3.6.3.2 Contestation**

A second way the citizenry exert agency is through contestation, especially non-compliance or non-obedience to demands, actions or practice(s) they are dissatisfied with. Contestation could also be in the form of active resistance by the citizenry against military authority, or the way it uses its power, given that power attracts resistance, especially when it is perceived to be abused or used indiscriminately (Foucault, 1978: 95). This position was re-emphasised by Scott (1985: 290) when he stressed that resistance comprises of numerous actions and strategies employed by a subordinate group against the domination by a superordinate group or class. However, resistance in this sense does not involve the use of violence but a myriad of actions such as protests, strike and demonstrations, lobbying, and the use of legal remedy to contest certain demands, actions, or practices.

Other forms of resistance include “negotiation and bargaining; trickery, hiding, and avoidance; irony; the use of rumours” and spreading and propagating ‘fake’ or mostly unverified information/news that may not be true or that has been exaggerated (Verweijen, 2015: 195–208, 2018). Typically, resistance by the citizenry could be directed against demands or actions of the military, or against the decisions of the civilian political elite. Hence, unlike compliance, a prolonged or sustained contestation effort can alter the state of CMR. However, until the resistance gains popular support and momentum, the change it could force may be slow.

### **3.6.3.3 Collaboration**

The third way the citizenry exerts agency in CMR is through collaboration. Collaboration is a form of alliance or cooperation with the military or civilian political elite to achieve certain aims or demands. Unlike compliance, collaboration could either involve the citizenry requiring certain actions from either of the partners or could require a close-involvement of either of the partners with the citizenry

in order to achieve a given aim. This makes it “a more interactive process in which civilians might (also) place demands on the military in order to further their projects, or which concerns jointly developed and/or executed projects in which civilians actively participate” in contrast to just obedience from the citizenry (Verweijen, 2015: 192).

Given this, it becomes clear that collaboration achieves two aims; a legitimate and/or an illegitimate aim. Legitimate aims are legally sanctioned processes, demands or projects that are within the domain of the partners to achieve within a given period of time and under certain stipulated conditions. For example, cooperating and sharing vital information with the military towards achieving mission success during domestic deployment. This could also be in the form of “voluntarily alerting<sup>24</sup> the military to a certain detour that people take in order to avoid passing a roadblock” (Verweijen, 2015: 192). In contrast, illegitimate aims simply denote illegal, extra-legal, and unprofessional acts, inactions, demands, or practices by two or more of the partners. Typical examples include a section of the citizenry or armed groups cahooting with compromised soldiers, or the political elite aiding an attack on unsuspecting groups or communities, or to overlook an attack when it is occurring.

#### **3.6.3.4 Confrontation**

The fourth and final strategy the citizenry uses to exert agency in CMR involves the use of confrontation against the military or political elites over demands, actions, or practices they are dissatisfied with. Normally, confrontation could be moderately used in the form of contestation or resistance. However, as Scott & Smith (1969: 1) observed, confrontation is more frequently associated with a “radical and revolutionary” connotation which involves the use of threats, force, or/and violence. Thus, as a strategy of exerting agency in CMR, the citizenry could engage in violent hostility towards the military - be it towards a soldier, some soldiers, or a certain unit such as those at a military checkpoint. Generally, such confrontation from the citizenry only occurs occasionally and is mostly triggered by a threat action on a civilian group, such as the killing of a civilian by a soldier, or when soldiers fail to respond to a call for distress in time. Similarly, where the citizenry feels dissatisfied by a government which it sees as lacking legitimacy and is been unable to provide basic public goods and services including public safety and security, it could result to confrontation against the civilian political elites.

As confrontation is used in this context as radical and sometimes, revolutionary, it involves various forms of violent hostilities directed against the other partners – the military or/and the political elite as they case may be. Typical confrontation tactics involves retaliating military abuse through mob justice and attacking personnel/political elites, resisting state control, forming and/or collaborating with

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<sup>24</sup> My emphasis.

armed groups, and violent uprising against the state. The Arab spring especially in Libya where violent uprising led to the overthrow of a civilian government is a typical example here (see Lynch, 2012; Lutterbeck, 2013; Pion-Berlin, Esparza & Grisham, 2014). Unlike the other three forms of exertion of agency which reinforces the power position of especially, the military, confrontation is an expression of the agency and power position of the citizenry. Given this, confrontation has a higher tendency to force a change in the state of CMR than all the other forms of exertion of agency because of the hostility, aggression and possible violence this can evoke.

Hostility such as directing violence against the military, pulling down a military checkpoint and chasing away the personnel indicates a collective action which re-enforces the agency and power of the citizenry, when they act as a united force. Where civilian communities are marginalized or oppressed, they may employ this as a way of expressing local autonomy (Godoy, 2004: 637–639). Such conduct is more likely to occur in states where the military is frequently deployed in an internal role and where the military assumes a military approach that undermines the values and traditions of society. Given this, it is necessary to understand the various forms the military assumes based on their conduct and interaction with the political elite and citizenry.

### 3.7 THE FOURFOLD MILITARY TYPOLOGY

From this discussion of the quadrumvirate interaction between the three partners in CMR, it is possible that the military assumes different postures in its interaction with society and the polity. Sarigil (2011: 267) developed a fourfold military typology which I find relevant and useful to this discussion. An attempt will be made to summarise his submission, but first it is necessary to emphasise Perlmutter & Bennett's submission, that the professional posture of the modern soldier symbolises a fusionist portrait. The fusionist ideation "recognises that bureaucracy and politics, government and administration experts, and politicians are all symbiotically connected" (Perlmutter & Bennett, 1980: 13). This reinforces the intersectional position of Sarigil, and it further supports Janowitz's position of integration and sharing of common values between the political and military spheres. Another point is that, irrespective of the type a nation's military assumes, it is bound to have some level of political role and societal integration, be it minimal or high, hence the rationale behind Table 3.3 below.

**Table 3.1 Sarigil's Fourfold Military Typology**

		Societal Integration	
		Low	High
Political Role	Low	Q1 Professional	Q2 Nation's Army
	High	Q3 Predatory Praetorian	Q4 Popular Praetorian

Source: Sarigil (2011: 268) Civil-military relations beyond dichotomy

### **3.7.1 The Professional Military and Military Professionalism**

As Table 3.3 indicates, the professional military is one with low political role and low societal integration. Following Huntington, the military is professional when it has low or minimal political role/interference and a low level of integration in society, upholds civilian supremacy and is committed to fulfilling the wishes of its civilian 'master', to whom it is subordinate. Some examples of this type of military are found in Western European and North American countries (Sarigil, 2011: 268). Typically, a professional military recognises its roles and its position as distinct and different from political duties, which it keeps away from. As Huntington contends, "the vocation of officership absorbs all their energies and furnishes them with all their occupational satisfaction. Officership is an exclusive role, incompatible with any other significant social or political roles" (Huntington, 1956: 381). Thus, the professional military has minimal interaction with the social sphere. However, as we have seen with Huntington's separation theory and the agency theory, a detached military can lose touch with civilian values, creating a civil-military gap that could pose a threat to the state. Typically, this could result in separate institutional cultures which disregard those of society, thereby, evoking problems for the state.

### **3.7.2 The Nation's Military**

In the case of the nation's army or military, it also has very low or minimal political roles and interference. However, it is very much the military of the people because it has a firm connection with society and has similar values with society. As a result, it enjoys high popularity, backing and support from the social sphere, and the military is also unlikely to be predatory on the citizens. Lutterbeck's (2013: 33) discussion of the experiences of the military of four Arab countries – Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Bahrain – during the Arab spring presents a typical example. He noted that because the Tunisian military had a high degree of institutionalisation and a firm connection with society, they did not clamp down on protesters when deployed to quell civilian uprising against the state. The support a nation's military receives arises from its careful interaction with the citizenry, resulting in a high level of understanding and harmony.

Lutterbeck argues that a key explanation for the understanding is because of the use of a "broad-based conscription" (2013: 35). Schiff (1995) considers this the social representativeness of the composition of the officer corps, and the rank and files of the military. Other reasons could be that the military also engages in developmental services for the people, such as infrastructural developments and the provision of basic social support, as was the case in Egypt. Sarigil also contends that in this typology of the military, it is possible to see an overlap and sharing of common roles between the political and the military sphere. This can assume the form of the involvement of the military in the political decision-making, and the interference into military affairs by political elites and vice versa (Sarigil, 2011: 268;

Lutterbeck, 2013: 36–38). However, the degree of involvement is typically minimal, and non-praetorian.

### **3.7.3 Predatory Praetorian Military**

As Table 3.3 indicates, a predatory praetorian military is one that is influential in the political decision-making process but has low societal integration. This often leads it to quest for political power through active partisanship or openly engaging in politics, such as financing and placing its political candidate into top political offices (Nordlinger, 1977: 13). As the military has low levels of societal integration, it lacks the support and trust of the citizenry. This type of military is associated with praetorian tendencies due to its detachment from civilian society and its inability to integrate and form social ties with society. They are mostly violent, and often engage in human rights violations, excesses, and atrocities. Thus, not only do they lack popular support, but they also lack legitimacy and prestige in society, and have been referred to as ‘monsters’ by some (Bamidele, 2013; Ojo, 2014). What one sees here is that predatory praetorian militaries continuously evoke problems in both the political and social spheres of interaction. Several countries in Africa and Latin America still have the signs of this type of military.

As the focus of this study is on the societal sphere, it is also necessary to explore what kinds of interaction are possible between the citizenry and the political sphere when a predatory praetorian military is present. The lack of popular support of this type of military often leads to wide discontentment and dissatisfaction with the military. In such situations, the citizenry has few options available to them to seek redress, especially when this affects their security. These options involve the use of social movements and civil society to pressure the government to act on their demands (Allen, 1997). Civilians are likely to resort to violence or form armed groups when the social movement does not yield success and the state continues to use heavy-handedness from the military to quash protests and demonstrations. Two explanatory variables could explain why civilians could turn to violence. One is when legal and non-violent means appears to be yielding little or no result over a prolonged period, and the other is the failure of the state to fulfil its part of the social contract by providing redress to its citizens.

When states use coercive military might to repress internal violence and external aggression, it exposes the citizenry to threats/violence from armed groups and coercion from state forces. This is because the nature of military training and indoctrination focusing on warfighting is not well-suited for internal roles of law enforcement. Hence, the military struggles to police internal conflicts without incidences of excesses, heavy handedness, and rights violation and abuses. Empirically, data has shown that internal conflicts such as civil wars often last a long time and are also likely to reoccur (Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000; Walter, 2014). This poses even more challenges for societies policed by a predatory praetorian military, because citizens have to live with military excesses and abuses over a long period.

Some may feel compelled to resort to some form of 'self-defence' by resorting to arms to protect themselves from armed groups, or by joining an armed group to provide themselves with security and the capacity to confront state repression.

### **3.7.4 Popular Praetorian Military**

The last type military is the popular praetorian military. As with the predatory praetorian military, the popular praetorian military is highly politicised, and is highly involved in the political arena of the state, although it also receives high levels of popular support from society. The difference between the popular praetorian military and the predatory praetorian military lies in the motive for assuming political roles. Whereas the predatory praetorian military engages in politics for self-serving purposes, the popular praetorian military does so to restore order and end a political impasse, with no intention to remain in government. The recent military-aided political transition in Zimbabwe that led to the end of President Robert Mugabe's 37 years rule presents a typical instance of this military at the time it intervened.<sup>25</sup> Hence, popular praetorian militaries are the guardian of not just the political system but also of the state from the abuse of political office/power.

The Palestinian forces in the second armed conflict with Israel between 2000-2005 (*al-Aqsa Intifida*) serve as another example of a popular praetorian military, because "the civilian leadership had only limited control over its security forces... yet the military made no attempt to take over the government and did not direct the decision-making process" (Cohen, 2012: 464). The Egyptian military during the Arab Spring is another example (Lutterbeck, 2013: 33). Thus, the military enjoys a high level of support and popularity among the citizenry, even when it takes over political power. As citizens are aware that the military is neither predatory nor self-serving, they are happy trusting and supporting the military to restore political stability in the state. It is possible that in situations where political instability becomes intense, large sections of the citizenry could encourage the military to intervene in politics.

## **3.8 CONCLUSION**

This chapter reviewed the CMR literature from various theoretical perspectives. While there is a lot of literature, there are theoretical weaknesses and inadequacies on several issues concerning the 'civil' (social) sphere of relations. An exception is concordance theory, which has tried to address the theoretical weaknesses by integrating the social sphere into the debate. However, concordance theory failed to advance beyond the traditional mantra of preventing domestic military intervention in politics. The literature has extensively focused on civil control, while not addressing the interaction of the

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<sup>25</sup> Although the Zimbabwean military did not hold onto political power, the developments after the resignation of Mugabe, particularly the new cabinet which had several military officers, undermines the sincerity of the move. Along with this, the Zimbabwean military has always acted as a political tool in the hands of former President Robert Mugabe to suppress opposition and anti-regime campaigns (International Crisis Group, 2017).

military with its society, which has meant that there is a void in the studies on CMR. In this chapter, a quadrumvirate interaction theory explanation of CMR was developed to fill the void found in the literature. Using and modifying Sarigil's ideas, I contended that while CMR is a tripartite relationship, the interaction between the partners occurs as a quadrumvirate which involves one major intersecting level and three subunits of interaction.

The argument here (as Schiff rightly points out) is that, irrespective of the form of government in place and the posture the military assumes – integration or separation, if the three partners agree on the four indicators, concordance can be achieved. However, this agreement is subject to the interaction of the partners at the three subunits, which means that tensions at the subunit level could undermine concordance when not adequately addressed. In this regard, I contend that this study stands to benefit from this theoretical advancement by studying and examining the level of interaction of the citizenry with the military. In conclusion, this chapter has shown that although the subject matter of CMR encompasses the interaction of the military with the political and civilian spheres, little explanation has been offered on aspects of society from a theoretical angle. Because of this, the field has done little to increase our understanding of the interaction between the military institution and society, especially when it acts in an internal role. The aim of this study is to examine this and contribute to the theoretical debates by examining these issues in relation to Plateau State, Nigeria.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THREATS POSED BY ARMED GROUPS IN NIGERIA

#### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter examined some key theoretical propositions of CMR and the weaknesses of the theories. The chapter argued that these theories all contribute, but do not adequately explain the effect of the military on society, and how the citizenry responds to military abuse or the excessive use of force. This chapter therefore focuses on the internal use of the military in Nigeria, and has five objectives: (1) to explore the current threats posed by armed groups in Nigeria; (2) to identify the conditions that have necessitated the use of the military in an internal role; (3) to understand applicable rules of engagement of the military internal security operations in Plateau State; (4) to understand the image and professional posture of the Nigerian military since 1960; and (5) to examine how democratic civil control of the military is exercised in Nigeria.

#### 4.2 OVERVIEW OF THREATS POSED BY ARMED GROUPS IN NIGERIA

Since Nigeria became independent from Britain on 1 October 1960, communal violence, threats and serious internal disturbances have continued to affect the country. Every part of the country has been affected (Odoma, 2014: 33), often plunging it into chaos, threatening political stability and the provision of essential public goods and services, including security (Ujomu, 2015). As Table 4.1 below shows, Nigeria is divided into six geopolitical zones, each comprising five or more States. These geopolitical zones depict the spatial distribution of all the States of Nigeria, including the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja, according to their geographical location and composition (see Figure 4.1).

**Table 4. 1 Some Security Threats Across Geopolitical Zones of Nigeria**

SN	Geopolitical Zones		Security Threats	
	Zones	States	Current Threats	Previous Threats
1	North Central	FCT Abuja, Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, and Plateau State	Communal conflict - Jos conflict; herdsmen attacks and violence across the region	Communal conflict – Jos, Benue, Nasarawa
2	North West	Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, and Zamfara State	Communal conflict - Kaduna conflict and high scale kidnapping	Sectarian conflict – Kano and Kaduna, Maitatsine terrorism
3	North East	Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe	Terrorism - Boko Haram	Communal conflict – Taraba and Bauchi
4	South-West	Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, and Oyo State	Criminal & electoral violence	Criminal & electoral violence
5	South-South	Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Bayelsa, Rivers, Delta, and Edo State	Militancy and piracy by various militants (NDA, NDVF, MEND)	Militancy, piracy and violence from self-determination struggle




6	South-East	Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo State	Secession, kidnapping (MASSOB, IPOB)	Biafra civil war of 1967-1970
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Content compiled from numerous sources including (Agbu, 2004; Isumonah, 2012; Omede, 2012; Okoli & Orinya, 2013; Agbibo, 2014; Musa, 2014a,b; Odoma, 2014; Ujomu, 2015).

The table provides an outline of some of the current and previous internal security challenges that Nigeria faces across each geopolitical zone. In the North Central and North West Zones, communal conflicts are pervasive because religious and ethnic diversity are exploited by desperate politicians and numerous armed groups to create a rift for political/economic gains (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005: 19). This is worsened by incessant herders' (mostly, nomadic Fulani) attacks on indigenous population, comprising of Christians of numerous 'minority' ethnic groups. In the North-East Zone, where Muslim Hausa's and Fulani's dominate, religious fanaticism and terrorism pose the greatest security concerns for especially, the non-Hausa/Fulani Christian minority. In the South West Zone, criminal violence and electoral violence threaten peace, economic and political stability in the region.

In the oil-producing region of the South-South, most security threats emerge from militancy, piracy and oil theft, and the struggle for 'economic liberation' by several militias and criminal armed groups. A typical example is the Niger Delta Avengers, a militia which successfully weakened oil exploration and crippled the economy of the country between 2016 to 2017. In the non-oil-producing South East Zone, kidnapping and secession agitation by criminal armed groups and ethno-nationalist armed groups remains the major problems to date. The secession struggles stem from the Nigerian Civil (Biafran) War of 1967-1970, which claimed over three million lives (Ugochukwu, 2010: 182). However, since Nigeria returned to democratic rule, these security challenges "have been worsening on a daily basis" (Dambazau, 2014: 65). Serious security threats (the Biafra secession crisis; the Niger-Delta Militancy; the Boko Haram terrorism; and the communal violence and herdsmen attacks in Plateau State) are raging at present in four of the six geopolitical zones. The aim of this section is to discuss the incidences of armed conflicts which spread across Nigeria (see Figure 4.1 below).

**Figure 4. 1 Map of Nigeria Showing the Various Geopolitical Zones of the Country**



Source: Ekong *et al.* (2012: 171) Spatio-Temporal Epidemiology of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza

#### 4.2.1 Biafra Secession and the Nigerian Civil War (6 July 1967 to 15 January 1970)

On 1 January 1914, the British imperial government amalgamated the Northern and Southern Protectorates into one colony, which was later renamed Nigeria, for administrative convenience (Osaghae, 1998: 1; Klieman, 2012: 156). This decision turned out to be the major factor that led to the Nigerian Civil War, which was fought in the Eastern Region in the self-declared independent State of Biafra. The amalgamation ignored the wide range of cultures, values, and social and political organisations of the people, which made national unity difficult to achieve. Along with this, two other factors propelled the outbreak of the war. One is the failure of both the colonial and the independent government of Nigeria to adopt constitutional reforms that unified the country in the post-independence period (Obasanjo, 1981: 2–5). The second is the loss of military professionalism, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

**Figure 4. 2 Map of Nigeria Showing the Four Regions of the Country in 1963**



Four Regions, 1963

Source: Osaghae (1998: xxii) *Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence*

Nigeria gained independence in 1960, and became a republic in 1963, following the adoption of a new constitution. As Figure 4.2 above indicates, Nigeria adopted a regional federal structure by splitting the former Southern Protectorate, and the Colony and Protectorate of Lagos. This arrangement saw the adoption of four regions: The Western (comprised of mostly the Yoruba); Mid-West (former Bendel State comprised of Edo and Delta); Eastern (comprised of mostly Igbos and ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta); and Northern Region (comprised of Hausa/Fulani and most of Nigeria's ethnic minorities) in a regional parliamentary system with representatives at the federal level. However, this political structure created division within the country at both regional and federal level as it meant that the Northern region had more parliamentary seats and representatives at the federal level than both the Eastern and Western Regions combined. This would form the basis for deepening division and the development of ethnic politics.

Given the new political structure, the Igbos from the Eastern Region felt politically marginalised due to having fewer state governments than other regions, which meant less access to federal income

allocation. Added to this, two attempts to conduct national censuses in 1962 and 1963 were largely unsuccessful because the figures were allegedly manipulated and inflated in some regions, particularly the Northern Region (Obasanjo, 1981: 5). Despite this, the 1963 figures were passively accepted with several reservations. These events led to a deep division within the country based on ethnicity, which resulted in a struggle for political control and dominance over others in the region, the emergence of ethno-political factions and rivalries, and the outbreak of violence that threatened both the political and social stability of Nigeria as a country.

One example was the agitation/violence by the Tivs, one of the many ethnic minorities against the political domination of the Hausa/Fulani Muslims in the Northern Region (Maier, 2000: 12). The Tiv ethnic group were dissatisfied with their political marginalisation in the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC), the major political party in the region. As Agbu (2004: 20) observes, the politics of the NPC were isolationist, excluding non-Hausa/Fulani's in what appeared to be an "internal colonialism," leading to the Tivs forming ethnic militias who fought a campaign of violence against the ruling NPC which lasted from 1962 to 1965. Obasanjo (1981: 5) and Maier (2000: 12) reported that this was one of the earliest occasions of internal use of the military in Nigeria against dissents/uprisings. Similar political unrests were recorded in other regions following the 1964 Nigerian general elections. Electoral violence marred the election, due to electoral malpractice, widespread vote-rigging, and boycotts. The Western Region was plunged into a state of anarchy, similar to the Northern Region, where politicians were accused of the mismanagement of public funds and of large-scale corruption (Maier, 2000: 12).

In the morning of 15 January 1966, Nigeria witnessed its first military intervention in politics by a group of mainly Igbo military officers who sought to restore peace and order, fight corruption, and unify the country (Nzeogwu, 1966). All the political elites and senior military officers killed during the coup were from the North and West, with the exception of one political leader and one Army Officer from the Mid-West and East respectively (Obasanjo, 1981: 6). Although the coup plotters were not able to take hold of political power, the coup brought Maj.-Gen. Aguiyi Ironsi (an Igbo) into power. To redress the ethnicity problem, Ironsi enacted the military Decree No. 34 of 1966 which ended the Federal State Structure and abolished all forms of tribal and regional association. The intention of this was to unite Nigeria as a nation-state where ethnic and tribal identity no longer had primacy over nationalism and citizenship.

Ironsi's decree was furiously rejected, and in May 1966 serious riots broke out in the North, whose leaders feared the move was aimed at empowering the South in order to dominate and subjugate them. On 29 July 1966, a counter-coup took place to take revenge for the killing of Northerners in the first coup and was led by Army Officers of the Northern Region. The coup plotters were unable to seize political power and after a three-day impasse, Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon (an ethnic minority

from Plateau State in the Northern Region) emerged as the new military Head of State. This deepened the already existing division, suspicion, polarisation, and ethnic segmentation within the country, largely as result of the massacre of many Igbos (of the Eastern Region) living in several parts of the Northern Region. This forced survivors to flee back to the Eastern Region for safety (Obasanjo, 1981: 7; Maier, 2000: 13).

These events resulted in the Nigerian civil war, led by Lt. Col. Chukwu-Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, an Igbo and high-ranking Nigerian military officer who was dissatisfied with the emergence of Lt. Col Gowon, a subordinate officer, as the military head of state over him. Ojukwu led the war between the Nigerian government and the Biafran militia, made up of soldiers of Igbo extraction and able-bodied young Igbo men and women. This war lasted for three years and was one of the earliest and bloodiest recorded in a post-independent African State (Akresh, Bhalotra, Leone & Osili, 2011: 2, 2012: 273). The war broke out when the Igbos in the Eastern Region seceded from Nigeria and declared the region as the sovereign and independent state of Biafra. Aggravating the situation was the discovery of oil in the Niger Delta in the Eastern Region before the war began. The discovery meant that the new state of Biafra was destined to have a promising source of income, but the military government of Nigeria was unwilling to concede this (Maier, 2000: 13; Klieman, 2012: 157).

Both the Nigerian government and Biafra sought international aid and support. The Nigerian government received support from Britain, Italy and (West) Germany, while Biafra received international support, including weapons and logistic support, from France, Spain, Portugal, South Africa, and other countries. However, after three years of military combat, Biafra was overpowered and Ojukwu went into exile in January 1970. Following this, the Yakubu Gowon military government made a declaration of “no victor, no vanquish” on 12 January 1970 to officially bring the war to an end and to commence with the rehabilitation, reconstruction, and reconciliation of the East. Despite this, the Igbos continued to feel politically marginalised by the Hausa and Yoruba (the other two majority tribes of Nigeria). Similarly, their desire for secession continues, and numerous pro-Biafra groups and militias have been involved in this cause.

To curb political instability and violence in the region, the government has used both the military and police to suppress the conflict caused by the militia groups, which include the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), led by Nnamdi Kanu, whose current whereabouts is unknown. The groups appear to have no formal organisation given that their activities have effectively come to a halt since Kanu’s disappearance. Prior to his arrest, he founded Radio Biafra, the propaganda media of the group, and he has sought funds and support from the foreign diaspora in the United Kingdom, where he holds a dual citizenship.

#### 4.2.2 Militancy in the Niger-Delta

The Niger Delta region, also known as the South-South geopolitical zone, is made up of six States, all of which are among the nine oil-producing States of Nigeria. As with several other oil-producing regions across the globe, oil/resource racketeering, criminal violence, and the liberation struggle are the major security challenges (Joab-Peterside, 2007; Ross, 2012). In part, these problems are fuelled by the poor living conditions of the locals, and their desire to break out of the cycle of poverty. In the Niger Delta region, several studies have shown that locals feel deep-seated state neglect and marginalisation, despite the fact that the crude oil from this region is the major source of income for the country as a whole (Adeyeri, 2012: 98; Agbiboa, 2013a: 45; Ujomu, 2015: 178).

Aside from the high poverty level in this region, gas flaring, and environmental degradation due to oil spillage continue to pose severe challenges to the locals (Agbiboa, 2013a: 46). As a result, local fishermen and farmers are unable to subsist, affecting their income and livelihoods, yet the government appears to have done little to address their concerns. Along with this, youth unemployment and low rates of education has meant that many have ventured into criminal activities such as militancy, piracy, and illegal oil bunkering. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the region has aided this. In addition, the “struggle for control of illegal oil trade routes, ownership of oil bearing territories and the question of ownership of oil and gas deposits” contribute to the security problematic (Isumonah, 2012: 333).

Protests have become prevalent in the Niger Delta region, and have given rise to the emergence of numerous armed groups. One reason for this is the failure of the government to address the concerns of the locals through non-violent means, instead of using coercive force involving the police and military (Joab-Peterside, 2007; Odoemene, 2012). Several regimes and political administrations have attempted to address the problems, including the creation of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), which focuses on infrastructural development in the oil-producing state governments. However, this has not addressed the needs and expectations of the locals.<sup>26</sup>

One early and infamous militia group, the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Muhajid Dokubo-Assari, emerged as the militant wing of the Ijaw Youth Council, an ethnic group in the Niger Delta (Isumonah, 2012: 340). The group began as an advocacy group focusing on the needs and underdevelopment of the locals, and the failure of the government to address this. However, the group felt the government response was inadequate, and it engaged in a campaign of violence against

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<sup>26</sup> Adeyeri (2012: 99–101) provided an elaborate account of the various efforts of government to manage the problem of underdevelopment, poverty and the general needs and concerns in the Niger Delta. Some of the initiatives included the creation of the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) in 1961; using the principle of derivation to ensure the region receives higher allocation of revenue from the Federal Government; creation of Oils Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992; and the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000.

the State, destroying oil pipelines and installations. As is typical in new wars, the group engaged in criminal violent activities, including kidnapping expatriates for ransom, and the illegal extraction and sale of oil. Over time, armed groups proliferated in the region. These included the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV). These groups constantly engaged in rivalry over control of oil resources and illegal oil trade routes (Cline, 2011; Action on Armed Violence, 2013). Given this, the security situation worsened, and it provided justification for the use of the military in an internal role to deal with the threats these groups created.

At the height of state repression, the NDPVF led by Dokubo-Asari began seeking self-determination and secession of the Niger Delta through coercive violence and destruction of critical oil exploration/exploitation/carriage infrastructures. These activities slowed down oil production, as they targeted and kidnapped foreign contractors/workers working with international oil conglomerates. The action led to a sharp drop in oil exploration, resulting in a huge loss of income to the country, forcing the government to adopt non-violent means to end the spate of violence. Amnesty was declared and granted to all militants in June 2009, which entailed financial benefits and pardon for criminal activities (Hazen & Horner, 2007; Aghalino, 2012). However, the decision of the current Muhammadu Buhari's government to phase-out the scheme, due to several factors including the decline in global crude prices, has led to the emergence of a new militia, the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) in 2016. As with the NDPVF, the NDA also seeks rapid economic development or self-determination for the Niger Delta region. Since its emergence, it has successfully carried out numerous attacks on critical oil infrastructures and has crippled the economy and ability of the State to provide electrical power supply (Donovan, 2016). Currently, the group has negotiated with the Federal Government, as the State has been unable to repress the group militarily.

#### **4.2.3 Boko Haram Terrorism**

Another form of armed conflict has arisen in North East Nigeria: the Boko Haram terrorist group, as a microcosm of the Maitatsine terrorist group which existed in the 1980s in Kano State, North West Nigeria (Adesoji, 2011; Chilwa & Adegoke, 2013; Peterside, 2014a). Unlike the former, Boko Haram (which literally translates as 'Western education is sacrilegious') has been more resilient and powerful in its dogma and military capability. The group has a contested origin (Adesoji, 2010; Gray & Adeakin, 2015). One account holds that it began in 2002 after a meeting between Mohammed Yusuf (an Islamic Cleric) and some drop-outs from the University of Maiduguri, where he claimed that 'Western' education is sinful (Gusau, 2009). Yusuf developed this ideology, asking followers to destroy their school certificates because they were in contradiction with Islamic culture due to their association with 'Western' (infidel) culture. This led to its popularity as Boko Haram, although it emerged as *Jama'atu Ahlus Sunnah Lid Da'awati Wal Jihad* ('people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's

teachings and Jihad’).<sup>27</sup> From the name, the intention is made clear, although it did not begin waging ‘Jihad’ until the execution of Mohammed Yusuf in state custody in 2009. This led to the resurgence of the group under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau who made true the threat to wage war on Nigeria, particularly on ‘infidels’ and those sympathetic to or aiding them.

Since he assumed leadership of the group, Shekau has waged war on Nigeria, posing a serious existential threat to the political stability of Nigeria (Onapajo & Usman, 2015). In its 2015 report, the Global Terrorism Index named Boko Haram the deadliest terrorist group in the world (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015: 2). Its sinister campaign of violence has plunged the country and its neighbouring states into a humanitarian crisis, displacing over 1.5 million persons across Chad, Niger Republic, and Cameroon. Since 2009, it has launched several insurgent attacks against the military, and it has bombed/destroyed several critical infrastructures and international agencies, including the UN office in Abuja, Nigeria’s capital city. The death toll from its attacks in Nigeria is between 13,000 and 17,000 people, inclusive of security forces (Isine, 2017). The group is also responsible for the infamous kidnapping of the 276 Chibok girls from their school dormitory on 14 April 2014.

Although the Nigerian government has negotiated the release of some of the Chibok school girls, as of today (1 August 2018), 112 of the girls are still missing or in captivity. Not only this, the group has shown it is a serious force with the ability to gain and exert its control over territory. Between 2014 and 2015, it seized control of about 14 local government areas (approximately 20,000 square metres of land) in three States in North East Nigeria, and declared this an Islamic Republic (Blair, 2015). It took the efforts of a Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) (a group of hunters, vigilante members, and volunteers familiar with the terrain) and the multinational joint task collaboration of Nigeria, Niger Republic, Chad, and Cameroon before these areas were liberated from Boko Haram in 2016.<sup>28</sup>

Several reports and studies have shown that Boko Haram attracts membership from Northern Nigeria, and migrants from neighbouring communities in Niger Republic, Chad and Cameroon (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012: 27; Chukwurah, Okechukwu & Ogbeje, 2015: 377). Some report that it has about 280,000 members, comprising of “university lecturers, bankers, political elites, drug addicts, unemployed graduates, *Almajiri*’s and migrants from neighbouring countries” (Danjibo, 2009: 6; Agbiboa, 2013b: 19). Most of the combatants are young uneducated youths, with a few young females that have served as suicide bombers. Poverty and high unemployment serve as major factors attracting youths to join the group. Corruption by political actors, mismanagement and poor governance are used to develop deep-seated grievances and dissatisfaction with the state. These factors serve as a

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<sup>27</sup> Following its later allegiance with the Islamic State (IS), it renamed itself as Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP).

<sup>28</sup> Although the Nigerian government has not confirmed this, reports claim that mercenaries from South Africa have also played a key role in the fight against Boko Haram.



recruiting mechanism for members ready to 'revolutionise' the system (Agbibo, 2013c: 72). The *Almajiri* system prevalent in core States in Northern Nigeria has also acted as a major source of membership for the group, as it uses *Almajiri*'s (homeless and unemployed children usually under 10 years old growing up under the mentorship of an Islamic scholar, but without parental care) as a ready tool for violence.

Funding is secured through several illegitimate means, as is typical in the new war thesis. Some have argued that Boko Haram has acted as a militia for desperate politicians seeking political power, who in turn fund it before they lose control of the group (Omakhanlen & Babajide, 2012; Akinola, 2015: 9). Along with this, the group uses extortion, ransom/prisoner swap, and high-profile bank raids and robbery. By December 2011, it had raided about 30 commercial banks and stolen millions (Onu & Muhammed, 2011). Some funding originates from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom (Omakhanlen & Babajide, 2012; Agbibo, 2013b: 23). However, the counterterrorist measures of the Nigerian government have weakened Boko Haram's coercive capacity, regained control of captured territories from the group, and negotiated the release of some of the kidnapped school girls. Due to his weak and ineffective approach, former President Goodluck Jonathan contributed significantly to the group's capacity to wage sustained warfare against the State. To date, Boko Haram continues to unleash terror and sporadic attacks in several parts of Borno State and North-East Nigeria, killing many civilians, causing a humanitarian crisis and disrupting social and political stability in this region of Nigeria.

#### **4.2.4 Communal Violence in Plateau State, North Central Nigeria**

The violence in Plateau State is one of the most enduring and protracted conflicts in Nigeria. Since violence erupted between Christians and Muslims in Jos on Friday, 7 September 2001, the State has remained a 'flashpoint of violence' (Bawa & Nwogu, 2001; Musa, 2014c). Geographically, the State is situated in the North Central Zone, or the middle belt region of the country, as shown in Table 4.1. It has a population of over three million inhabitants, and is home to over 40 of the minority ethnic groups of Nigeria (Blench, 2000; National Population Census, 2010). The temperate climate and rich tin deposits in the State attracted migrants to the city as wage labourers during the tin boom era of the colonial period in the 1940's (Krause, 2011). The majority of these migrants, who later made the State their permanent abode, were Muslim Hausa- and Fulani-speaking Nigerians from neighbouring Northern States (Bawa & Nwogu, 2001). Today, the State is a microcosm of Nigeria, sheltering people of nearly all the ethnic groups of Nigeria. However, it is sharply divided between the majority Christians who are 'natives' to the State, and Hausa Muslim 'settlers' (Krause, 2011).

The root causes of the conflict in Plateau State are reflective of other conflicts in Nigeria, most of which emanate from the problem associated with the 'indigene' and 'settler' labels (Nwagwu, 2016: 218; Olakunle, Joseph & Segun, 2016: 2). Although Chapter III, Section 25 - 32 of the 1999 Constitution



of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides for numerous ways of acquiring citizenship of Nigeria, it makes no mention of indigenes or settlers (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999). However, the term indigeneship was brought about by the attempt of the Constitution to address ethnic diversity through a Federal Character System. Section 147 (3) specifically introduced the concept 'indigene' when it states that "the President shall appoint at least one Minister from each State, who shall be an *indigene* of such State."<sup>29</sup> However, it failed to define the concept, its application, or its operational limit (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999; Nwanegbo, Odigbo & Ochanja, 2014: 9). Thus, each of the 36 States and the Federal Capital Territory issue certificates of indigeneship to natives as a requirement for accessing certain rights and privileges in the country. The dilemma is that it denies access to citizens who live or work in States other than their State of origin in Nigeria, because they are not indigenes (Sayne, 2012: 1).

The decision to recognise one as an 'indigene' rests solely with each State government, through its Local Government Areas (LGA) or liaison offices. In most instances, the acknowledgement and stamp of one's traditional ruler (district head) indicating ancestral lineage is required before the LGA approves the application. The problem with this system is that it favours indigeneship over citizenship within the country. It also provides several privileges to certified indigenes of a community or state over non-indigenous citizens. One key privilege is that it provides access/claim to land by ancestry, which serves as the basis for tracing ancestry (Nwagwu, 2016: 221; Olakunle *et al.*, 2016: 3). Others include social, political, and economic benefits, such as appointments to civil service or political positions in the state; the right to run in local government or state elections; exclusive waivers/reduction of tuition; and exclusive bursaries (Ojukwu & Onifade, 2010; Best & Rakodi, 2011). Ojo (2009a: 697) adds that "during the 2006 headcount, Nigeria witnessed a mass movement of people from their base to their hometowns or States. Even the dead are rarely buried outside their state of origin." This system therefore marginalises, oppresses, and deprives settlers as they stand to miss all these benefits irrespective of their contribution, or length of residing in such communities/States.

In view of this, hostility began in Plateau State on 7 September 2001 when a group of Muslim youth scouts<sup>30</sup> denied an indigenous Christian woman passage through her usual route while the Jumu'ah<sup>31</sup> was in process (Bawa & Nwogu, 2001). The incident led to a heated altercation that resulted in the infamous 7 September 2001 carnage. However, although this immediate trigger and the manifestation of violence were along religious lines between Christians and Muslims, the major cause of the violence

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<sup>29</sup> My emphasis.

<sup>30</sup> The use of youth scouts by religious groups as guards during religious events is a common incident in Northern Nigeria. These youth groups often help coordinate the passage of pedestrians and with vehicle parking. However, with the escalation of violence in recent years, they also work as the security team or complementary to private security guards or State security agencies during religious events.

<sup>31</sup> Jumu'ah is a concept denoting the Friday prayer held by Muslims.

is the indigene-settler distinction. This came as a repeat of an earlier incident in April 1994 when protest by indigenes compelled the State's military administrator to rescind his appointment of a Hausa/Fulani as the Chairman of Jos North LGA. 'Settlers' protested this action as marginalisation, blocking access to roads. Due to its poor handling by the State, the situation led to full-blown violence resulting in the loss of several lives and properties (Ambe-Uva, 2010: 43–44; Crisis Group, 2012: 9; Human Rights Watch, 2013: 41).

In the same way, the August 2001 appointment of Alhaji Mukhtar Muhammed, a Muslim Hausa-Fulani settler, as the Coordinator of the Poverty Eradication Board of Jos North LGA sparked the violence in September 2001 (Bawa & Nwogu, 2001: 109). The conflict spread to most of the 17 LGAs of the State. Currently, several 'unknown gunmen'<sup>32</sup> (who are typically ethnic militias, particularly nomadic Fulani herders) use typical hit-and-run tactics in mostly rural areas which have little or no State forces. Local native communities have also formed vigilante groups, who act as ethnic and religious militias, to secure their communities from rampaging and invading herdsmen. Peace appears elusive in the State, and the recent carnage between 21<sup>st</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> June 2018 led to the death of about 200 people in three LGAs (see Stefanos Foundation, 2018; Usman, 2018).

The government has responded to the conflict by deploying the military to several parts of the State. Between 18 May and 18 November 2014, a state of emergency was imposed and Major Gen. Christopher Muhammed Ali (Rtd.) was made military administrator over the State. Subsequently, several other emergency rules were enforced in various parts of the State, and numerous curfews restricting human movement/activities (Fatile & Ejalonibu, 2014). Other non-coercive methods, such as the 2004 Plateau Peace Conference, Federal and State Commissions of Inquiry, and several other dialogue sessions, have also occurred but failed to restore peace and security (Segun & Jegede, 2013: 39). Human Rights Watch (2013: 42) quoted a former Attorney General of Plateau State as saying that in spite of various arrests, "nobody has been prosecuted." In addition to this, little or no attempt has been made to address the indigene-settler problematic arising from the 'false' federalism Nigeria practices. Hence, interethnic rivalry and competition is continuously spurring violence and internal warfare in every region of the country, as this section has shown (ActionAid Nigeria, 2008; Saye, 2012; Nwanegbo et al., 2014). Zeleza summarizes the challenge as follows:

In Nigeria, democratisation has led to the resurgence of ethnic identities and the proliferation of regional and local struggles over the entitlements of citizenship expressed in the language of 'indigenes' and 'settlers.' These struggles have increasingly

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<sup>32</sup> This concept, as used in the local media, refers to seemingly faceless ethnic militias. The militias are continually engaged in attacks and reprisal attacks which are speculated to be motivated by Islamic imperial agenda. These include the Dogo Nahawa extermination-style execution of 7 March 2010; and the 8 July 2012 massacre that led to the death of the Senator representing Jos North constituency, Dr Gyang Dangtong, and Hon Gyang Danfulani, a State House of Assembly member.

spilled into the formation of ethnic militias that have wrought havoc on Nigeria's civil society, unleashing periodic convulsions of inter-communal violence (Zezeza, 2008: 8).

However, it is also important to note that Nigeria's federal system reinforces the structure of traditional authority, which has undermined the democratisation process and prospects of unifying the country. Whereas maintaining traditional authority helps in sustaining the rich cultural values and diversity of the country, it promotes 'legitimate' discrimination, marginalisation, and the deprivation of Nigerians under the guise of indigeneship. Consequently, several violent communal conflicts have erupted, giving rise to the proliferation of various different armed groups across the country (Maier, 2000: 12). To curb the violence and the consequences these pose for the political stability of Nigeria, the government has often felt compelled to deploy the military to suppress the insurrection.

### **4.3 FACTORS COMPELLING THE INTERNAL USE OF THE MILITARY IN NIGERIA**

The preceding discussion showed that each geopolitical zone of Nigeria faces armed conflict. Ethnic groups that experience marginalisation/deprivation often mobilise as ethnic militias or some form of armed group to threaten or use violence against other groups or the Nigerian government. The use of coercive violence is a deliberate strategy to undermine the government (Kaldor, 1999). Fear and panic is created among the populace through targeted or random attacks on civilians; raiding communities; seeking territorial/political control by threatening or eroding state legitimacy; and engaging in asymmetrical warfare with state security forces. This shows that armed groups pose existential threats to both the lives and properties of citizens, and the ability of the state to effectively govern in Africa (Smith, 2003; Vinci, 2008; Vreÿ, 2010: 63). As seen from the different geopolitical zones in Nigeria, these armed groups/conflicts threaten national security, the ability of the state to maintain law and order, and ultimately to deliver public goods to the citizenry (Bowd & Chikwanha, 2010; Okumu & Ikelegbe, 2010b; Themnér & Wallenstein, 2013).

Threats or use of violence and terrorism in Nigeria have assumed worrisome dimensions, causing Caromba to dub the country the "African tinderbox" (2009: 1). These security challenges have a negative effect on governance, which drains state resources. Dealing with or curtailing such incidences is immensely difficult and requires a great level of force to contain the threats (see Ogah, 2011; Peterside, 2014b). This has compelled the national government to deploy the military in counter-insurgency (COIN) operations (Crelinsten, 1998; Nwolise, 2007; Potgieter, 2010). This is not something new. One of the earliest uses of the military was in the Middle Belt (North Central Zone) in 1964, when the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, ordered the use of the military to quell riots (Maier, 2000: 12). Ever since then, the military has remained a dominant actor in law enforcement in ISOPs in Nigeria (see Omede, 2012).

Conventionally, the provision of internal security and law enforcement are the core duties of the police (Hills, 2007: 405). This means that "the police are the domestic specialists in the exercise of

legitimate force” (Reiner, 1992: 762). However, in Nigeria as in many African countries, when civilian protest and violence breaks out, the norm is to deploy the military to suppress the situation/disturbances. A key reason for this is that the police are often overwhelmed and unable to handle situations that involve armed conflict. Although this dissertation focuses on the military, it is important to briefly outline some of the challenges facing the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), as this helps to explain the use of the military in an internal role.


One major problem facing the NPF is the poor living conditions and lack of motivation of its workforce, particularly for entry-level constables. This is due to two major factors: poor staff salaries, allowances, and remunerations; and the state of police housing/barracks. Several studies/reports have shown that the salaries of Nigerian police personnel are meagre and lower than those of other countries. On average, low-ranking entry-level officers residing in barracks (police housing) receive about ₦60,000.00, equivalent to US\$190 (Radda, Ibrahim & Dambazau, 2010: 32). While salaries vary by rank, reports suggest that senior officers skim off lower personnel’s salaries, which reduces the take-home pay of low-ranking personnel considerably (Hills, 2014: 12). In addition, regular personnel are reported to have little or no “special allowances, insurance, monetary compensation for death during duty, medical care, allowances and perks” (Hills, 2014: 15). Mostly, only Police Mobile Force (PMF) personnel engaged in special operational duties receive special allowances, while regular police personnel have no such benefits. Added to this, personnel are required to pay for their uniforms from their salaries (Hills, 2008: 224).

These factors affect the motivation of personnel and impede their performance and effectiveness in handling situations of public safety/security and violence. In cases where personnel are killed in the line of duty, as it happened with Sergeant Chukwudi Iboko who was recently killed in a crossfire exchange during a bank robbery, the Police Authority does little or nothing to assist the deceased’s family (see Punch, 2017). In addition to the poor or squalid working conditions of police personnel in Nigeria, the state of most police housing or barracks across the country is deplorable, as they are fetid and in need of repair. Describing the state of some barracks, Hills noted that they range “from inadequate to disgusting even though officers up to the rank of inspector (and in some cases assistant superintendents) live there” (2014: 12). This situation has continued as a trend irrespective of changes in government and the leadership of the NPF. Back in 2005, Sunday Ehindedro, a two-term serving Inspector General of NPF (the police chief in Nigeria) stated that police “live in a kennel... the conditions in some barracks are, to say the least, nauseating” (Nigeria Police Force, 2005: 26). In part, the combination of these explains why corruption is endemic among entry-level constables.

### 4.3.1 Endemic Corruption in the Police Force

Across the Nigerian Police Force, bribery, corruption and extortion are pervasive, endemic, seemingly customary and the norm, while little is done to address it (Ojo, 2006: 267).<sup>33</sup> Some have argued that the entire service is corrupt, and nearly all personnel are likely to receive bribes while serving (Dambazau, 2014). Police corruption is not only rampant in Nigeria, but across the African continent. However, as the 2013/14 data from the Afrobarometer survey of some African countries indicates, police corruption is more severe in Nigeria (Wambua, 2015: 4).

**Figure 4.3 Ranks of Police Corruption (%) Across 34 African Countries**



Source: Wambua (2015: 4) Police Corruption in Africa Undermines Trust

As Figure 4.3 above indicates, police corruption in Nigeria tops other African countries by a considerable margin, and the police are widely perceived to be the most corrupt institution of government in Nigeria (Alemika, 2007: 3; Hills, 2008: 216; Carolyn, 2017: 7). Several factors contribute to this. First, some serving and retired Inspector Generals of Nigerian Police (IGP) were involved in corrupt practices, such as IGP Mustafa Adebayo Balogun who served a six months sentence after a plea bargain and forfeiting properties, which later became the subject of another corruption trial. Other IGPs who also faced corruption charges include Mike Okiro and Sunday Ehindero. As with the top-ranking officers, both entry-level and mid-career personnel are implicated in corrupt practices.


<sup>33</sup> This study follows the definition of Kleinig, who defines corruption thus: "police officers act corruptly when, in exercising or failing to exercise their authority, they act with the primary intention of furthering private or departmental/divisional advantage" (1996: 166). Also, see Agbiboa (2015) for a more elaborate discussion.

Hills (2008: 223) states that rather than serving the populace, “the main tasks of low-ranking officers often appear to be collecting tolls from drivers and supplicants, and waiting for something to happen.” This is particularly evident in the low-ranking personnel on patrol who preoccupy themselves with extorting money from motorists as non-official/authorised toll on highways. Given this, Dambazau concluded that “for the Nigerian police, it is not a case of a few rotten apples, but that almost all the apples are rotten” (2014: 70).

### **4.3.2 Police Brutality, Extrajudicial Killing and Lack of Legitimacy**

Police brutality and excessive use of force in Nigeria is well-documented. One infamous case is the summary execution of Mohammed Yusuf (the leader of Boko Haram) and many of his followers while in custody. As discussed in Section 4.2.3, this “became the major driver of the current insurgency in the Northeast” (Dambazau, 2014: 70). Admittedly, the use of physical force in the performance of police duties in situations of violence may be unavoidable (Bryett, 1991: 286). However, in the Nigerian instance, numerous eyewitness and victim reports indicate that the police often act outside their mandate by committing extrajudicial killings (Human Rights Watch, 2005: 73–79; Crisis Group, 2012: 21–22). Reporting on incidences in Jos, Kano, and Kaduna, Human Rights Watch (2005: 73) concluded that brutality and extrajudicial killing is the typical way the Nigerian police respond to violent conflicts. Similarly, in several instances, the Nigerian Police Force has been described as “internationally notorious for high levels of unpredictable violence, corruption, prebendalism, and ethnic and religious sectarianism” (Hills, 2008: 216, 2012a: 47, b: 94, 2014: 9).

In Kano State, Hills (2014: 12) noted that although superior officers are largely Muslim Northerners, and not representative of the ethnic/religious diversity of Nigeria, it does not influence policing. However, it is difficult to substantiate this claim as reports of police brutality and human rights violations in Plateau State suggest the opposite (Bawa & Nwogu, 2001; Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 2013). Therefore, the possibility of bias, and ethnic and religious sectarianism is high. Added to this, victims of police brutality report that the police tend to rely heavily on coercion to extract information from persons in their custody, which leads to a loss of trust in the police (Ujomu, 2015: 188). As a result, there is evidence that about 69% of Nigerians who were victims of crime or physical attack did not report it to the police out of fear of further abuse from the police (see Figure 4.4 below) (Wambua, 2015: 15). This makes policing difficult, as well as intelligence gathering from the public. Ujomu observes that because Nigerians distrust the security forces, it has become a norm to rather provide or disclose information to the media, and on social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube.

**Figure 4. 4 Trust in the Police by Country (%) Across 34 African Countries**

Source: Wambua (2015: 7) Police Corruption in Africa Undermines Trust

Several reasons explain the public's distrust of the police and unwillingness to cooperate with it, one of which is the fear that the police could deal with civilians unfairly (Hills, 2008: 219). Other reasons include the lack of trust and confidence in the abilities of the police to address cases, and the fear that police may reveal the source of the information (Wambua, 2015: 16).

#### 4.3.3 Training, Shortage of Manpower, and Policing Equipment

Training and education form the cornerstone of professionalism, yet for the Nigerian police, it appears that little attention is paid to the training of new staff. Several reports show that training new recruits and in-service training of police personnel is lacking or inadequate, particularly the training of constables and low-ranking officers (Hills, 2008: 216, 2014: 12; Owen, 2014: 3). Police personnel exhibit little knowledge of the content of the law and how to enforce it, and this affects the role and duties of the police, their relationship with the public, and the powers and the limits of their authority. The problem is made worse due to the politicisation of the police, who have been heavily involved in regime/government representation. It therefore seems that this is the true reality of policing in Nigeria since independence (Potholm, 1969; Hills, 2008: 223). Another implication of failing to train and equip police personnel with the basic necessary skills and knowledge is the quality of service the police renders. This affects not only its relationship with the public, but its image and professional posture.

The Nigerian police are understaffed and lack basic policing equipment, which affects their ability to function effectively. Some have observed that the "shortage of manpower, vehicles and



communications equipment impacts on officers' operational efficiency and morale and, therefore, relationship with the populace" (Olong, 2010: 25; Hills, 2014: 11). The shortage of manpower and basic policing equipment and logistics exists throughout Nigeria. The website of the NPF lists the following basic police equipment it lacks: (1) manpower; (2) operational vehicles; (3) toolboxes; (4) workshop and office equipment; (5) funds to maintain operational vehicles; (6) funding; (7) electricity and power-generating sets; (8) barrack accommodation for personnel; (9) medical facilities, medical staff and medicine; (10) kit and bullet-proof jackets; (11) serviceable arms and ammunition; (12) road network to link the police headquarters to the main road; (13) welfare for personnel; (14) communication gadgets; (15) official cars; and (16) physical infrastructures (Nigeria Police Force, 2013). Clearly, this undermines the ability of the police to function effectively. Given this, one can only support Dambazau's claim that there exists a "poor relationship between the public and the police, the quality of police personnel, equipment, and facilities is extremely poor, and the combination of these factors makes it impossible to rely on police services in enforcing law and order" (2014: 70).

#### **4.3.4 The Nigerian Police Mobile Force (PMF/MOPOL)**

Studies have shown that using regular police forces to respond to riots and violent situations often creates an unpopular image for the civil police, because it is incompatible with their role or duties (Bryett, 1991; Ojo, 2009b; Weiss, 2012). This has necessitated the creation of paramilitary or gendarmerie forces which act as riot police and have some attributes of the military. In line with global practice, Nigeria maintains a PMF unit, popularly called MOPOL, which reports directly to the Inspector General of the Police. The unit acts as "a police striking force in the event of riots or other serious disturbances occurring within the Federation" (Federal Government of Nigeria, 2004: 41).<sup>34</sup> It serves as an intermediary between the police and the military and is trained and equipped to manage riots and low intensity conflicts. Recruitment into the unit is restricted to serving members of the regular police force and is subject to a period of service not exceeding 36 months.<sup>35</sup> The composition of personnel means that they are more able to manage civil disturbances without causing civilian casualties. Thus, the military only becomes involved in internal policing as a last resort, and preferably only for a brief period. However, the continuous involvement of the military in Nigeria suggests otherwise.

The PMF has 52 police mobile squadrons, and each squadron has about 700 personnel, with a total of about 40,000 personnel which is grossly inadequate given the population of Nigeria, and the prevalence of violence in various parts of the country. The inadequacy has compelled the state to rely on the military or a Joint Task Force (JTF), which comprises of the military, the PMF, and other civil security

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<sup>34</sup> Section 25 of the Police Act Cap. P19 NPR (Federal Government of Nigeria, 2004: 41).

<sup>35</sup> Section 28 of the Police Act Cap. P19 NPR (Federal Government of Nigeria, 2004: 41).



agencies, in situations of conflicts and other internal disturbances. However, the PMF faces similar constraints and problems as the regular police. These include lack of offices and inadequate equipment, and shortages of arms and ammunition, communication equipment, and operational vehicles (Nigeria Police Force, 2013; Owen, 2016). Like the police, the PMF has been accused of excesses and extrajudicial killings to suppress political opponents and control the population (Potholm, 1969; Hills, 2008: 223; Owen, 2016). These challenges undermine the ability of the police, including the JTF, to effectively act as a professional state institution providing law enforcement and security in Nigeria, thereby compelling the involvement of the military.

#### **4.4 MILITARY RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS**

To guide and define the interaction of the military with civilians, the conditions, and limits on the use of force in an internal role, the State provides certain rules of engagement. Some of the key features for military ISOPs in Plateau State are summarised by Para-Mallam & Hoomlong (2013: 26–27):

1. “To maintain the principle of minimum force and proportionality at all times.
2. Use of force should be a last resort after every reasonable effort to contain a situation had been made.
3. Use of force should only be resorted to if other means had failed or if non-use of force would result in the death or grievous injury to security personnel. For example, where there is evidence of a hostile act or hostile intent.<sup>36</sup>
4. Use of force must be limited in intensity and duration and must be employed as a protective measure.
5. Decision to open fire must only be upon the order of the on-scene commander unless there is no sufficient time to obtain such an order.
6. Fire must be controlled and aimed at non-vital body parts in order not to kill.
7. Avoid collateral damage.
8. Render medical assistance and record deaths at incident after cessation of fire. Data gathered to be passed through appropriate chain of command.
9. Protect internally displaced persons (IDPs) and assist agencies engaged in the distribution of relief materials.
10. Undertake activities that would aid in diffusing tension.”

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<sup>36</sup> “Hostile act refers to an action where the intent is to cause death, bodily harm or destruction of designated properties. Hostile intent refers to threat of imminent use of force, which is demonstrated through an action, which appears to be preparatory to a hostile act” (Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 2013: 27).

These terms provide an important measure to assess the adherence of the military to its mandate in Plateau State, and how non-adherence could strain the interaction with civilians, and foster insecurity. This is discussed further at a later stage of this dissertation.

#### 4.5 IMAGE AND PROFESSIONAL OUTLOOK OF NIGERIAN MILITARY SINCE 1960

From the period before Nigeria's independence to the end of the country's first Republic in 1966, the military received several international commendations for its reputation, bravery, and effectiveness in various international peacekeeping missions (Chick & Mazrui, 1971; Albert, 2007: 169; Oluyemi-Kusa, 2007: 138). It was commended for having an "honoured reputation throughout the world for its gallantry and military bearing in many actions through its history" (Yaqub & Muhammad, 2007: 16). During this period, the military had low levels of interaction with civilian society, and it was not involved with politics, staying in its barracks, training, and engaging in routine military drills. It served internally in four different instances, the most critical instance being the 8 November 1964 deployment to suppress the recurring Tiv Riots (Obasanjo, 1981: 5; Maier, 2000: 12; Okoli & Orinya, 2013: 22). Up until the end of the first republic in 1966, "the officers and men occupied themselves with training, peacekeeping efforts in foreign lands, and other sundry military activities" (Ojo, 2006: 262). Military presence and impact on society was minimal, and its involvement in internal security operations occurred in few communities.

Similarly, its political role and influence in political decision-making was limited. Whereas military praetorianism in Africa was pervasive, the Nigerian military appeared unconcerned about partisan politics or governance (Howe, 2001: 3). In part, colonial organisational structure and traditions served to limit the military into upholding civilian supremacy and self-restraint (Janowitz, 1977: 82). During this period, the military had more British commissioned officers than Nigerians. Table 4.2 below presents the nationality of officer corps in the Nigerian military between the period 1960 to 1966.

**Table 4. 2 Distribution of Britons and Nigerians in the Nigerian Army, 1960-1966<sup>37</sup>**

Year	No. of British Officers	No. of Nigerian Commission Officers		Percentage of Nigerians
		Combat	Non-Combat	
1 Jan. 1960	228	48	2	18
1 Jan. 1962	156	107	50	50
1 Jan. 1964	47	240	132	89
1 Jan. 1966	0	336	181	100

Source: Luckham (1971: 222) Authority and Conflict in the Nigerian Army

<sup>37</sup> No record was available for the year 1963 when Nigeria became a republic and Britain handed over full control. The official gazettes of the Federation of Nigeria (1960-66), which Luckham derived this data from, were incomplete.

As Table 4.2 reveals, by 1963 when Nigeria gained autonomy from Britain, it began withdrawing its officers from the Nigerian military. By 1964, Nigeria had more Nigerians in the officer ranks, many of whom were trained in Sandhurst in the United Kingdom, or other foreign military academies (Auma-Osolo, 1980: 38). In part, this foreign training and the adoption of British values of civilian supremacy over the military influenced the posture of the Nigerian military in the period 1960-1966 (Alaga & Akum, 2013: 219). Therefore, it is possible to argue that before the first military coup, the Nigerian military was a professional military.<sup>38</sup> The low societal integration and non-partisan posture typified that of a professional military, as described by Huntington (1957: 83–84, 1968). This was corroborated by several scholars, such as Alaga & Akum (2013: 221) and Ojo (2006: 262), who pointed out that “the Nigerian armed forces were a normal professional force.” However, this professional outlook was eroded after the first military coup of 15 January 1966. This coup provoked a counter-coup (see Section 4.2.1 above), both of which set the foundation for continuous military intervention in politics, which began to erode its professionalism.

Prior to the first coup, electoral violence, ethnic politics, mismanagement, leadership ineptitude, and massive corruption in the civil service and among political office holders was pervasive in Nigeria (George, Shadare & Owoyemi, 2012: 194). The October 1965 election was marred by electoral malpractice and interethnic violence, particularly between the Hausa and the Yoruba in the Western Region, where the results were contested and rejected by two political parties. Political violence and assassinations, arson, and destruction of properties forced many to flee the cities due to the rising level of insecurity (Yaqub & Muhammad, 2007: 19). Nearly all the military coups in Nigeria occurred during periods of strong competition for political power, riots, strikes and demonstrations, and public disaffection with civilian government (Ihonvbere, 1991: 604). Because of this, some have argued that the weakness of the government, particularly in response to the deteriorating security situation, led to civilians inviting the military to quell the riots and violence (Ehwarieme, 2011: 496–503). In fact, Yaqub & Muhammad argue that:

[I]t was highly the opinion of some concerned Nigerians that the Nigerian Army should step in and rescue Nigeria from total disaster which the Army willingly did *by intervening in politics*<sup>39</sup> (2007: 19).

This means that the Nigerian military was typically praetorian during this period, given its intervention in governance, and that the aim of the intervention was to restore peace and orderliness, fight corruption, and unify the country. While this is a valid argument, further examination reveals that this

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<sup>38</sup> This argument is made with caution because some have accused it of heavy handedness during some of the ISOPs it conducted. See for instance Dode (2012: 409) and Audu (2015: 11–14).

<sup>39</sup> My emphasis.

marked the beginning of military predatory praetorianism in Nigeria, a point which I will return to shortly.

The military could be described as a popular praetorian military during the first coup and the period between 8 June 1998 to 29 May 1999, when the former military despot Gen Sani Abacha died in office and Gen Abubakar Abdulsalami took over power. Gen Abdulsalami's regime was the shortest of all military transitions, as he handed over power to the elected civilian government on 29 May 1999 (Ojo, 2004, 2006: 255). He recognised the desire of Nigerians for civilian rule, having suffered 29 years of military dictatorship and tyranny. For instance, during the reign of Gen Sani Abacha, opposition parties were suppressed, political assassinations were rampant, and human rights violations occurred with impunity. Chief among these was the execution of nine Niger Delta activists, including Ken Saro Wiwa in November 1995, an act that later gave birth to the rise of insurgent groups and criminal violence in the Niger Delta (see section 0) (Idachaba, 2007: 280). In addition to this, military dictatorship brought about hardship and several international sanctions against Nigeria, fostering civilian impatience and resentment of the military (Idachaba, 2007: 281).

From another angle, it is possible to argue that the first coup revolutionised the military into becoming a predatory praetorian military. The coup changed the professional outlook of the Nigerian military, resulting in no less than nine further coups and 29 years of military rule, laying the foundation for military predatory activities. This involved several years of draconian military policies, brutality and clampdown on activists and opposition, and the annulment of the election on 12 June 1993 (Welch, 1995: 593; George *et al.*, 2012: 194). During this 29 year dictatorship, the military engaged in mismanagement, bribery and corruption, and looting and accumulation of public resources (Ehwarieme, 2011: 499). Ojo described the nature of praetorianism thus:

the military has become “political gladiators” in the battle for control of the state through incessant intervention in politics and government ... As a result of the frequent coups and countercoups, the military has ruled Nigeria for a much longer time than its civilian counterparts. The civilians have held office for fourteen out of the forty-three years of Nigeria's flag independence ... This is simply the picture of a praetorian state or what Leo Dare called the “Praetorian Trap” (Ojo, 2006: 262).

Along with this, the military subjected civilians to draconian decrees, silencing human rights advocates and bringing about several international sanctions against the country (Idachaba, 2007: 280–281). In the international theatre of peace support operations (PSO), the military received more criticism than commendation (Osunyikanmi, 2011: 58), as not only was it abusing its powers, but engaging in looting or predatory actions in its areas of assignment (Hills, 1997: 44). The many years of military rule ensured that the military accumulated much ill-gotten wealth and preserved significant prerogatives in both the economy and the political process of the country. As argued in the following section, these include

the trend of retiring military officers moving into political offices, as well as them having a major stake in the national economy and economic activities of the country.

#### **4.6 DEMOCRATIC CIVIL CONTROL AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE MILITARY**

The Nigerian military has acted as a predatory praetorian military, thereby making democratic civil control of the military a complex task. To overcome the problem, Section 218 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria empowers the civilian President with several responsibilities as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999). These include the power to decide on the operational use of the military, appointment of the Defence Chief and the Chiefs of the various Services (Army, Air Force, Navy), and the regulation of the presidential power by the National Assembly. In effect, the law institutionalises and legitimises civilian supremacy over the military, and provides both “constitutional and legal basis for democratic civilian control of the armed forces” in Nigeria (Magbadelo, 2012: 257; Alaga & Akum, 2013: 231).

Upon assuming office in 1999, former President Olusegun Obasanjo carried out two decisive actions to professionalise the military and to subordinate the armed forces to civilian authority, in line with the Constitutional provisions.<sup>40</sup> First, all serving officers who held political offices/appointments between 1984 and 1999 were retired as a measure to ensure that the remaining officers recognise, comply with, and appreciate the norm of civilian supremacy. The second action was the inauguration of a Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission (Oputa Panel) to investigate incidences of human rights abuses committed during military rule (Alaga & Akum, 2013: 227; Babatunde, 2015: 51). In addition to this, the government engaged civilians as ministers of defence; established a senate committee on defence to oversee matters involving the military; and granted relative autonomy to the three wings of the armed forces by appointing a chief for each service (Omede, 2012: 301). These mechanisms demonstrate the attempt by civilian leaders to exercise civil control over the military. However, the principles of civil control are not firmly institutionalised and, “the laws, and legal procedures have not been fully implemented and observed” (Alaga & Akum, 2013: 231).

Following the decision to formally hand over power to civilians in 1999, many serving military officers retired to go into politics. The electable position of the President and several State Governors were occupied by these retired military officers who had the ‘means’ to be ‘elected’ or ‘selected’ to these offices. These ‘means’ include power, positions, new-found wealth, ex-military connections, ‘old-boy’ networks, skills, prestige, and experiences or, simply put, military prerogatives (Stepan, 1988: 93; Adekanye, 1999b: 185). Using the economic advantage mostly ill-acquired as serving officers, the retired officers found themselves in an advantaged position in terms of gaining political power, which

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<sup>40</sup> President Olusegun Obasanjo is a retired military officer and former military dictator who is credited for peacefully handing over power to civilian rule in 1979. He later ruled Nigeria as a democratically elected president from May 1999 to 2007.

also served to protect their economic wealth (Badmus, 2005: 61).<sup>41</sup> Unsurprisingly, political appointments, including the Minister of Defence, “National Security Adviser, Director of State Security, Aso Rock Chief of Staff (that is, chief of staff of the presidential villa)” were given to retired military officers, many of whom were partisan while in military service (Alaga & Akum, 2013: 227). Thus, Nigeria’s democracy became a pseudo-civilian government, with serving and retired officers dominating key political decision-making processes, agencies, government parastatals, and political party leadership. Lutterbeck (2013: 30) refers to this as a “military-ruler regime.”

One can infer from this that the Nigerian military made a pact to civilianise and retire military officers into active political roles. While this was stated in the Nigerian Army Officers’ 1981 Terms and Conditions of Service, there appears to be no such formal policy of late, although the trend since the return to democracy in 1999 suggests otherwise (Agara, 2006: 51–52). In the light of the ascension of retired military officers into politics in a consciously planned swap from khaki to ‘agbada,’<sup>42</sup> Nigerian democracy remains under the direct/indirect control of retired military officers (Maja-Pearce, 1999; Kolawole, 2014: 22). This explains the unwillingness of government to restructure the State, particularly as it affects CMR as well as the continuous militarisation of both society and the polity.

Accordingly, Alaga & Akum (2013: 227) have argued that, rather than addressing the problem and the counter-effect it poses to the infant democracy and the process of consolidating it, government action encourages more involvement of retired officers. When states of emergency were declared in Plateau and Ekiti States, it was retired officers that were appointed as administrators, rather than civilians. In addition, while the commission charged with investigating human rights abuses was credited for being thorough and comprehensive, the government showed no interest in implementing its recommendations or prosecuting those found culpable. On the contrary, retired servicemen invited to answer to the charges against them refused to appear before the Commission, yet no action/sanction was taken against them, and neither was the recommendation of the commission implemented (Fayemi, 2002; Adeakin, 2015: 125). Clearly, the lack of political will to address the concerns indicates that some powerful forces associated with the military have ‘captured’ the State and are unwilling to change the status quo.

In addition to this, two instances of military extrajudicial actions shaped the state of CMR in Nigeria. The Odi and the Zaki Biam massacres<sup>43</sup> carried out by the military have gone unpunished, and the

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<sup>41</sup> Badmus (2005: 61) described three patterns of how military officers usurped state finances for themselves during the military regimes.

<sup>42</sup> Agbada or Kaftan is a popular male attire worn in Nigeria and the West African region, it is characterized by long wide sleeves.

<sup>43</sup> The military raids and massacres in Odi village of Bayelsa State, and Zaki Biam of Benue State, are examples of excessive use of military force, and its seeming possession of unquestionable power in Nigeria. For detailed accounts of the massacres and the events leading to them, see Nwachukwu & Ojugbana (2001: 152–159), and Effiong (2001: 73–82).

victims were offered no form of compensation (Bawa & Nwogu, 2001; Nwolise, 2007). This shows that despite the transition to civilian rule, liberal democratic principles are subverted while the military continues to wield unquestioned powers. Omede (2012: 301) corroborates this when he points out that “more often than not, one has had to wonder whether the military is above the nation’s constitution.” Thus, some have claimed that involving the military internally in society for law enforcement duties terrorises the populace (Ojo, 2006, 2009b: 16–17). This raises questions as to the role of civil society in Nigeria, especially when it comes to addressing and regulating the excesses of the military. As I argued in the previous chapter, civil society is one of the key legitimate mechanisms through which civilians can ensure the government and its various institutions/agencies are held accountable.

In Nigeria, civil society has little impact on the regulation of the military and holding them to account when it comes to military excesses and abuse of power. A number of reasons have been put forward to explain why this happens. Ojo (1997, 2006: 265) argues that the state constrains, suppresses and ‘beleaguers’ civil society organisations using coercion or military might, even in the present democratic dispensation. This observation remains true in Nigeria. In addition to repressing civil society, the criminal courts have produced little or no convincing evidence on their ability to successfully prosecute matters of military extrajudicial killings. A more recent military raid and alleged massacre on Tarok communities in 2015 in Plateau State has made little progress in the criminal courts, and victims of this abuse are losing faith in the judiciary.<sup>44</sup>

In several other instances, civil society has been unable to question government actions due to fear of repression, and because government leadership is often dominated by retired military officers, sympathisers or its ‘puppets.’ The three influential ethno-regional civil society organisations (Arewa Consultative Forum, Ohaeneze Ndigbo, and Afenifere) pursue ethnic agendas and are still being led by retired military officers (Alaga & Akum, 2013: 227). Another problem affecting the power and influence of civil society in Nigeria is that the citizenry is sharply divided along religious and ethnic lines, which undermines their ability to act as a united force.

Another crucial area where the military has exerted an influence is the economy of the country. According to Agara (2006: 64), this developed through three different stages: intervention in politics; assuming political appointments on boards of parastatals and public corporations; and holding a firm grip on contracts with contractors and private business entrepreneurs. Since the military coup in 1966, the military became more politically involved and aware of both political and economic decision-making processes. Officers developed an interest in venturing into economic activities, especially because the

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<sup>44</sup> Participant (a member of one of the communities affected) interviewed in Jos North LGA of Plateau State on 29 September 2016.



civil war and its end provided promising opportunities for numerous business activities to thrive. Many tapped into the development and the public expenditure plans of the Nigerian government by establishing business enterprises to execute these projects (Adekanye, 1999a: 34). The coup made it possible for officers to be both military and political administrators, as well as economic managers of the various States and the Federal government, with the ability to direct policy and influence decision-making. Through this, opportunities for the ascension of officers into the economic structure of the state were provided, which also disadvantaged civilians and the underprivileged (Adekanye, 1999a: 34). Agara succinctly sums up the situation as follows:

The virtual monopoly of the state power by the military discriminated against other groups' access to economic and political largesse offered by their control of the state apparatus in as much as access to the office and its spoils is the object of politics. The military politicians by their actions had made it clear that their looting of public funds could not be challenged within the framework of electoral politics and military dictatorship because of the 'old boys' network and feelings of comradeship (Agara, 2006: 67).

This became instrumental in the military funding and winning elections. More so, as some have argued, the Nigerian political system became monetised, such that only the wealthy and their cronies are able to be successful (Badmus, 2005: 62; Ehwarieme, 2011: 501–502). This smooths the process for retired officers to consolidate their grip on both the economic and the political structures of Nigeria.

To put this in context of the theories of CMR, I focus on the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (amended), hereafter referred to as the Constitution. The understanding is that, because the Constitution defines the establishment, roles, and functions of the armed forces, it sets the pattern for the civil control of the military. First, it does not make provision for the military to be involved in the political decision-making processes. Rather, section 144 (5) provides that the Executive Council of the Federation (the cabinet) shall only comprise a “body of ministers of the government of the federation” which has no military representative (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999: 66). A second point pertains to the role of the military in society as regards to military aid to civil authority. Accordingly, section 217 (2) C makes it clear that the military can be made to assume an internal role of a constabulary force to assist in suppressing insurrection when the need arises. A third and equally important provision is that the composition of the officer corps and other ranks of the military must reflect the federal character (ethnic diversity) of Nigeria.

From this, one sees that the Constitution has aspects of Huntington's separation theory, given that it favours an insular military that is detached from the political decision-making process. Where the Constitution involves the military and the police in the National Security Council, it provides that it shall only be an advisory body, and the President shall be the head of the body (section 25 and 26 of the third schedule of the Constitution). As such, it excludes the military from the political decision-making process. Another consideration is that the Constitution favours the constabulary roles that



Janowitz observes the military assuming in society, hence, it embodies aspects of both the integration and separation theories.

The implication of this is that it aligns more closely with Schiff's concordance theory, which favours neither the separation nor integration of the military in the political decision-making process, but rather an agreement on the most suitable option. Importantly, the requirement that the military must reflect the federal character of Nigeria emphasises concordance on the significance of an agreement on the recruitment pattern, especially as it concerns the composition of the officer corps. Given that Nigeria has endured a civil war and is still facing numerous armed conflicts, the emphasis on concordance in the institutional and cultural conditions of the state becomes even more salient. However, although there has not been any military intervention in politics since the return to civil rule in 1999, there appear to be tensions in the state of CMR due to military excesses. While in theory the Constitution provides a framework for civil control of the military, in practice civil control is lacking, as the discussion in this section reveals. Where the issues are not addressed and civilians resort to arms or allying with armed groups to seek protection and to retaliate against military abuse, this can affect CMR.

#### **4.7 CONCLUSION**

Having examined the challenges armed groups pose to states, this chapter narrowed the discussion to Nigeria where every region in the country faces incidences of armed violence. One explanation why armed violence is so ubiquitous in Nigeria is a lack of political will to unite the country and address the political and economic marginalisation that the various groups suffer. As the grievances have not been addressed, several groups resort to arms to challenge their exclusion. However, this does not fully account for the resort to violence, and other explanations point to the constitutional lacuna which emphasises indigeneship over citizenship, and the exploitation of these sentiments by some for economic or political gains. When violence breaks out, it overwhelms the police agency, which suffers a legitimacy crisis due to its brutality and corruption, as well as the shortage of manpower, inadequate training, and a lack of basic policing equipment.

The combination of these challenges compels the government to use the military internally in society for basic law-enforcement duties and the maintenance of security. However, using the military in this capacity results in numerous atrocities and abuses of human rights, which affect the relationship of the military with the citizenry. The professional image of the military is undermined by its predatory praetorianism and its grip on the political, economic, and social structures of the State. Consequently, the military has come to wield unchecked powers when it acts internally in society, and civil control is nearly non-existent to null and void.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### METHODOLOGY

#### 5.1 CHAPTER OVERVIEW

This chapter discusses the research methods used for data collection and analysis, the ethics, and a reflection on the research process. The framework and the underlying techniques and assumptions that were made in collecting and analysing the data for the study are provided, as well as information that explains how the research was conducted, and why certain approaches were chosen over others. The chapter is divided into five sections: (1) the philosophical assumptions of the study, (2) the research design, (3) the ethical considerations, (4) the limitations of the study and (5) a reflection on the fieldwork.

#### 5.2 PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS

Typically, research design follows certain assumptions that guide the conduct of the study, the data collection, interpretation and analysis. The approach is determined by several factors, key among which are the aim of the study, the sample size, time availability and the availability of funds to execute the project. Given that this study focusses on understanding human experiences of military operations and how it affects people's security, a strategy which could explore individual accounts of the experiences is most suitable. I therefore adopt a social constructivist approach. Social constructionism is a philosophical standpoint that sees individuals as meaning makers who are able to socially construct their reality (Creswell, 1998: 76). The aim is to understand the meaning individual participants attach to their experiences and how this affects them, rather than focusing on the views and opinions contained in theories and the literature. It contends that humans understand their reality through an interaction with their historical, social and cultural reality (Crotty, 1998; Schwandt, 2000). For this reason, this study leans towards the social constructionist ontology, which strives to understand the reality of the participants, their experiences, and how it affects their daily livelihoods. To achieve this, the study used broad questions, rather than a structured interview questionnaire or guide. This helped to facilitate open conversation with the research participants, and it provided me an opportunity to carefully listen to the detailed experience of each participant, making prompts and inquiries, and seeking to better understand how each participant experienced the phenomenon (Creswell, 2003: 8).

Several scholars have indicated that the interpretivist epistemology can be favourably used with social constructionist ontology to study human experiences (Creswell, 1998, 2003; Bryman, 2012: 36). As this research studied the experiences of civilians with the military operations in Plateau State, it adopts the interpretivist epistemology. This facilitated the understanding of how the citizens in this State in Nigeria experienced the use of the military in their communities, as well as their interaction with the military. Interpretivism offers the requisite conversational space necessary to elicit discussions and to

uncover the meanings participants attach to certain events. This aligns closely with the contention that the relationship between the researcher and the research participants plays a major role in determining the outcome of a study (Guba & Lincoln, 1994: 111).

Creating a close interactive link between a researcher and participants provides an atmosphere in which to uncover the subjective meanings individuals attach to their experiences. When a researcher allows participants to recount their reality and experiences, they can narrate and explain the meaning participants attach to certain events that affect their lives. Interpretivism thus recognises and respects the fact that individuals' experiences provide different meanings to a given phenomenon. Unlike the positivist orthodoxy, it recognises the possibility of multiple views from different individuals, and an understanding of the meanings they attach to their reality (Bryman, 2012: 30).

The process of interacting with each participant has implications for the values, opinions and biases researchers might bring into a study. This problem, considered as the axiological assumption in social research, tends to be inherent in social research. Rarely do investigators develop and conduct studies without prior values, assumptions, thoughts, and experiences about the phenomenon studied (Creswell, 1998: 76). This is certainly true for me in this study, given that I have first-hand experience of military abuse against civilians. As I have also resided in some parts of the study area for a considerable number of years, I have experienced military operations in Plateau State and I reflect on this in the study.

### **5.3 RESEARCH DESIGN**

#### **5.3.1 Research Strategy**

This research was designed as an exploratory study due to its focus on understanding the experiences of civilians with respect to military operations in Plateau State. In line with the above-mentioned philosophical assumptions, the qualitative research strategy was used to guide this research. For conceptual clarity, a research strategy is the fundamental framework which guides the overall conduct and process of social research (Bryman, 2012: 35). The qualitative research strategy places emphasis on understanding rather than measuring, quantifying, and generalising from the data derived or used for the study. It focuses on giving thick and detailed descriptions of human experiences through observation and interaction with those involved in order to understand the meaning they attach to their experiences. Several reasons informed the choice of the qualitative research strategy for this study. One was the need to produce a thick textual description of citizens' experiences, perceptions, and attitudes regarding the military operations in their communities. This is important because few studies have examined this in Plateau State, Nigeria.

In addition, while several studies have examined the conflict in Plateau State, a thorough literature search across databases and local publications reveals that few have examined it from the perspective

of the interaction and experiences of civilians with the military (Abdullahi *et al.*, 2016). A quantitative study would have required knowing what indicators to use to measure the effect the military has on the security situation in the State, which was not known. However, with qualitative research, themes, ideas and theories are derived from findings made from the data collected in the field (Corbin & Strauss, 2008: ix; Bryman, 2012: 399–404). Furthermore, using qualitative strategies generates the primary data to fill the gap in existing theories of CMR to fully explain the phenomenon in Plateau State. Several scholars indicate that this is the most appropriate and suitable research method to elicit the perceptions, experiences and attitudes of people (Berg, 2007; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Denzin & Lincoln, 2008).

### **5.3.2 Site of the Study**

The study site for this research was Plateau State, North Central Nigeria. As indicated in the previous Chapter, several other States face recurrent and intermittent violence in Nigeria. These include the Niger-Delta oil producing region, and several States in the North East such as Borno, Adamawa, and Gombe affected by severe threat and violence from the Boko Haram and military coercion. While these States could have been used, Plateau State has been adopted for several reasons. One is that I am more knowledgeable about the terrain, geographical landscape and the conflict situation in Plateau State as I have been resident here for over 20 years. This insider knowledge was important because it enabled me to navigate the conflict zones with great care and cautiousness to ensure my own safety and security, and that of my participants. Another key factor was my understanding and ability to speak, read and write the Hausa language, which is spoken as a second language in some localities in Plateau State. This meant language and communication pitfalls were minimised, and participants could speak about their experiences and express their opinions comfortably without having to use an interpreter.

The last, and possibly the most important reason for using Plateau State, is the ongoing violence and continuous use of the military to curb the conflict. Despite the military's presence and excessive use of force, they have been unable to stabilise this once-peaceful State in Nigeria. On the contrary, the military has been engaged in extrajudicial killings and genocide, with one of the most recent attacks on civilians on 2 May, 2015 in Tarok communities (Bawa & Nwogu, 2001: 116; Human Rights Watch, 2005, 2013; Best & Rakodi, 2011: 72). The actions of the military have affected its relationship with civilians, who are no longer willing to interact or cooperate with them. The citizenry feel that that the military has brought little relief, and rather have become part of the security problem (Crisis Group, 2012: 21). This made Plateau State relevant in terms of the aims and goals of this study.

Plateau State has 17 Local Government Areas (LGAs). Of these, six LGAs were used as sites from which participants were selected for this study. These LGAs included:

- i. Jos North LGA
- ii. Jos South LGA
- iii. Riyom LGA
- iv. Barkin Ladi LGA
- v. Mangu LGA and
- vi. Bokkos LGA

After a preliminary investigation, several reasons informed the decision to use these LGAs as the sites of the study. These include the fact that military operations in these LGAs were still very active, and that the presence of military personnel in several parts of each of the LGAs was visible and pervasive. Along with this, these LGAs have continued to face violence that involved the military and the local population, and the recentness of the violence meant participants could more readily recollect, narrate, and discuss the issues, as it was topical and fresh in their minds.

### **5.3.3 Selection of Participants**

Given that the study aimed to investigate the experiences of civilians of military operations in Plateau State, only civilians were recruited as participants for this study. A criterion was that they must have been resident in any of the LGAs for at least the past five years. They should also not have travelled or stayed away from the State for more than two months within the past five years. These measures were put in place to ensure that every person selected to participate in the study had some level of experience with the conflict and the use of the military. The assumption was that when individuals reside in an environment for a long period, they can observe the changes in the environment, develop coping strategies and adapt to the changing environment. Thus, only participants with the required lived experiences were included in the study. Another criterion was that they were to be over 20 years of age in order to avoid the challenges associated with researching minors, as they may not possess adequate first-hand experience and a good grasp of the origin of the violence.

To elicit a broad spectrum of views and perspectives, participants were sampled from different social categories across the six LGAs. These categories included students of tertiary institutions; traders and artisans; public/private sector employees; employers of labour; unemployed persons; elected representatives; and community leaders, as detailed below.

1. Students of tertiary institutions: In each of the mapped LGAs, there is at least one tertiary learning institution, and these institutions were the point of locating and recruiting participants. These educational institutions were the University of Jos, the Jos Campus of Plateau State Polytechnic, the Barkin Ladi Campus of Plateau State Polytechnic, College of Nursing and Midwifery Vom, College of Education Gindiri, and Plateau State University Bokkos.
2. Traders and artisans: Sampling for this category took place at their respective places of work or trade. For traders, markets and shops in each of the sites were used as the venue for recruitment.

Artisans, such as vehicle mechanics, blacksmiths, tailors, and barbers were reached by visiting their workshops, garages, stores, or shops.

3. Public/private sector employees: Recruitment for this category was from the respective secretariats, private sector offices and government offices in each of the LGAs.
4. Employers of labour: A visit to private sector organisations was made to seek consent of entrepreneurs who employ labour in each of the six LGAs.
5. Unemployed persons: Community and youth leaders in each of the LGAs served as leads for recruiting this category of participants, given the vast knowledge they have of members of their communities.
6. Elected representatives: Snowball sampling was used here to contact and arrange meetings with individuals in this category, due to the difficulties faced in accessing them.
7. Community leaders: Most community members easily know their community leaders, and oral inquiry was used to contact and locate them.

Criterion purposive sampling and snowball sampling techniques were used, because they offered flexibility in selecting participants who met the objectives of the research (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995; Patton, 2002). Using criterion-purposive sampling ensured that participants met the stated requirements, and I assumed that civilians who fulfilled the criteria must have had some form of interaction with the military. The benefit was that it presented the opportunity to elicit both good and unpleasant experiences with the military, providing a more balanced view. In addition to the broad social categories of participants, I also considered ethnic and religious affiliation when sampling participants to ensure that I included all spectrums in the sampled population. This was important as it included individuals from diverse backgrounds, affiliations, and orientations who had interacted with the military, which enabled me to capture diverse views.

#### **5.3.4 Data Collection**

As this study aimed to investigate the views, perception, experiences, and attitudes of people in relation to the military, participant observation and one-on-one qualitative interviews were used for data collection. Participant observation was helpful because it provided the opportunity to observe and encounter the role of the military, in terms of how they act and behave when interacting with civilians. This was important because it aligned my experience of the military as a researcher (within the period of data collection) with those of participants. It also facilitated a deeper understanding of the experiences of civilians without presenting the challenge of behaviour alteration and inaccurate description during interviews. The qualitative interviewing was selected because it supports the use of open unstructured conversations with participants and it counters the limitations of using a structured interview guide, or a standardised questionnaire for all participants. Rather, it requires the use of an aide memoire or broad questions to elicit in-depth responses from participants and to gain 'first-hand

experience' with the phenomenon of study<sup>45</sup> (Kvale, 1996). This approach provided the conversational space to comprehensively explore the experiences of participants, the meaning they attached to it, and the opportunity to investigate 'unanticipated' areas of inquiry.

A total of 55 interviews were conducted for the study. This number was decided upon due to the recommendation of conducting not less than 15 interviews for a research using qualitative strategies (Bertaux, 1981; Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006). The view is corroborated by many scholars because it is expected that saturation of categories would be achieved from this number of interviews (Morse, 1994; Creswell, 1998; Warren, 2001; Green & Thorogood, 2009; Mason, 2010). However, as I wanted to capture diverse views, interviews were continued until a point of saturation was reached. Table 5.1 below presents a breakdown of participants and the sites in which they were sampled.

**Table 5.1 Breakdown of Interviews by LGAs and Social Categories of Participants**

<i>S. No</i>	<i>Students</i>	<i>Traders/Artisans</i>	<i>Public/Private Employees</i>	<i>Employers of Labour</i>	<i>Unemployed Persons</i>	<i>Elected Reps.</i>	<i>Community Leaders</i>	<i>LGAs</i>
1.	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	Jos North
2.	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	Jos South
3.	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	Riyom
4.	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	B/Ladi
5.	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	Mangu
6.	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	Bokkos
<i>Sum</i>	12	6	12	7	6	6	6	55

Source: Fieldwork Notes

Although the table does not present other characteristics, such as religious affiliation and ethnicity, careful consideration of these characteristics was made in the sampling process. Another characteristic not covered in the table, but which needs emphasis is the gender of my participants. Of the 55 participants interviewed, 36 were men and 19 women. Some participants had less interaction with the military than others, irrespective of gender. Interaction with the military was not a criterion used in selecting participants, and the reasons for this are discussed upon later on in this chapter (Section 5.6).

### 5.3.5 Data Analysis

Although there are several qualitative data analysis techniques, thematic analysis was used for this study. This choice arose from the exploratory nature of this study, and its desire to investigate complex human experiences. It was considered adequate given that it focuses on identifying and describing both obvious and hidden truths within the data. As an analytical tool, thematic analysis is considered the most adequate and useful tool for investigating "complexities of meaning within a textual data set" (Guest, Macqueen & Namey, 2012: 11). Braun & Clarke (2006: 81) indicate that it is

<sup>45</sup> See Appendix B for the aide memoire used for this study.

a vital analytical tool for describing and examining the meanings and experiences individuals have about a given phenomenon. This shows the approach was suitable for this study which sought to understand the lived experiences of people. The analysis was conducted with the aid of Atlas.ti 8 computer-aided qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS). It followed a six phase approach which involved getting familiarised with the data; coding the data; generating themes; reviewing the themes; defining and naming the themes; and producing the report by way of analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 87). As this was an inductive study, themes were derived from the fieldwork and not from extant literatures or my prior knowledge.

#### **5.4 ETHICAL CLEARANCE**

Prior to the fieldwork for the study, ethical clearance and approval from Stellenbosch University Humanities Research Ethics Committee was obtained. This process followed scrutiny from the Admissions Committee to the Department Ethics Screening Committee and the Humanities Research Ethics Committee, as the study was considered of medium risk. The key considerations outlined in the ethical application process were all strictly adhered to during the fieldwork and in writing this research report. Some of the major considerations included voluntary expression of consent to take part in the study. Consent was obtained orally from all participants after they read, or the content of the consent form was read and explained to them, and clarifications were made. Due to the sensitive nature of the research and the need to protect participants from unforeseen risks, their names were not required or recorded. They were also informed of their right to withdraw from the study. Pseudonyms were used for each participant.

All the interviews were conducted in a safe and noise-free space and were participants felt comfortable. I prioritised my safety and security, by navigating unsafe zones with the assistance of field officers working in local communities in the conflict zones. Some participants were linked with social workers for professional counselling upon the conclusion of the interviews. One participant was referred to social workers because his remarks indicated his desire to use actual violence to kill any military personnel he encounters. However, participants were assured of their privacy, anonymity and confidentiality as the interviews were conducted on a one-on-one basis. They were assured that all audio recordings of the interviews would not be given to anyone but would be saved on an encrypted and password-protected device. These were consequently deleted after the interviews were transcribed into text. All information capable of identifying participants, such as the names of their streets and the address where some incidents directly affecting them happened, were not reported in this study.

#### **5.5 LIMITATIONS**

The study has certain limitations, one being that the scope was limited to civilians' experiences of the military. The design of the study deliberately excluded active military personnel and the officer corps.



While this decision was intentional, it meant that the study does not benefit from juxtaposing the opinions of military personnel vis-à-vis those of civilians. However, doing this presented the study with the opportunity to explore in-depth, the views of the citizens who interact and experience the heavy-handedness of the military in their daily lives. This rationale helped make the research focus on the practical details of the study while not comparing the data with opposing views, which could have been at polar extremes. Moreover, it was more practical and feasible to interview civilians than military personnel, given that access to active-duty personnel is near-impossible in terms of obtaining official approval. However, this is a potential recommendation for future studies to interrogate both views.

In practical terms, the use of Hausa language for data collection posed certain limitations regarding translation and transcribing the data. However, I addressed these issues and ensured that they had little or no effect to the outcome of the study. I did this by translating the broad interview questions for the aide memoire to Hausa language prior to the interview, and a native speaker of the language confirmed its accuracy before I conducted the interviews. This assurance mechanism was important despite me being proficient in Hausa, as it was possible that some information could have been lost in the process of translation (see Hoffman, 1998). I also did a similar accuracy control with the interview transcripts before I began the analysis. However, I anonymised all the data and all information that could identify participants before asking for assistance from a native speaker of the language.

## **5.6 REFLECTION ON THE DATA COLLECTION PROCESS**

I started the fieldwork on 22nd August 2016 and concluded it in January 2017. Before beginning the fieldwork, I carried out a preliminary visit to the various sites of the study in January 2016 to familiarise myself with the localities. I did this with the support and help of members of civil society organisations who were working in the communities. The support staff from the civil society organisations guided me and helped me gain access to potentially unsafe communities that I could not visit alone. This was necessary as the residential settlements in various parts of the State are polarised and compartmentalised by religion. Non-adherents are unable to visit areas occupied by the different faiths for safety concerns. However, the support staff helped me navigate through these communities and linked me to key community members, who assisted me in recruiting some participants for the study. This assisted in addressing possible trust relations and gaining acceptance.

I used both snowball and criterion purposive sampling techniques to recruit participants. The combination of these became necessary due to the complex sensitive nature of the research, and my interest in uncovering and examining specific experiences. Along with this, concerns about my safety and gaining the trust of participants played a role: snowballing reinforces trust because it works on referral. The sampling strategies further ensured that those interviewed were persons consistently resident in the study area, and above 20 years of age. I assumed that these categories of persons would have had some form of interaction with the military, given that temporary military bases and make-

shift roadblocks are common in several locations in the State. However, I did not ask any participant about their interaction with military personnel before recruiting them for interviewing. I assumed that because they had lived in the State for a prolonged period with pervasive military presence, they are likely to have interacted with the military, and this turned out to be the case for all participants.

Although the combination of snowballing and criterion purposive sampling proved suitable for this study, other strategies could have been effective as well. One such strategy is stratified random sampling, which also helps to recruit participants across different social categories representing the focus of the research (Fox, Hunn & Mathers, 2009: 8). However, because of the sensitive nature of the research, security concerns, and the challenges involved in gaining the trust of participants, this approach would have been inappropriate. Without the aid of the support staff of various community organisations, and the referral snowballing brings, I would not have been able to visit some localities or recruit many of my participants. Through snowballing, some participants suggested persons they thought would be beneficial to the study and this helped to minimise the challenges associated with trust and speaking out. Although one weakness of snowballing is the likelihood that referral could lead to recruiting a network of friends, inputs from support staff from civil society organisations helped to mitigate this. Also, my use of several sites (six LGAs) for participant recruitment addressed this potential shortcoming.

One point to note is how my positionality as a Christian and a native of Plateau State could have affected the research. Typically, being an insider has both benefits and potential challenges in terms of the data collection process. The benefits, as I noted in Section 5.3.4, include insider knowledge of some local languages, which facilitated effective interactions during the interviews, and knowledge of the conflict and conflict zones. Nevertheless, despite being an insider, I encountered several challenges in recruiting participants for the study, as some saw me as a 'suspicious insider.' I presumed that being a native and a Christian would make it easy to contact Christian natives and recruit them for the study, without the help of support staff from civil society organisations. However, many Christian natives declined to participate in the study, once I introduced myself to them as a research student and explained the nature of my topic.

In one instance in Heipang, Barkin Ladi LGA, a native Christian told me that identity documents can be forged, and he was therefore suspicious and would not participate in the research. However, as I reached most Muslims through the assistance of support staff, I did not encounter this challenge with them. Incidentally, Kusow (2003: 594) also experienced a similar challenge of being a suspicious insider while attempting to interview Somali migrants in Canada. Another challenge was that being a Christian native, which made me an 'insider' to Christians, also made me an 'outsider' to Muslims, as such statuses are fluid, situational, and contextual (Merton, 1972: 21). This had certain implications for the study as Muslims may not have been opened to share and discuss their experiences with me. However,

as I used referral and the help of support staff working in the local communities, Muslims generally provided consent to participate and opened up on their interactions and experiences with the military.

Another point to note is that security and safety concerns affected the selection of tools for data collection. Dyadic one-on-one interviews were used instead of focus group discussions, which would have been beneficial in showing agreement, arguments and disagreement on several issues raised. However, concerns about the safety and security of participants convinced me to adopt one-on-one interviews to reduce the risk of harm which may arise when participants' express critical opinions before strangers. This decision proved helpful as participants openly narrated their experiences and detailed how they felt about the presence and activities of the military. In one interview, the interviewee not only expressed bitterness with the military, but the desire to shoot to kill should a gun be available. This also showed that the guarantee and assurance on confidentiality, privacy and anonymity were essential in order for participants to freely express their positions and disposition towards the military. This enabled me to elicit rich data for this study.

As a native of the State, and of the Christian religious affiliation, my identity needed careful consideration before visiting some localities. This was important because the conflict in the State is experienced along ethnic and religious lines, between the majority ethnic Christian natives and minority Muslim 'settlers.' Thus, given that I was not a neutral 'outsider', this consideration was important because it could have affected the data collection process in two ways. First, my security and safety as the researcher was at stake when I visited areas polarised by religious differences and intolerance. However, as I sought and obtained support and help from members of civil society organisations who were working in the area, this enabled me to overcome the safety and security concerns. Together with these staff, I navigated areas which I would not have been able to visit due to my being a Christian and a native of the area. However, the second challenge, of trust and openness, could have emerged during the interviews even after overcoming the first challenge. Despite gaining access and consent to interview those whose religious affiliation was different from mine, gaining their trust to open-up and freely discuss their experiences needed further consideration. Thus, through the support and help of the support staff, I convinced participants of the relevance, purpose, and benefit of the study. Along with this, the assurances of anonymity and confidentiality helped to bridge the openness challenge.

During the interviews, some participants alerted me to incidences of mass extra-judicial killings carried out by the military in the border communities of Plateau State with Taraba State. Although these areas were not in the proposed site of the study, the facts and wealth of data coming from this incident contributed to this study as it corroborated the heavy handedness and extrajudicial use of force by the military. One participant made available a six-page communique from the Nwang Ishi Otarok community of Wase Local Government Area of Plateau State on 6th May 2015, tagged "planned

genocide against the Tarok Race by the Nigerian Army and the Plateau State Government.” The communique described incidences of military excesses and parts of the report are referred to in this study, given that the incident was officially reported and is currently being prosecuted as a human rights violation crime in the court of law in Nigeria (Ahovi, 2015). However, as I did not obtain ethical clearance to conduct studies in these areas, I did not visit the localities to conduct interviews with the community affected.

I conducted the interviews in either English or Hausa. Most of the interviews were in Hausa and given that I am a fluent speaker of the language, I was able to conduct the interviews without communication problems. Using this language proved highly important because some of my participants could not speak English. I also noticed that despite the ability of some participants to speak the English, conversing in Hausa endeared me to some participants who were native speakers of Hausa. This became beneficial to the study because it helped them express their opinions clearly and openly.

As this study only examined and reported on the experiences of civilians in their interaction with the military, one could argue that the study is ‘one-sided’ or biased because it did not include the perspectives of the military. The study would have benefitted from obtaining the opinions of military personnel, but several factors led to the resolve to only interview civilians. One reason was that the study aimed to examine the experiences and interaction of civilians with the military. The shortcoming of several theories of CMR is that they fail to consider the citizenry as an active partner whose actions affect civil-military relations. Had the study included military participants, attention may have been shifted from achieving this. Given the hostility towards the military, obtaining approval from the military to interview personnel would also have been difficult. Along with this, it is possible that due to the sensitive nature of my study, I could have become a target of the military. They could have placed restrictions on my movements or placed me under surveillance, which would have put my research participants at risk. This could have further undermined the objective of this study, jeopardised it, or lead to the abrupt end of the study.

One axiomatic issue needs to be reflected upon. I had the misconception that chastity and sexual purity is higher in Muslim communities, in part because Muslims in the research area do not openly express intimacy, and do not allow non-relative males to visit their residences. With this presumption, I did not expect to hear about problems of sexual interaction between Muslim ladies and male military personnel. However, this appeared to be one of the major problems in the Muslims communities I visited. At first, this came as a shock to me when my first Muslim participant revealed this, but I was careful to not express my surprise as this could have jeopardised the interview. Later, I found out that the problem was endemic and that both married and unmarried ladies had relationships with male military personnel. As I conducted more interviews, I found out that there is a gendered experience

of the military in the different study areas which was clearly shaped by religion. Although I discuss this further in the next chapter, it is worth noting some of the reasons for this.

Most females reported having little problems with the military, except for the several desperate attempts soldiers make to get their attention. With most of the male participants, however, the experience appears to be hugely different. Several male participants reported that the military is confrontational, predatory and indulges in excesses including threatening and torturing young men for refusing to let go of their relationships with ladies that male military personnel have desires on. Thus, while males reported heavy-handedness, intolerance, dehumanising treatment, and a tendency for the military to label them as criminals, females do not often have such experiences. On the contrary, a number reported experiencing sexual harassment, and a few instances of abuse and exploitation from the military.

## **5.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY**

This chapter outlined the research methods, tools used for data collection, the participants whom data was collected from, why they were sampled, and how they were recruited into the study. Reference was made to how ethical clearance was obtained and the considerations that were made. The chapter concludes with a reflection and details of the fieldwork as background to the findings that were made from the fieldwork, which are discussed and analysed in the following chapter.

## CHAPTER SIX

### FINDINGS

#### 6.1 INTRODUCTION

Studies show that the military often uses disproportionate violence when it is used internally for law and order functions (Zaverucha, 2000; Ojo, 2006; Nwolise, 2007). In Nigeria, where the military is frequently used in constabulary roles, there is evidence that it abuses its power (Ojo-Ade, 2004: 293; Ojo, 2006). This study looked at the military operations in Plateau State and the effect these have on the security of the citizenry, and this chapter presents the findings. These are presented according to the themes that emerged from the data: (1) types of military abuse experienced in Plateau State; (2) military professionalism and conduct of soldiers; (3) civilians reacting to and retaliating against military abuses; and (4) the various interventions by the State to control the military.

#### 6.2 TYPES OF MILITARY ABUSE EXPERIENCED IN PLATEAU STATE

This section describes the experiences of civilians with the military in Plateau State, Nigeria. The findings support reports and other empirical studies that soldiers often violate the human rights of civilians and abuse their power (Odoemene, 2012; Amnesty International, 2015). In Plateau State, the findings show that four different forms of military violence and abuse occur in all the six local government areas: coercion, predatory acts of corruption and extortion, gender-based violence (GBV) against women, and psychological and emotional abuse. The aim of this section is to describe, explain, and provide a deeper understanding of the different types of military violence experienced by the citizenry in Plateau State Nigeria.

##### 6.2.1 Intimidation and Coercion

The findings show that it is the norm for soldiers to use coercion and violence against the citizenry, in periods of both hostilities and relative peace. The most common incidence of military abuse experienced by the citizenry is at checkpoints and in communities where soldiers are stationed. All participants interviewed reported that they have experienced one or more forms of intimidation and coercion by the military, or that they know of a close friend, family member or a relative who has suffered from military abuse. A typical example is corporal punishment of civilians who offend a soldier, are alleged to be involved in a criminal or violent act, or for simply sounding rude or impolite to a soldier. Such punishment varies in gravity, depending on the soldier administering it, but can involve bodily pain, injury, harm, or discomfort. Common forms of corporal punishment included beating, kicking, and hitting civilians with the soldier's boot, or flogging using a whip or a military belt. I bore witness to several such incidences during my research. A female participant in Jos South LGA recalls:

I was standing here one day when a *Keke* (tricycle) mistakenly hit the back of their (soldiers) Hilux Van, the way they beat that man was just so unimaginable. A lot of

people were passing and laying curses on them saying *dem no go make am, God go punish dem*.<sup>46</sup> Yes, the man did wrong, and traffic offence is normal, it happens in every society, besides, it was even a busy road with heavy traffic. But, aside from being wrong, he is a citizen like you, but, because you are in uniform, you think people cannot do anything to you, so you beat him like you have all the authority to do all things. The man bled so much because they dealt with him mercilessly, so, for me sometimes I think they are heartless in their actions.<sup>47</sup>

This incident indicates that soldiers are quick to administer ‘instant justice’ by punishing civilians when they commit an offence. They undermine the laws of the State and act as a law upon themselves by instantly beating their victims, rather than following the sanctioned and appropriate process of justice. The data from this study is replete with such incidences, which makes many see the military as cold, heartless, and deriving pleasure from inflicting pain and discomfort on civilians, as one male participant described: “the manner they beat people and punish people is more than the offence that was committed, even if it is a very little offence that doesn’t even require punishment, you still see them punishing and beating people anyhow they want to.”<sup>48</sup> Another explained that “on my way from Barkin Ladi to Jos, I saw military personnel beating somebody by the roadside mercilessly... but that is how the soldiers behave. Most times you meet them, if you offend them just a little, they will bring out all their anger on you.”<sup>49</sup> Active duty soldiers inflict disproportionate violence on civilians when they are seen to transgress or violate any rule or law, with the punishment being disproportionate to the perceived crime.

Other forms of physical punishment involved forcing civilians to do frog jumps, to squat while holding their ears for a very long time, and other forms of humiliating punishments. Several participants revealed this type of punishment and how this is continued until the soldier felt satisfied. A female participant narrated the experience of her neighbour:

During the recent crisis that happened in Bokkos LGA ... my neighbour was just sitting by his door, because they said there was curfew and it was for 24 hours for two days. They said everybody should not go out, but he went outside his room and sat down outside the door. He was just sitting by his door when the military man came, ... dragged him out and punished him severely by making him to frog-jump while he was hitting him with the boot. He was sick for quite some time even though the illness was quite severe, but after the punishment by the military, it worsened and that quickened his death. After the incidence, he was not able to do most things he used to do, he could not even walk again before he died.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Words in italic are in Nigerian Pidgin English translated as: the soldiers are cursed, they would never be successful, and God would punish them.

<sup>47</sup> Interview with a female participant in Jos South LGA on 9 November 2016.

<sup>48</sup> Interview with a male participant in Jos North LGA on 11 October 2016.

<sup>49</sup> Interview with a male participant in Riyom LGA on 5 December 2016.

<sup>50</sup> Interview with a female participant in Bokkos on 6 September 2016.

The government often imposed curfews as a measure to help curb the outbreak or worsening of violence when it is tense, or after a community has been attacked. Since the outbreak of violence in Jos on 7 September 2001, several curfews have been imposed to restrict the movement of civilians for specified periods. Added to this, the Federal Government has declared states of emergency in Plateau State on numerous occasions, and in one instance even substituted the civilian elected government with a military administrator. During curfews, the movement of civilians is restricted and only soldiers and critical service personnel, such as those in the health and media profession, enjoy freedom of movement. Soldiers then abuse the enforcement of curfew hours by punishing and beating civilians, even when they do not violate the timing or restriction of movement. Soldiers use the imposition of curfews as an avenue to express their power in discretionary ways. Incidences of military violence are more frequent when curfews are in place, or even before they come into effect. A male participant in Jos North LGA voiced this concern:

Most of the problems we had was with the curfew period. The soldiers were just so power-drunk, and they never wait for the time before they start punishing the people. In our community, it was by 4 o'clock for example, but, while it was still quarter to four and you are rushing to get home, the moment you approach their checkpoint, they would detain and accuse you for being late when it is not time yet. And even if you show them the time, they would not look at it, they would tell you their own watch says it is time and they would beat the hell out of you no matter what you do. They would say that according to their watch, it is 4 o'clock already. I have seen this happened to some right in front of my house and I heard everything that happened from inside.<sup>51</sup>

While soldiers tend to be more abusive during curfew periods, there are several other reasons that explain this conduct. It is possible that the soldiers are stricter in compelling civilians to obey security measures because the security situation is more fragile during such periods, due to heightened insecurity and increasing tension. However, in rural communities and various parts of the city and surrounding townships, it may be necessary for civilians to step outside of their homes even during curfew hours, as kitchens and bathrooms/toilets are often detached from the living/bedrooms. This is then construed as violating the movement restriction. The narrative below by a participant presents one such account:

There was a time I came back home from school and there was curfew in town and because of that, the soldiers go out to patrol every street at random. It happened that our house was not fenced, some rooms are facing the road and it was an open compound. Some bathroom and toilets are detached from the main house and whenever we want to use it, we have to go out before going to the bathroom or toilet. One of my cousins went out to urinate outside at a culvert, which was closer than the toilet, but while he was doing that, he saw some soldiers, but the soldiers also saw him, and they decided to chase after him into the house. They came into the compound and stirred trouble because they wanted us and our parents to produce him, so, they were yelling, where is he? Where is he? They were not willing to listen to our pleas and apologies.

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<sup>51</sup> Interview with a male participant in Jos North LGA on 24 October 2016.



Nobody knew who they were asking for because we were all in the room and didn't know who they were talking about because when he ran into the compound, he went straight to the backyard toilet and hid there. We only knew it was him they were looking for after they had left because that was when he came out of the toilet. When they came, we argued with them and told them nobody entered our house, but they insisted they saw someone coming in. So, they asked all the women and our wives to move to one side and asked we the men and our male parents to lie down on the ground, that they were going to flog us since we refused to point at the person they were looking for. Because they were serious about it, I laid straight on the ground before any other person because I was very scared. Luckily for us, one of their senior officers' who was coming from where he went to relax heard the noise and all the shouting and yelling, so he came and asked them to leave us before they did.<sup>52</sup>

Although this individual was only a few meters from his living room, it was difficult for the soldiers to not consider him as violating the movement restriction because he was outside his room. One would have imagined that the soldiers would consider his actions harmless and constituting no threat, but, this was not the case. Thus, either the terms restricting movement are not well-defined to exclude civilians within their compound, even when it has no fence or gate, or the soldiers acted irrationally and in an abusive manner. What is certain from the quote is that the soldiers overreacted by stirring panic and threatening to punish all the occupants of the house. Thus, as in many other instances, their actions were not only unprofessional and coercive but constituted an abuse of their legitimate power. They also constituted an immediate threat to innocent law-abiding citizens when they threatened to punish everyone for an offence, they knew nothing about.

Another way that soldiers abuse their power is by delaying civilians at checkpoints as a form of punishment for an offence they commit when they travel by road. The military Special Task Force (STF) command, codenamed 'Operation Safe Haven' (OSH)<sup>53</sup> in Plateau State, has written and placed notices about some of the proscribed activities at checkpoints. These include warnings not to give money to soldiers and not to receive/make phone calls while at the checkpoint. Other common though unwritten offences include playing loud music, failing to reduce or turn off one's car radio while at the checkpoint, driving through the barricade before one was asked to, driving at a speed personnel consider too high, and throwing dirt/food waste at the checkpoints constitute offences. These offences often result in soldiers punishing or delaying motorists for prolonged periods before allowing them to continue their journey.

In some instances, the drivers were not told what offence they committed. While asking a driver to pull over for a routine check/search constitutes part of the legitimate task of soldiers at checkpoints,

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<sup>52</sup> Interview with a male participant in Mangu LGA on 24 November 2016.

<sup>53</sup> The STF is a joint task force comprising the Nigerian military, the police, and other civil security agencies. The STF was established in 2010 by the Federal Government in a bid to strategize and restructure the military operation that has been ongoing in the state since the outbreak of violence in Jos on 7 September 2001. The STF is further discussed later in the chapter.

participants mentioned that soldiers used this to threaten or victimise road users. At some checkpoints, the soldiers required motorcycle users to turn off the engine, get down and push the motorcycle pass the checkpoint. However, as a participant explains, “if you do not know that order and you ride down there, they will keep you there for five hours or more, it happened to my brother.”<sup>54</sup> When soldiers are having a bad day, it is common for them to delay or subject road users to punishment for small infractions. Consider the following accounts and experiences of some participants:

Because of a very minor mistake; a soldier would make everyone in a vehicle to alight (drop) and he would punish all of them. There was a time I was travelling in a car, when we approached their checkpoint, the brakes of the car began to fail, and the driver was not able to stop immediately, and the soldiers were trying to stop us. When the car finally came to a halt, they ordered everyone in the car to alight and they gave us severe punishment. We were lucky they did not beat us, but they made us fill the empty sacks they use for barricades with sand, then we also sewed it and when we finished, they let us continue our journey.<sup>55</sup>

If they ask a driver to stop, but the driver fails to stop immediately, the journey might just end there. They may choose to hold back the car and of course that could come with punishments for both the driver and sometimes, even the passengers if we are not lucky.<sup>56</sup>

We were going to church on bike when we passed them, but they stopped us that we did not greet them. They asked us to come down and to pack some stones, they also made us to do frog jump and serve other punishments.<sup>57</sup>

They make all the passengers frog jump or do some manual labour for them. I have seen people forced to ‘weed’ grasses at the checkpoint, some asked to fill all their sacks that they use as barricade with sand, and others were even made to sweep the area and pack all the dirt with their bare hands just because one passenger threw groundnut peel or sugar cane peel there.<sup>58</sup>

Delaying road users could come with one or more forms of corporal punishment. Civilians dare not question or argue with soldiers, as this is seen as challenging or questioning their authority. A male participant remarked that “they do victimise some people especially those who try to speak up and stand for their rights. They always use their office or position to suppress anyone who does this.”<sup>59</sup> It appears as if soldiers focus more on punishing civilians at checkpoints than doing their job, which entails searching of and monitoring vehicular movements.

Another common tactic is to degrade and humiliate civilians by forcing them to sit, lie, or swim in a gutter, drain, or muddy water. A male participant witnessed how some civilians suffered this and he

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<sup>54</sup> Interview with a male participant in Jos North LGA on 24 October 2016.

<sup>55</sup> Interview with a male participant in Jos North LGA on 26 October 2016.

<sup>56</sup> Interview with a female participant in Bokkos on 5 September 2016.

<sup>57</sup> Interview with a male participant in Barkin Ladi LGA (also called Gwol) on 31 August 2016.

<sup>58</sup> Interview with a female participant in Bokkos on 14 September 2016.

<sup>59</sup> Interview with a male participant in Barkin Ladi LGA on 31 August 2016.

explained that “they (*soldiers*) asked them to lie inside the gutter first, but the guys refused to do that, so they started beating them and after beating them, they still asked them to lie down inside the gutter.”<sup>60</sup> Another participant, who was a victim, described the following:

They (*soldiers*) made me sit inside a gutter. After that incident, I met with one of them at a football viewing centre, he waved at me and I told him I cannot exchange pleasantries with him because he does not know the value and dignity of humans.<sup>61</sup>

Soldiers delight in coercing civilians and this strains their relationship with the citizenry. Several videos of such abuses recorded by civilians are available on YouTube and the internet<sup>62</sup> and these videos confirm that soldiers abuse their power, while civilians watch without being able to hold them to account for these infringements, as doing so could result in further problems with the soldiers.

### 6.2.2 Corruption and Extortion

Corruption and extortion is another category of military abuse that civilians experience, mostly at checkpoints as they commute on roads and in their communities as they interact with soldiers. This occurs in two separate ways. One is by extorting money from mostly commercial taxi drivers and drivers of vans, trucks, lorries, petroleum tankers, motorcycles and commercial tricycles at military checkpoints. Soldiers extort money from drivers to not check the goods/items the driver has in the vehicle. Failure to comply and offer money to soldiers often results in drivers having to offload the contents of their vehicle, having the content searched, or being purposefully delayed. One participant mentioned that “some people refuse to give them. But when they do not, they keep you there for long and delay you.”<sup>63</sup> Clearly, this is illegal, and participants see it not only as a violation of their rights, but as a criminal action. A commercial driver described this extortion as “a daylight robbery. I feel bad because I know that they are not supposed to do this but... I am powerless and cannot do anything about it.”<sup>64</sup> Soldiers are aware that certain categories of goods/products are very expensive, heavy and fragile, which means that drivers would rather pay than risk these goods being broken by the heavy-handedness of soldiers. A participant who does tiling of buildings narrates:

If they see you with loaded goods, they would always tell you to give them something, so if you give them something little, they will ask you to go and park your vehicle there. They would say you have a lot of very expensive goods, so, why give them change? Even yesterday, when I gave them one hundred naira at the checkpoint at Federal Lowcost

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<sup>60</sup> Interview with a male participant in Bokkos on 5 September 2016.

<sup>61</sup> Interview with a male participant in Mangu LGA on 30 November 2016.

<sup>62</sup> See Appendix A for a list of some selected incidents. A typical instance involved a female Cadet and other male officers beating a male civilian for complementing her as beautiful. See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mEFgfDOWbqE>

<sup>63</sup> Interview with a male participant in Riyom LGA on 14 December 2016

<sup>64</sup> Interview with a male participant in Jos North LGA on 27 October 2016.

Junction, they looked down on it, and complained that it was not enough, then, I added eighty naira to it and that was when he nodded and said good, *carry your load dey go*.<sup>65</sup>

In the interviews, I asked participants what came to mind when they hear the word ‘military checkpoint’, and it surprised me that only a few mentioned ‘soldiers checking commuters.’ The first thing they mentioned was that this was a place where money is extorted. Some even mentioned the most popular checkpoints where such extortion happens frequently:

When you get to a checkpoint, all you will see is soldiers collecting twenty to fifty naira and I can give you examples. Before Barkin Ladi, the checkpoint around Barkin Ladi Junction, they do it openly. If you go to Dorowa, they are doing it. When you go to Panyam, the checkpoint around there do it. These are roads I always pass like seven times in a month.<sup>66</sup>

As with the intimidation and coercion of civilians, I witnessed and experienced this extortion when I boarded commercial vehicles as a passenger. What I noticed is that this extortion targets commercial taxi drivers, motorcyclists, tricyclists, and drivers of heavy-duty trucks and petroleum tankers. Those who are not targeted include elites, many whom drive ‘expensive’ and ‘flashy’ vehicles, as the soldiers do not know if this is an influential person or not. Notwithstanding, some drivers of such ‘expensive’ and ‘flashy’ vehicles give money to personnel at checkpoints out of freewill, or to prevent being delayed or searched. Failure to carry out security checks, which is one of the main tasks of soldiers, has the potential to perpetuate insecurity and undermine peace. A participant explained one such key effect thus:

They don’t do what they are supposed to do. The only thing they are after is to collect money to put in their pockets for their selfish use. So, they are not even doing the checking they are supposed to. If you pass the checkpoint with arms and ammunitions, you can pass through to the destination you are taking it to unnoticed. Once you can just put your hands in your pocket and give them money, you are good to go, just like that... Sometimes they just bring some allegations, or they would delay you indirectly. They may not like to say give me something, but they always look for some flimsy excuses to frustrate you so that you will be frustrated to put your hands in your pocket.<sup>67</sup>

What this means is that weapons and ammunition can flow freely through these checkpoints if the bribe is high enough. A second way soldiers extort civilians is by forcefully collecting edible food products at checkpoints. It is important to point out that although numerous studies indicate that in conflict situations, it is common for extortion and seizing of food items to occur in local communities, this is not reported in Plateau State. On the contrary, in both Christian and Muslim communities,

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<sup>65</sup> Interview with a male participant in Mangu LGA on 27 October 2016. The statement ‘carry your load dey go’ translates as ‘take your properties with you and leave’.

<sup>66</sup> Interview with a male participant in Barkin Ladi LGA on 22 August 2016.

<sup>67</sup> Interview with a male participant in Barkin Ladi LGA on 23 August 2016.

some community members freely and voluntarily give food to the soldiers. However, when this food is forcibly taken through extortion, it is seen as problematic, as one interviewee explained bitterly:

In 2014, I was delivering water, and every time we get to their checkpoints, they forced me that it is their right to receive water sachets from me without paying me. This was not right, and I know it is a thing of choice for me to give it, not them collecting it from me forcefully, it was like robbery in the daylight.<sup>68</sup>

Civilians are bitter about this behaviour, labelling soldiers ‘daylight robbers,’ but this has become ‘normal’ predatory conduct by the soldiers of the Nigerian military. Even though signposts at military checkpoints, written in both English and Hausa languages, state that money should not be given to soldiers, extortion by soldiers in Plateau State is an everyday practice. This brings about two immediate consequences. One is that soldiers do not perform their assigned official tasks diligently and effectively, and the other is that it encourages crime and other illegal acts by unscrupulous individuals and armed groups who benefit from the recurring violence. Ideally, soldiers should check every vehicle and its content on the grounds of intuitive suspicion. For road users, particularly commercial drivers on a long-distance journey, this could mean a long delay and being unable to arrive at their destination in time. Therefore, an uncomplicated way around this is to offer money and to proceed unchecked, which means that weapons and illicit substances can flow freely through checkpoints. There is suspicion that some soldiers receive bribes to help armed groups traffic weapons that are then used to attack some communities, and that the soldiers may even be directly involved. Suspicion of this was raised after a military identity card was found at the scene of an attack where military personnel were not present at the time.

Soldiers’ failure to do their work effectively facilitates and encourages the proliferation of small arms and light weapons into the State and, to an extent, across the country. The discovery and interception by the Nigerian Custom Service of large caches of illegal arms shipped into the country supports this claim. Arms proliferation has a ripple effect of worsening insecurity as belligerents can easily obtain access to such arms and weapons. However, even when civilians know about such activities, they fear reporting or cooperating with the military, given the strained relations and lack of trust that has evolved. Besides the physical abuse and extortion, for many civilians it is the fear that they may suffer psychological and emotional abuse from the military.

### **6.2.3 Psychological and Emotional Harm**

Psychological and emotional abuse is usually a subtler and less visible form of abuse but can have significant psychological effects on the victim. One way it occurs is by calling civilians names using

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<sup>68</sup> Interview with a male participant in Jos South LGA on 8 November 2016.

derogatory words meant to humiliate them. Examples include calling a civilian a ‘fool,’ ‘bastard,’ ‘goat,’ ‘monkey’ and ‘bloody civilian.’ A participant recalls:

We were installing the *product* for the military officer when he came out and imagine what they ordered us to do, they said, ‘all civilians should face the wall’ so that we do not see who was coming out. This is someone who bought this *product* from me, I am now in his residence installing it and you order me to stand up, face the wall and raise my hand up like a common criminal?<sup>69</sup>

Acts such as these reinforce military superiority, as through name-calling, military work and the profession is glorified. By ‘othering’ civilians, the military can enforce their domination and civilian subordination. What gives them the power is that they can inflict punishment by othering civilians without fear or consequence as they enjoy a level of ‘unquestioned’ impunity and are able to hold civilians in a state of fear. One common example is to threaten civilians’ lives. The findings show that it is common for some personnel to utter threats to ‘waste’ (kill) anyone who disobeys or challenges their authority. A male participant explained that “one of them threatened me that if I talk, they would ‘shoot me and waste me’.”<sup>70</sup> In another incident, a male participant reported:

It was the first time I was passing through that checkpoint, so, I did not know they also have the order for motorcyclist to use the bush path. So, unknowingly, I rode to the barriers and that was it. The soldier started screaming at me, who ‘the hell’ are you, and of course, I knew he was simply looking for another excuse to be provoked.<sup>71</sup>

Asking the motorcyclist who he is shows the soldier’s desire to know if he is personnel, as personnel wearing mufti freely ride through the checkpoints, while civilians who do so get punished. This shows the soldier’s desire to reinforce the privilege and power the military has over civilians. It also points to the othering and depersonalising of civilians by soldiers, an action that projects military superiority and authority, and this extends to the conduct of soldiers in other spheres. One sees how the military blatantly violates traffic rules and regulations but punishes civilians for the same offences. While traffic violations could be justifiable, especially when soldiers need to respond to calls for distress, the frequency of the practice shows that they abuse their power when in a military vehicle. Added to this, soldiers appear to have taken disregarding traffic regulations a step further. The findings revealed that soldiers have replaced traffic laws with ‘sets of unwritten rules’ which not only permit them to disobey all traffic rules and regulations but prohibit civilians from overtaking a military convoy. A male participant voiced this concern:

They have made it a law in their head that, if they are driving as a convoy of two or more cars, all other road users cannot overtake and pass them, and when they are on a convoy, they drive very slowly. It is very frustrating and annoying. There was a day I was

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<sup>69</sup> Interview with a male participant on 24 October 2016. ‘Product’ is italicised because it is used as a generic word to keep with the assurance of anonymous presentation of data that could mark or reveal the identity of participants.

<sup>70</sup> Interview with a male participant in Mangu LGA on 30 November 2016.

<sup>71</sup> Interview with a female participant in Barkin Ladi LGA on 25 August 2016.

coming back to Jos when I met such a convoy, some drivers tried to overtake them, and they blocked the road and warned them. The journey that should have taken me 2 hours ended up taking about 5 hours that day. In fact, at another point, one man tried overtaking and they stopped him and dealt with him.<sup>72</sup>

Such acts of intimidation and oppression strain CMR and evoke anger and resentment towards the military. Instead of being seen as the protectors of society, the military is seen as a source of humiliation, pain, and maltreatment that traumatises the citizenry. This is even more so for women who suffer persistent and recurring GBV.

#### **6.2.4 Gender-Based Violence**

GBV by soldiers in Plateau State is a widespread problem faced by women as the military is on ISOPs in many communities in Plateau State. This often takes the form of sexual abuse and sexual harassment and occurs mainly at military checkpoints and outposts in towns and residential areas. This adds to the strain that families and communities face when the military is present. A female participant explained that “every time I am leaving the house or returning, I am always worried about their disturbance ... I have to get out from the Taxi or Keke<sup>73</sup> in the next junction and then walk a longer distance back home just to avoid passing through where they are.”<sup>74</sup> Another participant in a different part of the State expressed a similar concern that this is a typical problem facing “females especially the young girls and sometimes even married women. Soldiers behave wildly as if they cannot live without the ladies and they are always harassing them when they begin to have sexual urges.”<sup>75</sup>

Civilians seem to shy away from discussing sexual violations publicly due to the shame and stigma it brings, although some were more prepared to explain how sexual abuse of female civilians by soldiers occurs. This has been a topic of extensive debate among those that study sexual entitlement by soldiers (Enloe, 2004; Kelly, 2010; Odoemene, 2012). One of the issues is that many of the ladies have been impregnated by soldiers, which raises further difficulties, such as how to establish whether the pregnancy was the result of consensual intercourse or abuse, and to what extent soldiers take responsibility for their actions. In several instances, soldiers become ‘invisible’ when they are redeployed to other areas. Others shirk their responsibility and change their contact number so that the woman concerned cannot reach them.<sup>76</sup> The laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria prohibit abortion, meaning that unless the lady miscarries or illegally aborts, chances are high that she will give

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<sup>72</sup> Interview with a male participant in Bokkos on 20 September 2016.

<sup>73</sup> Keke is the Hausa word for ‘tricycle’ in the study area.

<sup>74</sup> Interview with a female participant in Barkin Ladi LGA on 24 August 2016.

<sup>75</sup> Interview with a male participant in Mangu LGA on 22 November 2016.

<sup>76</sup> This is more so when the soldier is relieved from such internal operations or moved to another area or for a different mission. Some of the reasons for this rotation are later in this chapter.



birth to the baby.<sup>77</sup> This is worse when soldiers use coercion, threats and intimidation to prevent the pregnant woman from taking actions, such as reporting this to the military authority. One female participant mentioned that “most of them often leave you with the pregnancy or with a baby. They disappear into thin air when this happens. Two of my friends in Jos have had such an encounter.”<sup>78</sup> This is not an isolated case, as several other interviewees reported similar incidences. A male participant in Jos South LGA narrates:

I know that in places like Barkin Ladi, there have been two instances of sexual abuse, involving military personnel. I also know that in one community in Riyom, about two years ago, a young man was gunned down by a soldier because he shared the same girlfriend with a soldier. I also know of a young girl in Zawan who took in for a soldier under forceful circumstances. I don't know the situation of things right now, but as at the last time I spoke with her ... she could actually reach him but, all she could ever get from him is threats. He keeps threatening that if she ever talks to him about any pregnancy or any child he was going to deal with her.<sup>79</sup>

Such incidences show that women not only face sexual harassment and intimidation from soldiers, they are also the victims of soldiers' threats of violence when they stand up to them. This causes the citizenry a great deal of discomfort when the military is present, not only because they evoke fear, but because they lack the basic social skills to interact with the civilian population due to the authoritarian way they behave. A female participant shared her experience:

I was so uncomfortable and shaking. Imagine someone holding a gun and asking you for a date. That was exactly how I felt. He did not even have the courtesy of leaving his gun behind. Even when I told him I am a married, he said it does not matter, that he is also married.<sup>80</sup>

Sexual harassment is an abusive and criminal act that tarnishes the professional image of the military. In both conflict and peace times, it constitutes criminal actions liable to prosecution in a court of law. Sexual harassment undermines the professionalism and legitimacy of the military and is a violation of the fundamental human rights of the citizenry, and such acts can have lasting or lifelong effects on the victim, especially where the victim does not receive professional help or support. Added to this, it can also create numerous health, psychological, and social consequences. In Plateau State, sexual harassment typically includes using coercion to obtain the contact numbers of females, requesting sexual favours, and unsolicited sexual advances on both married and unmarried women. A female participant commented:

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<sup>77</sup> This is explicitly stated in both the Criminal Code and Penal Code used in Southern and Northern Nigeria respectively. Punishment for abortion runs from seven to fourteen years for the offender and anyone who helps or contribute to it in any way. See Odunsi (2015) for a detailed discussion of abortion and the applicable law in Nigeria.

<sup>78</sup> Interview with a female participant in Barkin Ladi LGA on 24 August 2016.

<sup>79</sup> Interview with a male participant in Jos South LGA on 15 November 2016.

<sup>80</sup> Interview with a female participant in Bokkos on 17 September 2016.



One soldier just stopped me on the road, asked me for my name and I told him, then he asked me if I live around here, close to the checkpoint, I told him no. That was how he started insisting that I must give him my phone number or make him a Facebook friend. I refused and to be honest, he held me captive there and insisted that he would not let me go or he would follow me to wherever I am going because I told him I was visiting my friend and I do not reside in the street. Luckily for me, their boss, maybe the commandant or something like that came and he had to run back to his duty post, and that was just how I managed to escape. Since that day, I told myself I would not even turn to look at any soldier, even if they call me, I would not answer, at least I know they would not shoot me just like that.<sup>81</sup>

Sexual abuse by soldiers in Plateau State is rife. Several participants, both males and females, indicated that this as a common occurrence. A female participant in Jos North LGA mentioned that “they use threat to intimidate ladies into giving them their contact number or accepting them.”<sup>82</sup> A female participant who had such an encounter narrated:

There was a day I was going to see a friend at Anguldi, and when I got out from the car and was walking towards the house, I came across one checkpoint. This funny looking soldier stopped me and was asking for my phone number, but I refused to give it to him. Can you believe he grabbed my phone from me to call his number from my phone? ... He took it forcefully because I was holding it in my hand, but, it was locked with a password. He asked me for the password, but I refused to tell him, so, he said he is seizing the phone until I give him the number or open the phone. When I realised how desperate and serious he was, I left the phone with him that evening and I went away.<sup>83</sup>

Another participant described a recent experience of some young females with a soldier in Jos North LGA:

Just yesterday, a friend of mine told me she was going to Terminus. There is also a checkpoint there, so when they were driving, even though the Keke man was at fault, though they said it was just few minutes to the time, because there is a time restriction for Keke to drive in, and maybe the man was not aware it was not yet time to drive in. So, when he got in, one soldier stopped them, and threatened to seize his Keke if he did not settle him, so, she and her friends now pleaded with the soldier, but, even at that, he still punished the Keke driver and collected the phone number of the ladies as a condition to free the man from the punishment. Why did he collect their numbers? Their number was like a sacrificial lamb, because even after they collected money from the Keke driver, he still gave him punishment. So, since the soldiers are promiscuous as they always are, and they asked for their number as the way out, they must have felt that it was a worthwhile sacrifice. Besides, giving you my number does not mean I am going to stand a chance with you, I would only answer your call if I feel like.<sup>84</sup>

Once soldiers obtain the phone numbers of women, they harass them. This opinion was also expressed by another female participant when she stated that “the truth is the soldiers disturb us ladies so much.

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<sup>81</sup> Interview with a female participant in Bokkos on 17 September 2016.

<sup>82</sup> Interview with a female participant in Jos North LGA on 11 October 2016.

<sup>83</sup> Interview with a female participant in Bokkos on 5 September 2016.

<sup>84</sup> Interview with a female participant in Bokkos on 20 September 2016.

It is either they are forcing us to give them our number or to sleep with them.”<sup>85</sup> In turn, this explains why women who do not cooperate and give out their contact number then receive obscene remarks from soldiers. Soldiers call them names to denigrate and disparage them because they are uncooperative or unwilling to accept the soldiers’ unsolicited sexual advances. As a female participant puts it, such name-calling occurs frequently. She explains that, “you will hear them calling us ‘hey bitch or ‘hey’ or even say ‘babe come here.’ If you did not come, they will try to force you to come and could even embarrass you.”<sup>86</sup> Often, name-calling is aimed at shaming and ridiculing the victim, and this could cause the victim psychological and emotional trauma when it is persistent, and the victim does not receive professional support. As the victims do not often report the abuses, soldiers who do this tend to escape any form of punitive actions from the State/military authority.

In all the six local government areas where I interviewed individuals for this study, GBV was reported as a cause of concern, and was identified as a recurring problem in most communities. However, one salient observation from the data is that while women experienced several forms of GBV, they also experienced less intimidation and coercive violence than men. What was interesting is that although more females reported this than males, fewer Christian males raised this as a major concern. In comparison, Muslim males reported this as a major problem in their community and this became an important finding for this study given that opinions differed by religion and gender of participants.

Several factors can explain this difference of opinion on GBV. One is that Christians are more liberal and are more influenced by Western lifestyles, even though the faith considers sexual promiscuity as sinful and prohibited. Another is that GBV is seen as less severe when compared to the frequent violent attacks which often result in death and the destruction of their properties and means of livelihood. Christian communities continuously encounter cycles of violent attacks and consider the military complicit in them. In contrast, Muslims consider GBV as a major cause of concern. As with the incidence of recurring attacks and community invasion, few or no such incidences have occurred in a Muslim community in the past five years. Also, Muslims in this State and across the Northern States of Nigeria are conservative to the point that many ‘protect’ their women by not allowing male visitors into their houses. For example, an average Muslim in Jos has the inscription, ‘*Ba Shiga/No Enter*’ written on the doorpost of his house, indicating that visitors are not welcome or allowed into the house/premises. Therefore, many Muslims find GBV more troubling than Christians, especially because they consider any sexual affair outside marriage as ‘spoiling’ and ‘corrupting’ women, particularly young unmarried ladies. As they do not have to deal with incidences of targeted attacks in their communities,

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<sup>85</sup> Interview with a female participant in Riyom LGA on 9 December 2016.

<sup>86</sup> Interview with a female participant in Jos South LGA on 8 November 2016.

it is understandable that GBV becomes the more pressing issue to them. Notwithstanding, this problem highlights the need to examine the conduct of soldiers.

### 6.3 UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF SOLDIERS

A professional military is one that does not prey on society, become involved in politics, or seize political power. Based on the preceding discussion, one cannot say that the conduct of the Nigerian military projects a professional image. This section explains other forms of misconduct which affect the professional stature of the military.

#### 6.3.1 Substance Abuse

Substance abuse by active duty personnel during working hours occurs often and it affects soldiers' conduct. The abuse of illicit substances, such as marijuana, Indian hemp and drugs, by military personnel deployed for internal security enforcement duties is common. Participants reported encountering personnel in uniforms patronising dealers or abusing such substances, while others also mention that they know those who supply the substances to the soldiers. A participant in Jos North LGA explained in detail how this occurs:

Here in Adebayo, there is a place where the dealing has been going on for more than 20 years now, even before the Jos crisis began, the place is called Long Street. If you go there, you will see soldiers going there in their Hilux Vans and some on motorcycles to buy these illicit substances, everyone knows what is sold there, it is not something hidden. They joke, play, and relate very well with those selling these stuffs. If you are passing through that place and you happen to look at them twice, they may disgrace and mistreat you if they notice you are looking at them.<sup>87</sup>

While some directly approach the dealers, others use youths to obtain their regular supply. Soldiers often have a good relationship with those who are involved in substance abuse, and several participants remarked that soldiers tend to interact mostly with 'deviant' persons who deal in, or abuse drugs. One participant said that "they only tend to relate well with people who smoke 'weed' and abuse drugs because these people help them get the supply or accompany them there."<sup>88</sup> Some participants stated that law-abiding civilians find it difficult to interact with the military because several soldiers, especially those who abuse drugs, only tend to interact with and relate to deviants. Consider this remark from a middle-aged employer interviewed in Jos North LGA:

If you are an honest and an upright person, you are unlikely to have any dealing with them, this is because in most instances, their friends are either drunkards, or those who abuse drugs and 'weed.'<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> Interview with a male participant in Jos North LGA on 24 October 2016.

<sup>88</sup> Interview with a male participant in Mangu LGA on 30 November 2016.

<sup>89</sup> Interview with a male participant in Jos North LGA on 24 October 2016.

Given the close connection with the soldiers, criminals and dealers enjoy military protection from their competitors and threats from other law enforcement agencies. This indicates that a mutual relationship exists, one involving trade facilitation and protection from threats, and an uninterrupted supply of the substances to both soldiers and civilian buyers. However, several problems do arise when soldiers abuse substances when on duty or before they commence work at checkpoints. A participant expressed the opinion that, “when they take these stuffs, it makes them to be non-sympathetic on civilians, but if they are in their right senses, some of them behave calmly.”<sup>90</sup>

When active duty personnel abuse drugs and other illicit substances, this may alter their reasoning, behaviour and conduct, as some of these substances are stimulants which distort reality. Such addiction could also contribute to the economic predatory actions by personnel to raise money to finance this. Furthermore, the abuse of drugs and other illicit substances contribute to military excesses, such as extrajudicial killings, community raids, and acts of ethnic cleansing. In Kadarko community, where soldiers massacred about 400 unarmed civilians,<sup>91</sup> there is speculation that soldiers who committed this atrocity were under the influence of drugs. Another effect of soldiers being under the influence of drugs is that it affects their performance and effectiveness. One typical example of how this plays out in Plateau State is described in the following section.

### **6.3.2 Dereliction of Duty**

As explained above, in Plateau State the Nigerian military oversees the collaborative security enforcement effort involving personnel from the armed forces, the police, and other civil security agencies. This makes the military directly responsible for security enforcement across the 17 local government areas of the State. To do this effectively, the military established several operational sector commands and bases in various parts of the State. This arrangement makes it easy for the military to respond swiftly by sending troops to areas where there is an outbreak of violence, or a call for distress. The military has published several emergency numbers of the military operational sector commands for civilians to call whenever violence erupts, or when there is an emergency. However, several civilians interviewed in this study indicated that, despite circulating these numbers, the dereliction of duty by soldiers is a frequent problem in their communities. The military response to distress calls is often late, with soldiers arriving long after the assailants have fled the scene. Consider the quotation below from an interview with a male participant in Barkin Ladi LGA:

I have worked in areas facing serious insecurity and threats and that was when I understood how soldiers behave. Let me give you instances, in one of those areas, there were several times when farms were invaded, in some instance, plants were destroyed in the farmland, in others, crops that are nearing harvest were destroyed or completely

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<sup>90</sup> Interview with a female participant in Jos South LGA on 8 November 2016.

<sup>91</sup> Data reported in the 6<sup>th</sup> May 2015 press communique of the Ngwang Ishi Otarok community association of Wase LGA of Plateau state, one of the communities which fell victim to the attack.

damaged, fertilizers were stolen, and farmlands were also encroached. The victims then sort reprieve from soldiers, but, the soldiers keep failing to do anything to stop the incidence from reoccurring and they also are not able to apprehend any suspect. Even when the community members provide leads, they refuse to act on it. Not only this, I have other reasons for saying most of them are corrupt. We have had several instances where reports were sent to them about ongoing attacks, but they did nothing about it. Most times, they would not come over until when the damage has been done and the attackers have long gone.<sup>92</sup>

This quote highlights several issues, such as the military failing to deliver on the mandate of protecting the people or responding to calls for distress promptly, which would have helped to control the situation. This supports the concern of the former Governor of Plateau State, Da Jonah David Jang, that the military is often slow in responding or generally unresponsive, even when he alerts them about an ongoing attack (see for example Haruna, Bekuma & Elias, 2017: 34). In turn, he established 'Operation Rainbow,' a State security outfit comprising of retired military and police personnel and civilians to help forestall the increasing level of attacks. This became necessary because both the Nigerian military and the police force are federal agencies, and do not receive instructions from or report to the State Governor. They receive commands from the office of the President through their respective heads, thereby leaving all the 36 State Governors of the country with little control of the security of their State. Thus, decisions on the use of the military, when and how to respond, and with what amount of force occur outside the State and are enforced by the officer commanding, operating in the State.<sup>93</sup>

From the findings, it is clear that the military lacks legitimacy and that citizens cannot rely on the military for their protection. This leaves them vulnerable to attack and has meant that some civilians resort to joining or supporting vigilante groups or other armed groups for their protection. There is also evidence that the military collaborates with armed groups in some communities. Consider the following remarks by some participants:

There was a time when people protested because a military ID card was found in the clothes of one of the attackers that was killed. And the military were not there when the attack happened, so, how do people know if the man is a genuine soldier or not. People say the military can be bribed to kill for the enemy, and this I can say is true because even with the way the soldiers now collect money and extort money from drivers on the road is too much.<sup>94</sup>

We in the villages that have witnessed the violence, we know for sure that it is always the Fulani and the Hausa that are attacking us. If you check how the crisis started, you would know that they have always been the ones starting all the attacks. Sometimes, the soldiers are assisting them and that is even what led to the recent protest in Bokkos.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> Interview with a male participant in Barkin Ladi LGA on 25 August 2016.

<sup>93</sup> The position of the commander of the STF is an appointable position. This is further discussed later in this chapter.

<sup>94</sup> Interview with a male participant in Jos South LGA on 11 November 2016.

<sup>95</sup> Interview with a male participant in Riyom LGA on 15 December 2016.

Some participants contended that soldiers are paid to collaborate with armed groups. Many civilians believe that the military is complicit in some attacks, which may explain why they fail to arrest perpetrators. Recently, concerns intensified over this with some accusing the military of aiding an attack that led to the massacre of about 27 people on 16<sup>th</sup> October 2017 in Nkiedonwhro community of Bassa LGA (Olorok, 2017; Usman, 2017). Many felt that the military did not act in an impartial manner. Consider the opinion of a male participant who narrated an experience they encountered in Jos North in one of the armed violent clashes that ensued:

A tanker, this military armour tank, the person driving the armour tank was a Christian. He is in the military but a Christian while the person holding the gun was a Muslim. At the junction, the opposite side was a Muslim dominated area and this side is a Christian dominated area. The driver kept driving up and down because he doesn't want anyone to come close because the military had come between both sides. So, when the driver goes down to where the Muslims were, if the one with the gun wants to shoot, he raises the gun up so that the bullets would go up. But we noticed that when he faces the Christian side, he takes down the bullet and fires directly at us. So, taking it down, he was hoping to hit us with the bullets which he did. At that point, about four of our people were killed. But, it was like the driver saw what was happening, then he now turned. Those people were now shouting "*Ba isa ba, Ba isa ba. Karya ne!*"<sup>96</sup> When the driver turned towards them, he drove to them and crushed some of them because he saw that the one operating the gun was bias. I later heard that both were relocated.

This account shows that military personnel are inclined to save those of their respective religious group and are sympathetic to those who share their faith. It further indicates that personnel could be partial in the handling of the security situation in the State, which raises concerns on the legitimacy and impartiality of the military.

### 6.3.3 Legitimacy and Impartiality of the Military

Plateau State is a diverse multi-ethnic society with sharp divisions along religious lines. Findings from this study show that many civilians feel that the military does not act in an impartial manner. Most participants who were Christians expressed concern that the military favours Muslims in its handling of the security situation in the State. They contended that when a Christian-dominated community comes under attack, the military response is often late and inadequate. Some Christian participants felt that the military is advancing an expansionist agenda of Hausa/Fulani Muslim 'settlers' who want to take over political and economic control of Plateau State. Concerns included the military leading Fulani assailants to raid local communities, and the discovery of a military identity card at the scene of an attack. A case in point is the disclosure by a native Christian interviewed on an attack in a community:

There was this day when they came to attack one neighbouring village, Chaha after Kuru, when you are going to Vom-Vet. But somehow, we learnt they would be coming over, so we went to the farms to hide and await their coming. To our surprise, we saw the Fulani men in the bush having a long discussion with some soldiers for about thirty

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<sup>96</sup> In Hausa, implying the opponents cannot do anything to them because the military is now in between them.

minutes. After that, they (Fulani) now moved to that village to attack it, but we called the people and told them to prepare that the Fulani were coming, that was how they were able to defend themselves and the Fulani were not successful that day. My problem is the military men, they are supposed to oversee our security and our protection, but, from what we are seeing, we have every reason to believe that they are conniving with the Fulani to kill our people.<sup>97</sup>

In the attack described in this quote, the military only arrived at the scene when the attack was over, and the assailants had fled. Thus, Christians felt that soldiers are complicit in aiding assailants attacking their communities. Christian participants reported that the military acts in favour of Muslims when their community comes under attack and considered the military effort to suppress violence when their community is under attack as biased and unfair. They also did not distinguish between assailants and the victim population when using coercion. This happened particularly where the victim population arm themselves against assailants. Typically, civilians arm themselves with machetes and weapons as a means of self-defence, but when the military arrives, they shoot sporadically and arrest everyone they can. The problem with this, and why they participants saw it as bias favouring the Hausa/Fulani, is that those apprehended by the military are mostly armed members of the victim population, not the assailants who often flee and evade arrest. This experience of the Christians interviewed fuels emotions and dissatisfaction with the military, as they felt victimised. Added to this, they feel oppressed because they are unable to retaliate, adding to their vulnerability.

The opinions of Muslim participants differed from those of Christians. Muslims neither expressed the opinion that the military is biased, nor shared the view that its response to calls for distress are late or unsatisfactory. On the contrary, their opinion was that the military is very responsive and efficient in its response to calls of distress, an opinion which differed from those of the Christians interviewed. Similarly, while Muslim participants agreed that the military is susceptible to corruption and that some personnel could take sides when bribed, they felt it was less likely to occur. They did not mention any incidence of the military colluding with Christians to attack them. While some felt that the military may be biased, they felt that this could be rumours to tarnish the professional image of the military. A participant stated that “this issue cannot be completely ruled out. Like the issue of ID card, it might be true that the military could be bias, or some people are trying to tarnish the image of the military.”<sup>98</sup> A more compelling opinion held by most Muslims is that civilians impersonate the military, rather than that the military collaborates with others to attack or invade communities. Thus, it may not be military personnel who are responsible for the lack of service delivery or atrocities, but impostors. However, the general feeling is a lack of confidence in the military, especially from Christians.

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<sup>97</sup> Interview with a Christian youth leader in Jos South LGA on 3 November 2016.

<sup>98</sup> Interview with a male participant in Mangu LGA on 24 November 2016.



In a situation where civilians are not confident that the persons they come across in military uniforms are genuine, it can contribute to insecurity. Although the government and military leadership have attempted to address this by introducing a different set of military uniforms, this has not dispelled the distrust of the citizenry.<sup>99</sup> Moreover, as civilians experience more incidences of military complicity and bias towards some groups, it clearly erodes the confidence the citizenry has in the military to protect them, as reflected in the following statement:

Normally, when you see a soldier you are supposed to run to him for security, but the soldiers as we have seen will end up killing you. Before now, we did not know why this was happening, but we later discovered that it was because of some of them were Muslims and our area is a Christian dominated area.<sup>100</sup>

This shows that civilians are likely to feel that military personnel favour their respective religious persuasion by taking sides. Participants reported several accounts of the military acting in a partial manner, which affects their legitimacy and neutrality, and this included high level coercion, intimidation, and brutality associated with their conduct. In such cases, clamping down on anyone standing up against the military was common and frequent, reflected in several instances of military personnel threatening to kill or 'waste' civilians, while boasting that they can get away with it. Along with this, soldiers claim that they will not risk their lives to protect civilians, as their salary cannot compensate for such loss. This statement and behaviour contradicts the principle of professional military service ethic of selfless service.

Muslim communities seemingly do not feel that soldiers act in a biased manner, although they did express concerns about corruption and the manner in which soldiers dealt with issues of land ownership and community disputes. They blamed this not on the soldiers themselves, but the lack of training that they receive. However, when religious affiliation is taken into consideration, two contrasting opinions on the legitimacy and impartiality of the military emerge. One holds that the military is complicit, aiding assailants, and biased towards Muslims, while the other opinion holds that assailants impersonate the military when they attack communities. Although the opinions differ, they both spoke to the integrity and professional image of the military. This situation not only affects the interaction and relationship of civilians with the military, but it evokes further consequences such as civilians forming or allying with armed groups for protection and retaliation against military abuse. The next section explains how it plays out in Plateau State.

#### **6.4 CIVILIANS REACTING TO AND RETALIATING AGAINST MILITARY ABUSE**

This section discusses the use of disproportionate violence by the military on the citizenry, the effects on the security situation in the State, and what civilians make of it, including the willingness of civilians

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<sup>99</sup> The introduction of a new set of uniform is discussed later in this chapter.

<sup>100</sup> Interview with a male participant in Bokkos on 9 September 2016.



to cooperate with the military, and how they react to military abuse. This includes legitimate reactions to military violence, and the illegitimate retaliation against military violence and abuse in Plateau State.

#### **6.4.1 Cooperation and Sharing Information with Military**

The findings indicate that it is common for civilians to refuse to cooperate and share information with the military as a way of reacting to military abuse and violence. Under the conditions presented earlier, it is understandable that civilians, and particularly Christians, are less likely to cooperate with the military because they feel more aggrieved. Several participants said that they deliberately distanced themselves from the military, or completely avoided any form of interaction with them because they saw the actions and conduct of the military as unprofessional and lacking legitimacy. Along with this, as the citizenry suffer from various forms of violence and heavy-handedness from the military, they are less likely to cooperate with them, and many participants preferred not to share information or report any sensitive information about an impending attack to the military as they feared they might be victimised, as this male participant in Jos North LGA mentioned: “if you give them such a report without evidence, they can harass you if they doubt you.”<sup>101</sup> A Christian male living in Jos South LGA expressed a similar opinion:

In Nigeria, what I notice is when you have something to share with the security personnel, if you are not careful, at the end of the day, you might turn out to be the victim, and if I am not sure about it, I cannot say anything to them about it. It is better to keep myself safe than to say had I known tomorrow.<sup>102</sup>

Only a few participants reported that they would inform the military about an impending or a planned attack. However, even though these participants offered to report or share such information, they would only do so with great care and caution due to the fear of being victimised, interrogated or detained by the military. However, most opted not to report or share information with the military due to the injustices they may suffer and preferred to report incidents to their community vigilante groups, community leaders or the police. Thus, although the military is the key agency responsible for internal security enforcement in the State, it lacks the legitimacy to do so effectively. Added to this, civilians distrust them and are unwilling to share information as they are inclined to seek protection from other sources, which may be legitimate or illegitimate.

#### **6.4.2 Legitimate and Quasi-Legitimate Approaches**

In most instances, the reaction or coping strategy involved the use of collective action to make the demand for military accountability known. The first is the formation and use of civil-society groups, such as local community groups, faith-based organisations, and non-governmental organisations. Community group leadership forms an important channel through which the citizenry can express

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<sup>101</sup> Interview with a male participant in Jos North LGA on 27 October 2016.

<sup>102</sup> Interview with a male participant in Jos South LGA on 11 November 2016.

their grievances to the military command, particularly those stationed in their community. This happens through elders or appointed representatives, on the advice of community members. However, this medium does not always yield satisfactory outcomes, especially when the community leaders are required to provide evidence to substantiate their claims of abuse. Such evidence is difficult to provide because, unless pre-empted and pre-planned, one may not think to make a secret video or audio recording of the military in the act. Also, in several instances, those caught recording or photographing acts of military brutality were maltreated and the device was confiscated or destroyed, making this option less desirable. Other legitimate options for reacting to military abuse include NGOs involved in human rights advocacy, peace dialogues, seminars, mediation and advocating for the human rights of the citizenry. However, few participants in this study had any contact with NGOs working in the State, showing that such groups play a limited role, or do not appeal to the citizenry.

Another strategy used by some civilian groups is the criminal court. However, based on my findings, this mechanism is the least-used, although it is legitimate and a State sanctioned process. Whether these were individual cases, such as a person whose hair was forcefully barbed because a person in the military felt it was bushy and unkempt, or more serious cases such as the ethnic cleansing suit against the military by the Tarok community, participants stated that the court process is long, delayed, unpromising and costly. Cases tend to linger on and victims become frustrated, tired, or unable to continue the trial, which explains why the court option is the least used. Even where cases are taken to court and won, the military often blatantly disobeys the court ruling and other court injunctions.

As civil society organisations/activism and the courts are unpromising, marches, rallies, protest actions and demonstrations have become more popular with the citizenry. This alternative is common, as most participants had seen or taken part in one or more of such protests. Although most protests and demonstrations start peacefully, many end up becoming violent as protesters pick up sticks and weapons. In other instances, it is the military attempt to dispel protesters that leads to violence due to their heavy-handedness and high level of brutality. A male participant described one such incident which occurred in Barkin Ladi:

There was a time when women went out on mass and protested to show their dissatisfaction with the military. But, do you know that some of those women were beaten while others were even shot at? This happened right here in the heart of this Barkin Ladi.<sup>103</sup>

This shows that military mishandling of protesters contributes to such protests turning violent, especially when it involves extra-judicial killing. However, protest marches and rallies organised by civil society organisations working in the State were usually successful with no reports of violence. The

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<sup>103</sup> Interview with a male participant in Barkin Ladi LGA on 25 August 2016.

problem with non-violent protests, as some participants mentioned, is that it is often less likely to get the attention of authorities or yield any satisfactory outcome.

Another factor that contributes to the culture of impunity of the military is people simply obeying illegitimate orders to avoid stricter punishments. For those in underprivileged positions with no access to senior leaders, the mechanism of avoiding the military or obeying and getting victimised was the only option, although it was a deviation from legitimate procedures. As active citizens, they should be able to challenge unfair practices and be comfortable meeting with the military, but for many this was immensely difficult, or not an option. It makes this approach quasi-legitimate because it means that citizens conform to illegitimate and informal procedures, thereby blurring the boundaries between what they know is legally right, and what they will do to avoid harm. This leads to a breakdown of law and order, especially when this is pervasive and has become the normal way soldiers deal with civilians.

Another form of quasi-legitimate approach is where courageous, educated, ‘connected’ members of the public and political figures who experience military abuse try to address or raise awareness of military abuses. Some are prepared to take up issues of military abuses because they know a more senior ranking officer whom they can call to address a problem with lower-ranking personnel. However, because only a few civilians have these connections and courage, it is rare and only a few employ this as an option. In its place, some elect to partake in violent protests and other illegitimate approaches to show their dissatisfaction with the heavy-handedness and use of violence.

### **6.4.3 Illegitimate Approaches**

Given that legitimate approaches appear to be yielding little or no success, some resort to illegitimate actions to retaliate against military abuses. One is the use of disruptive and violent protest actions against the military. In such instances, the citizenry target military personnel as a way of expressing outrage and calling for their complete withdrawal from the community. Several such incidents have occurred in parts of Plateau State, particularly the study areas of this research. Some of the recent incidences occurred in Bokkos, Mangu, and Barkin Ladi LGAs, where a male participant made this remark: “all the military checkpoints were dismantled by civilians, their tents were destroyed, and the military had to quickly escape being lynched because the civilians were ready to die that day.”<sup>104</sup> When civilians violently confront the military by chasing them away from their communities, it shows that the military no longer has the capacity to maintain security in the State, unless it becomes predatory on the citizenry. This situation is then likely to enable the rise and proliferation of numerous armed militias and vigilante groups for protection.

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<sup>104</sup> Interview with a male participant in Barkin Ladi LGA on 25 August 2016.

Faced with the dual dilemma of violence from armed groups and heavy-handedness from the military, some have resolved to self-protection and vigilantism. Self-protection and vigilantism are popular in local communities, particularly those without military presence, and in communities that have previously forced the military to vacate from their town/streets. Because people have resorted to self-protection, locally-fabricated guns and other small arms and light weapons are in wide circulation in the State. Local communities have set up militias as vigilante groups who assume the responsibility of securing and defending their communities against marauders and invaders. A male participant who is a community leader explained it as follows:

In my community, we had to organise and form a vigilante, and we are now paying them and encouraging people to cooperate with them. If the vigilante does anything wrong, we bring them to order, we have collected money from the people and we are using it to sustain the vigilante, and we have bought working implements for them.<sup>105</sup>

The vigilante groups are mostly made up of uneducated and unemployed youths who are not only easily mobilised, but also loyal to their communities. The funding for the group comes from the contributions of community members, and community leaders or chiefs' delegates control or regulate the activities of the group and ensure loyalty to their community. Community members trust these groups due to their dedication and loyalty to the community. A female participant in Jos North LGA noted that "every evening, they are around securing the area very well."<sup>106</sup> A male participant in Riyom LGA stressed he "trusts the vigilante groups we have in the community because they can easily warn or sound the alarm if there is a problem."<sup>107</sup> However, a problem with the group is that its informality means flexibility to act in other roles, such as being assailants. Thus, it is not certain if such vigilante groups do not transform or are not used as local militias to fight other communities. Also, given the magnitude of security work required of them, one wonders how 'heavily' armed they are. In towns and urban areas, there are more formal vigilante groups organised and working, but these groups seek State approval through registration with the government and are under the direct supervision of the police.

As we have seen from the previous sections, the abuse of power by the military has led to the erosion of their legitimacy and has in turn strained CMR. The State faces a quandary because withdrawing the military will not guarantee peace or security, as the activities of armed groups are likely to continue because the root causes of the conflict remain unaddressed. Although the military can enforce peaceful tolerance and coexistence, the conduct of its own personnel continues to worsen the security situation. This study shows that Plateau State is in a state of fragility, where peace and security is precarious, and violence is likely to escalate. A male participant described Plateau State as being at a

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<sup>105</sup> Interview with a male participant in Jos North LGA on 24 October 2016.

<sup>106</sup> Interview with a female participant in Jos North LGA on 13 October 2016.

<sup>107</sup> Interview with a male participant in Riyom LGA on 6 December 2016.

“freezing stage, it is only a relative and forced peace, there is no peace yet at the present state ... and we would go back to where we are coming from.”<sup>108</sup> In urban areas and Jos, accessing or visiting several streets is problematic because the violence has led to the compartmentalisation of streets and residences along religious lines. Christians are unable to visit several Muslim-occupied streets fearing victimisation, and vice versa. As it stands, while violence appears to have receded in some urban areas, rural communities still face the threat of violent attacks and invasion. A distressed participant explained the situation: “for us in the remote parts of the State, we often return home by 5-6:00pm, yet, despite being too early, we still suffer attacks from unknown gunmen.”<sup>109</sup>

Given the fragile state of security in Plateau State, the government continues to use the military, feeling that it is a ‘necessary evil’ to enforce ceasefires and prevent violence from erupting. However, in certain quarters the data shows that participants feel that the use of the military is not important. Despite the shared experience of disproportionate force from the military, different opinions exist on the effectiveness of the military. The fact that differences of opinion exist between Muslims and Christians is something to examine more closely in relation to security in Plateau State. Given this, it is necessary to examine how the State has intervened to control the excesses of the military, and if participants are aware of such interventions.

## **6.5 STATE INTERVENTIONS TO CONTROL THE MILITARY**

This section examines the attempts by government to address the concerns related to the conduct and heavy-handedness of the military. The ability of the government to control the coercive might of the military is important, as it affects citizens’ trust in government, and the citizenry needs to see that the government is aware of and attempting to address the problems raised. From the findings, three different State interventions by the Plateau State Government and the Federal Government of Nigeria were identified and discussed below.

### **6.5.1 Desert Military Camouflage**

The first strategy the Federal Government of Nigeria adopted when it saw that the deteriorating security situation in Plateau State was to deploy the military. However, the reliance on the military to force the return of peace in the State brought about several consequences, one of which was armed groups impersonating the military. In response to these military impostors, the government changed the uniforms of military personnel, and all soldiers doing military ISOPs in the State were given and required to use desert camouflage in place of the green camouflage uniforms. This was intended to help identify ‘genuine’ personnel and differentiate them from armed groups impersonating the military.

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<sup>108</sup> Interview with a male participant in Barkin Ladi LGA on 22 August 2016.

<sup>109</sup> Interview with a male participant in Barkin Ladi LGA on 23 August 2016.

The participants in this study had a significant level of awareness about the abuse of military uniforms by armed groups, and some tried to explain the difference the intervention has brought. An example of this can be seen from the opinion of a male participant interviewed in Jos North LGA:

There were some soldiers who came to Jos, but their uniform was fake, they were not genuine. They were always shooting at civilians haphazardly because they were on a mission. They also shot at one of my friends in his house, the house had no fence, so, when he was opening the entrance door to get some air while eating, that was how the bullet met him. But, they ran out of luck when the government discovered their activity and decided to change the uniforms of the soldiers to another colour. Unknowing to them that the uniform was changed, when they returned to continue their atrocity, they were caught one after the other.<sup>110</sup>

Accordingly, the intervention by the government to change the military uniform proved effective in helping personnel to apprehend some impostors. It also brought some respite to civilians as the military could apprehend some impostors and prevent further attacks on civilian communities. In turn, this raised the confidence of civilians in the military because it brought about some level of relief and trust. However, participants indicated that this relief was only temporary. While it reduced the abuse of military uniforms, it did not stop soldiers from acting unprofessionally. In fact, as the discussion in this chapter indicates, military complicity and bias towards Muslims persists and participants narrated several accounts of soldiers collaborating with or aiding armed groups to attack local Christian communities.

### **6.5.2 The STF and the Frequent Rotation and Change of Personnel**

As the change in military uniform did not stop the accusations of military bias and complicity, the government was compelled to take further actions, realising the need to restructure and re-strategize military operations. About a decade after violence erupted in Plateau State, the Federal Government established an STF, Operation Safe Haven (OSH), in 2010 to take full control of the security situation in the State. The STF was made up of soldiers of the Nigerian military who were deployed to various parts of the State where violence had become common. However, this did not allay the fears or problems the citizenry faced with the military. Thus, in September 2011, the Federal Government upgraded the STF to a Joint Task Force (JTF).

The decision to upgrade the STF to a JTF was part of the intervention to gradually reduce the number of active military personnel in the State. In its place, personnel from the PMF, a constabulary arm of the Nigeria police and other civil security agencies, were brought in to replace some of the recalled military personnel, and to work with soldiers as a JTF. The hope was that this arrangement would be more effective in handling the security situation in Plateau State and help to rebuild a better

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<sup>110</sup> Interview with a male participant in Jos North LGA on 26 October 2016.

relationship between the soldiers and civilians. However, this did not improve CMR or peaceful coexistence.

The Federal Government then made the military leadership the subject of ‘close scrutiny.’ A military commander, usually a senior military officer not below the rank of a Brigadier, is made the JTF commander. The position of the JTF commander has been very ‘flexible’ to allow for rapid changes if a new or different commander is needed. In fact, due to the flexibility of the position, eleven commanders held this position between 2010 and 12 July 2018. Among these officers, some held the position for a period less than a month (see Table 6.1 below).

**Table 6. 1 Plateau State, ‘Operation Safe Haven’ Commanders Since 2010**

<i>S. No</i>	<i>Name of Commanders</i>	<i>Chronology</i>	<i>Year</i>
1	Major General Saleh Maina	1 <sup>st</sup> Commander	2010
2	Brigadier General Hassan Umaru	2 <sup>nd</sup> Commander	2010 – 9 September 2011
3	Brigadier General Pat Akem	3 <sup>rd</sup> Commander	10 September 2011 - 18 Sept. 2011
4	Major Gen. Oluwaseun Olayinka Oshinowo	4 <sup>th</sup> Commander	19 September 2011 – 23 February 2012
5	Major General Mohammed Ibrahim	5 <sup>th</sup> Commander	24 February 2012 – 11 May 2012
6	Major General Henry Ayoola	6 <sup>th</sup> Commander	11 May 2012 - 8 September 2013
7	Major General David Enetie	7 <sup>th</sup> Commander	9 September 2013 - 4 August 2015
8	Major General Tagbo Ude	8 <sup>th</sup> Commander	5 August 2015 – 13 June 2016
9	Brigadier Gen. Abdulsalam Bagudu Ibrahim	Acting Commander	14 June 2016 – 26 July 2016
10	Major General Rogers Ibe Nicholas	9 <sup>th</sup> Commander	27 July 2016 -11 February 2017
11	Major General Anthony Atolagbe	10 <sup>th</sup> Commander	12 August 2017 – 23 July 2018
12	Major Gen. Augustine Chris Chukwudi Agundu	11 <sup>th</sup> Commander	24 July 2018

Source: Compiled from different local online media reports.

The government hoped that this frequent changing of commanders would improve military professionalism and address the conduct and unprofessional behaviour of soldiers. However, this does not appear to have been the case. While the reasons for the frequent change of the commanders are confidential and not made available to the public, the recall of some was associated with periods of escalating insecurity. For others, it was their religious affiliation, intense public outcry over complicity and unprofessional conduct of personnel, and compulsory retirement of officers for being political, among other reasons<sup>111</sup> (Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 2013: 31–34). Another State intervention is

<sup>111</sup> For specificity, there is no record suggesting that any STF commander in Plateau State was compulsory retired from service for an offence. Rather, the compulsory retirement referred to is a nationwide exercise.

rotation of soldiers and, in some instances, the complete recall and change of all the soldiers. This too did not address the problem of military heavy-handedness, and abuse.

Several factors explain why neutrality and professionalism of the military in Plateau State remains elusive. One key explanation is that the STF remains under the leadership of the military, who are not trained for such internal roles. With the military in charge, it becomes difficult for even newly-deployed soldiers not to engage in excesses, especially because their training and the nature of military culture are not well suited for internal security duties. Other problems include the susceptibility of soldiers to corruption and extortion, and their substance abuse. Equally important, interagency feuds play a vital role. Although there have been few reports on this, there tends to be a degree of interagency rivalry between soldiers, the police, and other civil security agencies, especially the Plateau State Operation Rainbow security outfit. Consider the following account from a male participant in Bokkos LGA:

I remember vividly there was this time in Barkin Ladi, on your way coming here you must have seen the Sector Headquarters in Barkin Ladi, Sector 7, there had been a problem between Operation Rainbow that the former Governor, Baba Jang was using to quell the crisis, because they were meant to be like the police of the indigenous people or the community helping the soldiers with sourcing of information and preventing outbreak of violence where the military are not present. The issue started when a team of Operation Rainbow parked their van on the road close to the gate of the sector headquarters. So, when they parked, altercation began on why they parked their van close to the military sector command headquarters. You know in Nigeria, wherever the military are, they do not allow any car to stop there, or even park or drop someone, even if it is just a house of a military officer. So, the Operation Rainbow guy answered the soldier that we are the same uniform people, at least when I am talking to you, you need to hear and respect my view. But, the soldier now removed his knife and stabbed the Operation Rainbow guy and the guy died. So, that caused a lot of problems.

This suggests interagency rivalry, but as this study did not include interviewing members of the security forces, this was difficult to verify. What is clear is that the security effort of the military has not changed, despite its reorganisation to an STF. There appear to be no changes in terms of its mandates, command and structures, and importantly, the operational rules of engagement are highly confidential and have not been made publicly available. This makes it difficult for security analysts to establish the limits and boundaries of the use of military force, and what could be considered 'excessive'. Given that the rules of engagement are not known, one can only draw inferences from global standard practices of military ISOPs. In their study of the security agencies in the Jos conflict, Para-Mallam & Hoomlong (2013) provide a good summary of some of the issues raised in this section:

The precise operational rules of engagement of military formations are normally classified and not released for public consumption... The military troops deployed to Plateau State in the immediate aftermath of violent outbreak consisted of soldiers. However, possibly due to public outcry over ethno-religious polarisation within the military, the Federal Government soon set up a Special Joint Military Task Force (2013: 24).



The discussion in this section shows that the special joint military task force has not only failed to change, but has defied several interventions by the Federal Government to professionalise it. Based on the evidence from this study, we can see that the conduct of soldiers continues to erode public trust and confidence in the military, along with its the ethno-religious polarisation. This has exacerbated the conflict, such that civilians react against military abuses by joining vigilante or armed groups, which pressures the government to seek other alternatives.

### **6.5.3 ‘Operation Rainbow’ Constabulary Force**

Given these problems and the inability of the Federal Government to control the military, the Plateau State Government provided an alternative security strategy: the formation of ‘Operation Rainbow,’ a Plateau State-owned and controlled constabulary force. ‘Operation Rainbow’ is made up of civilians, retired police and military personnel, and other civil security agents. As an agent of the Plateau State Government, it is maintained by Plateau State and is answerable to the office of the State Governor. The benefit is that its personnel are more civilian than military and are from Plateau State, so they are more familiar with the dynamics of the region.

The establishment of the Operation Rainbow constabulary force has improved peace and security in Plateau State. There has been a decline in the rate of military abuse and excesses, and some participants remarked that it has led to an improved security situation and peaceful tolerance in several parts of the State previously seen as hostile and conflict-prone. A male participant in Jos North LGA mentioned that “it appears that corruption has reduced, and the rate of molestation of people by the military has reduced.”<sup>112</sup> Another supported this opinion, saying “presently, the problems have reduced unlike before, because it was out of hand in times past,”<sup>113</sup> now “we are beginning to see improvement in the security situation.”<sup>114</sup>

It is important to note that this study did not seek to investigate the effectiveness of the Operation Rainbow constabulary force, as this was outside the scope of the research. Nonetheless, the opinions of participants interviewed indicate that it has been more effective, and the eruption and escalation of violence has reduced. However, there is still ongoing military abuse and excessive use of force, as the military remains the major security provider in the State, and the Operation Rainbow security outfit has only limited powers. The citizenry still feels that government is doing too little or nothing to reduce the abuse of power by the military and until this is addressed, the people will continue to support vigilante and other armed groups as an alternative means of security.

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<sup>112</sup> Interview with a male participant in Jos North LGA on 24 October 2016.

<sup>113</sup> Interview with a female participant in Jos North LGA on 13 October 2016.

<sup>114</sup> Interview with a male participant in Barkin Ladi LGA on 30 August 2016.

## 6.6 CONCLUSION

The interview data presented in this chapter provided an in-depth insight into the interaction of the citizenry with the military in Plateau State, Nigeria, including the state of CMR from the ground up, and the dynamics of State control in a diverse society facing endemic violence. Some prominent issues raised in the chapter include that the military uses disproportionate violence, that their conduct is unprofessional, that it perpetuates conflict, and that there is a low level of trust in the military. This compromises the legitimacy of the military at various levels, and citizens loath to interact with and support the military. Therefore, civilians' distance themselves by refusing to offer useful security tips or information to the military because of the fear of victimisation, intimidation and abuse.

The findings show that the reactions of the citizenry to the disproportionate violence of the military contribute to the insecurity in the State. Due to the desire for security, there is a proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the State, which has compelled the State to adopt other less coercive measures, even though it is yet to fully reconsider the military alternative. This data therefore helps to study: (1) CMR when the military acts internally in society, (2) how military heavy-handedness affects the relationship, and (3) the reaction, response, or coping strategies of the citizenry. In the following chapter, the implications are discussed and analysed in more depth by bringing together the conceptual and contextual frameworks and the findings.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### DISCUSSION

#### 7.1 INTRODUCTION

Having presented the findings of this study in the previous chapter, this chapter aims to interpret the empirical data in relation with the theories of CMR. The goal is to discuss and analyse the issues in-depth by applying the conceptual and contextual framework appraised in the earlier chapters. Accordingly, the chapter discusses the findings in the context of the broader literature of CMR, internal conflict, and the internal deployment of the military. The discussion followed the quadrumvirate interaction theory of CMR, while also reflecting on extant theories of CMR. The understanding is that this will help to indicate and explain the sources and causes of the strained CMR highlighted in the findings.

#### 7.2 CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN NIGERIA

In Chapter 4 (section 4.6), the nature of Nigeria's CMR was discussed and it was highlighted that Section 218 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provided the legal basis for this. The law institutionalises and legitimises civilian supremacy over the military, and provides both "constitutional and legal basis for democratic civilian control of the armed forces" in Nigeria (Magbadelo, 2012: 257; Alaga & Akum, 2013: 231). Accordingly, it empowers the President as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and whose power and that of the military shall be regulated by the parliament (National Assembly) (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999). At the level of theory, Nigeria appears to be complying with the legal provision in terms of the nature of CMR. The President acts as the commander in chief, and there appears to be both civil supremacy and parliamentary oversight since Nigeria returned to democracy in 1999. In practice however, there is a weak implementation or rather a subjective civil control, as the military continues to act extra-legally without sanctions.

To put this in the context of extant theories of CMR, the Nigerian military is detached from the political decision-making process as separation theory suggests, but it has an active constabulary role in society (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960). Given this overlap, and the findings of this study, which reveals the existence of a dysfunctional civil-military gap (Feaver, 1999), the ideas of both Huntington and Janowitz are unable to fully explain CMR in Nigeria. For example, the findings shows the existence of a cultural gap, its influence on military habitus, and how it leads to abuses and violations of civilian norms. Also, in terms of the day-to-day control of the military, agency theory (Feaver, 1997, 2003a) highlights that there are attempts to control the military that the separation and integration theories do not explain. This includes the decisions to frequently change the STF Commanders in Plateau State, and the complete withdrawal and replacing of troops with new contingents. However, as with

Huntington and Janowitz, agency theory does not consider the role of the citizenry in CMR. Therefore, a more useful lens is concordance theory, which explains why despite detaching the military from society and the political decision-making processes, Nigeria actively and frequently uses the military internally (Omede, 2012; Dambazau, 2014).

Concordance theory argues that what is necessary is neither separation nor integration of the military, but agreement on certain indicators in line with the cultural and historical traditions of a state (Schiff, 1995, 2009: 37). These indicators are the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, the method of recruitment into the military, and the military style (Schiff, 2009: 44–47). The assumption is that when the partners agree on this, concordance or a healthy CMR will result. However, concordance theory failed to explain how the citizenry can exert agency and the influence this has on CMR, a variable which forms a key finding of this study. The findings indicate that there is a strained CMR in Nigeria, and the source(s) of this can be identified by examining the levels of interaction of the quadrumvirate interaction theory.

### **7.3 SOURCES OF STRAINED CMR IN PLATEAU STATE, NIGERIA**

One key contribution of the quadrumvirate interaction theory of CMR is that it introduces the four levels of interaction in CMR, which it also identifies as the possible sources of a strained CMR. The aim of this section is to identify and discuss the sources of the resulting strained CMR in Plateau State, Nigeria. This is achieved by appraising CMR in Nigeria along the five indicators of concordance/agreement at the levels of the three sub-units of interaction between the partners.

#### **7.3.1 The major intersecting level**

Based on the existing cultural and historical tradition of Nigeria, the understanding and agreement is that the military shall enlist personnel to the rank and file of the military using the all-volunteer force model of recruitment. The recruits across all the 36 States and the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja) are enlisted based on the quota system of the Federal Character Commission (FCC), which apportions how many and where to recruit civilians (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999). The aim is to ensure that the rank and file of the military reflects the ethnic diversity of Nigeria, and that no region of the country is excluded from employment into the military. Similarly, the agreement and understanding is that the officer corps shall be recruited from all the geopolitical zones of the country, and that this must be in line with the principle of the FCC to ensure that the composition of the officer corps reflects the ethnic diversity of the country.

There appears to be compliance to representativeness when the military enlists commissioned officers, but data on the nation's officer corps is not publicly available to verify the degree of compliance. However, there is evidence of a lack of cohesion as ethnic and religious identity affects the functioning of the military. Major General Chris Alli, a retired high-ranking officer of the Nigerian military, noted

that in the army, “religious and ethnic diversities regulate inter-personal relationships and values... you have to be a Muslim to serve as aide-de-camp or military assistant to a Muslim officer. This is the pattern among most Christian officers” (Alli, 2001: 23). The findings of this study reinforce Alli’s claims that ethnic and religious identity have a major impact on the sense of corporateness of the military. Evidence presented in the study shows that personnel are prompt in assisting groups/communities who belong to their religious identity. This implies that they do not act in an impartial manner in the conduct of their duties to protect the citizenry.

The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria provides the legal framework for the use of the military for internal security operations and MOOTW in society, in times of serious security threat. However, this shall be under strict parliamentary oversight with clearly worded operational rules of engagement to guide the conduct of the mission. Another key part of the agreement and understanding is that the Nigerian military shall not be involved in the political decision-making process of the country. Given this, the military is not involved in the Federal Executive Council, the apex executive body, which is responsible for the functions of government in Nigeria. However, given the security challenges Nigeria faces, the military is represented in the National Security Council, a body responsible for advising the President on security matters (section 25 and 26 of the third schedule of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria). In theory, Nigeria has a clear legal framework which was drafted towards the end of 29 years of military rule, to guide the state of CMR for the democratic state. However, on practical matters of implementation of the agreement on the indicators of concordance/agreement, problems exist which undermine the state of CMR in the country. To understand the sources of the problems and how they occur, I turn to the three subunits of interaction between the partners.

### **7.3.2 Interactions at the subunits**

The findings of this study revealed that an unhealthy relationship exists between the military and civilians in Plateau State. In the subunit of interaction between the military and the citizenry, the relationship has reached a stage where civilians feel compelled to pick up arms or ally with armed groups in self-defence and for protection. Typically, this involves retaliating against military abuse or the willingness to do so, using violent and disruptive protests and through directing violence against military personnel. Thus, problems which undermine the legitimacy of the mission exist in this subunit of interaction. As this affects the interaction between two partners, it has negative effects on the agreement and understanding reached at the major intersecting level, and this affects the state of CMR in Nigeria.

While the findings from this study did not provide adequate data on the interaction in the subunit of interaction between the political elites and the citizenry, it is not to say that this subunit has little or no influence on CMR. Recently, civilians have begun revolting against the Plateau State Government for its failure to intervene and end the attacks by the military, and the inability of the military to provide

them security. One incident involved a forceful occupation of the State House, where government properties were destroyed and vandalised by protesting civilians. Another incident involved an attack on the State Governor on 16 July 2018, after visiting internally displaced persons in one of the communities hosting them (Alechenu, Ameh, Fabiyi, Adetayo, Olorok, *et al.*, 2018; Sadiq & Adama, 2018; Usman, 2018b). These incidents occurred within a space of two weeks, after two separate attacks on 23<sup>rd</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup> June 2018 leading to the death of over 200 people (Stefanos Foundation, 2018; Usman, 2018a,c). In this study, civilians expressed dissatisfaction with the inability of the government to ameliorate their security situation, although they applauded the Operation Rainbow constabulary force established to complement the security work of the military. Thus, civilians are getting impatient with the government, and this dissatisfaction has the potential to undermine CMR if the concerns are not addressed.

While there is a growing tension and dissatisfaction in the two subunits discussed above, in the subunit of interaction between the political elites and the military, there appears to be no major concerns. Here, what is evident is weak implementation of civil control of the military. Although there is a clear system which empowers civilian political elites to oversee the military and ensure it complies with applicable rules and professional standards, little is done to implement or ensure this. Chiefly, this is because political elites exert subjective civilian control which undermines military professionalism, and ultimately leads to their unprofessional conduct. Again, this points to the inadequacy of subjective civilian control, given that it does not allow for the maximising of military professionalism (Huntington, 1957: 80–83).

As military professionalism is not enhanced, the military continues to serve the interests of the ruling group and, in the process, pose significant threats to society. Added to this is the fact that the military holds significant prerogatives over civilian leaders, and civilians are unable to implement adequate civil control because this would raise tensions in this subunit of interaction. This explains why long-lasting solutions to military abuse or ongoing conflict are hardly explored or prioritised, as they do not serve the interests of the ruling political elites and retired military officers (Dantani, Wika & Abdullahi, 2017).

In Plateau State, while the decisions of the civilian political elites brought some respite, however, this was only temporary. For example, the decision to restructure the military operations into an STF ensured heavy militarisation of society, but the militias have also changed their pattern of warfare to surprise attacks late at night, a tactic that has remained highly effective and surgical. The decision to frequently rotate personnel, change unpopular commanders, and change the military uniform of personnel has also not led to the end of violence. On the contrary, while the threats and abuse of the military continue daily, there is a lack of political will to call them to order (Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 2013), and the problems are often overlooked. Given this, it is important to understand the causes of the strained CMR and why the military has become a source of threat and insecurity to the citizenry.

## 7.4 CAUSES OF STRAINED CMR IN PLATEAU STATE, NIGERIA

The findings of this study indicate that the military operations in Plateau State are rife with abuses and violations of the human rights of civilians, including instances of extra-judicial killings. Along with these are concerns of military bias, complicity, and soldiers conspiring with armed groups to attack certain communities. Christians particularly believed that soldiers only support and protect Muslim communities, while their own communities rarely benefit from the military when they are under attack. Several incidents were referred to in favour of this claim, thereby supporting earlier studies that in the resolution of conflicts, the military is rarely a neutral actor, and professionalising it would not guarantee neutrality either (Enloe, 1977: 137). Given this, it is necessary to examine the dimensions of military professionalism of the Nigerian military and how this is affected by military ISOPs in society.

### 7.4.1 Loss of Professionalism

A key starting point for this discussion is Michael Desch's submission, which is informed by Huntington's (1957) objective model of civilian control. Desch argues that using the military for internal missions would often result in unhealthy CMR. Accordingly, he maintains that:

[E]xternal missions are the most conducive to healthy patterns of civil-military relations, whereas non-military, internal missions often engender pathologies... If a country faces significant internal threats, the institutions of civilian authority will most likely be weak and deeply divided, making it difficult for civilians to control the military... a non-military and internal mission will produce the worst pattern of civil-military relations (1996: 13–14).

This claim has been proven to be true especially in states where the military intervened in politics following deep political division, corruption and resource mismanagement, and increasing levels of internal threats (Luckham, 1971; Collier, 2009: 8). However, Desch seems to have missed an important point in that involving the military in such non-military roles can erode military professionalism, particularly where civil control is absent or weak. The task of this section is to discuss the findings of this study, which show evidence of eroding military professionalism, and dissatisfaction from civilians due to the military's conduct.

The dissatisfaction of civilians with military abuse can be explained using the service ethic dimension of military professionalism. For Huntington (1957: 8), the responsibility of the military to the state is to serve and defend, and not to engage in predatory actions, or pose a threat to society. As the military institution has the monopoly on knowledge and skills on the management of organised violence, the service ethic holds that it must use this for the good of the state and citizenry (Huntington, 1957: 9; Downes, 1985: 159). However, the findings of this study indicate that personnel deployed in Plateau State engage in acts that undermine the objective of the military mission. One such action is the use of intimidation and coercion.

In the arena of warfare and armed conflict, it is the norm for the military to use intimidation and coercion to suppress hostilities. As previously noted, the military could use coercion to stop belligerents from continuing with violence by forcing a ceasefire. When this does not prove effective and violence ensues, the military could engage in intimidation by using sanctions or the threats of sanctions to force compliance and prevent violence from recurring (Sharp, 2012: 71, 114). Commonly used sanctions include “punishments, pressure ... to penalize, thwart, and alter the behaviour of other persons, groups, or institutions ... for failure to behave in the expected or desired manner” (Sharp, 2012: 173). In this way, it is seen that the use of intimidation and coercion by the military plays a vital role in managing conflict situations. The importance of this is that it cripples the ability of one or more warring parties to continue with violence. Also, because the military has superior instruments of violence, using intimidation and coercion enables it to protect the weaker side from further threats or violence from opposition groups (Boulding, 1989: 25). However, although this measure could be effective in forcing a ceasefire and suppressing violence, implementing it is often problematic. Where there is suspicion of third-party bias or the military is believed to be taking sides, it can erode public trust and undermine the peace-enhancing mission of the military.

Another concern with the use of coercion and intimidation is the way soldiers use force on non-combatant civilians. Several studies indicate that how state forces use these tools can be questionable and problematic (see Collier, 1999), especially where it assumes the form of extrajudicial killings and summary execution of civilians or suspects. In his ‘Democracy’s blameless leaders’ Mitchell (2012) documented five instances of such abuse against the civilian population. For him, such gross violations occur because of a systemic weakness, and in this context, this points to the erosion of service ethic by the military (Mitchell, 2012: 6). The problems with this are numerous. Civilians face the dangers of violence from armed groups and threats from state forces, and this can result in bodily harm, injuries or the loss of life. Where victims survive, resources are also strained as more must be earmarked for treatment and rehabilitation.

As the Nigerian military has a long history of involvement in the internal security of the country, several accounts of military abuse of civilians exist (Okoli & Orinya, 2013). An example is the instance reported by Amnesty International which describes how, “in 2013 and 2014 ... Nigerian military forces, sometimes in collaboration with civilian JTF members, executed a large number of victims, at times dozens or even hundreds in one day” (2015: 40). Other instances of such violations include the extrajudicial and indiscriminate killing of civilians in Zaki Biam in Benue State, and in Odi in Bayelsa State (Ojo, 2009b). While these and several other extrajudicial executions constitute gross violations of human rights and professional service ethics, both political and military leaders express little or no concern over the abuse (Ojo, 2009b: 5–7; Mitchell, 2012: 1–2; Odoemene, 2012: 226). Rather, their rhetoric indicates support for such military abuse, and this is partly because a significant number of



the political elites are retired military generals (Adekanye, 1999a; Badmus, 2005; Agara, 2006). This problem brings to light the concern of Janowitz (1960: 440) of “unanticipated militarism”, especially when military values become extolled over civil and societal values. A consequence is that society and social institutions become militarised because military values have a hold on the state.

An important point is that the use of intimidation and coercion by the military to suppress violence during periods of heightened hostilities could be legitimate, as this is necessary to prevent violence. However, one cannot make the same argument during periods of calm or ceasefire. Incidences of extrajudicial killing, such as the massacre in Tarok communities in 2015, as well as the daily abusive treatment and manhandling of civilians at various military checkpoints, indicate that this is the norm. As a result, civilians are afraid of encountering or approaching military personnel or checkpoints. This indicates that an unhealthy relationship exists between the military and the civilian population, and several participants prefer not to have any interaction with the military at all. Thus, “an average Nigerian encountering soldiers on the road is likely to be subjected to unnecessary and unwarranted fear” (Peterside, 2014b: 1306). Clearly, this is in violation of the military service ethic to protect society and not become a threat to the state. However, as this study did not interview military personnel, it cannot examine if the reasons for joining military service influence the behaviour of soldiers, as this is an important aspect of military service ethic.

The evidence from this study shows that the unregulated use of intimidation and coercion has strained the relationship between civilians and personnel. When this becomes a recurring problem and government makes little or no effort to stop the violation or to serve justice to victims, it leads to an erosion of military service ethic. Although the State can compensate victims of military abuse, this does not change the fact that whenever the military does internal security duties, brutality and abuse would be likely. Hence, as Collier (1999: 11) claims, “where the boundary between internal policing and external defence is not clear..., there is likely to be a serious problem of proportionality in the use of state violence”. This could result in soldiers becoming involved in more abusive violence, especially where there is no proper regulation or measures to ensure accountability, and where the military does not respect the rule of law or democratic values.

Another problem with eroding service ethic is the incidence of sexual and gender based-violence (SGBV). In armed conflict situations, rape, and other forms of SGBV are as ubiquitous as intimidation and coercion. Although reports of sexual violence in armed conflicts is widespread and rampant, Wood (2006, 2009) argues that it occurs in varying proportions and might not necessarily be used in some conflicts. Notwithstanding, several accounts have shown that state forces, including the military, often engage in sexual violence against girls and women in the societies where they provide peace support activities (Odoemene, 2012; Bartels, Kelly, Scott, Leaning, Mukwege, *et al.*, 2013). In fact, the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict Dataset indicates that “state militaries are more likely to be

reported as perpetrators of sexual violence than either rebel groups or militias” (Cohen & Nordås, 2014: 418, 425). While the dataset does not express certainty due to data collection and reporting biases and limitations, several individual studies validate the claim that military personnel are often involved in the sexual abuse of civilians (Butler, Gluch & Mitchell, 2007; Nwolise, 2007; Leiby, 2009; Bartels *et al.*, 2013; Johansson & Sarwari, 2017).

In Plateau State, SGBV is a common occurrence and as with intimidation and coercion, it strains the relationship between the military and the citizenry. According to Wood (2009: 133) and the International Criminal Court (2011: 7–10), acts such as “rape, sexual torture and mutilation, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, enforced sterilization, and forced pregnancy” are common examples of sexual violence. However, this study did not find these to be common in Plateau State, although sexual harassment, intimidation, and unsolicited appeals for sexual favours were reported. Given this, one wonders why personnel deployed for military ISOPs become sexually predatory on civilians they should be protecting.

For Wood (2009: 132), a contributing factor is selfish desires and opportunism, as armed conflict “provides the opportunity for widespread rape, and many if not all male soldiers will take advantage of it.” Thus, conflicts make women (who are often the dominant victims of sexual violence) vulnerable to predatory males. Butler *et al.* (2007: 679–670) and Schneider, Banholzer & Albarracin (2015: 1341) note that selfish drives and opportunism serve as the central causal factors. However, beyond this opportunism perspective, other explanations also shed light on why soldiers are sexually predatory. Johansson & Sarwari (2017: 2) explain that one key explanation pertains to the imbalance of power relations between the military and civilians. Leiby (2009: 84) also emphasized this point when she argues that the aim of sexual violence is to not only humiliate the victim, but to also demonstrate the powerlessness of the victim. Studies documenting and analysing some instances of military sexual violence in Nigeria not only support the claim, but emphasise that this formed part of the intention of personnel who raped and sexually abused women (Nwolise, 2007: 391–393). Odoemene (2012) also supported this position in his analysis of the sexual violence by the Nigerian armed forces in Ogoni land in the Niger Delta region between 1990–1999. He argues that “an imbalance of power relations was identified as the ultimate cause of violent acts, which were used as demonstrations of power and weapons of state terrorism” (Odoemene, 2012: 225).

Accordingly, one sees that due to both selfish motivations and the imbalance of power relations between personnel and civilians, conflict situations expose women to predatory SGBV. Considering Odoemene’s submission and the findings presented in the previous chapter showing evidence of sexual violence by personnel in Plateau State, one can infer that the military misuses its power. The widespread occurrence and frequency indicate that the socialization of the military plays a key role in influencing personnel’s sexual misconducts. Along with this, as few or no cases of disciplinary measures

have been taken against perpetrators, the claims of Moncrief (2017: 715) and Wood & Toppelberg (2017: 620) hold true that both officers and recruits are involved or tolerant of such sexual predation of civilians. It is therefore likely that such sexual predation would strain the relationship between the citizenry and the military. Moreover, in conservative communities where sexual purity and chastity is highly valued and held in high regard, this would not only lead to unhealthy CMR, but it could result in confrontation over the actions of the military. Ultimately, the sexual predation by soldiers entails personnel seeking their selfish desires rather than upholding professional service ethic and protecting the civilian population. This evokes even more challenges for the victims, including mental health problems which is widely associated with SGBV in conflict situations (Amone-P'Olak, Lekhutlile, Ovuga, Abbott, Meiser-Stedman, *et al.*, 2016).

Psychological and emotional harm are mostly non-violent actions which do not immediately result in injuries or bodily harm and may not necessarily lead to the death of the victim. However, it poses substantial problems that undermine the mental well-being of the victim and create numerous burdens on their families and communities. This harm typically consists of a “myriad and often less obvious consequences of violent behaviour, such as... deprivation and maldevelopment that compromise the well-being of individuals, families and communities” (World Health Organization, 2002: 4). Common forms include verbal aggression such as name-calling, and other dominant behaviours such as othering civilians. Others include “controlling behaviours such as isolating a person from family and friends or restricting access to movement, information and assistance” (World Health Organization, 2002: 15). According to O'Hagan (1995: 458) and Sharp (2012: 161), psychological and emotional harm may not be the same, but they are interrelated and are not necessarily “entirely separate experiences.” As such, one exposed to psychological distress from experiencing violence could also experience emotional distress because of the same exposure.

When the military conducts ISOPs, and the behaviour of soldiers is unprofessional and poorly regulated, resultant psychological distress could be severe and traumatic, and could evoke further consequences. In part, this is because an unequal power relation exists when personnel interact with society. When the military takes undue advantage of this, it evokes psychological and emotional problems for the victim. Intimidation and coercion, such as public humiliation, can cause psychological and emotional distress for civilians. Clearly, this is distressing for the victim, and can result in some disorders. According to Khan & Majumdar, the effects include “depression, recurrent, intrusive and distressing recollection of events, irritability and outbursts of anger, difficulty in concentrating, insomnia, persistent sadness, poor mental health and coping, and disinterest in social activities” (2017: 50). For Nwolise (2007: 393), a possible consequence is that it could “sow the seed of future wars and revolt in the conscience of the general public.” Even more problematic is when such abuse is a frequent experience for civilians.

The findings from this study indicate that it is common for military personnel in Plateau State to use condescending and humiliating language when engaging with civilians. For many participants, psychological harm has become part of the military style of the Nigerian armed forces, particularly the foot soldiers who have the most interaction with the citizenry. Again, this indicates that the actions of soldiers fall short of professional conduct and are a clear case of an eroding service ethic and a lack of responsibility to society. More problematic in the Plateau instance is that the physical presence of abusive soldiers in society makes the problem frequent and repetitive, thereby worsening the situation of victims. For example, O'Hagan (1995) observes that the more exposure to emotional and psychological abuse, the more consequence it has on the victim, and the higher the tendency to expect different forms of reactions to the abuse. In most cases, because individuals react differently to psychological abuse, reactions vary depending on social and demographic factors, the temperaments and the availability of emotional support for the victim (World Health Organization, 2002: 8). The consequences of psychological trauma include "disturbed and antisocial behaviour... conflict, and aggression towards others. The situation is often exacerbated by the availability of weapons and by people becoming inured to violence after long exposure to conflict" (World Health Organization, 2002: 22). The implication is that it strains the relationship between civilians and the military, causing civilians to retaliate against the military using violence.

Another problem with an eroding service ethic is the possibility for personnel to become corrupt and exploit civilians. Studies shows that corruption is associated with inequality, power imbalance and unequal interpersonal relationship (Zimring & Johnson, 2005: 796; Anders & Nuijten, 2007: 15; Dawood, 2014: 103). As such, this reinforces the position of Zimring & Johnson that corruption is a "crime of the powerful" (2005: 796). While power imbalances and inequality are a social constant in every society, its exploitation for undue advantage by privileged power holders makes the act illegitimate and corrupt. The literature outlines some of the common forms corruption can assume: extortion; fraud; embezzlement or theft; misappropriation of public resources; collusion; trading influence; nepotism; bribery; conflict of interest; political meddling; the obstruction of justice; facilitation payment; corruption; and money laundering (World Bank, 1997: 9–11; Zhang, Cao & Vaughn, 2009: 205; Dawood, 2014: 105). Participants in this study indicated that soldiers in their communities engage in some of these acts, especially extortion, collusion, nepotism, bribery, conflict of interest, and the obstruction of justice. The literature on military professionalism indicates that the erosion of selfless service ethic occurs when recruits join the military for occupational reasons or as a pathway to other careers (Moskos, 1986; Battistelli, 1997; Manigart, 2005; Heinecken, 2013a). However, soldiers who engage in corrupt acts while on duty take the problem a step further. I outline the argument that supports this.

The presence of the military in society, especially in periods of both hostilities and relative peace, confers a privileged power position to soldiers, albeit as authorised armed servants of the state. Although the military is required to perform specific conflict prevention and law and order duties, absent or weak civil control means personnel could use their power discretionarily, including involving in corrupt practices. Along with this, the presence of military personnel with weapons and paraphernalia reinforces the ability of personnel to control and direct civilians to do their bidding. While this power imbalance is legitimately sanctioned by the state, corrupt practices become evident when personnel do not uphold ethical and professional standards. Collier raised this concern, noting that internal deployment paves the way for “predatory rent seeking, extortion, and abuse” (1999: 9). In Africa, a similar trend was observed in the military operations in the conflicts in the DR Congo (Baaz & Verweijen, 2014).

Participants in this study also identified self-serving interests as the reason why soldiers deployed in their communities are prone to corrupt practices. The findings support the literature that self-serving interest and weak civil control are the major factors responsible for military corruption in Africa (Howe, 2001: 40–42). In Nigeria, the problem of corruption is not unique to the military, as some have argued that it is institutionalized, systemic, and pervasive across all institutions of the state, and has seemingly become uncontrollable (Osoba, 1996: 371; Erero & Oladoyin, 2000: 280). In the military operations in Plateau State, military corruption is endemic, resulting in the military authority placing signposts at each military checkpoint asking civilians not to give money to personnel in an attempt to curtail the growing problem. However, this intervention has yielded little or no relief because the soldiers extort money, food products, and other valuables from commuters at military checkpoints. This undermines the credibility and the legitimacy of the military mission, particularly where civilians see the military as a predator preying on their livelihood. Also embedded in this are issues of corporateness, especially where corruption among soldiers makes them prone to complicity and bias to the extent of aiding/colluding with some armed groups or taking sides with belligerents.

Corporateness means a shared “sense of organic unity and consciousness... a common bond of work, and the sharing of a unique social responsibility” among personnel (Huntington, 1957: 10). When there are “ideological, political, or service-oriented differences” within the armed forces, it undermines the feeling of unity existing within the military (Pion-Berlin *et al.*, 2014: 235). For many, as corporateness is the unifying force of the military, it is the determinant of mission success as the military can only succeed when soldiers act in unity and as a team (Frank, 1991; Siebold, 1999, 2007; King, 2007; Käihkö, 2018). In fact, Wong, Kolditz, Millen & Potter (2003) added that cohesion not only influences the success of a mission, but has a positive impact on performance and effectiveness. When cohesion is lacking, it paves the way for the emergence of factions or splits, which undermine military values including discipline, obedience and subservience to command and hierarchy.

However, MacCoun, Kier & Belkin (2006) challenge the notion that cohesion is an important determinant of effective performance in combat. They argue that evidence suggesting that cohesion affects performance in combat does not hold true and does not support the claim. Rather, they maintain, that “the evidence indicates that military performance depends on whether service members are committed to the same professional goals, not on whether they like one another” (MacCoun *et al.*, 2006: 652). An important point MacCoun *et al.* made is that although there is no evidence to support the claim that cohesion influences performance in combat, it has a strong influence on the success of a mission. When personnel do not commit to work towards achieving the mission objective, it makes it difficult for the military to emerge victorious in any combat mission. Although my study specifically focused on eliciting primary data from civilians and did not interview personnel, my participants raised concerns about the corporateness of the military. One of these is a concern that soldiers are biased towards certain groups.

Young (1996: 179) observes that “military factors... have often determined the ultimate outcome of modern African insurgencies”, and one of these military factors is the actions of personnel in the process of dealing with conflict situations. This was supported by Herbst (2004: 358), who contends that when the military does internal security duties, the behaviour of its personnel “is a critical determinant of the duration and course of the conflict.” This is especially so where the military is deployed internally to police ethnic hostilities, religious conflicts or political violence. These hostilities occur along identity lines that can stir the emotions and sentiments of soldiers, especially those who have a connection with the local communities. This could influence personnel to be biased and to act in an unprofessional manner. Ideally, state militaries form part of the unifying force of a nation (Shaw, 1979; Simonsen, 2006; Samii, 2013). When the military is representative of society, it embodies strong institutional cohesion, strong bond, solidarity, and an unequalled esprit de corps. However, where internal conflicts affect the bond and personnel are biased towards their respective ethno-religious persuasions, this can have lasting impacts on the state.

The findings of this study show a sharp difference of opinions among participants of different religions, with Christians contending that the military is biased in favour of Muslims while Muslims do not share such sentiment. In 2010, after series of attacks by ‘unknown assailants’ on many Christian communities, the military was accused of being complicit and heavily biased towards Muslims, as it is seen to be collaborating with the assailants who are believed to be militias sponsored by Muslim Hausa/Fulani groups, and the military neither repelled the attack nor arrested the assailants. Civilians who were largely of the Christian faith protested vehemently against the military’s complicity. The protest forced the Federal Government of Nigeria to withdraw and replace the military personnel in Plateau State with about 850 other military personnel (Crisis Group, 2012: 21).

One sees that the military is therefore complicit and has failed to perform its duty in Christian communities. However, Muslim participants do not feel this way about the military. Rather, they expressed satisfaction with the role and duties of the military, and a recent study reported a similar finding (Dantani *et al.*, 2017). One must note here that although opinions on military bias differ by religion, it does not refute the concern that military complicity occurs. Rather, it is a strong sign of a possible collusion. When some soldiers take sides and are biased, it shows a loss of the sense of corporateness towards mission objectives. One reason widely believed in the study area is that the military is serving as a political tool for the ruling class, to promote a 'conquest agenda' associated with the serving government. As I shall subsequently explain, this is an indication that civilians exercise subjective control over the military (Huntington, 1957: 80), which explains why the military is lacking professionalism. Downes (1985) had earlier observed that a loss of the sense of corporateness occurs when soldiers no longer share in the organisational goal of achieving success in a mission. Clearly, the Plateau case illustrates that soldiers are biased. In essence, this means organisational goals are typically replaced with individual's own ideological interests, one of the three causes of eroding corporateness (Pion-Berlin *et al.*, 2014: 235).

This is not atypical. Enloe (1977: 137) argues that "militaries and police forces are rarely neutral actors in ethnic conflicts," making it difficult for military power alone to resolve such conflicts. Thus, the military should be seen "in any country afflicted with ethnic hostilities as being participants with a stake in the outcome, not simply as neutral instruments of a supra-ethnic state authority" (Enloe, 1977: 138). Accordingly, Ouédraogo (2014: 16) observes that a major contributing factor is that the military is not representative of society. As Nigeria is a multi-religious and an ethnically heterogeneous nation, it fits into this analogy, and two indicators of concordance theory are relevant in explaining the situation. One is the composition of the officer corps, which is a critical component because it comprises the administrative leadership of the armed forces. They are responsible for decisions on the functioning of the armed forces and accomplishing the mission objectives of the military (Schiff, 1995: 14; Young, 1996: 182). The second pertains to issues of recruitment, size, and the general composition of the armed forces (Schiff, 2009: 13).

Accordingly, the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria states that all public sector recruitment and appointment should consider the native origin of candidates and the ethno-religious diversity of the country. Through this, the Constitution sets the legal basis for the social composition of the officer corps, enlisting recruits across the ranks and file to ensure an even representation of the various states of the country. In practice, it is difficult to establish if the military adheres to this principle. Data on the social composition of the officer corps and the ethno-religious composition of the rank and file of the Nigerian armed forces is not made publicly available. As such, it poses certain limitations for this study, but one can make certain inferences from the findings. Most attacks on



Christian communities in Plateau State up until the 2010 protest happened when the military commanders leading the military operations were Muslims. This intensified the outcry by Christians that under the leadership of Muslim officers, the military has a stake in the violence and its outcome. While the officers may or may not have such a stake, personnel across the rank and file whom civilians interact with daily are behaving in ways that reinforce this reality. This was supported by the numerous assertions by participants indicating that personnel are not impartial and are assisting communities or persons who belong to their respective ethno-religious groups. A recent study on the deployment of security operatives in Plateau State by Dantani *et al.* (2017) also reported this lack of neutrality by the personnel.

Another possible explanation is that the bias could be a consequence of prolonged contact between military personnel and society. As Ginsburgh (1964: 256) indicates, when soldiers 'intermingle' with civilian society, it could affect their willingness for sacrificial service. The fear is that personnel can "become more concerned with the adequacy of military pay than when they were living on military stations isolated from the impact of the more attractive wages." Hence, where there is an attack, it is unlikely for such soldiers to respond to calls for distress as they begin to see this as constituting a risk to their life. Whereas the oath of a professional soldier is to protect and defend the state (even if it means paying the ultimate sacrifice of death in the process), this is not the case here. Rather, dereliction of duty becomes more obvious. A consequence of this is demotivation and decreased morale of unit members who notice such behaviour among their fellows. However, while soldier's bias explains the perceived or actual impartiality, contributing factors may also include substance dependence and excessive alcohol consumption.

Excessive alcohol consumption and substance abuse are social ills that pose other challenges for both the individual user and the state, and evidence from numerous studies indicates that this is common within several state militaries (Rona, Jones, Fear, Hull, Hotopf, *et al.*, 2010; Adams, Larson, Corrigan, Ritter & Williams, 2013; Bray, Brown & Williams, 2013). Many studies show a connection between alcohol and substance abuse with deployment and combat exposure (Bray, Fairbank & Marsden, 1999: 247; Hooper, Rona, Jones, Fear, Hull, *et al.*, 2008; Spera, Thomas, Barlas, Szoc & Cambridge, 2011). Other studies show that binge drinking is more common among active-duty personnel than among civilians (Stahre, Brewer, Fonseca & Naimi, 2009: 208). This indicates that personnel deployed for combat or violence control/prevention missions are likely to adopt such a lifestyle.

Given this, one can ask why soldiers indulge in this lifestyle; how those deployed on security missions/operations sustain such substance abuse and binge drinking dependence; and what are the consequences for both the image of the professional soldier and the security duties they conduct in society? To begin with, it must be noted that there are numerous reasons for heavy alcohol use and substance abuse. In a worldwide survey on the alcohol and drug use of military personnel, some of the



reasons uncovered include getting along with peers who indulge, or to be sociable. For other personnel, the reasons include the desire to forget about their worries, for relaxation purposes, to cheer and change one's mood, as a way to alleviate boredom and depression, and for the purpose of boosting self-confidence (Bray, Guess, Mason, Hubbard, Smith, *et al.*, 1983: 160).

In a more specific study, Bray *et al.* (1999: 246) found a correlation between stress and substance abuse for both military men and women. The study identified the major causes of stress for personnel as "being away from family, deployment, increases in workload, financial problems, and conflicts between military and family responsibilities" (Bray *et al.*, 1999: 247). Other studies identified exposure to traumatic incidences, such as life-threatening hostilities while on deployment, and the feeling that they could be killed in such deployment or combat operation (Hooper *et al.*, 2008). While this study did not interview personnel and has not established the reasons why some personnel in Plateau State engage in this lifestyle, civilians reported that substance abuse and alcohol consumption among the soldiers is not only common and frequent, but a cause of concern because they also indulge the youths in communities they work.

From another angle, given that active-duty military personnel work around the clock in periods of tension and heightened hostilities, it is a concern if soldiers work under the influence of drugs and alcohol. The findings indicate that some personnel working at checkpoints get drunk and often smell of cannabis and other substances while on duty. This supports extant studies that deployment promotes the likelihood that personnel would indulge in binge drinking and become substance abusers (Federman, Bray & Kroutil, 2000; Saxon, 2011). Accordingly, Kazeem & Abdulkarim (2014: 29–30) reported that of the 22,400 Nigerian military personnel deployed for United Nations (UN) peace support missions between June 2010 and July 2013, 18.5% were active abusers of substances, alcohol, cannabis or tobacco. Given the frequent deployment of the military for ISOPs and peacekeeping/enforcement duties, this supports a connection between deployment, binge drinking and substance abuse (Federman *et al.*, 2000; Saxon, 2011). It further validates the claims by participants that at several checkpoints one is likely to encounter personnel who have just finished abusing substances or are working while under the influence of substances.

The findings from this study show that active-duty military personnel sustain these habits through two strategies. The first strategy involves collaborating and cooperating with the dealers of these substances. Instead of apprehending and handing over the dealers for prosecution, they reach an understanding with the dealers for continuous supply in exchange for not arresting them for prosecution. The second strategy involves the use of extortion, and this resonates with the earlier discussion on corruption by active duty military personnel. Although it is likely that military personnel could use their salaries and allowances to maintain their lifestyle, the high levels of corruption, particularly extorting money from civilians, suggest otherwise. Abusers could be doing so to sustain

this habit, as binge drinking, and substance abuse often leads to dependency, and it is difficult to conclude if the salaries of personnel are sufficient to sustain such habits.

The consequences of substance abuse by active-duty military personnel are numerous, as it can affect job performance and effectiveness. A study found that “binge drinkers were more likely to report not being promoted, getting into a fight and hitting someone, working below their normal level of performance, and drinking and driving” (Stahre *et al.*, 2009: 211). While this study did not investigate nor establish these issues because interviewing personnel fell outside its scope, the problem of personnel violating traffic regulations shows the possibility for a linkage between drunk-driving or driving under the influence by military personnel. This is particularly worrying because the findings indicate that personnel violate traffic rules even when they are not responding to an emergency or a call for distress. Stahre *et al.* outline other problems substance abuse and binge drinking pose, including “adverse health and social consequences, ... interpersonal violence, motor vehicle crashes, sexually transmitted diseases, and unintended pregnancy” (2009: 208). The findings of this study indicate that some of these issues are prevalent in Plateau State.

Along with this, when personnel work under the influence of drugs, alcohol, and other illicit substances, it affects their performance, and could lead to misjudgement and unsound decisions (Ames, Cunradi, Moore & Stern, 2007). Those working at checkpoints are likely to not perform the security checks effectively and may be engaged in outright extortion to help sustain their dependency needs. Clearly, this erodes military service ethic. Along with this, the claim of personnel collaborating with armed groups as several participants indicated, could become highly possible due to the distortion of reasoning and mental instability associated with substance abuse. Similarly, the likelihood is high for binge drinkers and substance abusers to be biased, complicit, and negligent while on duty. Stahre *et al.* argue that this behaviour “can adversely affect military readiness, workplace productivity, and safety... particularly given the equipment and the dangerous environments” (2009: 209).

While this study does not have sufficient evidence to confirm how binge drinking and substance abuse affects cohesion, it is likely that this behaviour affects commitment to achieving the objective of the military mission. It is difficult to imagine how personnel who rely on drugs and substances can guarantee the safety and security of the civilian population. Also, despite the restructuring of the military operations to an STF with several bases across Plateau State, the high militarisation has not prevented violence from recurring, nor militias from carrying out attacks on civilian populations. Given this, it becomes clear that alcohol/substance dependency has an impact on corporateness because it undermines mission success. A possible way this occurs is through the dereliction of duty, which is identified in this study as a major factor undermining mission success.

Dereliction of duty occurs in several ways, as identified by participants in this study: a failure to respond to calls for distress when a community is facing violent attacks; delayed response to such calls and arriving at scenes of attacks after the assailants had escaped; collaborating with armed groups who attack a community; and failing to stop further attacks from occurring. Several of the issues discussed above provide possible explanations for this, including alcohol/substance dependence, ethno-religious bias, corruption, or simply a lack of social responsibility by the military to both society and the state. Feaver (2003a) considers such actions as 'shirking', that is, "part of a broader range of deviant behaviour in which a soldier might engage - for instance, looting, going to sleep on duty, showing insubordination to an officer", among many others (Feaver, 2003a: 60).

This study indicates that personnel of the Nigerian military do shirk their responsibility by extorting civilians and neglecting the performance of their duty to protect civilians from the threats of harm and coercion from assailants. Certainly, dereliction of duty is a deviant behaviour. It is also a product of the rational choice of personnel who decide to behave in this manner. Further, this could dampen the morale of other personnel by fraying internal cohesion and the unity of the military institution. Typically, this is because when some are seen as biased or supporting groups they have vested interest in, it undermines the unity and collective solidarity of the group. Similarly, when the military does not respond to calls for distress to prevent violence, it indicates that it bears little or no responsibility to protect civilians from the threats of harm and violence they face from armed groups.

Additionally, where internal cohesion is undermined, this could lead to the emergence of factions and hostilities within the rank and file of the military. Pion-Berlin *et al.* (2014: 235) contend that in the face of growing division within the military, personnel could begin armed clashes with their fellows over differences in interest. Danfulani (2007: 368–371) also argues that this has been the situation in Nigeria, and the major factor that led to the incursion into politics. Although the findings of this study did not reveal any incidents of altercations among personnel which led to armed clashes, there was a report of personnel having vested interests while on duty. This involved the driver and gun operator of an armoured military tank suppressing conflict in a religiously-polarized and demarcated community in Jos North LGA. The gun operator, whom participants identified as a Muslim, shot and killed some Christian belligerents, yet when facing Muslims, his gunshots were aimed at dispersing them. In retaliation, the driver (who was identified as a Christian) ran over the Muslim belligerents. Such actions undermine the bond and unity of personnel, especially when they have some form of affiliation to communities facing recurring violence. However, as this study did not interview active-duty military personnel, I am unable to establish the motives and opinions of personnel on the existence of factions and how it affects their work in society.

One major theme from this discussion is that the behaviour of soldiers, particularly their violence, abuse, bias, corruption, GBV, dereliction of duty, coercion, and intimidation of civilians, affects military

professionalism. According to Huntington (1957: 11), these issues speak to the management of violence, particularly the 'expertise of officership.' This is because the officers are the administrative head and leadership of the military. As such, planning and organising "the direction, operation, and control" of the military organisation "whose primary function is the application of violence is the peculiar skill of the officer" (Huntington, 1957: 11).

The officer acquires the skills and knowledge on how to manage the organisation through education, training and prolonged experience of participating in combat missions (Huntington, 1957: 8). The knowledge is expected to cover broad areas of human relations, including the motivations, attitudes, behaviour, and the cultural values of society (Huntington, 1957: 14). Lasswell adds that "it is probable that the specialists on violence will include in their training a large degree of expertness in many of the skills that we have traditionally accepted as part of modern civilian management" (1941: 457). Similar observations were made by Sarkesian (1981: x), who noted that this includes "the humanistic and political-social character of the military institution as well as the characteristics of the environment in which the military must operate." The expectation is that the knowledge will equip and empower the officers to oversee military missions and ensure performance that would lead to success and effectiveness.

In this regard, along with the management of violence, a central feature of the expertise of officership is that the unique knowledge creates responsibility for the collective and individual actions of personnel (Gabriel, 1982: 86). Sarkesian (1981: x) calls this "the responsibilities of unit commanders to the 'people' problem - what to do with hundreds and thousands of refugees or how to deal with the problems encountered in trying to engage an enemy within the territory and population." In this sense, for military leadership, expert knowledge means assuming responsibility to society, a point which reflects the need for the preservation of democratic values. Equally important, this responsibility means an obligation to advise the government on the capability of the military to successfully execute missions, and the limitations and the challenges of the military when it does this (Keithley, 2002: 21). The significance of this, notes Sarkesian, is that "the total value system of military professionalism must be linked to society - in turn, society provides the context within which the military is assessed regarding credibility and legitimacy" (1981: 13). Therefore, in Plateau State where the military abuses its authority and the citizens view the soldiers as predatory and abusive, it indicates a failure of officers whose duty is the management of the mission, including aspects of military and civilian interactions.

Another reason why the onus is on the officer is because the military operates with a high degree of autonomy which ensures self-governance over internal institutional matters (Van Doorn, 1965; Moskos, 1981). Where the military has a high degree of autonomy, as Pion-Berlin (1992: 84) observes, the officers make the decisions on the general functioning of the organisation, and also oversee the administration of the service. While this entails numerous functions, it is important to emphasise

sanctioning insubordination and ensuring that personnel who transgress are disciplined in line with the military code, as this applies more to this study.

Galligan (1979: 92) observed that when officers tolerate or overlook unprofessional conduct of personnel, it poses fundamental problems for military professionalism. When soldiers abuse their power and violate the human rights of civilians, the officer must take appropriate measures to address, caution or sanction the perpetrators. When strict measures are not taken, and justice is not served to the victim, the legitimacy of the military can be a subject of contestation and public condemnation, and a possible consequence is that this could undermine mission success (Sarkesian, 1981; Howe, 2001). Feaver (2003b: 77) adds that civilian leaders could also assert more regulatory control and choose to monitor the military more intrusively, thereby restricting professional autonomy. Typical examples of such intrusive monitoring include “withdrawing esteem or support ... withdraw a measure of autonomy by placing societal controls upon the profession when it judges that the profession cannot maintain its own corporate self-discipline” (Galligan, 1979: 20–21).

Clearly, self-regulation is central to military autonomy, and the discussion in this chapter supports the literature that this is among the most crucial characteristics of military professionalism (see Van Doorn, 1965: 267). Commenting on the African context, Howe states that “military rulers themselves are often to blame for the lack of professionalism” (2001: 13). In Nigeria, there appears to be a recognition of this concern, hence the decision to frequently change the STF Commanders in Plateau State due to the numerous problems evoked by the military in this State. However, despite having over ten Commanders (none of whom was below the rank of a Brigadier), this has not resulted in a change in the behaviour of personnel as the problem of the loss of military professionalism persists. This indicates a failing of the officer corps, a loss of service ethic by personnel, and an unwillingness to discipline and bring to order, personnel in society.

#### **7.4.2 Military Culture and Habitus**

The previous discussion explained the loss of professionalism of the Nigerian military in the ISOPs it conducts in Plateau State. Two reasons for the problem were discussed: unprofessional conduct from soldiers, and a general weakness by the officer corps in the management of violence. The discussion detailed the problems civilians encounter with the military and the reasons why military abuses occur. However, the discussion did not cover the influence of military culture and habitus on personnel when they perform ISOPs in civilian society, which operates on a different cultural system altogether. I therefore now turn to these issues, with an outline of military culture and values, which are often the antithesis of those of civilian society.

As a professional organisation, the military has a distinct occupational culture, which is different to those of professional civilian institutions. Along with this distinct military culture, most militaries are

relatively isolated from civilian society, in that they generally work and live in bases and barracks with their families (Soeters *et al.*, 2006: 237). As such, the cultural elements of the military differ significantly from those of civilian society because the culture of the military aims at equipping and preparing personnel for battle (Esterhuysen *et al.*, 2013: xvi). The need to equip personnel to be alert and battle-ready at all times means that the military is characterised by a high degree of communal life, obedience to an established hierarchical structure, and a strict emphasis on discipline and control (Soeters *et al.*, 2006: 240). However, several external forces, including socio-political changes in society, have brought about a considerable change in the values of the modern military. This means a shift from traditional virtues to the new values of 'duty, courage, commitment, patriotism, honesty and truthfulness, and competence' (Keithley, 2002: 49–56). However, despite the changes, the military still has many features of a traditional military, it is still conservative in its outlook and focus on warfighting, and it still emphasises cohesion and formalism (Bacevich, 1997; Burk, 1999; Winslow, Heineken & Soeters, 2006). Given that military culture differs from the values of society, how does this influence soldiers' behaviour when they are deployed in society?

One answer to the question lies in the nature of military training and socialisation. The military trains and educates its new recruits to transform them from civilians to soldiers. The training process occurs mainly along the notion of the total institution, where recruits are isolated from society and are enclosed as a team or unit, and are made to live a regimented life with little or no control over their daily routines (Goffman, 1961: 5–7; Woodward, 2000). The training regime is designed to facilitate the transfer of military skills to the recruits, to ensure they become accustomed to military culture and are skilled in the art of combat warfare (Ricks, 1997; Woodward, 2000). However, although both the culture and training regime are important for teaching and instilling the necessary skills for combat operations, military training and education is not primarily focused on law enforcement (Salo, 2011: 139). As such, the training prepares both personnel and officers for combat operations, although this does not prevent using them for military operations other than war (MOOTW). The concern here is that the training and indoctrination of recruits with the cultural values of the military equips them for combat, but it does not train them for ISOPs (Weiss, 2012; Dambazau, 2014). Bourdieu (1990) refers to this as *habitus*, a social disposition which embodies people, and shapes and guides their actions and behaviour.

In the context of this study, it can be argued that the unprofessional conduct of soldiers occurs because of their cultural disposition. Personnel struggle with the tension of substituting the military values they are accustomed to with the liberal values of society in periods of both relative calm and hostility. Along with this, military training and strategies are not suitable for use in an internal capacity. In one recent study on ISOPs in some parts of Nigeria, Gulleng & Hunduh argued that "the Nigerian military was not ever intended to be substantially deployed in internal security... as a result, their strategies,

training and rules of engagement are not always suited” for this purpose (2018: 221). Similarly, Azinge (2013: 16–19) pointed to the orientation, training, strategy and tactics of the military as the reason for the challenges. In Pakistan, military training and values, including discipline, bureaucracy and ‘cohesion without consensus’, were highlighted as the key factors which deepened insecurity and gave rise to several fundamentalists (Farooq, 2012: 76). Similar problems were also reported in a study on the deployment of troops to suppress the 1992 riots in Los Angeles, and the Northern Ireland troubles (José & Rasmussen, 1999). Given this, one sees that the training and socialisation of personnel makes their engagement in MOOTW problematic.

However, associating soldiers’ misconduct with the habitus of the military has two major shortcomings. One is that it ignores the fact that personnel can switch identity in different situations, particularly across time and locations (Bergman *et al.*, 2014). A second is that it takes away the agency of personnel, as though habitus is fixed, unchanging, and cannot be unlearned (Vest, 2012). Critiques of military habitus indicate that it does not take away the agency of personnel, although it can influence their behaviour (Reed-Danahay, 2005; Vest, 2012). As such, it is difficult to conclude whether personnel always act out of their free will or that military habitus often predisposes them to violate civilian norms. However, one can argue that unprofessional conduct such as rights violations, intimidation, coercion, and GBV can be influenced by military culture and socialisation and are thus a consequence of military habitus. It is difficult to associate other forms of misconduct with military culture and socialisation, as they are not influenced by military habitus, but by other factors. For example, personnel conspiring with armed groups and incidences of dereliction of duty are largely rational and premeditated actions. Along with this, corruption is also a product of rationally-thought actions. Warnings against extortion and signposts placed at checkpoints by the military support the claim that extortion and corruption are against professional military ethics. However, as the misconduct continues, one sees that these rational actions have become a part of the habitus of the soldiers.

Another point is that participants reported that many soldiers abuse alcohol and substances during active duty hours. This supports the literature that binge drinking or alcohol dependency is high among personnel (Rona *et al.*, 2010; Adams *et al.*, 2013; Bray *et al.*, 2013). However, I believe that this dependency problem has a bigger influence on corruption and extortion than habitus, as military culture and training does not encourage this rational misconduct. Given this, it seems that military habitus tends to influence personnel to commit atrocities that involves excessive use of force, GBV, and psychological and emotional abuse. However, it is difficult to substantiate the claim for acts such as corruption, dereliction of duty, and bias towards certain groups. As such, rational choice rather than habitus explains the abusive actions of the military when it conducts security enforcement duties.



In this regard, it is necessary to examine the consequences of the misconduct on the peace and security of civilians.

Although the causes of strained CMR points to a loss of military professionalism, and the culture and habitus of the Nigerian military, these issues are deeply embedded in the military approach of concordance/agreement. However, while this forms the root of the problem, the level of subjective control over the military, which means that politicians fail to hold the military to account, serves to encourage the abuse and provide impunity. In turn, civilians feel compelled to exert their agency including providing security for themselves. Given this, it is important to understand the various ways they do this.

## **7.5 AGENCY OF THE CITIZENRY**

The evidence from this study shows that the military abuses their power when they interact with civilians in the process of conducting military ISOPs. Some of the problems, such as unprofessional conduct and a lack of impartiality, result from the rational choice of soldiers. Other problems, such as the abuse of civilians emerge from the tensions between the military habitus of soldiers and civilian society. The findings indicate that the Nigerian military are predatory in nature, causing immense dissatisfaction among the citizenry, and this situation has caused the citizenry to use their own agency to counteract this misconduct. The findings of this study as presented in section 6.4 of the previous chapter indicates that the citizenry in Plateau State exert agency in all the ways identified by the typology of the quadrumvirate interaction theory. This includes compliance, contestation, collaboration, and confrontation.

Accordingly, this study indicates several instances of compliance to demands from civilian political elites (the state) and from the military. One example of compliance is obedience to the imposition of curfews that restricted movement. Other forms of compliance included obeying extra-legal demands, especially from soldiers at checkpoints who extort money and valuables from citizens or inflict corporal punishments on so-called offenders. The problem with this is that it not only fosters a culture of impunity, but is a violation of basic human rights, and a clear disregard for the criminal justice processes. Although the findings indicate compliance, the study also found numerous instances of contestation against both military demands and those of the civilian political elites or the state. A typical example here is the use of protests and demonstrations, an action which has since been banned by the State government under the guise of 'security concerns'. Examples of this were presented as legitimate and quasi-legitimate approaches in section 6.4.2 earlier.

The findings of the study indicates instances of collaboration between the citizenry and the other partners. Legitimate aims for collaboration such as providing information to soldiers and civilian elites and calling to inform soldiers about the occurrence of violence were noted. Similarly, illegitimate aims



for collaboration were observed as some civilian groups ally with soldiers, particularly where they need them to overlook their criminal activities/attacks. In the same regard, confrontation, the last form of exerting agency were also observed in Plateau State. There have been several instances of civilians retaliating against military abuse and the failure to protect their community from attacks. As detailed in the findings, such instances include the violent protests that led to the damage/destruction of properties, such as vehicles in the government house, Little Rayfield and many other instances of violent hostilities against the military. This includes several instances of confrontation and burning down of military tents and removal of checkpoints in Barkin Ladi, Bokkos, and the 11 March 2012 incident opposite the PRTV gate Rayfield. The Rayfield incident was because the soldiers failed to detect the suicide bombers who drove past the checkpoint before detonating their explosives at the St Finbarr's Church, which was only some few meters away from the church.

## **7.6 CONSEQUENCES FOR PEACE AND SECURITY**

This section examines the implications of the strained relationship between the military and the citizenry when the military conducts ISOPs.

### **7.6.1 Insecurity amidst military presence**

One critical consequence of this strained relationship is the continuous experience of the threat of violence and insecurity, in spite of the militarisation of society. Typically, the threats and insecurity emerge from two sources - the military institution, and armed groups. In terms of the former, studies show that where the state does not regulate its institutions effectively, they can become a source of insecurity to the citizenry (Buzan, 1983: 25; Howe, 2001: 13). Such threats include “physical threats (pain, injury, death), economic threats (seizure or destruction of property, denial of access to work or resources), threats to rights (imprisonment, denial of normal civil activities), and threats to position or status (demotion, public humiliation)” (Buzan, 1983: 19–20). The findings of this study support these claims, as many participants reported experiencing or knowing someone who has been subjected to one or more forms of threats from the military. Hence, where the activities of the military are not carefully regulated, it results in a security dilemma for the citizenry as civilians have to contend with abuse and threats from both state forces and armed groups.

Given the unpleasant encounters that the citizenry endures when interacting with the military, most of the populace feared encountering soldiers. The situation is not specific to Plateau State, but is reported across Nigeria in general (Dode, 2012; Omede, 2012; Okoli & Orinya, 2013). Peterside noted that “an average Nigerian encountering soldiers on the road is likely to be subjected to unnecessary and unwarranted fear” (2014b: 1306). This study shows that the citizenry experience fear because military abuse is a continuous threat in their everyday lives, supporting other studies which also reported that military abuse of power and human rights violations in communities have become a part of life for the citizenry (Okoli & Orinya, 2013; Dantani *et al.*, 2017).

One would expect that the presence of the military should force a ceasefire and suppress further incidences of hostilities and violence. Yet despite their extensive deployment, violent attacks, hostilities and tensions remain a recurring problem in Plateau State (Olorok, 2017; Usman, 2017; Gulleng & Hunduh, 2018). In 2018 alone, attacks from suspected Fulani militias and reprisal attacks from other ethnic militias has resulted in the loss of over 200 lives (Stefanos Foundation, 2018; Usman, 2018a,c). This supports the claim by Ferreyra & Segura (2000: 19) that although the military is capable of forcing an immediate ceasefire and bringing about relative peace, the military option is only temporal, and often does not have a lasting impact. Other writers have highlighted “the irrelevance of military solution”, as the military appears to complicate rather than resolve the security issues (Sisk, 1995: 104; Howe, 2001: 13). In Plateau State, there may be other explanations as to why the crisis remains difficult to overcome. For this reason, it is important to examine why the threats of violence and hostilities from armed groups continue to be experienced in spite of the heavy military presence.

### **7.6.2 Unwillingness to cooperate or share information with the military**

While civilians are often the target of violence from armed groups during conflict, writers indicate that they play a crucial role in the management of conflict and the peace enforcement processes (Miall *et al.*, 1999; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2005; Ramsbotham *et al.*, 2011). One way they do this is by reporting strange and suspicious activities, persons, or objects in their environment to military personnel. This is important as security agencies cannot effectively cover and monitor all communities due to several limitations, including inadequate manpower. Added to this, many contemporary conflicts and violence occur within society and are mostly fought by masked armed groups that hide and seek refuge within civilian society (Kaldor, 1999, 2013; Thompson, 2014). Under such conditions, security tips from civilians form an integral part of preventive and proactive mechanisms for preventing the outbreak of violence and further insurrections. Accordingly, it is common practice for security agencies to make available to the public, dedicated hotlines and phone numbers to call and offer security tips or when in distress and in need of emergency response, and this is also the case in Plateau State. However, the strained relationship between the citizenry and the military in this State has hampered cooperation between the military and civilians in reaching lasting peace.

Three factors impede effective cooperation between the military and civilians. The first is the fear among civilians that they could be victimized if they report information to the military. The findings of this study indicate that a significant section of the population do not have a healthy relationship with the military and have developed antipathy toward soldiers. As a result, civilians are less inclined to report sensitive security tips to the military, preferring to share security information with local authorities such as traditional chiefs and local vigilante groups. This makes it more likely that civilians will harbour belligerents, especially when they feel that such armed groups can provide the protection

that the military cannot. Again, this points to a lack of trust and legitimacy in the military, which adds to the unwillingness of civilians to cooperate and share information.

A second factor that impedes effective cooperation between the military and civilians is military legitimacy. Sarkesian (1981: 13) and Pattison (2011: 136) argue that the legitimacy of the military relies heavily on effective performance of the tasks that the military is charged with carrying out. This includes fulfilling the aim of a mission such as suppressing violence, peace enforcement and protection, or ensuring that the citizenry enjoy their basic human rights. The inability of the military to prevent attacks, and the widespread nature of military corruption and extortion undermines their public legitimacy.

In Plateau State, the legitimacy of the military is further undermined by suspicion that the military fosters and facilitates an Islamic agenda. Christians believe that the attacks are an attempt to continue with the aim of the Sokoto Caliphate (of a Fulani, Sheik Usman Dan Fodio) to defeat and subject the indigenous people of Plateau State to its imperial rule. The concern is that President Muhammadu Buhari, whom the military receives orders and command from, is a Fulani. His ministerial appointments disregarded the constitutional provision of reflecting the ethnic diversity of Nigeria, and his security council comprises of mostly Muslims, many whom are from the Hausa/Fulani ethnicity. Added to this, he has not been vocal against the attacks by his kinsmen (Ostien, 2009: 2–11; Crisis Group, 2012: 6; Madueke, 2018: 96–97). The recent actions of the STF Commander, General Anthony Atolagbe, such as relocating the operational base of the STF to Barkin Ladi, a locality most affected by attacks from Fulani militias, led to unprecedented success in arresting militants and forcing a respite. However, many analysts claim the effort may not have been supported, as he was immediately recalled, a decision made by the Chief of Defence Staff who is appointed and directly reports to the President (Ogorry, 2018; Usman, 2018d; Yakubu, 2018). Therefore, one sees that the military is acting as a political tool because it lacks professionalism and is serving the interests of the ruling class (Huntington, 1957: 80).

The third factor pertains to the rule of law, and how the military complicates the criminal justice process (Howe, 2001: 30–31), such as when the Constitution of a state is replaced with martial law, especially during periods of emergency rule. When this occurs, military ISOPs are often characterized by arbitrary arrests and heavy-handedness. As this study has shown, in conflict situations it can be difficult to differentiate between assailants and victims acting in self-defence, and civilians are often arrested and detained without trial, for summary punishment and for a myriad of other civil offences. Typically, these problems arise when the military becomes involved in handling civilian disputes. Ideally, these should be referred to the police for prosecution, but military personnel frequently assume this role.

The problem with the involvement of the military in civilian disputes centres around what Von Benda-Beckmann (1981) refers to as 'forum shopping.' Forum shopping is the choice disputants make in choosing "between different institutions and they base their choice on what they hope the outcome of the dispute will be, however vague or ill-founded their expectations may be" (Von Benda-Beckmann, 1981: 117). The problem with this is that personnel often lack the capacity and the patience for investigation to ascertain guilt as the police and the courts do. As such, this justice can be denied where the accused is subject to unnecessary coercion, physical and psychological punishments and abuse before ascertaining guilt. As civilians choose their arbiters based on expected outcome/benefit, it is likely that they elect soldiers that will favour them, even when they are wrong or the guilty party. Another concern is that military personnel do not specialise in investigation, hence they could destroy and trample on the evidence required for effective prosecution of crimes and violations. Woody (2017) for instance observes this as a major challenge in the over ten years Mexico's military campaign against drugs trafficking and cartels. As such, this study supports similar studies which indicate the involvement of the military in handling civil disputes and issues (see Baaz & Verweijen, 2014).

### **7.6.3 Violence against the military**

Faced by growing threats from the military, civilians exert their agency by adopting various strategies to cope with or counteract the abuse. According to Verweijen (2015: 191–192), the first is compliance or obedience to military demands and instructions, although this could be either willingly or grudgingly. The second strategy involves civilians collaborating with the military to achieve a set aim, be it a legitimate or an illegitimate/harmful aim. The third strategy involves contesting military actions or behaviours. Elements of each of these were identified in this study. Some comply and obey military orders, others collaborate with the military specifically to cause harm to other groups, while at the same time there is a general contestation of military violations by others. This supports the claim that the expression of the agency of civilians towards the military is fluid and enacted on the basis of perceived benefit or harm to the individual actor (Verweijen, 2015: 211). Because individuals associate themselves with certain identities, it is understandable that their interests could change over time and in different situations.

One notable rational evaluation of benefit and harm played out in two different but related protests in Plateau State by women. Abdullahi *et al.* (2016: 19) described Christian women staging a protest march against the military and calling for their withdrawal from Plateau State, while Muslim women staged a counter-protest maintaining that the military should remain in Plateau State. They further pledged continuous support and satisfaction over the role and duties of the military in Plateau State. In each of these cases, the two groups acted based on actual and perceived rationality having weighed between benefit and harm of the presence of the military in their respective communities. The Christians demanded withdrawal because they suffered injustice, while the Muslim groups protested

because the presence of the military in Plateau State was beneficial to them. Civilian actors are likely to comply with legitimate instructions, but when they consider certain actions as harmful, they are likely to contest the source of harm, including when it emanates from the military. Contestation in this sense entails refusing to comply or obey instructions made by military personnel. It assumes “active efforts at resistance, implying that civilians take the initiative to protest against certain of the military’s practices or certain units or figures within the military” (Verweijen, 2015: 192). Unsurprisingly, this study found that civilian contestation of military violations in Plateau State used some of the repertoires identified in the literature.<sup>115</sup>

One such example is collective violent protest actions against the military or a military unit considered to be acting illegitimately. This falls under what Verweijen (2015: 197–211) calls collective popular protest against the military, and is one of the two ways the citizenry enact their agency in Plateau State. The often disruptive and violent nature of collective civilian protest actions and demonstrations undermines their legitimacy. Nevertheless, it calls attention to the concerns of civilian groups that can prove successful in forcing desired changes. The women protests in Plateau State were successful in compelling the Federal Government to withdraw and replace the entire military personnel (Crisis Group, 2012: 21), while similar civilian protests and demonstrations against the deteriorating security situation compelled the replacement of some STF military Commanders. This indicates the strength and efficacy of the collective power of the citizenry when they protest to force a change of their social, political or security conditions. The civil contestation in what is called the Arab renaissance/spring/uprising is an indication of how the exercise of agency can bring about socio-political changes (Puddington, 2012; Lutterbeck, 2013; Nepstad, 2013).

A second way that civilians enact their agency is through direct confrontation, usually involving violence aimed at military personnel. Civilians in Plateau State tend to engage in rapid reprisal attacks after an attack or a bomb explosion in their community or in a neighbouring community (Krause, 2011: 36–44; Musa, 2014b: 78, c: 122–123), and this often involves attacking, killing, and burning or destroying properties of persons of other religions. In the case of violence against the military, most incidents involve mob violence against military personnel either for failing to prevent an attack, or for suspicion of complicity. In some instances, military checkpoints are pulled down and the barricades and tents of personnel at checkpoints are destroyed or burnt down. I bore witness to violence against the military on 11 March 2012 following a bomb attack targeting Christian worshippers at St Finbarr’s Catholic Church Rayfield, in Jos South LGA of Plateau State. Worshippers who survived the bomb explosion

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<sup>115</sup> Contestation in the Kivu province takes the form of: everyday contestation (negotiation and bargaining, non-compliance, trickery, hiding, avoidance, and rumours), collective popular protest (demonstrations and spontaneous protests, strikes, mob justice), and professional practices of contestation (civilian authorities, civil society organizations and local media, and formal vs informal forms of contestation) (Verweijen, 2015: 197–211).

immediately formed a group, attacked the military personnel at the nearby checkpoint, and destroyed and burnt down the checkpoint.

There are several incidents of confrontation/killing of soldiers in Nigeria. For example, in October 2001, 19 soldiers were killed in Benue State by Tiv ethnic militia groups who were dissatisfied with the actions of the military deployed to contain hostilities in their communities (Agbu, 2004: 25). In Plateau State, four soldiers were killed in the first quarter of 2018. One reason for this violence is citizens' dissatisfaction with the behaviour of the military, while also serving as a means of enacting their agency and making their grievances known. Confronting soldiers and pulling and burning down checkpoints sends a strong message that the citizenry do not want the military in their community. As with the case of the military checkpoint next to St Finbarr's Church in Jos, civilians burnt down the checkpoint and to date has not been replaced. Such acts are seen as a way of expressing local autonomy by civilian communities suffering marginalization/oppression (Godoy, 2004: 637–639). Accordingly, Godoy argues further that this serves as:

[A]n attempt by embattled communities to reassert their autonomy after decades of repeated assault by State armies, local elites, the globalized economy, and other adversaries. By enacting these highly ritualized, unequivocally public displays of “justice,” marginalized communities seek not only to punish and to deter criminal activity, but perhaps more importantly, to reassert themselves collectively as agents rather than victims (Godoy, 2004: 621).

This shows the strength of collective action by the citizenry, and highlights that the citizenry is not just a passive actor, but that they have and exercise their agency when they are not satisfied with their social, material, and general conditions of living. This reinforces the position of Schiff on the importance of introducing the citizenry as a partner with agency in CMR: “the current civil-military relations literature does not consider the citizenry, ... it reflects only a partial story of civil-military relations” (Schiff, 1995: 13). These issues have consequences for both peace and stability, especially as the military is not only seen as lacking legitimacy but is also coming under attacks from civilians who see them as being complicit in violence. As in the case of the Tivs murder of 19 soldiers, civilians recognize their individual weaknesses, and decide to form alliances or join militias to exert their agency. The next section discusses this point further.

#### **7.6.4 Armed groups proliferation, deteriorating insecurity**

Numerous studies have reported the increase in non-state armed groups in North Central Nigeria, particularly in Plateau State (Crisis Group, 2012: 15; Ploch, 2012: 10). This is attributed to growing levels of hostilities and insecurity, and the inability of the government to adequately curb the violence and protect the citizenry. Since the outburst of violence in Jos on 7 September 2001, several communities across the 17 LGAs have experienced many incidents of violence. This is largely due to the proliferation of armed groups, which means civilians and civilian groups feel the need to protect

themselves against these threats. Hence, both individually and collectively, some feel compelled to ally, join, or seek needed protection from armed groups and state oppression.

Studies show that threats and insecurity from both state and non-state sources compel the citizenry to seek protection. Buzan (1983: 31) contends that “individuals can do many things to enhance their security both against threats from the state and against threats which the state has failed to alleviate.” He stressed further that such security-enhancing measures include formation or alliance with armed groups. Collier (1999: 10) argues that individuals “who join opposition movements often seek the security that the state has failed to provide: participation represents an attempt at individual or community self-help in a setting of social anarchy.” Clearly, the Plateau State example reflects the position of these studies. Two types of armed groups operate in this State - ethno-religious militias, and criminal armed groups specialising in looting and cattle rustling.

The proliferation of ethno-religious militias in Nigeria predates the country’s current democratic dispensation. Agbu (2004: 14–33) examined the historical antecedents of some of the renowned groups, noting that many emerged as a result of frustration and dissatisfaction with the government, the socio-political reality, and the economic hardship citizens face. This supports the generally-held view that militias are the result of an unpopular and failing state, and its inability to provide basic and essential public goods evenly across the state (Shultz *et al.*, 2004: 33; Carey *et al.*, 2012: 250; Thompson, 2014: 89). In terms of organization, ethno-religious militias in Plateau State are usually loosely-organized and operating as community vigilante groups. They are often led by a leader who directly reports to either a community leader (a Chief or a community leader called Mai Angwa), a religious leader or both, depending on the ownership of the group. Some of these groups are for self-help and defence against threats, aggression and attacks from known or suspected rival groups (Gulleng & Hunduh, 2018). Muggah & Sang (2013: 427) refer to such groups as “spontaneous community groups arising as part of their self-defence strategies and in response to repressive police and military tactics.”

Membership of ethno-religious militias in Plateau State is often exclusive to members of the community, church or mosque that the militia represents or defends, and these larger communities fund the group through voluntary or enforced contributions. The size of each group is often determined by factors such as the perceived level of threat facing the group, the size of the community, and the availability of able-bodied youths. Irrespective of the size of these groups, they will often attack unsuspecting communities to inflict the maximum harm possible, and minimize their own casualties (Sayne, 2012: 6). This mode of attack makes them highly effective in inflicting violence against enemies, as evidenced by the recent overnight attacks on 23<sup>rd</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup> June 2018, which resulted in the death of at least 233 people (Stefanos Foundation, 2018; Usman, 2018a,c). These attacks are more serious when the groups acquire small arms and light weapons. Muggah & Sang (2013: 427) argue that “such weapons are frequently used by vigilante, neighbourhood-based and spontaneous community groups



as part of their self-defence strategies and in response to repressive police and military tactics.” In turn, this makes them a serious security challenge to both the citizenry and the state (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010: 223).

In North-Central Nigeria, criminal armed groups that specialise in cattle rustling are a major security challenge. The groups are highly clandestine in their operations, membership and finances. For example, the Fulani herdsmen accuse local native community groups of cattle rustling, implying that such communities assist the criminal groups (Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 2013: 11).<sup>116</sup> In January 2011, over 7,000 cattle were said to have been stolen by criminal groups (Krause, 2011: 44). However, recent reports in the media indicate that while native militia groups might play a role, members of the Fulani ethnic group are also culpable of cattle rustling (Olokor, 2018; Usman, 2018e,f). While little is known about the organization of cattle rustling groups, their activities pose a significant security threat as they cause retaliatory attacks by Fulani militias.

The security problem arises when heavily armed Fulani militias react by attacking communities, they suspect of rustling their cattle. This has caused “the escalation of conflict, and is responsible for... a similar pattern of violence in the Southern Zone of Plateau State, with pockets of the situation in the Northern and Central Zones” (Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 2013: 13). While Para-Mallam & Hoomlong (2013) observed this warning sign at an early stage, the failure by government to address this problem has led to it becoming a national emergency. In 2017, the Global Terrorism Index reported that Fulani militias carried out more attacks than the Boko Haram terrorist group, killing over 2,500 Nigerians between 2012 and 2016 (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017: 24). Total deaths from its attacks in Nigeria since 2001 is estimated at over 60000 people (Obaji, 2016).

From another angle, while both ethno-religious militias and criminal groups appear to be effective in their use of violence against civilians and their opposition, the level of effectiveness suggests that military personnel collaborate with these armed groups in various ways (also see Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 2013: 11). A typical example is military inaction or refusing to promptly respond to calls for distress when a community is under attack, as was the case in the 2004 intercommunal violence in Yelwa-Shendam of Plateau State. Human Rights Watch (2005: 47) observed that the military only responded to the violence after about 700 people were killed. The result of this inaction is the loss of trust and legitimacy of the military, and the failure of the military and the State to successfully restore peace and stability.

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<sup>116</sup> In Nigeria, as in several parts of West Africa, the Fulani are known for nomadic cattle farming, which involves open grazing of their animals and constantly migrating from one part of the country to another in accordance with the seasons.



From this, it is obvious that the role of the Nigerian military in Plateau State has become a matter of concern due to the challenges it evokes for the citizenry and the state of peace and security. While Abdullahi *et al.* (2016: 9) observed that “only a heavy presence of military and police forces ensures a fragile calm in the city,” this has not resulted in the restoration of peaceful coexistence in Plateau State. On the contrary, the military presence has evoked hostility, worsened the insecurity and violence experienced. Along with this study, other studies point to evidence that the military has indeed entrenched the conflict situation and added to the number of civilian casualties (Sayne, 2012: 8). In fact, Dantani *et al.* (2017: 99) argue strongly that “state security agencies constitute veritable threat to the security of the citizens... and rather than restore peace and order, they exacerbate crises, thus ramping up social and political tensions.”

Since the outburst of violence in Jos on 7 September 2001, the conflict situation has assumed different dimensions while spreading through most parts of the State. Typically, the conflict took the form of open confrontation, attacks, and burning of properties and valuables of minority groups. In Christian-dominated neighbourhoods, Muslims and other non-Christians became the target of violence and were killed if they could not escape. The same victimization happened in streets and neighbourhoods with majority Muslim dwellers. Places of religious worship of both groups were burnt and destroyed. This paved way for the compartmentalization of residents, forcing those who were unable to return to their properties to sell or abandon them and move to neighbourhoods occupied by those sharing similar religious affiliations. However, following the heavy presence of military personnel, the conflict assumed the pattern of “silent killing”.<sup>117</sup>

Added to this, militias started using the cover of night or darkness to attack unsuspecting communities. Improvised explosive devices were acquired or made by some groups to launch quick attacks to inflict maximum harm (Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 2013: 11; Musa, 2014b: 79–81). In turn, these incidences led to a surge in civilian deaths. In the 2001 crises, between 3,000 - 4,000 people were killed in the conflict. Since then, several episodes of violence and reprisal attacks have led to more deaths, while displacing over 220,000 people (Krause, 2011: 36; Abdullahi *et al.*, 2016: 9). However, the deterioration of the conflict occurred while military presence was firmly established and widespread across this State, thereby, pointing to the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of the military option.

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<sup>117</sup> Silent killing refers to isolated killing of othered persons (for example, Christians in Muslim neighbourhoods and vice versa) and mostly burying their remains so that the assailants or their community would not be implicated for the murder.

## CHAPTER 8

### CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 8.1 CONCLUSION

This study has examined the experiences of civilians with the military ISOPs in Plateau State, Nigeria. The aim was to understand whether the State exercises adequate civil control of the armed forces to ensure that it does not become a threat to the citizenry and exacerbate insecurity. To understand the issues, the study argues that there is a relationship between authority and conflict, hence, a conflict theory explanation was used to explain why conflicts occur in society (see Dahrendorf, 1958, 1959). It notes that dissatisfaction from marginalisation or the deprivation of certain section of society tends to compel the desire for social change, including using violence where non-violent alternatives fail. Typically, where the problems are not addressed promptly, it results in insecurity that threatens both the political and social stability of the state.

The study established that contemporary violence and conflicts manifests in numerous ways, which are often determined by the actors and their motives for resorting to the use of violence. This means both state and non-state actors perpetrate contemporary violence, and these non-state actors could assume the form of a militia, an insurgent, terrorist groups, or organised criminal and transnational criminal organisations. Two of these groups were found to be operating in Plateau State. One is criminal armed groups who specialise in rustling cattle for the economic motive of profit. The second are numerous militia groups that are motivated by a combination of religious, political, and ethnic ideologies. These groups typically operate in the guise of community vigilante groups, or the armed faction of ethnic or religious organisations. The activities of these groups has turned Plateau State to a scene of recurrent violence since the 7 September 2001 violence between Christians and Muslims.

The problem with the activities of armed groups as evidenced in Plateau State is that they are difficult to suppress, and the police do not have the capacity to contain the emergence of armed violence. Armed groups who use sustained violence of irregular nature against state forces and civilian groups, overwhelm many African police forces who are under-manned and equipped to counter their threats. Because of this, it has become the norm for many African governments to deploy the military to curb the violence and conflict situations these groups create. This is the situation in Nigeria where several parts of the country continues to face incidences of recurring and protracted violence and armed conflicts. However, while the military has come to be accepted as the most potent organ of the state with the superior coercive force to suppress the threats and violence posed by armed groups, this is problematic, especially where the military is generally abusive and engaged in numerous predatory activities that violate the human rights of the citizenry and exacerbates their insecurity.

One key finding of this study is that the abuse of power by the Nigerian military in Plateau State has made the military unapproachable to the public. This has strained the state of CMR and has made civilians loathe to associate with the military. Some have also felt compelled to seek alternative protection against violence from armed groups and from the coercion of the military. The study traces military abuse and human rights violations during military ISOPs to two sources. The first points to this as the product of the rational choice of soldiers that are either supported, or tolerated by military commanders, which undermines military professionalism and the legitimacy of the military. The study establishes that there is an association between abusive military conduct (such as dereliction of duty, conspiring with armed groups, and corruption and extortion) and the loss of professionalism. It further indicates that this has the negative effect of eroding the service ethic of selfless service, as well as the corporateness of the military. The lack of political neutrality, a key element of military professionalism is also undermined where political elites are retired military officers. These political elites, given their close relationship with the military, undermines effective civil control especially where they fail to hold the military accountable for human rights violations and the abuse of power

The second source of military abuse and human rights violations is the tension between military culture and habitus, and the values of society. As military culture differs from civilian values, the habitus of soldiers makes them act in ways which are unacceptable to society. However, as critics of habitus indicate, habitus does not necessarily take away the agency of the actor. While it can influence action, soldiers are capable of exercising agency to decide to be abusive, or to act professionally. Typically, a weak implementation of civil control of the military has contributed to foster the unprofessional military conduct. Using the quadrumvirate interaction theory explanation, the problem is understood to have emerged from the subunit of interaction between the military and the citizenry, despite agreement on the pattern of CMR at the major level of intersection. This means that agreement on the pattern of CMR must be closely followed with an effective implementation strategy at the subunits of the political and military sphere to ensure conformity and compliance with the agreement in place. The evidence from Plateau State shows why this is important, particularly because where it becomes the norm for the military to be abusive, it has negative implications for CMR.

Accordingly, my assessment of the CMR literature indicates a disconnect between theory and the findings of this study, as existing theories do not explain the agency of the citizenry. Most of the literature focuses on institutional explanations of CMR and civil control, while not explaining crucial micro issues, and particularly the agency of the citizenry. As numerous studies have been conducted on CMR and the civil control of the military, this study focussed on an under-researched aspect of the discipline. The study shows the complex interaction between the partners in CMR, and the various ways the citizenry can influence CMR, despite being the partner with less influence when compared to political elites and the military. It presents evidence that the citizenry can exert agency which can

undermine the agreement and understanding reached at the institutional level of policy where all the partners interact and agree on the pattern of CMR. When the citizenry is dissatisfied with the military and consider their actions illegitimate, this can result in tension and crisis that can sever CMR.

This study indicates that civilians in Plateau State are dissatisfied with the unprofessional conduct of soldiers, and that they consider the military a source of threat and insecurity. This has led some to retaliate against military abuse, a situation which emphasises the agency of the citizenry. This supports the position of concordance theory, which introduced the citizenry as a third autonomous partner in CMR. However, while Schiff's contribution introduced the citizenry as an autonomous partner, it does not address their interaction with the military in terms of how they exert their agency. This is undertheorized but has a critical effect on CMR, as the findings from Plateau State indicate. To explain this, the study proposed the quadrumvirate interaction theory explanation of CMR which takes these micro level issues into account and also reflects on how it affects agreement at the intersecting level.

Using the quadrumvirate interaction theory, the sources of the strained CMR were identified as the subunits of interaction between the military and the citizenry, and the subunits of interaction between political elites and the citizenry. Along with this, a weak implementation of civil control in Nigeria has meant that the military has come to act as a law upon themselves, which abuses their power and authority with impunity. As such, civil control only occurs subjectively because civilian political elites also appear to benefit from the lack of professionalism of the military because it is predatory, but as long as it does not take over political power. Thus, although personnel continue to act unprofessionally, state actions to address this are minimal and have little or no impact.

The implication is that the insecurity in Plateau State is likely to remain unchanged and may further worsen, despite the continuous presence of the military and the security enforcement duties it conducts. As such, it becomes clear that although existing literature supports the internal use of the military as a necessary evil, the effectiveness of military ISOPs is questionable and of little help. Where there is a weak civil control of the military, and consequent failure to uphold professional standards the military can act with impunity. The challenge with this is that compromised soldiers can collaborate with armed groups to aid their attacks or abet it by overlooking the attacks while it occurs, thus, worsening insecurity and eroding public trust and the legitimacy of the military. Under this circumstance, military ISOPs is counter-productive because it exacerbates insecurity. As is the case in Plateau State, this can compel the citizenry into exerting agency in numerous ways to protect themselves or to retaliate military abuse, thereby, further worsening insecurity.

In conclusion, although Nigeria faces serious internal security challenges, social instability, political uncertainties, and has a history of military intervention in politics, the Nigerian military has yet to intervene in politics since 1999. One explanation from this study suggests that the Nigerian military

holds significant prerogatives in political and economic structures of the State, therefore, it has no need for intervention in politics yet. Evidently, the security problems discussed in this study, and the growing unhealthy relationship between the military and the citizenry are some of the key predisposing factors influencing military intervention in politics. Added to these are monumental corruption in the civil service, deep-seated political grievances, and increasing ethno-religious intolerance. Although no such intervention has occurred since the return to civilian rule in 1999, when the problems extend to other States in Nigeria, it would not be surprising if the military intervenes to 'salvage the situation', as it has done in the past. Hence, the need for the State to adopt certain measures that could prevent a possible return to a predatory praetorian military era is necessary in Nigeria. The signs are ripe, and Nigeria is currently on a ticking time bomb.

## **8.2 RECOMMENDATIONS**

In the conclusion of this study, in the previous section, the key problems uncovered by this study were highlighted as: (1) Nigeria has a weak implementation of civil control of the military, especially to curtail military excesses and the violations of the human rights of the citizenry; (2) there is a general failure of the State to fulfil its part of the social contract to address the conflict situation in Plateau State and guarantee security to the citizenry; (3) the citizenry have felt compelled to exert agency by allying or joining armed groups to provide the needed security and protection from military abuse and coercion; (4) the combination of all these problems has resulted to a the worsening of insecurity in Plateau State. In the light of these problems, this study presents some recommendations to help address the problems.

Given the general weakness in implementing adequate civil control of the military, there is a need for an improved civil control of the military, across the various arms of government. As the representatives of the people for instance, an improved parliamentary oversight by the National Assembly which is empowered to ensure the military complies with the regulations guiding its missions would improve compliance. This can also include making publicly available, the military rules of engagement for every internal security operation in the country. The benefit of this is that it will improve accountability, ensure compliance, and also serve as the standard which to assess the performance and activities of personnel deployed for every ISOPs in society. Without this, it becomes difficult to determine which actions of personnel are appropriate, when to use force on civilians, and the extent at which force can be used against a protesting or riotous civilian group.

Similarly, another important area of consideration relates to the role of an independent military ombudsman that can effectively intervene in the areas of military abuse. While at present, the National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria performs similar activities an ombudsman can perform, an independent military ombudsman dedicated to addressing issues of military abuses is more beneficial. The everyday presence of the military in society and the high frequency of military abuse requires a

priority attention in order to adequately address the challenge. Also, as the military is in active deployment in many parts of the country, this measure can help to build public trust in this institution of the state and improve its status and legitimacy.

This study highlights that the Nigerian military is largely unapproachable to the public, and civilians prefer to distance personnel as far as they can. The source of this problem was identified as the military approach indicator of concordance/agreement – that is, the reflective and interactive aspect of military style which considers, both human and relational variables when the military interacts with society. As this is influenced by military training, socialisation, and habitus, an obvious solution to this is to prioritise redressing the socialisation and habitus of the military in a way that aligns with the values and tradition of society. This point emphasises the position of Janowitz that the values of the military, especially when it assumes constabulary roles should be closely aligned with those of its society in order to overcome the challenges with its new role in society. The expectation is that this will help transform the acquired military habitus which makes it difficult for personnel to maintain healthy relationship with civilians.

This study found a general loss or a lack of professionalism by personnel of the Nigerian military conducting military ISOPs in Plateau State, across all the dimensions of military professionalism. While some pointed to the socialisation and habitus of the military, some were out of the rational choice of soldiers, thereby highlighting a general lack of discipline in the military. This is a leadership and command issue and the necessary military sanctions should be in place to discipline, charge and dismiss soldiers who are found guilty of misconduct and human rights violations. Clearly, there is the need for the military to develop an effective way of tracking erring personnel, and ensure they are subject to an effective disciplinary procedure.

Unprofessional actions such as corruptly extorting money and valuables from civilians at checkpoints, which is rampant and pervasive can be easily identified when commanding officers engage in ‘disguise monitoring operations.’ This can be in the form of boarding a commercial taxi which plies the roads with checkpoints, using trucks and vans of commercial drivers, and also boarding the popularly used tricycle (Keke Napep). The benefit of this is that it will raise consciousness among personnel that their activities are subject to effective monitoring by their superiors, and hence, discourage unprofessional conducts. Added to this also, there is the need for an effective disciplinary procedure to ensure justice is served to victims of military abuse and excesses. Where the accomplishment of the agencies of the military on redress offered to victims of military abuse is made public, this will increase civilian confidence to approach the bodies rather than retaliating such. Agencies such as the human rights desk of the Nigerian Army and its department of civil military affairs are among those that require such priority attention.

### **8.3 FURTHER AREAS OF RESEARCH**

As this study focused on how civilians experience their interaction with military, an area for future research is to establish how military personnel experience their deployment in ISOPs, and why they act in the way they do. As the study only relies on the account of civilians and political elites, it did not benefit from understanding the opinions of personnel on the problems and concerns civilians raised about the military, and particularly the excessive use of force. Thus, the study has not presented a complete account of CMR in Plateau State in Nigeria, giving that it only provided the opinions of only two of the three partners. A comparative study that cross-examines the opinions of both civilians and military personnel directed at understanding the knowledge, attitude and practices is necessary to develop effective policies for intervention to address the issues raised in this study.

A study which uses multiple case studies, or one conducted across two or more countries with civilians, active-duty military personnel, and political elites as participants would be highly beneficial. It would serve to validate the claims of this study and could be important in strengthening the quadrumvirate interaction theory this study propounds, especially the claim that civilians are capable of exerting agency which can affect the state of CMR.

Future studies should also attempt to verify the representativeness of both enlisted soldiers and the officer corps of the Nigerian military, especially, their ethnicity, religion, and gender. This can provide understanding on the social dynamics of those serving in a conflict situation and can verify the degree of compliance with personnel's representativeness. It would also present a variable for understanding why soldiers are keen to support communities who belong to their religious or ethnic background while neglecting others. In the same way, the gender balance of the military can also be an important variable to explore. This could provide more insight on the frequency of military abuse of civilians, giving that most of the abuses were perpetrated by male personnel.

Another possible area of further study is the Operation Rainbow constabulary forces which this study did not investigate. Future studies should examine the effectiveness of the constabulary force, and the effect of having multiple state security agencies in conflict situations. There is a possibility that because multiple security agencies operate in Plateau State, security coordination could be an issue, and that this could have an impact on the conduct of the military ISOPs in Plateau State.

### **8.4 POSTSCRIPT**

After the data of this study were generated, certain events and developments occurred that are crucial to mention as an afterthought. One development was the creation of the Plateau Peace Building Agency by the current government of Plateau State. The expectation is that the body will bridge the gap between the reactive security measure of deploying personnel with proactive conflict prevention intervention strategies. One of the key outputs of the agency has been the development and launch of

a five-year strategic action plan (2018-2022) tagged Plateau State Roadmap to Peace on 8 March 2018. The action plan has five priority areas which the government wishes to focus attention on as key to promoting peace and avoiding a relapse to violence in the State. These priority areas are: 1) research, coordination and partnership; 2) natural resources management 3) peace education 4) gender and youth development 5) post conflict rehabilitation (Plateau Peace Building Agency, 2018). However, the document provided little to no attention to issues of CMR and the security role of the military, which this study has argued is exacerbating the security situation in this State in Nigeria.

Another incident was the killing of Major General Idris Alkali (who had just retired from active service in August 2018) in Dura-Du community in Plateau State. The incident was said to have occurred as a retaliation by angry protesters who blocked the road and attacked travellers, in the aftermath of an attack in their community. However, while this incident raised concerns across the country, several commentators and analyst expressed concern on the genuineness of the recovery of the corpse of the late General by the military. The concern was that an autopsy was not conducted to authenticate that the corpse was the body of the late General before it was reburied by the military. This was because he was reported missing/killed for over a month before the corpse was recovered from the grave, and later the well it was hidden, as such, the recovered corpse was beyond recognition. What is important for this study is the concern raised by the military authority that knowing the late Major General was personnel did not deter the protesters from killing him. This corroborates the position of this study that there is a wide feeling of disaffection and dissatisfaction with the military, and that civilians feel compelled to take up arms, even against the military.



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## APPENDIX A – SOME INSTANCES OF MILITARY ABUSE

1. Abuja: “Nigerian female army beats man for calling her beautiful”:  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mEFgfDOWbqE> and  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wUYnrvkTsg>
2. Link of interview granted by the victim on Channels Television:  
<http://dailypost.ng/2016/02/08/how-i-was-tortured-for-telling-female-cadet-she-is-beautiful-amari-sunday/>
3. Abule Egba Lagos: “Nigerian Naval Officers Beating Poor Man Because Car Broke Down”:  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iY3nAxvyEIE>
4. Onipanu, Lagos: “Army Officer beat up a conductor”:  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pSTiBwNhAnM>
5. “Nigerian Army Abusing Civilians”: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GxNcFWI8VHw>
6. “Nigerian Army Doing What They Are Best At”: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sInlDlqIZso>
7. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gDwTtTdGQlw>
8. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zE4HHv0dpPY>
9. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vy4oITqbBZI>

## **APPENDIX B – AIDE MEMOIR**

### **Duration of residence in study area**

Are you permanently resident in Plateau state?

Length of time spent residing in the state

Any travel away from the study area in the past 5 years for up to 2 months?

Employment or occupation status of the participant

### **Frequency of contact with military personnel**

Military stationed in close street or neighbourhood?

Daily contact frequency with military

Reason for coming into contact with the military – checkpoint and activities at checkpoints

Is there substantial military presence at workplace, market, school or place of worship?

### **Experiences**

Experience fear or panic with military presence and why so?

Remarkable experience with the military (personal or otherwise)

Bad/sad/sour experience with the military

Place of occurrence

Account of the experience.

Any experience by a friend, colleague, relative, or employer?

General relationship with military personnel: cordial or negative

### **Perception**

How would you feel if the military is withdrawn from the state?

Importance of military presence in Plateau state

Are you happy with the service of the military in the state?

Trust in the ability of the military?

Military bias

Excessive use of force

Friendliness with civilians

### **Cooperation with military**

Provision of useful information to military personnel – Facebook, social media?

Cooperation with military personnel

Comfort with military presence



### **Armed groups and fake soldiers**

Who is responsible for the attacks in the state?

Masked armed groups or unknown gunmen

Fake soldiers

General or distinct features

### **Legitimacy of using the military**

Support for the use of the military?

Tension

Exacerbate insecurity?

Adaptation or how tension and fear is overcome?

Military use of abusive and derogatory words

Feeling of military bias – if so perceived, how is it handled?

Any incidence of civilian protest against the military

Civil-military interaction

### **Problems**

Eroding the liberty of civilians?

Military presence evoking fear, panic or hope

Feeling of sense of security or insecurity

Forceful tolerance and peaceful co-existence

Military predation or enforcing peace

Excessive use of force

Military and police/civil defence relations

Resentment or sympathy of military towards civilians