


# PRAGMATIC MARKERS IN L1 LUGANDA- L2 ENGLISH BILINGUAL SPOKEN DISCOURSE: A RELEVANCE-THEORETIC APPROACH

by

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degree of Doctor of Philosophy in General Linguistics at the University  
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## **Declaration**

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Sarah Nakijoba

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## Abstract

In this dissertation, I examine the manifestation of Luganda and English pragmatic markers as embedded elements, and analyse the procedural roles they play in facilitating interaction in bilingual spoken discourse. Pragmatic markers (PMs) are procedural expressions such as *so*, *but*, and *kubanga* (because), which facilitate interaction by guiding the hearer towards an interpretation intended by the speaker. Spoken interactions involving bilingual speakers of L1 Luganda and L2 English are characterised by spontaneous code-switching, in which certain Luganda PMs are used in English utterances as though they were native PMs, and vice versa. By focusing on the English PM *so* and the Luganda PM *kubanga* as code-switched PMs in Luganda and English respectively, the study aims to analyse their manifestation as single PM occurrences and as PMs occurring in monolingual and bilingual combinations. The study examines the contextual, operational and domain status of PMs as embedded elements, assesses their procedural roles in facilitating interaction within their contexts, and establishes whether the procedural roles they play as embedded elements in bilingual discourse are similar to, or different from, the roles they would play in related monolingual contexts. The analysed PMs are extracted from a Luganda-English bilingual spoken corpus of 192 000 words. The corpus was obtained from verbatim transcriptions of 23 hours of audio recordings of interviews and discussions with 41 adult L1 Luganda-L2 English bilingual speakers. The analysis is theoretically informed by two approaches. The first is Blakemore's (1987, 2002) Relevance-theoretic (RT) notion of procedural encoding, which assumes that PMs constrain the implicatures of the utterances they introduce by guiding the hearer to the relevant contextual assumptions, thereby reducing their processing effort. The second approach is Myers-Scotton's (1993a, 2002) Matrix Language Frame (MLF) model, which explains the structural configurations of embedded PMs within bilingual clauses. The findings show that, as expected, the Luganda and the English PM systems are in contact. During bilingual communication situations, bilingual speakers take advantage of the availability of the extra resources and they employ PMs from both systems. To enhance communication, speakers select PMs which they judge to be more relevant in encoding certain procedural relations from either language. *So* and *kubanga* are examples of such PMs. As embedded PMs, *so* and *kubanga* operate predominantly as code-switches, which occur singly and in monolingual and bilingual PM

combinations. Coexistence of Luganda and English PMs is evidenced in functional overlaps in which more than one procedurally identical PM from Luganda and English co-occur in the same environment and in literal translation where PMs in functional competition are partially or completely translated. *So* and *kubanga* are multifunctional PMs and they operate on different planes and domains to signal context-dependent procedural information. In general, the procedural roles they encode as embedded elements are not significantly different from the roles they play in similar contexts in monolingual discourse. To achieve more universal conclusions about the nature, manifestation and procedural underpinnings of the contested aspects related to PMs, the study recommends a comprehensive analysis based on multi-modal and cross-linguistic data, as well as integrative synchronic and diachronic approaches to the analysis of PMs.

## Opsomming

In hierdie proefskrif, ondersoek ek die manifestasie van, en die prosedurele rolle gespeel deur, pragmatiese merkers in Luganda en Engels in die fasilitering van interaksie in tweetalige gesproke diskoers. Pragmatiese merkers (PM's) is prosedurele uitdrukkings soos *so*, *but* (maar) en *kubanga* (omdat), wat interaksie fasiliteer deur die luisteraar na die spreker se beoogde interpretasie te lei. Gesproke interaksie tussen tweetalige sprekers van L1 Luganda en L2 Engels word gekenmerk deur spontane kodewisseling, waarin sekere Lugandese PM's in Engelse uitsprake gebruik word asof hulle inheemse PM's is, en omgekeerd. Deur te fokus op die Engelse PM *so* en die Lugandese PM *kubanga* (omdat) wat kodewisseling ondergaan het as PM's in Luganda en Engels, onderskeidelik, beoog die studie om hul manifestasie as enkel-PM-gebeurtenisse en as PM's wat in eentalige en tweetalige kombinasies voorkom, te analiseer. Die studie ondersoek die kontekstuele, operasionele en domein-status van PM's as ingebedde elemente, assesseer hul prosedurele rolle in die fasilitering van interaksie binne hul kontekste, en bepaal of die prosedurele rolle wat hulle as ingebedde elemente in tweetalige diskoers speel, soortgelyk is aan of verskil van die rolle wat hulle sou speel in verwante eentalige kontekste. Die geanaliseerde PM's is onttrek uit 'n Lugandese-Engelse tweetalige gesproke korpus van 192 000 woorde. Hierdie korpus is verkry van 23 ure van onderhoud- en gespreksklankopnames, woordelik getranskribeer, met 41 volwasse L1-Luganda L2-Engels tweetalige sprekers. Die analise word teoreties ingelig deur twee benaderings. Eerstens, Blakemore (1987, 2002) se Relevansie-teoretiese (RT) begrip van prosedurele-kodering, wat veronderstel dat PM's die implikasies van die uitsprake wat hulle inlei, beperk, deur die luisteraar na die relevante kontekstuele aannames te lei en sodoende hul prosesseringsmoeite te verminder, en tweedens, Myers-Scotton (1993a, 2002) se Matrikstaalraam (MLF) model, wat die strukturele konfigurasies van ingebedde PM's in die tweetalige sinsdele verduidelik. Die bevindinge dui daarop dat, soos verwag, die Lugandese en die Engelse PM sisteme in kontak is. Tydens tweetalige kommunikasie-situasies trek tweetalige sprekers voordeel uit die beskikbaarheid van ekstra hulpbronne en gebruik PM's van beide sisteme. Om kommunikasie te versterk, kies sprekers daardie PM's wat hulle as meer relevant beoordeel vir die kodering van sekere prosedurele verhoudings van albei tale. *So* en *kubanga* is voorbeelde van sulke PM's. As ingebedde PM's kom *so* en *kubanga* dikwels as enkel-ingebedde elemente en in medevoorkoms in eentalige en tweetalige pare en klusters voor. Daar was gevalle van funksionele oorvleueling waarin meer as een prosedureel-identiese PM in dieselfde omgewing gebruik is, 'n

aanduiding dat die Lugandese en Engelse PM sisteme saambestaan. So en *kubanga* is multifunksionele PM's met die vermoë om op verskillende vlakke en in verskillende domeine te funksioneer om konteks-afhanklike inligting aan te dui. Die prosedurele rolle wat hulle as ingebedde elemente enkodeer, verskil nie betekenisvol van die rolle wat hulle in soortgelyke kontekste in eentalige diskoers speel nie. Ten einde meer universele gevolgtrekkings oor die aard, manifestasie en prosedurele-onderbou van die betwiste aspekte van PM's te bereik, beveel die studie 'n omvattende analise aan, gebaseer op multi-modale en kruis-linguistiese data, asook integrerende sinchroniese en diachroniese benaderings tot die analise van PM's.

## Ekifunze

Ekiwakano kino kyekenneenya emigaso gy’obugambo obutono, okugeza nga *kubanga*, *naye*, *noolwekyo*, n’engeri gyebukozesebwa mu mbooji enyumizibwa nga ya nnanimibbiri (code-switched conversations). Embooji za nnanimibbiri nga zinyumizibwa mu Luganda n’Olungereza zooleka nti waliwo obugambo bw’omu Luganda obukozesebwa mu Lungereza nga gyoli nti bwa Lungereza. Mu ngeri y’emu, waliwo n’obugambo bw’Olungereza obukozesebwa mu Luganda ng’oyinza okulowooza nti bwa Luganda. Nga nneeyambisa akagambo k’Olungereza ka *so* (noolwekyo) n’ak’Oluganda ka *kubanga* ng’eby’okulabirako, neekaliriza engeri obugambo obwo gy’ebulabisibwa mu mbooji nga bwannamunigina (single occurrences) oba nga bwannabansansaana (co-occurrences) n’amakulu ge bukongojja mu mbooji mwebuba bukozesebwa. Ngezaako okuzuula enkozesa, ennambika n’emigaso gyabwo mu mbooji ng’obugambo obugwira (embedded language elements) era n’okuzuula oba emigaso gyabwo egy’obugwira gyawukana kwegyo gyebukola singa buba bukozesebwa mu mbeera y’emu mu nnimi mwe busibuka. Obugambo obubiri okwesigazimiddwa ekiwakano kino bunokoddwa mu mbooji ezaakwatibwa ku katambi nga zaali zinyumizibwa abantu abakulu amakumi ana mu omu nga boogera kyere mu nnimi bbiri: Oluganda n’Olungereza. Embooji zonna awamu zaali za ssaawa 23. Ebyogero ebikwate ku ntambi n’ebikolwa ebigerako byawandiikibwa nebivaamu ebigambo 192000. Ennyinyonnyola n’ennambika y’ensonga ku nkozesa y’obugambo bunonyesigamiziddwa ku zimu ku nsonga omunoonyereza Blakemore (1987, 2002) z’alambika mu mirimu gye, waalagira nti wadde amakulu g’obugambo bunonyesigamiziddwa si ga nkalakkalira era nga tegakwatwako, obugambo bunonyesigamiziddwa bwa mugaso nnyo mu kubbulula amakulu mu mbooji kuba busongera omuwuliriza ku ngeri gyateekwa okutaputa ekyo ekiba kyogeddwa mu mbooji eyungiddwa n’obugambo bunonyesigamiziddwa. Kino ne kiyamba mu kukekkereza ku maanyi omuntu geyandimaze ng’ataputa embooji, bwogeraageranya n’embooji obugambo bunonyesigamiziddwa tebukozesebwa. Ensonga ezikwata ku kuzuula obugwira bw’obugambo, enneetobeka yaabwo mu mbooji, engeri gy’ebwegatta mu ngeri ya nnabansansaana n’engeri gye bweyungamu mu mbooji nga tebumenye mateeka gagobererwa nnimi zombi, byo byesigamiziddwa mu kunoonyereza kwa Myers-Scotton (1993a, 2002). Okunoonyereza kukakasizza ekibadde kisuubirwa nti obugambo bw’Oluganda n’Olungereza bukozesebwa wamu kintabuli n’ekigererwa eky’okutumbula

amakulu g'embooji. Obugambo *so ne kubanga* butobekebwa nga bwa nnamunigina (single switches) oba nga bwa nnabansasaana (co-occurrences) era mu mbooji ezimu. Tulaba obugambo obusoba mu kamu okuva mu nnimi zombi, Oluganda n'Olungereza, nga bukozesebwa wamu mu mbooji kyokka nga bwombi bukongojja amakulu ge gamu. Mu mbooji endala, obugambo obumu bukozesebwa nga buvvuunuuliddwa. Kino kyongerera okulaga nti ennimi zino ziwolaŋŋana era nga waliwo n'obugambo obweyisa ng'obuvuganya ne bunnaabwo. *So ne kubanga* bukongojja amakulu ga njawulo nga gasinziira ku mbooji mwebuba bulabikidde era ku mitendera egy'enjawulo (planes and domains). Okutwaliza awamu, amakulu obugambo gebukongojja nga bukozesebwa ng'obugwira mu mbooji tegaawukana kiri awo na makulu gebukongojja singa buba bukozesebwa nga si bugwira mu mbooji ezeefaanaanyirizaako. Olwokuba nti waliwo okukubagana empawa ku nsonga ez'enjawulo ku bugambo buno, okunoonyereza kukyetaagisa okukolebwa okulaba ng'ensonga zino zimulungulwa. Okusobola okutuuka ku kinyusi ku nkola y'obugambo buno mu nnimi ez'enjawulo, kyetaagisa okunoonyereza nga kwesigamiziddwa ku byogero ebikwate nga bingi ate nga bya bika bya njawulo; okweyambisa ebyokulabirako okuva mu nnimi ez'ebika eby'enjawulo, okusoma enkola y'obugambo buno nga bweri kaakano (synchronic approach) wamu n'okubusoma mu ng'eri ya kannabyafaayo (diachronic approach).



## **Dedication**

With deepest love and affection, I dedicate this work to my:

Precious husband: For being an adoring, caring and committed husband and a father

Beloved little children: For supporting a cause you understood little about

Sacrificial parents: For raising me in the fear of God

Great family: For being proud of me

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## List of abbreviations

<b>Agr:</b>	Agreement
<b>APPL:</b>	Applied
<b>CAUS:</b>	Causative
<b>COMP:</b>	Complementiser
<b>CONJ:</b>	Conjunction
<b>COP:</b>	Copula
<b>CP:</b>	Complementiser phrase
<b>CS:</b>	Code-switching
<b>CSK:</b>	Communication Skills
<b>CVCV:</b>	Consonant–Vowel–Consonant–Vowel
<b>DEM:</b>	Demonstrative
<b>DIM:</b>	Diminutive
<b>DM:</b>	Discourse Markers
<b>EL:</b>	Embedded Language
<b>ELS:</b>	English Language Studies
<b>EMPH:</b>	Emphatic marker
<b>FV:</b>	Final Vowel
<b>GD(s):</b>	Group Discussion(s)
<b>HAB:</b>	Habitual
<b>IP:</b>	Inflectional phrase
<b>INT:</b>	Interjection
<b>INTEROG:</b>	Interrogative
<b>ITER:</b>	Iterative
<b>IV:</b>	Initial vowel
<b>L1:</b>	First language
<b>L2:</b>	Second language
<b>LOC:</b>	Locative
<b>ML:</b>	Matrix Language
<b>MLF:</b>	Matrix Language Frame
<b>MOP:</b>	Morpheme Order Principle

- OBJ:** Object
- P:** Preposition/Primary, e.g. P.3 for primary three
- PARTv:** Partitive
- PASS:** Passive
- PERF:** Perfective
- POSS:** Possessive
- PL:** Plural
- PM(s):** Pragmatic Marker(s)
- PROG:** Progressive aspect
- PST:** Past tense
- RECIP:** Reciprocal
- REFL:** Reflexive
- REL:** Relative pronoun
- RT:** Relevance theory
- S1, S2:** Segments (coordinated by a PM in the utterance)
- S:** Senior school, e.g. S.3, for senior three
- SG:** Singular
- SMP:** System Morpheme Principle
- SOV:** Subject–Object–Verb
- SUBJ:** Subject
- SUBJtv:** Subjunctive
- UNCST:** Uganda National Council for Science and Technology
- UNEB:** Uganda National Examinations Board
- USP:** Uniform Structure Principle
- 4-M (Model):** Four types of morpheme (model)

## Transcription key

**Single underscore:** Marks short pause \_

**Double underscore:** Marks long pause \_\_

**Hyphen:** Marks truncation -

**Dash:** Indicates lengthened vowel –

**Asterisk:** Symbolises ill-formedness \*

**Question mark:** Represents reservations/queries ?

**Ellipsis:** Marks incomplete utterance ...

**Single braces:** Enclose elaborative information ()

**Double braces:** Enclose asides, interjections and non-verbals, such as, ((in overlap)), ((laughs))

**Square brackets:** Bracket CPs [ ]

**Curly brackets:** Bracket contextual information { }

**Capitalisation:** Represents emphatic intonation

**Single quotes:** Enclose translations and special expressions ‘ ’

**Underline:** Indicates saliency

**Italics:** Represent Luganda or special expressions in sample excerpts

**Bold and italics:** Marks off PMs in the analysed utterances

**Codes:** Speech turns are coded. Codes have capital letters, which represent the initials of the participant and a number representing a speech turn. Codes have colons, which introduce a speech turn for each participant. For instance, NS10: represents the utterance for NS's 10<sup>th</sup> speech turn. Except for excerpts, codes are indicated in brackets after the utterances. Footnotes, excerpts and utterances are numbered consecutively throughout the dissertation.



# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE OF THE STUDY

### 1.1 Introduction and rationale of the study

Pragmatic markers (PMs) – expressions such as *so* and *but*, which facilitate interaction – have been studied extensively since the late 1980s. However, PMs in L1 Luganda and the L2 English variety spoken in Uganda have not received scholarly attention. The overarching aim of this study is to analyse the behaviour and manifestation of selected PMs and the procedural roles they play in facilitating interaction in bilingual spoken discourse. Whereas findings on PMs from different studies have been revealing, it is evident that these results are not be all-inclusive. For instance, conclusions have been based on specific languages, particularly Germanic and a few Romance languages; the analysed PMs have been extracted mainly from monolingual spoken data sets; certain recurrent PM types such as *well* and *but* have been analysed more than other PMs, and so on. I argue that a comprehensive analysis of PMs requires an inclusive approach in which multi-modal and cross-linguistic large corpora are used to analyse a cross section of PMs, occurring singly or in combination, and occurring in monolingual and bilingual discourses.

PMs exist in all languages (Hussein, 2009:13), and although it is assumed that their meaning does not contribute to the truth-conditional content of their host utterances, they are a means by which interlocutors attempt to give clues of inference that guide the processes of interpretation, for a minimum processing cost (Blakemore, 2002:61). In the utterance, *Joy worked hard; so she excelled in her studies*, *so* is an implicative PM, which encodes a forward causal relation between the two propositions. That is, it signals a logical cause-effect relation between the two clauses, in which the proposition *Joy worked hard* is construed as a premise, and *she excelled in her studies*, as a conclusion of the utterance. Thus, *so* procedurally guides the reader in the inferential process of attaining an optimal causal interpretation, which attributes Joy's excellence to her hard work. In this study two PMs are selected for analysis, the English implicative PM *so* and the Luganda causal PM *kubanga* (because). Construed as PMs, *so* and *kubanga* do not play a role in determining the proposition expressed by the utterances that contain them. Rather, they constrain the inferential

computations the hearer performs in order to arrive at the speaker's intended interpretation, for minimal mental processing effort (Blakemore, 1987:18; Ramos, 1998:328).

The corpus from which *so* and *kubanga* are extracted was obtained from audio recordings of bilingual conversations of adult speakers of L1 Luganda and L2 English. In bilingual conversations, one of the most striking features is code-switching – the spontaneous alternation of codes in the same conversation (Milroy & Muysken, 1995; Wei, 2000; Pena, 2011; Myers-Scotton, 2002; Torres, 2006). A number of linguistic items can be alternated, and prominent among these are PMs. In the bilingual communication mode, bilingual speakers, driven by the principles of relevance, advantageously choose from a range of linguistic resources available, selecting, for example, certain PMs which they judge to be the most relevant in encoding specific procedural information. Thus, code-switching (CS) is seen as a discourse phenomenon in which bilingual speakers rely on merging different language systems, such as Luganda and English, in order to convey optimally relevant information to the hearers (Chan, 2005). Observation shows that certain Luganda PMs are recurrently and idiosyncratically used in English as though they were native expressions and vice versa. Two such PMs are the English *so* and the Luganda *kubanga*, which are analysed in this study as embedded constituents in the L1 Luganda-L2 English bilingual spoken corpus.

This study takes a qualitative approach in examining the manifestation of *so* and *kubanga*, and the procedural roles these elements play in facilitating interaction in the bilingual data. In terms of manifestation, the study discusses *so* and *kubanga* occurring as single PM elements and as paired or clustered monolingual and bilingual PM co-occurrences. It focuses on their distribution frequency, the structural positions they occupy in their host utterances and their operating status as switches. PMs are analysed as procedural and as conceptuo-procedural elements and they are categorised according to their functional domains and operating status. Given that PMs are multifunctional and their procedural roles are context dependent, the discussion establishes whether the procedural roles PMs play in bilingual discourse are similar to or different from the roles they would play in monolingual conversations in similar contexts.

PMs have been studied extensively in different languages, as devices occurring in monolingual contexts (e.g. Schiffrin, 1987; Fraser & Malamud-Makowski, 1996; Andersen, 2001; Aijmer, 2002; Huddleston & Fairhurst, 2013), and in bilingual discourse (e.g. Goss & Salmons, 2000; Hlavac, 2006; Torres & Potowski, 2008; Nel & Huddleston, 2012). However, I have not come across a study that examines or refers to PMs in L1 Luganda or the L2 English variety spoken in Uganda, as they occur singly or in sequences in monolingual or bilingual discourse. In general, Luganda is an under-researched language and, as we shall see later, PMs in Luganda are only referenced in the few concise dictionaries available. Concerning Ugandan English, the interest in analysing it as an independent non-native variety of English is at the embryonic stage and little research has been done (Isingoma, 2013). This study contributes to the PM literature not only by examining two under-researched codes, but also by observing the behaviour of PMs in contact situations.

Furthermore, the focus of the available research, particularly research on PMs in monolingual discourse, has focused on resolving contentious debates related to the definition, terminology, contextual functional roles, position in the utterance, diagnostic properties, among other things, of singly occurring PMs (Fraser, 2015:48). On the other hand, the few studies on bilingual data have focused on the form and functions of PMs in indigenous languages (Torres, 2006:615), the way PMs in contact situations are used across generations (Torres & Potowski, 2008:263), and the frequency and functionality of English-origin forms in bilingual discourses (Hlavac, 2006:1870), among others. Despite the efforts in analysing PMs in bilingual and monolingual discourses, a number of issues remain controversial (see Fraser, 1999:932; Fischer, 2006:1). Some controversies are terminological, others relate to the provision of a precise definition of PMs as a unified functional category, establishing their diagnostic properties, delimiting their functional spectrum, defining explicitly the procedural and the conceptuo-procedural roles they encode, and so on. These and other controversies are discussed in Section 2.2.

While I recognise the successes so far achieved in studies of PMs, there are a number of grey areas in the domain of bilingual discourse which need to be explored, and this study is motivated by the need to fill some of the gaps. Other than contributing to the ongoing debate about the functional status of PMs and presenting a new bilingual language pair – L1 Luganda-L2English – the study

takes a newer direction by examining the procedural roles of embedded PMs occurring singly and in sequential patterns in bilingual discourse. While I recognise Fraser's (2015) contribution in his analysis of PM combinations involving selected implicative PMs and selected contrastives, his analytical illustrations are introspective and focus solely on English PM pairs, comprising six implicatives and eight contrastives. Therefore, it is justifiably essential to analyse more PM co-occurrences, using another dynamic cross-linguistic data set based on 'naturalistic' conversation.

The necessity of cross-linguistic data to facilitate comparative research was put forth in Schiffrin (1987:328), after an observation that her English-based conclusions about PMs may not be universal. This observation has been supported and emphasised in later studies, such as Fraser (1990,1999, 2015). As a default language, English has informed most linguistic analyses, and the reviewed literature shows that most generalisations about PMs are based on a 'Standard' English or at least a language from a Germanic language family (Fraser, 1999:950). In addition, it is observed that the analyses of PMs in Standard English have not been evenly distributed. As mentioned, certain PMs, for example, *well*, have been studied in considerable depth (see Schourup, 1985, 1999; Schiffrin, 1987; Blakemore, 2002; De Klerk, 2005; Cuenca, 2008; Aijmer, 2013), while some PMs, such as *so*, have received limited attention, and many PMs have not been studied at all. I argue that a comprehensive conceptualisation of PMs not only requires an in-depth analysis of a wider sample of cross-linguistic PMs, but also analyses of PMs extracted from large, authentic, multi-modal data sets. Only then can we attempt to make universal generalisations about PMs. This study contributes towards such cross-linguistic data, by describing and documenting two specific PMs occurring in naturalistic bilingual spoken interactions conducted in an indigenous language, Luganda, in contact with a non-native variety of English spoken in Uganda.

Another criticism of PM research relates to the observation that bilingual studies have dealt with typologically related language pairs (Poplack & Meechan, 1995:202), such as English-German (Salmons, 1990), or two standardised national languages such as French-English (Nivens, 2002:1), or the integration of PMs between two socially dominant languages such as English-Spanish among New York Puerto Ricans (Torres, 2002:65). As mentioned, results from such studies can be revealing, but their conclusions cannot be treated as universal given that they represent a small portion of the languages spoken globally. Of course I don't intend to claim that the findings in this

study are comprehensive. I am aware of the tentative nature of the categories, findings and conclusions I suggest in this study, and I point out quite emphatically the need for further enquiries. However, given the assumption that this study is the first of its kind, it reveals a great deal about PMs in bilingual discourse where the operating languages are not genetically similar. Thus, the significance of this study not only lies in its contribution to the current debate on PMs and their interface in contact situations, but it contributes a new language pair to the growing field of contact linguistics, particularly in relation to the coexistence and combinability of PMs.

A survey of earlier studies on PMs shows that PM analyses have been characterised predominantly by taxonomy and classification (see Blakemore, 2002: 184). With the exception of Schiffrin's (1987) macro study based on a naturalistic corpus, the majority of studies involve far less authentic data, characteristic of an introspective approach. This partly explains why there are variations in research findings, and numerous controversies. Blakemore (2002:184) also observes that most analyses in these taxonomic studies lack firm theoretical grounding, despite scientifically respectable work requiring studies to be informed by a coherent theoretical model of inquiry (Creswell, 1998:74; Rensburg, 2011:12). In this study, the major analytical assumptions that guide the discussion of PMs are informed by an established pragmatic theory of utterance interpretation. I employ Blakemore's (1987, 2002) Relevance-theoretic (RT) notion of procedural meaning to account for the procedural statuses of PMs. In addition, Myers-Scotton's (1993a, 2002) Matrix Language Frame (MLF) model, and the supporting 4-M model (Myers-Scotton & Jake 2000) are used to account for the structural configurations of bilingual clauses in which *so* and *kubanga* occur as embedded elements.

Although these models are analytically constrained, their selection is based on my judgement that they remain the most relevant models in providing analytical answers with regard to the procedural roles PMs play in their host utterances and their structural configurations as embedded constituents in intra-sentential bilingual clauses, respectively. The motivation for the choice of these models and their strengths and weaknesses are discussed in Chapter 4. The validity of the analysed data builds from the fact that the data set is constructed in accordance with the methods of corpus linguistics, which are recommended for naturalistic data – data metarepresenting real communicative competences of speakers (Leech, 1992:105; Andersen, 2010:549). This validity is

reinforced by checking the transcriptions and translations of the collected data, as well as speaker intuitions in the analysis of the data, with language consultants.

Drawing from literature on language contact, the study assumes that the Luganda and English PM systems are in contact and that bilingual speakers operating in the bilingual mode will have access to both PM systems. As the discussion will reveal, bilinguals can switch PMs by necessity or by choice to enhance communication. Bilingual speakers select PMs from either language which they find optimal in encoding specific procedural relations between propositions. Arguing from an RT perspective, the selection of embedded PMs that speakers make is driven by the principles of relevance. That is, the code-switched PM choices are judged by the speakers to require less processing effort and to be more rewarding in terms of cognitive effects for the hearers, in relation to their Matrix Language (ML) counterparts. Similar principles motivate speakers to employ more than one procedurally identical PMs in the same environment.

I argue that an understanding of the manifestation of PMs as embedded elements in the ML and the procedural roles they play in facilitating interaction in the bilingual data is essential in establishing the behaviour of PMs in contact. I am optimistic that the findings from a theory-based analysis of Luganda-English PMs in contact will provide a clearer theoretical understanding of the dynamics of PMs in cross-cultural spoken contexts, and especially where the operating languages are genetically unrelated.

## **1.2 Problem statement and research questions**

Spoken conversations involving bilingual speakers of L1 Luganda and L2 English are characterised by spontaneous alternations of PMs, among other lexical elements. As a speaker of L1 Luganda and L2 English, I have observed that certain PMs are employed recurrently or idiosyncratically in Luganda and English ML as though they were part of either language. These PMs manifest singly and in co-occurrence sequences of monolingual and bilingual PM clusters, comprising between two and five PMs, including instances where more than one procedurally identical PM may be employed in the same environment. However, no study has been conducted to establish what PMs are recurrently alternated, their distribution frequency, the positions they occupy in utterances, their operational status in the discourse (whether they operate as switches,

borrowings or as calques), their structural co-occurrence patterns in monolingual and bilingual combinations, their context-specific procedural functions, and why procedurally identical PMs pair or cluster. The principal objective of this study is to examine the manifestation, use and behaviour of two recurring PMs, *so* and *kubanga*, in the collected data sample of L1 Luganda-L2 English spoken discourse. The study aims to establish the procedural and conceptuo-procedural roles the two PMs play in facilitating interaction in bilingual discourse and to account for their interpretation within Blakemore's (1987, 2002) RT-based notion of procedural meaning. To achieve these aims and objectives, the study addresses the following research questions:

- i. What is the general behaviour and manifestation of *so* and *kubanga* in the bilingual discourse, in terms of their occurrence in single or pair/cluster co-occurrence structural patterns, the ordering of these patterns, their operational status as switches in the ML, their classification according to procedural roles, the position they occupy in the utterance, and their distribution frequency?
- ii. How does Myers-Scotton's (1993a, 2002) Matrix Language Frame Model account for the structural configurations of the bilingual clauses in which *so* and *kubanga* occur and co-occur as embedded elements?
- iii. What procedural roles do the selected PMs play in the ML, and in what ways are those roles similar to, or different from, the roles the same PMs would perform in monolingual discourse?
- iv. How does Blakemore's (1987; 2002) Relevance-theoretic notion of procedural meaning account for the functions of the selected PMs as used in the bilingual spoken discourse?

### 1.3 Scope of the study

Although numerous PMs occur recurrently and idiosyncratically as embedded constituents in English and Luganda ML, the study does not analyse every single PM featuring in the data because such an attempt is not feasible within the time frame of the study. Only two PMs are analysed: the English implicative *so*, operating mainly as a switch in the Luganda ML, and the Luganda causal marker *kubanga* (because), operating in a similar way in the English ML. The selection of *so* and *kubanga* is motivated by their distributional frequency and their distinctive manifestation patterns in intra-sentential structures— structures in which Luganda and English morphemes are in contact

(cf. Myers-Scotton, 2002:55). The analysis focuses on the manifestation of *so* and *kubanga* as singly occurring embedded PMs, and as members of monolingual and bilingual co-occurrence structural pairs/clusters. The number and variety of illustrative examples are restricted by space.

Structurally, the data exhibits switching at different levels, namely morpheme, lexical, phrasal, sentential and discourse level, where longer utterances and paragraphs are code-switched. Similarly, it exhibits different types of CS, namely inter-sentential CS (switching between sentences), intra-sentential CS (switching within sentences), extra-sentential CS (switching at the periphery of sentences), inter-lexical CS (switching within words) and inter-morpheme CS (switching between morphemes). The focus of the study is on the intra-sentential code-switched utterances, and the optimal constituent is the mixed constituent containing a PM as an embedded element in the ML. The selection is motivated by two considerations: the assumption that the study participants are balanced bilingual speakers<sup>1</sup> of Luganda and English and the relevance of the MLF model in analysing intra-sentential CS. Studies on CS have established that intra-sentential CS occurs primarily in the speech of balanced bilinguals. This is because the production of intra-sententially code-switched clauses requires a good command of both languages to enable speakers to mix the lexicon and the grammars of the two languages involved with ease (Sankoff, Thibault, Nagy, Blondeau, Fonollosa & Gagnon, 1997:191; Nortier, 2008:41). Given that PMs are not explicitly taught formally at school (Sankoff, et al, 1997), the authors argue that high frequency in the use of PMs in bilingual speech correlates with speaker fluency. Second, the principles and assumptions from Myers-Scotton's (1993a, 2002) MLF model, and the supporting 4-M model, I adopt to discuss the structural configurations in embedded PM constituents, specifically addresses intra-sentential CS, making it relevant for analysing utterances which feature CS of this kind.

#### **1.4 Motivation for the study**

As a bilingual speaker of L1 Luganda-L2 English as well as a member of the teaching staff at Makerere University where the study population is located, I observed that the speech behaviours of bilingual speakers are characterised by alternation between the two languages at different levels.

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<sup>1</sup>I am aware of the controversies with regard to defining who bilinguals are and how bilinguals are categorised and described (see Wei, 2000:6-7). In this study, I follow Pena's (2011) interpretation of a balanced bilingual as a speaker having the ability to speak both languages equally fluently. Fluency is another contentious description. I use it here loosely in reference to one's ability to sustain a conversation in a language effortlessly.



It was interesting to observe that certain PMs in English were spontaneously and recurrently used in the Luganda ML as though they were native Luganda PMs and vice versa. Many studies on CS have focused on language contact where borrowing is unidirectional (see Myers-Scotton, 2002; Torres, 2002; Hlavac, 2006). Unidirectional borrowing appeals to the prestige hypothesis in which it is assumed that the prestigious language (in this case, English) donates to a less prestigious language (in this case, Luganda) (Myers-Scotton, 2002). Thus, an investigation into bidirectional borrowing where Luganda and English borrow from each other would be revealing to contact linguistics studies.

In addition, I also observed instances where more than one PM was used in the same environment, and interestingly, some of the PMs in co-occurrence structures appeared to serve more or less the same procedural functions. I was interested in finding out what these recurrent PMs are, their frequency, how they manifest in the spoken discourse, the procedural roles they play in facilitating interaction in the ML as embedded constituents, and whether these roles are similar to or different from the roles they play in monolingual discourse. I also wanted to ascertain whether assumptions about the outcomes of language contact on lexical items apply to PM systems in contact.

The study is also significant in highlighting the biases, prejudices and attitudes about CS as evidenced by the opinions of study participants during interviews. Some lecturer participants testified that whenever they taught a course where CS was used as a strategy to enhance learning, they recorded better results from students' assessment in comparison with results where only English was used as a medium of instruction. Such responses have an implication for curriculum implementation, language policies and ideologies. On the assumption that CS enhances students' comprehension, consideration should be given to its incorporation as a teaching method in future education curricula in Uganda. A number of pilot studies have been conducted in various universities in Africa and the results are promising. The challenges and successes of such cases are discussed in Antia (2015a; 2015b; 2000).

## **1.5 Luganda and English in contact**

English and Luganda have been in contact since the arrival of missionaries and the advent of British colonial rule in Uganda in the 1890s (Ladefoged, Glick & Clive, 1972:22). As a common

consequence in languages that have coexisted for an extended length of time, the sustained contact between Luganda and English has resulted in a reciprocal influence at all levels of linguistic analysis (see Torres, 2006:616; Tukwasibwe, 2014:12). Luganda and English are typologically distant languages, the former being a Bantu language and the latter being a Germanic language. In brief, Luganda is the native language of the Baganda, a group of people from Buganda (kingdom), a region found in the Southern and Central parts of Uganda. It is the most widely spoken, written and studied language among the 41 indigenous languages in Uganda, and has the largest number of native and non-native speakers compared to other indigenous and non-indigenous languages spoken in Uganda (Fisher, 2000b:57-58; Simons & Fennig, 2017). As a *de facto* lingua franca, and a language of wider communication, Luganda is not only used natively in the Buganda region but also in the cosmopolitan spaces in Uganda. Out of the estimated population of 36 million Ugandans, Luganda has an approximate L1 speaker population of 5,563,450 and about 1,000,000 L2 speakers (Simons & Fennig, 2017).

English, on the other hand, is the primary official language in Uganda; used in official government records and national newspapers and in formal sessions such as in parliament and the courts. It is used as a medium of instruction from elementary to tertiary level, and as a lingua franca in many multilingual spaces. These and more roles are reported in Nakayiza (2013:57ff), Isingoma (2014:51), Ssentanda (2014:10ff) and Bayiga (2016:31ff). English occurs primarily as an L2, with an estimated 2,500,000 speakers, according to the 2003 census (Simons & Fennig, 2017)<sup>2</sup>. Aware that the status of a language does not depend on the number of speakers but on the social roles that language plays in the community, the language policy in Uganda has promoted English to a superior position in comparison with other languages in Uganda. For instance, although Luganda has more speakers compared to English, the hegemony of English as an official language and a world language gives it a superior status (see Kachru, 1989, 1996; Sankoff, Thibault, Nagy, Blondeau, Fonollosa & Gagnon, 1997). It remains a highly regarded language in post-colonial Uganda, being associated with elitism and intellectualism.

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<sup>2</sup> This number has certainly grown in the last 13 years.

English is mainly acquired formally at school as an L2, although it is reported that there is a new generation of L1 speakers of English (Bayiga, 2016:31). In Uganda today English is also acquired informally through the casual social interactions of daily life in a manner similar to what Sankoff, et al (1997:191) describe as ‘picking up English’. As such, the variety of English labelled ‘Ugandan English’ is often described as having both ‘crude’ and ‘formal’ varieties, from a prescriptive linguistic perspective (see Fisher, 2000a,b)<sup>3</sup>.

The acquisition of English formally at school presupposes that a Muganda child<sup>4</sup> is likely to acquire Luganda naturally as an L1, and later, acquire English formally at school as an L2, thereby becoming a bilingual L1 Luganda-L2 English speaker. The study participants from whose conversations the corpus was constructed are all adults who, in general terms, acquired the two languages in this way. Against this background, the study assumes that a speaker who has had contact with English through formal schooling in the Ugandan education system up to university level, has acquired a satisfactory degree of fluency in both languages and can be described as a balanced bilingual speaker of Luganda and English. I also assume that the study participants’ levels of proficiency in both languages are sufficient to enable them to distinguish nuances of meanings encoded by synonymous PMs, use synonymous PMs appropriately and process them within the right contexts. Thus, by referring to the study participants as bilingual speakers of Luganda and English, I assume they have the ability to engage in intra-sentential CS effortlessly. As we shall see later, this assumption is in line with Myers-Scotton’s (2002:8) observation that a certain degree of proficiency is required by speakers to produce well-formed monolingual utterances that obey the morphosyntactic conditions of the ML.

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<sup>3</sup> Following the participants’ conversations during the interviews, Luganda-English contact can be divided into three stages: The first stage is when the missionaries and the British imperialists arrived in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and English was taught to the privileged few. The second stage is the period between the 1950s and the early years of independence (1970s) when formal education was open to all Ugandans who could afford it. During these two stages, the teachers of English were either native speakers or the first generation of those who were taught by native speakers. The third stage, the post-independence period, includes the current generation, some of whom acquire English naturally in cosmopolitan and metropolitan spaces.

<sup>4</sup> Child belonging to Ganda tribe; the native speakers of Luganda.

Returning to Luganda and English in contact, it is reported that Standard British English was used in Uganda at the time of colonialism (Nakayiza, 2013:57), but as time went by, this variety was influenced by contact with the indigenous languages of Uganda and it lost its ‘standard flavour’ (Tukwasibwe, 2014:32). Today, the English spoken in Uganda, and which features in the bilingual corpus, is recognised as an independent indigenised variety of English with its own phonology, syntax, morphology, and usage (Fisher, 2000:39, 61). It has been described variously as Ugandan English, Lugandan English, and as Uglish<sup>5</sup>. Although Ugandan English is not represented in Kachru’s (1989; 1996) Concentric Model, it fits the description of an outer circle English, which is historically drawn from Standard British English. For simplicity of expression, I use the generic term ‘English’ in this study in reference to Ugandan English, as a non-native variety of L2 English spoken in Uganda.

The behaviour of Luganda and English during the early stages of their contact conforms to the assumptions of the prestige hypothesis (see Myers-Scotton, 2002:41; Gardner-Chloros, 2010:190; Winford, 2010:170). By this hypothesis, borrowing is typically a uni-directional process, where the socially more prestigious language (English) donated lexical items to Luganda, the less prestigious language (cf. Matras, 2009:150). Of late, however, the tide has turned such that borrowing between the two languages is apparently bi-directional. Studies have reported on hundreds of expressions of Luganda origin being used freely in English by speakers who do not speak Luganda at all (cf. Isingoma, 2007; 2013; 2014). Thus, it is no exaggeration to describe Ugandan English as *Lugandan English* (Fisher, 2000:59), a label which metarepresents how much Luganda has ‘counter-influenced’ English (cf. Ladefoged, Glick & Clive, 1972:23). Similarly, the prescriptive older generation has described the Luganda spoken especially by the younger generation informally as ‘Englishised Luganda’, or simply Luglish, for related reasons<sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>5</sup> For a general description of Ugandan English, see Fisher (2000b), Isingoma (2013, 2014), Ssempuuma (2013) and Schmied (2006, 2008).

<sup>6</sup> I have not come across a study that makes reference to expressions such as *Lugandan English* or *Englishised Luganda*, but on several occasions, I have heard purist older generation Luganda speakers ridiculing the young generation for ‘corrupting’ what they take to be formal Luganda using this label. The wide spread purism is not unique to the Luganda-English situation; a similar scenario is reported in Hill & Hill (1986:1) where the Malinche people in Central Mexico (including linguists) condemn CS between Spanish and Mexicano, their native and indigenous American language. Such labels, definitions and attitudes are symbolic of the values speakers associate with their languages, their struggles to construct themselves with a linguistic identity and resist any form of linguistic imperialism.

However, the overall extent to which the two languages have influenced each other, what words are frequently or seldom code-switched, their frequency of occurrence, the way they pattern singly and in combinations, their operational status as switches, their functional status, among other issues, have not received empirical scholarly attention. As mentioned, this study focuses on two PMs, one from each language, and examines them as embedded elements in their respective MLs. As procedural devices, *so* and *kubanga* provide inferential clues to hearers leading to the derivation of cognitive effects in the form of contextual implication (conclusions for the communicated propositions), and in the form of presupposition strengthening (evidence or justification for the communicated assumptions), respectively.

## 1.6 Organisation of the dissertation

The dissertation comprises eight chapters: In the previous sections of this chapter (Chapter 1), I have given an introduction, which gives an expository overview that situates the study in the context. It includes a general introduction and rationale of the study, problem statement and research questions, the study objectives, motivation and significance of the study, a brief discussion of Luganda and English in contact, as well as the dissertation outline.

Chapter 2 discusses the notion of PMs and aims to contextualize *so* and *kubanga* as selected procedural devices in the study. I briefly describe the research findings on PMs in general, the controversies with regard to the way they are defined and labelled, the diagnostic properties that delimit them as a functional ‘category’, and their procedural meaning and functions. In addition, the competing analytical approaches, the Coherence framework and RT, are juxtaposed and RT is presented as offering a more plausible account for explaining the procedural roles PMs play as embedded constituents in the ML. The penultimate section of this chapter briefly examines PMs in combination, in both monolingual and bilingual contexts, and the chapter ends with expository insights on *so* and *kubanga* PMs.

In Chapter 3, a discussion of the notion of language contact is presented. Given that the corpus from which the PMs under discussion are obtained is from two languages in contact, Luganda and English, an exploration into what goes on when languages are in contact, what goes on when

bilingual speakers operate in the bilingual conversation mode, and what defines a bilingual speaker or bilingual data, is necessary. The dynamics of CS and borrowing as outcomes of language contact are also discussed, highlighting the controversies and agreements with regard to their definition and distinction. In this discussion, I attempt to show how the available literature on language contact in general, relates to the contact between Luganda and English PM systems.

Chapter 4 presents the major theoretical frameworks, which inform the analysis of the selected PMs. They include Blakemore's (1987, 2002) RT-based notion of procedural meaning and Myers-Scotton's (1993a, 2002) MLF model. Because the two theories are designed to address broader linguistic aspects, the chapter focuses on those premises, principles and assumptions which relate to the manifestation, analysis and interpretation of the selected PMs under study.

Chapter 5 deals with the methodological underpinnings of the study. I discuss the study design and approach, the nature of data collected, the data collection tools and methods, the study participants, the data management and analysis, and the ethical procedures observed during the research process.

Chapters 6 and 7 are the core analytical chapters which discuss the manifestation of *so* and *kubanga*, and the procedural/conceptuo-procedural roles these elements play in facilitating interaction in the bilingual discourse. In Chapter 6, I discuss the distribution of the English PM *so* as a code-switched element in the data and the position it occupies in the ML utterances. I demonstrate its structural manifestation in the bilingual sentences/complementiser phrases (CPs), pointing out the structural overlaps between the English *so* and the Luganda *so*. The structural configurations of these PMs, which reflect contact between the Luganda and English PM systems, such as coexistence, translation and bilingual co-occurrences are illustrated. In addition, the procedural functions of *so* as an implicative PM are analysed and functional categories are proposed along the structural domains of textual, interactional and interpersonal levels.

In Chapter 7, the Luganda backward causal *kubanga* forms are analysed within their domain-specific contexts. The discussion in this chapter follows a similar structure to that of Chapter 6. The chapter touches on the distribution of *kubanga* forms as switches in the data, their positioning

and structural configuration in bilingual CPs, their specificity, as well as their combinability in monolingual and bilingual sequences. I discuss the notion of reversibility of PMs in combinations in which I demonstrate that Luganda monolingual PMs are flexibly reversible; English PMs are not, but certain bilingual PM combinations reverse depending on the operating ML. A discussion of the procedural roles of *kubanga* forms is given and functional categories are proposed along the conceptual-procedural dimension.

The dissertation ends with Chapter 8 highlighting the major research findings, and providing a summative conclusion and recommendations for further research. The findings from the discussion not only benefit less studied languages such as Luganda and the non-native variety of English spoken in Uganda, but they also contribute directly to scholarly debates on the notion of bilingualism, language contact and language change.

## CHAPTER 2

# PRAGMATIC MARKERS: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND APPROACHES

### 2.1 Introduction

A general understanding of the notion of pragmatic markers (PMs) and the approaches from which they are analysed is essential to the examination of *so* and *kubanga* (because) as selected PMs in this study. In simple terms, PMs are procedural expressions such as *but*, *so* and *kubanga* which facilitate interaction by providing clues to the hearer which constrain the inferential process of utterance interpretation. Although PMs have been studied quite extensively, numerous controversies related to their definition as a unified functional category, their diagnostic properties, the explicit procedural roles they play, among other issues, have not been resolved satisfactorily (Fraser, 1999; Schourup, 2001; Redeker, 2006; Norrick, 2009b; Aijmer, 2013; Fischer, 2013). This chapter aims to investigate the notion of PMs. In brief, I present a discussion of the fundamental issues concerning PMs, which engages the arguments and controversies with regard to the way PMs are defined, the terms used in reference to them, their functional spectrum, diagnostic properties, meanings, as well as their combinability. In addition, I give a brief discussion of the dominant approaches used in the study of PMs, emphasising the contrast between the Coherence-based assumptions with the Relevance-theoretic (RT) approaches. I highlight how RT offers a more plausible account of utterance interpretation, and how *so* and *kubanga* PMs are analysable as primarily procedural devices. In the conclusion, I point out the research challenges and dilemmas that current and future researchers should address for a better conceptualisation of PMs, particularly PMs from non-Indo-European language families.

### 2.2 Research findings on pragmatic markers

Research on PMs is relatively new; very few publications were available on PMs before the 1980s (Schourup, 1999:228; Fraser, 2015:48). The earliest reference to PMs as an independent linguistic entity is contentious: Fraser (1999:932) refers to Labov & Fanshel (1977), when Labov was discussing Rhoda's question that began with *well*; Müller (2005:2-3) attributes it to Zwicky's (1985:303-304) recommendations, in which Zwicky expressed the need to study a functional class of words, which were later described as PMs. However, the actual inspiration for the study of PMs,



as a subfield of pragmatics, was covertly instigated by Levinson (1983: 87-88) who created an awareness of the existence of certain expressions such as *but, therefore, well, actually* which “indicate the relationship between an utterance and the prior discourse”. In his work, these expressions are described as occurring in the initial position of the utterance, their meaning resists truth-conditional treatment, and they indicate “just how the utterance that contains them is a response to, or a continuation of, some portion of the prior discourse” (Levinson, 1983:88). According to Fraser (1999:932), this brief description offered by Levinson (1983) laid the platform on which the present assumptions about PMs are built.

Before the 1980s, studies in PMs were less popular because they were considered as the side-lined aspects of sentence-based research, far from the “bread-and-butter side of language” (Stubbs, 1986:23, as cited in Aijmer 2004:173). Traugott (1995:5) speculates that PMs were ignored because they are primarily pragmatic and non-truth-conditional. Over the past two to three decades, however, PMs have developed into a fascinating area of investigation in the field of pragmatics, and are described as “a growth industry in linguistics” (Fraser, 1999:932). However, due to the Anglo-centric nature of pragmatic research undertaken within a component view of pragmatics<sup>7</sup> (see Andersen, 2001:17), most of these publications focus on English and a few other Indo-European languages. Thus, a study such as this one, which provides cross-linguistic data, is justifiably relevant in consolidating or nullifying the fundamental assumptions as regards the ‘universalities’ of PMs. Such studies retell a story about PMs using different linguistic lenses.

The available research has extensively discussed PMs, touching on issues related to definitions and terminology, procedural meaning and functions, meaning organisation and classification, and of late, their ability to combine, among others (Fraser, 1999:932; 2015:48). In addition, PMs have been studied within the following domains: language and gender (Erman, 1992), language change (Andersen, 2001; Erman, 2001), language pedagogy and interlanguage (Müller, 2005) and bilingual adult and children discourses (Maschler, 2000; Matras, 2000; Nel & Huddleston, 2012; Andersen, 2014). Despite the intensity of research output in all these domains, the notion of PM remains highly contentious and a number of challenges call for scholarly attention (Fraser,

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<sup>7</sup> Also known as the Anglo-American view of pragmatics (Levinson 1983).

1999:932; Aijmer, 2013). The juxtaposition between available data and the misty research situation surrounding the notion of PMs is summarised by Fischer's (2006:1) introductory remarks,

There are very many studies of discourse particles on the market, and by now it is almost impossible to find one's way through this jungle of publications. For a newcomer to the field, it is furthermore often very difficult to find the bits and pieces that constitute an original model of the meanings and functions of discourse particles. Moreover, the studies available so far are hardly comparable: the approaches vary with respect to very many different aspects: the language(s) under consideration, the items taken into account, the terminology used, the functions considered, the problems focused on, and the methodologies employed. Some kind of overview is needed that allows us to sort out the different research directions, methods, and perspectives.

According to Furkó (2014:289), the fundamental questions that need to be answered, as a way forward to a fuller conceptualisation of PMs, relate to coming up with generally accepted terminologies and classification, accepted formal, semantic, and pragmatic properties which characterise PMs, as well as an integrative model which can relate the linguistic categories. In the next section, I present the literature survey of PMs, highlighting some achievements and challenges in the studies of PMs with regard to terminologies and labels, definition, classification, terminology, meaning, functions, and genesis and evolution.

### **2.2.1 Terminological debates**

There is no consensus on what label, from the many existing labels, best describes elements which I refer to as *pragmatic markers* in this study (Schourup, 1999:228). It is reported that the way PMs are perceived and defined greatly influences what label is given to them (Heine, 2013:1208; Huddleston & Fairhurst, 2013:98). Thus, the existence of a multitude of terms can be attributed to the different approaches and perspectives, in which analysts suggest labels based on the overall functions PMs play within the studied data (Fraser, 1999:932; Alshamari, 2015:6). The overabundance of terms is spelled out in Dér's (2010: 5) study, as cited in Heine (2013:1206) in which he compiles more than 42 labels in reference to PMs. The most frequent include: *discourse particles* (Schourup, 1985; Abraham, 1991; Aijmer, 2002; Fischer, 2006), *discourse markers* (Schiffrin 1987; Schourup 2011) *pragmatic markers* (Fraser, 1996; Andersen & Fretheim, 2000; Andersen, 2001; Cuenca, 2008; Norrick, 2009a, 2009b; Aijmer, 2013; Huddleston & Fairhurst, 2013), *discourse connectives* (Blakemore, 1987, 2002; Sperber & Wilson, 1995), *segmentation*

*markers* (Bestgen, 1998), *modal particles* (Abraham 1991), *contextualisation cues* (Gumperz and Tannen 1979), *tag switches* (Romaine, 1995), *semantic conjuncts* (Quirk et al., 1985), *sentence connectives* (Halliday and Hasan, 1976), to mention a few.

In the literature, various justifications are given for the adoption or rejection of certain terms. For instance, Andersen & Fretheim (2000:1-3) and Andersen (2001:40), justify their adoption of the label *pragmatic markers* over *discourse markers* on two grounds: (i) to avoid confusion arising from Fraser's treatment of discourse markers as a specific subtype of PMs (see Section 2.3.1.2); and (ii) they are convinced that the modifier *pragmatic* is broader than *discourse* for it entails a range of textual or conversational functions. Similarly, the head noun *marker* is judged to be broader, in their opinion, than *particle*, given that there are a variety of expressions which can be called 'markers' but which are certainly not 'particles'. To them, the collocation 'pragmatic markers' subsumes collocations such as 'pragmatic particles' or 'discourse markers'.

The motivations for adoption of a PM label are varied and they include how popular a label is (e.g. *discourse markers* in Schourup (1999:228)); the frequency at which different studies adopt a label (e.g. *pragmatic markers* or *discourse particles* in Feng (2008:1688)); the need to differentiate different functional categories such as PMs from clitics (e.g. *discourse particles* in Fischer (2013:273)); and adoption for compliance (e.g. Müller (2005:3), a follower of Schourup and Schiffrin, adopts *discourse markers* label in compliance). Blakemore (1987, 2002) uses two labels, *discourse markers* and *discourse connectives*, interchangeably. The former label co-classifies items which are both connective/conceptual and non-truth-conditional, and the latter refers to those which are both non-truth-conditional and non-conceptual (see Schourup, 1999:240; Blakemore, 2002:2). In the absence of consensus, I adopt *pragmatic markers* as an inclusive term. My preference is inspired by the justifications in Andersen & Fretheim (2000:1-3) and Andersen (2001:40) as presented above and for the fact that *pragmatic markers* is one of the most popular labels.

### 2.2.2 Definitions

A precise definition of PM is non-existent, and no accurate definition is likely to win universal acceptance (Fraser, 1999:931; Schourup, 1999:241). As with terminology, the definitions attributed to PMs are as varied as the researchers. In the interest of time, I will discuss definitions

which reflect the two approaches that are referred to in this study. That is, the Coherence-based and Relevance theoretic (RT) definitions. The definitions are predominantly descriptive, reflecting the diagnostic properties of PMs as discussed in Section 2.2.4 below.

The classic definition offered by Schiffrin (1987:31) describes PMs (discourse markers therein) from a Coherence perspective as “**sequentially dependent** elements which bracket units of talk”. By “sequentially dependent elements”, Schiffrin means that PMs are independent devices that operate at a level beyond sentences, at discourse level. The expression “units of talk” is left vague intentionally because the author does not want to restrict herself to the type of units PMs can potentially bracket, such as sentences, propositions, speech acts and tone units, or units embedded within larger units, such as explanations bracketed by *kubanga* causal PMs (see Schiffrin, 1987:31; 37). On the other hand, Fraser (1999:391) provides a modified-Coherence based definition of PMs describing them as “a class of lexical expressions drawn from the syntactic classes of conjunctions, adverbials, and prepositional phrases. [...] they signal a relationship between the segment they introduce, S2, and the prior segment, S1”. This definition is problematic in the sense that PMs do not necessarily relate two segments. This idea is discussed and illustrated later in Section 2.2.4. The most striking contribution in Fraser’s definitional analysis is the idea that PMs encode procedural meaning, which contributes to the coherence of the text (Fraser, 1999:931). However, the procedural functions of PMs as envisaged by Fraser differ from the RT-based procedural functions of PMs; the former contributes to coherence and the later contributes to inferences.

Andersen’s (2001:39) definition of PMs as “a class of short, recurrent linguistic items that generally have little lexical import but serve significant pragmatic functions in conversation” sounds plausible, but not inclusive. Although PMs are commonly short, non-clausal expressions, studies attest to the existence of multi-word or clausal PMs such as, *to return to my original point* or the Luganda elaborative PM, *kankubuulire* (Lit. Me let me tell you) or *owulidde* (Lit. Are we together?) which structurally are sentential. I thus concur with Heine’s (2013:1209) assertion that defining PMs as “a class of short items” is not only questionable but also unnecessary. In addition, a claim from Andersen’s definition that PMs are recurrent in my opinion is a subjective judgement and may not be empirically quantifiable, especially in spoken discourse where the genre of discourse may determine the type of PMs speakers employ (see Povolnà 2012:135). Depending on

the data, some PMs occur once and others do not occur at all. This suggests that idiosyncratic and infrequent occurrences can also be treated as PMs provided they satisfy the definitional properties. Similarly, the adjective ‘significant’ as used in the definition is empirically unquantifiable (how significant is a ‘significant’ function?). As long as controversies on the pragmatic functions of PMs remain unresolved, defining PMs by their ‘significant pragmatic functions’ may only complicate matters.

This study adopts an RT-based definition, in which PMs are construed as procedural devices which constrain the implicatures of the utterances they introduce by guiding the hearer to the relevant contextual assumptions (Blakemore, 2002:5; Wilson, 1998:68). In other words, PMs provide clues that guide hearers “towards a particular line of processing” or “towards a particular range of contextual effects or inferential strategy or context” (Blakemore, 2000: 471), thereby reducing their mental processing effort (Blakemore, 2002:5; Fraser, 2006:189; Fischer, 2013:277). This definition offers an alternative approach which according to Sperber & Wilson (1995:217-218) and Wilson (1998:58, 68) provides a better understanding of PMs beyond coherence or beyond connecting discourse segments, propositions, and social acts. A cognitive-based definition of PMs, in my opinion, is more inclusive than the structurally-based definitions, which are physically and structurally descriptive.

As long as what delimits PMs as a category is not established, questions with regard to definition will continue to arise. For instance, we cannot define PMs by their specific functions because these functions vary across languages, approaches, and context; we cannot define them by their category because they are a heterogeneous class, we cannot define them by position because they are positionally mobile, and so on.

### **2.2.3 Pragmatic markers and grammatical category**

The difficulty of placing PMs within the traditional word class was first noted by Svartvik (1980:168), and has been supported by researchers such as Fraser (1999) and Zwicky (1985). However, this challenge has not been questioned or discussed at length (Müller, 2005:5). Fraser (1999:943), reports that earlier research assumed that PMs are drawn from three classes, namely conjunctions, adverbs and prepositional phrases, and a few idioms. On the other hand, recent studies have shown that in English (and to a larger extent in Luganda), clausal and non-clausal

PMs are drawn mainly from five syntactic classes, namely conjunctions (*so, but, yet, kubanga*), adverbs (*however, frankly*), verbs (*look, see*), interjections (*oh!, okay!*), prepositions (*after all, in spite of*), a small class of lexicalised clauses (*you see (y'see), you know (y'know), I mean*), multi-word clauses/clausal PMs such as *to return to my original point, sort of, and things like that*, and idioms such as *all things considered*, among others (Müller, 2005:3). In the data, some Luganda expressions provide evidence for a further two PM categories: sentential PMs, such as the persuasive or emphatic PM *nkubuulidde* (I have told you (the truth)), and the affixal PM, for example, the *ko* in *mpaako* (give-*ko*), in which the affix *-ko* encodes partitive and deference meaning.

From the discussion, it is evident that PM membership is diverse and open. With such a wide range of examples, Fraser (1999:944) argues that there is no way a subset of these words could be cobbled together into a syntactic class. First, the functions of PMs relate to the syntactic categories they belong to; these categories are many, and their membership is also controversial. Second, the environments for the different functions of PMs are in complementary distribution, and third, the naming of PMs is dependent on the theoretical framework at play. With respect to the third reason, Heine (2013: 1216), observes that an item such as *frankly*, can be an “adverb” in Sentence Grammar (SG), “determining the meaning of the predicate”, it can be a “stance adverbial” according to Biber et al. (1999: 133), a “sentence adverb” in Brinton’s (2008:3) terminology, a “disjunct” according to Quirk et al. (1985), an “evidential adverb” according to Infantidou (2000), or a “commentary PM” according to Fraser (1996:16).

Although a general consensus with regard to the genesis and development of PMs is lacking, it is agreed that PMs from the grammaticalisation point of view “start out having a propositional function, and only achieve discourse-marking functions over time” (Hansen, 1998:237). That is, PM units semantically bleach by shedding their semantic properties and acquire certain pragmatic functions (Fischer, 2013:277). While not all PMs develop this way, Fischer (2013) argues that it is generally through semantic bleaching that PMs lose their inherent context-independent propositional meaning, and take up “more subjective, textual and interpersonal functions” (see Brinton, 2008:50; Furkó, 2014: 292-295). The development of PMs are explained by grammaticalisation, pragmaticalisation, lexicalisation, idiomaticalisation, subjectification and

intersubjectification (see Brinton, 2008) and most recently co-optation processes (see Heine, 2013).

#### **2.2.4 Diagnostic properties of pragmatic markers**

Recent research has been preoccupied with describing the properties of PMs and developing the criteria for qualifying elements for every given instance (Schourup, 1999). However, the benchmarks for qualifying elements as PMs have not only remained controversial (Furkó, 2014:290) but also varied, with different scholars proposing lists of overlapping hypothetical conditions. According to Schiffrin (1987:328), PMs are syntactically detachable from a sentence; they occupy initial position in the utterance; they are phonologically marked with prosodic contours; and they have the ability to operate globally and on different planes of discourse. On the other hand, Sankoff, et al (1997:195,197) discuss PMs' properties to include non-compositionality, non-propositionality, being subject to semantic bleaching in comparison to other forms, undergoing phonological reduction, and being articulated as part of smoothly flowing speech production. For Heine (2013:1209), PMs are syntactically independent, prosodically set off from the rest of the utterance, they have non-restrictive meaning (which is procedural), they are non-compositional and as a rule short.

Suffice it to note that these properties are not restricted to PMs, but may be shared by other elements such as (para)theticals (Heine, 2013:1209). Heine argues that the only typical properties of PMs are apparently the property of encoding procedural meaning and the property of non-compositionality, but other properties are shared by theticals<sup>8</sup>. In the following subsections, I give a brief explanation of the cardinal properties of PMs, which include non-propositionality, non-truth-conditionality, orality, optionality, multifunctionality, non-compositionality, among others.

##### **2.2.4.1 Non-propositionality/non-truth conditionality**

PMs in general have little semantic contribution to the proposition content of their host utterance. The assumption that PMs are syntactically dispensable, generally non-truth conditional and non-

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<sup>8</sup> Theticals are syntactically independent expressions such as *I guess* in “You will do it, I guess” whose meaning is determined essentially by discourse situation. They are normally separated from the host clause by a comma intonation. To Heine (2013:1216), PMs (discourse markers, in his terminology), are described as a “subset of conceptual theticals sharing with other theticals the properties [...] but differing from many other theticals in having the properties” [of encoding procedural meaning and being non-compositional].

propositional has been misinterpreted by some scholars to mean that PMs have little or zero contribution to the propositional content of the host utterances (Schourup, 1999:232). However, Fraser (2006:27) warns that the difficulty to tease out the conceptual meaning of some PMs does not mean that they have no meaning. In addition, the property of non-propositionality has been equated with a lack of semantic content (Müller, 2005:6), having “no meaning” or having “vague meaning” (Schiffrin, 1987:328); having “little or no meaning in themselves” (Erman, 2001:1339); having “no apparent meaning” (Romero Trillo, 2002:774); having “relatively little semantic content” (Simon-Vandenberg, 2001:82), or containing “a residue of semantic meaning” (Ariel, 1994: 3254, as cited in Müller 2005:6). Andersen (2001:40ff) recognises the non-propositionality of PMs but clarifies that “...non-propositionality is only partly a valid criterion, because some pragmatic markers can be seen to have truth-conditional implications [...]”. Indeed, the analysis, of *kubanga* (because) as a conceptual-procedural marker contradicts the claim of non-propositionality.

Furthermore, studies have shown that certain PMs can, as procedural devices, be used in fragmentary utterances to communicate fully-fledged explicatures. Blakemore (2002:85) discusses PMs in an imaginary scenario in which a secretary explains to a university professor why a student was not able to submit her assignment for assessment on time. After listening, the professor says *nevertheless* or *even then*<sup>9</sup> [produced without rising intonation characteristic of incomplete sentence]. The recovery of explicatures from such fragmentary PMs, according to Blakemore (2002), requires inferential processing, and propositions such as, *I am not convinced that the student did her best*, can be recovered. Such examples prove that PMs are not as non-propositional as previously assumed. The processes required for the extraction of such an explicature, according to Blakemore, are the same processes a hearer will undertake in processing fragmentary conceptual elements such as *Coffee*, in which an explicature such as, *It is time for coffee*, would be derived. In the data, *so* PM signals inferential explicatures, in contexts similar to those of *nevertheless* above. Such *so* PMs are described as stand-alone PMs, and they procedurally signal contextually dependent implied meaning. The ability for *so* to ‘stand-alone’ and signal inferential meaning (see Section 6.3) contravenes the Coherence-based idea that PMs structurally coordinate relations.

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<sup>9</sup> The Luganda PM equivalents, *newankubadde* and *wadde*, respectively, behave in a similar way.



#### 2.2.4.2 Optionality

Optionality of PMs is premised on the assumption that PMs are non-truth-conditional or non-propositional. Optionality, according to Schourup (1999:231), is used in two senses: syntactic optionality in which the grammaticality of the host utterance is not affected even when a PM is removed, and optionality in the semantic relationship where PM signals will still be retrievable even when a PM is omitted. The feature of optionality is implied in Schiffrin's (1987) analysis of 11 PMs, all of which occur at the periphery of the utterance making them appear "independent of sentential structure". In addition, their removal would leave the host structure intact (Schiffrin, 1987:32). I argue, following the available literature, that the idea of optionality, be it syntactic or semantic, does not suggest that PMs are redundant. In fact, studies have established that omission of certain PMs either renders the host utterance ill-formed or impairs or delays text comprehension (Dér, 2010:14–15, as cited in Heine 2013:1212). For instance, the PM, *like*, in an utterance such as, *he came in like an hour ago*, is procedurally significant for it indicates uncertainty in the communicated assumption as regards time, and its deletion will not only affect the pragmatics of the utterance, but also its semantics.

As documented, PMs constrain interpretation by providing clues which guide hearers/readers towards the intended interpretation (Schourup, 1999:232), and their deletion from the utterance leaves the hearer "without a lexical clue as to the relationship intended between the two segments" (Fraser, 1999:944). In RT terms, PMs contribute to the relevance of an utterance by reducing the cognitive effort of utterance processing and interpretation. Segments without PMs expose the hearers to gratuitous processing efforts for no extra effect. Thus, descriptions such as "[a]n element is a PM if its removal does not affect the semantic elements connected by it or make the utterance ill-formed" (Torres & Potowski, 2008:263) are no longer valid.

#### 2.2.4.3 Orality

While orality has not been a popular defining feature for PMs (Müller, 2005:7), it has been referred to on several occasions. Although not a viable defining criterion, orality, as a feature of PMs, has been supported by the fact that most studies on PMs are based on spoken discourse rather than written discourse (cf. González, 2004:1). For instance, Schiffrin's (1987:31) operational definition of PMs as elements that contextually coordinate "units of **talk**" points to orality as a conceivable

criterion for distinguishing PMs. Equally, Erman (2001:1339) asserts that PMs are not only “abundant in spoken language” but are “all restricted to spoken language” or “mimetic dialogue”. In Brinton (2008:17), it is argued that PMs are “characteristic of oral medium, particularly unplanned speech”. In addition, McCarthy’s (1993) study, titled *Spoken discourse markers in written texts*, explicitly highlights that PMs are spoken. In his conclusion, he indicates that PMs are significant in “our judgement of the degree of spokenness present in the text” (McCarthy, 1993:180). These observations point to the assumption that PMs are frequent in spoken language (Müller, 2005:7).

In a counter argument, Schourup (1999:234) comments that although PMs occur more frequently in speech than in writing, there are no principled grounds on which to ally PMs to spoken or written discourse. Moreover, studies have empirically proven that certain PMs such as *notwithstanding* are more frequent in written discourse (Brinton, 2008:17). What is established though is that written PMs and spoken PMs serve different functions. That is, written PMs facilitate the expression of writer’s attitude and creation of textual relationships whereas the spoken PMs manage conversational relations (Fischer, 2013:278-279). Interestingly, even though Schiffrin’s (1987) definition embraces orality, her list of PMs extracted from a spoken discourse includes items such as *but* (Schiffrin 1987:155) and *and* (Schiffrin 1987:133) which can be found in written discourse as well. Hence, orality should be defined as a tendency and not a necessary condition.

#### 2.2.4.4 Initiality/positional mobility

The claim by Schiffrin (1987:328) and Schourup (1999:233), among others, that PMs are positioned at the periphery/beginning of a discourse unit is controversial (Fischer, 2013:274). Again, this claim is partly based on Schiffrin’s (1987) study where PMs feature on the left periphery of the utterance. However, given that PMs are subject to minimal syntactic restrictions, studies have shown that they may occur before, after or between clauses (Hlavac, 2006:1873; Fischer, 2013:274). Thus, the three utterances (1a-c) below are all grammatical.

1. a. **After all**, Esther is a brilliant girl.
- b. Esther is, **after all**, a brilliant girl.
- c. Esther is a brilliant girl, **after all**. (Adapted from Fraser, 1999).

In the data, *so* and *kubanga* can occupy all three of these positions: the initial, medial and final position. As we shall see later, *so* and *kubanga* occupy the final position to signal implied meaning by providing clues that guide the hearer to derive inferences in the form of explicatures (see Sections 6.3 and 7.4). However, Heine (2013:1213) warns that positional flexibility in the placement abilities of PMs does not suggest that PMs can occur anywhere in the discourse. Although they may generally be described as free in movement, or positionally mobile, their movement, just like switches, is constrained syntactically and pragmatically (Brinton, 2008:8). Therefore, initiality/positional mobility, just like orality, describes a tendency rather than a necessary condition for diagnosing PMs.

#### **2.2.4.5 Prosody**

Prosodic independence has been cited as one of the salient properties of PMs (Heine, 2013:1210). In Traugott (1995:6) and Fischer (2013:275), PMs have been phonologically described as independent units carrying a special intonation and stress pattern, not being integrated into the tone unit of adjacent material. Constitution of tone units by themselves point towards phonological markedness. In Schiffrin (1987: 328) and Sankoff, et al (1997:197), PMs have a “range of prosodic contours e.g. tonic stress and followed by a pause, phonological reduction”.

Note that only a few researchers diagnose PMs phonologically (Müller, 2005:5), as prosodic independence may only apply to prototypical PMs but it might be universally irrelevant (Heine, 2013:1210). In view of the data at hand, not all PMs can be described with the quality of phonological independence; whereas the English *so* is in many instances phonologically marked, *kubanga* PMs rarely are. Therefore, Schiffrin’s (1987:328) observation that the “in between” character of discourse markers is often signalled through prosodic cues or pauses, preceded and/or followed by pauses may not hold in cross-linguistic PM analyses.

#### **2.2.4.6 Connectivity**

PMs are traditionally known for their ability to connect discourse units. This is reflected in the definitional attributes as “an expression which signals the relationship of the basic message to the foregoing discourse” (Fraser, 1996:186); “linguistic items of variable scope, and whose primary function is connective” (Hansen, 1997:160); “sequentially dependent elements which bracket units of talk” (Schiffrin, 1987:31). However, Blakemore (1987:85-86) argues that certain PMs don’t

necessarily relate two segments. They can occur singly in fragmentary utterances (Fischer, 2013:274) such as *nevertheless* discussed in Section in 2.2.4.1 and the implied-meaning-marking *so* discussed in Section 6.9.2.2, where the PMs encode fully-fledged explicatures. PMs can also occur without an explicit S1 segment. Blakemore (1992:150; 2002:85,166) discusses an utterance, *So you've spent all your money* [said by a mother after seeing her son return home with parcels]. In this utterance, *so* does not connect two segments of a text as construed in the Coherence framework but relates “the propositional content expressed by the current utterance to assumptions that may or may not have been communicated by a prior utterance” but derived from “observation of a state of affairs”. Examples such as (2) in which *kuba* (because) does not relate directly to the prior discourse are common in the data.

2. *Kuba kati* *athinkinga* about working for advertising company (HK101)

*kuba kati a-thinking-a* about working for advertising company  
because now SUBJ.3SG-think-FV

‘Because (for) now he is thinking about working for an advertising company’

#### 2.2.4.7 Non-inflectionality

Construed as non-lexical items, PMs have been diagnosed with the property of non-inflectionality. This assumption, according to Fischer, (2013:274) is based on Zwicky’s (1985:302-303) observation that PMs are a unified class of particles and particles are tagged with a non-inflection property. However, if fixed expressions such as *if I may interrupt* are taken to be cases of clausal PMs, then this criterion is void. Such expressions inflect into *If I might interrupt*. In Luganda, a lexicalised PM such as *kankubuulire* (let me tell you) on inflection into subjunctive mood becomes *nkubuulidde* (I have told you).

The discussion of the diagnostic properties of PMs shows a number of proposed characteristics of PMs. The presentation here is not exhaustive but it paints a picture of the nature of the contention within research on what defines PMs as a functional class.

#### 2.2.5 Meaning of pragmatic markers

The meaning encoded by functional words such as PMs differs from the meaning encoded by lexical entries such as verbs. Studies on individual PMs have assumed that each PM has a core

meaning – an isolated semantic value attributed to it (Fraser, 1999:945). Sometimes, multiple cores might be proposed for a given case but these are subsequently unified into a general formula (Schourup, 1999:249). Assigning meaning to PMs, according to Schourup (1999:242), has been as troublesome as determining what they are. He clarifies that the exercise of searching for semantic cores is complex because PMs have a “high degree of context dependence”, they tend to “have extremely general ‘one-size-fits-all’ meanings” (Schourup, 1999: 253). In addition, because the meaning of PMs is dependent on the labels that define the category, it would require the reader to determine whether the meaning of a PM is embedded in the PM itself or in the context. This explains why the widely studied PMs, such as *well*, have more than a dozen meanings attributed to them (Schourup, 1999:250). Correspondingly, the exercise of assigning meaning to a PM is subjective and there is no heuristic criterion for proving the validity of the meaning assigned to a PM<sup>10</sup>. This makes it difficult to establish that a certain meaning is present in a given PM and at other times, results are often conflicting.

On the other hand, Blakemore (1987, 2002) looks at the meaning of PMs from a procedural dimension. She argues that PMs are conceptually empty but procedurally rich. They encode procedures that “constrain the interpretation of the utterances that contain them by virtue of the inferential connections they express” (see Schourup, 1999:244). For Blakemore, the difference between two utterances with and without a PM lies in relevance. She argues that a hearer processing an utterance without a PM will spend more effort in processing the utterance. Thus, PMs contribute to relevance of utterances by sparing the hearer’s mental processing effort. As we will see later, one of the notions which define relevance is effort: the less the effort spent on processing a stimulus, the more relevant it will be.

### **2.2.6 Functional spectrum of pragmatic markers**

One of the outlined properties of PMs is the property of multifunctionality – the ability to operate on discourse, grammatical and lexical levels (Torres, 2002:65, 2006:616; Torres & Potowski, 2008:263). Three basic functions of PMs have been cited in research: the textual functions which relate to the structuring of the text, the interactional functions which relate to planning processes

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<sup>10</sup> The meaning of PMs is mostly validated by means of intuitive judgments/plausibility, commutation and paraphrase (Fischer, 1998:111).

such as turn-taking, and the interpersonal functions which relate to attitude, evaluations and speech acts (see Heine, 2013:1239). In addition, the general functions of PM as suggested in previous research include: acting as cues or guides to facilitate comprehension and interpretation (Müller, 2005:8) and (Aijmer, 1996:210, as cited in Müller 2005:8); connecting utterances to the situation of discourse (Heine, 2013:1211); constraining procedural interpretation (Blakemore, 2002:5); signalling a relationship between the segments they introduce (Fraser, 1999:931); bracketing units of talk (Schiffrin, 1987:31,326) or to “situate their host unit with respect to the surrounding discourse and with respect to the speaker-hearer relationship” (Walthereit, 2006: 64), signal turn-taking, hesitation and back channels (Torres, 2006:618; Furkó, 2014:293), among others.

According to Aijmer (2002:3), the property of multifunctionality in PMs makes it hard to pin down the different functions of certain PMs within their contexts (see Cuenca, 2008:1373). In the data, there are instances where a PM would encode multiple meanings, making it hard to contextually identify the core or dominant procedural meaning. In other instances, more than one functional level or domain of operation was appropriate. Whereas the assumption of multifunctionality is recurrent in many PMs, Müller (2005: 8) cautions that this assumption should not be taken for granted, but should be restricted to specific PMs for which evidence is convincingly given. She reasons that such generalisations are misleading given that certain PMs are used mono-functionally. For instance, Lenk’s (1998:50) analysis of the PM *summing up*, as cited in Müller (2005:8), indicates that it is mono-functional.

It should be noted that PMs differ in the degrees of multifunctionality; some PMs are more multifunctional than others. This assumption can be explained from Fraser’s (2015:49) categorisation of PMs into hierarchies in which primary PMs in the PM category are more multifunctional than secondary PMs. For instance, the English *so* in the implicative PM category is more multifunctional than *hence*, which is a secondary PM. The functional spectrum covered by PMs is as heterogeneous as their properties. Fischer (2013:279) sums them up when she says,

no single function can be found that all discourse markers fulfil alike; instead, there is a considerable breadth of possible functions which discourse markers may have. This might suggest that discourse markers do not form a single class. However, the individual functions within this spectrum tend to be related to each other within individual occurrences of discourse markers

(polyfunctionality), i.e. many of these functions co-occur in individual discourse marker uses. Furthermore, the same discourse marker may fulfil different functions in different contexts...

From the analytical chapters we see that *so* and *kubanga* are multifunctional, but the functional spectrum of *so* is wider than that of *kubanga*.

## 2.3 Analytical approaches to pragmatic markers

Research on PMs has been undertaken from a number of analytical approaches including the Coherence-based approaches (Schiffrin, 1987; Redeker, 1990; Fraser, 1999; Torres, 2006), the Relevance-theoretic (RT) approaches (Andersen & Fretheim, 2000; Andersen, 2001; Blakemore, 2002; Carston, 2002), Sentence grammar (Traugott, 1995; Frank-Job, 2006; Brinton, 2008b; Kaltenböck, Heine & Kuteva, 2011), and Interactional sociolinguistics (Stubbs, 1983), among others. While Risselada & Spooren (1998:131) claim that PMs have been mostly approached from a Coherence framework perspective, a number of studies are theoretically grounded in RT. In the interest of time, two approaches will be comparatively discussed: the Coherence approach and the RT-based approach. The core assumptions which define these approaches are discussed from the perspectives of the contributions of three major scholars: Schiffrin and Fraser, representing the Coherence framework, and Blakemore representing the RT-based assumptions on procedural encoding. Interestingly, their studies were developed at around the same time – Schiffrin in 1987; Blakemore in 1987; and Fraser in 1988. The views of these scholars have undergone criticism, and subsequent modification.

### 2.3.1 Coherence framework

The discussion of PMs within the Coherence framework dates back to the influential works of Halliday & Hasan (1976) on cohesion. They define cohesion as “the set of meaning relations that is general to ALL CLASSES of text, that distinguishes text from ‘non-text’ and interrelates the substantive meanings of the text with each other” (Halliday & Hasan, 1976:26). It is argued that Schiffrin (1987), one of the pioneer authors within the Coherence framework, draws her assumptions from Halliday & Hasan’s notion of cohesion. Hussein (2009:142ff) observed that Halliday & Hasan’s (1976:26-30) functional-semantic components are comparable with Schiffrin’s (1987) Discourse model. According to Halliday & Hasan (1976), a text is created only when passages of whatever length form a unified whole – when they cohere. Texts cohere when a

semantic relationship holds between them (Halliday & Hasan, 1976:1-2). Thus, cohesion is viewed as a linguistic device which constrains the semantic well-formedness of texts through the syntactic process of interconnecting sentences (see Hussein, 2009:142). For instance, an utterance such as *She threw it at her*, in Halliday and Hasan's (1976) cohesive terms, does not cohere as long as the pronominal forms are not matched semantically. Other than the need to establish who the Agent (she) and the Theme (it) are, it is crucial to establish whether *she* and *her* refer to the same entity in which case the sentence will not cohere. Cohesion, according to Halliday & Hasan (1976:5), is expressed partly through the vocabulary (lexical cohesion) and partly through the grammar and intonation systems (grammatical cohesion). The former involves achieving cohesion through the use of linking words such as PMs and the latter is achieved through repetition and reiteration.

They propose four cohesive relations: co-reference, conjunction, ellipsis and substitution<sup>11</sup>, as illustrated in utterances, (3a-c) respectively:

3. a. Before you peel the bananas<sub>i</sub>, you must wash them<sub>i</sub>.
- b. He is a surgeon. But he fears blood.
- c. In case the food on your plate is little, go for more. (more food)

The notion of coherence has proven notoriously hard to define and many discourse analysts have avoided direct definitions in favour of theories that account for discourse coherence (Stubbs, 1983:147). Whereas linguists can tell intuitively that a given discourse is coherent, they might fail to give a principled account of their judgements (Schiffrin, 1987).

### 2.3.1.1 Schiffrin's account of pragmatic markers

The idea that coherence is constructed through "relations between adjacent units in a discourse" forms the basis of Schiffrin's (1987) Discourse model of coherence (see Hussein, 2009; Fairbanks, 2009). In this model, coherence is of central significance in explaining the textuality of discourse (Schiffrin, 1987:21). Schiffrin's analysis of PMs aims to show that PMs contribute to discourse coherence by providing contextual coordinates for utterances that index them (Schiffrin, 1987:315,

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<sup>11</sup>Halliday & Hasan, (1976:88) define substitution as "the replacement of one item by another" and ellipsis as "the omission of an item". They however argue that the two notions are essentially the same processes because both of them can be explained in terms of substitution in which during ellipsis, the item is replaced with nothing.



326). Using illustrations from 11 PMs in English (*oh, well, and, but, or, so, because, now, then, I mean and y'know*), Schiffrin explains the semantic and grammatical status, functions and characteristics of these PMs as signalling coherence within the interactive and coherent discourse. As “sequentially dependent” elements with the ability to “bracket units of talk” in a discourse (Schiffrin, 1987:31), the role of PMs is to “**select** the content of the talk, and then **display** that relation” (Schiffrin, 1987:318).

Following the Discourse model of local coherence in talk, Schiffrin (1987) proposes that PMs operate at five different levels of discourse structures/planes. The planes are both linguistic and non-linguistic as illustrated in (4a-e).

4. a. Exchange structure (the turns taken by interlocutors during conversation);
- b. Action structure (the illocutionary force–action intended from the conversation);
- c. Ideational structure (how ideas are organized in a discourse);
- d. Participation framework (the way interlocutors relate to what they say, claim or to their opinion);
- e. Information state (the cognitive capacities of speakers to organize and manage knowledge and meta-knowledge) (Schiffrin, 1987:24-29, 326).

Schiffrin explains that the primary role of PMs is to operate on the ideational plane connecting ideas or proposition structures and their secondary function is to accomplish more global functions on other planes of discourse. The manifestation of *so* and *kubanga* PMs on the relevant planes is demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7.

### 2.3.1.2 Fraser’s account of pragmatic markers

In his series of work on PMs (see Fraser, 1990, 1996, 1999, 2009, 2015; Fraser & Malamud-Makowski, 1996), Fraser provides a wide panorama of PMs from a modified coherence point of view. In his later work, Fraser (2015:48) provides a characteristic-based definition in which a PM is,

a lexical expression, drawn from one of the three classes (Contrastive DMs, Elaborative DMs, and Implicative DMs), which typically occurs in S2 sentence-initial position in a S1-S2 combination, and which provides no **semantic content** value but rather **signals a semantic relationship** between the two sentences.

Fraser shares with RT an assumption that PMs are procedural, and do not contribute to the semantics of the host utterance. However, the procedural roles they play are important and their deletion from the utterance leaves the hearer “without a lexical clue as to the relationship intended between the two segments” (Fraser, 1999:944). As mentioned, Fraser does not regard PMs as cognitive devices that put constraints on the relevance of discourse as assumed in the RT approach, rather, PMs are linguistic elements which facilitate local and global coherence. That is, procedurality within the coherence framework relates to coordination between contiguous and detached propositions (see Schiffrin, 1987:287-288; Torres, 2006:620).

Fraser analyses PMs as occurring in a “two-place relation, one argument lying in the segment they introduce, the other lying in the prior discourse” (Fraser, 1999:938). This relation is canonically formulated as *S1, DM+S2* and represented in utterance (5a). However, because PMs are positionally mobile, and they do not always relate segments adjacent to them, formulations as illustrated in (5b-d) are realistic:

5. a. Joy loves singing, *but* she does not play any instruments. [S1 +DM, S2]
- b. Emmanuel is an intelligent student. *However*, he never gets space to exercise his intelligence. [S1.DM+S2]
- c. Brian was not invited to the party. He will, *nonetheless*, go. [S1. S2+DM, S2]
- d. Joram was not invited to the party. He will go, *nevertheless*. [S1. S2+DM]

In his descriptive analysis, Fraser divides the English PMs into four categories based on their pragmatic function in signalling a relationship. The four main categories are: basic markers, commentary markers, parallel markers, and discourse markers (PMs in this study). In summary, “basic markers signal the force **of** the basic message, commentary markers signal a message which comments **on** the basic message, e.g. *amazingly*, parallel markers signal a message **in addition to** the basic message, and discourse markers signal the **relationship** of the basic message to the foregoing discourse” (Norrick & Fraser, 2007:195). Basic pragmatic markers have representational meaning and thus “they contribute conceptual information over and above that of the propositional meaning” (Fraser, 1996:6). Like their name suggests, “they signal information

about the speaker's basic communicative intentions" (Fraser, 1996:15). Commentary PMs, on the other hand, signal both representational meaning and a procedural meaning (Fraser, 1996:12-15).

The third category of PMs comprise the parallel markers. Although Fraser (1999) points out that this is the broadest category with many subdivisions, he only discusses four sub-types: The vocatives, which are forms of direct or indirect address, such as titles, e.g. *my Lord*, or pronominal forms, e.g. *somebody* (Fraser, 1996:21); speaker displeasure markers such as *damn* or the clausal *how many times have I told you* which express the speaker's anger (Fraser, 1996:21); solidarity markers which signal commonality to the addressee, e.g. *my friend, as your superior* (Fraser, 1996:21-22); and the focusing markers such as *now, alright*, which focus or refocus on the topic of discussion.

The category of PMs, which Fraser (1996) refers to as discourse markers (DMs) relates to *so* and *kubanga* as the selected PMs of the study. Fraser's DMs encode procedural meaning, which signals instructions/clues to the addressee on how the host utterance is to be interpreted (Fraser, 1996:22). He divides them into topic change markers, which signal the speaker's departure from the current topic, e.g. *by the way, on a different note*, contrastive markers, which signal contrast between propositions expressed, e.g. *but, however*, elaborative markers, which indicate a refinement of some sort on the preceding discourse, e.g. *in addition, in other words*, and the inferential markers such as *after all, or therefore*, which indicate that the utterance is a conclusion which follows from the preceding discourse (Fraser, 1996:23-24). The English PM *so*, would by Fraser's (1996) taxonomy, be categorised under the inferential subcategory and as an implicative PM by the newer taxonomy. The Luganda causal PM *kubanga* would be categorised as an elaborative marker.

Although Fraser recognises the effort in research to study PMs cross-linguistically in most of his works, he points out a number of research areas worth investigation. Some of these questions have been answered in recent research and others are directly addressed in this research, particularly the question of cross-linguistic PMs (PMs from distinct languages) and their co-occurrence in monolingual and bilingual pairs and clusters. Sections 6.8 and 7.9 in the analysis are dedicated to PM combinability.

### 2.3.2 Relevance-theoretic account: Blakemore's contrastive views

A detailed account of Blakemore's (1987, 2002) notion of procedural meaning is discussed in Section 4.5. What is emphasised in this sub-section are the notable points of divergence between the Coherence and RT-based frameworks, and the emphasis on how RT offers a more plausible account of utterance interpretation.

First, the Coherence framework provides a structural and functional approach to PMs in which interpretation is driven by coherence. In terms of this, PMs contribute to coherence by "encoding cohesive relationships between conceptual representations" (Hussein, 2009:175). The RT-driven approach, on the other hand, offers a cognitive-based framework to the study of PMs in which utterance interpretation is constrained by relevance. In RT, PMs act as inputs to the cognitive processes underlying utterance interpretation by virtue of the inferential connections they express (Blakemore, 2002:5).

Second, from an RT perspective, what drives comprehension is not the search for coherence or textuality, as assumed by the Coherence framework, but rather a search for optimal relevance. Blakemore recognises the importance of coherence in discourse but emphasises that even when perceptions of coherence occur, they should be analysed as a consequence of the hearer's search for relevance. In this regard, the primary function of PMs is not to signal relations between units of discourse but to procedurally guide the hearer's search for optimal relevance. PMs can convey procedural information that controls the choice of contextual information (Hussein, 2009:175:185) by either allowing the derivation of a contextual implication through the use of, for example, *so*, *therefore*, or strengthening an existing assumption by providing better evidence through the use of PMs such as *after all*, *moreover*. A speaker may also contradict/deny an existing assumption through the use of PMs such as *however*, *but*, or may specify the role of the utterance in the discourse through the use of, for example, *anyway*, *incidentally*, *by the way* (Blakemore, 2000: 478).

## 2.4 Pragmatic markers in combination

A survey of literature on PMs reveals that much of the scholarly attention has been geared towards understanding PMs which occur singly and primarily in monolingual discourse. Little, in terms of

research, has been done to investigate the behaviour, manifestation and procedural functions of PMs occurring in monolingual and bilingual combinations (see Fraser, 2015: 48). Sections 6.8 and 7.9 aim to explore such PM combinations, with emphasis on those which pair or cluster with the English PM *so* and the Luganda *kubanga*. I argue that a comprehensive understanding of PMs in their entirety requires not only establishing their behaviour as single elements, but also their behaviour in monolingual and bilingual PM sequences. Issues with regard to defining combined PMs, determining a concrete label in reference to them, establishing which PMs can co-occur, how they co-occur, in what contexts they co-occur, whether the co-occurring PMs are functionally compositional or not, and what constraints bind their combinability, to mention but a few, are crucial to gaining a systematic understanding of PMs.

Given that PMs in combinations are also less studied, the nature of the controversies with regard to PMs in combinations are not different from the controversies discussed for PMs as single entities. First, there is no consensus on the label(s) used in reference to PMs in combinations. The few studies available have adopted different descriptive terms, such as, *bilingual co-occurrences* (Cuenca & Marín, 2009), *compound pragmatic markers* (González, 2004:208), *discourse marker clusters* (de Rooij, 2000), and *discourse marker combinations* (Fraser, 2015). Although these labels are descriptive, they cannot be easily adopted because they are study-specific and exclusive. For instance, considering the current data, adopting Cuenca & Marín's (2009) label *bilingual co-occurrences* disregards the existence of monolingual PM combinations in the data; González's (2004) label, *compound pragmatic markers* is limited because some PMs combine without necessarily being 'compounded' and so on. I adopt Fraser's label, *discourse marker combinations* because it is more inclusive. For systematic analysis, I modify *discourse marker combinations* to *pragmatic marker combinations*. Pragmatic marker combinations are subdivided into monolingual co-occurrences (Luganda or English) and bilingual (Luganda-English) co-occurrences. The PM combinations in this study manifest as simple pairs and as complex sets involving three or more PM combinations. The analysis is based mainly on co-occurrences involving *so* and *kubanga*, the selected PMs for analysis.

The second controversy relates to definition. Attempts to offer a precise definition of PMs in combination have not been successful. As mentioned in Nivens (2002:5), defining CS will remain

challenging, provided a definition for language as a single entity is contentious. By analogy, as long as the definition of a single PM remains contentious, defining a combination of them, especially in bilingual discourse, should be doubly complex. González (2004:208), who labels PMs in combination as *compound pragmatic markers*, offers a descriptive definition of PMs as “functional co-occurrences of two (sometimes more) pragmatic markers whose combinatory functions result in: a) a change of attentional state of the speaker... or shift in his/her cognitive frame; and/or b) a remarkable emphasis on the illocutionary point of the segment”. This is the only definition I could access from the literature I consulted. Regrettably, this definition is study specific, and thus exclusive. In this study, PMs in combination are construed as procedural devices, defined by the following conditions: (i) occurrence in pairs or in clusters of monolingual, or bilingual sequences; (ii) relating propositions locally or globally; and (iii) encoding procedural meaning which is integrated by addition or by composition. By addition, I mean that the PMs structurally combine but each marker maintains its own distinct meaning. By composition, I refer to occurrences where the PMs in combination function as a complex unit, jointly contributing to a unified procedural function.

For purposes of demonstration, the following are some of the pairs and clusters attested in the data. Not all these PMs are analysed, but they are outlined here to give you a sense of “being there” as Stake (1995:63) describes it. The monolingual English PMs include *then finally*, *fortunately still*, *and so*, the monolingual Luganda category includes *naye kati olwokubanga* (but now because of), *naye ng'ate* (AND YET), and the bilingual pairs/clusters include *Naye era still* (But STILL), *so kati/kakaati* (and now), *so kati* because (now and because) *so nga* (now while), *ng'era of course* (and indeed of course), and the literally translated combinations such as *but because again* (translated from the Luganda cluster *naye era olwokubanga*), and so on. (Capital letters signify emphasis).

## 2.5 Insights on *so* and *kubanga* pragmatic markers

As mentioned, this study aims to analyse two PMs: the English *so* and the Luganda *kubanga* (because) occurring as embedded elements or as part of the embedded elements in their respective MLs. In this section, I give a brief preamble to each PM. As pointed out, the PM *so* occurs both in Luganda and English. Although the two markers share the same structural form, they are different

lexical items; they are true homonyms for they are not etymologically related. Given that Luganda has a simple vowel system comprising only five pure vowels (a, e, i, o, u), bilingual speakers of Luganda and English, in general, have difficulties pronouncing English vowel sounds, and often, the English diphthongs and triphthongs are pronounced as pure vowels. Thus, the English *so* [səʊ] and the Luganda *so* [so] in bilingual speech are phonologically similar, pronounced as [so], and sometimes as [so:]. The English *so*, is an implicative PM and the Luganda *so*, is a contrastive marker. In terms of cognitive effects, implicative PMs signal relations which result in the derivation of contextual implication, and contrastive markers signal relations leading to the elimination of presupposition (see Blakemore, 1992; 2002; Sperber & Wilson, 1995). The Luganda *so* is included in the discussion because it structurally overlaps with the English *so*, as the discussion in Section 6.6 reveals. However, the procedural underpinnings of the Luganda *so* are discussed in Section 6.10.

### 2.5.1 The English *so*

The English *so* PM is recorded as one of the most frequently occurring PMs in spoken English corpora (Hlavac, 2006:1896; Lam, 2010:657). Despite this observation, *so* has received limited scholarly attention in comparison with other commonly used PMs such as *well*, *you know*, or *like* (Müller, 2005:61; Bolden, 2009:974; Lam, 2010:658). Müller (2005:61) speculates that *so* could be excluded from analysis on grounds of being a peripheral member of the PM family; a marker which does not fulfil the diagnostic properties of PMs. Other than the works by Schiffrin (1987), Bolden (2006; 2009), and Müller (2005:61), which overtly discuss *so* in substantial detail, other works (e.g. Fraser & Malamud-Makowski, 1996; Lam, 2009; 2010, Buysse, 2012; Fraser, 2015) are not detailed enough to offer empirical conclusions. Therefore, the need to explore *so* as a ‘neglected’ PM is part of the motivation for its selection for analysis in this study.

The earliest empirical analysis of *so* is attributed to Schiffrin’s (1987) ground-breaking work on PM characterisation (Fairbanks, 2009:18). In her analysis, *so* is construed to have the ability to function on different planes of conversational structure simultaneously or consecutively (Schiffrin, 2001:67, cited in Fairbanks (2009:23)), and to operate glocally (locally and globally) in signalling relational coordinates between discourse segments. In the ideational plane *so* signals a relation “result” between fact-based idea units such as in utterance (6a). In the information state, it warrants knowledge-based evidence for inference such as in utterance (6b). In the action plane, *so* may

signal the following: a request and account for information, as in utterance (6c), marking compliance and justification, as in (6d), or expressing a ground claim, as in (6e). In the participation framework, *so* functions in the organisation of transitions in which the speaker or hearer's responsibility is to perform an interactive task shift, such as in turn-taking or maintaining or changing a discourse topic (Schiffrin, 1987:217).

6. a. Barbara ran very fast in the marathon **so** she got a trophy.
- b. The clouds are darker **so** it might rain.
- c. **So**, tell me about your trip.
- d. **So**, I will vote for him (because...).
- e. **So** that is why I will vote for him.

Schiffrin (1987:201) claims that the core meaning signalled by *so* is “result”, which can be formally paraphrased as *Q because P*. However, a number of researchers, such as Fraser (1990, 1999), Blakemore (2002), and Bolden (2009) are opposed to the idea of a core function. They contend that the functions of *so* (and for that matter other PMs) are not limited to one aspect, such as indicating results, in the case of *so*; but rather, PMs signal how the message following it relates to the foregoing discourse (Fraser, 1990: 395). Fraser (1990:394) illustrates the multifunctionality of *so* in utterances (7a-d) in which each *so* PM reinforces a context-based implicative relation between the coordinated propositions, by virtue of its meaning (cf. Fraser, 1999:945-946). The meanings encoded by the PM *so* are paraphrased in brackets.

7. a. Susan is married. **So** she is no longer single. (logical conclusion)
- b. John was tired. **So** he left early. (reasonable conclusion)
- c. Son: My clothes are still wet.  
Mother: **So** put the drier on for 30 minutes more. (in that case, you should do something)
- d. [Grandmother to granddaughter] **So** tell me about this wonderful young man you're seeing.  
(direct request for information and thus the need 'to continue').

Blakemore's (1987, 2002) RT-based conceptualisation of PMs as elements which encode procedural constraints on the inferential phase of comprehension suggests that what Blakemore would consider to be the core function of *so* is “inference” derived by the hearer following the



principle of least effort (cf. Bolden, 2006:633). The role of PMs is to indicate to the hearer that some kind of inferential connection exists between the two propositions and it is the hearer's task to supply the most appropriate context in order to arrive at the relevant interpretation. The context-based procedural roles *so* performs are confirmed by the existence of descriptive terms which show the multifunctionality of *so*. These include the *stand-alone so* (Raymond, 2004), the *section-introducing marker* (Buysse 2012), the *main-idea-unit marker* (Müller 2005:76; Schiffrin 1987:191), a *resumption marker* (González 2004:108), and so on. These and more markers are described in Section 6.9.

### 2.5.2 The Luganda *kubanga* (because)

*Kubanga* (because) is one of the most common devices used to encode explicit causal relations in Luganda. At a conceptual level, *kubanga* associates cause and effect between coordinated propositions and at a procedural level, it relates propositions intended to offer an epistemic reason, or justification for the existence of an event, or the state of affairs described. In Luganda, *kubanga* can manifest in 12 forms: *kubanga* (because), *kuba* (because), *kulwokuba* (for the reason that), *kulwokubanga* (for the reason that), *lwakuba* (because), *lwakubanga* (because), *olwokubanga* (because of/since/for the fact that), *olwokuba* (because of/since/for the fact that), and as the two infrequent pairs *okuba/okubanga*, *bba* and *bbanga*, all translating as *because*. In the bilingual data, seven forms are used: *kubanga*, *kuba*, *olwokuba*, *olwokubanga*, *kulwokuba*, *lwakuba*, and *lwakubanga*, and these are discussed in Chapter 7. For simplicity of expression, I adopt the form “*kubanga* PMs” in reference to any of the variations of *kubanga* in the analysis. The choice of the expression “*kubanga* PMs” is motivated by the high occurrence of *kubanga* in the data in comparison to other forms.

The Luganda orthography is contentious. Orthographic discrepancies are evident from the way *kubanga* PMs are spelled, namely, *olwokuba* or *olw'okuba*, *lwakubanga* or *lw'akubanga*, and so on. These differences are evident in documents written in a Standard Luganda variety such as the Luganda Bible and Luganda novels written in early 1970s. However, the adopted spelling for a given PM does not affect its semantic or pragmatic quality. Besides, such variations are evident in written but not in spoken language. In this analysis, all the PM forms are spelled without an apostrophe, and this choice is motivated by preference.

The prototypical *kubanga* form is also contentious. Whereas the majority of Luganda speakers, consulted in this regard, assume that it is *kubanga*, given that it is the most frequent PM in all domains of usage, some consultants propose *kuba*. Considering the seemingly related forms of the *kubanga* PMs above, it is assumed that *kubanga*, *olwokuba*, *olwokubanga*, *lwakubanga*, *lwakuba*, and so on, are morphological derivations from the form *kuba*, as underlined. However, this assumption has not been heuristically justified. Nonetheless, each of these *kubanga* PMs is a fully-fledged independent PM and would resist semantic decomposition. In addition, a speaker-intuitive assumption holds that *kuba* may be a contracted form of *kubanga*, similar to the English informal contraction 'cause or the Swahili *sababu* (from *kwa sababu*). However, whereas 'cause and *sababu* are informally used, *kuba* is apparently formal<sup>12</sup>.

The procedural status of all *kubanga* PMs is equal; they all signal context-dependent backward causal relations between the segments they coordinate (see Maat & Sanders, 2000:57). Like the English *so*, discussed in Chapter 6, the relationships *kubanga* PMs signal can be local and global (see Schiffrin, 1987). Although certain tokens occur more frequently in the discourse than others, their usage and distribution in discourse is a result of a number of factors, such as speaker preference, idiolectal/idiosyncratic usage, and contextual/domain dependencies. The notion of domain specificity is addressed in Section 7.6 where we see that these PMs are distinct at the pragmatic level, and their interchangeability is contextually constrained.

*Kubanga* PMs have not been studied beyond reference to them in dictionaries and a few classic online resources, dating as far back as the 1920s, during the early years of English contact with Luganda. The classic works were mainly authored by European scholars during the colonial era, in collaboration with native Luganda speakers, most of whom were non-linguists. Whereas I recognise the contribution of such resources to the body of literature, they need to be supplemented by detailed authentic descriptions, and theoretical analyses. The analysis of *kubanga* PMs in this

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<sup>12</sup>*Kuba* serves other grammatical roles which are not causally related. For example, *kuba* occurs as a polysemous intransitive verb or verbal phrase in, *kuba* (beat), *kuba* (draw), *kuba akalulu* (cast a vote), *kuba ekigwo* (wrestle), *kuba omulanga* (appeal), etc. *Kuba* can also serve auxiliary verbal functions such as, *lwa kuba muwanvu naye muto* (she is tall but young); it occurs in rhetoric and interjected constructions e.g. *lwa kuba maama!* (how I wish?). Such roles should not be confused with the procedural roles it plays as a PM.

study is based on the findings of cross-linguistic studies, assumptions inferable from the behaviours of *kubanga* PMs in the data, and introspective views from language consultants<sup>13</sup>.

### 2.5.3 *Kubanga* in dictionaries and mini-grammars

In the few concise dictionaries and mini-grammars available, only three *kubanga* forms are referenced: *kuba*, *kubanga* and *okuba*. This observation does not suggest that other variants are less significant; rather, it emphasises the need to analyse Luganda PMs using empirical data. In addition, there are inconsistencies with regard to the way *kubanga* and *kuba* are entered in the dictionaries, and with the way they are functionally categorised, interpreted and translated. The inconsistencies can be attributed to their multifunctionality, introspective study descriptions, and the reality that some compilers of the Luganda mini-grammars and dictionaries were/are not linguists. For instance, whereas some dictionaries, such as Bagunywa, Kyakulumbye, Muwonge & Ssentogoo (2012:71), list both *kubanga* and *kuba* as causal markers, Ashton, Mulira, Ndawula & Tucker (1954:418-419) and Weatherhead & Bazongere (1933:13), list only *kubanga*, and in Crabtree (1921:154; 1923:167) only *kubanga* and *okuba* are listed.<sup>14</sup>

With regard to translation, *kubanga* is translated as *because* in Ashton, et al (1954); in Weatherhead & Bazongere (1933), it is translated as *because* or *since*, and in Bagunywa, et al (2012), and in Crabtree, (1921, 1923) it is translated as *for* and *because*. Bagunywa, et al (2012), being a concise Luganda-English bilingual dictionary, translates *because* variously as *kubanga* (because), *olw'ensonga nti* (for the reason that) and *olw'okuba* (because (of)/since). What is interesting is that although Bagunywa, et al (2012) have entries for both *kubanga* and *kuba* in

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<sup>13</sup> Comparing *kubanga* PMs with other causal markers in other languages such as English, Modern Greek and French was challenging because languages differ in the number of entries used as causal PMs, and in their domain specificity. For instance, whereas English, has one predominant connective *because*, which can operate in all three domains (content, epistemic, speech act), Luganda has 12 variants of *kubanga*, which are apparently domain specific. In addition, the methodologies used in the analysis of PMs in the language differed from my methodology. For instance, whereas conclusions about French and Modern Greek PMs have been drawn from studies based on large monolingual corpora in both the spoken and written mode (e.g. Maat & Sanders, 2000; Moeschler, 2003; Bardzokas, 2014; Zufferey, 2014), my study draws from a smaller bilingual spoken corpus obtained from a small population sample of bilingual speakers.

<sup>14</sup>The *okuba* form is not familiar to me or to all but one of my consultants. It might be interpreted as a case of idiosyncratic usage recorded in Crabtree (1921,1923). The existence of *okuba* may be indicative of the possibility of the existence of *okubanga* as a pair partner variant. Although *okuba* and *okubanga* do not appear at all in my data, they are counted among the 12 members of the *kubanga* family. *Okuba* appears in the dictionary and *okubanga* features in some Luganda data.

Luganda, they only use one form *kubanga* as a translation of the English *because*. If this omission is intentional, my prediction would be that the authors presume that *kuba* and *kubanga* are variants, which should therefore not be repeated.

Functionally, Ashton, et al (1954) categorise *kubanga* mistakenly as a coordinating conjunction. Interestingly, however, their illustrative utterance, presented in (8a-b), situates *kubanga* in the speech act domain, for it offers a directive to the hearer to do something about the speech act performed. The assignment of a ‘comma intonation’ (as Sweetser (1990) refers to it) to utterance (8a) presupposes that the *because*-clause is a justification of the directive. Similarly, although their translation of (8a) into (8b) gives *kubanga* a commaless intonation, it is contextually evident that it is operating in the speech act domain, and not in the content domain.

8. a. *Otera n’ogenda, kubanga nzija kukwetaaga mangu.*

<i>O-tera</i>	<i>ne-o-genda</i>	<b><i>kubanga</i></b>	<i>nzi-ja</i>	<i>ku-kuetaaga</i>	<i>mangu</i>
You-should	and-you-go	<b>because</b>	I-will	INF-need	soon

‘Lit: Consider going early because I will need you soon’

b. You must go at once ***because*** I shall need you.

These and other inconsistencies are evident in the few available resources. Although they are contributed by a number of factors, I argue that it is time they became resolved authentically.

## 2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the various methods and approaches different scholars have used in the attempt to investigate the notion of PMs. The controversies and (dis)agreements with regard to the definition, labels, meaning, function, diagnostic properties and genesis have been discussed. However, the research findings concerning these issues are not conclusive. The numerous disagreements are attributed to a number of factors including the fact that research in this domain is relatively new (Schourup, 1999:228), and the lack of a global analytical model and a cross-linguistic theory for analysing discourse functions (Roulet, 2006:117; Fischer, 2013:289), among other issues. Fischer (2013:279-280) argues for an ideal model of PM analyses with “a single,

underlying function from which all other functions can be deduced". Such a model should be able, for instance, to identify an overarching function of PMs, by linking up, for example, the various definitions of PMs and marking out the overarching features such definitions could exhibit, digging into the specificities of certain terms as included in the definitions and continuing down to the finest detail before an underlying function is suggested.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **THE LANGUAGE CONTACT PHENOMENA: SCOPE, DEFINITION AND ISSUES**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter provides a discussion of selected literature on language contact and related phenomena, relevant to the analysis of pragmatic markers (PMs) in bilingual discourse. The chapter begins in the following section with an exposition of the notion of language contact in which contact outcomes related to PM systems are emphasised. A discussion of the notion of bilingualism is briefly presented, highlighting the controversies surrounding its conceptual scope as well as the controversies related to speaker bilingualism. I present a description of borrowing as an outcome of language contact, pointing out the dominant types of borrowing, motivations for borrowing and, most importantly, accounting for the high borrowability of PMs as discourse content morphemes. A discussion of code switching (CS) forms the core of the chapter given that the studied PMs operate predominantly as code-switches in the data. Issues such as types of CS, motivation for CS, structural constraints on CS and differentiating CS from borrowing are unpacked. The chapter ends with a conclusion, which wraps up the discussion.

#### **3.2 Language contact**

Language contact is a broad concept encompassing different but thematically related phenomena such as CS, bilingualism, borrowing, and language change (Romaine, 2010:320). It deals with situations where bilingualism occurs as a result of the interaction between speech communities or linguistic systems. Language contact is everywhere; there is no linguistic community which has succeeded in keeping their language ‘pure’ by deliberately avoiding contact with other languages (Bowern, 2010). This is because the occurrence of language contact does not require speakers to move to different places to interact with speakers of other languages, as the presence of more than one language provides opportunities of language contact within a country, community, neighbourhood or family (Wei, 2000:5). Thus, language contact is practically inevitable and hearing people engaged in CS, according to Myers-Scotton (2002:11), is no longer exotic.

The cycle of language contact begins with bilingualism when a monolingual speaker is exposed to an environment that compels them to learn an L2, or when a child born in a bilingual environment acquires two languages simultaneously (Myers-Scotton, 2002:30). If other L2s are introduced to the bilingual speaker, there may be a possibility of replacing or duplicating the first L2. Although researchers have found it a challenging task to predict the outcome of languages in contact (Siemund, 2008:3), three possibilities are established: some features may be lost; some features may be added, or some features may be replaced (Thomason, 2001:60).

Studies in language contact date back to the classic works of Haugen (1950, 1953) and Weinreich (1953). Since the 1950s, a large body of knowledge featuring detailed case studies and complex analytical frameworks has been generated (Muysken, 2010:265). Today, the domains in which language contact are explored include language acquisition, language processing and production, conversation and discourse, the social functions of language and language policy, and typology and language change (Matras, 2009:1). Despite the serious research undertaken, the notion of language contact has remained contentious and there is still a great deal of room to explore its expansive underpinnings (Nivens, 2002:2). Some controversies are conceptual while others are terminological.

Terminologically, contemporary researchers have assumed that language contact relates to the way in which linguistic systems influence one another (Matras, 2010: 66) and hence the expression *language contact*. However, other linguists have argued that what is in contact are speakers and not languages (Brody, 1995:133) and so the expression *language contact* is erroneous. Scholars in support of this view reason that the true locus of language contact is the bilingual individual and that languages are mere mental constructs (Nivens, 2002:13). On the other hand, some researchers view *language contact* as encompassing both senses of “languages in contact” and “speakers in contact” (see Myers-Scotton, 2002; Muysken, 2010). The former relates to the two languages being adjacent in the speaker’s mental lexicon, and the latter relates to speakers of different languages in contact and who for some reason may learn and use the other’s language (Myers-Scotton, 2002:5).

The theoretical position the present study takes is the “languages in contact” position. This position is influenced by the assumptions of the MLF model. Within this model, intrasententially code-switched constituents are conditioned to involve two participating languages, and these languages are assumed to be in contact. The dominant language, the Matrix Language (ML) will supply the morphosyntactic frame of the constituent and the less dominant language, the Embedded Language (EL) supplies the switched element. Thus, the optimal bilingual constituents targeted for this study are the intrasententially code-switched constituents which have an embedded PM element, the English *so* or the Luganda *kubanga* (because) form. Moreover, the analyses in Sections 6.7 and 7.7 point towards contact between Luganda and English PM systems.

Conceptually, the scope of language contact is mirrored in the way it is defined by different researchers. Despite slight differences, all definitions point to the existence, and use, of more than one code (Bowerman, 2010:341). Scholars view language contact as an umbrella term in reference to its different thematically related structural outcomes, including everything from borrowing new concepts to changes in the morphosyntactic system of one of the languages in contact (Myers-Scotton, 2002:4). The frequently referred to contact outcomes include notions such as code switching (use of two languages in the same conversation) borrowing (adoption of a foreign linguistic element into a language), calquing (loan translation), mixed language (such as pidgins and creoles which arise primarily through modification of existing languages), diglossia (coexistence of High and Low varieties in a speech community), convergence (process where languages in contact become more similar) and language attrition (loss of vocabulary and structure), among others (see Crystal 1992:104;1997:116; Myers-Scotton 2002:4; Thomason, 2001a:461; Bullock & Toribio 2009:5). A considerable amount of cross-linguistic research is available on each of the above contact phenomena. However, because these categories are inextricably interrelated, their in-depth exploration has been challenging. In this chapter, borrowing and CS are discussed at length because they relate to PMs in bilingual discourse. That is, PMs are defined as core borrowings by motivation and they are defined as code-switches by operation in their respective MLs. Before I discuss borrowing and CS, I introduce the notion of bilingualism with the aim of defining bilingual speakers who engage in CS and borrowing.



### 3.3 Bilingualism: Conceptualisation and scope

Bilingualism is sometimes used interchangeably with multilingualism as a cover term for non-monolingualism (Bowern, 2010:355). It is a diverse concept related to aspects of degree (how well does the speaker know the languages in operation?), function (for what purpose are these languages?), alternation (to what extent are the languages alternated?), and interference (how well does the speaker keep the languages apart?) among other dynamics (Mackey, 2000:27-29). The necessity of understanding the underpinnings of bilingualism are pointed out in Gafaranga's (2007:2) observation that "bilingualism offers an opportunity to understand the structures of a particular language when we see how they pattern when in contact with the structures of another language". For instance, whereas the Luganda PM system can be studied in isolation, a contact linguistic approach that looks into Luganda-English PM systems in contact reveals more about the behaviour of PMs cross-linguistically.

Bilingualism has been variously defined as "the practice of using two languages alternately by the bilingual in a situation of language contact", "a situation where two or more languages are used by the same persons" (Weinreich, 1953:1); or "the ability to communicate in two languages" (Wei, 2000:7). It is a fact of life among individual speakers in many parts of the world where languages coexist. *Ethnologue* (Simons & Fennig, 2017) estimates that there are about 7,102 living languages and these are spoken in 196 countries in the world, thus, bilingualism is present in practically every country in the world. Grosjean (2001:10) hypothesises that half of the world's population is bilingual, employing different languages at work, at home and at leisure. There are two categories of bilingualism, namely societal bilingualism in which two or more languages coexist and are used by different members of society, and individual bilingualism in which the languages in contact are within the individual (Blanc, 2001:17). This study speaks more to individual bilingualism, but because the two types are existentially intertwined, some elements of societal bilingualism such as code choice may be included in the discussion.

#### 3.3.1 The bilingual speaker

The study participants whose conversations form the corpus for this study are described as bilinguals. However, the question of who is and who is not bilingual is more complex to address than it appears (Wei, 2000:5). Its complexity springs from the fact that it is largely determined by

a speaker's competence and the mode of acquisition of the languages in question (Pena, 2011:183). Mackey (2003), cited in Myers-Scotton (2002:33), proposes a series of questions whose answers could help in describing one's bilingual competence. The questions relate to which languages a bilingual speaks, the interlingual distance between L1 and L2, where and when the L2 was learned, whether the L2 was learned as a child or not, whether a speaker is bilingual by choice or necessity, how much was learnt and what skills the learning apply to, among other questions. Using these questions as a checklist, the following describes my participants and the two languages in contact: (i) they acquired Luganda natively and English was acquired formally at school, starting in the early years of formal education (at the age of 5-7 years); (ii) given that English is a medium of communication in the Ugandan education system, I assume that all participants are bilingual by necessity; (iii) the participants are bilinguals who have written, spoken, listening and comprehension skills in both languages; (iv) Luganda and English are typologically distant language. In general, I describe the study participants as a fairly homogeneous group of bilinguals, who acquired the two languages in a 'similar' way and with similar motivations. Although their proficiencies varied here and there, such variations were not significant to affect the quality of the data obtained.

The notion of bilingual competence is also controversial. Early research viewed bilingualism as the native-like ability to use each language at a level of proficiency that equals that of a monolingual speaker (Bloomfield, 1933: 56; Mackey, 2000:26). In Grosjean, (2001:10-12), it is reported that a bilingual was appraised by accentless speech, equal abilities in writing and speaking skills, and the ability to interpret or translate without prior training. Thus, terms such as "balanced bilingual", "true bilingual", "symmetrical bilingual" described a putative speaker who is "two monolinguals in one". With this unrealistic criterion, bilingualism was thought to be a rare phenomenon found in officially multilingual countries such as Canada, Switzerland and Belgium. By the 1950s, however, the assumptions about bilingualism in general, and who a bilingual is in particular, had increasingly broadened (Mackey, 2000:26) and they continue to expand with current trends in research. For instance, the conceptualisation of bilingualism has broadened to include passive familiarity (Thomason, 2001:139).

Consequently, contact linguists have broadly described a bilingual as “someone in possession of two languages”, “people in the world who have varying degrees of proficiency in and interchangeably use three, four or even more languages” (see Wei, 2000:7-8), or “people who use two or more languages or dialects in their everyday lives” (Grosjean, 2001:10). Such definitions confirm that researchers no longer evaluate bilinguals in terms of fluency, because bilinguals make their linguistic choice for different purposes, with different people, and in different domains of life. By this assumption, it becomes inappropriate to describe a speaker’s competences as inadequate given that bilinguals are not appraised by monolingual standards (Grosjean, 2001:11). Given the elusiveness of the notion of bilingualism, it is not surprising that a bilingual, according to Wei (2000:6-7), can be described by one or more of the 39 expressions<sup>15</sup> on his list. Although some of the terms can be used interchangeably, they are not necessarily synonymous.

### **3.4 The notion of borrowing**

Borrowing is construed as an outcome of language contact. It relates to the bilingual’s importing of a foreign structure/word from one language system into another (see Matras, 2009:146). Like other language contact outcomes such as CS, research on borrowing has been challenged by terminological and conceptual contentions (Tatsioka, 2010:133). Terminologically, although the label “borrowing” is well established in studies, it is criticised for being inaccurate and semantically misleading. “Borrowing” has been interpreted to denote that a borrowed element is expected to be returned with or without interest to the donor language, and yet borrowings are never returned but become integrated permanently into the inventory of the replica language (Haugen, 1953:362; Heath, 2001:433; Field, 2002:8; Myers-Scotton, 2006:209; Matras, 2009:146). According to Johanson (2002:8, as cited in Matras 2009:146), the label “borrowing” can be interpreted as implying that the donor language is robbed of an item that belongs to its inventory, given that borrowing takes place without the donor’s consent, or even awareness (see Haugen, 1953:362).

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<sup>15</sup> Expressions in reference to a bilingual include: achieved/late, additive, ascendant, ascribed/early, asymmetrical/receptive, balanced/ambilingual/equilingual/symmetrical, compound, consecutive/successive, co-ordinate, covert, diagonal, dominant, dormant, functional, horizontal, incipient, late, maximal, minimal, natural/primary, passive/receptive, productive, secondary, semibilingual, semilingual, simultaneous, surbodinate, subtractive, successive and vertical bilingual (Wei, 2000:6-7).

Field (2002:8) and Haugen (1953:362) comment that the alternative label “stealing” appropriately describes what goes on when “borrowing” takes place. However, they are conscious of the absurd connotations of “stealing”. Haugen (1950:211) emphasises that because the donor language is not deprived of anything, it feels no urge to recover her stolen ‘linguistic goods’. Besides, the borrower is under no obligation to repay or return what was borrowed; and even if he was to return what is borrowed, the awareness of the speakers about the origin of loans is blurred over time, and the intention to ‘return’ the ‘loan’ to its rightful ‘lender’ may fail. In many situations, though, the original owner may not be traceable (see Matras, 2009:146). In an attempt to search for acceptable terms, neutral labels such as “copying” (Johanson 2002:8, as cited in Matras 2009:146), and “sharing” (Muysken, 2000:69; Gafaranga, 2007:17) are suggested. Such terms, according to Gafaranga (2007), do not only emphasise the creativity involved in the use of a foreign item within the replica language, but they also point to the assumption that the linguistic repertoire of bilingual speakers engaged in ‘talk in two languages’ is fully integrated. In defence of “borrowing” as an ideal term, Haugen (1950:211-212) states,

the real advantage of the term ‘borrowing’ is the fact that it is not applied to language by laymen. It has therefore remained comparatively unambiguous in linguistic discussion, and no apter term has yet been invented. Once we have decided to retain this well-established linguistic term, we shall simply have to disregard its popular associations, and give it as precise a significance as we can.

Similarly, the contrasting labels which define the state of languages involved in contact such as “donor/lending language” or “recipient/borrowing language” have been questioned. The conceptual pairs are perceived to evoke an interpretation in which the borrowing language is “impoverished, as incapable of expressing the totality of the speaker’s experience, hence the need to borrow from the other” (Gafaranga, 2007:14). Besides, these labels may not be restricted in situations where borrowing between the two languages is reciprocal. For instance, I observe from the data that Luganda and English borrow from each other and so, either language can be a situational donor or recipient.

Another contention relates to the synonymy or not of the terms “borrowings” and “loans”. Heath (2001:432) believes that the two terms express related notions but they are not synonymous. He clarifies that a loan is always a single word, a complete lexical item, but a borrowing can be a stem

or a full phrase. On the other hand, scholars such as Myers-Scotton (2006:209) argue for synonymy of the two terms. Myers-Scotton stresses that both “loans” and “borrowings” describe the same linguistic function, that is, words loaned from a donor language to a replica language. In the absence of consensus, the labels “borrowings” and “loans” are used synonymously in this study.

### 3.4.1 Motivations for borrowing

Various reasons call for borrowing but the frequently cited causes of structural borrowing are explained in terms of the gap and prestige hypotheses (Matras 2009:149; Myers-Scotton 2006:216). The ‘gap’ hypothesis assumes that bilinguals extend their expressive choices by selecting from the donor language certain forms which may be missing or present but less expressive in their languages. The gap-fillers which are non-existent in the replica language are what Myers-Scotton (2002:41) refers to as cultural loans. The idea of borrowing a more expressive form described in the ‘gap’ hypothesis can be explained in RT terms as a product of the speaker’s effort to maximise relevance. Given that speakers desire to communicate to their audience in the most effective way, they will be motivated to choose forms which are optimal in communicating the intended meaning at the minimum processing cost. Similarly, speakers too may opt for expressions which require less production effort during communication. Gafaranga (2007:14), citing Grosjean (1982:150), reports on an L1 French-L2 English bilingual woman who borrows often from English because she has difficulty in expressing certain notions of her daily life in the U.S.A. in French. She explains that she needed a few sentences in French to explain notions such as *day care centre*, or *window shopping* and yet in English, those expressions are straightforward. From the RT stance, the English expressions, in this case, will be judged to require less effort in production and processing, and are therefore more relevant than their French counterparts.

The donor-language prestige hypothesis, on the other hand, assumes that bilinguals imitate forms of a socially more prestigious language as a means of seeking recognition and social status (Matras, 2009:150). Unlike gap-fillers/cultural loans which may be missing in the replica language, borrowings caused by prestige will have equivalents (Myers-Scotton, 2002:41; Matras, 2009:150). Bringing the Ugandan situation into perspective, English is a highly regarded language of post-colonial Uganda and it is associated with elitism and intellectualism (see Fisher, 2000; Isingoma, 2013). I have observed monolinguals in Ugandan indigenous languages such as Luganda literally struggling to insert English constituents, to prove to the hearers that they belong to an elite class.

Unfortunately, however, they sometimes employ them out of context. Similarly, in Ugandan regions where speaking Luganda is associated with one's exposure to Kampala (the capital city of Uganda) where Luganda is spoken, such speakers will struggle to embed Luganda morphemes for prestigious reasons. Similar attitudes to English as an alien language are reported in Myers-Scotton (1993a:72).

Myers-Scotton's (2002:41, 2006:212-217) proposed typology of borrowing, comprising cultural and core borrowing, relates to the gap and prestige hypotheses respectively. That is, cultural borrowings express concepts which do not exist in the lexicon of the replica language/culture, for example, words related to science and technology. It is assumed that cultural borrowings enter languages mainly through CS by bilingual speakers, although they may also come through monolingual speech of either bilinguals or monolinguals speaking the replica language (Myers-Scotton, 2002:41). Core borrowings, on the other hand, have native lexical equivalents in the replica language and so they do not metarepresent concepts that are new or foreign. Myers-Scotton (2006:215) describes these elements as gratuitous, another layer on the cake, because they duplicate elements in the recipient language which have viable equivalents. The type of borrowing that defines PMs in this study is core borrowing, and the speaker's choice to insert an embedded PM element in the ML of either language is motivated by factors external to the need to fill a lexical gap given that Luganda and English have fully established PM systems.

It is reported that cultural borrowings appear abruptly in a language, usually when influential speakers begin to use them and others follow suit. On the other hand, core borrowed words only enter the replica language gradually, through CS and the agency of bilingual speakers (Myers-Scotton, 2002:41). Unlike core borrowings which are traceable from the speech of bilinguals, cultural borrowings appear in the speech of either bilinguals or monolinguals (speaking the recipient language), or in the CS of bilinguals.

Other types of borrowing are study specific. They include nonce borrowings (singly occurring items in a corpus); established/true borrowings (items which show full linguistic integration); wide spread loans (a switch used by many speakers); loan words (items which have received some degree of currency); idiosyncratic borrowings (switches that occur in the speech of a single

speaker); and recurrent borrowings (a switch which occurs more than 10 times irrespective of the number of speakers) (see Poplack & Meechan, 1995:200; Heath, 2001:433). Haugen (1950, 1953) suggests three major types of borrowing: loanwords (importation of words with their phonemic shapes and meaning); loan translations/calquing (native morpheme substitution in the structure of the borrowed item); and semantic loans (a word acquires new meaning in the new environment).

Various lexical items are borrowable from a language. However, certain lexical categories are more susceptible to borrowing than others. In the next two sections, I examine the possible conditions and constraints that promote or demote borrowability of these categories, particularly the functional class where PMs belong.

### 3.4.2 Borrowability of lexical categories

Earlier studies on language contact observed that a language would accept a foreign structural element only when it corresponded to its own tendencies of development (see Haugen, 1950, 1953). It was also assumed that linguistic elements “with ‘transparent’ or a one-to-one relationship between form and referent without other conspicuous grammatical features were most easily borrowed” (Hlavac, 2006:1870). By this criterion, many borrowability hierarchies such as Haugen’s (1950:224) word class-based adoptability scale showed that PMs are not prime targets for borrowing as they belong to the functional category<sup>16</sup>. By Haugen’s hierarchy, it followed that the more grammatical or less lexical an item, the less likely it would be borrowed/adopted (cf. Torres, 2002:65). It should be noted that the patterns in the hierarchies do not follow in all situations, and so these are generalisations which depict what usually happens<sup>17</sup>.

Contemporary studies have shown that any linguistic feature, including core lexical items such as PMs, is borrowable on condition that it satisfies certain constraints in language contact situations (Thomason, 2001:11, 63; Torres, 2002:65, 2006:615; Gardner-Chloros, 2010:195; MacMahon, 2010:128). Nevertheless, some linguistic items are more easily borrowable than others, as we shall see shortly in the discussion. According to Matras (2010: 77), the ease of borrowability is measured

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<sup>16</sup> His scale includes: [Nouns › Verbs › Adjectives › Adverbs › Prepositions › Interjections]. PMs are construed as members of the broader category of interjections (see Torres, 2002:65; Andersen, 2014:19).

<sup>17</sup> Other borrowability scale hierarchies include those of Thomason (2001:63) and Muysken (1981), as cited in Winford (2010:176).

in two ways: the frequency with which a structure is found to be borrowed in a sample case study, and the duration and intensity of contact that is required to license the borrowing of a particular structure. In addition, semantic autonomy is also cited as the predominant factor that favours borrowability. By semantic autonomy, it is assumed that “items which convey transparent meaning are more easily acquired given that their consistent meaning allows them to be replicated in different structural environments and in different interactional contexts” (Matras, 2010: 78). Thus, lexical items are more borrowable than non-lexical items, nouns are more borrowable than non-nouns, free morphemes are more borrowable than bound morphemes, and derivational morphemes are more borrowable than inflectional morphemes, and so on (Moravcsik, 1978, as cited in Matras 2010: 77). Although nouns and PMs may be cited as the most frequently borrowed and code-switched classes across languages owing to their grammatically self-contained character (Thomason, 2001:133; Gardner-Chloros, 2010:195), certain corpora show counter examples in which single nouns are not more frequently transferable (Gardner-Chloros, 2010:195).

Myers-Scotton (2002:76) shifts her attention from borrowability hierarchies to offering accounts for why certain lexical categories are ranked thus. She is concerned that while contact researchers agree that content morphemes such as nouns are the most frequently borrowed items, a heuristic explanation to this consensus has not been given. Using the MLF and the 4-M models, Myers-Scotton explains the distribution and high ranking of certain word categories such as nouns and verbs on the borrowability hierarchy. The explanation is based on, among other criteria, their activation in the mental lexicon and their roles on the thematic grid. As details show in Section 4.6, oppositional features such as [+/-conceptually activated] and [+/-thematic role receiver/assigner] are used to determine the borrowability of certain items. Thus, conceptually activated items are more borrowable than non-conceptually activated items and thematic role receivers are more borrowable than thematic role assigners. Conceptual activation relates to the saliency and direct accessibility a speaker may have to the contents required in order to convey the intentions of the speaker in the maximal projections (Myers-Scotton, 2002). The details with this regard are elaborated in Section 4.4.6.

The interpretation is that conceptually activated morphemes are more borrowable than conceptually inactivated morphemes because at the production level, the lemmas underlying these



morphemes are salient at the level of the mental lexicon. Similarly, morphemes which assign thematic roles are less borrowable than those which receive thematic roles because thematic role assignment requires transfer of ‘syntactic baggage’. For example, although both nouns and verbs are content morphemes, nouns are more borrowable than verbs. Both morpheme types will be conceptually activated at the production level, but their differences on the thematic role grid makes nouns (as thematic role receivers) easier to switch than verbs (the thematic role assigners). The implication is that verbs are more loaded (with ‘syntactic baggage’) than nouns, making their appearance as EL insertions in the ML harder (Myers-Scotton, 2002:76).

The high borrowability of PMs is explained in a similar way. Following the 4-M model morpheme classification (see section 4.6), PMs are treated as content morphemes that operate at discourse level. As it were, PMs as content morphemes have the features of [+conceptually activated] and [+thematic role assigner]. However, the thematic roles PMs assign are discourse-related, including Topic and Focus, which constrain the interpretation of the host utterances. According to these features, the rate at which verbs are borrowable should be similar to the rate at which PMs are borrowable, other factors being constant.

In general PMs occupy a high-ranking position on the borrowability hierarchy across languages (Hlavac, 2006:1871; Matras, 2009:193). Other accounts of the ease of borrowability of PMs relate to the nature of the meaning that PMs encode. The pragmatic meaning encoded by PMs has been described as notoriously hard to pin down, describe metalinguistically or translate (Andersen, 2014:19). It then becomes easy for bilingual speakers to accept them and transport them ‘wholly’ from the replica language (Haugen, 1953:92). Furthermore, PMs as functional elements (like interjections, some adverbs and sentence coordination markers) are susceptible to borrowing because of the peripheral grammatical role they play in sentences (Matras, 2000:505; Andersen, 2014:20).

### **3.4.3 Outcomes of pragmatic markers in contact**

The survey of the literature associates three outcomes with PM systems in contact: the two PM sets may coexist, they may acquire differentiated meanings, or markers from one language may be replaced partially or completely (Torres & Potowski, 2008:264). Coexistence occurs when the two PM systems in contact are both functioning in bilingual conversations. For instance, Brody’s

(1987:512) study discusses the Spanish PM system in contact with the PM system of Tojolba'l, a Mayan language. Example (9a) illustrates the Spanish PM *entonse* (so) co-occurring with a semantically and procedurally identical Tojolab'l PM, *ti*.

- 9a. *Entose ti wa yajni jawli*  
*Entonse*        *ti*        *wa*        *yajni jawli*  
 then    then    but    now    when that term  
 'And that's how it was'

Such examples of coexistence are frequent in the data analysed in this study. In example (9b), the Luganda PM *oba* (maybe) co-occurs with the English PM (maybe) in the same environment and both PMs encode identical procedural meaning – signalling speculation.

- 9b.        So, I think it's about maybe six or seven miles, *oba maybe* six *kubanga*... (LM10)  
 'So, I think it's about maybe six or seven miles, maybe (perhaps) maybe six because...'

Unlike in example (9a), where Spanish as a dominant language supplies the PM switch, in example (9b), English, as the dominant language, receives the switch. In the study data, both Luganda and English participate as MLs. However, Luganda being the unmarked code of the recorded bilingual conversations dominates as the ML. The coexistent PMs in (9a) and (9b) are not motivated by the need to fill a gap. Brody explains that occurrences, such as in (9a), may reflect the speaker's balance between purism attitudes (speaker's need to maintain the unmarked code status quo) and the sociocultural reality that Spanish is prestigious. The general and RT-based reasons which explain the existence of procedural doublets are discussed in the analytical chapters.

The second outcome of PMs in contact is the possibility that PMs acquire differentiated meaning. Torres & Potowski (2008:265) report that this outcome is common in contexts of stable bilingualism where the doublets may assume different glocal functions. In the data, the PMs do not exhibit characteristics of differentiated meaning. The procedural meanings they encode as embedded constituents (whether singly or in co-occurrence) do not differ from the meaning they encode elsewhere in monolingual discourse. This observation is illustrated in the analytical chapters.

Replacement is discussed as the third outcome of PMs in contact. Goss and Salmons (2000) report that replacement is a gradual process and that before PMs are replaced, they will coexist for some time, before they eventually substitute the ML markers. In addition, replacement can be complete or partial. Complete replacement is reported in Texan German varieties where the German PMs have been replaced by English PMs. The narrative shows that replacement was gradual; the English PMs were introduced into German through CS by the bilingual German-English speakers and the two PM systems coexisted for some time. Eventually, the German PMs were completely replaced by the English PMs in the language of German-English bilinguals. On the other hand, partial replacement of PMs is reported in Hlavac's (2006) study of Croatian-English bilinguals in which the English PMs have partially replaced the Croatian markers. Hlavac argues that there is a relationship between replacement and the multifunctionality of the replaced markers. He observes that English PMs which are more multifunctional seem to be replacing the Croatian PMs with fewer functions.

A similar observation is made from Myers-Scotton's (2006:216) Shona-English corpus in which the English PMs *because* and *but* are frequently used in the place of the Shona PM equivalents, *nokuti* and *asi* respectively, in monolingual Shona discourse. She concludes that the frequency of the PM insertions is indicative of borrowing in progress. Although coexistence is the most appropriate outcome which describes Luganda-English PM systems, the data exhibits instances which are closer to partial replacement. The English *so* is more multifunctional than the Luganda PM counterparts such as *kati* (now/then) and *kale* (now/then) and I can predict on the basis of the data that *so* is in 'competition' with the Luganda PM counterparts. However, there are no cases where Luganda PMs are threatening to be in competition with the English PM.

The study data demonstrates another outcome which I describe as literal translation. As in lexical calques where a word is literally translated from one language into another, the PMs in the bilingual data exhibit a related quality. The illustrations in Section 6.7 show that certain Luganda PMs are literally translated into English, and vice versa. Some translations involve singly occurring PMs and others involve PMs in combinations. Some translations are partial and others are complete.

As it is with other lexical items, the outcomes of contact in PM systems are dependent on the level of bilingualism and the intensity of contact between languages. As explained in Mougeon & Beniak (1986), cited in Torres & Potowski (2008:264), PMs are introduced into the receptor language as switches by the most bilingual speakers and the less proficient speakers may pick them up and use them differently from the way the proficient bilinguals use them.

### **3.5 Code-switching**

CS is one of the outcomes of language contact. It is defined as the “juxtaposition within the same speech exchange of passages of speech belonging to two different grammatical systems or subsystems” (Gumperz, 1982:59). Different researchers have suggested different discourse-specific functions of CS and there is no complete list available both at macro- and micro-level (Myers-Scotton, 2002). Functions include the need to fill the lexical gap, CS for euphemistic effects (to soften the effect of something unpleasant), CS for identification purposes (Thomason 2001:132), CS as used in quotations, emphasis, alignment of speech roles, reiteration, and elaboration (Gumperz 1982), CS for originality purposes, for instance, in citing figurative expressions such as idioms whose flavour might be lost if they are not expressed in a specific language (Tatsioka, 2010:131), CS to supplement the resources of the ML, CS for expressive purposes where the donor language may contain a more accurate term (Gardner-Chloros 2010:196), and so on. As we shall see in the analysis, not all these functions apply to CS of PMs.

CS is by far the most studied of the language contact phenomena. However, the fact that its mechanism interfaces with many other phenomena, such as convergence and borrowing, has rendered its conceptual scope elusive (Kazuko, 1996:52; Thomason, 2001:131; Myers-Scotton, 2002:7; Bullock & Toribio, 2009:1). The difficulties in studying CS are outlined in Bullock & Toribio (2009:2). They include issues such as: (i) its linguistic manifestation may extend from the insertion of a single word to the alternation of languages for larger segments of discourse; (ii) code-switched elements are produced by bilinguals of varying degrees of proficiency; (iii) bilingual speakers reside in various types of language contact settings and so their CS patterns may not be uniform; (iv) CS is employed for different reasons such as filling a linguistic gap, expressing ethnic identity or achieving a particular discursive aim, among others.

In addition to conceptual controversies, there are terminological disagreements. CS has been variously referred to as code-switching, code mixing, code alternation and, occasionally, as tag switching<sup>18</sup>. Such terminological differences result from the fact that CS is approached from different disciplines, and each discipline determines which terminology and definitions to adopt. Although the four terms have been used synonymously, some scholars believe they are distinct: CS in general refers to the random alternation of two languages, between and within sentences (Poplack, 1980); code mixing is used in situations where alternation results in the creation of a third code in which elements from the two languages combine in a structurally definable pattern (Maschler, 1998:125; Myers-Scotton, 2002); code alternation is viewed as an umbrella term that subsumes code-switching and code mixing (Pena 2011:185, Auer 1995:116); and tag switching/emblematic switching is the insertion of a tag such as *y'know*, *I mean* into a utterance which is entirely in the other language (Romaine, 1995:122).

Heath (2001:443) argues that the problem with CS and other contentious phenomena, such as borrowing and bilingualism, does not lie in terms or lack of labels, but the intrinsically gradient and fuzzy nature of the continuum on which they range. Heath supports the idea of keeping the terminology simple while keeping in mind its limitations. This messy situation is not surprising to Nivens (2002:5), who argues that if linguists across disciplines have failed to define language explicitly, defining CS which involves a combination of two or more languages should be doubly difficult. In the absence of consensus, I adopt the label code-switching (CS) for two reasons: first, CS is a term of wider usage and second, it conforms to the nomenclature of the MLF model, one of the frameworks which informs this study.

### **3.5.1 Types of code-switching**

CS has been classified along two dimensions, namely the structural and motivational dimensions. These dimensions are grouped under three factors: (i) factors that are independent of particular speakers and particular circumstance (e.g. overt prestige of a given language), (ii) factors which are dependent on speakers (e.g. their competence, attitudes and ideologies) and (iii) factors within conversation (Gardner-Chloros, 2009:98-99). However, as Auer (1998), cited in (Gardner-

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<sup>18</sup> There are also orthographic differences in which CS is spelled as *code-switching*, *code switching* or *codeswitching*.

Chloros, 2009:99, 109), points out, the overlaps and inter-relations between these factors makes disentangling them unfeasible in practice.

### 3.5.1.1 Structural-based code-switching types

The structural categorisation of CS is premised on the assumption that code alternations do not occur randomly, rather, they occur at specific points exhibiting a smooth transition between languages (Poplack, 1980). In other words, code-switched sentences exhibit the same ‘discourse unity’ as monolingual sentences (Myers-Scotton, 1993b:1). Different scholars have suggested different structural CS types and in this section, four scholars are discussed, namely Muysken (2000), Auer (2001), Poplack (1980) and Myers-Scotton (2002). The selection of these four scholars is motivated by two factors, namely the prominence of their typologies in contact studies and the fact that their descriptive types are reflected in the studied data.

Muysken (2000) proposes three types of CS based on conversational strategies bilingual speakers adopt, including alternational CS, insertional CS and congruent lexicalisation. As the names suggest, alternational CS occurs when materials from the two languages (A and B) alternate, as in utterance (10), in which NJ starts her utterance in English and then switches to Luganda. The participating languages remain relatively separated in an A-B configuration, and the speaker may not necessarily return immediately to English.

10. I try to think why *sirina bintu bingi byenzijukira mu buto bwange* (NJ 91)

I try to think why *si-rina*                    *bi-ntu*   *bi-ngi*   *bi-ee-nzi-jukira*                    *mu*   *buto*  
 I try to think why   NEG.ISG-have   8-thing   8-many   8-REFL-I-remember   P   childhood

*bu-ange*

14-POSS.ISG

‘I try to think why I don’t remember many things about my childhood’

Insertional CS involves the introduction of Embedded Language (EL) materials (which can range from single morphemes to entire sentences) in the Matrix Language (ML), forming an A-B-A

configuration pattern. In utterance (11), a Luganda PM combination, *naye nga* (but while), is the EL element which is inserted in a construction which is entirely English.

11. That's what I remember    *naye nga*            you rotate (HK6)  
       That's what I remember    **but while**            you would rotate

The third CS strategy, congruent lexicalisation, occurs when the participating languages share a common grammatical structure and each language will contribute lexical elements that build up the bilingual sentence as we see in utterance (12). Note that the feature of congruency does not technically define Luganda-English contact situations, and this utterance metarepresents what would suit structural outcomes in congruent situations.

12. *Obulamu obuli* focused *ku* spiritual growth (KA114)  
       *O-bulamu*    *o-bu-li*        focused    *ku*    spiritual    growth  
       IV-life        IV-14-be    focused    P        spiritual    growth  
       'Life which is focused on spiritual growth'.

Muysken's CS types are related to Auer's (2001:445) conversational patterns which explain the possible configurations in bilingual interactions. In Auer's patterns, the letters represent the interacting languages and the numbers represent the interactants. Unlike Muysken's (2000) CS types which are based on individual speakers producing bilingual utterances, the patterns in Auer (2001) are dialogic or speaker turn-based.

In Pattern Ia (A1 A2 //B1 B2 B1...), the speakers orient themselves towards a preference for one language at a time. In Pattern Ib (A1 //B1 B2 B1 B2...), the first speaker starts a conversation in language A but the addressee picks on another language B, a behaviour which causes the first speaker to adopt a new language B which the addressee supposedly prefers. Pattern II (A1 [B1] A1...) is similar to insertional CS explained above. The bilingual speaker introduces an embedded element (a switch or a borrowing) in the ML of the bilingual constituent. In Pattern IIIa (A1 B2 A1 B2 A1 B2 A1 B2...), there is sustained divergence of language choices between participants in which each speaker uses a chosen language consistently. Pattern IIIb (A1 B2 A1 B2 A1//A2 A1

A2 A1...) represents sustained convergence of language choices and the participants' negotiation sequences.

Poplack's (1980) classification of CS, as cited in Romaine (1995:122-124), is based on the structural position the embedded element occupies in the bilingual sentence. Thus, CS can be inter-sentential, intra-sentential and extra-sentential. As the names suggest, inter-sentential CS occurs between boundaries of two separate utterances or two coordinated clauses of the same utterance, similar to what happens in alternational CS, as exemplified in utterance (10) above. Inter-sentential CS involves a significant amount of syntactic complexity and conformity to the rules of both languages, and for this matter, it is performed by speakers who are fairly proficient in participating languages (Romaine, 1995:123). Intra-sentential CS occurs inside the same clause or bilingual sentence and it contains lexical elements from both participating languages as we see in utterance (13).

13. Yes. *Naye kati wandibadde osettinze parameters ezidetermininga ki kyonochoosinga* because to wait, you will be in trouble. (BV 92)

yes    *naye*    *kati*    *wa-ndi-badde*                      *o-settin-ze*    parameters

yes    but    now    SUBJ.2SG-will-be-PERF    2SG-set.PST    parameters

*e-zi-determining-a*    *ki*    *ki-o-no-choosing-a*    because to wait, you will be in trouble

IV-10-determine-FV    what    7-2SG-will-choose-FV

'Yes. But by now, you would have set up parameters which would determine what you will be choosing because to wait, you will be in trouble'.

Given that the grammars of the two languages are in contact, this type of CS is assumed to involve "the greatest syntactic risk" and engaging in it requires speakers to be fluent in both languages



(Romaine, 1995:123)<sup>19</sup>. This assumption is also reflected in definitions offered for CS such as “a certain skill of the bilingual speaker that requires pragmatic and grammatical competence in both languages” (Meisel & Köppe, 1995:277).

The extra-sentential/emblematic/tag switches occur between a clause and an extra-clausal element attached to it. Tag switches such as *y’know*, *I mean* are assumed to be subject to minimal syntactic restrictions and can be inserted in different points without violating syntactic rules of the host clause. Thus, Romaine (1995:122) accounts for the ease of their employment in terms of their syntactic flexibility. In addition, the specific pragmatic nuances they encode such as persuasion also explain why speakers employ them frequently (cf. Pena 2011:187). In utterance (14a), the Luganda interpersonal, persuasive PM *kweggamba* (Lit: I mean) is extra-sententially tagged onto clauses which are entirely in English. Note that *kweggamba* is positionally mobile and different speakers have used it in different positions as we see in (14a-c). *Kweggamba*, in non-persuasive functional usages translates as ‘in other words’. As we saw in Section 2.2.4.4, positional mobility is a diagnostic feature of emblematic switched PMs (see Hlavac, 2006:1873; Fischer, 2013:274).

14. a. The standard was so good, *kweggamba* (KG 117)

The standard was so good, I mean!

b. *Kweggamba* to her I meant a lot (BG72)

You know, to her I meant a lot

c. So *nze byebyo kweggamba by’ene* experiencing *amu okusinga*. (SL18)

so    *nze*    *bi-ebyo*    *kweggamba*    *bi-e-n-experiencing-amu*    *okusinga*

so    I    8-DEM    in other words    8.REL.SUBJ.1SG-REFL-experience-PARTv    mainly

‘In brief, that is what I experienced mainly’

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<sup>19</sup> It is established that the degree of proficiency of the bilingual speaker correlates with the type of CS engaged (Bullock & Toribio, 2009:9), and studies have shown that CS patterns of bilingual speakers may be used as a measure of one’s bilingualism – “the psychological state of an individual who has access to more than one linguistic code as a means of communication” (Blanc, 2001:16).

Although extra-sentential CS is associated with speakers with limited abilities in one language (Bullock and Toribio, 2009:4), the collected data reveals that tag switches such as the interpersonal *bannange* (my dear), *mbu* (hearsay PM) *y'know*, *I mean* and certain interactional PMs such as *well* are frequent among participants whose proficiencies in both languages are undoubted. Therefore, engagement in extra-sentential CS may be idiolectal and idiosyncratic.

Myers-Scotton (1993a, 2002) proposes three types of CS: classic CS, composite CS and convergence CS. These categories are based on the roles participating languages play in the formation and production of a bilingual clause, as reflected in her definition of CS as “the selection by bilinguals or multilinguals of forms from an embedded language (or languages) in utterances of a matrix language during the same conversation” (Myers-Scotton, 1993a:4).

Classic CS results in bilingual clauses (CPs) in which the surface level morphemes come from the ML and the EL, forming “ML+EL” constituents (Myers-Scotton, 1995:238), as illustrated in utterance (15).

15. *Era tosobola bbireversinga so\_* (NJ132)

<i>era</i>	<i>to-sobol-a</i>	<i>ku-bi-reversing-a</i>	<i>so_</i>
indeed	NEG.2SG-can-FV	INF-8-reverse-FV	<i>so_</i>

‘Indeed, you cannot reverse {one’s horrible childhood experiences}, *so\_*’

Utterance (15) is a bilingual CP in which both Luganda (ML) and English (EL) morphemes contribute to its composition. The form “*bbireversinga*” (to reverse them) illustrates the morphological mixing of codes, and is typical of a Luganda verbal morphosyntactic structure. In this case, however, it contains an embedded English inflected verb ‘reversing’, which is bracketed by the Luganda system morphemes – affixes: the fused infinitive (*bbi*)<sup>20</sup> and the FV (*a*) at the end

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<sup>20</sup>*bbi* is a product of syllable reduction process in which the infinitive morpheme *ku* and the noun class *bi* are ‘contracted’. The stressed segment ‘bbi’ in *obbireversinga* in Standard Luganda would be ‘*kubi...*’, in *okubireversinga* (to reverse them). The younger generation speakers of Luganda have a tendency of deleting the infinitival morpheme (CV- *ku*) and compensating a deletion by double consonants (CCV). For instance, *o-ku-kuuma* (to protect) transforms to *okkuuma, o-ku-komola* (to trim) to *okkomola*. The CCV segment will be stressed. In verbs such as *o-ku-simba* (to plant) in which the C of the initial syllable of the verb is not identical with that of the infinitival C /k/, there will be regressive assimilation. Thus *o-ku-simba* (to plant) becomes *ossimba*, *o-ku-bi-reversing-a* becomes *obbireversinga*. Other such examples in the data include, *obbavisinga* (to visit them) in example 16b and *mmutwala* (to take him/her) in example 49.

of the clause. Classic constituents, and testing for the ML in such constituents are discussed further in Section 4.6. Classic CS is crucial to this study because it defines the optimal constituents that I analyse. That is, PMs occurring as embedded elements in bilingual CPs. As Poplack (1980) observed for intra-sentential CS, Myers-Scotton (2002:8) also maintains that classic CS requires speakers to have enough proficiency in the participating languages to produce well-formed monolingual utterances that obey the morphosyntactic frame in the variety, which becomes the source of the ML and to be able to insert EL morphemes or to produce well-formed EL islands.

The second type of CS in Myers-Scotton's classification is composite CS. This occurs in situations where the speakers (due to psycholinguistic or socio-political factors) cannot fully access the morphosyntactic frame of the participating languages that can act as a base for the structure of the utterance. It is thus associated with language attrition and shift (Myers-Scotton, 2002:297, 2006:242). Composite CS is similar to classic CS in the sense that the morphosyntactic structure of the bilingual sentence is influenced by the rules of both languages. However, the two differ in the status of the ML. While the ML comes from one of the participating languages in classic CS, the grammatical frame in composite CS will have a composite ML structure (Myers-Scotton, 2002:297). Composite CPs are similar to the bilingual constituents envisaged in Muysken's (2000) congruent lexicalisation. The third type of CS, according to Myers-Scotton (2002), is convergence in which the CPs are built on composite ML frames with morphemes coming from only one language (Myers-Scotton, 2002:297). This study focuses on CS in which the two languages, Luganda and English, are in contact.

### **3.5.1.2 Motivational-based code-switching types**

Motivational categorisation of CS positions CS as a discourse strategy of code negotiation where speakers exploit associations of the varieties in their repertoires to convey social meanings of various types (Myers-Scotton, 2002:45). Motivational-based types of CS include situational CS (later reconceptualised as sequential unmarked choice CS), metaphorical/conversational CS (later reconceptualised as marked choice CS), CS as an unmarked choice and exploratory CS. The work of three scholars are discussed in this subsection, namely Blom and Gumperz (1972), Gumperz (1982), and Myers-Scotton (1993b, 2002, 2006).

Blom & Gumperz's (1972) classification of CS laid a foundation on which current researchers have built. They proposed two types of CS based on different social or communicative functions, namely situational CS and metaphorical CS. Metaphorical CS was later renamed as conversational CS in Gumperz (1982). Situational CS is common in diglossic communities in which distinct varieties may be associated with particular situations. Speakers will switch to a language which is appropriate for a given context, topic, participants, and so on, as community linguistic norms dictate. On the other hand, metaphorical CS is motivated by enriching conversational situations. As the name suggests, speakers may switch to a new code to induce connotations (metaphors) of the variety introduced in the conversation (Gardner-Chloros 2009:107). For instance, Mazrui & Mazrui (2003:285) discuss a polylingual Ugandan house-servant with a remarkable ability to negotiate what codes to use in different domains. She speaks to her family in Rutooro, to her neighbours in Luganda, to her employer in English, to the traders in Swahili and to the visitors in fluent French which she had learnt from her Rwandese husband.

Myers-Scotton (1993b) advanced a typology of the social motivations underlying CS which adds two more types of CS on top of situational and metaphorical/conversational CS. Based on the Markedness model<sup>21</sup>, she reconceptualised Gumperz's situational and conversational CS as sequential unmarked choice CS, and marked choice CS respectively. She then introduced two new types of CS, that is, unmarked choice CS and exploratory choice CS. Sequential unmarked CS occurs in situations where the course of conversations change (resulting in a change of the unmarked Rights and Obligations (RO) set). For example, the housemaid in Mazrui & Mazrui (2003) who switched codes acknowledges the indexical value of the various codes she employs whenever it is required in those particular situations. Marked choice CS occurs when speakers dis-identify themselves with the expected RO set by using a code which is unusual in the particular situation. It is commonly used in situations when speakers want to add nuances to meaning, emphasise something, quote something, and so on. On the other hand, exploratory choice CS occurs in situations when the unmarked code choice is not clear and it is necessary that participants

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<sup>21</sup> The Markedness model (Myers-Scotton, 1993b) is a sociolinguistic theory which explains the social indexical motivations for CS. The model holds that language choice is a system of opposition in which speakers in different communication situations will choose a dominant unmarked choice (code which indexes expected interpersonal relationships) or a less expected code, the marked code on the basis of costs and benefits. It is argued that these choices index rights and obligations sets (RO sets) between participants in a given interaction type (Myers-Scotton, 1993:84).

negotiate what is to be the unmarked code in that particular interaction (Myers-Scotton, 1993b:142). This type of CS illustrates how CS is a true negotiation between language choices. For instance, whereas siblings may use a clear unmarked choice at home, they may negotiate another code if one of them visits the other in his office.

The fourth type of CS is switching as unmarked choice. It involves the use of a code which is the most expected for a given interaction type. What makes unmarked CS unique among other motivational CS types is the fact that speakers engage two or more languages resulting in intrasentential CS (Myers-Scotton, 1993b: 117). For this reason, it is the most relevant type for the present analysis. At Makerere University (Uganda) where I work and where data was obtained, spontaneous CS is the norm for all non-formal interactions where the participants are bilingual speakers of Luganda and English. Except for official meetings and lectures, CS remains the unmarked code. Myers-Scotton (1993b:117) reports that unmarked CS is common among urban Africans who switch between the colonial language (with official status) and indigenous languages for many interaction types.

Myers-Scotton (1993b: 119) proposes various conditions that favour unmarked CS, including that speakers must be bilingual peers, the interaction type must call for such a choice, and participants must be relatively proficient in the languages to evaluate positively their identities. The idea of level of proficiency is debatable. Myers-Scotton (1993b:119) argues that proficiency should not be a necessary condition that must be met for unmarked CS (which involves intrasentential CS) to take place. She argues that the speakers' ability to engage in CS is more associated with familiarity with using the two languages than with social factors such as education. She cites insertional CS, (the introduction of the EL elements in the ML frame) as a type of CS that does not require high proficiency cost. However, she recognises that the differences in individual speakers' proficiencies explain the differences in their CS patterns, and hence the speakers' bilingualism.

### **3.5.2 Attitudes towards codeswitching**

The notion of CS has been viewed as a disorderly phenomenon, especially by non-linguists, because it touches on the issues of orderliness of language structures involved (Gafaranga, 2007:11). To this effect, derogatory names such as *Franglais* (French-English in France), *Kinyafraçais* (Kinyarwanda-French in Rwanda), *Uglish* (English-Indigenous Ugandan languages

in Uganda) are coined to describe the mode of language used for such speech interactions. Ironically, though, alternations involving two prestigious codes, like French and English, are typically portrayed positively, and coinages like “elite bilingualism”, are used in their reference (Gafaranga, 2007:12). Gafaranga explains that derogatory coinages reflect two ideas, namely that such speech behaviours are very visible and that monolingualism, across the world, remains the dominant language ideology.

In addition, although research on bilingualism has shown that smooth integration of languages among bilingual speakers indexes bilingual linguistic and communication skills rather than shortcomings, CS is largely perceived as a sign of semilingualism, particularly in the educational domain (Bullock & Toribio, 2009:10), and a sign of linguistic deficiency and language corruption (Matras, 2009:101). It is reported that some societal norms and values confer prestige on monolingual forms and stigma on bilingual codes such CS. Such attitudes were experienced during data collection.

Although CS is used as the unmarked code in semi-formal and informal interactions among educated bilinguals in Uganda, my participants were hesitant to do so because many take CS to be informal and ‘disrespectful’. Given that English is associated with formality, most of the participants were set to use English. It was necessary for me to brief them about the general objective of the study (which for ethical reasons had been included in the consent form). I reminded them that they were free to use Luganda, English or CS during interaction. Even so, many did not take me seriously. As a moderator, I set an example by engaging in CS myself. While the majority of participants were able to code-switch freely, three participants used English only and three used Luganda only. Those who ‘avoided’ code-switching did so partly because they were stigmatised by the negative associations of CS. Others were bound by issues related to indigenous language purism, linguistic and cultural identity and other associated language ideologies as reported in Hill & Hill (1986).

The idea of purism, according to Muysken (2013:714), speaks to some of the factors which may hinder extensive and intimate CS practices. Paradoxically, some of the participants who ‘resisted’ CS were knowledgeable about linguistic realities related to the social dynamics of language

contact, and other sociolinguistic assumptions. Interestingly, however, even those participants who ‘avoided’ CS ended up switching because CS is characteristically spontaneous and can be triggered by necessity. Their conversations were punctuated by some PM switches including interjections and certain deference markers which were more expressive in Luganda than in English, and vice versa. Such behaviours have been reported in studies elsewhere. Myers-Scotton (1993b: 122) observes that speakers who engage in unmarked CS are often unaware that they are using a mixed code. Because they usually start their conversations in their indigenous languages (usually the MLs), they perceive their conversation to be typically in those languages. Similar scenarios are reported in Forson (1979:127), cited in Myers-Scotton (1993b: 122), in which Akan-English bilinguals would start a conversation in Akan and freely introduce EL elements in Akan and they would be taken aback when their attention was drawn to the fact that they were code-switching. As we got into the discussions, I realised that some participants find it okay to code-switch between Luganda and another indigenous language, or even another foreign language other than the hegemonic English. Such attitudes are similar to those inferable from labels such as ‘elite bilingualism’ above.

The attitudes and related resentments towards CS can be attributed to, and exhibited by, individuals or communities. For instance, it is reported that in Tariana (a language spoken in Brazil), CS is considered a taboo and those who engage in it even accidentally are ridiculed (Holmes, 2001:38-39, as cited in Tatsioka 2010:131). One is allowed to code-switch only during direct reporting or in expressions of speeches of animals or spirits. Other communities are reported to have particular codes employed for particular topics or functions (Tatsioka, 2010:131). On the contrary, in areas where extensive CS is normal, it might be extremely unnatural for someone to talk in a single language (Bowern, 2010:349). Studies have also reported cases of bilingualism where speakers have accepted the bilingual nature of their communities and CS is treated as a normal phenomenon, a fact of life (see Sankoff, et al, 1997:192).

### **3.5.3 Structural constraints on CS**

CS is not a product of accidental combination of different languages. Rather, bilingual constituents are systematically organised and distributed at specific points in the bilingual sentence as determined by the interlocutor’s social and communicative needs and preferences (Muysken, 2000). The transitions in CS are always smooth and systematic, irrespective of whether the

languages in operation are genetically related or not. Interestingly, bilingual speakers have the ability to draw on the language varieties in their linguistic repertoires as dictated by the needs of the participants and the conversational setting, and successfully communicate without violation of the grammar of either language (Sebba, 2009:40). For this, CS structures are analysable just like monolingual structures because they are guided by rules and principles, although there is some contention about the form such rules and principles may take.

CS researchers have proposed various structural constraints on CS. These constraints have been discussed at length in Bokamba (1988), Myers-Scotton (1993a), MacSwan (2009). Earlier constraints on CS have been criticised for being data-specific and structure-specific and are thus not applicable to many cross-linguistic data sets. For instance, Timm's (1975) Clitic Pronoun Constraint<sup>22</sup> was based on a Spanish-English corpus and specifically looked at constraints on switches between pronominals and finite verbs, requiring clitic pronouns to belong to the same language as the verb to which they are cliticised. Pfaff's (1979) Adjectival Phrase Constraint<sup>23</sup> targeted adjective/noun mixes. This condition favours switching of surface structures common to the participating languages. Poplack's (1979) Equivalence Constraint<sup>24</sup> assumes that CS within constituents is acceptable on condition that the word order requirements of the participating languages are fulfilled at surface level, and her Free Morpheme Constraint<sup>25</sup> (Poplack, 1980), which restricts the switching of bound morphemes, has been influential in many studies because it is both general and concise. Finally, Sridhar & Sridhar's (1980:412) Dual-structure Principle<sup>26</sup> restricts the point at which "a CS constituent may begin, but allowing for the possibility that a constituent's internal structure differs from that of the host language" (see Myers-Scotton, 1993a:27).

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<sup>22</sup> "Clitic pronouns objects are realised in the same language as the verb to which they are cliticized, and in the position required by the syntactic rules of that language" (Timm, 1975).

<sup>23</sup> "Adjective/noun mixes must match the surface word order of both the language of the adjective and the language of the head noun" Pfaff's (1979:306).

<sup>24</sup> "Code-switches will tend to occur at points in discourse where juxtaposition of L1 and L2 elements does not violate a syntactic rule of either language. i.e., at points around which the surface structures of the two languages map on to each other" Poplack (1979:10)

<sup>25</sup> "A switch is prohibited from occurring between a bound morpheme and lexical form unless the latter has been phonologically integrated into the language of the former Poplack (1982:12).

<sup>26</sup> "The internal structure of the guest constituent [EL constituent] need not to conform to the constituent structure rules of the host language [ML], so long as its placement in the host sentence obeys the rules of the host language" Sridhar & Sridhar's (1980:7)



Although these rules have been successfully used to address study specific questions in some mixed varieties, other studies have demonstrated counter examples (see Bokamba, 1988:34; Myers-Scotton, 1993a: 27ff; MacSwan, 2009:312). Bokamba (1988) reports that the Free Morpheme Constraint and the Clitic Pronoun Constraints are untenable in CS involving African and Indo-European language pairs such as Kiswahili-English and Lingala-French. Bantu languages, for instance are agglutinative and may allow code insertions between dependent morphemes. Similarly, Clitic pronoun objects may not be realised as prescribed by Timm's constraint. Myers-Scotton (1993a:28) cites an example from Nartey's (1982) study of Adɲame<sup>27</sup>-English data where the Free Morpheme Constraint is violated. In example (16a) the Adɲame inflectional (bound) morpheme *-e* is realised on the English verb, *help*, and this constituent follows the morpheme order of Adɲame (SOV) and not the English (SVO).

16. a. *a ɲe mĩ help-e*  
 3PL COP me help-PRES PROG  
 'They are helping me'

Similarly, in terms of the Free Morpheme Constraint, the Luganda-English bilingual clause in (16b) would be unacceptable because the English verb forms *visiting* and *looking* host Luganda bound morphemes such as *o-bba-* on *visiting* and the noun class *ba-* on *looking*, as well as the FV *-a* on both verbs.

- 16b. *Abaana beegaana bazadde baabwe nga bazze obbavisitinga nga balookinga bubi* (BI61).

<i>A-ba-ana</i>	<i>ba-egaana</i>	<i>ba-zadde</i>	<i>ba-abwe</i>	<i>nga</i>	<i>ba-zze</i>
IV-2 <sub>x</sub> -child	2 <sub>x</sub> -deny	2 <sub>Y</sub> -parent	2 <sub>x</sub> -POSS.3PL	when	2 <sub>Y</sub> .3PL-come-PERF

<i>o-ku-ba-visiting-a</i>	<i>nga</i>	<i>ba-looking-a</i>	<i>bubi</i>
IV-INF-2 <sub>x</sub> -visit-FV	when	SUBJ <sub>x</sub> -look-FV	bad

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<sup>27</sup> Adɲame is a Kwa language spoken in South-Eastern Ghana.

‘Children ‘disown’ their parents when they (parents) go to visit them and they are not looking good, i.e, not dressed decently’

Example (17) demonstrate a clash in the ordering of NP constituents in Luganda-English. Whereas English requires a prenominal adjective, Luganda require a postnominal modifier.

17. I think **weeks** *bbiri gujja kuba gukaze*. (KM2)  
 I think **weeks** *bbiri gu-jja kuba gu-kaze*  
 I think weeks two 3-will be.PRES 3-dry.PST  
 ‘I think in two weeks it would be dry {the cut-down tree}’.

Myers-Scotton (1993a:24) describes the constraints discussed above as ‘local-solution’ constraints because their motivation is inductive and data specific. In addition, because they are mainly descriptive and not theoretical, they can only account for specific data sets, without explaining them. Myers-Scotton (1993a:34) recommends their rejection in favour of the MLF model on two grounds: that the counter-examples are too many to be attributed to natural speech variation and given that the constraints are based on typologically diverse languages, the counter examples cannot be explained in terms of such differences.

Nonetheless, Myers-Scotton recognised the contributions of these rules and principles and, by building on some of their assumptions and observations, developed the MLF model which in comparison to the earlier constraints is organised, principled and independently motivated<sup>28</sup>. As we shall see in Section 4.6, the rules and principles of the MLF and the 4-M models which explain the structural configuration in bilingual speech are more universal and have been successfully applied to a number of genetically unrelated language pairs. For instance, by applying the MLF model’s Morpheme Order Principle and System Morpheme Principle, we are able to empirically account for the structural configurations in utterances (16a-b and 17a-b). The MLF model has thus

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<sup>28</sup> The MLF has also benefited from non-local constraints such as the asymmetrical model (Joshi, 1985) and the frame-content hypothesis (Azuma, 1993).

claimed universal acceptance (Myers-Scotton & Jake, 2009: 337). This, however, does not suggest that it lacks limitations.

### **3.6 Differentiating borrowed forms from code-switched forms**

Borrowing and CS are highly interrelated and distinguishing singly occurring borrowings from singly occurring code-switches has remained challenging. The criteria for differentiating between the two phenomena vary from one researcher to another and there may not be a failsafe distinctive method at the synchronic level to tease the two notions apart (Gardner-Chloros, 2010:195). What complicates the delineation between the two is the hypothesis that every loan presumably starts as a spontaneous switch before it is generalised among speakers of the host language (Myers-Scotton, 1992:20; Gardner-Chloros, 1995; 2010:195; Heath, 2001: 433). The proposed criteria for differentiating switches from loans are based on the output and the input distinctions. The output distinctions relate to frequency of occurrence, linguistic integration and assimilation (see Haugen, 1950:212) and the input distinctions are speaker-based. They relate to determining the ML of the embedded constituent, and whether the speaker knows the ML equivalent of the constituent, among others (Nivens, 2002:5). The assumption is that the more criteria met by a given item, the more confident we can be that we are dealing with a loanword or a code-switch.

Owing to the range of linguistic guises which CS adopts (Gardner-Chloros, 2010:202), these criteria and the level at which they are qualified have remained controversial. For instance, on the issue of integration, while some scholars have argued that loans are both phonologically and morphologically integrated (e.g. Grosjean, 1982; Bokamba, 1988), some scholars are in favour of morphological and syntactic integration but not necessarily phonological integration (e.g. Hyltenstam, 1995:307). Other scholars believe in integration at all levels (e.g. Berk-Seligson, 1986), and for some, the distinction is not always clear-cut (e.g. Koppe & Miesel, 1995:277-278) (see also Nivens, 2002:5). Some of the criteria are discussed below.

#### **3.6.1 Phonological integration**

Earlier studies had assumed that loans are normally adopted to the structure of the receptor language in sound and form and that code-switches are not. Whereas this observation is still treated as accurate by many linguists, Myers-Scotton (2006:219) points out that it oversimplifies facts about loans and leaves out the detailed levels of integration. There is evidence in many studies

where loans fit into the phonological or morphological system of the replica language. There are words that show only partial integration and some which do not show any integration. Thus, Myers-Scotton argues that integration should be represented as a continuum in which certain words may be more or less integrated. The study data exhibits all these cases. In utterance (18), there are two established loans borrowed from English: a core borrowing *ppeeni* (pen) and a cultural borrowing *bbulu* (blue). These two words are established borrowings in Luganda and they are widely used by monolingual speakers.

18. ... : *ppeeni eya bbulu ne e-myufu*. (MS 246)  
*ppeeni eya bbulu ne e-myufu*  
 pen REL blue CONJ IV-red  
 ‘{At school, I used to have two pens:}: a blue and a red pen’

Both words are fully integrated (phonologically) in Luganda and they satisfy the phonotactics of the language such as constituting open syllables, among others. The integration process of the English *pen*, which is a closed stressed monosyllabic word, into Luganda required among other things, (i) opening the syllable by introducing a final vowel which makes *ppeeni* disyllabic, and (ii) creation of a CCV segment to mark stress. On the other hand, the integration of *blue* (*bbulu*) involved breaking up the English consonant cluster ‘bl’ in *blue* because such a cluster is not permissible in Luganda.

While some words integrate fully in the ML, other words do not. For example, the French loans such as *café*, *etcetera*, *sine qua non* are still recognisable as foreign in English because they have maintained their graphic, structural and phonetic structures (Heath 2001:433). In some studies, however, such words which resist phonological integration will be treated as switches and not as loans (Kazuko, 1996:53). With such examples, Myers-Scotton (1992, 2002) comments that phonological integration may not be an ideal criterion because loans, (both cultural and core) phonologically integrate into the replica language depending on a number of factors including differences in the phonology of the two languages, the degree of bilingualism of the speakers using the language, etc. Some words integrate fully, other integrate partially and some do not integrate at all, making using a phonological integration criterion challenging.

### 3.6.2 Morphosyntactic integration

Similarly, the criterion of morphosyntactic integration is not viable in differentiating loans from code-switches. Although most loans are entirely or almost entirely morphosyntactically integrated into the replica language, there are always exceptions. For instance, the Luganda cultural loan *ssaati* (shirt) from English is fully integrated and it will be constrained by the morphosyntactic rules of Luganda, including inflections and morpheme order whenever it occurs, just like other Luganda words. Utterance (19) illustrates this. The noun *essaati* (a shirt) receives Subject-Agreement marker befitting CL9, (a class for loans in Luganda) as bold-faced, and it occupies a syntactic slot expected of nouns in Luganda ML.

19. ... *ng'amapeesa geereze **essaati** eringa egenda okkutuka.* (NP67).

<i>nga</i>	<i>a-ma-peesa</i>	<i>ge-ereeze</i>	<b><i>e-ssaati</i></b>	<i>e-ri-nga</i>	<i>e-gend-a</i>	<i>o-ku-kutuk-a</i>
while	IV-6-button	6-stretch.PERF	IV-shirt	IV-be-like	6-go-FV	IV-INF-break-FV

{Context: NP was describing someone who was wearing a tight shirt}. While the buttons on the shirt were overstretched and it appeared like the shirt was about to tear'

Conversely, some established loans retain some of their system morphemes from the donor language. For instance, the word *alchemy* is borrowed from Arabic *Al kimiya* and it has retained *al* (definite article). Myers-Scotton (1992, 2002) explains that system morphemes are usually retained as they are not part of the morphosyntactic frame. However, she argues, within the MLF model, that the borrowings which enter into a replica language with their system morphemes will conform to the morphosyntactic requirements of the replica language. For instance, if *syllabi* or *data* are recognised as plural forms in the replica language, then they will obey the Subject-Verb agreement (indicating plurality) whenever they appear. Speakers would be expected to say, "the data/syllabi are..." and not "the data/syllabi is...". Such language integrative behaviours affirm the asymmetry principle working between the participating languages as envisaged in the MLF model.

### 3.6.3 Nativisation

The nativisation criterion is described as being more realistic and reliable because it is taken from the perspective of the entire language and not from the perspective of single speakers (Andersen, 2014:21). Nativised loans will occur in situations where CS is not involved at all, including in the speech of monolinguals. The nativised forms will have a conventional meaning across speaker groups, and will be repeatedly used by monolingual speakers, including children whose competence in the donor language may be restricted (see Myers-Scotton, 2006:254). Such loans will not be disputed, and can have a dictionary status (Myers-Scotton, 2002:41).

Within the MLF model nativisation is explained in terms of cognitive status of loans vis-à-vis code-switches within the mental lexicon. The model assumes that while loans can be projected by lemmas tagged for the ML mental lexicon, code-switches have entries tagged only for the EL. However, code-switches can achieve the status of loans if they are used frequently enough, that is, when their lemmas are added to the replica language's store in the mental lexicon to support them. It is also assumed that loans (particularly cultural loans) enter their ML abruptly but code-switches enter a language gradually.

### 3.6.4 Predictability

Myers-Scotton (1922:29; 2002:41) supports predictability as the most viable criterion agreed upon by most researchers. The argument is that while you may not predict when a loan will reoccur, you may predict that it definitely will reoccur whenever it is needed to signify a concept it refers to. On the contrary, code-switches lack predictive value; they may or may not reoccur. The predictive value of loans is strengthened when the loan has an established dictionary status in the replica language, and such a status is undisputed. The challenge is that words may take some time to attain dictionary status. Thus, there are many established loans without dictionary status and in less documented languages which lack dictionaries, this additional factor may not be feasible.

### 3.6.5 Frequency

Switches have also been distinguished from borrowings by the criterion of frequency, in that if a foreign element appears once, then it would presumably be safe to assume that it is a code switch and vice versa. As Thomason (2001:134) argues, this criterion is difficult or impossible to apply in practice. Unless elements occur very frequently, it may not be easy to determine whether a

speaker has used an item once, occasionally or frequently. Scholars such as Myers-Scotton (1993: 204-205), based on a 24 hour corpus, to claim that any lexeme which occurs more than three times is a borrowing. She explains that of the remaining elements, any lexeme representing a new concept or object in the ML culture is a borrowing and the remaining EL elements, whether assimilated into the phonology or morphology of the ML or not, are regarded as switches. Again, this criterion may not be empirically viable. Zufferey (2012:143) observed that a number of factors affect the distribution of elements, such as PMs, including the nature and the mode of the data analysed. As long as you are not analysing a large multi-genre and multi-modal discourse, recurrence of certain elements becomes unpredictable (Torres, 2002:66).

Myers-Scotton (1992) used the MLF model to define frequency heuristically. She recognises that loans occur more frequently than code-switches. Using the blocking hypothesis, “A blocking filter will block any EL content morpheme which is not congruent with the ML”, Myers-Scotton (1992:35) clarifies why loans will occur more frequently than code-switches. She explains that during surface sentence production, the formulator does not restrict loans (both content and system morphemes) in ML+EL constituents, but permits only content morphemes as code-switches on condition that they satisfy the requirements of the blocking filter, that is, when they are found congruent with the ML. As mentioned, on the assumption that loans are part of the ML’s lexicon, Myers-Scotton explains that they will be accessed via their own ML lemmas and will have a similar frequency as the indigenous ML words. Code-switches as EL elements hold another status; they are “accessed through ML lemmas if there is a congruence between the ML lemma and the indigenous EL lemma”. This explains why code-switches are limited in frequency.

Below is a feature matrix table which summarises the predominant characteristics that distinguish CS from borrowing as suggested by Scotton (1988), and Poplack & Sankoff (1984), (cf. Salmons, 1990: 466; Muysken, 1995:190).

		Borrowing	Code-switching
Adaptation	Phonological	+/-	+/-
	Morphological	+	-
	Syntactic	+	-
Frequent use		+	-
Replacement		+	-
Nativisation		+	-
Semantic change		+	-
Acceptability		+	-

Table 1: Feature matrix for distinguishing code-switching from borrowing

Overall, not all the features and categories in the table are equally relevant for this study. Remember that the proposed matrix criteria are suggested to address CS and borrowing in general, and yet this study addresses a specific type of CS – intra-sentential CS – a specific type of borrowing – core borrowing, and a specific type of morpheme – PMs – whose diagnostic properties differ significantly from the properties of content words. Following the behaviour and manifestation of *so* and *kubanga* as core borrowings in the data, I propose a modified feature matrix in the table below.

–		<i>kubanga</i>	<i>So</i>
Adaptation	Phonological	-	+
	Morphological	-	-
	Syntactic	-	-
Frequent use		-	+
Replacement		-	+
Nativisation		-	-
Procedural change		-	-
Acceptability		-	?

Table 2: Adapted feature matrix for *so* and *kubanga* in the data



Although the English *so* and the Luganda *kubanga* operate as switches in their respective MLs, we see from the table that they differ on a number of dimensions. These differences are explored further in the analytical chapters.

### **3.7 Conclusion**

The focus of the discussion in this chapter has been on the notion of language contact and its outcomes. Emphasis has been on CS and borrowing as outcomes which define the operational status of *so* and *kubanga* PMs in the bilingual data. The discussion has confirmed further that the distinction between CS and borrowing is fuzzy partly because singly occurring switches have the potential of becoming borrowings upon adoption by fluent bilinguals, borrowings may resemble switches in retaining a foreign status or discernible internal structure, switches may resemble borrowings often in brevity (words and short phrases) and in being fitted into another language's syntax (Heath, 2001:433). I concur with Thomason's (2001:60) observation that language contact outcomes should be viewed as rough approximations or abstractions of a very messy reality where each notion varies in scope and in details.

## CHAPTER 4

# THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS: RELEVANCE THEORY AND THE MATRIX LANGUAGE FRAME MODEL

### 4.1 Introduction

The discussion of the manifestation of *so* and *kubanga* and the procedural roles they play in facilitating interaction in their respective contexts is informed by two theoretical frameworks, namely Blakemore's (1987, 2002) Relevance-theoretic (RT) notion of procedural meaning, and Myers-Scotton's (1993a, 2002) Matrix Language Frame (MLF) model. The RT-based notion of procedural meaning treats PMs as procedural elements which constrain the implicatures of the utterances they introduce, by guiding the hearer to perform certain computations which lead to the derivation of relevant contextual assumptions for minimal mental processing effort. The MLF model, on the other hand, explains the structural configurations and constraints which license the occurrences of embedded PMs within the bilingual clauses.

Although the two models have limitations, which I discuss later in the chapter, they are selected as the best options for the analytical requirements of the study. In situations where their explanatory power is constrained, I adopted two compensatory strategies. First, borrowing from related models to clarify the salient issues and second, broadening certain existing principles and assumptions to accommodate a concept under discussion. For instance, RT is a hearer-oriented framework whose aim is to explain how utterances are processed and interpreted by the hearer, and what cognitive effects hearers derive from the linguistic computations that they perform (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). In this study, however, I adopt a speaker-oriented perspective to suit the requirements of the study. That is, a speaker-oriented perspective which focuses on the choices of PMs and PM combinations that a speaker selects in order to communicate optimally relevant procedural relations to the hearer. It is evident from the analysis that the principles which govern utterance interpretation on the side of the hearer are tilted to apply to a speaker, a pointer to the inclusiveness of RT (Wilson, 1998:58). The two analytical frameworks are broad and they have undergone various modifications. I narrow my focus to the key aspects, principles and assumptions relevant to the analysis of the PMs in question.

The largest part of this chapter discusses RT as the primary theoretical framework which informs the core objective of study – analysing the procedural roles the selected PMs play in the discourse. I give a brief exposition of the pre-RT models of communication (the Code model and the Inferential model of communication), whose weaknesses RT is designed to address. The core of the chapter relates to Blakemore’s assumptions about procedural encoding and the inferential processes involved in the retrieval of the wide range of procedural meanings PMs encode. Lastly, I discuss the MLF model and demonstrate how some of its principles explain the configuration of embedded bilingual PMs in the data.

## **4.2 The Code model of communication**

The Code model, or the Semiotic approach, is regarded as the foundation of all theories of communication from the time of Aristotle through to modern semiotics (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:2). It is premised on the assumption that communication is achieved by encoding and decoding messages. The model presupposes that as long as the devices are in order, and the codes/language used in communication are shared by the speaker and the hearer and the channel is not distorted (by noise), communication will be guaranteed (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:4). As we shall see shortly, RT opposes this assumption. Sperber & Wilson (1995) argue that successful communication relates to the inferential retrieval of the communicative and informative intentions of the communicator, and not on the orderliness of codes.

The Code model is credited for being explanatory in nature, having made the first breakthrough in explaining how we understand one another in communication and why communication fails (Clark, 2013:47). However, it is descriptively inadequate to account for the recovery of implicit information (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:6) or in resolving linguistic indeterminacies. For instance, on the assumption that the devices are in order, the codes used in communication are shared by the speaker and the hearer, the channel is not distorted and the speaker and hearers share knowledge about Christian faith, mere decoding of the utterance below in (20), will not enable the hearer to access the intended attributes that the speaker might have intended him to recover by associating *Joel* with an angel, given that *Joel* is human and not a heavenly being. Thus, post-Code model

scholars would argue that the utterance in (20) serves as an input for the recovery of a series of implicit meanings such as, *Joel has a pure heart, is caring, committed, faithful, etc.*<sup>29</sup>

20. Joel is an angel.

21. Esther will buy it next week.

Similarly, the referents encoded by *it*, and *next week* in utterance (21) are underspecified. Their retrieval is a necessary part of interpretation and decoding them linguistically yields a skeletal conceptual representation such as *Esther will buy ‘something’ a ‘week after today’*. What *Esther* will buy and the time at which it will be bought are not specified. In addition, determining the specific reference *next week* is dependent on the context in which the construction is uttered as *next week* is just a pointer to the concept ‘next week’, which could be any time (seven or fewer days) from the day the utterance is made. Since identifying a referent of any referential expression is part of the hearer’s task in utterance interpretation, it is only by inferential computations that a hearer will be able to fill the underspecified conceptual gaps through assigning reference, disambiguating, recovery of implicit import, recovery of figurative interpretation, among others (Wilson & Sperber, 2004:613).

### 4.3 The Gricean Inferential model of communication

The Inferential model is built on the assumption that “communication is achieved by producing and interpreting evidence” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:2). That is, by producing an utterance, speakers aim to make their intentions known to the hearer, who in return will recognize messages that provide evidence directly or indirectly about the speaker’s intention (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). For instance, if a two-year-old child intends to make it manifest to her mother that she is hungry, her behaviour of walking to her mother with an empty cup is evidence enough to allow the mother to infer that the child is hungry. The notion of manifestness is explained later in Section 4.4.3.

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<sup>29</sup> The interpretation procedure would be different in utterances such as *Michael is an angel* in which Michael could be explicitly processed not as a mortal being but as a heavenly being – Michael the archangel.

Within the model, it is assumed that “once a certain piece of behaviour is identified as communicative, it is reasonable to assume that the communicator is trying to meet certain general standards” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:58). These expectations or standards are stipulated roughly in a general principle – the Cooperative Principle<sup>30</sup>. The principle assumes that “our talk exchanges are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognises in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:33). The Cooperative Principle is classified into four categories which are fleshed out in a series of nine (sub) maxims<sup>31</sup>, all of which are suggested to govern conversational interactions. The maxims of quality, quantity and relation appeal to ‘what is said’ and the maxim of manner appeals to how ‘what is said’ is said. The maxim of relation was problematic for Grice to define and as an attempt to address this problem, Sperber & Wilson redefined this concept and incorporated it in RT (Clark, 2013:58). In RT, Grice’s Cooperative Principle has been reduced to one principle, the relevance principle, although Sperber & Wilson’s concept of relevance differs from Grice’s original concept<sup>32</sup>. As we shall see, relevance in RT is defined in terms of cognitive effects and processing effort.

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<sup>30</sup> “Make your conversation contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” (Grice, 1975:45).

<sup>31</sup> Maxims of quantity

1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required

Maxims of quality

*Supermaxim*: Try to make your contribution one that is true

1. Do not say what you believe to be false
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence

Maxim of relation

1. Be relevant

Maxims of manner

*Supermaxim*: Be perspicuous

1. Avoid obscurity of expression
2. Avoid ambiguity (It does not bar speakers from using ambiguous expressions but if used, hearers must be able to disambiguate them)
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)
4. Be orderly. (Grice, 1975:45-47)

<sup>32</sup>Note that RT is not the only approach to understanding human communication that is influenced by the work of Grice. Neo-Gricean scholars such as Keen (1976) challenge the universality of the maxims, Horn (1984, 1988, 1989, 2004) reduces the Gricean maxims into two principles (the Q and R Principle) and advances the notion of scalar implicatures, and Levinson’s (1987a, 1987b, 2000) heuristics aim to reduce the maxims into three (see Clark, 2013 for details).

## 4.4. Relevance theory

Sperber & Wilson's (1986, 1995) cognitive-based theory of utterance interpretation is drawn from Fodor (1983)'s hypothesis about the modularity of mind, and treats utterance interpretation as a cognitive process performed by the central systems of the mind (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:66). Since Sperber & Wilson's initial 1986 publication, RT has undergone various modifications (see Ramos, 1998), with the most notable development being Blakemore's contribution on the notion of the conceptual-procedural distinction (Sperber & Wilson, 2000:77; Clark, 2016:142), a development from which the analysis of the PMs in this study benefits. It should be pointed out that RT is not a theory of communication in general, but rather a theory of utterance interpretation which sets out to offer an explanation of what culminates in appropriate interpretation in ostensive human verbal communication (Wilson & Sperber 1994:85; Sperber & Wilson, 2000:77). As mentioned, the explanatory power of RT is constrained (see Sperber & Wilson, 1995:166; Giora, 1997:17; 262; Ramos, 1998:307), but it remains one of the most promising and credible models in explaining the cognitive processes involved in utterance interpretation beyond mere description.

### 4.4.1 Relevance theory and utterance interpretation

Human communication is a complex phenomenon and understanding how it is achieved requires some knowledge of what goes on when hearers perform computations. The goal of RT is to "identify underlying mechanisms, rooted in psychology, which explain how humans communicate with one another" (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:32). That is, RT is motivated by the need to explain how we know what other people mean when they communicate with us (Clark, 2013: 5). Its central claim is the assumption that the recovery of the information which the speaker intends to convey by an ostensive stimulus is achieved not by decoding but by the non-demonstrative inferential processes in which considerations of relevance play a central role (Wilson & Sperber, 1994:85). What guides the hearer to arrive at the intended meaning represented by the stimulus is the cognitive search for the optimally relevant interpretation from the resources available. According to RT, the first accessible interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance is the correct interpretation of the ostensive stimulus (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:178)<sup>33</sup>.

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<sup>33</sup> This assumption has been criticised. For instance, it falls short in the face of ambiguity (see Ramos, 1998:307).

The proponents of RT assume that utterance interpretation involves three inferential subtasks, in addition to a number of other processes at subconscious and conscious levels:

- a. the recovery of the propositional form and mood of the utterance – which is achieved by the selection of semantic representations through disambiguation and reference-assignment processes, among others;
- b. the recovery of the explicit content conveyed by the utterance; and
- c. the recovery of the implicit information conveyed by the utterance.

(Sperber & Wilson, 1995:179)

In other words, utterance interpretation requires the recovery of explicatures, implicated premises and implicated conclusions (Wilson & Sperber, 2004:615). For instance, the recovery of the information communicated in utterance (22), involves mapping of individual items to their semantic representation at the lexical level.

22. Fred won it.

At the explicit level, the hearer, driven by his knowledge of grammar, will assign reference to the semantically underspecified form *it* such as [-HUMAN]. Then, driven by the principle of relevance, the hearer will supply the relevant context and derive a saturated proposition out of utterance (22), that is, a thought that uniquely identifies *Fred*, contextualises the sense of *won* and conceptually represents the thing that *Fred* won. In a discourse context<sup>34</sup> where more than one referent is accessible as a representation of the intended referent, accessibility can be enhanced by the speaker's addition of information that narrows down to a set of potential referents (see Scott, 2013:51).

Like the Gricean Inferential model, RT assumes that there are general pragmatic principles that guide utterance interpretation. However, these principles are not maxims which speakers aim to observe and obey, rather they are rational generalisations that guide the interpretation process (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:165).

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<sup>34</sup>Scott (2011:189) defines discourse context in relation to referents as including “a set of potential referents, each of which can be mentally represented in a variety of more or less accessible ways”, and referring expressions as “a means by which the speaker may select a subset of the potential referents, such that a representation of the intended referent is the most accessible to the hearer in that subset” (Scott, 2013:51).

#### 4.4.2 The principles of relevance

RT is built on two fundamental claims about cognition and communication. These claims are articulated in the two principles which govern relevance, namely, the cognitive principle of relevance which maximises relevance and the communicative principle which optimises relevance, given in (23a) and (23b) respectively.

23. a. Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance.  
 b. Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance  
 (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:260)

The cognitive principle assumes that human cognition attends to relevant inputs, which leads to attainment of positive cognitive effects for minimum processing effort (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:261), and the speaker's effort to maximise relevance amounts to producing a stimulus with the greatest cognitive effect for the least amount of processing effort. On the other hand, the communicative principle assumes that overt communication comes with a guarantee of relevance. That is, for any successful communication, the ostensive stimulus must appear "relevant enough for it to be worth the addressee's effort to process it" (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:265). We shall see that principle (23b) relates to the analysis of PMs as optimal elements in encoding procedural information they signal, and so it will be employed more than principle (23a) in this study.

The proponents of RT recognise that principle (23a) has shortcomings and that is why they claim that human cognition **tends** to be geared towards the maximisation of relevance. They point out that in many instances, cognitive sub-mechanisms may "fail to deliver enough effect for the effort they require" (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:262). By this observation, Sperber & Wilson recognise the incompleteness of their definition of relevance as subject to revision (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:263).

#### 4.4.3 Meaning recognition and cognitive environment

RT presents human beings as information-processing devices with the ability to select from their cognitive environment only the stimuli relevant to process (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:46). The hearer's cognitive environment – the set of assumptions manifest to the hearer (Sperber & Wilson,



1995:39) – makes a myriad stimuli manifest to him. A hearer cannot access and process each stimulus in his cognitive environment because his cognitive processing resources are limited. Only if a stimulus reaches the level of the hearer’s attention (by being manifest or more manifest) and becomes identifiable and recognised as a stimulus with the possibility of achieving cognitive effects will it be processed (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:150).

To demonstrate accessibility of the hearer’s cognitive environment, Sperber & Wilson propose the notion of manifestness in which “[a] fact is manifest to an individual at a given time if and only if he is capable at that time of representing it mentally and accepting its representation as true or probably true” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:39). By this definition, an assumption does not have to be true or false to be relevant in a context, rather, “a false assumption that contextually implies many false conclusions, is, by our definition, as relevant as a true assumption that implies true conclusions” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:263). To distinguish true conclusions from false ones, Sperber & Wilson introduce the notion of positive cognitive effects, in reference to cognitive effects which “contribute positively to the fulfilment of cognitive functions or goals” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:265). Thus, positive cognitive effects work for cases of “true conclusions, warranted strengthening or revisions of existing assumptions” (Clark, 2013:103).

Accessibility is affected by a number of factors including the recency of the information, frequency of occurrence and the conceptual hierarchy of the encyclopaedic information, among others (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:13; Ramos, 1998:307). Wilson & Sperber (1995:48) explain that some information is old and may never be accessed unless it is needed to perform a given cognitive task. Other information may be new but may be entirely unconnected with anything in the hearer’s cognitive environment and so if such information is processed, it would require more processing effort for little rewards in terms of cognitive effects. Finally, other information may be new but with the possibility of the speaker connecting it with old information.

Relevance is therefore defined in contexts where the processing of new information brings about the greater multiplication of cognitive effects. Thus, “the greater the multiplication effect, the greater the relevance” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:48). To explain the way in which new information can improve the hearer’s cognitive environment, Sperber & Wilson (1995) suggest three types of

contextual/cognitive effects. They argue that new information can combine with the existing assumptions to derive contextual effects in the form of contextual implication, presupposition strengthening or presupposition cancelling. Bringing the PMs into perspective, the three analysed PMs substantiate the three cognitive effects as envisaged in RT: the English implicative PM *so* procedurally signals contextual implications, the Luganda contrastive *so* signals presupposition cancelling and the causal *kubanga* PMs (because) strengthens presuppositions.

Ostensive communication is perceived as a means of adjusting the manifestness of the hearer's cognitive environment. For instance, a written stimulus such as (24) would adjust your cognitive environment by making you focus on Donald Trump, even though your cognitive environment, at least, by recency, would have been attending to reading about RT.

24. Donald Trump is the president of America.

#### 4.4.4 The communicative and informative intention

Grice characterised meaning in terms of the communicator's intentions. He argued that for a communicator to mean something and successfully communicate it required fulfilment of these intentions. These intentions in RT are explained in terms of communicative intention and informative intention. Informative intention aims "to make manifest or more manifest to an audience a set of assumptions **I**", and the communicative intention aims "to make it mutually manifest to audience and communicator that the communicator has this informative intention". (Sperber & Wilson, 1995: 58, 60, 61). From this definition, we infer that communicative intention is a second order informative intention only fulfilled once the informative intention is recognised in ostensive communication (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:29). For instance, in a context that includes the assumption that if a student raises his hand during a lesson, he intends to draw the teacher's attention to the fact that he has a question or a comment to make, if a student raises his hand ostensively, the teacher will process the student's behaviour and derive the contextual implication that the student intends to make manifest his informative intention to ask a question or to make a comment. One intention or a set of them may be retrievable as long as they are members of **I** (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:58). Additionally, if this student ostensively waves his hand in the air and looks intensely at the teacher as a way of making it more manifest to the teacher, this behaviour

would contribute to the higher-order intention which Sperber & Wilson call the communicative intention. Communicative intention results from ostensive communication whose performance creates a demand for attention and raises expectations of relevance (Blakemore, 2002: 62). Manifestness may vary in degree; thus, the addresser may strongly manifest his informative intention to make certain assumptions strongly manifest (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:59).

One of the requirements with regard to making the informative intention mutually manifest, is that it “must be manifest that the stimulus is ostensive” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:163). In defence of ostensive-inferential communication, Sperber & Wilson (1995) argue that the manifestly intentional stimulus should attract attention and once it is mutually manifest to the speaker and addressee, it is also mutually manifest that the communicator intends to make manifest some set of assumptions.

#### **4.4.5 Ostensive-inferential communication**

Ostensive communication is construed as communication which gives rise to strong expectations of relevance in the audience (Clark, 2013:98). Clark observes that the terms *ostensive* and *inferential* metarepresent the roles of both the addresser, who produces an ostensive act, and the addressee, who makes inferences about the communicative intentions of the addresser, in the communication act. The role of the speaker is to help the hearer in recognising his informative intention of producing a stimulus and consequently, the hearer is expected to “construct a hypothesis about the speaker’s meaning that satisfies the presumption of relevance conveyed by the speaker” (Wilson & Sperber, 2004:615).

RT regards verbal communication as involving communication processes of two types: coding and decoding, and ostension and inference. As mentioned, the coded communication is dependent on the acoustic signs, which signal the semantic representations retrievable by the decoding processes. Inferential communication, on the other hand, uses the decoded information as a source of hypotheses and evidence to recover or strengthen any represented information (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:63, 176). However, Sperber & Wilson (1995:56) recognise that we can achieve inferential communication without coding, although such interpretations would be poorer/vaguer compared to how they would be if they were spelled out. In a similar manner, whereas speakers can

communicate without PMs, PM coordinated utterances are easier to process because their inferential processing routes will be explicitly activated.

The ostensibly communicated stimuli come with a guarantee of relevance as they are produced overtly with the intention of seeking attention from the audience and for that, they focus on the communicative intentions of the speaker (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:153). RT claims that when speakers engage in ostensive communication, they have “the expectation generated by the ostensiveness of this act [...] that the communicator has an interpretation of her behaviour in mind which she thinks you will find significant and that you will not be put to undue effort in arriving at it” (Clark, 2013:99). For instance, the ostensive behaviour of the two-year-old child, who walks to her mother with an empty cup early in the morning is ostensive (see Section 4.3) makes it mutually manifest to her mother that she needs attention and the mother cannot help but notice the behaviour of her child and the set of assumptions inferable from her behaviour. The mother’s task would be to access the appropriate contextual assumptions and to draw relevant inferences about the child’s informative and communicative intentions. In this case, the optimally relevant interpretation would be that “the child is hungry” or that “the child needs milk”.

One of the principles of relevance states that “every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own relevance”. Ostensive-inferential communication is thus the phenomenon which gives rise to the presumption of its own relevance (Clark, 2013:112). The identification of a given member of **I** out of the many assumptions, for instance, assumptions derivable from the child’s behaviour of moving with an empty cup, is determined by what is stated in the conditions of the presumption of optimal relevance, namely,

25. a. The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough for it to be worth the addressee’s effort to process it.
- b. The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator’s abilities and preferences.

(Sperber & Wilson, 1995:270)

The conditions of the presumption of optimal relevance in (25a-b) relate to the speaker’s choice of PMs during bilingual communication. The study assumes that speakers will ostensibly introduce embedded PM stimuli to encode procedural meaning because those PMs are relevant

enough to be processed and to derive the specific cognitive effects associated with them. Similarly, the study assumes that their choices of PMs are the most relevant, compatible with their bilingual abilities and preferences. In other words, they ostensibly produce utterances with specific PMs with the aim of maximising relevance, and they are entitled to presume that these PMs will be optimally relevant for the hearers to interpret (see Scott, 2013:50). Whether the embedded PMs selected are the best options or not, it is always assumed that the bilingual speaker has tried hard to be relevant to their audience, by selecting a PM or PM cluster that he thinks encodes stronger assumptions than their counterparts (see Sperber & Wilson, 1995:158-159).

#### **4.4.6 Degree of relevance: Effort and effects**

Within the RT framework, relevance is considered a matter of degree and is affected by the balance of the binary notions of effect (how rewarding an expression is in terms of contextual effects) and effort (how much effort is spent during their processing) (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:123). Thus, the relevance of an assumption is measured by the extent to which the “contextual effects achieved when it is optimally processed are large” and to the extent to which “the effort required to process it is optimally small” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:145). The need to balance the twin factors, effort and effect, is captured in Blakemore’s (1992:34) two rhetorical questions, namely, (i) What would be the point in my spending effort in attracting your attention if I didn’t think I had any information that was relevant to you? (ii) What would be the point of my deliberately wasting your processing effort? Thus, relevance is measured by balancing between effort and effect. For instance, if I intend to inform you about the age of my son, I may do so by uttering (26a) or (26b).

26. a. My son is seventy-two and a half months old.  
 b. My son has just turned six years.

Processed under ordinary context, utterance (26a) will be less relevant than (26b) because it requires more processing effort. It unjustifiably puts a hearer through the gratuitous task of computing months into years which effort is not compensated for in terms of cognitive effects. Note that (26a) would be optimally relevant in contexts, such as in medical discourse, where it may be required to state the age of my son in months.

According to RT, extra processing efforts are justifiable as long as they are compensated for in terms of cognitive effects. For instance, Margaret's indirect reply in the conversational exchange in (27) is more relevant than Sticah's direct reply to the same question. Although Margaret's reply requires more processing effort than for a direct reply such as "she will not", the indirect reply encodes extra information on the basis of which Betty infers that Florence will not join them. Interestingly, indirect/subtler utterances are preferred by speakers because they are more relevant, i.e. they make more manifest certain assumptions, which direct answers may not (see Ramos, 1998:320).

27. Betty: Will Florence join us for a barbeque this evening?

Margaret: Florence is a vegetarian.

Sticah: She will not.

In explaining how interlocutors process stimuli to derive the optimally relevant interpretation, RT proposes a comprehension procedure, which defines the paths interpreters follow during utterance processing. This procedure is given in (28).

- 28.** a. Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: test interpretive hypotheses, disambiguation, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc., in order of accessibility.  
 b. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied or abandoned.

In practice, the comprehension procedure hypothesises that hearers upon recognition of an ostensive stimulus will look for a set of propositions that the speaker might have intended to communicate and which would justify the effort involved in processing them. That is, an utterance may be automatically decoded to identify its conceptual structure following a path of least effort. If the recovered conceptual representation is not satisfactory at the explicit level (if there are no cognitive effects following from it), the hearer will abandon it in search of a plausible interpretation at the implicit level, one which satisfies their expectations of relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:272; Wilson & Sperber, 2004:613; Clark, 2013:119-120). For instance, following the path of least effort, the most accessible interpretation of what was seen in utterance (29) would be that *duck* designates a bird. This interpretation holds unless the hearer's expectations of relevance are

not met, in which case he will continue to process the stimulus and access another interpretation such as “I saw her shying away”.

29. I saw her duck.

The comprehension procedure presupposes that the comprehension process is recursive and unless the expectations of relevance are met, the cognitive processing of the stimulus will carry on (Wilson, 1997:12). It also presupposes that the correct/relevant interpretation of an ostensive stimulus is the first accessible interpretation, an interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:178).

The inference-centred comprehension procedure has been critiqued. First, the idea of a recursive comprehension process is problematic because it makes it challenging to determine when to stop processing given that there is no absolute certainty and guarantee that the hearer will pick on the very interpretation the communicator intended to put across by the communicated stimuli (see Ramos, 1998:307). The idea of the first accessible interpretation is constrained in the face of ambiguity where the first interpretation may not necessarily be the interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance. Such weaknesses are highlighted in Wilson (1994:47), as cited in Ramos (1998:305),

precisely, because utterance interpretation is not a simple matter of decoding, but a fallible process of hypothesis formation and evaluation, there is *no guarantee* that the interpretation that satisfies the hearer’s expectation of relevance will be correct, i.e. the intended one. Because of mismatches in memory and perceptual systems, the hearer may overlook a hypothesis that the speaker thought would be highly salient, or notice a hypothesis that the speaker had overlooked. Misunderstandings occur

As expressed by Blakemore (1992:21, 34), utterance interpretation is a risky business, and quite often ostensibly communicated assumptions fail to achieve cognitive effects (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:159). These failures are explained in situations where communication is done in bad faith or when the speaker may be “mistaken about the contextual and processing resources of their audiences” (Blakemore, 2002:63). It should be noted that the principle of relevance doesn’t say that “communicators necessarily produce optimally relevant stimuli” rather, communicators “intend the addressee to believe that they do” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:158).

#### 4.4.7 Relevance and context

RT defines context psychologically as “the subset of the individual’s assumptions, with which the new assumptions combine to yield a variety of contextual effects” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:132). Blakemore (1992:18) defines it as “the hearer’s beliefs and assumptions about the world”. Context is uniquely determined, and is not restricted to the immediate physical environment, or to the immediately preceding discourse, but includes assumptions hearers retrieve from memory, encyclopaedic information, assumptions derived through perceptions, and guesses and hypotheses (Blakemore, 1992:18).

Context is an essential requirement in the interpretation processes of the ostensive stimulus. It is necessary in resolving ambiguities, ellipses, identifying implicatures, resolving illocutionary ambiguities, interpreting tropes and irony, among other things (Wilson & Sperber, 2004:613). For instance, the inherent polyfunctionality property of PMs requires hearers to interpret them within the right context in order to retrieve the optimally relevant procedural meanings encoded by them. The hearer’s ability to distinguish the structurally identical English implicative *so* from the Luganda contrastive *so* as discussed in Section 6.6 would, for instance, require interpreting them within their relevant contexts.

As mentioned, individuals may hold a myriad of assumptions at any time and it is from these that a subset will be drawn to act as a context in utterance processing (Scott, 2013:50). Under the guidance of the principle of relevance, hearers select the most relevant context, the one envisaged by the speaker to interpret utterances. From a psychological point of view, context is open to choices and hearers have the ability to revise their choice of context during the comprehension process to a context that they find optimally relevant for the interpretation (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:137). For instance, the hearer of utterance (29) above, *I saw her duck*, may revise his choice of context from processing ‘duck’ as a noun to processing it as a verb. Note that context is also affected by the binary notion of effect and effort; any context accessible to the hearer will require different processing effort and will yield different cognitive effects (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:144). Just as processing an item of information in a context involves some effort, accessing a relevant context also involves some effort, and “the less accessible a context, the greater the effort involved in accessing it, and conversely” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:142).



Under contention has been the issue of the order of context and comprehension; what comes first during interpretation? Some approaches assume that hearers determine context first before they interpret an utterance and that the assessment for relevance of the interpreted utterance comes last. Such approaches treat relevance as a variable and context as a given (Clark, 2013). In RT, relevance is treated as a given and context as a variable (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:141-142; Ramos, 1998:307). Because interlocutors hope that what is processed is relevant and therefore worth processing, they try to select the most relevant context, that is, the one which will optimise relevance.

#### **4.4.8 Explicatures and implicatures**

Within the Gricean-tradition, scholars analysed explicatures and implicatures in correspondence with ‘what is said’ and ‘what is meant/implicated’ (Blakemore, 2002:71), and the two notions overlap with the distinction between the truth conditional and non-truth conditional content of an utterance (Blakemore, 2002:75). However, RT does not distinguish explicit and implicit content by truth conditional parameters but by the processes of information recovery. The claim is that the “recovery of explicatures involves both decoding and inference, while the recovery of implicatures involves just inference” (Blakemore, 2002:77). That is, explicatures are “derived by inference processes that develop the linguistically encoded semantic representation of an utterance” and implicatures are “derived in an inference in which the explicature is one of the premises” (Blakemore, 2002:74).

Sperber & Wilson extend the idea of explicit content to include two types of explicatures: the proposition expressed which is recovered from the semantic representation, and the higher-level explicatures, which are recovered from the propositional attitude or speech acts (Blakemore, 2002:75). Higher-level explicatures are defined as “conceptual representations, capable of entailing and contradicting each other and representing determinate states of affairs. Though true or false in their own right, they do not generally contribute to the truth conditions of their associated utterances” (Wilson & Sperber, 1993:16). For instance, the difference between the utterance (30a) and (30b) lies in the latter’s production of a higher-level explicatures decoded and inferred from the implicative verb *claim*.

30. a. Tom is hardworking.  
 b. Tom claims to be hardworking.

The process of recovering meaning encoded by procedural elements such as PMs is inherently inferential, in which the explicit information encoded by the coordinated propositions serves as the premise on which implicatures can be drawn. As demonstrated in the analysis, the implicative *so* signals inferential relations which result in the derivation of contextual implications such as logical conclusions. However, there are PMs, such as the implied meaning signalling PMs, which signal inferences which guide hearers in the recovery of explicatures (see Section 6.9.2.2). Furthermore, Sperber and Wilson's notion of higher-level explicature has been extended to analyse *kubanga* PMs operating under the speech act domain. Some *kubanga* forms are categorised as base-level metarepresentational and others as a higher-level metarepresentational. The higher-level metarepresentational causal relations are more manifest than the base-level metarepresentational relations (see Section 7.8.4).

#### 4.5 Encoding procedural meaning: Blakemore's (1987, 2002) views

Blakemore's major contribution to Sperber & Wilson's (1995:32) RT is the development of the notion of procedural meaning (Sperber & Wilson, 2000:77; Blakemore, 2002: 79), a notion which relates to the traditional conventional implicatures. Conventional implicatures are tied to non-truth conditional linguistic forms, and by Gricean analysis, PMs such as *therefore*, *moreover*, *but* would be construed as encoding conventional implicatures (see Blakemore, 2002:48, Sperber & Wilson, 1995:182). For instance, if Molly in the utterance in (31) is a Ugandan where Afrikaans is not spoken, the PM *therefore* encodes the causal connection between Molly's study in South Africa and her ability to speak Afrikaans, one of South Africa's official languages.

31. Molly studied in South Africa; she **therefore** speaks Afrikaans.

This line of interpretation results in the generation of a conventional implicature such as 'Molly speaks Afrikaans because she studied in South Africa' or 'Molly speaks Afrikaans for the reason that she studied in South Africa'. Blakemore (1987) develops this notion of conventional implicature further into procedural encoding by arguing that linguistic elements such as PMs encode procedural meaning which constrain implicatures, and not conventional meaning.

#### 4.5.1 The conceptual-procedural distinction

According to Blakemore (2000:476; 2002:79), linguistic constructions encode two basic types of information, namely conceptual information and procedural information. Conceptual information enters into inferential computations, and procedural information constrains these computations by increasing their saliency. Although many RT researchers subscribe to the conceptual-procedural distinction, and to the recent research finding that some expressions are conceptuo-procedural, such assumptions are not universal. Scholars such as Saussure (2011) as cited in Nicolle (2015:135) propose principles for analysing expressions along the conceptual-procedural dimension. One of such principles conditions that expressions can be analysed as procedural if the conceptual analysis is inadequate. (see Nicolle (2015) for details).

Conceptual representations are defined by two properties: logical form and truth conditionality (Wilson & Sperber, 2012:157; Wharton, 2016:25). By logical form, is meant that conceptual representations, “enter into entailment or contradiction relations, and can act as the input to logical inference rules” (Wilson & Sperber, 1993:10). By truth conditionality is meant that conceptual representations “describe or partially characterise a certain state of affairs” as either true or false (Wilson & Sperber, 1993:10). For instance, utterance (21), repeated here as (32a) can be assigned a logical form such as (32b). Through inferential processes of reference assignment, (32b) can be developed into a fully propositional form such as (32c). Both (32b) and (32c) are conceptual representations in which (32b) is derived purely from decoding and inference and (32c) by embedding the utterance under the propositional attitude descriptions. Both (32b) and (32c) conceptually represent higher-level explicatures. The truth conditionality of this utterance is retrievable from (32c). That is, the utterance is true if it fulfils the conditions in (32c).

32. a. Esther will buy it next week.  
 b. X believes at time  $t_1$  that Y will buy Z at time  $t_2$ .  
 c. The speaker believes at 2:00 a.m. on 25<sup>th</sup> April 2016 that Esther will buy something (non-human) in seven days or less counting from 25<sup>th</sup> April 2016, at 2:00 a.m.

Whereas conceptual representations can be brought to consciousness, reflected on and used as input to inference rules which are used to describe the world as seen in (32) above (Wharton,

2016:25; Wilson, 2016:11), procedural representations cannot be represented with the above properties because they do not represent states of affairs in the world. This explains why they are notoriously hard to pin down conceptually, translate or paraphrase (Wilson, 2016:11). Procedural encoding forms the core for the analysis of PMs in this study, and it will be referred to throughout the study.

Carston (2016:154) reports that Blakemore's analysis of procedural meaning is construed as the cognitive-based reanalysis of the Gricean truth-conditional/non-truth-conditional semantics, a reanalysis which, according to Wilson (2016:17) is genuinely original. In her 1987 work, Blakemore had suggested that the distinction of conceptual-procedural meaning and the truth-conditional/non-truth-conditional meaning coincided. However, research conducted later such as Blakemore (2002), Carston (2016), Infantidou (1993), Wilson & Sperber (1993), and Fraser (2006) empirically undermines this distinction on the grounds of being too narrow, and make it clear that the two distinctions cross-cut each other in several ways (Wilson, 2016:7).

#### 4.5.2 The revised conceptual-procedural distinction

Sperber & Wilson's ideas on procedural encoding have led to the extension of procedural elements to include explicit communication in which expressions such as pronouns, mood indicators, illocutionary particles and attitudinal particles are analysed as procedural constraints on explicatures (Wilson & Sperber, 1993:11; Wilson, 1997:15; Wharton, 2016:32). For instance, illocutionary adverbials like *seriously* in (33) and attitudinal adverbials like *fortunately* in (34) are standardly treated as encoding conceptual information. Although they do not contribute to the truth-conditional content of the utterance in which they occur (Wilson & Sperber, 1993:17), they indicate the performance of a particular illocutionary act, in Speech Act terms (Wharton, 2016:21).

33. *Seriously*, I am not coming to your party.

34. *Fortunately*, I am not coming to your party.

In his comments on the attitudinal adverb *happily*, Récánati (1987:70), as cited in Wilson & Sperber (1993:17), describes the criterion for non-truth conditionality and optionality of such adverbs by claiming that

deleting the adverb would not change the proposition expressed by the sentence [...] because the modification introduced by the adverb is external to the proposition and concerns the speaker's emotional attitude [...] This attitude is neither "stated" nor "described", but only "indicated".

Although illocutionary adverbials are not truth conditional, Wilson & Sperber (1993:17) argue that their synonymous manner adverbial counterparts, such as utterance (35), are truth-conditional and may contribute to higher-order explicatures "which carry information about the speaker's propositional or affective attitude of the type of speech act she intends to perform" (Wilson, 2016:7).

35. Rose told Victor *seriously* that Swalik was not coming to the party.

Wilson & Sperber (1993) explain that in both (33) and (35), the adverbial *seriously* encodes exactly the same concept. However the interpretation of (33) requires incorporation of the concept encoded by *seriously* into a higher-level explicature by means of inference (Wilson & Sperber, 1993:17). The authors justify the treatment of illocutionary adverbials as both non-truth conditional and conceptual, and by this stand, the idea that all non-truth-conditional meaning is necessarily procedural is abandoned. Using examples, Wilson & Sperber (1993:18-19) argue that conceptuo-procedural elements can be ambiguous as in (36), they enter into semantic compositionality and become semantically complex, or figure in syntactically complex phrases as in (37), they can be refuted as untruthful as in (38), and in some cases, they contribute directly to the truth conditions of the associated utterance as in (39).

36. *Seriously*, are you not coming to the party? (Can be interpreted as "I ask you seriously whether you are not coming to the party" or as "I ask you to tell me seriously whether you are not coming to the party")

37. *Speaking seriously*, though not as seriously as I'd like to, I am not coming to the party.

38. That is not true, you are *not speaking seriously*.

39. Kato: What can I tell our readers about our private life?

Janat: *On the record*, I'm happily married; *off the record*, I'm about to divorce.

Pronouns and demonstratives are interesting linguistic expressions to analyse under the revised conceptual-procedural distinction. As procedural devices, pronouns encode procedural constraints

on the proposition expressed by the utterance, thereby guiding the hearer or reader to the intended referent of that pronoun, which is part of the propositional content (Wilson & Sperber, 1993:19; Hussein, 2009:111-112; Wilson, 2016: 8). Just as PMs increase the salience of certain relations in utterances, pronominals and demonstratives increase the salience of a certain class of referents. Thus, the difference between PMs and pronouns is that PMs impose constraints on implicatures in the search for intended context, and contextual effects, and pronominals impose constraints on explicatures in the search for the intended referent (Wilson & Sperber, 1993:21).

Following the development on the conceptual-procedural distinction, linguistic expressions are categorised into four types:

40. a. Those which encode conceptual information that do not contribute to truth conditions e.g. the illocutionary adverbs *Seriously*. *I am not coming to your party*,
- b. Those which encode conceptual information but contribute to truth conditions, e.g. *she told me seriously that she is not coming to my party*;
- c. Those which encode procedural meaning but don't contribute to the truth conditions e.g. *She did not wear his rain coat, so she is chilly*; and
- d. Those which encode procedural meaning and whose processing contributes to the truth conditions of an utterance, for instance, pronouns (see Wilson & Sperber, 1993:19).

The focus of this study is on PMs, which fall under categorisation (40c).

### 4.5.3 Pragmatic markers and procedural encoding

As mentioned, procedural expressions such as PMs encode primarily procedural meaning – meaning which indicates the inferential routes hearers use to compute the relational meaning between coordinated propositions (Blakemore, 2002: 78-79; Wilson, 2016:5). It is established that PMs are non-truth conditional and they contribute to relevance in two ways: they guide the hearer towards the intended contextual effects, and they reduce the overall processing effort required in interpretation process (see Wilson & Sperber, 1993:11). In utterance (41), *but* as a PM relates the proposition that *Summa works hard*, and the proposition that *she (Summa) earns little*. It encodes procedures whose processing results in contradiction of the assumption communicated by the first segment. Blakemore (2002:79) argues that “the use of an expression which encodes a procedure

for identifying the intended cognitive effects would be consistent with the speaker's aim of achieving relevance for a minimum cost in processing".

41. Summa works hard *but* she earns so little.

Recall that human cognition is relevance oriented, and utterance (41) remains fully propositional if it is processed in the right context without the PM, *but*. However, the RT-based argument against processing proposition which are non-PM-coordinated lies in the binary notion of effect and effort. That is, propositions without explicit PMs subject hearers to unnecessary extra mental processing efforts, efforts which are not cognitively rewarded.

42. a. Jeremiah is brilliant. He graduated with distinctions.  
 b. Jeremiah is brilliant; *so*, he graduated with distinctions.  
 c. Jeremiah is brilliant; *after all*, he graduated with distinctions.  
 d. Jeremiah is brilliant; *moreover*, he graduated with distinctions.

Processed without PMs, the openness of utterance (42a) would require extra effort because it encourages a number of interpretations, three of which can be (42b), (42c) and (42c). The inclusion of the PMs, *so*, *after all* and *moreover* is vital in resolving such ambiguities, thereby increasing relevance of the utterance. The role of the PMs in (42b-d) is to encode procedures which guide the hearer to make different inferences about the second proposition. That is, *so* signals an interpretation in which the proposition, *he graduated with distinctions* is interpreted as a premise for a conclusion that *Jeremiah is brilliant* in (42b); in (42c) the proposition *he graduated with distinctions* can be interpreted as encoding evidence for *Jeremiah's brilliance*; and so on. Although the absence of PMs in utterance (42a) does not stop hearers from interpreting the propositions and arriving at speaker intended interpretation, this will cost the hearer extra processing efforts. It means that propositions coordinated by PMs are evidently less ambiguous and therefore more relevant. Thus, PMs contribute to the relevance of utterances by signalling interpretation clues to the hearer, thereby reducing the overall processing effort. Thus, Blakemore (2002:79) argues that "the use of an expression which encodes a procedure for identifying the intended cognitive effects would be consistent with the speaker's aim of achieving relevance for a minimum cost in

processing”. Propositions without explicit PMs have been compared to a descriptive signpost without an arrow pointing to a specific direction.

The diagnostic properties that distinguish procedural meaning, including the meaning encoded by PMs, from its conceptual counterparts are discussed in Carston (2016: 159-161). These are: introspectively inaccessible (resistance to conceptualisation, difficulty to bring to consciousness, paraphrase or translate); they are non-compositional (inability to compose into phrases like conceptual elements do because they are non-propositional); they are rigid (they never adjust pragmatically. It is always the conceptual content, which adjusts to qualify a procedural interpretation); they are often used in a non-literal context/utterance (they are not susceptible to metaphor or irony because their use is not descriptive); and PMs are non-polyprocedural (they are not associated with a family of related uses). These properties relate to the diagnostic properties of PM in Section 2.2.4 above; the difference is that the characterisation here is RT-based.

It should, however, be pointed out that some of these properties have been challenged in the recent research. Nevertheless, Carston (2016:161) warns that counter claims in new research, though exciting, are subject to debate and may require a lot of scholarly attention.

## **4.6 The Matrix Language Frame Model and the 4-M Model**

### **4.6.1 Introduction**

Myers-Scotton’s (1993a, 2002) Matrix Language Frame (MLF) model, including the supporting Four types of Morphemes Model (4-M model), is a theoretical framework whose principles are designed to account for contact phenomena, such as CS. It is a frame-based model of grammatical constraints, aimed at explaining the structural configurations found in intra-sentential CS (CS in which morphemes from two or more language varieties occur in the same clause). Following certain principles and premises, the model predicts the possible occurrences of well-formed bilingual clauses. The claims of the MLF model are built on the notion of asymmetry, that is, structural asymmetry and lexical asymmetry. Structural asymmetry relates to the roles of the participating languages in the bilingual clause and lexical asymmetry relates to the grammatical constraints on what morpheme types come from what language in the bilingual clause (Myers-Scotton, 2002:9). The MLF model centrepiece is that CS takes place within a frame set by the ML.



Considered one of the most influential models in the field of CS (Hadei & Ramakrishna, 2017: 434), the MLF model has been successfully used to analyse bilingual clauses in different language pairs. Genetically related languages, such as Indo-European language pairs including Welsh-English (Deuchar, 2006: 1986), Spanish-English (Callahan, 2002), Persian-English (Hadei & Ramakrishna, 2017), and Afrikaans-English (Nel & Huddleston, 2012) have been analysed in this framework. It has also been used successfully in the analysis of genetically unrelated languages such as between language pairs from Indo-European and Niger-Congo families, respectively, including Igbo-English (Akinremi, 2016; Ihemere, 2016), Kiswahili-English (Myers-Scotton, 2002), and Luganda-English, the language pair analysed in this study, among others<sup>35</sup>.

A number of studies have employed the MLF model for analysis, but to my knowledge none has focused on the analysis of PMs as embedded elements in bilingual clauses. Many studies aim to test the MLF model (Ihemene, 2016; Rahimi & Dabaghi, 2013); others aim to show the structural patterns of CS (Akinremi, 2016); some present newer methodological perspectives by analysing embedded elements in written corpora as opposed to spoken discourse (Callahan, 2002) while others discuss specific morphemes, such as nouns and adjectives given their high borrowability status (Hadei & Ramakrishna, 2017). Other than presenting a new language pair which contributes to the ongoing debate over the universality of the model, the focus on analysing PMs as embedded elements occurring singly and in combination brings in a newer perspective with regard to intra-sentential CS.

#### 4.6.2 Premises of the Matrix Language Frame model

The MLF is built on three premises. The first premise is that in the bilingual constituent structure, the languages do not participate equally (Myers-Scotton, 2006:243). The dominant language, the Matrix Language (ML), has a more central role of providing the grammatical/morphosyntactic frame in the bilingual clause and the less dominant language, the Embedded Language (EL), contributes the switch. This assumption is reflected in the definition of classic CS as “elements from two (or more) languages varieties in the same clause, but *only one of these varieties is the*

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<sup>35</sup> Despite its successes and achievements, the MLF model has received criticism (see MacSwan, 2000, Muysken, 2000), as would be expected for any framework that purports to be universal (Callahan, 2002:2). Although Myers-Scotton recognises, to some extent, the weaknesses of her model, she attributes most criticisms to misinterpretation of the models (Myers-Scotton, 2002:53ff).

*source of the morphosyntactic frame for the clause*” Myers-Scotton (2006:241). By morphosyntactic frame, Myers-Scotton is referring to “all the abstract grammatical requirements that would make the frame well-formed in the language in question (concerning word order, morpheme order, and the necessary inflectional morphemes)” (Myers-Scotton, 2006:241). Although there may be more than one EL in a bilingual clause, there is always only ever one ML (Myers-Scotton, 1993a:75). The ML is not equated with an existing language, rather it is an abstract frame for the morphosyntax of the bilingual CP (Myers-Scotton, 2002:66).

In utterances (43) and (44), although the two languages (Luganda and English) are both participating in contributing morphemes to the bilingual clause, their participation is not equal.

43. Kyaggwe *munda* **actually** *si na* Mukono (KM51)

kyaggwe munda **actually** si na Mukono

kyaggwe inside **actually** NEG even Mukono

‘Deep inside Kyaggwe (county) actually very far away from Mukono {district}’.

44. They’ll need what they need **ate** they are very demanding in terms of time (NJ38)

they’ll need what they need **ate** they are very demanding in terms of time

**yet**

‘They’ll need what they need and yet they are very demanding in terms of time’

In example (43), KM inserts an EL PM switch, *actually*, in a clause that is otherwise all in Luganda. Similarly, in example (44), NJ inserts a Luganda PM *ate* (yet) in a sentence that is otherwise all in English. In utterance (43), the ML is Luganda as it provides the grammatical frame of the sentence and English is therefore the EL because it supplies the switch. In sentence (44), the ML is English and Luganda, which supplies the switch, is the EL. As will be illustrated later, the ML is not determined arbitrarily but it is determined following two principles, the Morpheme Order Principle (MOP) and the System Morpheme Principle (SMP).

The second premise of the MLF model relates to the participation of morpheme types in the bilingual clause. Within the MLF model, morphemes are categorised according to the content–system morpheme distinction. The assumption is that content and system morphemes are not equal,

in the sense that not all morphemes can come equally from the ML and the EL (Myers-Scotton, 2006:423). It is assumed that in the bilingual clause, content morphemes can be supplied by both the ML and the EL but that certain types of grammatical elements (system morphemes) can be supplied only by the ML. The details with regard to morpheme types and how they are constrained are discussed under the 4-M model, in Section 4.6.6 below. The opposition of content – system morphemes corresponds roughly to other syntactic dichotomies such as free – bound morphemes, open – closed class words, content – function words, lexical – grammatical items, and so on.

The third premise relates to the activation of participating languages involved in CS. The model assumes that when a speaker engages in CS, the participating languages are always “on”, although the ML is always more activated (Myers-Scotton, 2006). However, Myers-Scotton (2006:423) recognises that whereas the MLF model can empirically support the first two premises (regarding the ML – EL opposition and content – system morpheme opposition), it doesn’t provide a heuristic support for the premise on ‘activation’. Nonetheless, she points out that the patterns of CS can offer strong indirect support for the levels of ‘activation’ in the participating languages.

#### **4.6.3 Unit of analysis**

Within the MLF model, the implicit unit of analysis is the CP constituent. It is defined as “the syntactic structure expressing the predicate-argument structure of a clause, plus any additional structures needed to encode discourse-relevant structure and the logical form of that clause” (Myers-Scotton, 2002:54). Myers-Scotton explains that unlike the traditional analyses which used and continue to use a sentence as a reference for structural analyses in CS, she (and her associates) find the CP not only easier to analyse but also a unit which “offers comparability across examples not only for codeswitching, but also for other contact phenomena” (Myers-Scotton, 2002:54-55).

Within the MLF model, a bilingual CP may configure in different ways. It may be made up of two conjoined monolingual CPs, each in a different language, such as in utterance (45). It may be composed of a monolingual CP (or CPs) and an embedded clause (or clauses) in another language as we see in utterance (46), or a bilingual sentence may consist of only one CP in which both languages are participating, as in utterance (47). The individual CPs are enclosed in square brackets and labelled accordingly.

45. [<sub>CP</sub>[<sub>CP</sub> Securing an interview is not easy;] [<sub>CP</sub> *gwe ffe tu-etoolo-dde bbanga ki?*]] (BV92)

Securing an interview is not easy *gwe ffe tu-etoolo-dde bbanga ki*  
 PM SUBJ.IPL SUBJ.1PL-rotate-PERF period INTEROG  
 ‘Securing an interview is not easy, consider how long has it taken us to schedule this interview?’

46. [<sub>CP</sub> [<sub>CP</sub>But [<sub>IP</sub> I think even when I was younger maybe I looked like a responsible child]  
 [<sub>CP</sub> *kubanga* [<sub>IP</sub> *n’abantu baaleetanga abaana awaka*] [<sub>CP</sub> mainly because [<sub>IP</sub> I am there]]]]. (NJ93)

But I think even when I was younger maybe I looked like a responsible child; *kubanga*  
 because  
*ne a-ba-ntu ba-a-leeta-nga a-ba-ana a-wa-ka* mainly because I am there  
 even IV-2-person 2-PST-bring-HAB IV-2-child IV-16-home

‘But I think even when I was younger maybe I looked like a responsible child because even people used to bring their children at home mainly because I am there’

47. [<sub>CP</sub>*Twetaaga okurevampinga* the way we do things]. (BV3)

*Tu-etaag-a o-ku-revamping-a* the way we do things  
 SUBJ.1PL-need-FV IV-INF-revamping-FV  
 ‘We need to revamp the way we do things’

The optimal configuration for classic CS is the CP with mixed constituents, expressed as “ML+EL constituents” (Myers-Scotton, 1995:238). Note that the ML – EL opposition only applies to mixed constituents such as (47) in which the participating languages are in actual contact.

#### 4.6.4 Constituent types

The MLF model recognises three types of structural constituents in CS: mixed constituents, ML islands and EL islands. Mixed constituents consist of morphemes from the ML and EL as we see in utterance (47) above. Myers-Scotton (2002) explains that ML+EL constituents are well-formed according to the ML grammar. For example, in (47), the ML is Luganda as it provides the morphosyntactic frame of the bilingual CP. ML islands consist only of ML morphemes, while EL islands consist only of EL morphemes. The ML and EL islands must be well-formed according to

their respective grammars and must show structural dependency relations (they must consist of two or more morphemes). In utterance (48), the CP *I don't regret* is an EL island consisting of English morphemes and is well-formed according to English grammar.

48. *Naye I don't regret kubanga essomero lyatuyigiriza okkola bannaye!* (HK172)

<i>Naye</i>	<b>I don't regret</b>	<i>kubanga</i>	<i>e-ssomero</i>	<i>li-a-tu-yigiriz-a</i>	<i>o-ku-kol-a</i>	<i>bannaye!</i>
But	because	IV-school	5-PST-SUBJ.1PL-teach-FV	IV-INF-work-FV		surely

'But I don't regret because the school taught us to work, for sure'

Myers-Scotton explains that the placement of an EL island within the larger host CP will depend on the procedures of the morphosyntactic frame of the ML. In this case, the EL island in (48) is placed in a CP whose morphosyntactic frame is Luganda. The placement of EL islands in the ML is constrained by a universal principle – the Uniform Structure Principle (USP).

#### 4.6.5 The Uniform Structure Principle

The structural configurations of sentences/clauses and the well-formedness of structures in both monolingual and bilingual discourse are governed by the USP, stated as “[a] given constituent type in any language has a uniform abstract structure and the requirements of well-formedness for this constituent type must be observed whenever the constituent appears” (Myers-Scotton & Jake, 2009:337). The principle assumes that languages are conditioned towards uniformity and they strive to achieve it. Paraphrased as “no chaos allowed”, the principle explains the composition of the CS constituent, and contributes to defining what should and what should not occur in a well-formed constituent (Myers-Scotton, 2002:8). The principle does not allow sharing of the grammatical structure within a bilingual clause because there is an asymmetric relationship between the participating languages. In “ML+EL constituents”, the EL constituents must conform to the well-formedness conditions of the ML frame (Myers-Scotton, 2002:43). That is, the structure of the ML is always preferred in classic CS and EL islands are allowed on condition that they observe the well-formedness conditions of the ML (Myers-Scotton, 2006:243).

The USP relates to Poplack's (1980) Equivalence Constraint which assumes that code-switching tends to occur at points in discourse where the juxtaposition of L1 and L2 elements does not violate a syntactic rule of either language. This and other structural-based constraints on CS were discussed in Section 3.5.3.

#### **4.6.6 The 4-M Model**

Since its inception in 1993, the MLF model has undergone modifications motivated by the need to address questions which the earlier versions could not satisfactorily address (see Myers-Scotton, 2002:53, 2006:251-252). The 4-M model (Myers-Scotton & Jake 2000) is a product of the refinement and extension of the content – system morpheme opposition as outlined in the MLF model. The model aims to divide system morphemes into three types of morphemes, namely, early system morphemes and two types of late system morphemes, late bridge system morphemes and late outsider system morphemes, as we see in Figure (1) below. These subdivisions are based on the activation stage of the morphemes in the mental lexicon and formulator. Although the 4-M model morpheme types are universal, Myers-Scotton (2002:73) explains that the classification of morphemes can differ cross-linguistically.




Figure 1: Feature-based classification of morphemes in the 4-M model (Myers-Scotton 2002:73)

Within the 4-M model, morphemes are defined by three features, namely, [+/-conceptually activated], [+/-thematic role receiver/assigner] and [+/-looks outside its immediate maximal projection for information about its form], abbreviated as [+/-looks outside]. The notion of activation is linked to the hypothesis that morphemes are accessed differently in the production process. By activation, it means that some lemmas underlying types of morphemes are more directly linked to speaker's intentions and are salient at the level of the mental lexicon. Thus, content morphemes such as verbs and nouns are conceptually activated because they have the semantic content needed by speakers in order to convey their intentions, and the lemmas underlying them are directly accessed in their maximal projections.

Like content morphemes, early system morphemes contribute to mapping of the conceptual structure and they depend on their heads for information about their form. The lemmas underlying morphemes such as determiners, and gender or plural markers are assumed to be salient at the level of the mental lexicon because they appear in the same surface-level maximal projections as their

heads (Myers-Scotton, 2002:75). The 4-M model assigns content morphemes and early system morphemes the feature [+conceptually activated], and assigns late system morphemes the feature [-conceptually activated]. However, the two differ in terms of the thematic role grid. Whereas content morphemes assign or receive thematic roles, early system morphemes do not.

On the other hand, the opposition [+/-looks outside] relates to late bridge system morphemes and late outsider system morphemes. They are referred to as “late” system morphemes because “the lemmas underlying them are not fully salient in language production until the level of the Formulator where larger constituents are assembled” (Myers-Scotton, 2002:76). Bridge system morphemes are assigned the feature [-looks outside] because they integrate content morphemes into larger constituents, depending on the information within their own maximal projection. In English, the morpheme *of* is a bridge system morpheme type in the clause, *a man of the people*, because it connects the NP (a man) to another NP (the people) without reference to the properties of a head (cf. Myers-Scotton, 2002:75).

Late outsider system morphemes are assigned the feature [+looks outside]. They depend on information outside their immediate maximal projection (Myers-Scotton, 2002:75). They include morphemes such as subject-verb agreement, clitics and affixes, among others.

#### 4.6.7 Pragmatic markers and the Matrix Language Frame Model

Within the MLF model, PMs (discourse markers therein) are awarded the status of content morphemes for the reason that they are conceptually activated and assign thematic roles at the discourse level (Myers-Scotton, 1995:241; Myers-Scotton & Jake, 1995:984). The way the feature [+activation] relates to PMs is discussed in Section 3.4.2. Like ordinary content morphemes, such as verbs which assign theta roles such as Agent, Patient and so on, the discourse thematic roles assigned by PMs may include Topic, Focus or Consequence (Myers-Scotton, 2002:241). In utterances (49a-d), the relevant PMs assign thematic roles such as interrogation, conclusion, addition and contrast, respectively. Such roles “restrict the interpretation of the CP of which they are part” (Myers-Scotton, 2002:241). Myers-Scotton’s syntactic interpretation of PMs relates to Blakemore’s (2002) RT-based interpretation in which PMs constrain inferential interpretation.

49. a. [<sub>CP</sub>So [<sub>IP</sub>e Gayaza tojja mmutwala? <sub>IP</sub>]<sub>CP</sub>]. (NA128)



**so** e gayaza to-jja ku-mu-twal-a  
 so P gayaza NEG.2SG-will INF-OBJ.1SG-take-FV  
 ‘So you will not take her to Gayaza {High school}?’

- b. [<sub>CP</sub>**So** [<sub>IP</sub> ndowooza processes zaawukana <sub>IP</sub>] <sub>CP</sub>]. (KA188)

**so** n-lowooza processes za-awuka  
 so SUBJ.ISG-think processes 9-differ  
 ‘So I think the processes differ {the writing and speaking processes}’

- c. [<sub>CP</sub>**Naye** [<sub>IP</sub>there was something that had happened in my third year<sub>IP</sub>] <sub>CP</sub>]. (LM106)

**naye** there was something that happened in my third year  
**but** there was something that happened in my third year  
 ‘But there was something that happened in my third year’

- d. [<sub>CP</sub> Nze nnakula njogera Luganda [<sub>CP</sub> **although** [<sub>IP</sub> sddaawo ddusoma <sub>IP</sub>] <sub>CP</sub>]. (NEM70)

Nze n-a-kul-a n-joger-a Luganda **although**  
 I SUBJ.ISG-PST-grow-FV SUBJ.ISG-speak-FV Luganda although  
 si-a-ddaawo ku-lu-som-a  
 NEG-1SG-take time INF-5-study-FV  
 (I grew up speaking Luganda **although** I never took interest in studying it).

Because PMs indicate various interpretations (often assigning Contrastive Focus to the following IP proposition), Myers-Scotton observes that they often come from the EL and a ‘double contrast’ is achieved (Myers-Scotton, 2002:241). The CP constituents in utterances (49a-d) indicate that PMs take up the Comp position, and they have scope over their respective IPs. Myers-Scotton (2002:70) explains that “whatever can appear in the position of Comp can also be a CP and whatever can occur in the position of Spec of Comp can also be a discourse-thematic element”.

#### 4.6.8 Testing for the Matrix Language in bilingual clauses

Within the MLF framework, the ML of the bilingual CP is tested using two principles, which I referred to earlier, namely, the Morpheme Order Principle (MOP) and the System Morpheme Principle (SMP)<sup>36</sup>. The MOP states that,

in Matrix Language + Embedded Language constituents consisting of singly occurring Embedded Language lexemes and any number of the Matrix Language morphemes, the surface morpheme order (reflecting surface syntactic relations) will be that of the Matrix Language. (Myers-Scotton, 2002:59)

The SMP, on the other hand, states that,

in the Matrix Language – Embedded Language constituents, all system morphemes which have grammatical relations external to their head constituent (i.e. which participate in the sentence’s thematic role grid) will come from the Matrix Language. (Myers-Scotton, 2002:59)

The two principles ensure that a language that satisfies the requirements contained in the MOP and SMP will be the ML.

Following the MOP, which assumes that the surface structure of the bilingual CP is that of the ML and that the word order should conform to the word order of the ML, the grammatical frame in utterance (50) is Luganda.

50. *Kaakati nsigninga wa?* (NJ1)  
*kaakati n-signing-a wa*  
 now SUBJ.1SG-sign-FV INTEROG  
 ‘Now where do I sign?’ {NJ uttered this before signing the consent form}

Question formation in English requires a transformational movement of the wh-question operator to the initial position, while question formation in Luganda does not require such movement; the wh-operator (*wa*) occupies a clause final (in-situ) position. Thus, the morpheme order of (50) conforms to the order of Luganda. Similarly, the Luganda bound morphemes which affix to the

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<sup>36</sup> In the earlier developments of the MLF model, the ML was determined by mere counting of the morphemes in the bilingual CP. Thus, the language that contributed more morphemes qualified to be the ML in a mixed constituent (Myers-Scotton, 1993).

English inflected verb, *signing*, are indicative of the agglutinative nature of Luganda. In addition, we see the Luganda phonotactic conditions of syllabification fulfilled in which a FV (-a) is affixed to the English verb *signing* to create an open syllable. As mentioned previously, Luganda does not permit closed syllables.

In certain bilingual CPs the identification of the ML might be transparent to identify, such as in (50). However, there are CPs where the identification of ML requires deeper engagement with the MOP and SMP, as we see in utterance (51).

51. [<sub>CP</sub> [<sub>CP</sub> We make mistakes [<sub>CP</sub> *kuba* [<sub>IP</sub> *tetuyina batugindinga*]]]] (SJ81)

We make mistakes *kuba*      *te-tu-yina*      *ba-tu-guiding-a*

Because    NEG-1PL-have    SUBJ.3PL-OBJ.1PL-guide-FV

‘We {students at university} make mistakes *because* we do not have anyone to guide us’

This bilingual CP has two embedded CPs as indicated by bracketing: the EL island (we make mistakes) and the bilingual CP (*kuba tetuyina batugindinga* (because we lack people to guide us)). As mentioned, the MOP ensures that the word order of the bilingual CP conforms to the word order of the ML. Luganda and English share the canonical word order of sentences, the SVO (Subject, Verb, Object) structure. According to the MOP criterion, the ML in example (51) can be Luganda or English because the morpheme ordering of constituents in both languages is the same. By applying the second principle, the SMP (which requires that in mixed constituents, system morphemes will come from the ML), we establish that the ML is Luganda. The form *batugindinga* is a morphologically integrated switch which conforms to the agglutinative nature of Luganda morphemes. Resumptive pronouns such as *ba-*(which co-indexes with the counsellors) and *tu-*(which co-indexes with the students) in the form *batugindinga* also mark agreement with their antecedents. Following the 4-M model, morphemes which mark agreement are categorised as late outsider system morphemes and these are conditioned to come from the ML.

Although the MOP and SMP, which realise the ML hypothesis, have been used successfully, Myers-Scotton (1992:25) reports that there are data sets which falsify them. This may occur when the morpheme order violates the order specified by the ML or when ‘active’ morphemes from EL

are be present. However, she notes that the percentage of such occurrences is insignificant. For instance, in her Nairobi corpus (1988) not more than 1% of violations were recorded.

## 4.7 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the basic principles and assumptions of RT, the RT-based notion of procedural encoding, as well as the MLF and its supporting 4-M model. The discussion of RT has revealed that human communication is a complex phenomenon, and can be achieved in various ways. This observation partly explains why designing a single model that explains human communication has not been successful (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:3). The discussion of procedural encoding characterises PMs as procedural devices which constrain interpretation by guiding hearers towards the intended contextual effects. They contribute to relevance by reducing the overall processing effort required in the interpretation process. The debate around conceptual-procedural meaning has revealed that although the notion of procedural encoding at the inception stage was designed to describe elements such as PMs which are inherently procedural, recent research has expanded the notion of procedural encoding to include linguistic expressions such as pronouns, certain adverbials, tenses and negation (cf. Wilson, 2016:17). It is also established that certain PMs such as *kubanga* and its English counterpart *because* are analysable as conceptuo-procedural elements, because they encode representational meaning at the content level and metarepresentation meaning at the non-content level. However, research on conceptuo-procedural devices is still too limited to enable us to make conclusive judgements about the behaviour of conceptuo-procedural devices.

On the other hand, the discussion of the principles and assumptions of the MLF model, and its supporting 4-M model, has shed light on the structural configurations of bilingual CPs in general and how CS is constrained. An explanation of what transpires when bilingual speakers operate in the bilingual mode, the status of the participating languages, and the roles each language plays in the bilingual clause is given. PMs have been analysed as content morphemes and given this status, PMs are assumed to be conceptually activated and they assign discourse-related thematic roles to the IPs they head. This explains why PMs are highly borrowable. In general, the dominant ML for most of the bilingual CPs in the study data (following the MOP and SMP) is Luganda.

## CHAPTER 5

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

#### 5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss the methodological procedures I followed in order to obtain relevant data for the analysis of bilingual pragmatic markers (PMs) in Luganda and English. I adopted research approaches, procedures and ethical conventions which I judged to be the most effective in guiding my analysis towards valid and reliable results/conclusions. The discussion situates the study in its philosophical stance (interpretivism), its theoretical perspective (subjectivism), research design (qualitative-descriptive), research approach (corpus linguistic methods), data collection methods, and the strategies of data management and analysis. I also discuss issues related to ethical protocols and qualitative validity. Given that different researchers adopt different methodologies to approach their enquiries, the motivation for my choices are critically evaluated.

#### 5.2 Research design

The study adopts a qualitative research design, in which knowledge claims are based primarily on a descriptive philosophical stance (Creswell, 2003:18). The cardinal objective of the study relates to establishing the procedural functions of the embedded PMs in facilitating interaction in their host utterances. According to Auerbach & Silverstein (2003:3), a study which involves texts and interviews, and in which meaningful patterns of notions such as PMs are described, requires qualitative methods. Although the scope and definition of what makes qualitative research qualitative remains a contentious issue, the general consensus situates qualitative design in natural settings and places, where the researcher is in a central position of collecting naturalistic data, in whatever form, interpreting it according to the meanings participants assign to it, and analysing it inductively (Creswell, 1998:14).

The protocol of the study draws from the definitional attributes of the qualitative research paradigm as stipulated in Creswell (1998:15-16), which includes the use of semi-structured interviews and group discussions as ‘empirical’ study materials, follows specific procedures of natural data collection, selection and descriptive analysis of interesting PMs, provides an explanation of how the selected PMs procedurally facilitate interaction, and a discussion of their

procedural roles in a flexible manner within a particular theoretical framework. Two frameworks are employed in this study, Blakemore's (1987, 2002) RT-based notion of procedural meaning, and Myers-Scotton's (1993a, 2002) MLF and 4-M models. The inductive generalisations and hypotheses with regard to the PMs studied and the plans to disseminate the findings are presented in the concluding chapter.

### 5.3 Corpus-based approach

The study is built on two bilingual spoken data sets which form the corpus used in the analysis: data from face-to-face interviews and data from group discussions. I adopted corpus linguistics as a methodology recommended for linguistic studies which seek to address the 'naturalistic' manifestation of communicative competences of speakers whose language is metarepresented in the corpus (see Leech 1992:105), cited in Andersen (2010:549). The corpus represents the speech behaviours of adult bilingual L1 Luganda-L2 English speakers, engaged in semi-formal conversations. It is a relatively small corpus of 23 hours of recording, which converted into 192,000 words of verbatim transcription. The size and design of the corpus was defined by the research questions and the general guidelines for building a corpus<sup>37</sup>. The type of transcription, annotation, and glossing were selected based on their relevance to the study, and their feasibility within the time frame.

Although I did not use any data management software, it was easy to retrieve the relevant PMs from the data for analysis, using simple Microsoft commands such as *find*. The only challenge I faced, which is also recorded as a disadvantage of a corpus linguistic approach, was to retrieve the specific PMs relevant to the study. Because the retrieval system cannot distinguish form from function, a command to retrieve, for example, *kuba* returned both the PM *kuba* and the auxiliary *kuba*. Equally, the English implicative PM *so* could not be distinguished from its grammatical *so* counterpart let alone the Luganda contrastive *so*. It was time consuming to search through all returns and identify the contextually relevant PMs manually.

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<sup>37</sup> The guidelines include: provision of the information on the structure of corpus, metadata (basic information about participants, recordings), transcripts and annotations, provision of glosses and translation into English (as a major/default language), among others (see Backus, 2008:243).

## 5.4 Nature of data

In the study, I analyse bilingual spoken data obtained from bilingual conversations – spoken interaction “which is affected as little as possible by the fact that it is being studied” (Gardner-Chloros, 2008:54). Gardner-Chloros (2008: 53) offers an inclusive definition of bilingual data as “talk between bilinguals who share the same varieties, or between a bilingual and a monolingual, or even two monolinguals who speak different languages but nevertheless understand one another”. In this study, the clause “talk between bilinguals who share the same varieties” defines the spoken interaction. The corpus is highly code-switched, with PMs occurring singly and in co-occurrence in monolingual and bilingual sequences. Although three languages, English, Luganda and Kiswahili, participate in the bilingual CPs, the study focuses on CPs where Luganda and English embedded PMs form part of the mixed constituents. In addition, the corpus exhibits non-standard expressions, slang and other forms of informal language use, especially from student participant group discussions. According to Gardner-Chloros (2008:55), all these informalities would be expected in free conversations. She argues that such tendencies should not be seen as a challenge to the study, given that the authenticity of bilingual data is not determined by ‘standard’ varieties.

## 5.5 Study participants and sample size

The data for the study was obtained from three population groups, namely seven academic teaching staff, six non-teaching staff and 28 students, all working or studying at Makerere University. Eide (2008: 743) advises researchers to strive to include participants who meet the study criteria and who represent the richest and most complex source of information (data) relevant to the phenomena being studied. As will be explained shortly, Makerere University was not selected as a domain but as an academic institution which conveniently offered the optimal samples of participants, L1 Luganda-L2 English bilingual participants. In total, 41 bilingual adult speakers were sampled, to represent the speech behaviours of bilingual speakers. Patton (2002: 244), cited in Braun & Clarke (2013:55), clarifies that there are no rules for sample size in qualitative studies; while a size of 15-30 interviewees is more common, Patton argues that a single participant or a text analysed in depth can be appropriate.

As mentioned, the participants were bilingual speakers with a satisfactory degree of proficiency in both languages, having acquired Luganda naturally as an L1 and English formally at school. By selecting participants from Makerere University, the idea was to engage participants who have been in contact with English formally for over 13 years. With this criterion, the study assumes that the students and the employees of Makerere University have had adequate experience with English, and are able to comfortably employ resources from both languages during bilingual communication. Thirteen participants were individually interviewed and 28 students across different years and disciplines of study participated in group discussions. Both male and female participants were randomly sampled: 14 males and 27 female participants.<sup>38</sup> The information about participants is included in Appendix E.

The thirteen interviewees consisted of:

- 6 non-teaching staff employed in administrative positions (1 female, 5 males);
- 7 teaching staff from the school of Languages, Literature and Communication (3 females, 4 males).

The six group discussions comprised:

- 6 third year students of Ethics and Human Rights (all female);
- 2 first year students from the Engineering department (both female);
- 8 second year students studying Communication Skills (CSK) as a subject (2 females, 6 males);
- 6 third year students of Education studying English Language Studies (ELS) as one of their teaching subjects (1 male, 5 females);
- 3 third year students offering Education where Luganda was one of their teaching subjects (1 male, 2 females), and another group of
- 3 third year students offering Education where Luganda was one of their teaching subjects (1 male, 2 females).<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Gender is not a variable in the study. Participants were purposively sampled by availability. Equally, although age can be a factor in influencing the production of PMs especially among the youth, and indeed the data attests to this, age is not a variable considered in this study. I do however make recommendations for such analyses.

<sup>39</sup> Luganda classes potentially provided higher number of students who speak Luganda natively or as an L1. I strategised to start off with Luganda students who were not only native speakers of Luganda but had also studied Luganda linguistics, and knew the structural aspects of language.



Students varied in the way they code-switched. Luganda students were biased against language alternation (an attitude they might have received from their interaction with prescriptive language studies), Engineering students barely code-switched (for they could not imagine an academic discussion in which ‘vernacular’ languages like Luganda could be freely used; in fact they took my probes into code-switching as a trick), students of Ethics and Human Rights, ELS, and CSK code-switched freely. With the exception of the Engineering and Ethics and Human Rights students, I was acquainted with other student participants, having taught them an introductory first year course at the university. Similarly, I was acquainted with all the participants from the teaching and non-teaching staff. As mentioned, it was easier for them to code-switch (as a unmarked choice) in a semi-formal interaction.

## 5.6 Data collection procedures, methods and tools

Aware that PMs occur more frequently in naturalistic contexts of spoken conversations than in written language or in formal discourse genres (Brody, 1995:138; Andersen, 2001:21; Nortier, 2008:44), two data collection methods were employed in this study: face-to-face group discussions or buzz groups, and face-to-face oral interviews, in addition to document analysis<sup>40</sup>. Collecting spoken data by recording is considered challenging because participants may not code-switch in front of a recorder or in front of a stranger (Nortier, 2008:35), so to reduce the risks associated with the observer’s paradox, a number of strategies were employed, all aimed at creating a more naturalistic participation environment. Before I discuss the data collection methods, I give an account of the procedures and protocol that guided the data collection processes:

- Negotiating access to participants three weeks ahead of time, because the negotiation exercise is time consuming (Harding, 2013:17). Students were accessed through their lecturers<sup>41</sup> and the staff were contacted directly for interview appointments, using purposive and convenience

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<sup>40</sup> For terminological clarity, I used the label buzz groups in reference to discussions which comprised between two and three participants, and group discussions in reference to discussions which had more than three participants.

<sup>41</sup> After the permission to speak to students had been granted by the lecturers, I had to attend those lectures and speak to students during the last fifteen minutes of the lectures. Volunteers registered their names and phone contacts, and were grouped – seven to ten per group. Each group proposed a coordinator whose responsibility was to go between me and the group. By working with the coordinators, I was able to schedule the group discussion at a time that was convenient for all. A small incentive was given to each coordinator.

sampling strategies. All the group discussions and some interviews were conducted at Makerere University in my office, UB 21<sup>42</sup>.

- Welcoming participants warmly to the group discussion/buzz group and interview venue. I reminded them to relax and feel at home. During the sessions, I employed communication etiquettes such as eye contact, and listening attentively with interest and respect. Participants in the group discussions were acquainted with one another, and so there was less tension and suspicion as they shared in the discussion.
- Briefing participants about the general aim of the study, the benefits of being free during interaction, and ethical requirements. Although informing participants about the aims of the study is discouraged in research methods in bilingualism/multilingualism for fear of conscious CS behaviours, it is an ethical requirement to inform participants about the study and the risks (if any) involved in it. However, studies have established that participant consciousness is normally short-lived (see Nortier, 2008: 45). For my participants, it took them an average of seven minutes to relax and engage freely in the conversations. I want to think that their general knowledge about the objectives of the study did not affect the quality of the conversation, particularly their production of PMs.
- Signing the consent forms just before the interview/discussion was conducted. Although I clearly indicated in the consent form that participants were expected to interact freely using Luganda and English as they wished, the formality associated with the interview/discussion and office environment indexed English as the unmarked code. On the other hand, semi-formal contexts generally index spontaneous CS as the unmarked code. Given that we were in a formal environment and some participants could not interact freely, it was necessary for me to provide such a semi-formal environment. One effective way was to speak to them freely, using CS

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<sup>42</sup> 11 out of 13 interviews were conducted in UB 21. Although the office is not spacious, it had the advantage of minimising interruption. I put a note on the door, "Meeting in progress, please don't interrupt". On a few occasions, however, non-participants still interrupted. The two interviews which I conducted in the interviewees' offices were interrupted more frequently to the extent that I had to pause the recording. UB 21 had another advantage of controlling power relationships between me and the student participants. Having taught some of the student participants, meeting them in my office made the discussion less formal and more 'natural' in comparison to lecture room setting, which is considered formal.

during my turns, especially at the beginning of the conversations. Although my decision to code-switch may be interpreted as coercive and subsequently render the discussions and interviews artificial to some degree, I found it the most efficient way to obtain code-switched data. Interestingly however, my efforts to code-switch did not have an impact on all participants. One interview participant (my friend) used English throughout her narrative, and she only code-switched for marked code-related reasons. As a friend, I knew that she typically uses Luganda as an ML and not English. Two students in a buzz group discussion also ‘refused’ to code-switch despite my efforts to create a free environment. Upon interrogation, one said that she did not take me seriously, speaking CS in a formal environment, another said that she does not speak Luganda to ‘strangers’. In this case, I was a stranger because I was not her peer.

- Drawing the procedure of the interviews and group discussions from Bryman (2008:484) and Harding's (2013:44-48) propositions. Specifically, I introduced myself<sup>43</sup>; thanked participants for coming; explained briefly the objectives of the study and the significance of their participation; explained the procedure of the discussion; reminded them why the discussion would be audio recorded; presented the conventions of participation, such as freedom to code-switch, speaking in turns<sup>44</sup>; indicated the duration of the discussion; emphasised the assurance of confidentiality; encouraged free participation; and gave them an opportunity to seek clarification about the study before the discussion began. Participants took turns following their sitting order in the group discussions. While I recognise that the idea of speakers talking in turns during the group discussions makes the conversations less spontaneous, the free style of discussions on unrestricted topics required some kind of control of who should hold the floor, lest, the less vocal participants never be given the opportunity to contribute. Many students were fascinated by the study and some were inspired to study linguistics, as a means to document their local languages.

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<sup>43</sup> It is recommended that participants introduce themselves too, but in this case, participants were from the same class and so they knew one another.

<sup>44</sup> Although I had explained the difficulty of participants talking over one another, this was the most violated convention. Participants would be excited about a shared experience and they would chip in, causing overlaps in speech turns. Controlling overlaps, especially in ‘heated up’ discussions of bigger group discussions was harder, and transcribing these recordings was strenuous and time consuming.

- Providing some refreshments subsequent to the discussions. I am aware of the ethical considerations in which offering incentives is interpreted as a coercive act that creates undue pressure to participants (see Harding, 2013:19). However, as Grant & Sugarman (2004:732) argue, this was unlikely the case because the incentive was very small. Besides, I emphasised during the registration stages that participation was voluntary and would not be remunerated.
- Switching on the recorder and the computer and placing them on my table just before the discussions started. As is reported in Kasper (2000:319), cited in Geluykens (2007:39, I noticed some anxiety associated with the participants' fears of not wanting to be recorded but this wore off after a few minutes. Most students, on the other hand, were just excited about being part of the discussion<sup>45</sup>.
- Ensuring 'equal' participation by calling out the names of participants from the register in their sitting order and providing each one with a turn to participate, comment or clarify something. My role as a moderator was to allow discussion to flow freely and to intervene (in a way that was not intrusive) and to introduce salient issues that made the discussion lively and interesting.
- Using a semi-structured interview guide, which comprised a list of open-ended topics and questions. This allowed participants to narrate their experiences as they saw best and give their opinion about certain linguistic realities. Following Bryman's (2008:438) advice, the interview schedule was designed in a flexible way such that topics and question which were not outlined therein would be followed up. In addition, the order of questions or topics as outlined on the schedule was not keenly followed. One interview guide was used for both group discussions or buzz groups and face-to-face interviews because the kind of data solicited in all cases was the same.
- Proposing casual topics, which encourage free participation. Participants shared (by narration) their childhood experiences and other memorable moments in their lives in the domain of play, school life, domestic chores, Christmas festivals, etc. I encouraged participants to share their

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<sup>45</sup> Some groups requested me to play the recording after the discussion because they wanted to 'hear' how they 'argue'.

sociolinguistic profiles, such as their linguistic history, linguistic choices, language attitudes and ideologies, and their opinion with regard to CS as a communication strategy. Studies have established that semi-structured interviews depend heavily on the use of topical probes (see Legard, Keegan, & Ward, 2003:152-153), and since a good probe can be the key to carrying out effective interviews. I probed and encouraged the participants to contribute to my satisfaction.

- Ending all group discussions and interviews by thanking participants for their time, once the recorder and the computer were paused. I then recapped briefly what I intended to use the recorded data for. For some students who wanted to ‘hear’ themselves, I played bits of their turns, as they made jokes about their eloquence. Upon the departure of the participants, I made notes on what generally transpired during the discussion particularly pointing out notable aspects relevant in relation to what is reviewed in the literature about contact linguistics and what is intended to be focused on in the analysis.

### **5.6.1 Group discussions**

In this study, 28 student participants were engaged in group discussions/buzz group discussions. Each group discussion was planned to last for two hours but some discussions were heated and they went slightly beyond the two hour time slot. By proposing two hours of recording for each group discussion, I had anticipated that each group would consist of six to eight participants, and each participant would have about 15 to 20 minutes of interactions. In some group discussions, fewer participants showed up and thus each participant had more than 20 minutes of interaction. For instance, the second Luganda group discussion had three participants and it lasted 90 minutes giving each participant around 25 minutes of interaction. As Nortier (2008) observes, the more minutes a participant is given, the greater the chances of CS, and thus the more chances of finding switched PM occurrences.

There is controversy on the typical size of a group discussion, and seemingly, different disciplines adopt different sizes (see Morgan, 1998; Bryman, 2008; Harding, 2013). However, Harding argues that the ideal number of participants for each group discussion is constrained by the skills of the moderator to handle different voices and the complexity of the discussion. In my opinion, the nature of study conducted constrains a sample size. Studies like this, which do not adopt content

analysis, may not require big sizes. The only shortcoming I noticed was that discussions which had more participants were more relaxed and therefore more ‘naturalistic’ than those with fewer participants. However, as long as the participants were able to speak to one another, irrespective of the number of participants present, PMs would be switched as naturally as they would be in any informal context involving many participants.

One of the recorded challenges of group discussions, as briefly mentioned above, is participants’ failure to show up on the expected day for the discussion (Bryman, 2008:479). In this study, I had proposed an average size groups of six to eight participants for two supported reasons: too few participants would lead to cancellation of the meeting if a certain number did not show up (Harding, 2013:42), and too many participants could result in a lack of opportunity for each participant to express their views (Bloor 2001:26-28, as cited in Harding 2013:42). It happened that some discussions were cancelled or postponed for ‘no show’-related reasons. On the other hand, discussions such as the CSK<sup>46</sup> group were big because all the eight participants showed up. This was challenging in three ways: the venue for the discussion was too small to accommodate eight participants, it was more difficult for me to control a heated discussion, and as a consequence, the ‘louder’ participants overshadowed the ‘quieter’ participants.<sup>47</sup>

### **5.6.2 Face-to-face semi-structured interviews**

In qualitative research, interviews are probably the most widely employed method for data collection (Bryman, 2008:436) given their flexibility and adaptability (Robson, 2011:283). They have been assumed to be the ‘gold standard’ for qualitative research (Barbour, 2008: 113, as cited in Harding 2013:22) – so much so that researchers can use them without any justification (Harding, 2013:22). In this study, semi-structured interviews are employed because they are more naturalistic, flexible and yield more authentic data. Thirteen face-to-face interviews were conducted and each lasted between 40 and 90 minutes, giving a total of about 13 hours of interview recording. As noted earlier, the interviews were narrative in nature, guided by open-ended

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<sup>46</sup> Group comprising Communication Skills students.

<sup>47</sup> UB 21 has a small sitting capacity which allows a maximum of six participants. I had to squeeze in two extra chairs to accommodate the eight participants in the discussion. The venue in itself is noise free, but the noise from the nearby busy offices, and people’s movements in the corridor affected the quality of the recordings. Also, the university bell which rings on the hour also interfered with the natural flow of the discussions, for whenever it rang, participants, especially students, would check their watches and time tables.

questions that stimulated the conversation. They were designed in a freer and more open way to accommodate associative reactions from the participants (see Hopf, 2004: 205). Given that PMs are not generally found in simple answers or when utterances are short (Vincent and Sankoff, 1992:212; Hlavac, 2006:1874), it was necessary to provide to the participant an atmosphere which facilitated elaborative and descriptive spoken exchange. I played the role of an attentive hearer by providing supportive gestures to further the narrative. However, participants would at times engage me directly, asking for my views or experience. In such situations, I would take up the role of a narrator, and the participants become the facilitators. Although my utterances were transcribed, they do not contribute to the analysis of PMs.

### **5.6.3 Document analysis**

In research, documents can be used in two ways: as part of reviewing literature and as sources of data where the objects of investigation are the documents themselves (Denscombe 2003, as cited in Nyaga 2013:115). In this study, document analysis is used as part of the literature review to contextualise the study, to explain the data and to show the relevance of findings in relation to the existing body of literature (Rensburg, 2011:27). I critically engaged with the theories and debates on the notion of PM and other phenomena associated with language contact such as code-switching.

## **5.7 Data management and analysis**

This section presents the procedures of data recording, transcription, editing, and translation, as well as the methods of data categorisation and analysis.

### **5.7.1 Data recording and storage**

As reported, all conversational interviews and discussions were audio recorded using an audio recorder and a laptop. The audio recordings were transcribed and stored safely on a password-protected computer. Recording data with machines is recommended for making the documentation of data independent of perspectives of the researcher and facilitating a ‘natural design’ (Flick, 1998: 169). The quality of the recordings varied; some had more inaudible utterances, annotated

as ((inaudible)) in the transcription, participants talking over one another, annotated as ((in overlap)), and failure of the transcriber to associate a turn to a speaker annotated as ((X))<sup>48</sup>.

### 5.7.2 Data transcription

Speech turns from two participants were not considered for analysis because I judged the speakers to be below the required proficiency levels in English. I observed that they struggled to speak English and their speech turns had grammatical issues, which are not characteristic of Ugandan English. Interestingly, however, the way PMs are configured in their speech is similar to the way PMs manifest in the speech of the proficient participants. This observation points to Myers-Scotton's (2002) argument that proficiency is not a necessary condition for CS performance. This argument is developed further in Section 3.5.1.

Turell & Moyer (2008:193) define transcription as “the process of representing oral language with orthographic conventions”. The seriousness of data transcription is stated in Poland's (2008:885) argument that data transcription is not just “a phase of data preparation and data management, but it is an early stage in the analysis and interpretation of data in qualitative research”. For this matter, Kvale & Brinkmann (2009) advises researchers to do their transcription themselves if they want to capture many details relevant to the analysis of the study. He argues that transcribing your own recordings, among other benefits, helps the researcher to “learn much about their own interviewing style”, “have social and emotional aspects of the interview situation present or reawakened during transcription” and it is a step into “the analysis of the meaning of what was said” (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009:180). Although I did my best to minimise transcription inconsistencies, some may have slipped through.

Different analytical methods call for different transcription methods and styles (Braun & Clarke, 2013: 161). This being a study focused on pragmatic meaning and linguistic structure, and which specifically analyses the procedural role of PMs in CS structures, I found it fit to use true verbatim transcription, a transcription which focuses on transcribing all spoken words, and other paralinguistic features such as noises, pauses or interjections. In some analytical contexts, non-

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<sup>48</sup> Matching speech turns to speakers became more challenging with speeches which I transcribed after one month. Although I was familiar with the conversations, my guesses as to who said what in certain instances could not go beyond gender.



verbal cues were handy in the identification of specific pragmatic nuances that distinguish one PM from another. As Wharton (2003:82-84) argues, paralinguistic forms contribute to the derivation of certain cognitive effects in the PM host utterances.

The challenges I faced during the transcription exercise relate closely to Braun & Clarke's (2013:162) explanation:

When we speak, we don't use punctuation to make ourselves understood. We use pauses and intonation; we vary our speech in pace (faster, slower), volume (louder, quieter) and many other ways. Spoken (natural) language is 'messier' than written language: we hesitate and say the same word or phrase a number of times.

To boost transcription speed, I used the PotPlayer audio/video player which allows the user to skip back and forth using computer keyboard settings. Despite this, because the study is not team-based, I had to shoulder the task of transcribing all the data, which at times became a lonely and isolated activity. At my discretion, the first five and last five minutes of the recording were not transcribed for reliability/validity reasons.

During the transcription exercise, the selected PMs for analysis and other interesting paralinguistic elements were highlighted and commented on in the review pane. This saved me from going through the many pages (665 pages) of the transcribed data later during the analysis. Having transcribed all the data, it was edited for reliability reasons. I listened again to the recordings, and compared the recordings with the transcripts. Cases of mishearing, misinterpretations of hardly audible utterances, etc. were resolved during the editing process. Despite my efforts, there are issues which remain elusive, for example, defining the length of silence, or pauses (how 'long' is a long or short pause?), representing emotional aspects such as tense voice, nervous laughter, among others. The speech turns in the transcribed data are coded by symbols which represent the initials of the participant and a number representing a speech turn (see Saldaña 2009:3).

### **5.7.3 Transcribing mixed constituents**

Transcribing expressions involving intra-lexical and intra-morpheme CS was challenging because there is no framework in orthographic studies that accounts for orthographic choices in social contexts such as these (see Sebba, 2009:5). I had two options: either to follow the Luganda

orthography by Lugandanising the expressions to suit its phonotactic conditions, as represented in the orthography, or to harmonise the Luganda and English spelling systems. I opted for harmonisation as a true representation of the bilingual CS speech structures. However, the adopted convention resulted in bizarre spellings which speakers of either languages would judge as unacceptable. For instance, the form “*nazilivingamu*” (I lived in both (worlds)) looks strange because it violates the phonotactic constraints of Luganda, as represented in the orthography. In Luganda the alveolar sounds [l] and [r] are allophones of the phoneme /l/. Although they are phonemically undistinguishable, their occurrence is rule governed: /r/ never occurs word initially and when it is used it is preceded by either /e/ or /i/; /l/ is used elsewhere. Following this rule, we spell *buliri* (bed), *mulimu* (work), *laba* (see) and so on, as [l] and [r] are in complementary distribution. In the form *nazilivingamu* (I lived in both (worlds)), the segment *-li-* would have been written *-ri-* if it was a Luganda word, because it is preceded by the *i* in *-zi-*. What informs my decision to spell it as I as have is the assumption that the Luganda system morphemes, as glossed below, are affixed to the English inflected verb form *living*. Given that the ML of *nazilivingamu* is Luganda (by MOP and SMP), it might have been appropriate to represent the form as *nazirivingamu* but this would have tampered with the analysis of the English verb form. That is, *riving* would not have been relevant to interpret because it is not a lexical entry in English.

*n-a-zi-living-a-mu*

SUBJ.ISG-PST-Agr-live-FV?-there

‘I lived in both (worlds)’

Note too that borrowed words which contain an /r/, such as *radio* in English, will be pronounced as an /l/ irrespective of where the /r/ occurs in the foreign word.

The responses from consultations with native Luganda speaking language consultants with regard to spelling adoption varied. While some consultants were in support of spelling harmonisation of inter-lexically code-switched expressions, others supported Lugandanisation. I could sense a strong spirit of linguistic ‘prescriptive purism’ from the latter group. On the whole, the transcriptions are fair representations of bilingual speech. Forms such as *byetutacompromisingako* (things we do not compromise), *mbicritiquinga* (I critique them – the ideas), *n’oalready* (and already), etc. exemplify this. Similar spelling adaptations are reported in de Rooij (2000:464) where embedding Spanish PMs in the Mesoamerican languages functioning as MLs would trigger

syntactic innovations. This behaviour is interesting, in de Rooij's opinion, because it shows how powerful CS can be in languages which are not linearly equivalent.

#### **5.7.4 Translation of data and glossing**

Given that the collected data was bilingual, the Luganda segments in the bilingual excerpts selected for analysis were translated and glossed. Although translations were subjected to translation reliability tests and assessed to be precise by the judgments of translation checkers/editors, consulted as part of the data validation process, scholars in translation studies have claimed that there is no single correct translation possible (Temple, 2008:890), especially in pragmatic studies. It is established that translating procedural meaning such as the meaning embedded in PMs poses more linguistic challenges than translating conceptual notions (Larson, 1984; Gutt, 2000; Bazzanella, 2006:452). This is because PMs are multifunctional and the procedural information they encode cannot be easily brought to consciousness (see Wharton, 2016:25; Wilson, 2016:11). In addition, the two languages under investigation are not typologically related, and certain PMs were not easy to render literally, or otherwise, even by the professional translators. Borrowing from Gutt's (2000:36-37) notion of interpretive resemblance, I argue that some renderings only interpretively resemble the source language text in cognitive effects. That is, the propositional forms of the translated bilingual data expressions are not necessarily identical with the source language text but they communicate the same set of assumptions relevant to the context and audience (cf. Ramos, 1998:331).

To enhance transparency in the analysis, all the selected utterances were glossed using the Leipzig glossing conventions (Comrie, Haspelmath & Bickel, 2008). Glossing is relevant in providing further information concerning the rendered structure of the utterance beyond the idiomatic translation. It is presumed that researchers choose a glossing style depending on their "purposes" and "reader's assumed background knowledge" (Comrie, et al, 2008). This being a pragmatic study, I found word-for-word glossing notation appropriate, and time saving. However, given that the study is also concerned with linguistic structure, there are instances where I employed morpheme-by-morpheme glosses, specifically where the analysis necessitated marking off the boundaries of the translated segments.

The major linguistic challenge I faced during the glossing exercise comes from the genetic differences between the code-switched languages. Luganda being an agglutinative language, certain expressions were composed of many morpheme boundaries which were challenging to decompose. For instance, the expression, *baatuloongoosaangamu buloongoosa*, in KG51, describes a state of affairs in which KG's mother gave birth by caesarean. It has the following truncated morphemes: *ba-a-tu-loongoosaa-nga-mu bu-loongoos-a* (they used to 'cut' us out from our mother's stomach). In other cases, there was there was lack of straightforward correspondence between the source language text units and the target language text units in the gloss tier, notwithstanding contexts in which one word in Luganda would correspond to two words in English and vice versa (see Turell & Moyer, 2008:203).

### 5.7.5 Data analysis

The process of data analysis is described as the 'heartbeat' of research because it gives evidence of the analyst's quality of thinking (Henning, 2011:103). The initial idea of analysing data using software (Atlas.ti or WordsmithTools) was dropped because the available resources did not allow for training in either of these programmes. Instead, I used the word count function and the find function in MS Word and worked systematically through the transcribed data identifying interesting utterances containing the English *so* and Luganda *kubanga* tokens as embedded constituents. Following the principles and assumptions of Myers-Scotton's (1993a, 1995, 2002) MLF model, and its supporting 4-M model, and Blakemore's (1987, 2002) RT-based notion of procedural meaning, the selected PMs were categorised and analysed based on their manifestation (e.g. single/co-occurrence), operation status (e.g. switch), functional domain (e.g. textual, organisation, ideational) and the procedural functions they played in facilitating interaction in those specific contexts.

The analysis is highly subjective, with some of its analytical arguments based on comparative literature, introspection and educated guesses. By comparing the manifestation of PMs in this study with the results from cross-linguistic studies, I do not intend to imply that their distribution, manifestation and procedural functions are the same. Rather, I make a case that although the study contexts differ, the behaviours of some cross-linguistic PMs are related semantically and functionally. For instance, given that the Luganda causal PM *kubanga* (because) has not previously

been studied, it was prudent to compare it with Schiffrin's (1987) analysis of a functionally similar causal PM, *because*.

### 5.7.6 Selection criteria of pragmatic markers for analysis

There are a number of PMs occurring in bilingual clauses in the data. However, given the limited resources in terms of time and space, it was unfeasible to discuss, at length, all of them. As such, I restrict my selection to those occurrences which are interesting according to the combined criteria below:

- a) Quantity: Tokens which are quantitatively substantial to constitute a category (at least five tokens from different participants) (see Poplack & Sankoff, 1984:103; Myers-Scotton, 1993b:204-205, 2006:254; Nivens, 2002:6).
- b) Quality: Tokens which belong to salient categories, with definable procedural functions. Thus, all the PMs I have analysed here are named after their procedural functions.
- c) Precision: Only PMs whose manifestation is precise were selected. Thus, tokens occurring in vague contexts, in incomplete utterances, in unintelligible and fuzzy extracts were ignored.
- d) The selected PMs fulfil at least three diagnostic properties of PMs namely, procedurality, multifunctionality, multicategoriality.

By the above criteria, many PMs qualified for selection, but the selection of *so* and *kubanga* is motivated by two additional interests. First, *so* and *kubanga* not only have the ability to occur singly and in monolingual and bilingual PM combinations such as “*so kati*” and “*kuba n'oalready*”, their distribution frequency in such occurrences is higher than other PMs. Second, the presence of a Luganda PM homophone *so* which participants were ‘confusing’ with the English *so* raised my curiosity in analysing both PMs. For the case of *kubanga*, the structural manifestation of its different forms was equally interesting to investigate.

### 5.7.7 Reliability and validity of data

To ensure that the methodological procedures and protocol were coherent and transparent, and that the research findings, analysis of the findings, and research conclusions were precise and convincing, I subjected my study to a number of reliability and validity assessments. Reliability and validity are controversial terms in research (see Jupp, 2006; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009), being perceived differently by qualitative and quantitative researchers. Within quantitative approaches,

validity is defined as “the extent to which conclusions drawn from research provide an accurate description of what happened” (Jupp, 2006:311), and reliability is quantitatively regarded as the “extent the to which different researchers following similar procedures will arrive at similar results when they engage in the same study using identical procedures” (Miller, 2008:753), (see also Jupp, 2006: 262).

In this study, I use the two terms interchangeably to define the appropriate means that facilitate the production of subjective but dependable and conformable knowledge. Reliability pertains to “the consistency and trustworthiness of research findings”, and validity pertains to “quality control throughout the stages of knowledge production”, or to “the ‘goodness’ or ‘soundness’ of a study” (see Miller, 2008:909; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009: 245; 249). In this study, I employ triangulation, translation checking and peer debriefing strategies to enhance validity and reliability, as briefly outlined below.

#### **5.7.7.1 Triangulation**

In qualitative inquiry, triangulation is associated with applying multi-method approaches to data collection and analysis. It is a strategy that allows researchers to “identify, explore, and understand different dimensions of the units of study, thereby strengthening their findings and enriching their interpretations” (Rothbauer, 2008:892). In this study, I employ data collection triangulation (collecting data using both individual interviews and group discussions); theoretical triangulation (using multi-model theoretical lenses – RT and the MLF model); and triangulation in population samples.

In defence of triangulation, Creswell (2003:15) argues that because all methods have limitations, when researchers recognise biases inherent in any single method, they neutralise or cancel biases through the strength of other methods. Against this assumption, I triangulated data sources. Although it can be impractical for its limitations in terms of consumption of time and other resources, triangulation is credited for reducing the biases or deficiencies that would result in a mono-method inquiry (Rothbauer, 2008:892).

### **5.7.7.2 Translation checking**

There are various methods suggested for checking accuracy in translation, including back translation and the use of professional translators (Temple 2008:890). Having translated the selected Luganda constituents which were interesting for the study into English, I used Luganda-English bilingual linguists from Makerere University, Linguistics Department to check the accuracy of my translations. Glosses were checked by two linguists who have significant expertise in language description and documentation.

### **5.7.7.3 Peer debriefing**

Peer debriefing sessions were conducted primarily with linguists from the Linguistics Department at Makerere University. I judged them to have an adequate ability to investigate and critique my study methodologically and conceptually. In addition, Luganda teachers and graduate students of Luganda were consulted to comment on especially the clarity of the bilingual translations and procedural interpretations. Given that there is no prescribed set of procedures in peer debriefing, (Nguyễn, 2008:602), I talked about my study whenever an opportunity to do so was available. I presented sections of my study in the lunch hour seminars organised at departmental and school level at Makerere University, and in conferences and workshops in South Africa, at Rhodes University and Stellenbosch University, and all insights from the constructive feedback were incorporated in the study, accordingly.

## **5.8 Research ethics**

It is ethically required of researchers to adhere to the codes and practices concerned with ensuring that research is conducted in a moral and non-harmful manner (Braun & Clarke, 2013:330). Thus, the entire process of planning and executing this research was conducted ethically. Although different scholarly associations have adopted different, but overlapping, codes (Christians, 2011:65), this study is bound by the six conventional ethical principles/guidelines, which include: informed consent (participation without coercion); privacy and confidentiality; accuracy (data presentation without fabrications, fraudulence, omissions); no deception (interviewing without wearing ‘masks’), and personal integrity of the researcher (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009:73-74). As mentioned, the spoken corpus used for analysis in this study was obtained from bilingual human participants interacting in naturalistic environments. According to Stellenbosch University’s research ethics policy (SU, 2013) and the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology’s

research guidelines (UNCST, 2014), it is required that all research involving interaction with or observation of human subjects must go through a process of ethical screening and clearance.

Having sought ethical approval from the two institutional research boards, I also sought participants' informed consent in which participants signed a written informed consent form, guaranteeing confidentiality and anonymity. Ethical issues were considered at the different stages of my research as recommended in Kvale & Brinkmann (2009:63). At the thematising stage, I justified the benefits of the study; at the designing stage, I designed consent forms and sought consent from participants; during interviews I was considerate to the personal concerns of the participants and I avoided deception; during transcription I emphasised confidentiality, accuracy and precision, and in the analysis, PMs were interpreted appropriately within the frameworks of RT and the MLF model.

## **5.9 Conclusion**

The focus of this chapter has been on the methods, processes and procedures that I followed to collect and analyse the data. Following the assumption that there is no failsafe method in any given research (Nortier, 2008:35), I have confidence that the choices I made have yielded desirable results, as I weighed the pros and cons of each method carefully. The choice of the approaches and methods adopted in this study were determined by the research problem and the experiences of the researcher. The adopted methods are justifiably the better alternatives to data collection, recording, and transcription. Although the study was challenging, both technically and logistically, these challenges were within my means to overcome. However, it remains a fact that authentic data is practically difficult to obtain (Geluykens, 2007:39), given that recording participants is surrounded by the challenges related to the observer's paradox.



## CHAPTER 6

### MANIFESTATION AND PROCEDURAL FUNCTIONS OF THE ENGLISH AND THE LUGANDA *SO*

#### 6.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to examine the manifestation of the English *so* PMs and the procedural roles they play in facilitating interaction in contexts where they occur, and to establish whether these roles differ or not from the roles the same PMs would play in related monolingual contexts. As mentioned, the subjective interpretations that I ascribe to the *so*-embedded utterances are guided largely by RT assumptions, specifically Blakemore's (1987, 2002) notion of procedural meaning, and to a lesser extent by the Coherence-based framework, particularly Fraser's (1990) assumption that *so* permits a range of inferential interpretations. The underlying hypothesis in the analysis of the English *so* is that speakers' employment of *so* in the ML is a strategy aimed at optimising relevance, and that the PM choices speakers make to encode certain procedural relations are the optimal and preferred choices. The *so* PMs have been categorised following their contextual procedural statuses, and their meaning has been accounted for.

The discussion touches on a number of issues including the distribution frequency of *so* PMs, the structural position they occupy in their host clauses, their operational status as switches and their structural configurations as single PM code-switches and as elements forming part of monolingual and bilingual PM co-occurrences. A discussion of the outcome of PMs in contact is presented, demonstrating the coexistence of *so* with the Luganda PM functional equivalents.

#### 6.2 Distribution of *so* in the data

*So* is one of the highly distributed elements in the data. In the study corpus of 192 000 words, there are about 900 tokens of *so*. However, not all of these are functionally identical. About 480 tokens are English implicative *so* PMs, 16 are Luganda contrastive PMs and the rest serve other functions,

such as adjectives, adverbs or coordinating conjunctions<sup>49</sup>. Given that the study focuses on the English *so* as a PM, the discussion of distribution frequency is limited to *so* PMs. The discussion of the procedural functions of *so* classify it along the textual, interpersonal and interactional domains (see section 6.9). The distribution of *so* tokens across these domains is uneven; there are about 264 textual *so* PMs, 173 interpersonal *so* PMs, and 42 *so* PMs in the interactional domain. A tentative explanation for the variance between interpersonal and textual *so*, on the one hand, and interactional *so* on the other, lies in the nature of the conversations recorded in the data collection process. As mentioned in previous chapters, conversations from which the data was obtained were narrative in nature and narratives operate mainly at the textual level (in structuring the discourse) and at the interpersonal level (in evaluating and assessing attitudes). The interviews were less interactional and participants were less engaged in dialogic encounters, which typically prompt turn management.

### 6.3 Positional mobility of *so* in utterances

The discussion of the position of PMs in Section 2.2.4.4 highlighted two views on what positions PMs occupy: firstly, the view that PMs occur utterance initially and secondly, the view that PMs are positionally mobile. I illustrated that although certain PMs in English are positionally mobile and can occupy the initial, medial and final position, their mobility is constrained syntactically and pragmatically (see Brinton, 2008). In the data, the English PM *so* predominantly occupies two positions: the initial and medial slots, as illustrated in bilingual examples (52) and (53) respectively. However, most occurrences were utterance initial.

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<sup>49</sup> In the data, *so* is used to: describe the extent to which something is done, (e.g. NEM37...I cried I was so I felt so bad); point to the extremity of something, for instance, (e.g. BN 150: There are so many factors); express continuity of a longer list (e.g. LM 106: ...Remember, I used not to have even pens, papers and so on to use because my problem was tuition); disclose purpose/intention of doing something (P so that Q: e.g. LM 104: ...They had given me three years to study so that I could go back and teach); feature in imaginary nominalisations (e.g. DN47: ...tell so and so that her daughter is here); suggest that the referent is not described appropriately (e.g. LM132: ...I remember there was a day when some so called school, if I may say was coming to our school to have a football match, friendly match with our school...); indicate unspecified quantity (e.g. BG142: Er we were eating so many non informal foods); substitute for implicit information in cases where the speaker may not want to repeat himself (e.g. NS870: Paying in hours is advantageous.../NJ67: I think so); occurs in fixed expressions such as so long as, (e.g. KS94: ...so long as I am descent, she has no problem with it); and, it is used in idiomatic phrases such as so (what)? (e.g. NS2286: People talk about their problems, *n'ogamba* 'so what?' [ People talk about their problems, and you say 'so what?'.?'] (see Cowie, 1992:864; Soanes & Stevenson, 2003:1678; Bolden, 2009: 974).

52. *Tetwalina wa* third grade. **So** *ne baturecommendinga ne tweyongereyo mu* Nyenga seminary (KA 125).

*te-tu-alina*                      *wa* third grade **so**    *ne ba-tu-recommending-a*  
 NEG-SUBJ.2PL-have of    third grade **so**    and SUBJ.3PL-OBJ.2PL-recommend-FV

*ne*        *tu-eyongera-yo*                      *mu* nyenga seminary  
 CONJ    SUBJ.2PL-continue.LOC    P    nyenga seminary

‘We did not have (no one passed) with third grade. **So** they recommended us and we continued to Nyenga seminary’

53. ...*eka nga ndi mwana wa mpisa*; **so** I was-it was easy for me (BG122)

*e-ka*        *nga*    *n-di*                      *mu-ana*    *wa*    *mpisa*        **so**    I was- it was really easy for me  
 IV-home HAB    SUBJ.1SG-be 1-child    of    discipline **so**

‘At home, I was always a disciplined child **so** I was-it was really easy for me’

In utterances (52) and (53), *so* relates two separate propositions in adjacent sequences. In utterance (53), each of the conjoined propositions forms an independent intonation unit. Both *so* PMs are phonologically marked, although the *so* in (52) is seemingly more emphatic than the one in (53). Example (52) features classic CS in which Luganda operates as the ML and English as the EL. The morpheme order of the clauses “*Tetwalina wa* third grade” (We did not have a pupil who scored in third grade) and “**So** *ne baturecommendinga ne tweyongerayomu* Nyenga seminary” (so they recommended us and we joined Nyenga seminary) conform to the morphosyntactic frame of Luganda as an agglutinative language. For instance, we see from the mixed constituent “*ne-ba-tu-recommending-a*” (they recommended us) that certain Luganda system morphemes such as the subject prefix *ba* (they) and the object prefix *tu* (us) are affixed on the English inflected verb form *recommending*. We also see a functionally peripheral final vowel (FV) *-a* attached as a suffix on the English verb form.

Utterance (53) is also a bilingual utterance which comprises two monolingual CPs in which each CP is controlled by its respective ML. The Luganda ML CP *eka nga ndi mwana wa mpisa* (At home, I was always a disciplined child) and the English ML, *so I was- it was really easy for me*. Within the MLF model, Luganda and English are in contact in example (52) but not in (53).

In the data, there were instances where *so* occupied an utterance final position to signal implied meaning, as we see in utterance (54). In the final position, *so* ‘stands alone’ to encode explicatures inferable from the contextual assumptions.

54. ...*balina amaanyi mangi nnyo ate nga balamu. So\_* (KG25)

*ba-lin-a*                      *a-maanyi*    *ma-ngi*    *nnyo*    *ate*    *nga*    *ba-lamu*    **so**  
 SUBJ.3PL-have-FV    IV-strength    6-a lot    very    and    yet    3PL-healthy    **so**

‘...they have a lot of energy {people from a certain region in Uganda} and yet they are healthy. **So\_**’

The discussion of the implied-meaning marking *so* in Section 6.9.2.2 predicts that the ‘stand-alone’ *so* is employed in contexts where the speaker assumes that the hearer has easy access to the relevant contextual knowledge from which he can infer the meaning intended by the speaker. Utterance (54) is set in a context where KG was describing the relationship between eating habits and body size. She described some ethnic group which has small-bodied people who are healthy and strong. Against this background, the hearer uses *so* as a clue to process KG’s elided information into a full proposition. The open-endedness of the stand-alone *so* can yield various explicatures such as “So they are strong and healthy because of their eating habits”, “So people should watch their diets” and so on. In this study, much as the ‘stand-alone’ PMs occur in isolation, they are taken to occupy an utterance initial position in which they preface an inferable explicature. Within the MLF/4-M models, such *so* PMs can be analysed as occupying the COMP position, in which they head an implicit CP. An interesting question would be whether the MLF model can predict the ML of the implicit CP.

The PM property of connectivity discussed in Section 2.2.4.6 relates to the position PMs occupy in the data. In that section, we saw that while PMs have been defined by the property of connecting discourse explicitly as seen in (52) and (53), this is not a necessary condition. Blakemore (2002) has demonstrated that PMs can occur in fragmentary utterances to encode fully-fledged explicatures as in (54), and they can occur without the explicit S1 such as in (55).

55. **So** for a given interview, *olina okubeerako ne* critical minimum? (BV119)

**So** for a given interview    *o-lina*                      *o-ku-beera-ko*                      *ne*    critical minimum  
SUBJ.2SG-have    IV-INF-possess-PARTv    with

‘**So** for a given interview, you must have a critical minimum {number of PMs obtained}?’

The interrogative *so* in utterance (55) does not relate this proposition locally or globally. Rather, BV intends to engage his co-participant further and the information prefaced by *so* makes manifest to his co-participant his intention to request information. In general, although *so* PMs enjoy ‘free’ movement in utterance initial and medial positions, their movement as EL elements in bilingual CPs are constrained by the morphosyntactic requirements of the ML.

#### 6.4 Operational status of *so* PM as a code-switch

The discussion of the notion of borrowing in Section 3.4 established that PMs in this data are core borrowings and that their existence in the ML cannot be explained primarily in terms of the gap hypothesis for they have functional equivalents in the ML. Furthermore, from the discussion of differentiating code-switches from borrowings in Section 3.6, it was established that the English *so* operates predominantly as a code-switch in the ML. This observation is illustrated in utterance (56) in which *so* is inserted as a switch in a bilingual CP where Luganda is the ML. Similar explanations would hold for all the occurrences of *so* as an EL in the data. Following the feature matrix presented in Table (2), I would assign a [–] feature to *so* in terms of nativisation, semantic change, replacement and morphosyntactic integration. On the other hand, I would assign a [+/-] feature to *so* in terms of phonological integration, acceptability, and frequency. While I concluded that these features are debatable, I use them in the analysis to support my interpretation of *so* as a core-borrowed switch.

56. ....*omukyala naye yeewa ekitiibwa. So nga waliwo byatasobola kkola.* (BG192)

*omukyala naye ye-ewa e-ki-tiibwa so nga wa-li-wo*  
wife            herself    She-give 1V-7-respect **so**    HAB    16-be-there  
*bya-ta-sobol-a*                      *ku-kol-a*  
8.REL-NEG.3SG-can-FV    INF-do-FV

‘The {my} wife also respects herself. **So** there are things that you could not do’.

As explained, differentiating between loans and code-switches as singly occurring items has been challenging because they resemble each other more than they differ. I argue that *so* is a switch because it is not an established loan and lacks dictionary status. Although it occurs quite frequently in the data, it lacks predicative value. Concerning semantic change, the procedural role *so* plays in general as an embedded element, in this utterance and elsewhere in the data, is not significantly different from the roles it would play in English. Thus, its procedural and semantic status is in general intact. Similarly, *so* as a PM has not replaced or been replaced by (a) Luganda PM functional equivalent(s); instead, PMs from both languages coexist. As a content morpheme operating at discourse level, *so* may not easily integrate morphosyntactically because it encodes complete non-compositional meaning. All these descriptions point towards switches and not loans.

Concerning the [+/-] features, I make the following claims. The type of phonological integration, which loosely defines *so* in the data is what I describe as partial integration. Note that what I describe here as partial phonological integration differs from ‘pure’ phonological integration such as what we saw in examples such as *ppeeni* (pen), *bbulu* (blue) in Section 3.6. I predict that partial integration of *so* is augmented by the existence of the Luganda homograph *so*. As mentioned, there are two *so* PMs in the data: the Luganda contrastive *so* and the English implicative *so*. The two *so* PMs are true homonyms for they are not etymologically related. I pointed out that many bilingual speakers find difficulties pronouncing English vowel sounds, particularly the English diphthongs and triphthongs. They usually pronounce them as pure vowels following the simple Luganda vowel system which comprises only five pure vowels (*a, e, i, o, u*, which can be long or short). Thus, the English *so* [səʊ] and the Luganda *so* [so] in bilingual speech are phonetically undistinguishable, pronounced as [so], and sometimes as [so:] (where the Luganda /o/ is a close-mid back vowel).

I predict that the high distributional frequency of *so* in relation to other embedded PMs in Luganda ML in the data may be partly accounted for by the existence of the Luganda *so*. That is, bilingual speakers, at whatever level of bilingualism, would find it easier to associate with a familiar form existent in the ML, especially when it is easier to pronounce. This, in addition to the fact that *so* is highly multifunctional, with the ability to signal a range of context-based procedural meaning,

makes its occurrence frequent both as an embedded PM in the data and as part of the English ML. This argument ties in with the feature of [+/-] acceptability. Although *so* is still recognisable as a switch, the presence of the Luganda homograph increases the chances of its acceptability. No wonder the bilingual speakers ‘confuse’ the two forms. For lack of failsafe criteria, the more plus features a PM has, the more confident I became in establishing them as code-switches.

## 6.5 Manifestation of *so* in mixed constituencies

Classic code-switching involves bilingual CPs in which the surface level morphemes come from the participating languages, resulting in mixed “ML+EL” constituents (Myers-Scotton, 1995:238). *So* as a single item occurs in three forms: as a single insertion in the Luganda ML; in ML/EL islands; and in mixed ML+EL constituents whose ML may be Luganda. These are exemplified in utterances (57)-(59) respectively.

57. *Kati bwe twatuuka e Mityana ne nfuna kammunguluze ow’amanyi so ne nkoma okutegeera.* (KA146)

*kati bwe tu-a-tuuk-a e mityana ne n-fun-a*  
 now when SUBJ.1PL-PST-reach-FV P mityana and SUBJ.1SG-get-FV

*kammunguluze owa a-maanyi so ne n-kom-a o-ku-tegeer-a.*  
 dizziness 3.REL IV-strong so and SUBJ.1SG-stop-FV IV-INF-understand-FV

‘Now, when we reached at Mityana, I became very dizzy and **consequently** I became unconscious’.

In example (57), we see *so* occurring as a single switch inserted in the Luganda ML. *So* contributes to the relevance of the utterance by providing clues to the hearer which guide him in the derivation of a contextual implication, the conclusion that KA became unconscious as a consequence of too much *kammunguluze* (dizziness). In this context, KA had the option of using the Luganda functional PM counterpart of *so*, namely *kati* (then), which signals similar procedural meaning. Speaker intuition informs me that the Luganda alternative *kati* rhymes better in this utterance, and would be more appropriate than the foreign insertion. My educated guess for KA’s use of *so* instead of *kati* is that KA was operating in a bilingual mode, in which CS was the unmarked code, and such insertions happen unconsciously.

In example (58), the *so* embedded constituent occurs as an ML island.

58. [<sub>CP</sub> My father had a home *e* Bukomero *mu* town [<sub>CP</sub> **so** [<sub>IP</sub> it was near [<sub>CP</sub> *nga* [<sub>IP</sub> *tukomawo* for lunch]]]]]  
(BG 158).

my father had another home *e* bukomero *mu* town **so** it was near *nga*  
at bukomero P HAB

*tu-komawo* for lunch

SUBJ.1PL-return

‘My father had another home at Bukomero in town, **so** (because?) it was near and we would return home for lunch’.

In this utterance, the bilingual sentence BG produces comprises three CPs: the bilingual CP “My father had another home *e* (at) Bukomero *mu* (in) town”, the English ML island “**so** it was near” and another bilingual CP “*nga tukomawo* for lunch” (and we would return home for lunch) as indicated by the square brackets. The bilingual CP which hosts the target *so*, “**so** it was near *nga tukomawo* for lunch” is interesting. The ML of this CP is English which provides the frame of the CP. The CP comprises morphemes from Luganda and English but the Luganda morphemes occur in an EL island, *nga tukomawo* (we would come back) which is inserted into the CP. In Section 4.6.3, EL islands are defined with three properties: they must consist of only EL morphemes, they must be bound by the well-formedness conditions of the respective grammar, and they must occur in a particular slot in a larger CP, constrained by the morphosyntactic frame of the ML. These conditions are in line with the Uniform Structure Principle (USP) which does not allow structural ‘chaos’ in mixed constituents.

*Nga tukomawo* can only be described as an EL island as long as it is interpreted within the larger CP, “so it was near *nga tukomawo* for lunch”. However, if this CP (with reference to the bracketing of utterance (58)) is extracted from the larger CP, we would end up with a smaller bilingual CP “*nga tukomawo* for lunch”. In this CP, *nga* would be the head, COMP, which assigns the utterance discourse-related theta roles and “*tukomawo* for lunch” would be the IP<sup>50</sup>. Thus, *nga tukomawo* in

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<sup>50</sup> In RT terms, such theta roles are akin to the procedural roles and the IP would be the encoded proposition.



“*nga tukomawo* for lunch” would not be an island but a monolingual segment which combines with an English PP (for lunch) to form a bilingual CP “*nga tukomawo* for lunch”.

In utterance (59), *so* is part of a mixed ML+EL constituent, in which Luganda is the ML.

59. *Kati oli<sup>51</sup> bw'aberaYO, YE OLI WA? MWANA GGWE! So nga* every time *nga akasinglinga* out, *ekyavaamu n'a-nhamba nti*, “*naye maama...*”(NJ 117). {Capitalisation for emphasis}.

*kati o-li bwa-a-beera-yo ye o-li wa mu-ana ggwe*  
now 2SG-other when 3SG-be-LOC PM 2SG-be INTEROG 1-Child you

*so* every time *nga a-ka-singling-a* out *ekyavaamu*  
HAB SUBJ<sub>x</sub>3SG-DIM-singling-FV out eventually

*ne a-n-gamb-a nti naye maama*  
and SUBJ<sub>y</sub>3SG-OBJ.1SG.tell-FV that but mother

‘Now, whenever the other one (visitor) was around, (she would scream...)’ “And where are you!? what kind of child are you!?” So she would single her out every time, eventually the (my) child told me, “but mother...” {Context, a mother describes a visitor who used to discriminate against her children}

The mixed constituent, “So every time *nga akasinglinga* out”, is prefaced by a *so*. From morpheme types and morpheme ordering of the form “*a-ka-singling-a out*”, it is evident that Luganda is the ML of the bilingual CP. This phrase is interesting because it shows how powerful CS can be in triggering syntactic configurations. We see an English phrasal verb *single out* broken up (see underlined) in order to satisfy the phonotactic and other requirements of well-formedness in Luganda, as the ML.

## 6.6 Structural overlaps between the Luganda and English *so*

Prior to this project, I had never been aware of the existence of the Luganda and the English *so* PMs. My awareness was raised when I attempted to categorise the different *so* PMs as they

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<sup>51</sup> *Oli* can be a second person demonstrative or a second person auxiliary.

featured in the data. The initial stages of categorisation were challenging because I could not easily tell whether it was a Luganda *so* or the English *so* operating in certain contexts. To my surprise, many of the consultants were equally unaware of the existence of the two PMs. To some non-linguist language consultants, I had to explain convincingly the existence of a Luganda *so*, which they had previously interpreted as an established English borrowing. Against this background, the initial aim to examine the English *so*, as an embedded language element in bilingual spoken data, was broadened to include the Luganda *so*, as preliminary analysis showed structural overlaps in the use of the two PMs. I was motivated to establish the source of ‘confusion’ between the two PMs, despite the fact that they are etymologically and procedurally unrelated.

Whereas the English *so* is relatively well studied, to the best of my knowledge, no research enquiry has been directed towards understanding Luganda PMs in general or in monolingual-bilingual discourse. What is available as literature are brief outlines featuring in concise monolingual Luganda dictionaries, and bilingual Luganda-English dictionaries, such as Kiingi (2012:762, 769), Bagunywa, Kyakulumbye, Muwonge & Ssentooogo (2012:141, 332), Snoxall (1967:290), and Le Veux (1917:908). In these dictionaries, *so* (or *sso*) is entered as a contrastive conjunction translated as *whereas*, *while*, *but* and *yet*; an adverb translating into *very*. Its procedural roles, according to these dictionaries, relate it to signaling uncertainty.

The Luganda *so* encodes a ‘core’ meaning of contrast, and, following Fraser’s (2015) hierarchical grouping of PMs, it is a secondary PM in the adversative PM hierarchy where *naye* (but) operates as the primary Luganda contrastive. This partly explains why its distributional frequency is much lower than that of the English *so* which is a primary PM on the implicative PM hierarchy. The Luganda *so* manifests singly and in co-occurrences of only monolingual sequences and its distribution frequency is much lower than that of the English *so*. In the data, the Luganda *so* features in monolingual Luganda CPs and it never occurs as an embedded element.

The way Luganda *so* configures in Luganda monolingual CPs is similar to the configurations in which the English *so* occurs as a switched element. In this section, I illustrate some of the overlaps by juxtaposing bilingual utterances in which the English *so* occurs (singly and in bilingual

combinations) as an EL element with structures in which the Luganda *so* exists (singly and in monolingual combinations).

### 6.6.1 A Luganda contrastive *so* overlapping with an English *so* single code-switch

In Excerpt 1, the Luganda *so* prefaces a proposition which contrasts the presupposition communicated by the first proposition. In this excerpt, JN was narrating how she was misinterpreted by her co-participant when they quarrelled. By processing the propositions in the right context, JN expects the hearer to abandon the contested old information “that JN’s insultee has HIV”, in favour of the new information, “that JN’s insultee does not have HIV but she looks like the actual HIV virus”. In RT, the cognitive effects associated with contrastive devices result in elimination of the communicated assumptions. That is, the old information combines with the new information and results in the cancellation of the old information.

#### Excerpt 1

JN162: *Namugamba ALINGA*

ML136: *So takalina*

.....

JN162: *n-a-mu-gamb-a*

*a-li-nga*

SUBJ.1SG-PST-OBJ.1SG-tell-FV

SUBJ.3SG-be-like

‘I told her she LOOKS LIKE (the virus that causes AIDS)’

ML136: *so ta-ka-lina*

but NEG.3SG-12-have

‘**BUT** she does not have it’

{Context: JN (as a child) insults a friend by telling her she looks like the actual HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus). However, when the insultee reported JN, she claimed that JN had said that she has HIV} Capitalisation for emphasis.

The Luganda *so* embedded clause “*so takalina*” (but she does not have it) structurally resembles a bilingual CP “*so tubuulire*” (so/now tell us) in Excerpt 2, and the two can be confused. The Luganda *so* and the English *so* are both prosodically marked. However, while the English *so* forms an independent intonation unit, the Luganda *so* does not.

**Excerpt 2**

MNS65: *Nze ngalaba, si nti* boredom but I must watch news

BI54: **So**, *tubuulire*

.....

MNS65: *nze n-ga-lab-a si nti* boredom but I must watch news

I SUBJ.1SG-6-see-FV NEG that

‘I watch them {news}, not out of boredom but I must watch news’

BI54: **so** *tu-buulir-e*

now 1PL-tell-SUBJtv

‘So/now, tell us’

BI 54’s *so* is an English PM switch. Unlike the Luganda *so* in Excerpt 1 which operates in the textual domain to signal ideational relations which are contrastive, the English *so* operates at the interpersonal level to signal the speaker’s request for the audience to perform a certain speech act. The discussion of requestive/interrogative *so* PMs is presented in Section 6.9.3.1 below.

Note that the interpretation of the Luganda and the English *so* in Excerpts 1 and 2 is context dependent and the procedural relations each PM signals cannot be swapped between the two excerpts. That is, it is not possible to process the English *so* along the contrastive route nor can the Luganda *so* be interpreted following the interrogative path. However, the Luganda *so*-prefaced proposition, *so takalina* (so she does not have it) can be interpreted as an implicative *so* in certain contexts. For instance, in utterances such as “She has tested HIV negative, *so takalina*”, the *so*-prefaced proposition, *so takalina*, can be processed as a conclusion based on the premise such as “testing HIV negative implies not having HIV”.

### 6.6.2 The Luganda monolingual pair *so nga* overlaps with the bilingual pair “*so nga*”.

The PM form “*so nga*” is ambiguous. It can be interpreted as a Luganda monolingual PM compound or as a bilingual English-Luganda pair in which the English *so* pairs with the Luganda *nga*. The structural overlap (confusion) is illustrated in utterance (60a) where Luganda *so nga* is used and in utterance (60b) where the bilingual pair manifests.

60.a. ... *agamba nti takyaweerera* , **so nga** (*ate*) *aba mummy wange bakyasoma* (SJ 40).

*a-gamb-a*    *ta-ki-aweerer-a*    *so nga* (ate)    *a-ba*    mummy  
 SUBJ.3SG.PRES-say-FV                          NEG.3SG-PROG-fund-FV                          and yet                          IV-POSS                          mummy  
*wa-ange*    *ba-ki-asom-a*  
 1-POSS.1SG                          2-PROG-study-FV  
 ‘(He {our father} says that he retired from paying tuition, and yet the children of my mother  
 have not completed their studies’.

60.b. ...*tetwalina nanny, so nga tumuzazika awo n'eqhenda n'ensoma* (NJ 96)

*te-tu-a-lina-nga*    nanny    **so nga**    *tu-mu-zazika*    *awo*  
 NEG-SUBJ.1PL-PST-have-HAB                          nanny    so    PROG?    1PL-OBJ.1SG-place    there  
*ne*    *n-gend-a*    *ne*    *n-som-a*  
 and    SUBJ.1SG-go-FV    and    SUBJ.1SG-study-FV  
 ‘We did not have a nanny, **so** we would often place him {the baby} there {in some room} and I  
 would go to class’

Utterance (60a) features the Luganda monolingual pair *so nga* (and yet) whose procedural role is to signal strong contrastive relations between the conjoined propositions. The Luganda *so nga* is functionally compositional; unlike the bilingual pair in which *so* and *nga* can be used singly, the Luganda *so nga* cannot. In utterance (60b), the bilingual pair “*so nga*” (so, PROG) prefaces a proposition which warrants an explanation for the cause of the state of affairs described in the utterance. That is, “*so nga*” in (60b) guides an interpretation in which the action of placing of the baby in the room is a result of some state in which NJ’s family lacked a nanny. Bilingual PM pairs and clusters involving the English *so* PM are discussed in Section 6.8.2.

Unlike the Luganda and English *so* which occurred singly, as described in Excerpt 1 and 2 above, the two *so nga* PM pairs in (60a) and (60b) are phonologically distinct. The Luganda monolingual pair *so nga* does not form an independent intonation unit. In contrast, the *so* in the bilingual pair is prosodically marked and it forms an independent intonation unit.

Note that the bilingual “*so nga*” is flexibly separable; and in face of CS, it can be broken up as we saw in utterance (59) repeated here as (61).

61.    **So**, every time *nga akasinglinga* out (NJ 117)

So, every time *nga* *a-ka-singling-a* out  
 HAB SUBJ.3SG-DIM-singling-FV out  
 ‘Every time she would single her out’.

In this utterance, the bilingual pair “so *nga*” is broken up and a temporal adverb *every time* is inserted in-between. This example shows how powerful CS constraints are in triggering the breakup of constituents, which results in configurational innovations. In addition, the verb phrase *singling out* is configured into “*akasinglinga* out” in the face of CS to fulfil the morphosyntactic requirements of Luganda ML. In terms of cognitive effects, the CP “So, every time *nga akasinglinga* out” where “so...*nga*” is broken up encodes similar cognitive effects to the CP “so *nga* everytime *akasinglinga* out” where “so *nga*” is not broken up. Note that *so* in the CP “So, every time *nga akasinglinga* out” is a translation of the Luganda functional equivalent *kati*. Further discussion of PM translations is presented in Section 6.7 and 6.8.

### 6.6.3 The structure of the Luganda *so nga* in marking implied results resembles bilingual *so nga*

Implied-meaning encoding *so* PMs occur in contexts where the speaker leaves out some information judging that the hearer will base their interpretation on the contextual information and inferentially derive contextual implications from the argument embedded in the preceding segment. These PM types are discussed at length in Section 6.9.2.2.

62. *Ggwe nga weewaana nti, “Eh, omwana wange tafuka ku buliri” so nga*\_(NS 1338)<sup>52</sup>

<i>ggwe</i>	<i>nga</i>	<i>we-ewaan-a</i>	<i>nti</i>	<i>eh</i>	<i>o-mu-ana</i>	<i>wa-ange</i>	
	SUBJ.2SG	PROG 1SG.REFL-brag-FV	that	see	IV-1-child	1-	
	POSS.1SG						
<i>ta-fuk-a</i>		<i>ku</i>	<i>bu-liri</i>	<i>so nga</i>			
NEG.3SG-pee-FVP		14-bed	and yet				

<sup>52</sup> NS was the interviewer. For validity and reliability purposes, utterances produced by NS were not included in the main analytical arguments. However, there are two illustrations which refer to NS’s utterances because they were the only available utterances in the data to substantiate the discussion where they occur. Another example is 96.

‘You then show off that, ‘Sure, my child does not wet the bed’ **and yet\_**’.

{Context: Participants are comparing bed-wetting habits among young children in villages and in towns. The argument is that urban children will be restricted as to what to eat/drink and so they may not wet their beds. So a parent in town need not to brag about their children for if they allowed them to eat/drink as much as they wanted, they would, wet their beds}

In utterance (62) the Luganda monolingual pair *so nga* stands alone to signal elliptical information which is dismissive. It operates at the textual level to provide clues that guide hearers to construct an inferential explicature such as that “children wet their beds more than their parents can imagine”. This interpretation cancels the earlier held presupposition that “children do not wet their beds”. In addition to signalling implied meaning, *so nga* can be interpreted as operating on the interactional level as a turn-taking PM pair. It gives procedural clues to NS’s co-participant her desire to relinquish the floor. For this use, *so nga* will be phonologically marked with a rising intonation, a feature that according to Blakemore (2002:85) characterises unfinished utterances.

Despite the fact that the Luganda contrastive *so* is procedurally distinct from the English implicative *so*, it is interesting that the bilingual speakers, including linguists, were not consciously aware of the functional distinction between the two PMs and as mentioned, quite often they ‘confused’ them. The more they were made conscious of the existence of the English and Luganda *so* in the discourse, especially in the transcribed data, the more ‘confused’ they were in making choices. However, this ‘confusion’ is not evident in the spoken discourse. As mentioned, a plausible explanation for the confusion could be from the fact that most bilingual speakers pronounce the two *so* PMs indistinguishably. From a contact linguistics perspective, confusing the two PMs could also imply that *so* as a core borrowing is gaining currency in the Luganda ML.

## **6.7 Outcomes of Luganda-English pragmatic markers systems in contact**

As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, three possible outcomes are reported in the literature for what happens when PM systems get in contact. They may coexist, they may acquire differentiated meaning and they may be replaced (see Brody, 1987; Goss and Salmons, 2000; Fuller, 2001; Hlavac, 2006; Torres & Potowski, 2008). I pointed out that what defines the Luganda-English PMs in contact is the notion of coexistence and translation, and that translation as a product of PM contact is not reported in the literature I surveyed. The following sections are aimed at

illustrating the two outcomes applicable to my data. A number of Luganda PMs exhibit features of coexistence with other English PMs but as mentioned, I will restrict my illustrations to those PMs which interface with the English *so*. To enrich the discussion, I have included some illustrations which do not include *so*.

### 6.7.1 Coexistence

In this study, PMs are described as being in coexistence when both the Luganda and English PMs function in bilingual conversations. Coexistence is evidenced in bilingual co-occurrences in which two (or more) semantically and procedurally identical PMs are employed in the same environment. From the data, I predict that the English *so* coexists in ‘competition’ with a Luganda functional equivalent *kati* and its variant *kaakati*, both of which can be rendered as a temporal *now* or *then*. Although *kati* and *kaakati* are semantically synonymous, they are seemingly context specific. That is, there may be contexts where *kati* may encode context-specific nuances and interchanging it with *kaakati* would result in significant differences in cognitive effects. *Kati* and *kaakati* are not evenly distributed: in a corpus of 192 000 words, there are 2 400 *kati* tokens and 191 *kaakati* tokens. One plausible explanation for the higher distribution of *kati* is speaker preference; *kati* being a shorter form to use than *kaakati*. A RT ‘speaker-oriented’ explanation would be that *kati* requires less production effort than *kaakati*. Given that relevance is measured by a balance between effort and effect, *kati* is more relevant than its variant *kaakati* whose production requires extra effort for no extra rewards in cognitive effects for the hearer.

*So* and *kati/kaakati* co-occur. Out of the 2400 *kati* tokens, there are 38 “*so kati*” combinations, and out of the 191 *kaakati* tokens, there are 2 cases of co-occurrences of “*so kaakati*” combinations. In addition, there are tokens in which “*so kati*” and “*so kaakati*” occur in reversed order. Thus, there are two tokens of “*kati so*” and one token of “*kaakati so*” combinations. The notion of reversibility in PMs is discussed in Section 7.10. In this subsection, I demonstrate coexistence of *so* and its functional equivalents in Luganda. Five brief illustrations are given representing “*so kati*” and “*so kaakati*” employed to signal procedural relations between propositions “*so kati\_*” and “*so kaakati\_*” signalling implied meaning, and *so* occurring in a Ugandan English structure.

63. a. ... *ng'alumye amannyo. So kati, n'ayita baganda be abalala* (NMS10).



<i>nga</i>	<i>a-lum-ye</i>	<i>a-ma-nnyo</i>	<i>so</i>	<i>kati</i>	<i>ne</i>
PROG	SUBJ <sub>x</sub> .3SG.PRES-bite-PERF	IV-PL-tooth	so	therefore	and
<i>a-yit-a</i>	<i>ba-ganda</i>	<i>be</i>	<i>a-ba-lala</i>	<i>a-ba-lenzi</i>	
SUBJ <sub>y</sub> .3SG.PST-call-FV	2-sibling	POSS.2SG	IV-2-other	IV-2-boy	

‘...while he {grandfather} had bitten his teeth {convulsed}. And so he {his son} called on his male siblings... {and they took their father to hospital}’

In utterance (63a), NMS was describing an event in which her grandfather got convulsions. The English temporal PM *so* co-occurs with the Luganda temporal PM *kati* in the same environment. The two PMs encode similar procedural relations in signalling an interpretation in which the event of a son calling his siblings is processed as an event which happened as a result of his father’s convulsions and his need to help. If utterance (63a) were to be produced with one of the PMs, either *so* or *kati*, the representational meaning encoded by the utterance would not be different, for both *so* and *kati* are identical in terms of textual and procedural values.

The question of what motivates speakers to use two procedurally identical PMs in the same environment where one PM would encode similar results is crucial here. Following the assumption that PMs contribute to relevance by reducing the overall processing effort, it means that an utterance which has more PMs will be more relevant in signalling those relations to the hearer between propositions. Thus, whereas (63a), if produced with one PM, would be relevant, its production with two PMs makes it more relevant for the double PMs make the temporal relations more manifest to the hearer than a single PM. The extra cognitive effects the hearers may obtain compensates for the extra production cost on the side of the speaker. Another explanation for NMS’s employment of two identical PMs builds from the ML hypothesis in which the participating languages are assumed to be ‘on’ or activated during bilingual communication mode. Following this assumption, NMS’ desire to encode temporal relations in this context may put *kati* and *so* ‘on’. In situations where CS is used as the unmarked code, double PM production can be interpreted as a conscious or unconscious strategy to enhance communication, and reinforce solidarity.

A similar motivational interpretation holds for utterance (63b), where *kaakati* (now), a variant of *kati* coexists with *so* to signal emphatic temporal relations between propositions. In these utterances, *kati* and *kaakati* can be used interchangeably.

63. b. My father was born in Ntwetwe but his grandfather was born there; his father migrated nearer to Kiboga *kati ye n'amigratinga, migrated to Bukomero...So kaakati when the lutalo came naddirayo ddala ewa jjajjawe* (BG31).

My father was born in Ntwetwe but his grandfather was born there; his father migrated nearer to Kiboga *kati ye ne a-migrating-a* migrated to bukomero  
so him and SUBJ.3SG.PST-migrate-FV migrated to bukomwero

**so** *kaakati* when the *lu-talo* came *ne a-ddira-yo*  
therefore? now when the 11-war came and SUBJ.3SG.PST-return-LOC

*ddala ewa jjajja-we*  
EMPH at grandfather-POSS.3SG

'My father was born in Ntwetwe but his grandfather was born there (but in another place); his father migrated nearer to Kiboga so for him, he migrated to Bukomero. Yeah. **And? now**, when the war broke up, he had to return to his ancestral home.'

Another manifestation of coexistence is exemplified by co-occurrences which signal implied meaning. We saw in Section 6.3 that the English 'stand-alone' *so* signals implied meaning, by virtue of indicating to the hearer the route required in the inferential computation of explicature(s). Interestingly, in utterances (64a) and (64b) the English-Luganda "so *kaakati*" and "so *kati*" 'stand together' in the sentence final position to signal stronger procedural clues which guide hearers in the processing of implicit meaning. The possible explicatures derivable from each utterance are indicated in the curly brackets in their respective translations.

64. a. *Kuba babeera n'ensonga zaabwe ate nga zitegeerekeka...So kaakati\_* (KA169)

*kuba ba-beera ne e-nsonga za-abwe ate nga zi-tegeerekeka*  
 because SUBJ.3PL-be with IV-reasons 10-POSS.3PL and while 10-genuine

so *kaakati*

now now

'For they (children) also have genuine reasons (for doing whatever they do), **so now (therefore)**...  
 {they deserve to be listened to}'

64. b. *Mukama singa y'ali akituwadde kyandibadde kirungi. So kaakati\_* (KA145).

*Mukama singa a-a-li a-ki-tu-wa-dde*  
 God if SUBJ.3SG-PST-have SUBJ.3SG-7-OBJ.1PL-give-PERF

*ki-a-ndiba-dde ki-rungi so kati*

7-PST-willbe-PERF 7-good now now

'If God had given it to us (made KA a priest) it would have been good, **so...** {now that he is not we should accept it}'.

In these utterances, “so *kaakati*” and “so *kati*” may also be interpreted as a floor relinquishing PM combination, signalling to KA’s co-participant the need to acquire speakership in the conversation. This role is also evident in stand-alone *so* PMs. Note that the Luganda *kati/kaakati* occur singly to signal implied meaning, in a similar way the English *so* as a single element does. They can also occur in monolingual combinations *kale kati* (therefore/and now) and *kale kaakati* (therefore/so now) to signal similar procedures bilingual “so *kaakati*” and “so *kati*” signal in similar contexts. In some contexts, “so *kaakati*” and “so *kati*” feature as partial translations of *kale kati* and *kale kaakati* respectively. All this points towards the coexistence of Luganda-English PMs.

Note that although Luganda and English PMs coexist because of contact, there are no similar traces of coexistence with other word class items. For example, there are no cases where a Luganda verb co-occurs with an English verb. However, there are traces of language interference manifesting in literal translations of Luganda morphosyntactic forms into English and, rarely, the English forms appear translated into Luganda. Utterances 65a and 65c illustrate this.

65. a. ...So I said, “AAA, **me I** wanted what? I wanted PCB”. (DN99)

In (65a) the co-occurrence of double pronominals, *me* and *I* is a Luganda morphosyntactic feature, and the underlined interrogative marker ‘what’ defines a cultural style in Luganda conversations. Although such usages are widespread and have been described as cases of Ugandan English, they have remained stigmatised. The rendering of DN99a in Luganda would be utterance (65b).

65. b. *Kati nze n'ennyamba, “AAA, nze njagala ki? njagala PCB”*

<i>kati</i>	<i>nze</i>	<i>ne</i>	<i>n-gamb-a</i>	“AAA	<i>nze</i>	<i>n-jagal-a</i>	<i>ki</i>
now	I	and	SUBJ.1SG-say-FV	no	I	SUBJ.1SG-want-FV	
	INTEROG						

*n-jagal-a* PCB

SUBJ.1SG-want-FV PCB

‘Then me I said, “NO WAY, me I-want what? I-want PCB”’.

65. c. *Nzannyirayo akayimba* (X)

*N-zanny-ir-ayo a-ka-yimba*

SUBJ.1SG-play-APPL-PARTv IV-DIM-song

‘Play for me a sweet song’

Utterance (65c) is characterised as a calque of an English expression, and it is commonly used in the media, particularly by radio presenters. In Standard Luganda, songs are not played but ‘beaten’, and the ‘appropriate’ utterance used in Luganda to encode a request for a song would be, *nkubirayo akayimba* (Lit. beat for me a (sweet) song). Although instances that show contact between Ugandan English and British English would be interesting to analyse, they fall outside the scope of the study. Besides, examples in Ugandan English and British English cannot be accounted for within the MLF model because the two are mutually intelligible varieties (see Myers-Scotton, 2006:253).

Coexistence has been analysed as a step towards language substitution. Goss & Salmons’ (2000:469) diachronic study of English-German PMs reports that English PMs were introduced

into German discourse as emblematic switches, the two PM systems then coexisted for some time, after which the English markers became established borrowings which eventually substituted the native German PM system. By analogy, I hypothesise that in the future, English PMs may replace Luganda PMs, *kati/kaakati* and *kale*, as has happened in German-American English bilingual dialects. However, if replacement is to occur it is likely to take a long time because Luganda, although less prestigious than English, has a strong social status in the informal domain in Uganda.

## 6.7.2 Translation

In the data, there are many instances exhibiting literal translation mainly of the Luganda PMs into English. Singly occurring PMs can be translated and PM combinations are also translated, either partially or completely. These are demonstrated as follows.

### 6.7.2.1 Singly occurring *so* PM translation

In utterance (66), my analysis is that *so* is a translation of a Luganda interpersonal PM *kale*. *Kale* is a highly multifunctional interpersonal PM which, depending on the context, can be translated as *well, you see, right, perhaps, okay*. Following Fraser's PMs taxonomy, *kale* would belong to the category of parallel markers which signal focus or refocus on the proposition it prefaces. Utterance (66) is set in a context where HK as a lecturer was explaining her disappointment having left her house for work and only to find students striking.

66. *Saagisuspectinze naye* I didn't want to come, *nga bw'omanyi awaka nga tolina muntu...so teebeereza buli kimu nkiresse awo...*(HK10-11).

<i>si-a-gi-suspectin-ze</i>	<i>naye</i>	I didn't want to come	<i>nga bw'omanyi</i>
NEG.1SG-PST-9-suspect-PERF	but	....	as you know

<i>a-waka</i>	<i>nga</i>	<i>to-lina</i>	<i>muntu</i>	<b>so</b>	<i>teebeereza</i>	<i>buli</i>
IV-home	while	NEG.2SG-have	person	Just?	imagine	every
<i>ki-mu</i>	<i>n-ki-resse</i>	<i>awo</i>				
7-thing	SUBJ.1SG-7-leave.PERF	there				

'I did not suspect it {students' strike} but I didn't want to come, as you know, a home without a nanny. Now? just imagine, I left everything {housework} undone'.

As an interpersonal PM, *kale* signals pragmatic nuances, which appeal to HK's participants to imagine her situation and sympathise with her. In Luganda, the expression *kale teebereza* (you just imagine) is employed to encode feelings of disappointment which are metarepresented in “*so teebereza...*(You just imagine...)”. *Kale* in this context is difficult to bring to consciousness and translate because it serves rhetorical-related functions. Clearly, such nuances cannot be retrieved from HK's utterance if *so* were to be interpreted as an English PM and not as a translated Luganda functional equivalent. An interpretation of this utterance where *so* is construed as a native English *so* will not yield any cognitive effects and will require expending extra processing effort.

### 6.7.2.2 Total translation of the PM pair or cluster

Total translation involves transfer of the whole PM pair or cluster into another language. In example (67), the Luganda PM cluster *naye era olwokubanga* (in order: *but again because*), which signals strong contrast is translated into an English cluster. Whereas PMs in English are constrained from forming more than two PM pairs, Luganda PM clusters can comprise three PM sequences. Such PM occurrences can be interpreted as violating the rules of PM combinability in English but they also point to the reality of contact outcomes.

67. **But because again** of my problems, *nga sisobola kusiibaayo* (LM40).

**But because again** of my problems, *nga si-sobol-a ku-siiba-yo*

But because again of my problems, HAB NEG.1SG-can-FV INF-spend a day-LOC

‘**But because** {again} of my problems, I could not spend the whole day {at school}’.

Interestingly, the ordering of the translated PM cluster does not conform to the ordering of the Luganda functionally equivalent cluster. Note that this CP comprises two monolingual CPs, each in a different language. This, within the MLF model, implies that Luganda and English are not in contact<sup>53</sup>. My educated guess is that the rules of well formedness of the Standard English variety ‘constrains’ the well formedness conditions in morpheme ordering of the translated PM cluster. For instance, in signalling contrast in English, a combination, *but because* is more acceptable than *but again* and thus, disposition of *again* to the final position in the translated PM cluster is predictable.

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<sup>53</sup> Note that the CP *but because again of my problems* shows that two varieties of English are in contact, and the scope of MLF falls outside describing mutually intelligible varieties.

### 6.7.2.3 Partial translation of the PM pair

Sometimes, the PM pair or cluster may be partially translated forming bilingual combinations such as “*naye* since then” illustrated in (68). The temporal PM cluster *naye okuva olwo* (and since then) is partially translated into English. In this utterance, LM was explaining how he got embarrassed during a reading lesson after he attempted to read the word ‘sign’ as /sigini/ and his classmates laughed at him.

68. ...*abaana ne batulika ne baseka. Naye* since then, okay not since then, may be later alone  
*natandika okwebuuz-a lwaki...*(LM155)

<i>a-ba-ana</i>	<i>ne</i>	<i>ba-tulik-a</i>	<i>ne</i>	<i>ba-sek-a</i>	<i>naye</i> since then...
IV-2-child	and	2-break-FV	and	2-laugh-FV	but

<i>n-a-tandik-a</i>	<i>o-ku-ee-buuz-a</i>	<i>lwaki</i>
SUBJ.3SG-PST-begin-FV	IV-INF-REFL-ask-FV	INTEROG

‘And children broke into laughter. And since then, okay not since then, maybe later alone I started to ask myself why {certain words have silent letters}’

Furthermore, there are recurrent colloquial PM uses among the university student participants. For instance, the use of the “so *nga*” bilingual pair appears to be a translation of the Luganda textual PM pair *kati nga* (and then/now) used in signalling a new event in the narrative. It features in examples such as, “So *nga* I come back to Kampala”, “So *nga* the headmaster calls me...”, “so *nga* I go to the village...”. It should be noted that the criterion for differentiating between coexistence and partial translation is not precise. As we shall see below, many bilingual co-occurrences can be explained as resulting from coexistence or partial translation, both of which are outcomes of PMs contact.

## 6.8 The English *so* PMs in co-occurrences

In the bilingual utterances, *so* manifests in three forms: it occurs singly as a switch, it co-occurs in monolingual sequences with other English PMs or particles, and in complex bilingual sequences with Luganda PMs and particles. The notion of co-occurrence should not be confused with

coexistence discussed in Section 6.7.1. While PM co-occurrences relate to PM combinations in general, which can be monolingual or bilingual combinations, coexistence is more specific and relates to cases of bilingual combinations in which procedurally identical PMs pair or cluster and occur in the same environment. Such PMs are usually in competition. As explained, the speaker's employment of more than one PM is aimed at maximising relevance. Given that the purpose of PMs within a RT interpretation is to reduce the hearer's inferential processing effort in computing meaning, using many PMs in combination does not necessarily increase the processing effort. Even if it did, the extra production effort would be compensated for by the extra cognitive effects.

In the data, PM combinations are diverse, and in this analysis, I focus on those combinations in which the English *so* is a member, for example “*so ne*”- (and so), “*so nga*” (and while/whereas), “*so kati* because”, etc. As a prelude, I give a brief exposition of the English monolingual PM pairs involving *so*.

### 6.8.1 Monolingual co-occurrence pairs involving *so*

In the data the English *so* occurs in combinations of English monolingual pairs such as *so then*, *then after*, *fortunately still*, *and so* among others. Some of these pairs are not ‘pure’ English combinations but are rather PM calques of Luganda combinations. In utterance (69), KM uses a PM pair *and so* to relate propositions. He was explaining how his family perceives his speech behaviour, which he describes as being both serious and casual. The PM pair *and so* compositionally encodes procedures which lead to an interpretation in which the proposition it prefaces is construed as a contextual implication. That is, from the assumption that KM's speech is characterised by seriousness and jokes, it can be concluded that KM's family may have difficulties understanding his speech behaviour. If KM had preferred to use *and so* as a ‘stand alone’ PM pair, a similar conclusive interpretation would be processed.

69. ...quite a few times I joke **and so** *kizibu bo okutegeera* speech behaviour *zange* (KM110).

quite a few times I joke and so *ki-zibu*    *bo*            *o-ku-teegeer-a*            speech behaviour

7-difficult    OBJ.3PL    IV-INF-understand-FV

*za-ange*

9-POSS.1SG



‘...quite a few times I joke **and so** it becomes difficult for them to understand my speech behaviour’

### 6.8.2 Bilingual pairs involving *so*

The utterance in (70) illustrates a bilingual pair involving the English *so* and a Luganda contrastive *naye* (but).

70. ...*oba tebaakola bulungi oba* whatever *so tebaasobola*. **So** *naye mu baana mwe baasomesa abato mwe mwasigala abo*.(DN138)

<i>oba</i>	<i>te-ba-a-kol-a</i>	<i>bu-lungi</i>	<i>oba</i>	whatever	<i>so</i>
perhaps	NEG-SUBJ.3PL-PST-do-FV	2-well	perhaps		

<i>te-ba-a-sigal-a</i>	<i>so</i>	<i>naye</i>	<i>mu</i>	<i>ba-ana</i>	<i>mwe</i>
NEG-SUBJ.3PL-PST-remain-FV	so	but	P	2-child	REL

<i>ba-a-som-esa</i>	<i>a-ba-to</i>	<i>mwe</i>	<i>mu-a-sigal-a</i>	<i>a-bo</i>
SUBJ.3PL-PST-teach-CAUS	IV-2-young	REL	1-PST-remain-FV	IV-those

‘...perhaps they did not perform well or whatever so they were not retained. **But then** from the younger students they taught, that is where they retained those ones’

DN was explaining the recruitment strategy at some time at the university in which a group of younger students were retained rather than the older students. Following Fraser’s (2015) categorisation of PMs in terms of a primary and secondary hierarchy, both *so* and *naye* would be classified as primary PMs, that is, *naye* (but) is a primary adversative and *so* is a primary implicative. Co-occurrence of an implicative together with a contrastive is constrained because such an interpretation would be incoherent and would require extra processing effort to interpret. From the fact that “*so naye*” signals strong contrast between the coordinated propositions, I predict that this pair illustrates another case of partial translation in which a Luganda temporal *kati* (now) is translated into *so*. “*So naye*” in this utterance will then be construed as a partial translation of the Luganda monolingual pair, *kati naye* (but then).

### 6.8.3 Bilingual cluster involving *so*

A number of bilingual clusters are evident in the data. They include “*naye* since then” (but since then), “*ng’era* of course” (and while of course) “*naye era* still” (BUT STILL), “*naye* then *nga*” (but then while), “*kati* then *nga*” (now then while), “*naye ng’*otherwise” (but while otherwise), among others (Capitalisation for emphasis). However, there is only one bilingual cluster involving the English *so*, that is, “*so kati kubanga*” (now, now because), which interestingly occurs in combination with a *kubanga* form.

Utterance (71) is produced in a context where KA was describing how they rushed him home after he had a black out at school.

71. *Ndwooza baali beeraliikirira nti nnali sigenda kuwona! So kati, kubanga ebiseera ebyo era tebyali bya mirembe kati nga n’amakubo si mangu kkola ki?kuyitamu* (KA146).

<i>N-lowooz-a</i>	<i>oba</i>	<i>ba-a-li</i>	<i>ba-eraliikirir-a</i>	<i>nti</i>	<i>n-a-li</i>
SUBJ.ISG-think-FV	perhaps	3PL-PST-be	3PL-worry-FV	that	SUBJ.ISG-PST-be

<i>si-gend-a</i>	<i>ku-wona</i>	<b>so</b>	<b>kati</b>	<b>kubanga</b>	<i>e-bi-seera</i>	<i>ebyo</i>
NEG.1SG-go-FV	INF-heal	<b>now</b>	<b>now</b>	<b>because</b>	IV-7-time	8.DEM

<i>era</i>	<i>te-bi-a-li</i>	<i>nnyo</i>	<i>bya</i>	<i>mirembe</i>	<i>kati</i>	<i>nga</i>	<i>a-ma-kubo</i>
indeed	NEG-7-PST-be	very	7.of	peace	and	PROG	IV-6-road

<i>si</i>	<i>ma-angu</i>	<i>ku-kol-a</i>	<i>ki</i>	<i>ku-yita-mu.</i>
NEG	6-easy	INF-do-FV	INTEROG	INF-pass-LOC

(I think perhaps they were worried that I would not recover...**Now, because** those times were (indeed) not very peaceful, and the roads were not accessible).

This PM cluster is interesting because it is seemingly not operating compositionally. The “*so kati*” pair procedurally encodes temporal relations and the *kubanga* encodes causal relations. This prediction is confirmed by the fact that “*so kati*” forms its own intonation unit independent from the *kubanga*. The procedural function of *kubanga* is to instruct hearers to process two adjacent

propositions *ebiseera ebyo tebyali bya mirembe* (those times were not peaceful) and *amakubo si mangu* (roads not easy) as a justification or a causal explanation for the event in which KA was rushed home, which event was also caused by their fear that KA might die.

## 6.9 Functional classification of the English pragmatic marker *so*

In this section the PM *so* is analysed as a multifunctional device, with the ability to operate on different planes and in different domains: the textual, interpersonal and interactional domains. To briefly summarise, the textual *so* relates to the structure and organisation of discourse; the interpersonal *so* is associated with signalling attitudes (such as in speech acts), evaluations and feelings; and the interactional *so* relates to the planning processes such as turn-taking (see Lam, 2010:660).

### 6.9.1 Textual domain *so* pragmatic markers

PMs, which are grouped under this category relate to the structure and organisation of discourse. They include consequential/result-marking *so*, thematic/return-to-the-main-idea *so*, narrative/sequential/temporal *so*, summarising/emphatic *so* and the conclusive *so*, as discussed below.

#### 6.9.1.1 Consequential/Result-marking *so*

The consequential/result-signalling *so* is one of the most frequent types of *so* found in the data. It is an ideational PM paraphrased as “state of affairs Y is a result/consequence of state of affairs X” (Buyse, 2012:1765). In utterance (72), AS was describing how her father’s involvement in an accident resulted in his death.

72. ...they had an accident and he was driving. **So** he hit his face *ku ki? ku mmotoka* I think *n’afuna* internal bleeding or something. (AS6)

they had an accident and he was driving. <b>So</b> he hit his face	<i>ku</i>	<i>ki</i>	<i>ku</i>
	P	INTEROG	P

<i>mmotoka</i>	I think	<i>ne</i>	<i>a-fun-a</i>	<i>oba</i>	internal bleeding or something...
motor car		and	SUBJ.3SG.PST-get-FV	perhaps	

‘...they had an accident and he was driving. **So** he hit his face on what? on the car. I think, and he perhaps got internal bleeding or something...’

In this utterance, *so* signals consequential relations between the propositions it coordinates, in which the death of AS's father is interpreted as a direct consequence of his involvement in the accident, having hit his head on the steering wheel (of the car). The cognitive effects associated with *so* in this context are in the form of contextual implications. That is, *so* contributes to relevance by guiding the hearer to make deductions about a specific outcome of motor accidents. Produced without a PM, AS's utterance would be less relevant because it would necessitate that the hearer spends extra processing effort to arrive at the speaker's intended interpretation. This is because a range of assumptions concerning the causes of death in the context of accidents may be manifest in the hearer's cognitive environment.

### 6.9.1.2 Thematic/Return-to-the-main-idea *so*

The thematic *so* operates in the participation domain. It occurs in contexts where the speaker gets interrupted for various reasons or finds it relevant to digress during a narrative. He then uses a *so*-prefaced utterance to return to the theme of the main story, as we see in Excerpt 3. In such cases, the textual coordinates that *so* brackets are not structurally adjacent but global (cf. Schiffrin, 1987).

#### Excerpt 3

NMS 1: Well, ((clears throat)) it was in 2004

NS 4560: Okay

NMS 2: I think we were in P.5

NS 4561: You people you are young. 2004 and you were in P.5?

NMS 3: Yes

NS 4562: ((Laughs))

NMS 4: **So**, it was 24<sup>th</sup>. So my *jjajja*, 'cause *nnakulira mu kyalo ne jjajja wange...*

-----  
 NMS4: **So** it was 24<sup>th</sup>. so my *jjajja* 'cause *n-a-kul-ir-a* *mu*  
   grandparent                SUBJ.1SG-PST-grow-APPL-FV    P  
       *ki-alo*   *ne*   *jjajja*          *wa-ange*  
       7-village  with  grandparent  1-POSS.1SG

'...So my grandmother, 'cause I grew up in the village with my grandparent'

In this excerpt, NMS, having introduced her narrative with a temporal setting of the story in NMS1, is distracted from continuing her main story by NS in NS4561. She is able to resume her story about her childhood experience later in NMS4. The utterance in NMS4 is intended to give a recap of the theme of her story, a repetition of what was said before, in NMS1. The repeated utterance is prefaced by a *so* (in bold-face) whose procedural function is to signal a return to the main theme of the narrative, restarting it from where it was left before NS’s interruption (see Schifffrin, 1987:195). Different labels/definitions have been used to describe the thematic *so*, and all of them point to a synonymous functional category. They include *marker of main idea units* (Schifffrin (1987; Müller, 2005), while Buysse (2012:1772) views it as “an indicator of a back shift to a higher unit of the discourse”, either after a brief interruption by, or an exchange with, the co-participant, or after a turn-internal digression.

### 6.9.1.3 Narrative/Sequential/Temporal *so*

In the data, the sequential *so* is employed in narratives to introduce a transition from one stage or scene to another. Like the thematic *so*, the sequential *so* operates in the participation domain, within the interactive speech tasks. It procedurally guides the hearer’s inferential route to arrive at the relevant structural organisation of discourse by marking serialised textual relations between the foregoing and the upcoming discourse as exemplified in utterance (73).

73. **So** one day we went very late (to school). It was a Monday. I think we overslept *netugenda ku ssomero ng’assembly y’atuuse dda. So bwe twatuuka, bwe twayingira bwe tuti mu gate nga twagala kuddayo ne bagamba askari otukwate.* (KS10)

**So** one day we went very late {to school} It was a Monday. I think we overslept *ne*  
and

*tu-gend-a*              *ku*    *ssomero*    *nga*    *assembly*    *a-a-tuuse*              *dda*    **so**  
SUBJ.1PL-go-FV    P    school    while    assembly    9-PST-reach.PERF    already    **now**

*bwe*    *tu-a-tuuk-a*                              *bwe*    *tu-a-yingir-a*                              *bu-etuti*              *mu*  
when    SUBJ.1PL-PST-reach-FV    when    SUBJ.1PL-PST-enter-FV    14-DEM              P

*gate*    *nga*    *tu-a-gal-a*                              *ku-dda-yo*              *ne*    *ba-gamb-a*  
gate    while    SUBJ.1PL-PST-want-FV    INF-return-LOC    and    SUBJ.3PL.PST-tell-FV

*asikari*            *a-tu-kwat-e*  
 gatekeeper        SUBJ.3SG.PST-OBJ.1PL-catch.SUBJtv

‘I think we overslept and we got to school when the assembly was underway. **So** when we got there-when we entered like this inside the gate, we wanted to retreat and they ordered the gate keeper to ‘arrest’ us’.

Utterance (73) is part of a narrative of what befell KS and her friends the day they went to school late. There are two sequential *so* PMs which procedurally signal a shift from one place/event to the next in the excerpt: the *so* in *so one day* which signals an exposition of the narrative, making it explicitly manifest to the hearers that KS intends to develop her story. The second *so* in *so bwe twatuuka* elevates us further to a new scene in the narrative, having given some contextual background information<sup>54</sup>. The temporal adverb *bwe-* (*when*) in *bwe twatuka* and *bwe twayingira*, combines with *so* in KS10 to strengthen the sequential procedural relations encoded. Segan, Duchan & Scott (1991) and Labov & Waletzky (1967), cited in Torres (2002:68), argue that oral narratives are highly structured discourse types characterised by additivity (each new clause encodes new information) and temporality (sequential ordering of events). Moreover, the conditional definition of sequential relations, according to Redeker (1990:369), is that “when two adjacent discourse units do not have any obvious ideational or rhetorical relation – while still being understood as belonging to the same discourse – their relation is called *sequential*”.

The two *so* PMs as well as the Luganda temporal adverb *bwe-* are prosodically marked with a rising intonation, indicating the beginning of a new scene in the narrative (see Müller, 2005:80). In Section 2.2.4.5, the notion of phonological markedness was discussed in which prosodic independence is assumed to be one of the salient conditions of defining PMs (cf. Heine, 2013:1210). Although not all PMs are phonologically marked in the data, this illustration (and some others provided earlier), shows that some PMs form independent intonation units, while others are dependently integrated into the tone unit of their host segments.

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<sup>54</sup> The *so* in *so bwe twatuuka* can also be described as a “return-to-main-idea” *so* for it also signals a resumption of the main event in the story. This interpretation is less salient.

#### 6.9.1.4 Conclusive *so*

As the name suggests, the conclusive *so* prefaces propositions in which the speaker makes a stronger conclusive statement drawn from the prior discourse. The statement can be in the form of an opinion or an assessment of the state of affairs described, as illustrated in utterance (74) below.

74. It's common sense; *omwana obeera naye mu lubuto* for nine months, *n'afuna ku BULI KIKYO kubanga* background *ne mwakulidde mu lubuto*. **So** that was her philosophy. *Ye nga "Omukazi omusiru azaala omwana omusiru" kubanga y'amulera mu lubuto*. (KG200)

It's common sense;	<i>o-mu-ana</i>	<i>o-beera</i>	<i>ne-aye</i>	<i>mu</i>	<i>lu-buto</i>	
	IV-1-child	SUBJ.2SG-be	with-1SG	P	11-stomach	
for nine months	<i>ne</i>	<i>a-fun-a</i>	<i>ku</i>	<i>buli</i>	<i>ki-kyo</i>	<i>kubanga</i>
	and	SUBJ.3SG-get-FV	P	every	7-POSS.2SG	because
background	<i>ne</i>	<i>mu-a-kul-idde</i>	<i>mu</i>	<i>lubuto</i>	<b>so</b>	that was her philosophy
	and	LOC-PST-grow-PERF	P	stomach		
<i>ye</i>	<i>nga</i>	<i>o-mu-kazi</i>	<i>o- mu-siru</i>	<i>a-zaal-a</i>		<i>o-mu-ana</i>
REFL	PM	IV-1-woman	IV-1-stupid	SUBJ.3SG.PST-produce-FV		IV-1-child
<i>o-mu-siru</i>	<i>kubanga</i>	<i>a-a-mu-ler-a</i>	<i>mu</i>	<i>lu-buto</i>		
IV-1-stupid	because	SUBJ.3SG-PST-OBJ.1SG	P	11-stomach		

'It's common sense; you keep the baby {foetus} in your stomach for nine months, and the baby gets a portion of EVERYTHING FROM YOU...Because {the child's} background is dependent on the mother and the child grows in her stomach {uterus}. **So** that was her philosophy. For her, "a stupid woman bears a stupid child" because she nurtures her in her stomach {womb}'.

Utterance (74) is placed in a context in which KG was stating her late grandmother's philosophy about why men should marry intelligent wives. Her grandmother believed that the child inherits the largest percentage of the mother's intelligence because the mother shares a lot with her baby in the womb. The *so*-prefaced proposition in KG200 "**So** that was her philosophy" signals a

conclusive opinion concerning KG's grandmother's philosophy about stupid or brilliant women. The conclusive *so* is paraphrased as "From the state of affairs X, I conclude the following: Y (see Buysse, 2012:1768).

## 6.9.2 Interactional domain *so* pragmatic markers

The interactional *so*, as mentioned, relates to planning processes and turn-management activities in the discourse. Two categories of interactional *so* PMs are predominant in the data: the turn-taking *so*, and the *so* which marks implied meaning.

### 6.9.2.1 Turn-taking *so*

The turn-taking *so*, as the name suggests, encodes procedures which relate to the planning processes in terms of which participant is holding the floor. Following Schiffrin's (1987) Discourse model, turn-taking *so* PMs are construed to operate predominantly at the exchange structure, and to a smaller extent at the action structure. The former domain relates to selecting speakers, and the latter domain relates to soliciting an action from speakers in which they are expected to compute information inferentially. In the data, the turn-taking *so* PMs manifest in three forms: the floor-relinquishing *so* which signals to the speaker's intention to release the floor to the co-participant(s) at the end of the proposition (Hlavac, 2006:1891), and the floor-holding *so* which is interpreted as a functional antonym of the floor-releasing *so*. In this discussion only the floor relinquishing *so* is illustrated in Excerpt 4.

#### Excerpt 4

KM 44: So, I still remember that girl's name was Victo, *nkyajjukira ne bwekaali kafaanana era nkyalaba nga mwana muto. Nkyakalaba era ne gyebakaziika ndabayo. Er, so*

So, I still remember that girl's name was Victo	<i>n-kya-jjukir-a</i>
	SUBJ.1SG-still-remember-FV
<i>ne bwe ka-a-li-nga ka-faanana era n-kya-lab-a nga</i>	
and how DIM-PST-be-HAB DIM-look and SUBJ.1SG-still-see-FV while	
<i>mu-ana mu-to n-kya-ka-lab-a ne gye</i>	
1-child 1-young SUBJ.1SG-still-DIM-see-FV see and where	



*ba-a-mu-ziika n-laba-yo Er so*  
 SUBJ.3PL-PST-OBJ.1SG-burry-FV SUBJ.1SG-see-LOC yes so

NS 481: *So wagenda?* ((KM: *Ee*)) You watched all the details?

So *a-a-gend-a* (Yes) You watched all the details?

So SUBJ.3SG-PST-go-FV

KM 45: *Ee, ee. Baatutwalayo*

*ee ee ba-a-tu-twala-yo*

yes yes SUBJ.3PL-PST-OBJ.1PL-take-LOC

.....

KM44: ‘So, I still remember that girl’s name was Victo, I still remember how she looked like, and I still see her as a young child...I still see her (as a little child). I still see where she was buried, I still see there. Er **so**\_\_’

NS481: ‘So did you go (for the funeral)? ((KM: Yes)). You watched all the details...’

KM 45: ‘Oh yes, they took us there...’

In this utterance, KM was describing his feelings about the loss of Victo, a little girl he met during his first days at nursery school. Having finished his sad narrative, KM utters *Er so*, which inferentially signals KM’s intention to terminate the conversation by releasing the floor to NS. It is prosodically marked with a fall in intonation, a feature which makes it more manifest to NS, that KM’s narrative has ended, and that KM intends her to assume speakership. In compliance, NS probes KM into sharing more of his story by asking a direct question in NS481, and the dialogic chain continues in KM45.

Although NS having inferred that KM wants her to gain the floor, complies, there are cases where for some reason, no turn exchanges take place. Instead, the speaker will be motivated to “self-select” and to hold the floor. The procedural interpretation of such a *so* will shift to floor-holding (speaker-continuation) for the speaker continues to speak and no turn exchange takes place (see Schiffrin, 1987:219). Thus, the floor-holding *so* and floor-relinquishing *so* are functional antonyms. However, the floor-holding *so* can be analysed as belonging to both the interactional (signalling planning processes) and interpersonal (relating to the speaker’s judgement and feelings

on who should take the floor and why he should take it) domain. The floor-holding and the floor-releasing *so* PMs are prosodically marked; they are pronounced with a rising weary tone, followed by empty pauses, and a prolonged vowel on the *so* PM (see Buysse (2012:1770)).

### 6.9.2.2 Implied-result-marking *so*

The implied-results-marking *so* PM has been referred to earlier (See Sections 6.3, 6.7.1 and 6.6.3). The discussion in this section will not focus on illustrations but on explaining its pragmatic-procedural status. As mentioned, the implied-results-marking *so* PM is inherently ideational for it metarepresents implicit representational meaning (explicatures). It operates in contexts where the speaker judges that the hearer has easy access to the relevant contextual knowledge from which the implicit meaning can be inferred. The marker thus instructs the hearer to the retrieval of explicature(s) mutually known and accessible by the speaker and the hearer (Schiffrin, 1987:223). In most cases, and it is also the case with the data at hand, the implied-result-marking *so* occurs in isolation. In some studies, it is described as *the stand-alone so* (see Raymond, 2004).

Within the RT framework, the implied-result-marking *so* can be analysed in terms of mutual manifestness, by nature of the self-explanatory explicatures it encodes. The speaker judges that the information supposedly shared or known by the interlocutors should be left implicit, lest, explicating it would be superfluous (Ramos, 1998:310). However, as we saw in Chapter 4, the nature of cognitive processing makes it impossible for the interlocutors to know beyond guessing what information is mutually shared and whether it is that very information that hearers will retrieve<sup>55</sup>.

### 6.9.3 Interpersonal-domain *so* pragmatic markers

As mentioned, the interpersonal *so* is associated with signalling attitudes, evaluations, feelings and speech acts. In the data, three major categories of interpersonal *so* PMs are identified, namely, the inquisitive, editorial, and assessment *so* PMs, as analysed below.

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<sup>55</sup> Mutual manifestness has been critiqued by scholars for being recursive (producing endless assumptions such as A knows P; B knows that A knows P; A knows that B knows that A knows P...), its failure to determine which information is assumed to be shared or known, and the fact that individuals have access to different cognitive environments, making it challenging to determine what is mutually manifest (Ramos, 1998:309-310).

### 6.9.3.1 Requestive/Interrogative *so*

The requestive/interrogative *so* would fall under the action structure within Schiffrin's (1987) Discourse model, for it relates to the speech acts the audience is expected to perform. It prefaces directives to the next speaker in the form of inquiries, requests for information, or questions which can be implicit or explicit. The requestive and interrogative *so* are discussed in Excerpts 5 and 6 respectively.

In Excerpt 5 *so* prefaces a proposition which expresses BI's desire to get some information from MNS. The information requested may be presented in the form of an answer, responsive to the speaker's search for clarification, elaboration or evidence (see Schiffrin, 1987:120).

#### Excerpt 5

MNS 65: *Nze ngalaba, si* boredom but I must watch news

*nze n-ga-lab-a si nti* boredom but I must watch news.

I SUBJ.1SG-6-see-FV NEG that

(I watch them (news), not out of boredom...)

BI 54: So, *tubuulire*

**so** *tu-buulir-e*

now SUBJ.1PL-tell-SUBJtv

(So/Now tell us)

NMS 66: There was a time...

In Excerpt 5 the participants were discussing what programmes they find interesting to watch on TV and why they find them interesting. When MNS, in MNS65, expresses her passion for watching all types of news telecasts, BI is propelled to challenge her using a requestive *so* in *so, tubuulire* (so tell us) in BI54. The PM *so* prefaces a directive which makes it manifest to MNS that BI wishes to hear her most interesting story. The story would be construed as evidence to warrant NMS's claim that she watches news.

On the other hand, when the interrogative *so* is used, it prefaces explicitly communicated wh-like questions in which the speaker requests the hearer to provide some information (Wilson & Sperber, 1988:93). The information requested is usually provided in the form of an answer, which may be direct, indirect, explicit or implicit as we see in Excerpt 6.

**Excerpt 6**

BV108: **So** all those people *be nnalabye mu gundi*, that seminar, you've already interviewed?

**So** all those people *be n-a-lab-ye mu gundi*  
that...

REL SUBJ.1SG-PST-see-PERF P something

'So all those people that I saw in what, that seminar, you've already interviewed them?'

NS 3462: Teaching staff, yes

In this excerpt, BV asks a direct question to NS, who provides an explicit reply. Unlike the requestive *so* in Excerpt 5, the interrogative *so* is more explicit and it directly points to specific information required by the question. Such *so* usages are intended to introduce what Schourup (2001:1040) terms as a 'genuine' information question and they bear a question mark<sup>56</sup>. Note that the *so* in Excerpts 5 and 6 occurs without an explicit S1 segment. That is, the requestive/interrogative *so* PMs do not relate propositions locally or globally. Such utterances provide counter examples to the coherence framework, in favour of RT. They present PMs not as coherence-motivated devices but as relevance-motivated devices.

**6.9.3.2 Editorial *so***

Editing, from a literal perspective, is aimed at producing a correct, consistent and accurate piece of work. Similarly, utterances prefaced by the editorial *so* are characterised by reselection and repackaging aimed at producing the most relevant utterance. Following Blakemore's (1992, 2002) categorisation of contextual effects, the cognitive effects which the editorial *so* encodes, by virtue of modification, are of some kind of presupposition cancelling/elimination (see Blakemore, 2000:478). The editorial *so* is oriented towards modifying the cognitive environment of the hearer in order to communicate assumptions which the previous expression could not offer at a low mental processing effort. The editorial *so* relates to the RT notion of cognitive environment, in which it is assumed that the speaker/hearer's cognitive environment and context is not static, but open to choices and modifications. By this assumption, interactants have the ability to revise/edit

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<sup>56</sup>However, Wilson & Sperber (1988:97), as cited in Blakemore (1992:114, 1994:199), observes that not all interrogatives necessarily request information. For instance, exam questions aim at assessment, expository questions pre-empt the speaker to answer himself, in rhetorical questions no answer is expected at all, speculative/musing questions are not directed to an audience, and in guess questions, the speaker already knows the answer.

their choices of concepts/formulations during the production or interpretation processes to those that they find optimally relevant (see Sperber & Wilson, 1995:137). In utterance (75), the propositional reformulations operate at the ideational level because they involve reconstructing the thought encoded by the edited segment.

75. *Ee, oba zibeera mu line zibeerewo. So, em\_ the - so* I think I am just endowed with language skills (KM94).

<i>Ee</i>	<i>oba</i>	<i>zi-beera</i>	<i>mu</i>	<i>line</i>	<i>zi-beere-wo</i>	<b>so</b>	<i>em</i>	<i>the - so ...</i>
Yes	if	9-be	P		9-be-LOC			

‘Yes, if it means them staying in the queue, let them stay {documents to be translated}. **So, em\_ the- so** I think I am just endowed with language skills...’

The utterance is placed in a context in which KM is explaining the importance of being meticulous. He modestly explains that clients would prefer to wait longer and have their documents worked on by someone whose services they trust. KM, using the utterance introduced by *so*, struggles on-line to formulate an optimally relevant representation to explicate his message. The editorial *so* is analysed as a processing marker, and it is used as a delay strategy by the speaker who may be undergoing some processing problem and requires extra time (Lam, 2009:364). The *so* hesitations have scope over the whole proposition encoded by the utterance, and as such, propositional adjustments encountered after *so* can be interpreted as affecting the whole proposition.

In general, the structural environments in which the editorial *so* PMs manifest are characterised by the presence of interjection(s), prolonged hesitations, temporary stammering, special intonation assignment, higher pitch, prolonged articulation, or long vowel assignment. These traits conform to Erman’s (2001:1344) comments about hesitation markers when he argues that

[m]arkers with an editing function can turn up anywhere in a text where there is need for either stalling for time, as hesitation markers, or signalling repair, as repair markers. The explanation of the speaker’s motivation for using hesitation markers is largely based on their position either within the phrase or at clause level [...] they usually occur after function words, within the phrase after a

determiner, the speaker obviously doing lexical search, or after a con/disjunct at the beginning of the clause for the sake of planning the overall continuation of it.

### 6.9.3.3 Assessment/Opinion-encoding *so*

In the data are tokens of *so* PMs which introduce utterances/segments, encoding the speaker's opinion or assessment of the world. As Armstrong, Mortensen, Ciccone & Godecke (2012:17) argue, one of the primary human mental states is concerned with evaluating things and events within our context/cognitive environment. This evaluation, according to Heritage (2001:47), cited in Mullan (2010:1), is performed when interactants express their opinion on what is before them. Utterance (76) demonstrates how the English *so* manifests in prefacing opinion-based expressions.

76. *Hmmm, n'azannya n'eneemalayo.* I played to my full, to me, because I played everything. I broke my limbs, actually I didn't break my limbs but I fell down and I got hurt. Bicycle riding, *nalinnya emiti*, I got scratches. Generally, I think I had a share of plays, **so** I am good (NA28).

*Hmmm n-a-zanny-a ne n-ee-malayo... n-a-linny-a*

Yes SUBJ.1SG-PST-play-FV and SUBJ.1SG-REFL-full SUBJ.ISG-PST-climb-FV

*e-mi-ti*

IV-4- tree

'Yes, I played to the maximum. I played to my full, to me, because I engaged in all plays, I broke my limbs-actually I didn't break my limbs but I fell down and I got hurt. Bicycle riding, I climbed trees, I got scratches. Generally, I think I had a share of plays, **so** I am good'.

The *so* in *so I am good* prefaces a proposition which encodes a conclusive opinion about NA's good childhood athletic abilities. This opinion follows NA's explicit information detailing her risky childhood playing activities. Appreciation of NA's assessment requires an interpretation drawn from NA's cultural background. Such contextual information is relevant in providing a

background on which NA's conclusion that she was good is premised<sup>57</sup>. The conclusive *so* overlaps in function with the assessment/opinion-signalling *so* (Section 6.9.3.3), which belongs to the interactional PM domain, since they both relate to feelings, emotions and evaluation. However, I discuss the conclusive *so* under the textual domain because conclusions are more ideational than interpersonal. For that matter, they guide in the structuring and organisation of discourse more at the textual level than at the interpersonal level.

The conclusive/opinion *so* can be made more manifest by mental verbs, such as *think*. In the data, constructions in which a Luganda or English mental verb co-occur in a *so*-embedded CP are predominant, as illustrated in utterance (77) below. The PM-mental verb-clause is usually emphatic, as represented with capital letters.

77. So long as I am decent, she has no problem with it. **SO** *NZE IŋŋAMBA* it comes from home. (KS94)

So long as I am decent, she has no problem with it	<b>so</b>	<i>nze</i>	<i>n-gamb-a</i>	it comes
		I	SUBJ.1SG-say-FV	

‘...So long as I am decent, she has no problem with it. **SO I WANT TO THINK** it comes from home’

The discussion of the textual, interactional and interpersonal *so* categories reveals that the distribution of *so* PM tokens across domains is uneven. There are about 264 (53%) textual *so* PMs, 42 (8%) *so* PMs in the interactional domain, 173 (35%) interpersonal *so* PMs and about 20 (4%) imprecise *so*. As noted in section 6.2, a tentative explanation as to why there is a difference between interpersonal and textual *so*, on the one hand, and interactional *so* on the other, lies in the nature of the conversations from which the data was recorded. Studies such as Degand & Fagard (2012) and Zufferey (2012) have established that the distribution of PMs is affected by various factors, including those related to stylistic variations and the type of genre engaged. As mentioned previously, conversations from which the data was obtained were narrative in nature and narratives mainly operate at the textual level (in structuring the discourse) and at the interpersonal level (in

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<sup>57</sup>NA belongs to Ganda culture where girls are prohibited from engaging in risk-taking games such as climbing trees or riding bicycles. Since NA engaged in all this, her opinion is that she is ‘good’.

evaluating and assessing attitudes). The interviews were not very interactional and the participants were less engaged in dialogic encounters, which prompt turn management. The analytical implications deducible from this section are highlighted in the chapter conclusion.

#### 6.9.4 Imprecise *so* pragmatic markers

In the data, a small percentage of utterances hosting *so* were not analysed on grounds of perceived inaccuracy (about 20 (4%) out of 499). Inaccuracies are common in analyses that deal with data obtained from naturalistic conversations. As Müller (2005:87) points out, language spoken in normal or real-world conditions is not always an orderly matter, and thus inaccuracies cannot be avoided. The imprecise *so* category includes those utterances which (at my discretion) were judged to be incomplete, vague, in fragments, illogical in terms of flow or argument, and so forth. For instance, utterance (78) is isolated on grounds of incompleteness; (79) is unintelligible because of inaudible segments in the utterance; (80) “**So**, a suit case”, is a fragment; and (81) is an illogical/incoherent construction. A brief comment follows each of the utterance below.

78. I did mature {exams} as well as senior six. I failed mature miserably ((laughs)) I think because *so*– (LM66)

The *so* in utterance (78) should not be confused with the implied-results marking *so* which guides hearers in the processing of implicit information based on contextual knowledge. No explicatures can be retrieved from the incomplete expression “I think because **so**” because the hearer lacks the mutual knowledge on the basis of which an explicature could be inferentially derived.

79. **So**, *e-o-oba-oba*-(inaudible) *okkikakasa nti abantu balina ebizibu*. (SJ101)

so	<i>o-ku-ki-kakas-a</i>	<i>nti</i>	<i>a-ba-ntu</i>	<i>ba-lin-a</i>	<i>e-bi-zibu</i>
so	IV-INF-7-confirm-FV	that	IV-2-person	SUBJ.3PL-have-FV	IV-8-problem

‘**So**,...for you to know that people have problems?’.

Utterance (79) is unintelligible because SJ stammered a great deal, and often his utterances would not be heard clearly or they would be left hanging.





## 6.10 The procedural functions of Luganda *so* PMs

As mentioned, *so* is described as a Luganda contrastive PM. It is a secondary PM on the Luganda adversative PM hierarchy where *naye* (but) is the primary PM. In the data, *so* can occur singly and it can combine with other PMs or Luganda particles to form monolingual Luganda PM pairs or clusters. For the reason that the Luganda *so* does not form part of the scope of the study, the discussion will be brief and focused. The functional spectrum of the Luganda *so* is wide. In the data, two categories of *so* are evident: the contrastive/comparative *so* which usually occurs in combination and the probability *so* which occurs singly. The Luganda *so* does not occur as a switch in the study data, but the primary Luganda contrastive *naye* does.

### 6.10.1 The contrastive/comparative *so*

The Luganda contrastive *so* can co-occur with other Luganda PMs or particles to indicate contrastive or comparative relations. In utterance (82), *so* combines with negator *si* to signal strong contrast between the conjoined propositions.

82. ...*Eby'edda ka biyingire mu bipya so si ebipya mu by'edda.* (KG49)

<i>e-bi-edda</i>	<i>ka-bi-yingir-e</i>	<i>mu</i>	<i>bi-pya</i>	<i>so si</i>	<i>e-bi-pya</i>	<i>mu</i>	<i>bi-edda</i>
IV-8-classic	let-8-enter-SUBJtv		P	8-new	but not	IV-8-new	P
8-classic							

‘Let the old things flow into the new BUT NOT the new, in the old’.

In this utterance KG was quoting Chinua Achebe’s (1958) popular statement in the novel *Things Fall Apart*. She is concerned that “things in the Ugandan system have fallen apart” whereby the old ideologies are replacing the new ones. As mentioned, the cognitive effects associated with contrast is that of presupposition cancelling. KG is contesting the flow of new ideologies into the old, in support of the old ideologies influencing the new. Both *so* and *si* are stressed to make the contrastive relation between the locally coordinated propositions more manifest. The pair *so si* forms an independent intonation unit.

In other contexts, *so si* can combine with a primary Luganda adversative *naye* (but) to encode extra-emphatic contrast. The contrastive relations signalled by the cluster *naye so si* (BUT NOT) are more manifest than the relations *so si* signals. For instance, one could argue that if *so si* in utterance (82) were to be replaced with *naye so si*, the utterance would be more rewarding in terms of cognitive effects and therefore more relevant. In the data, there is only one token of *naye so si* against four tokens of *so si*.

Another pair/cluster of contrastives which occur in the data are *so ng'ate* (and YET) and *so ate* (and/but yet). These combinations will not be discussed here because they are analysed in Sections 6.6.2, 6.6.3 and 7.9. The Luganda contrastive *so* can also feature in more complex combinations, such as *so ngaate naye* (and yet also), which can also be reversed and expressed as *so naye ngaate* (and/but when/yet? also) or *so naye ate nga* (and YET also). The three forms are semantically synonymous and their occurrence may be explained in terms of speaker preference.

### 6.10.2 The probability *so*

The probability *so* encodes information in which the speaker expresses an imprecise assumption. That is, the speaker is noncommittal about a communicated assumption and at the same time he takes responsibility for some evidence in support of what he is trying to make manifest to his audience, as we see in example (83).

83. *Yajja so twalina meeting awo mu main building oba yali 2012 oba 2013?* (KG 270)

<i>a-a-jja</i>	<b>so</b>	<i>tu-alin-a</i>	<i>meetinga-wo</i>	<i>mu</i>	<i>main building</i>	
SUBJ.3SG-PST-come		PM	1PL-have-FV		IV-LOC	P

<i>oba</i>	<i>a-a-li</i>	2012	<i>oba</i>	13	
perhaps	it-PST-be	2012	or	13	

'He came, **PM** {I vaguely remember} we even had a meeting there in the main building, in 2012 or 2013 {there about}'.

Other categories of Luganda *so* include the persuasive *so* which co-occurs with certain Luganda particles to signal to the hearer that the speaker has eventually yielded to the hearer's opinion – an opinion that did not seem obvious to the hearer in the first place. Persuasive *so* PMs manifest in sequences with particles, forming non-compositional forms such as *so wamma*, *so nno*, *so nno wamma*, and *wamma nno so*. For instance, in the introspective conversation in (84), any of the persuasive combinations of *so* would be a relevant response to A's concern. All these forms roughly translate as *oh yes* or *oh I see*, and they can be used interchangeably without causing significant variance in cognitive effects attained.

84. A: We would save a lot of time if we use him as a mediator

B: *So wamma/So nno (wamma)/wamma nno (so)*!

[Metarepresented as PERSUASIVE *so*!].

The regret-expressing *so* occurs singly to express remorse for not having done something worthwhile, as we see in introspective example (85).

85. *So yandabula!*

*So a-a-n-dabul-a*

PM SUBJ.3SG-PST-OBJ.1SG-warn-FV

'And yet he warned me!'

The interjection *so* PM also co-occurs in combination with other particles to signal contextual disgust, e.g. *owaaye nno so!* (who do you think you are!), *Tunaalaba so!*, (give me a break!); and to signal approval e.g. *Owomye so!* (You look elegant!) or in *so omwana muwulize ono!* (What a disciplined child this is!) (cf. Le Veux, 1917:908). Interjections are viewed as markers which encode modal and interactional meaning, and can be used in isolation as sentence or utterance equivalents (Cuenca & Marín, 2009:903). Although the status of interjections is syntactically contentious, they are analysed as PMs in Norrick (2007:166-168) and Fraserian (1996) PM taxonomy. They have the ability to signal basic representational meaning; a range of functions including contrast, elaboration, and affect (see Cuenca & Marín, 2009:903). From an RT perspective, interjections are semi-words which communicate "attitudinal information, relating to the emotional or mental state of the

speaker”, thereby increasing the manifestness of a wide range of assumptions (see Wharton, 2003:82-84).

## 6.11 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have qualitatively analysed the English implicative PM *so* and briefly, the Luganda contrastive PM *so*, as they feature in the bilingual data. The focus has been on the manifestation and the procedural roles the selected PMs play in facilitating interaction in the contexts in which they occur. The discussion of the English *so* has established that *so* as an EL island operates predominantly as a code-switch in the data. It is positionally mobile occurring initially, medially and finally to signal implied results. *So* manifests singly and in combinations of English monolingual pairs and English-Luganda bilingual pairs. While the English monolingual pairs are constrained to reverse, the bilingual pairs involving *so* can reverse as long as the Luganda ML frames the PM pair. This argument is consolidated further in Section 7.10.

The discussion has revealed further that the English and Luganda PM systems are in contact and that the English *so* is in competition with some of the Luganda PM functional counterparts such as *kati/kaakati* (now/then). The outcomes of this contact are evident from instances of coexistence where *so* may co-occur with a procedurally identical PM Luganda forming “*so kati*” and “*so kaakati*” pairs or, “*kati so*” and “*kaakati so*” pairs. Coexistence is also evident in PM translations where a Luganda PM functional equivalence such as *kale* (now) is translated as a *so* or where a Luganda monolingual combination such as *kati nga* is partially translated into “*so nga*”. In comparison with other EL switches in Luganda ML, the English *so* is highly distributed in the data. Based on this, we can predict that it might be in its early stages of development towards becoming an established loan or replacing some of the Luganda functional PM counterparts such as *kati* (now/then) and *kale* (now/then). The structural overlaps between the English and Luganda *so* are also illustrated and they are presented as the probable justifications for why bilingual speakers ‘confuse’ the two PMs despite them being procedurally distinct.

The English *so* is functionally diverse and has been categorised along three domains: textual, interactional and interpersonal domain. The discussion of the procedural meaning different PMs encode as embedded elements does not differ in general from the meaning they would encode if

they were used in English monolingual contexts. The recommendations for further studies on the English and Luganda *so* are presented in Chapter 8.

## CHAPTER 7

# MANIFESTATION AND PROCEDURAL FUNCTIONS OF *KUBANGA* (BECAUSE)

### 7.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to examine the manifestation of *kubanga* PMs and the procedural roles they play in facilitating interaction, and to establish whether these procedural roles are similar to, or different from the roles they would play if they were used in related monolingual contexts. Four *kubanga* forms occurring in bilingual CPs are analysed: *kubanga* (because), *kuba* (because), *olwokubanga* (because of/since/for the fact that), and *olwokuba* (because of/since/for the fact that). As core borrowings, *kubanga* forms operate as switches in the bilingual CPs which host them. They manifest as single EL insertions in the ML, as part of the morphemes forming the EL island, and as items in the mixed constituencies. *Kubanga* forms are procedurally multifunctional and the cognitive effects derived from processing *kubanga*-prefaced clauses associate with presupposition strengthening.

The structure of the chapter is as follows: it starts with an introduction in which the structure of *kubanga* PMs is explained. This is followed by a discussion of the manifestation of *kubanga* forms, in which issues such as their distribution frequency, operational status, positioning and structural configurations are explained. The notion of domain specificity is presented and the illustrations show that certain *kubanga* forms are constrained from occurring in certain contexts and from occupying certain positions. The core of the analysis is the discussion of the conceptuo-procedural roles *kubanga* PMs play in the English ML. They are analysed as conceptuo-procedural causal markers and their context-specific roles are reflected from the functional categories to which they are assigned. Issues of co-occurrence and reversibility constraints of PMs (both *so* and *kubanga*) are also explored. The chapter ends with a concluding summary.

### 7.2 Distribution of *kubanga* PMs in the data

Although *kubanga* and *so* PMs hold a similar operational status as code-switches in the data, *kubanga* PMs do not occur as frequently as *so* PMs analysed in Chapter 6. In the data of 192 000 words, there are 684 tokens of *kubanga* PMs in comparison with 1 200 tokens of the English *so*.

The differences in the distribution of the two PMs can be explained by a number of factors such as the type of discourse (certain conversations induce certain linguistic forms); prestige (Luganda is less prestigious and borrows more from English); the presence of the Luganda contrastive *so* PM fosters the adoption of the English *so*, and so on.

In Section 2.5.2, we saw that *kubanga* PMs can manifest in 12 different forms: *kubanga* (because), *kuba* (because), *kulwokuba* (for the reason that), *kulwokubanga* (for the reason that), *lwakuba* (because), *lwakubanga* (because), *olwokubanga* (because of/since/for the fact that), *olwokuba* (because of/since/for the fact that), and the two infrequent pairs *okuba/okubanga* (for the reason that), *bba* and *bbanga* (because). Not all of the 12 *kubanga* forms occur in the data; there are only seven forms and their distribution is indicated in Table 3. The differences in the distribution are explained under the discussion on domain specificity of *kubanga* PMs in Section 7.6.

Study data, (192,000 words)	<i>kubanga</i>	<i>kuba</i>	<i>olwokubanga</i>	<i>olwokuba</i>	<i>lwakuba</i>	<i>lwakubanga</i>	<i>kulwokuba</i>
	277 (40%)	316 (46%)	15 (3%)	36 (5%)	29 (4.2%)	10 (1.5%)	1 (0.2%)

Table 3: Distribution of *kubanga* PMs across the data

Furthermore, out of the 684 *kubanga* PMs in the data, only 81 tokens occur as embedded elements in bilingual CPs. Again, not all of the seven *kubanga* PMs occurring in the data feature in bilingual CPs; only four do. As mentioned, they include *kubanga* (because), *kuba* (because), *olwokubanga* (because of/since/for the fact that), and *olwokuba* (because of/since/for the fact that). The distribution frequency of the four forms is not even, as indicated in Table 4.

X out of 81 (occurring in bilingual CPs)	<i>kubanga</i>	<i>kuba</i>	<i>olwokuba</i>	<i>olwokubanga</i>
	50	22	3	6

Table 4: Distribution of *kubanga* PMs in bilingual CPs

While the presence of the seven *kubanga* PMs contributes to the broader understanding of their manifestation in the data, the scope of the study restricts my analysis on the four forms which form part of the bilingual CPs. In the next two sections, I demonstrate how *kubanga* PMs feature in the data by position and structural assemblage.



### 7.3 Operational status of *kubanga* PMs

*Kubanga* PMs are core borrowings and they operate as switches whenever they occur as embedded elements in the English ML. The discussion of the criteria for distinguishing switches from borrowings in Section 3.6 suggests that switches have a minus feature value to all the suggested criteria, except phonological integration. That is, switches may be integrated phonologically but not morphosyntactically, they are not nativised, they do not occur frequently, they lack predictive value, and so on. The discussion of the English *so* in Chapter 6 concluded that *so* is a core borrowing which operates as a switch. However, the status of *so* in the data differs from that of *kubanga* in a number of aspects: *so* occurs frequently and its phonological integration is debatable due to the presence of the Luganda homograph *so*. Unlike *so*, *kubanga* PMs in the data meet all the criteria of switches. That is, they do not show any tendencies of integration (both phonological and morphosyntactic), they are not nativised, they occur infrequently (only 81 times, compared to *so* which occurs almost 500 times), they do not have a dictionary status and thus lack predictive value.

### 7.4 *Kubanga* and its position in the utterance

In Section 2.2.4.4, we saw that PMs are defined by the property of positional mobility where certain PMs can occur sentence initially, medially and finally. Bringing *kubanga* forms into perspective, they also occupy the three positions in the data: the initial, medial and final positions as illustrated in utterances 86, 87 and 88, respectively. However, the canonical position of *kubanga* PMs is medial as illustrated in utterance (86).

86. Not all of us can be engineers, or medics or language experts but there will always be a community of practice for-for every particular training *kubanga* it deals with a specific class of problems which problems can only be solved properly, at least, by professionals (KM124).

In this utterance, *kubanga* locally connects the two propositions in the utterance. The procedural relations *kubanga* encodes guide the hearer towards an epistemic interpretation in which KM's opinion about employing professionals is justified by a *kubanga*-prefaced clause. Utterance (87) illustrates the initial position a *kubanga* form occupies.

87. ...*Nti* sometimes *n'ebyo byennyini bibakosa*. ***Kuba*** *nze bwe nnakimugamba nnamulaba ng'akiwelcominze nnyo*. (HK58)

*nti*        *ne*    *ebyo*        *bi-enyini*    *bi-ba-kos-a*                    ***kuba***        *nze*  
 COMP    and    8.DEM        8-exact        8-SUBJ.3PL-affect-FV    **because**    I

*bwe*        *n-a-ki-mu-gamb-a*                                    *n-a-mu-lab-a*                                    *nga*  
 when        SUBJ.1SG-PST-7-OBJ.1SG-tell-FV    SUBJ.ISG-PST-OBJ.1SG-see-FV    COMP

*a-ki-welcominze*        *nnyo*  
 IV-7-welcome.PST        very

{HK is describing her nanny who wanted to take leave}. That sometimes even those things (such as denying them visits) affect them. Because when I told her {about visiting her family}, I noticed that she welcomed the idea very much'.

In this utterance, *kuba* occurs initially in order to relate to the adjacent propositions in which the *kuba* clause provides new information which strengthens the presupposition encoded in the previous segment. That is, the information that HK's nanny welcomed the idea of visiting her family provides evidence for HK's belief that nannies are affected when they are denied opportunities to visit their homes.

In utterance (88) *kubanga* occupies a final position. As with the English *so* PM which occurred utterance finally to encode implied meaning, *kubanga* in this utterance performs similar procedural roles. The utterance is set in a context when HK was illustrating how difficult married life is. By leaving some information implicit, HK expects her audience to base their interpretation on the contextual information available and infer an explicature at a low cost. What guides the audience to the correct path of inferential processing of the speaker-intended meaning is the *kubanga* PM. Processed in the right context, the derived explicature should emphasise the difficulty of married life, the need for prayers, the need for God's mercy upon married people, and so on.

88. ...*munnange*, life was not easy. *Tusabe Katonda atukwatireko abafumbo kubanga* (HK315, 316)

*munnange*    life is not easy    *tu-sab-e*                                    *Katonda*



*n-noony-a*

SUBJ.ISG-search-FV

‘My problem was school fees. Because that is what I always looked for actually not only then but up to when I finished my Bachelors’.

This utterance comprises a number of CPs, as indicated by the brackets. However, our focus is on the CP, *kubanga zennalinga nnoonya* (because that is what I always looked for). It is an EL island inserted within a larger CP whose ML is English. The morphosyntactic frame of the EL island is defined by Luganda, and its constituents comprise entirely Luganda morphemes. As a USP requirement, the placement of this island within the larger CP is controlled by the English frame. Within the MLF model, this type of CS shows that the participating languages are not in contact.

### 7.5.3 *Kubanga* in mixed constituents

Utterance (91) demonstrates classic CS in which the participating languages which contribute to the bilingual CP are in contact. The morphemes that make up the CP come from Luganda and English. According to the MLF model, classic-code switched clauses will have one ML which is testable using the MOP and the SMP. The forms such as *estressinga* (it stresses), *okwattendinga* (to attend) point towards Luganda as the ML. That is, Luganda late system morphemes are affixed to the English verb form following the morpheme order of Luganda as an agglutinative language.

91. ... Retake *estressinga...olina okwattendinga* lectures *kuba akimanyi oli* retaker *olina obbeerayo* (BN268).

retake	<i>e-stressing-a</i>	<i>o-lina</i>	<i>o-ku-attending-a</i>	lectures	<i>kuba</i>
	IV-stress-FV	SUBJ.2SG-have	IV-INF-attend-FV		because
<i>a-ki-manyi</i>	<i>o-li</i>	retaker	<i>o-lin-a</i>		<i>o-ku-beera-yo</i>
SUBJ.3SG-7-know	SUBJ.2SG-be		SUBJ.2SG-have-FV		IV-INF-be-LOC

‘Doing a retake paper can be stressful...you have to attend lectures because he/she {lecturer} knows that you are a retaker and that you must be there {in lectures}’.

## 7.6 Domain specificity of *kubanga* PMs

A survey of literature shows that languages use certain PMs in specific domains (see Maat & Sanders, 2000; Moeschler, 2003; Degand & Fagard, 2012; Zufferey, 2012; Bardzokas, 2014). This observation is substantiated by their resistance to interchangeability. In English, for instance, causality is encoded by markers such as *because*, *since*, *for (the reason that)* among others. While the different English causal markers can be used interchangeably as in utterance (92), there are contexts and positions in which certain markers are constrained to occur, as we see in in (93) and (94). We see that *because* as a prototypical causal marker is permissible in all contexts for it is the underspecified PM for encoding the core conceptual and procedural relations<sup>58</sup>. Interestingly, even within the category of interchangeable markers, there will always be differences in distribution where certain markers occur more frequently than others. These differences can be accounted for in terms of speaker's linguistic abilities and preferences.

92. We needed more time to talk *because/since/for the reason that/for* we hadn't seen each other in ages.
93. *Because/since/for the reason that/\*for* we had not seen each other in ages, we needed more time to talk.
94. Joy is sad *because/?since/for the reason that/?for* she misses home.

Bringing the *kubanga* PMs into perspective, I mentioned that *kuba/kubanga* and *olwokuba/olwokubanga* are semantically synonymous and can be used interchangeably at the conceptual level to signal representational meaning. However, their resistance to interchangeability at the metarepresentational/procedural level point to their domain specificity. It means that there are certain contexts where a *kubanga* form may be constrained from occurring. For instance, in signalling implied meaning in utterance (88), repeated here as (95), *kubanga* is the permissible form; *kuba* is questionable; *olwokuba* and *olwokubanga* are constrained.

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<sup>58</sup> In French, a similar analysis holds between the three connectives *car*, *parce que*, *puisque* which relate propositions with backward causal meaning. However, they are often not interchangeable; *parce que* is a 'universal' or default PM, comparable with *because* and has the ability to operate in all domains *Car* predominantly operates in the epistemic and speech act domain, and *puisque* operates predominantly in echoic usages – interpretations in which the information is known to both the hearer and the speaker (see de Rooij, 2000; Moeschler, 2003; Degand & Fagard, 2012; Zufferey, 2012).

95. ...*munnage*, life was not easy. *Tusabe Katonda atukwatireko abafumbo **kubanga***\_(HK315, 316)

*munnage*      life is not easy      *tu-sab-e*                      *katonda*  
my dear                                      SUBJ.1PL-pray-SUBJtv      god

*a-tu-kwat-ire-ko*                              *a-ba-fumbo*      ***kubanga***  
3SG-1PL-help-APPL-PARTv      IV-2-married      **because**

‘My dear, life is not easy. Let us pray to God to help us the married people because\_’

In interrogative utterances such as (96), *kubanga* and *olwokubanga* can be interchangeable, *olwokuba* is questionable and *kuba* is unacceptable. In the same way, the Luganda negator *si* co-occurs with only *kuba*, *kubanga* is questionable and *olwokuba* and *olwokubanga* are constrained.

96. *Kubanga ki ?* (NS2456)

Because INTEROG

‘For what justification?’

97. *Baakitugamba si **kuba** nti bo byabaanguyira...*(ML152)

*Ba-a-ki-tu-gamba-nga*      *si*      ***kuba***      *nti*      *bo*      *bi-a-ba-anguy-ir-a*

SUBJ.3PL-PST-7-tell-HAB      NEG      **because**      that      them      8-PST-SUBJ.3PL-easy-APPL-FV

{Context: Teachers used to counsel and warn students about university academic life} ‘They used to tell us **not because** for them it was easy; {but to motivate us}’

Other than these specialised contexts, *kuba* and *kubanga* just like *olwokuba/olwokubanga* are generally interchangeable. Interestingly, there are utterances such as in (98), where both *kubanga* and *kuba* are employed, and the two markers can be swapped without causing significant differences in the cognitive effects attained.

98. *Yee, era yali takimanyi **kuba** yali akola mu section ndala; **kubanga** era n’ono namugamba taata takimanyi **kuba** yali taja kunzikiriza* (KA65).

*yee*      *era*      *a-a-li*                              *ta-ki-manyi*                      ***kuba***                      *a-a-li*  
yes      and      SUBJ.3SG-PST-be      NEG.3SG-7-know      **because**                      SUBJ.3SG-PST-be

*a-kol-a*          *mu*          section    *ndala*          **kubanga**    *era*    *ne*    *o-no*  
Agr-work-FV    P                                  different    **because**    and    even    IV-DEM

*n-a-mu-gamb-a*                                  *taata*          *ta-ki-manyi*          **kuba**  
SUBJ.1SG-PST-OBJ.1SG-tell-FV    father          NEG.3SG-7-know    **because**

*a-a-li*                                  *ta-jja*                                  *ku-n-zikiriz-a*

SUBJ.3SG-PST-be    NEG.3SG-will    INF-SUBJ.1SG-allow-FV

{Context: KA seeks employment in a department where his father was employed, but chooses to keep it a secret}. ‘Yes, and he never knew **because** he used to work in a different section; **because** I also informed this one {his father’s workmate} that my father was not aware of it {KA’s employment} **because** he would not have allowed me {to work because KA was juvenile}’.

Similarly, in utterances such as (99), *olwokubanga* can be interchanged with *olwokuba* without affecting the cognitive effects derived from the utterance.

99. ...It’s Buganda **olwokubanga** it’s the centre of so many other tribes...

for the reason that

{Context: BM explains why Buganda tribe may not succeed in preserving its cultural values}.(BM22).

Thus, we can say that the speaker’s employment of one form over the other (both at the conceptual and non-conceptual levels) where there are no observable rewards in cognitive effects can be best explained in terms of speaker preference.

## 7.7 **Kubanga and contact outcomes**

The review of literature showed that when PM systems are in contact, three outcomes are possible: coexistence, differentiation and replacement. The discussion of the English *so* in Section 6.7.2 revealed a fourth possible outcome, in which singly occurring *so* PMs can be translated and PM combinations involving *so* can be translated partially or completely. This section brings *kubanga* PMs into perspective, discussing the outcomes of contact between Luganda *kubanga* PMs and their English counterparts.

First, there are no apparent contact outcomes that can be ascribed to *kubanga* PMs. For instance, concerning coexistence, there are no occurrences in which a *kubanga* PM co-occurs with a procedurally identical English counterpart in the same environment. Whereas *so* can co-occur with its Luganda procedural counterparts such as *kati* or *kale* (now/then) and form a “so *kati*” bilingual PM pair, *kubanga* does not combine with procedurally identical PMs to form structures such as \**kubanga since*, \**kubanga because* or \*’*cause kubanga*. In utterance (100), the incomplete *ku-* is predicted to be an abandoned incomplete *kubanga* form. I suspect that the speaker had wanted to insert a *kubanga* PM switch in an English utterance but for some reason, he abandoned the idea. Even if this assumption were to be true, a single case in the study data would not be representative of coexistence or co-occurrence.

100. ...We need a more strategic approach *ku-* because this business is very profitable (BV15).

Second, there are no cases where *kubanga* PMs have acquired differentiated meaning. According to Torres & Potowski (2008:265), PMs normally acquire differentiated meaning in situations of stable bilingualism, a description which is not appropriate for the community where the study data was obtained. In general, the procedural meanings encoded by *kubanga* PMs as EL elements do not differ from the meaning they encode in monolingual discourses. For instance, utterance (101) is a bilingual CP in which both Luganda and English morphemes are in contact. By domain description, *kubanga* is a textual PM operating at the representational level. It encodes procedural information which leads to an interpretation in which the *kubanga* PM-prefaced information is interpreted as a justification for KM’s overstay in the office. If *kubanga* were to be replaced with an English counterpart such as *because*, the hearer would not derive any extra cognitive effects.

101. I used before *okubeeranga mu* office *kubanga* there was always work to do, Monday to Saturday. (KM143).

I used, before *o-ku-beera-nga* *mu* office *kubanga* there was always work to do...  
IV-INF-be-HAB P because

‘I used, before {before KM started farming}, to be in the office **because** there was always work to do, Monday to Saturday {but now KM does not go to office on Saturday}’.



There are complex bilingual CPs in which both a *kubanga* PM and *because* occur in different syntactic positions such as in utterance (102). Interestingly, if the PMs are interchanged (by replacing *because* with *kubanga* and *kubanga* with *because*) there would not be any differences in the cognitive effects derived from such adjustments.

102. But I think even when I was younger maybe I looked like a responsible child  
*kubanga* n'abantu baaleetanga abaana awaka mainly because I am there. (NJ93)

But I think even when I was younger maybe I looked like a responsible child; ***kubanga***  
**because**

<i>ne</i>	<i>a-ba-ntu</i>	<i>ba-a-leeta-nga</i>	<i>a-ba-ana</i>	<i>a-wa-ka</i>	mainly
even	IV-2-person	SUBJ.3PL-PST-bring-HAB	IV-2-child	IV-16-home	

‘But I think even when I was younger maybe I looked like a responsible child because even people used to bring their children to my home mainly because I am there’

These utterances are a representation of many utterances in which *kubanga* PMs occur as EL elements in the data. Concerning translation, speaker intuition informs the study that the behaviour of *kuba* and 'cause in the data may point towards calquing. In Section 2.5.2, we saw that *kuba* can be construed as a contracted form of *kubanga*, similar to the English informal contraction 'cause from *because*. Against this interpretation, some consultants interpreted *kuba* as a probable translation of 'cause in utterance (103), and 'cause in (104) (adapted from Excerpt 3) as a probable calque of Luganda.

103. *Hmm. Naye kyampisa bubu nnyo kuba* I used to cry every day... (HK165)

<i>hmm</i>	<i>naye</i>	<i>ki-a-n-pis-a</i>	<i>bubu</i>	<i>nnyo</i>	<b><i>kuba</i></b>	I used to cry every day
yes	but	7-PST-SUBJ.1SG-treat-FV	bad	very	<b>for</b>	

‘But it {studying in a boarding school} affected me so much that I used to cry every day’

104. ‘You should just read’ ‘**cause** *twali tugenda mu*-actually it was third term... (AS7).

‘You should just read’ ‘*cause tu-a-li tu-gend-a mu* actually

SUBJ.1PL-PST-be      SUBJ-1PL-go-FV      P

{Father advises a daughter before examinations} you should just read. ‘Cause we were crossing over to-actually it was third term {the promotional term}’.

Note that these interpretations are intuitive and therefore subjective. Moreover, native speakers of English attest that the glossed utterances in (103) and (104) are equally acceptable in English.

### 7.8 *Kubanga* PMs: Categories and functions

Following Blakemore’s (2002) conceptual-procedural distinction, the functional spectrum of *kubanga* PMs featuring in the data can be categorised along two dimensions: those which encode conceptual meaning and those which signal procedural meaning. In addition, these two categories have been narrowed down to specifics in which *kubanga* PMs are described by their context-specific procedural roles such as narrative *kubanga* (for those which preface epistemic narratives), implied-meaning signalling *kubanga* (*kubanga* forming a basis for derivation of inferential explicature), speech act-based *kubanga* (epistemic forms which involve illocutionary force) and so on. Furthermore, *kubanga* forms can be grouped according to their levels and domains of operation. Thus, the textual *kubanga* forms relate to the organisation of discourse, the interactional *kubanga* forms relate to discourse planning and management processes and the interpersonal *kubanga* forms relate to attitudes, speech acts, and evaluations, among others. However, these categories are not discrete and as we will see in the discussion, these descriptive categories overlap.

*Kubanga* forms are analysed as encoding both conceptual and procedural meaning. Conceptual information enters into inferential computations and guides the hearer in the processing of the speaker’s intended meaning. On the other hand, procedural meaning constrains the inferential conceptual computations (Blakemore, 2002). As we will see later, different scholars have represented this meaning dichotomy differently but the conceptual underpinnings of their descriptions are similar. For instance, by studying *because* as a causal marker, Hussein (2009) refers to conceptual *because* as encoding representational meaning and procedural *because* as encoding metarepresentational meaning. Sweetser’s (1990) Three domain model categorises *because* along three domains: the content or real-world domain in which the function of *because* is akin to conceptual/representational nomenclature, the epistemic domain where *because* signals

conclusions, justification and reason, and the speech act domain in which *because*, in addition to signalling epistemic meaning is illocutionary enforced. Schiffrin's (1987) Discourse model categorises *because*, along the exchange structure (turn-taking), action structure (speech acts related), ideational structure (organisation of meaning), and so on. In summary, the three functional domains of *kubanga* forms in the data are evident. These are metarepresented as [P is a result of Q] at conceptual level, [because Q, I conclude/infer P] at metarepresentational level and [I want P, because Q] at higher order metarepresentational level. The notion of higher order metarepresentation is explained briefly in Section 7.8.4.

### 7.8.1 Conceptual and procedural functions of *kubanga*

*Kubanga*, like its English counterpart *because*, is analysable as a conceptuo-procedural element (see Hussein, 2009). As mentioned, *kubanga* forms at the conceptual level impose constraints on the explication, thereby contributing to the representational meaning of the utterance. At the procedural level, they impose constraints on conceptual computations thereby guiding the interlocutors in their search for the relevant interpretation. As mentioned, the cognitive effects associated with *kubanga* forms are those of presupposition strengthening (see Blakemore, 2002; Hussein, 2009). That is, the *kubanga* form relates propositions in which the information provided by the main clause supports the assumptions described in the subordinating clause. *Kubanga* PMs inferentially signal reasons, causes, arguments and results in the consequential event/state described in another segment and the processing of metarepresentational meaning relies on the conceptual meaning in the real world (Noordman & de Blijzer, 2000:37). The authors assume that processing causal relations at the conceptual level is faster than at procedural level where less processing effort is required.

Canestrelli, Mak & Sanders (2013:1396) point out the metarepresentational meaning can be inferable from the linear ordering of propositions. For instance, the knowledge that *because* is a backward causal marker may guide the reader of (105a) to an interpretation that Judith's weight loss followed her start of the slimming diet. In addition, Canestrelli, Mak & Sanders observe that metarepresentational meaning can be indicated by other linguistic cues such as intonation. The authors argue that commaless intonation is assigned to conceptual usages and comma intonation is assigned to metarepresentational reading. Graphically, a comma or commaless reading are

represented with or without a comma as illustrated in the following examples (105a-b) respectively.

105. a. Judith lost weight *because* she is on a slimming diet. [P is a result of Q].  
 b. Jackson loved her, *because* he married her. [because Q, I conclude/infer P].

Although *kubanga* PMs are conceptuo-procedural, the main focus of the study will be on the analysis of *kubanga* PMs as procedural elements for this is what defines the objective of the study. For illustrative purposes, however, two types of conceptual *kubanga* forms are discussed below.

### 7.8.2 *Kubanga* PMs at conceptual level

Conceptual *kubanga* forms operate at the level of ideational structure to signal real-world causal relations between the coordinated propositions. Under conceptual usage, *kubanga* forms will have referential meaning, which is causal, and the relationship they signal will contribute to the truth-conditions of the utterance. In the data, conceptual causality is signalled directly as we see in utterance (106) and indirectly by correlational relationships as in utterance (107) below.

106. [CP1...*Tuyita mu bizibu biyitirivu*; [CP2 we make mistakes [CP3 *kuba* [IP *tetuyina batuguidinga*]]] (SJ81).

<i>tu-yit-a</i>	<i>mu</i>	<i>bi-zibu</i>	<i>bi-yitirivu</i>	we make mistakes	<i>kuba</i>
SUBJ.1PL-pass-FV	P	8-problem	8-many		<b>because</b>

<i>te-tu-yin-a</i>	<i>ba-tu-guiding-a</i>
NEG-SUBJ.1PL-have-FV	SUBJ.3PL-OBJ.1PL-guide-FV

‘We face many challenges {as university students} we make mistakes *because* we don’t have anyone to guide us’.

In utterance (106) SJ metarepresents a student’s opinion that the sex-related mistakes students make at university are directly attributed to lack of parental guidance. The utterance is a mixed constituent comprising Luganda and English morphemes, but where Luganda is the ML. Three embedded CPs (as indicated by the brackets) are marked in the utterance: CP<sub>1</sub> is an ML clause which provides preamble-like contextual information. CP<sub>2</sub> is the main clause; an EL island

consisting of English morphemes. CP<sub>3</sub> is the subordinate clause which hosts a *kuba* form, and provides causal justification for the state of affairs described in CP<sub>2</sub>. The scope of *kuba* falls within the two adjacent CPs: CP<sub>2</sub> and CP<sub>3</sub>. That is, *kuba* signals causal relations between the subordinate clause “*tetuyina batuguidinga*” (we do not have (adults) to guide us) and the main clause “we make mistakes”. *Kuba* is construed as a conceptual causal marker because it indicates real-world causality between the propositions encoded by CP<sub>2</sub> and CP<sub>3</sub>.

To process the causal relations between the two utterances requires certain contextual assumptions. For instance, the hearer’s real world knowledge of the importance of parental guidance and their awareness of the possible outcomes of lack of parental guidance. Against this contextual knowledge, the hearer will be expected to process CP<sub>2</sub> and CP<sub>3</sub> and derive an interpretation in which the assumption that *students make mistakes* is a consequence of the assumption that *they lack parental guidance*. Such information, according to RT, results from both decoding and inferential processes. If *kuba* were to be replaced with an English equivalent such as *because* or *'cause* in (106), the cognitive effects derived from the utterance would not be any different from the cognitive effects attained when *kuba* is used.

Moving on to the second example of a conceptual *kubanga*, we see that the causal relations encoded by *kubanga* in (107) are similar to what *kuba* encodes in (106). The difference between the two utterances lies in the directness of the causal relations signalled. While (106) is more direct, (107) is indirect and signals correlational relations.

107. Ku luli pastor waffe yali agamba nti the best way to lose weight, go and get a bank loan in a bank *kubanga* bank interests, eno fees eno biki biki... (MJN32/33)

<i>ku</i>	<i>lu-li</i>	pastor	<i>wa-affe</i>	<i>a-a-li</i>	<i>a-gamb-a</i>	<i>nti</i>
P	11-other day		1-POSS.1PL	SUBJ.1SG-PST-be	Agr-say-FV	COMP

the best way to lose weight, go and get a loan in a bank ***kubanga*** bank interests, *eno* fees  
because and fees  
*eno biki biki...*  
and so many things...

‘Last time our pastor was saying that the best way to lose weight, go and get a loan in a bank...’.

In utterance (107), MJN associates bank loans with weight loss. Unlike in (106) where the conjoined propositions were adjacent to each other, *kubanga* in this utterance relates propositions globally. The processing of the inferential explicature(s) from (107) requires hearers to use their encyclopaedic knowledge about bank loans and interest, and interpret them within the Ugandan context where the interest rates are supposedly high. The hearer will then associate the pressure and worries that come with the monthly payment obligation, and infer a correlational relation between getting a bank loan and losing weight. MJN is reasoning, not from real-world causation, but from the point of probable association in which the states of affairs described correlate. In reality, bank loans do not necessarily cause weight loss, but because the two events may co-occur, they can be confidently associated to be operating in a mutual relationship.

In discussing motivations for CS in Section 3.5, one of the reasons proposed is CS for quotation. This motivation is evidenced in (107). The structure of the complex EL island “the best way to lose weight, go and get a loan in a bank” is interpreted as a representation of the exact words said by MJN’s pastor. Note that the EL island is headed by a COMP, *nti* (that), a form which prefaces direct quotations.

### 7.8.3 *Kubanga* PMs and procedural meaning

As mentioned, *kubanga*, operating in the procedural domain, contributes to utterance interpretation by indicating the inferential routes hearers follow to compute indirect causality between propositions. That is, *kubanga* PMs inferentially signal reasons, causes, arguments and results in the consequential event/state described in another segment (cf. Brown & Rubin, 2005:800; Degand & Fagard, 2012: 155). For instance, in justifying his decision for using more than English to teach a course, LM produces the utterance in (108) in which he explains how CS can be used as an additional teaching strategy to enhance learning at university.

108. I remember there was a class I taught, even here in Makerere-I was teaching translation and interpretation. [<sub>CP1</sub>Because it was translation [<sub>CP2</sub> *nasalawo okukozesa byombi* [<sub>CP3</sub> of course very carefully [<sub>CP4</sub> *kubanga mubaamu abatamanyi* Luganda]]]]. (LM149)

<b>because</b> it was translation	<i>n-a-salawo</i>	<i>o-ku-koz-esa</i>	<i>bi-ombi,</i>
	SUBJ.1SG-PST-decide	IV-INF-use-CAUS	8-both
of course very carefully <i>kubanga</i>	<i>mu-bamu</i>	<i>a-ba-ta-manyi</i>	Luganda
because	LOC-exist	IV-PL-NEG.3SG-know	

‘I remember there was a class I taught, even here in Makerere I was teaching translation and interpretation. Because it was translation, I decided to use both {Luganda and English} of course very carefully because there are always those {students} who may not know Luganda’.

The first segment of the utterance, “I remember...interpretation” does not contribute directly to the causal interpretation but it provides contextual background for the focal propositions. The relevant bilingual CP, “Because it was...Luganda” comprises four CPs as indicated by bracketing. This utterance is interesting because it features two causal PMs: the English *because* in CP<sub>1</sub> and the Luganda *kubanga* in CP<sub>4</sub>. Both of these causal markers signal local procedural relations between their respective adjacent propositions, namely, the scope of *because* in CP<sub>1</sub> is over CP<sub>2</sub> and the scope of *kubanga* is over CP<sub>3</sub>. The two PMs are procedural because they encode meaning which does not contribute to the truth-conditions of the propositions they relate. In other words, there is no real world causal relationship between LM’s teaching of translation and his decision to use both CS and English during his lectures. Similarly, there is no real-world causality between CS and speaking English carefully during teaching and the fact that some students do not understand Luganda. Thus, *because* and *kubanga*, facilitate interpretation by guiding hearers in processing an interpretation in which the *because/kubanga* prefaced-clauses (as subordinating clauses) act as justification for LM’s respective decisions. However, since epistemic reasoning is based on real-world assumptions, the derivation of relevant interpretation from CP<sub>1</sub> and CP<sub>2</sub> would require hearers, for instance, to use their contextual knowledge of what necessitates teaching a translation course. Assumptions such as “translation courses involve using more than one language” or the assumption that “students attending a translation course are expected to be bilingual” would contribute to understanding the flexibility and appropriateness of LM’s decision in CP<sub>2</sub>. In a context such as Makerere University, where English is the formal language of instruction, we would not expect LM to code switch in lectures and the fact that he does for a translation class contradicts our expectations.

This utterance also demonstrates the domain specificity of *kubanga* PMs. The discussion on domain specificity in Section 7.6 showed that *kubanga* PMs are positionally and contextually constrained. In this utterance, while *kubanga* in CP<sub>4</sub> can be replaced with *kuba*, *olwokuba* and *olwokubanga*, the functionally equivalent forms which can substitute the English *because* in CP<sub>1</sub> are *olwokuba* and *olwokubanga*, both of which translate roughly as “for the reason that”. However, speaker intuition indicates that *kubanga* would be permissible but *kuba* is unacceptable in this context. This observation points to the assumption that *kubanga* is more specified than *kuba*, another reason why its distribution frequency is higher than that of *kuba*.

#### 7.8.4 *Kubanga* and speech acts

The *kubanga* PMs, which I describe as operating in the speech act domain, are interpersonal in nature, being associated with signalling attitudes and feelings. As mentioned, Sweetser’s (1990) Three domain model of interpretation which aims to explain the interpretive ambiguities between utterances encoded by identical causal PMs classifies *because* along three functional domains. Namely, the content domain, the epistemic domain, and the speech act or conversational domain. The content and epistemic categories have been discussed in the previous Sections 7.8.2 and 7.8.3 respectively. My interest in this section is in utterances in which the *because*-clause prefaces a directive which justifies the speaker’s motivation to perform a speech act, such as those illustrated in the constructed utterances in (109a-b).

109.       a.       What are you doing tonight, *because* there’s a good movie on? [I ask you P, because Q]
- b.       Get out of here, *because* I need privacy [I command you P, because Q], etc.

As with the *kubanga* PMs operating in the procedural domain, *because* in the speech act domain relates propositions by signalling reasons, explanations or justifications. However, the proposition in the main clause manifests as a speech act by virtue of the higher-level explicatures decoded and inferred from the implicative verb *ask* and *command*, as underlined in (109a-b). I propose a subcategorisation of the procedural/metarepresentational domain into base-order metarepresentational and higher order metarepresentational domains. The base-order metarepresentational domain includes uses in the usual epistemic domain such as in utterance



(108) and the higher order metarepresentational domain includes directives in the speech act domain, such as in utterance (110) below. These labels are drawn from Sperber & Wilson's (1993) categorisation of explicatures into two types: the proposition expressed (recovered from the semantic representation) and the higher-level explicatures (recovered from the propositional attitude or speech acts). According to their classification, the difference, for instance, between the utterance *Zaina is hardworking* and *Zaina claims to be hardworking* lies in the latter's production of a higher-level explicatures inferred from the implicative verb *claim*. Against this background, I move on to analyse the utterance in (110).

110. *Njagala nnyo okuyiga. Lwaki? Kubanga nsomesa literature ate nga waliwo ne unit ya creative writing.* (KA268)

<i>nja-agal-a</i>	<i>nnyo</i>	<i>o-ku-yig-a</i>	<i>lwaki</i>	<i>kubanga</i>
SUBJ.1SG.PRES-want-FV	very	IV-INF-learn-FV	<b>why</b>	<b>because</b>

<i>n-som-es-a</i>	literature	<i>ate nga</i>	<i>wa-li-wo</i>	<i>ne</i>	unit	<i>ya</i>	creative writing
SUBJ.1SG-teach-CAUS-FV		and yet	16-be-LOC	and		of	

'{Context: KA explains why he has an interest in translating books from English into Luganda}. I yearn to learn. **Why? Because** I teach Literature {in Luganda} and we also have a (course) unit on creative writing'

The higher-level metarepresentation of utterance (110) would be, [I yearn to P, because Q] as opposed to the representation in ordinary epistemic utterances, [P, because Q]. The utterance consists of three interesting CPs. The Luganda CP *njagala nnyo okuyiga* (I yearn to learn) which encodes the locus of the speech act, the independent interrogative pronoun, *lwaki* (why) which echoes the justification of the motive and the subordinating *kubanga*-prefaced CP which justifies the motive. As with the epistemic use (which can be referred to as base-level metarepresentational), the interpretation of the causal relations between the coordinated propositions follows the order of the states of affairs described in the utterances. That is, KA is motivated to learn because he yearns to be a better teacher of literature.

While the ML of the utterance in (110) is Luganda, we see a similar structural configuration of speech act domain use in utterances such as the one in (111) where the ML is English. These too can be metarepresented as [I was supposed to P, because Q]. In this utterance, the scope of the *because*-clause falls within the description of the forest. That is, it explains the reason why the forest was described as ‘Let you bury yourself’ and not the reason why LM had to pass through the forest.

111. I was supposed to pass through a forest called *ka weeziike* literally meaning ‘Let you bury yourself’. Why? **Because** during Amin’s time and so on, it was deadly. (LM29).

The functional spectrum of *kubanga* PMs as procedural items is diverse. As we saw with the English *so* PM, *kubanga* can preface propositions to signal a variety of relations including narrative, interrogative and implied meaning, among others. The functional behaviour of these PMs does not differ significantly from the behaviour of the narrative *so* or the *so* PM which signals implied meaning as seen in Chapter 6. In summary, causal PMs have the ability to operate in the content domain by signalling conceptual causal relations at the representational level; they operate in the epistemic domain to inferentially provide evidence or justification for an event or state of affairs; and they operate in the speech act domain to signal what I defined as higher-level metarepresentational meaning in the form of directives.

Unlike the *so* PMs, where some markers were not considered for analysis on grounds of imprecision, fragments, etc., there were no cases of *kubanga* forms being incoherent, incomplete or imprecise.

## 7.9 *Kubanga* in co-occurrences

The notion of PM co-occurrences was introduced in Section 6.8, where I discussed the English *so* co-occurring in monolingual and bilingual PM sequences. I use a similar protocol here to analyse co-occurrence sequences involving *kubanga* PMs with other markers. In the data, there are a number of monolingual and bilingual co-occurrences of PMs in both pairs and clusters, but the scope of the discussion is limited to the interesting co-occurrences in which *kubanga* PMs are involved. As I pointed out, while the English *so* co-occurred with procedurally identical PMs, the combinations involving *kubanga* forms involve markers which are procedurally distinct. The list

of the combinations included below is not exhaustive but is it enough to give an overall impression about the behaviour of *kubanga* PMs in combination. The following two categories are evident:

- (i) Monolingual co-occurrences, e.g. *kubanga/kuba kati* (because now?), *kubanga/kuba ne* (and because), *naye olwokuba/olwokubanga* (but for the reason that), *kuba era* (afterall), *ate olwokubanga* (and for the reason that), *naye olwokubanga ate* (but because again?), etc
- (ii) Bilingual co-occurrences, e.g. *kuba kati* already (because now already), *kubanga n'oalready* (because and already) , of course *olwokuba* (of course because), so *kati kubanga* (so now because), etc.

In the following discussion, I illustrate the manifestation of four subcategories of combinations: a) a Luganda monolingual pair, b) a Luganda monolingual cluster, c) a Luganda-English bilingual pair and d) a Luganda-English bilingual cluster.

### 7.9.1 Monolingual co-occurrences involving *kubanga*

Utterance (112) features a Luganda monolingual pair *kubanga kati* (because now) occurring in a bilingual utterance whose frame is Luganda.

112. ...*byabeeranga* fresh, more fresh than it is the case now...Fresh *nnyo*. *Kubanga kati omuyembe gubeeramu gundi z'ebayita ani?* Fibres *gudigestinga mangu nnyo ekintu kyonna ekiri mu lubuto n'ekivaamu*. (MS151/152)

<i>bi-a-beera-nga</i>	fresh more fresh than it is the case now...fresh	<i>nnyo</i>	<b><i>kubanga kati</i></b>
8-PST-be-HAB		very	<b>because now</b>

<i>o-mu-yembe</i>	<i>gu-beera-mu</i>	<i>gundi</i>	<i>ze-ba-yit-a</i>	<i>ani</i>	fibres	<i>gu-digesting-a</i>	<i>mangu</i>
IV-3-mango	8-be-LOC	something	REL-2-call-FV	what		8-digest-FV	fast

<i>nnyo</i>	<i>e-ki-ntu</i>	<i>ki-onna</i>	<i>e-ki-ri</i>	<i>mu</i>	<i>lu-buto</i>	<i>ne</i>	<i>ki-vaa-mu</i>
very	IV-7-thing	7-every	IV-7-be	P	11-stomach	and	7-remove-LOC

‘They {fruits} used to be fresh, more fresh<sup>59</sup> than is the case now...Very fresh. The reason (now) is that the mango has something which they call what? fibers; it digests very fast {easily} anything in the stomach and it leaves {the stomach}’.

This utterance is placed in a context where MS was describing the eating habits of children (especially in villages) and how children are able to eat different fruits anytime and surprisingly, are still able to eat their main meals during the day. In this utterance, *kubanga kati* relates propositions globally, that is, propositions which are not adjacent to each other. The information encoded by the proposition prefaced by the PM pair *kubanga kati* (because now) includes real-world scientific assumptions about the composition of mangoes; that mangoes have fibers and that fibers speed up digestion. With such contextual knowledge, the hearer processes the *kubanga kati* subordinate clause as an explanation for why children are able to eat their main meals shortly after eating fruit such as mangoes. Thus, the procedural role of *kubanga (kati)* is to indicate that causal relations exist between the assumption that mangoes have fibers on the one hand, and the assumption that fibers speed up digestion on the other, with the main clause, that children eat meals after eating fresh fruits.

The narrative marker *kati* (now/look here) which co-occurs with *kubanga* does not contribute to the causal interpretation of the utterance. Rather, KM ostensibly produces it to enforce his account of the causal relationship between the propositions related. Without *kati*, *kubanga* would appropriately encode the causal relations but the hearers would miss out on the cognitive rewards in the form of rhetorical nuances which *kati* encodes. While processing *kubanga* in isolation would require less processing efforts, the higher effort incurred during the processing of a PM pair *kubanga kati* is offset by the rewards in terms of cognitive effects. In simple terms, if the procedural role of PMs is to facilitate interpretation by providing inferential routes to meaning processing, then the more PMs there are, given a balance between economy and expressiveness, the clearer the route will be. Moreover, the clearer the route, the less the processing effort, and the less the processing effort, the more relevant the utterance will be.

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<sup>59</sup> *More fresh* is a generalised usage which some studies have described as Uglishism. However, such usages are stigmatised (Isingoma, 2013, 2014).

Utterance (113) is placed in a context where SJ was explaining his weekly working schedule, and justifying the modification he had made to it. The utterance features a Luganda monolingual cluster, *naye kati olwokuba* which comprises the contrastive *naye* (but), the temporal *kati* (now) and the causal *olwokuba* (for the reason that).

113. *Wano ku campus mbadde nzijawo ennaku bbiri; nga nzija lwa Thursday na Friday. Naye kati olwokuba wakaliwo problems za marks, Mwami X tajja kumalako yekka.* (SJ201)

<i>wa-no</i>	<i>ku</i>	campus	<i>n-ba-dde</i>		<i>nzi-ja-wo</i>	<i>e-n-naku</i>	<i>bbiri</i>	<i>nga</i>
16-DEM	P		SUBJ.1SG-be-PERF		I-come-LOC	IV-10-day	two	HAB
<i>nzi-ja</i>	<i>lwa</i>	thursday	<i>na</i>	Friday	<b><i>naye kati olwokuba</i></b>	<i>wa-ki-ali-wo</i>		
I-come	on		and		<b>but now because</b>	there-7-exists-LOC		
problems	<i>za</i>	marks	<i>mwami X</i>	<i>ta-jja</i>		<i>ku-mala-ko</i>	<i>ye-kka</i>	
	of		mr X	NEG.3SG-will		INF-finish-PARTtv	him-alone	

‘Here at Campus, I have been coming twice (a week); I would come on Thursday and Friday. But for the reason that there are still problems with (students’) marks, Mr X (the head of department) will not manage them alone’

In this utterance, the causal cluster *naye kati olwokuba* (but for the reason that) occurs utterance initially to signal emphatic causal-contrastive relations between the coordinated propositions. It presents two states of affairs (the numerous marks-related problems and the inability of Mr X to solve them) as the justification for SJ’s decision to increase his number of working days per week. From the linguistically encoded information, it is manifest that SJ has been coming two days a week: Thursday and Friday under normal circumstances. However, the problem of students’ marks, which Mr X could not sufficiently solve, caused SJ to increase his working days. However, the information about the new number of days SJ has decided to work per week is left implicit (including in the data). Given that human cognition is relevance-oriented, the hearer’s contextual knowledge, for instance, the knowledge about five working days in a week, can guide a hearer’s search for a relevant interpretation in which the justification for SJ’s increase in the number of working days from two to three, four or five is explained.

This utterance would have been relevant if SJ had produced it with one of the three PM options: *olwokuba*, *kati olwokuba* or *naye olwokuba*. Furthermore, he could have opted to leave the causal markers out completely and by the nature of human cognition, meaning processing would have been possible. However, Blakemore (2002) explains that non-PM coordinated utterances are costly to process and may result in multiple interpretations. Therefore, SJ ostensibly uses the *naye kati olwokuba* PMs as the optimal cluster in encoding emphatic causal relation. Each of these PMs encodes a specific pragmatic role which would be missed had it been left out. For instance, the emphatic contrastive nuances are signalled by the Luganda *naye* and the narrative nuances, as explained earlier, are signalled by *kati*, and all together they indicate causal-contrastive relations between the propositions. *Naye kati olwokuba* does not form an independent intonation unit.

The discussion of domain specificity indicated that certain *kubanga* forms are constrained to occupy certain positions, and in utterance (108), Section 7.8.3, we see *olwokuba/olwokubanga* as the preferred replacement for an English *because* marker which occurred utterance initially. In this utterance, we see the *olwokuba* occurring sentence initially, which is a marked position. As pointed out, *olwokubanga*, as a ‘variant’ of *olwokuba*, can replace it; *kubanga* is also possible here but *kuba* is unacceptable.

Moeschler’s (2003:129) causality model discusses causality as involving direct and indirect causal relational chains between the events/states and the utterance participants. He demonstrates that one cause can have an effect and this effect may have subsequent causes and effects. For instance, John pushes Mary, Mary falls down, Mary is injured, Mary is rushed to hospital, Mary is admitted, John is worried, and so on. In the utterance in (113), a similar causal chain is possible in which the students’ poor performance caused problems with the marks, which caused Mr X to come in, Mr X’s inefficiency caused SJ to offer his help and this caused SJ to change his schedule, and so on.

### 7.9.2 Bilingual co-occurrences involving *kubanga*

A number of bilingual PMs occur in the study data. In this discussion, I present two co-occurrence clusters: “of course *olwokuba*” and “*kubanga n’oalready*”. The two chosen clusters demonstrate two observations: (i) that in a bilingual pair the order of PM is not affected by the participating

languages (English PM can occupy a primary position, and vice versa), and (ii) that the constraints of CS are powerful enough to trigger structural innovations which may violate the phonotactics of a participating language, as underlined in “*kubanga n’oalready*” in utterance (114).

The utterance in (114) is part of NJ’s narrative concerning her job-searching experience as an international student in the UK.

114. *Kati bwe nnoonya akeeyo of course olwokuba time yali empeddeko nga sirina time nti nnoonye mpolampola ku last minute nkubirire nkubirire nga the only available job eyali eyabannaYuganda* – cleaning. (NJ39)

<i>kati</i>	<i>bwe</i>	<i>n-noony-a</i>	<i>a-keeyo</i>	<b>of course</b>	<i>olwokuba</i>	time	<i>a-a-li</i>
now	when	SUBJ.1SG-look-FV	IV-DIM.job	<b>for the reason that</b>			9-PST-be
<i>e-m-peddeko</i>	<i>nga</i>	<i>si-rin-a</i>	time	<i>nti</i>	<i>n-noony-e</i>		
9-1SG-finish.PERF	PROG	NEG.ISG-have-FV		COMP	SUBJ.ISG-search-SUBJtv		
<i>mpolampola</i>	<i>ku</i>	last minute	<i>n-kub-ir-ir-e</i>		<i>nkubirire</i>	<i>nga</i>	the only
slowly	P		1SG-rush-APPL-APPL-SUBJtv		ITER	PM	
available job	<i>e-a-a-li</i>	<i>eya</i>	<i>a-ba-nnayuganda</i>	cleaning.			
	REL-9-PST-be	REL	IV-2-Ugandan				

‘Now, when I looked for a simple job, of course for the reason that time had gone; I did not have time to search slowly at the last minute and I needed to work a lot (and earn something), and the only available job Ugandans used to do was cleaning’.

In this utterance, what “of course *olwokuba*” relates is the proposition that “NJ had limited time to look for a job” and the conclusive proposition that “she could therefore not look for a job slowly”. As in utterance (113) above, Moeschler’s (2003) causality model can be applied in this utterance to relate events/state of affairs in which NJ’s limited time caused her to look for the job hurriedly, which led her to doing the available cleaning job, and so on. The English *of course* that co-occurs with *olwokuba* does not contribute to the causal meaning encoded by the pair but it is an emphatic

marker signalling confirmation of the state of affairs described. That is, it adds emphasis to the assumption that, indeed, NJ did not have time. Other *kubanga* forms that can co-occur with *of course* include *olwokubanga*, *kubanga* is less preferable and *kuba* is unacceptable.

The discussion on bilingual pairs such as “so *kati*” revealed that the English *so* may be construed as a partial translation of the Luganda PM *kale*, in a *kale kati* (therefore/and now) pair. With regard to “of course *olwokuba*”, speaker intuition suggests that it is seemingly a partial translation of the Luganda monolingual functional equivalents, *era olwokuba* (and because) or *kale olwokuba* (and for the reason that). However, the cognitive effects derived from an interpretation in which *era olwokuba* or *kale olwokuba* are used, on the one hand, and “of course *olwokuba*” on the other hand will differ significantly. The optimal PM combination is the bilingual pair and not the monolingual pairs whose signalled relations are not as manifest as with the bilingual pair. Although the gap hypothesis does not in general account for code-switching of PMs, such cases where speakers lack a functional equivalent point to two things: (i) speakers can code switch out of necessity where they need to be more expressive, and (ii) CS is a communication strategy where speakers utilise the available resources to optimise relevance.

In the next utterance, what is demonstrated is how contact in PMs triggers violation of certain rules of the participating languages. Utterance (115) is placed in a context where HK was explaining how small business stalls along some highways were destroyed in preparation for the papal visit to Namugongo in Uganda. This utterance comes as a response to the question in which HK’s co-participant asked about the probability of business owners returning to their stalls after the Pope’s visit, to which a direct response, *Si nnyingi* (very minimal), is given. This response propels HK to justify her response by using a *kubanga*-prefaced clause narrative.

115. *Si nnyingi, kubanga n’oalready oba rumour oba si rumour waliwo omukazi eyagambye nti baagambye buli ali ku lane ye Namugongo bwoba tosobola kuzimba kalina vvaawo...*(HK137).

<i>si</i>	<i>nnyingi</i>	<i>kubanga ne already</i>	<i>oba</i>	it’s a rumour	<i>oba</i>	<i>si</i>	rumour
NEG	many	because and already	perhaps		perhaps	NEG	

<i>wa-li-wo</i>	<i>o-mu-kazi</i>	<i>e-a-a-gamb-ye</i>	<i>nti</i>	<i>ba-a-gamb-ye</i>
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16-be-LOC IV-1-woman REL-1-PST-tell.PERF COMP SUBJ.3PL-PST-say-PERF

*buli a-li ku lane ye namugongo bwoba to-sobol-a*  
 every Agr-be P of if NEG.2SG-can-FV

*ku-zimb-a kalina vaa-wo*  
 INF-build-FV flat vacate-LOC

‘They (chances of returning to work) are limited **because even already**, perhaps it’s a rumour or maybe not a rumour, some woman who told me that whoever is selling goods by the roadside leading to Namugongo, ...whoever cannot build a storied building should vacate’

In this utterance, *kubanga* combines with the Luganda additive *ne*, and the English temporal adverb, *already*, to form a bilingual cluster, “*kubanga n’oalready*”. The PM cluster procedurally indicates that the information it prefaces is an explanation that justifies HK’s belief that the chances of the small business owners returning to their stalls after the papal visit are minimal. This line of interpretation speaks to a higher-level metarepresentational meaning represented as [I believe P, because (even already) Q]. In this case, the relationship between the proposition *si nnyingi* (they are minimal) and the narrative/elaborative *kubanga* PM is not directly causal. Rather, what is explained is the reason or an explanation that causes HK to believe that P. In RT terms, the cognitive effects associated with “*kubanga n’oalready*” would fall under presupposition strengthening.

The interesting component of the PM cluster is its pair, *n’oalready*, which consists of the Luganda additive marker, *ne*, and the temporal adverb *already*. In combination, they encode emphatic temporal meaning which indicates that what HK is yet to report has already happened. *N’oalready* demonstrates two interesting aspects, both of which relate to PM contact outcomes discussed in Section 3.4.3: partial translation and ‘violation’ of phonotactic rules. “*Kubanga n’oalready*” can be interpreted as a partial translation of the Luganda cluster, *kubanga n’okuba* (because even already). Other speakers prefer *kuba n’okuba*. The composition of *kubanga n’okuba* is “*kubanga* (because)

+ *ne* (and) + *okuba*<sup>60</sup> (already)". The procedural information encoded by the English *already* is identical to that encoded by a Luganda temporal adverbial pair, *n'okuba*.

Against this, my prediction is that the structure "*n'oalready*" is influenced by *n'okuba*, its functional equivalent. HK might have wanted to use a Luganda PM pair, *kubanga n'okuba* (*because and already*, in the sense of "after all") and because she was operating in bilingual communication mode, she found "*kubanga n'oalready*" an optimal pair. Note that "*n'oalready*" features an aberrant vowel segment 'oa' which violates the phonotactic rules of Luganda. We saw that the Luganda vowel inventory consists of five cardinal vowels (a,e,i,o,u), which can be long or short vowels. However, diphthongs or triphthongs such as 'oa' are constrained. In the face of CS, such rules can be violated. Other cases of aberrant diphthongs include 'ao' in KG105 "*naye ng'aotherwise*" (but while otherwise). This violation does not only affect PM combinations but we see it in other relevant lexical categories. For instance, in KA115, KA was explaining his character as an introvert and used an expression "*siopeningannyo*" (I do not open up). "*Siopeningannyo*" combines *si* (1SG negator) with the English verb stem *open* and the Luganda PROG derivational affix *nga*, resulting in "io" as an aberrant diphthong in Luganda.

In Luganda when little words such as the conjunction *ne* (and) or the personal possessive *kye* (his) precede a word starting with a vowel, their ending vowel will be elided from spelling and denoted by an apostrophe. For instance, *n'okuba* is a contracted form of [ne + okuba]. If a similar rule had been applied to *ne* + *already*, the contracted form would have been "*n'already*" and not "*n'oalready*". It was clear from the recordings that the underlined segments in '*n'oalready*' were harder to pronounce. I argue from an RT perspective that PM combinations with such segments may require more production effort on the side of the speaker but because they are optimal candidates in communicating certain procedural meaning, speakers would prefer to expend extra effort for extra effects.

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<sup>60</sup> Recall that *kuba* serves other grammatical purposes beyond causality. See Section 2.5.3, footnote 12.

It should be noted that the English *because* also co-occurs with Luganda PMs forming pairs such as “*kati because*” (now because) and “*naye because*” (but because) among others. These too are treated as partial translations resulting from PM contact.

## 7.10 Reversibility of PM combinations

The earlier discussions have shown that PMs can co-occur, forming monolingual and bilingual combinations. In this section I briefly explore the notion of reversibility by demonstrating that sequential combinations of monolingual Luganda PMs and certain bilingual PMs can be structurally reversed without rendering the host utterance ungrammatical or unacceptable. The discussion is not exhaustive but it is intended to paint a picture of the behaviour of PMs in combinations in this regard. In addition, the observations are tentative and in the last chapter I make recommendations for a more comprehensive study into PM combinability. Although the illustrative examples target *so* and *kubanga* as the PMs selected in the study, I include illustrations where other PMs operate to explain salient tendencies which could not be determined from *so* and *kubanga* hosted utterances. As a prelude, I present a brief discussion on the behaviour of English monolingual PM combinations, as a means of providing cross-linguistic comparison.

### 7.10.1 English monolingual combinations

Fraser (2015) analysed the combinability of a sample of English implicative and contrastive PMs and demonstrated that reversing the order of PM combinations of the largest class of monolingual English PM pairs is constrained. For instance, whereas (116a) is acceptable, (116b) is unacceptable.

116. a. He could not buy a car. **So, instead** he bought a motorbike.  
 b. \*He could not buy a car. **Instead, so** he bought a motorbike.

Fraser (2015) explains that reversing the order of PMs is unacceptable because PMs are ordered according to their functional saliency. For instance, in the *so instead* PM combination, the PM *so*, as a primary marker is functionally more salient than *instead* because it sets the frame of the discourse by signalling the generic conclusive relations between the first segment (S1) and the second segment (S2). The procedural meaning encoded by the secondary PM, *instead*, is less transparent, relating to a specific explanation. This constrains *instead* from occupying the initial

position of the PM pair. However, Fraser observes that there are exceptional PM combinations, for instance those involving *however* which can be reversed. As we see in examples (117a-b), *however* in combination with *on the other hand*, is not bound by irreversibility constraints.

117. a. We ought to leave. **On the other hand, however**, there is a good reason to remain.  
 b. We ought to leave. **However, on the other hand**, there is a good reason to remain.

Note that irreversibility constraints will also apply in contexts where monolingual English PM pairs occur as EL constituents in the Luganda ML, as we see in utterance (118 a-b). Utterance (118b) is unacceptable because the order of PM sequence has been altered from *and so* to *\*so and*.

118. a. ...*Kati mwekangabwekanzi nga babaguddeko and so abasajja baba bajja kubonaabona* (KM13)

<i>kati</i>	<i>mu-ekanga-bwekanzi</i>	<i>nga</i>	<i>ba-ba-gudde-ko</i>	<b>and so</b>
now	2PL-surprised-ITER	PROG	SUBJ.3PL-OBJ.3PL-reach.PERF-PARTtv	and so
<i>a-ba-sajja</i>	<i>ba-ba</i>	<i>ba-jja</i>	<i>ku-bonaabona</i>	
IV-2-man 2-be	2-will	INF-suffer		

‘Now, you would be caught unawares **and so** men would have to suffer’

- b. \*...*Kati, mwekanga bwekanzi nga babaguddeko so and abasajja baba bajja kubonaabona*...

The two markers that form the *and so* pair are procedurally distinct; *and* is a temporal marker and *so* is a causal marker. *\*So and* is unacceptable because *and* sets the frame of the utterance by signalling the temporal relations and *so* supplements it by providing specific consequential relations. However, because causality entails temporality in most everyday situations where the occurrence of one event happens after the first (see Amfo, 2007:675), the two PMs combine to encode procedural information in which the suffering of men would be construed as a consequence of their being discovered. It should be noted that Fraser’s combinability conditions are English-based and may not necessarily apply to cross-linguistic data.

### 7.10.2 Monolingual Luganda pairs

Unlike the English PM pairs which resist reversibility, the Luganda PM combinations in general are flexibly reversible. In utterance (119) NB was comparing elastic ropes with ordinary ropes in relation to the energy required for her to jump either ropes. The contrastive interpretation is facilitated by the Luganda monolingual combination *so ate* (AND YET). The pair *so ate* can reverse to *ate so* as we will see below.

119. a. ... *ko kaali elastic nga si-buuka nnyo...so ate buno obwaffe obwa bulijjo...*(NB35-36).

<i>ko</i>	<i>ka-a-li</i>	elastic	<i>nga</i>	<i>si-buuka</i>	<i>nnyo</i>	<i>so ate</i>	<i>bu-no</i>
it	DIM-PST-be		and	NEG.ISG-jump	very	<b>and yet</b>	14-DEM
<i>o-bu-affe</i>	<i>o-bwa</i>	<i>bu-lijjo...</i>					
IV-14-POSS.1PL	IV-REL	14-common					

‘For it it was elastic and I would not jump high...**And yet** for the ordinary ones {you need to jump so high}’.

119. b. *ko kaali elastic nga sibuuka nnyo...ate so buno obwaffe obwa bulijjo...*

The structural difference between utterances (119a) and (119b) is in the order of the PM pair in which *so ate* in (119a) is reversed to *ate so* in (119b). The contrastive relations encoded by *so ate* and *ate so* in the two utterances is the same, and the cognitive effects derivable from processing both utterances are similar. The only difference, if any, would be explained in terms of the difference between a marked construction and unmarked construction, in which (119a) receives the unmarked reading. This explanation holds for all the PM alternations discussed in this section. Note that *so ate* and *ate so* differ prosodically, with *so* in *ate so* pronounced with a rising intonation. However, some consultants observed (intuitively) that while (119b) is acceptable, its clustered variant *ate nga so* (which adds *nga*) is the preferable cluster. *So nga ate* (AND YET) is discussed in the next subsection.

In example (118) we saw that an English monolingual PM pair will be bound by irreversibility constraints irrespective of whether the PMs occur as EL elements in the ML or otherwise. Similarly, the Luganda PM combinations will reverse irrespective of whether they occur natively in monolingual discourses or as embedded elements in the English ML. In utterance (120), the PM pair *naye nga* (but while) occurs as part of an EL island in the English ML. It is an embedded code-switch and can be reversed to *nga naye* (but while). In utterance (121) *naye nga* occurs as an independent EL PM insertion in English ML, and can also be reversed.

120. Yeah, the next day I went to school *naye nga yafa* in the night but I went to school...(AS13)  
but while he had died

(Yeah, the next day I went to school **but while** he had died in the night but I went to school)

121. I don't know how old he is, *naye nga* he's finished! He could hardly walk! (BG13).

While I could not find any tokens of *ate so* (the reversed form of *so ate*) in the data, there are tokens of both *naye nga* and *nga naye* in the data. There are 395 *naye nga* tokens and 22 *nga naye* tokens. The absence of *ate so* forms can be explained as a result of the low distribution of *so ate* in the data, which stands at only 3 tokens. As mentioned, the Luganda contrastive *so* PM is a lower level secondary marker on the adversative PM hierarchy as opposed to *naye* (but) which is a primary PM. Primary PMs, according to Fraser (2015), are more multifunctional because they encode general procedural roles making them optimal candidates for selection. For this reason, they occur more frequently than the secondary markers which are less multifunctional.

### 7.10.3 Monolingual Luganda clusters

Unlike English PM combinations which are constrained from forming clusters, Luganda PMs can combine forming clusters which may comprise up to five members. In the data, the longest clusters have three members but a four-member causal cluster such as *kuba kati ate era* (because now again?) and five-member contrastive cluster such as *naye kati ate era nga* (but even then?) is predictable. In this section, I re-examine the two Luganda PM pairs, *so ate* (and yet) and *naye nga* (but while) discussed in Section 7.10.2 above as they occur in three-member clusters, namely *so nga ate* (AND YET) and *naye nga ate* (and yet while).

The flexibility with which Luganda PMs reverse allows them to form different structural configurations, as we see in (122a-c). In the utterance in (122a), KA was making a contrastive observation about the way Luganda and English borrow from each other.

122. a. ...**So nga ate** luli mu myaka nga kkumi n'etaano emabega ng'owulira ate olungereza lweluliikiriza (Oluganda) (KA 235)

**So nga ate** lu-li mu mi-aka nga kkumi ne e-taano e-mabega nga  
AND YET 11-then P 4-year about ten and IV-five IV-behind PROG

*o-wulir-a ate olungereza lwe lu-liikir-iz-a*  
2SG-hear-FV PART English REL 11-feed-CAUS-FV

‘...AND YET in about the last 15 years you would hear English feeding (into Luganda)’

- b. **Ate nga so** luli mu myaka nga kkumi n'etaano emabega, ng'owulira ateolungereza lweluliikiriza.  
c. **So ate nga** luli mu myaka nga kkumi n'etaano emabega, ng'owulira ate olungereza lweluliikiriza.  
d. **Nga so ate** luli mu myaka nga kkumi n'etaano emabega, ng'owulira ate olungereza lweluliikiriza.

Utterances (122a-d) are semantically identical but they differ in the ordering of the PM elements in the cluster. *So nga ate* and *so ate* differ in terms of cognitive effects; the former is more emphatic, translated as “AND YET” and the latter is not, translated as “and yet”. Recall that I observed that the *so* in *ate so* (the marked form of *so ate*) is prosodically marked with a rise in intonation. In the case of *so nga ate*, not all the *sos* in the reversed configuration receive distinctive prosodic marking, except the forms in (b) and (d). The *sos* in these utterances are all Luganda contrastive markers and an English-*so* PM interpretation is not accessible. In the data, there are no reversed forms of the PM cluster.

In utterance (123), KG uses a PM cluster, *naye ate nga* (and yet while), to contrast two propositions: the proposition that they used to study hard and the proposition that they never felt like they were over taught at school. A similar PM configuration behaviour to that which we saw

in (122a-d) is evident in utterance (123a-c). *Naye ate nga* (and yet while) is the unmarked and the preferable form. In the data, there are (33) *naye ate nga* tokens, (2) *naye nga ate* tokens, (1) token of *nga ate naye* and no *nga naye ate* tokens.

123. a. *Kweggamba nga tusoma naye ate nga tolaba nnyo nti batumpumpinga* (KG6)

*kweggamba*    *nga*    *tu-som-a*                    *naye ate nga*    *to-lab-a*                    *nnyo*  
In other words    PROG    SUBJ.1PL-study-FV    **but while yet**    NEG.2SG-see-FV    very

*nti*            *ba-tu-pumping-a*  
COMP    SUBJ.3PL-OBJ.1PL-pump-FV

‘In other words, we would study very hard but (at the same time) you could not feel like we were over pumped’

b. *Kweggamba nga tusoma naye nga ate tolaba nnyo nti batupumpinga*

c. *Kweggamba nga tusoma nga naye ate tolaba nnyo nti batupumpinga*

d. *Kweggamba nga tusoma nga ate naye tolaba nnyo nti batupumpinga*

In all of the four configurations, the PM elements are not marked prosodically. However, some consultants commented that the *nga* in *naye nga ate* in the utterance in (123b) is marked with a rise in intonation. Recall that Luganda spelling convention prescribes that when little words precede a word starting with a vowel, their final vowel will be elided and denoted by an apostrophe. The dropping of the vowel creates a long sound, which is not represented by a double vowel. Thus, *naye nga ate* is standardly spelled as *naye ng'ate*, *so nga ate* as *so ng'ate* and so on. My motivation to spell it out was to show the individual PM members in the cluster.

#### 7.10.4 Bilingual combinations and the ML

Bilingual co-occurrences have been discussed in Section 6.8.2, 6.8.3 and 7.9.2 above. We saw that some bilingual PMs in coexistence can form combinations such as *so kati/kaakati* ((so) now/then), “*Naye era* still” (BUT STILL), “*nga* then” (and then). In this section, I examine reversibility constraints in bilingual PM combinations and show the relationship between the ML of the PM combination and its reversibility. The illustrations show that while certain combinations resist



reversing, others flexibly reverse. We saw that Luganda monolingual PMs generally reverse and that English monolingual pairs do not. The hypothesis is that combinations in which Luganda is the ML, the ML will control the combination and permit reversal. Conversely, bilingual PM combinations in which English is the ML will not be reversible. The bilingual PM pair “so *kati*” can occur in ‘unmarked’ form as in utterance (124a) and as the ‘marked’ “*kati* so” in utterance (124b).

124. a. *AA! kyekyo kyennyini. Yeah. So kati ffe tulackinga both* (MS174)

<i>aa</i>	<i>ki-ekyo</i>	<i>ki-ennyini</i>	<i>yeah</i>	<i>so kati ffe</i>	<i>tu-lacking-a</i>	<i>both</i>
<i>yes</i>	<i>7-that 7-indeed</i>	<i>therefore?</i>	<i>now</i>	<i>SUBJ.1PL</i>	<i>SUBJ.1PL-lack-FV</i>	

‘INDEED. Yeah. So for us we lack both {both English and Luganda proficiencies’

b. *AA!kyekyo kyennyini. Yeah. Kati so ffe tulackinga both*

The two utterances (124a and 124b) are semantically identical, and the procedural meaning encoded by the PMs would be similar if one of the PMs were used, as we see in (125a-b).

125. a. *AA!kyekyo kyennyini. Yeah. Kati ffe tulackinga both*

b. *AA!kyekyo kyennyini. Yeah. So ffe tulackinga both*

I earlier explained that “so *kati*” can be interpreted as a partial translation of the Luganda PM pair, *kale kati* (and now/then). Thus, *kale kati* can replace “so *kati*” in (124a), and *kati kale* can replace “*kati* so” in (124b). Similarly, just as *kati* and *so* can be used singly in (125a-b), *kale* or *kati* can also be used singly. The pair “so *kati*” is reversible as it is assumed that Luganda is the ML.

The study also predicts that in partially translated bilingual PMs where English is assumed to be in control (in the sense of being the ML), irreversibility constraints will be binding, and the PMs will not be interchangeable. Regrettably, the data could not provide a PM combination which involves a *so* PM. For illustrative purposes, I discuss the *naye of course* bilingual pair present in utterance (126).

126. a. *Yali takimanyi, naye of course, balaba ekifaananyi...*(KA3)

<i>a-a-li</i>	<i>ta-ki-manyi</i>	<b>naye of course</b>	<i>ba-lab-a</i>	<i>ekifaananyi</i>
SUBJ.3SG-PST-be	NEG.3SG-7-know	and of course	2-see-FV	IV-7-picture

‘He did not know **but of course** they could recognise his image’.

{Context: A friend to KA’s father saw that KA resembled his father much as had not met KA before}

126. b. \**Yali takimanyi, of course naye, balaba ekifaananyi...*

The bilingual pair “*naye of course*” can be construed as a partial translation of the Luganda PM pair *naye era* (but obviously?). This pair cannot be reversed because English is the more salient marker in the pair than the Luganda *naye*. My intuition is that English is the ML and since English combinations are constrained by reversibility, “*naye of course*” will resist reversal.

The way PMs manifest in both marked and unmarked combinations shows that speakers are not restricted in the way they use language. They may choose to vary from one form, *naye nga* (but while), *nga naye* (but while), “*naye era still*” (BUT STILL), to another. Their choices can be explained in terms of the conditions of the presumption of optimal relevance in that speakers employ stimuli (PMs) which are more relevant, compatible with their abilities and preferences (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:270).

## 7.11 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have analysed the manifestation of *kubanga* PM forms, partly as conceptual connectives and primarily as procedural markers, and the roles they play in facilitating interaction in bilingual spoken discourse. I pointed out that *kubanga* manifests in 12 different forms: *kubanga, kuba, olwokuba, olwokubanga, lwakuba, lwakubanga, kulwokuba, kulwokubanga, okuba, okubanga, bba* and *bbanga*. Out of these seven forms, *kubanga, kuba, olwokuba, olwokubanga, lwakuba, lwakubanga, kulwokuba*, are used in the data. I restricted my analysis to only four forms, *kubanga, kuba, olwokuba, olwokubanga*, which occurred in mixed constituents in the data. In the bilingual CPs where *kubanga* forms are hosted, they operate as switches. They occur as single

insertions and as part of larger monolingual and bilingual PM combinations. Their distribution in the bilingual CPs is generally low in comparison with the English *so* PM.

The analysis has revealed that the *kubanga* forms signal conceptual and procedural information. Conceptual information is ideational and relates to the real world representational meaning. Procedural information has been categorised into metarepresentational meaning and higher-level metarepresentation meaning. The former relates to the epistemic use in which evidence or justification for an event or state of affairs is provided and the latter relates to the speech act domain, signalling information in the form of directives, questions and so on.

The four analysed forms are semantically synonymous and can loosely be translated as *because* at conceptual level. Although they may be semantically and procedurally related, the discussion has shown that they are not necessarily interchangeable. Even in contexts where they may be replaceable, speakers will have idiosyncratic preferences. Resistance to interchangeability of PMs in certain contexts presupposes domain-specificity of *kubanga* forms. I also noted that the notion of domain specificity is not unique to Luganda *kubanga* PMs; results from cross-linguistic studies, for example, French also attest to it (see Degand & Fagard, 2012; Zufferey, 2014).

With regard to the manifestation of *kubanga* PMs, the discussion has revealed that the distributional frequency of the four PMs is uneven, with *kubanga* and *kuba* featuring more times than *olwokubanga* and *olwokuba*. The distribution of *kubanga* forms relates to domain specificity and constraints concerning permissible positions. For instance, *olwokuba* and *olwokubanga* cannot occupy final positions to signal implied meaning, and although they can occur medially to signal direct causality, they are less preferable. In general, the procedural meanings *kubanga* PMs encode in the English ML do not appear to be different from the roles they play in monolingual conversations.

## CHAPTER 8

### SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 8.1 Introduction

The focus of this study has been on the qualitative analysis of two pragmatic markers (PMs), namely the English *so* and the Luganda *kubanga* (because), occurring as embedded constituents in bilingual spoken discourse. The analysis of the two PMs is based on data from a bilingual spoken corpus, which was obtained from audio recordings of group discussions and interviews with L1 Luganda-L2 English adult bilingual speakers. The issues addressed in this study relate to the manifestation of *so* and *kubanga* as EL elements, their operational status in the bilingual corpus, their distributional frequency, the position they occupy in the utterances which host them, the procedural roles they play in facilitating interaction, and whether those roles would differ from the roles they would play in similar monolingual contexts. Following the principles and assumptions of Blakemore's (1987, 2002) RT notion of procedural encoding and Myers-Scotton's (1993a, 2002) MLF/ and 4-M models, *so* and *kubanga* have been analysed and a number of insights, recommendations and conclusions can be reported.

#### 8.2 Major highlights from the study

The structural configurations in the study data point to the fact that Luganda and English are in contact, and the two languages borrow items such as PMs from each other. The data is highly code switched, featuring alternations at different levels, from morpheme, lexical, and clausal level, up to discourse level. Different forms of CS, including intra-sentential CS, inter-sentential CS, and extra-sentential CS are evident. Concerning PMs, the data reveals that certain PMs from Luganda are used in English ML as though they are native English PMs, and vice versa. In this study, CS is construed as a communication strategy bilingual speakers employ with the aim of optimising relevance. The study assumes that the PM choices speakers make are optimal; they are the best alternatives according to speaker judgement to signal the respective procedural relations, in comparison with their counterparts in the monolingual discourse.

In bilingual utterances, *so* and *kubanga* (the studied PMs), occur singly and in combination with other PMs. Not all PMs enter into co-occurrences with *so* and *kubanga*, and the distributional

frequency for those which do vary. Some co-occurrences are monolingual while others are bilingual, comprising between two and three PMs in sequences. The English monolingual PMs co-occur in pairs, as they are constrained from forming complex PM clusters, while the Luganda monolingual PMs occur in pairs and in clusters. However, there are a few English PM combinations which occur in clusters and the study has established that they are not standard English PM combinations but calques of Luganda PM clusters, which are functional equivalents.

It is established that while Luganda monolingual PM combinations flexibly reverse, the English monolingual PM pairs resist reversibility. In bilingual combinations, however, certain combinations flexibly reverse while others resist reversal. The explanation suggested in the discussion relates to the ML structure of the PM combinations and to whether the PMs in co-occurrences operate compositionally to encode a unified procedural meaning or whether they are juxtaposed. In all cases of partial translation in which Luganda is the ML of the bilingual PM pair/cluster, PMs are able to reverse. Juxtaposed PM combinations (co-occurrences in which each PM signals a salient procedural relation) resist reversal and compositional PMs (co-occurrences in which the procedural relations are ‘unified’) reverse flexibly. The notion of PM combinations was not discussed in detail because it falls outside the scope of this study. However, it appears to be an under researched area in bilingual PM research. I thus recommend an in-depth analysis of the principles governing the combination of PMs, with the aim of discovering the criteria and processes which motivate or exclude certain PM co-occurrences in certain bilingual environments.

Studies on PM contact have reported three PM contact outcomes: coexistence, differentiation and replacement. This study adds a fourth outcome which I describe as literal translation or PM calquing. The data shows that certain Luganda PMs (occurring singly and in combination) are translated into English and vice versa. Some translations are partial in that only some PMs in the combinations are translated and other translations are complete in that the whole pair or cluster is translated. However, some instances show overlaps, making it impossible to decide whether the occurrence is a case of translation or coexistence. There are more translations of English PMs into Luganda than vice versa.

From Myers-Scotton's (2002) classification of borrowing, PMs can be described as core borrowings, as the motivation for CS is least explained in terms of the gap hypothesis – the need to fill a lexical gap. Thus, *so* and *kubanga* are core borrowings by virtue of being PMs which have functional equivalents in their respective MLs. In the data, they operate as switches and they occur as single insertions, PM combination insertions and in mixed CP constituents. Although *so* and *kubanga* share the same descriptive status (as core borrowed items and as switches), their behaviour in the data differs. This necessitated the adoption of a feature matrix table (see table, 2) suitable for the analysis of the behaviour of the two PMs in the data. For instance, *so* occurred more frequently (singly and otherwise), it showed more features of coexistence, and has been interpreted to be in 'competition' with the Luganda PM functional equivalents. I predict that *so* could be in its early stages of development towards becoming a loan. However, given the controversies surrounding the criteria for delimiting especially switches from borrowings, as discussed in Chapter 3, the dynamics of spoken data featuring various idiosyncratic usages, these definitions may not be precise. Although I have tried to account for my descriptions and categorisations; my conclusions are subject to reanalysis.

*So* and *kubanga* are analysed predominantly as procedural devices whose role is to facilitate interaction. As mentioned, they constrain the inferential computations the hearer performs in order to arrive at the speaker intended interpretation (Blakemore, 1987:18). Within Blakemore's (2002) RT-based description, *so* and *kubanga* contribute to relevance by reducing the hearer's processing effort during utterance interpretation. They provide clues which determine the path hearers follow in the processing of optimally relevant interpretations, and lead to the derivation of cognitive effects. The cognitive effects can be in form of contextual implication, presupposition strengthening, presupposition cancelling and by specifying the role of the utterance in the discourse. PMs differ with regard to the cognitive effects derived from their processing. In this study, the English *so* signals relations associated with contextual implications, *kubanga*, at the metarepresentational level, signals relations associated with presupposition strengthening. On the other hand, the Luganda PM *so*, as a contrastive, signals relations which result in the cancellation of presuppositions. As mentioned, the Luganda *so* was not part of the main analysis, but was introduced to explain the structural overlap that caused 'confusion' between itself as a contrastive and the English implicative *so*.

From the functional categories ascribed to *so* and *kubanga*, it is evident that they are multifunctional, a feature which characterises PMs. The English *so* is analysed along the textual, interactional and interpersonal dimensions. In some usages, *so* encodes procedural meaning, directly reflecting the core meaning, and in others, the context-specific meanings are not easy to bring to consciousness, making their categorisation abstract. In some instances, more than one procedural role is evident, in which case I had to categorise them by the procedural role that was more manifest. In cases where both roles were equally manifest, I harmonised the category by creating a compound class such as the narrative/sequential/temporal category.

On the other hand, *kubanga*, being a conceptuo-procedural PM, is analysed along conceptual-procedural dimensions. At the conceptual level, *kubanga* is analysed as encoding representational meaning which contributes to the truth conditional content of the host utterances by signalling real-world causal relations. At the procedural level, *kubanga* is analysed as encoding epistemic meaning, which is either base-level metarepresentational or higher-level metarepresentational. The former relates to ordinary epistemic meaning such as encoding justification and the latter embeds epistemic meaning with speech act performances, represented as [P, because Q] and [I ask P, because Q] respectively. In addition, it is established that *kubanga* is functionally domain-specific, a fact which explains why the different forms of *kubanga* are not evenly distributed.

In general, the procedural roles *so* and *kubanga* PMs play as embedded elements in bilingual discourse are closely related to the roles they play in monolingual discourse. This conclusion is confirmed by the comparative findings from studies in which *so* is analysed as a single PM occurring in monolingual discourse (see Bolden, 2006, 2009, Lam, 2009, 2010; Müller, 2005; Buysse, 2012). With *kubanga*, which has not been previously studied, the process of meaning assignment was subjective, based on the ‘traditional’ intuitive judgments/plausibility, commutation and paraphrase methods (see Fischer, 1998:111). Aware of the empirical challenges associated with these introspective methods, as articulated in Fischer (1998:111), conclusions were validated by consultations and peer debriefing.

### 8.3 Recommendations

During the analysis, a number of methodological and theoretical concerns which require further scholarly attention have been raised. They are re-emphasised in this section.

Being a corpus-based study, one methodological limitation relates to the size of the corpus, which stands at 192 000 words, transcribed from 23 hours of recordings of bilingual conversations with speakers of Luganda and English. The corpus comprised only one mode (spoken text), and only one conversational context (semi-formal interviews and group discussions). Small corpora are less revealing than large corpora featuring multiple contexts and modes. For instance, although frequency was not a major classification criterion, there were instances where defining the status of an embedded PM was difficult because the tokens in the data were not frequent enough to illustratively authenticate the conclusions. I recommend therefore that a comprehensive analysis based on a larger corpus, representative of the different genres and modes of communication, be undertaken for more valid conclusions about Luganda-English PMs in contact.

The distribution of PMs in the data is influenced by factors such as the age and gender of participants, and the topic of conversation (see Andersen, 2001; Erman, 1992, 2001; Gardner-Chloros, 2009). For instance, from the data, it appears overall that *so* as used by university students is more multifunctional than *so* used by older speakers. However, a discussion of all these factors, interesting as they might be, falls outside the scope of the study. Thus, a study which explores the manifestation of these PMs and takes these variables into account would be revealing.

The data features many PMs (singly and in combination) occurring as EL islands in the respective MLs. However, with the limitations in resources, it was only feasible to analyse two markers in the present study. For a comprehensive analysis of Luganda-English PMs in bilingual spoken discourse, future studies should aim to analyse a wider range of PMs, both synchronically and diachronically. In this study, PMs are approached from a synchronic dimension. Given that languages are not static but change dynamically over time, synchronic studies need to incorporate diachronic approaches. For instance, the authentication of my prediction that the English *so* is in the process of development towards becoming a loan would require a diachronic approach.



It has been observed that problems of orthography beset most African languages and Luganda is no exception (see Ssentanda, 2014:311). I referred to Niven's (2002:5) comment in which he said that defining a mixture of languages (CS) can never be realised until "language" is defined. By analogy, if monolingual Luganda spelling rules are controversial, it should not be surprising that more spelling challenges arise when Luganda spelling is in contact with English (which has an irregular spelling system (see Sebba, 2009)). Whereas I justified the harmonised spelling conventions used in this dissertation, I recognise the need for concerted scholarly efforts in the interrogation of what befits an orthographic convention within a CS environment.

The discussion on the operational status of *so* and *kubanga* places them in three categories: core borrowings, switches and calques. Whereas the notion of borrowing and CS have been discussed at length, little attention has been paid to calquing, as an independent outcome of language contact. Although calques are not as frequent as switches in this study, and perhaps in other bilingual contact studies, a study that specifically explores PM calques is recommended.

Overall, the interest in studying PM co-occurrences is new and little has been done to explore both monolingual and bilingual PM combinability. Issues with regard to defining combined PMs, determining a concrete label in their reference, establishing what PMs can co-occur, how they co-occur, in what contexts they co-occur, whether the co-occurring PMs are functionally compositional or not, and what constraints bind their combinability, among others, need to be addressed for these are crucial to understanding PMs comprehensively.

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## Appendix A: Ethical clearance, Stellenbosch University



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### Approved with Stipulations New Application

24-Aug-2015  
Nakijoba, Sarah S

Proposal #: SU-HSD-000725

Title: Pragmatic Markers in Luganda and English Bilingual Spoken Discourse: A Relevance-Theoretic Tpproach

Dear Mrs Sarah Nakijoba,

Your New Application received on 06-Aug-2015, was reviewed  
Please note the following information about your approved research proposal:

Proposal Approval Period: 19-Aug-2015 -18-Aug-2016

The following stipulations are relevant to the approval of your project and must be adhered to:

Please note that institutional permission from the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology must be forwarded to the REC once received.

Please provide a letter of response to all the points raised IN ADDITION to HIGHLIGHTING or using the TRACK CHANGES function to indicate ALL the corrections/amendments of ALL DOCUMENTS clearly in order to allow rapid scrutiny and appraisal.

Please take note of the general Investigator Responsibilities attached to this letter. You may commence with your research after complying fully with these guidelines.

Please remember to use your proposal number (SU-HSD-000725) on any documents or correspondence with the REC concerning your research proposal.

Please note that the REC has the prerogative and authority to ask further questions, seek additional information, require further modifications, or monitor the conduct of your research and the consent process.

Also note that a progress report should be submitted to the Committee before the approval period has expired if a continuation is required. The Committee will then consider the continuation of the project for a further year (if necessary).

This committee abides by the ethical norms and principles for research, established by the Declaration of Helsinki and the Guidelines for Ethical Research: Principles Structures and Processes 2004 (Department of Health). Annually a number of projects may be selected randomly for an external audit.

National Health Research Ethics Committee (NHREC) registration number REC-050411-032.

We wish you the best as you conduct your research.

If you have any questions or need further help, please contact the REC office at 218089183.

**Included Documents:**

DESC Report - Omra?t, Lauren

REC: Humanities New Application

Sincerely,

Clarissa Graham  
REC Coordinator  
Research Ethics Committee: Human Research (Humanities)

## Appendix B: Ethical clearance, Uganda



THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

### OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

PARLIAMENT BUILDING P.O. BOX 7168 KAMPALA, TELEPHONES: 254881/6, / 343934, 343926, 343943, 233717, 344026, 230048. FAX: 235459/ 256143  
Email: [secretary@op.go.ug](mailto:secretary@op.go.ug), Website: [www.officeofthepresident.go.ug](http://www.officeofthepresident.go.ug)

**ADM 154/212/01**

March 4, 2016

The Resident City Commissioner  
Kampala District

#### RESEARCH CLEARANCE

This is to introduce to you **Nakijoba Sarah** a Researcher who will be carrying out a research entitled **"PRAGMATIC MARKERS IN LUGANDA-ENGLISH BILINGUAL SPOKEN DISCOURSE: A RELEVANCE-THEORETIC APPROACH"** for a period of **three (3) years** in your district.

She has undergone the necessary clearance to carry out the said project.

Please render her the necessary assistance.

By copy of this letter **Nakijoba Sarah** is requested to report to the Resident City Commissioner of the above district before proceeding with the Research.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Alenga Rose'.

Alenga Rose  
**FOR: SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT**

Copy: Nakijoba Sarah

## Appendix C: Consent form to participate in research



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### STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY

#### CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH

Title of the study: Luganda–English Bilingual Spoken Interaction

Investigator: Ms Sarah Nakijoba, Ph.D student at Stellenbosch University.

ADDRESS 1: Department of General Linguistics

Stellenbosch University

Private Bag X1

Matieland

7602

ADDRESS 2: Department of Linguistics, English Language Studies  
and Communication Skills

Makerere University

P.O. Box 7062

Kampala

Mobile contact: 0773483444/0702027933

Dear research participant,

You are requested to participate in a research project entitled, **Luganda–English Bilingual spoken Interaction**.

The study aims to examine the role of pragmatic markers and other discourse elements in facilitating interaction in the semi-informal conversation.

The results of the study will contribute to the development of a PhD dissertation in General Linguistics of Stellenbosch University.

You were selected as a possible participant in this study because you speak Luganda and English fluently. If you volunteer to take part in this study, you will be asked to participate in a group discussion or an interview. The interaction will be conducted in two languages—Luganda and English. You are free to use both languages by way of mixing Luganda with English.

During the focus group discussion, you will interact orally with other participants in a group for about two hours. You will be asked to interpret ordinary pictures such as pictures used in adverts and to share your childhood memories. The interviews will be a one-on-one informal interaction with the researcher and each will last for about 40 minutes. You will be asked to share your life experiences and to give your opinion about certain linguistic realities. You are free not to respond to certain questions or share certain experiences. This will not disqualify you from being a participant.

All the interactions will be audio recorded. The voice recordings and all information of the participants will remain anonymous and it will be stored on a password protected computer to which only the researcher and the supervisor will have access.

The participation to this research will be entirely voluntary and you may withdraw at any time during the research study. The investigator may exclude you from this research if circumstances arise which warrant doing so.

If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact:

Sarah Nakijoba, 0773483444 or 0702027933

**RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS:** You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue participation without penalty. You are not waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies because of your participation in this research study. If you have questions regarding your rights as a research subject, contact Ms Maléne Fouché [mfouche@sun.ac.za; 021 808 4622] at the Division for Research Development.

If you are willing to participate in this study please sign the attached Declaration of Consent and hand it to the investigator.

I hereby consent voluntarily to participate in this study.

---

Name and signature of the participant

Date

---

Name and signature of the investigator

Date

Sarah Nakijoba,



7 July 2015

## **Appendix D: Interview schedule used for group discussions and interviews**

### Experiential questions

- General institutional and school experiences
- Special childhood and adulthood memories
- Hobbies and likes

### Opinion questions related to language contact

- Language acquisition, attitudes and feelings
- Participants' linguistic profiles and language use, at home, at school etc
- How Luganda/English have influenced each other

### Opinion questions related to Code-switching

- Code-switching behaviours
- Perception about code-switching
- Code-switching and institutional learning

### Opinion questions on Ugandan English

- Uganda language situation
- Comments and reactions on Englished Luganda and Lugandanised English
- Feelings and attitudes regarding linguistic identity
- Language use in Makerere, university. Way forward?
- Any other business



## **Appendix E: Information about the 41 study participants**

### **Students at Makerere University**

- Total number of participants: 28 students across years and discipline.
- Gender: 9 males and 19 females
- Age bracket: between 19-24 years
- Highest academic qualifications: Advance Level certificate
- Linguistic repertoire: Minimum, L1 Luganda and L2 English
- Nationality: Ugandans by descent
- Flexibility to code switch: 26 were free, 2 were not

### **Teaching staff at Makerere University**

- Total number of participants: 7 lecturers.
- Gender: 4 males and 3 females
- Age bracket: between 35 – 45 years
- Highest academic qualifications: Doctorate and Master's degrees
- Linguistic repertoire: Minimum, L1 Luganda and L2 English
- Nationality: Ugandans by descent
- Flexibility to code switch: 6 were free, 1 was not

### **Non-teaching staff at Makerere University**

- Total number of participants: 6 administrators.
- Gender: 5 males and 1 female
- Age bracket: between 30 – 50 years
- Highest academic qualifications: Bachelor's degree
- Linguistic repertoire: Minimum, L1 Luganda and L2 English
- Nationality: Ugandans by descent
- Flexibility to code switch: All were free

**Appendix F: Table of English *so* PMs in combinations**

<b>Monolingual co-occurrences</b>	<b>Bilingual co-occurrences</b>
And so (7)	So <i>kati</i> (so then/and now) (38)
So then (2)	<i>Kati</i> so (now then/now therefore) (2)
So actually (1)	So <i>kaakati</i> (so then/and now) (2)
So even (1)	<i>Kaakati</i> so (now then/now therefore) (1)
So still (1)	<i>Naye</i> so (but now/ and therefore) (1)
So since then (1)	So <i>era</i> (therefore, in addition/ and therefore) (1)
	So <i>nga</i> (and then?) (24)
	So <i>ne kati</i> (and therefore now) (2)

**Appendix G: Table of *kubanga* forms in combinations**

<b>Monolingual co-occurrences</b>	<b>Bilingual co-occurrences</b>
<i>Kubanga kaakati</i> (because now?), (1)	Actually <i>kubanga</i> (actually because), (1)
<i>Kubanga kati</i> (8) (because now?), 7	<i>Kuba kati</i> already (and now already), (1)
<i>Kuba kati</i> (because now?), (21)	Of course <i>olwokubanga</i> (of course given that), (1)
<i>Kuba era</i> (because again), (6)	<i>Kubanga</i> already (because already), (1)
<i>Kubanga kati bannange</i> (because now my dear), (1)	<i>Kubanga n'already</i> (and because already) (1)
<i>Naye olwokubanga</i> (but for the reason that), (3)	So <i>kati kubanga</i> (so now because) (1)
<i>Naye olwokuba</i> (but for the reason that), (5)	
<i>Naye olwokubanga ate</i> (but because again), (1)	
<i>Ate olwokubanga</i> ( and for the reason that), (1)	
<i>Kuba ne</i> (and because), (5)	
<i>Lwakuba kati</i> (because now), (1)	

## Appendix H: Bilingual data samples

(Numbered as they appear in the dissertation)

2. *Kuba kati* *athinkinga* about working for advertising company (HK101)  
*kuba kati a-thinking-a* about working for advertising company  
 because now SUBJ.3SG-think-FV  
 ‘Because (for) now he is thinking about working for an advertising company’.
- 9b. So, I think it’s about maybe six or seven miles, *oba maybe* six *kubanga*... (LM10)  
 ‘So, I think it’s about maybe six or seven miles, maybe (perhaps) maybe six because...’
10. I try to think why *sirina bintu bingi byenzijukira mu buto bwange* (NJ 91)  
 I try to think why *si-rina bi-ntu bi-ngi bi-ee-nzi-jukira mu*  
 I try to think why NEG.ISG-have 8-thing 8-many 8-REFL-I-remember P  
*buto bu-ange*  
 childhood 14-POSS.1SG  
 ‘I try to think why I don’t remember many things about my childhood’
11. That’s what I remember *naye nga* you rotate (HK6)  
 That’s what I remember **but while** you would rotate
12. *Obulamu obuli* focused *ku* spiritual growth (KA114)  
*O-bulamu o-bu-li* focused *ku* spiritual growth  
 IV-life IV-14-be focused P spiritual growth  
 ‘Life which is focused on spiritual growth’.
13. Yes. *Naye kati wandibadde osettinze* parameters *ezidetermininga ki kyonochoosinga* because to wait,  
 you will be in trouble. (BV 92)  
 yes *naye kati wa-ndi-badde* *o-settin-ze* parameters  
 yes but now SUBJ.2SG-will-be-PERF 2SG-set.PST parameters  
*e-zi-determining-a ki ki-o-no-choosing-a* because to wait, you will be in trouble  
 IV-10-determine-FV what 7-2SG-will-choose-FV

‘Yes. But by now, you would have set up parameters which would determine what you will be choosing because to wait, you will be in trouble’.

14. a. The standard was so good, *kweggamba* (KG 117)

The standard was so good, I mean!

- b. *Kweggamba* to her I meant a lot (BG72)

You know, to her I meant a lot

- c. So *nze byebyo kweggamba by'ene* experiencing *amu okusinga*. (SL18)

so *nze bi-ebyo kweggamba bi-e-n-experiencing-amu okusinga*

so I 8-DEM in other words 8.REL.SUBJ.1SG-REFL-experience-PARTv mainly

‘In brief, that is what I experienced mainly’

15. *Era tosobola bbireversinga so\_* (NJ132)

*era to-sobol-a ku-bi-reversing-a so\_*

indeed NEG.SUBJ.2SG-can-FV INF-8-reverse-FV so\_

‘Indeed, you cannot reverse {one’s horrible childhood experiences}, so\_’

- 16b. *Abaana beegaana bazadde baabwe nga bazze obbavisitinga nga balookinga bubi* (BI61).

*A-ba-ana ba-egaana ba-zadde ba-abwe nga ba-zze*

IV-2<sub>x</sub>-child 2<sub>x</sub>-deny 2<sub>Y</sub>-parent 2<sub>x</sub>-POSS.3PL when 2<sub>Y</sub>.3PL-come-PERF

*o-ku-ba-visiting-a nga ba-looking-a bubi*

IV-INF-2<sub>x</sub>-visit-FV when SUBJ<sub>x</sub>-look-FV bad

‘Children ‘disown’ their parents when they (parents) go to visit them and they are not looking good, i.e. not dressed decently’

- 17 I think *weeks bbiri gujja kuba gukaze*. (KM2)

I think *weeks bbiri gu-jja kuba gu-kaze*

I think weeks two 3-will be.PRES 3-dry.PST

‘I think in two weeks it would be dry {the cut-down tree}’.

18. ... : *ppeeni eya bbulu n'emyufu*. (MS 246)

*ppeeni eya bbulu ne e-myufu*  
pen REL blue CONJ IV-red

'{At school, I used to have two pens:}: a blue and a red pen'

- 19.... *ng'amapeesa geereeze essaati eringa egenda okkutuka*. (NP67).

*nga a-ma-peesa ge-ereeze e-ssaati e-ri-nga e-gend-a o-ku-kutuk-a*  
while IV-6-button 6-stretch.PERF IV-shirt IV-be-like 6-go-FV IV-INF-break-FV

'{Context: NP was describing someone who was wearing a tight shirt}. While the buttons on the shirt were overstretched and it appeared like the shirt was about to tear'

43. Kyaggwe *munda actually si na* Mukono (KM51)

kyaggwe munda **actually** si na Mukono  
kyaggwe inside **actually** NEG even Mukono

'Deep inside Kyaggwe (county) actually very far away from Mukono {district}'.

44. They'll need what they need **ate** they are very demanding in terms of time (NJ38)

they'll need what they need **ate** they are very demanding in terms of time

**yet**

'They'll need what they need and yet they are very demanding in terms of time'

45. [<sub>CP</sub>[<sub>CP</sub>Securing an interview is not easy;] [<sub>CP</sub>*gwe ffe twetooloodde bbanga ki?*]] (BV92)

Securing an interview is not easy *gwe ffe tu-etoolo-dde bbanga ki*  
PM SUBJ.IPL SUBJ.IPL-rotate-PERF period INTEROG

'Securing an interview is not easy, consider how long has it taken us to schedule this interview?'

46. [<sub>CP</sub> [<sub>CP</sub>But [<sub>IP</sub>I think even when I was younger maybe I looked like a responsible child]

[<sub>CP</sub>*kubanga* [<sub>IP</sub>*n'abantu baaleetanga abaana awaka*] [<sub>CP</sub>mainly because[<sub>IP</sub>I am there]]]]. (NJ93)

But I think even when I was younger maybe I looked like a responsible child;

*kubanga*

because

*ne a-ba-ntu ba-a-leeta-nga a-ba-ana a-wa-ka* mainly because I am there  
 even IV-2-person 2-PST-bring-HAB IV-2-child IV-16-home

‘But I think even when I was younger maybe I looked like a responsible child because even people used to bring their children at home mainly because I am there’

47. [<sub>CP</sub>*Twetaaga okurevampinga* the way we do things]. (BV3)

*Tu-etaag-a o-ku-revamping-a* the way we do things  
 SUBJ.1PL-need-FV IV-INF-revamping-FV

‘We need to revamp the way we do things’

48. *Naye* I don’t regret *kubanga essomero lyatuyigiriza okkola bannaye!* (HK172)

*Naye I don’t regret kubanga e-ssomero li-a-tu-yigiriz-a o-ku-kol-a bannaye!*  
 But because IV-school 5-PST-SUBJ.1PL-teach-FV IV-INF-work-FV surely

‘But I don’t regret because the school taught us to work, for sure’

49. a. [<sub>CP</sub>*So* [<sub>IP</sub>*Gayaza tojja mmutwala?* <sub>IP</sub>]<sub>CP</sub>]. (NA128)

**so** e *gayaza to-jja ku-mu-twal-a*  
 so P *gayaza NEG.2SG-will INF-OBJ.1SG-take-FV*  
 ‘So you will not take her to Gayaza {High school}?’

- e. [<sub>CP</sub>**So** [<sub>IP</sub>*ndwooza processes zaawukana* <sub>IP</sub>]<sub>CP</sub>]. (KA188)

**so** *n-lowooza processes za-awuka*  
 so SUBJ.ISG-think processes 9-differ  
 ‘So I think the processes differ {the writing and speaking processes}’

- f. [<sub>CP</sub>**Naye** [<sub>IP</sub>there was something that had happened in my third year<sub>IP</sub>]<sub>CP</sub>]. (LM106)

**naye** there was something that happened in my third year  
**but** there was something that happened in my third year  
 ‘**But** there was something that happened in my third year’

- g. [<sub>CP</sub>*Nze nnakula njogera* Luganda [<sub>CP</sub> **although** [<sub>IP</sub>*saddaawo ddusoma* <sub>IP</sub>]<sub>CP</sub>]. (NEM70)

- Nze n-a-kul-a n-joger-a Luganda although*  
 I SUBJ.ISG-PST-grow-FV SUBJ.ISG-speak-FV Luganda although  
*si-a-ddaawo ku-lu-som-a*  
 NEG-1SG-take time INF-5-study-FV  
 (I grew up speaking Luganda **although** I never took interest in studying it).
50. *Kaakati nsigninga wa? (NJ1)*  
*kaakati n-signing-a wa*  
 now SUBJ.1SG-sign-FV INTEROG  
 ‘Now where do I sign?’ {NJ uttered this before signing the consent form}
51. [<sub>CP</sub> [<sub>CP</sub> We make mistakes [<sub>CP</sub> **kuba** [<sub>IP</sub> *tetuyina batuguidinga*]]]] (SJ81)  
 We make mistakes **kuba** *te-tu-yina ba-tu-guiding-a*  
 Because NEG-1PL-have SUBJ.3PL-OBJ.1PL-guide-FV  
 ‘We {students at university} make mistakes **because** we do not have anyone to guide us’
52. *Tetwalina wa third grade. So ne baturecommendinga ne tweyongereyo mu Nyenga seminary (KA 125).*  
*te-tu-alina wa third grade so ne ba-tu-recommending-a*  
 NEG-SUBJ.2PL-have of third grade so and SUBJ.3PL-OBJ.2PL-recommend-FV  
  
*ne tu-eyongera-yo mu nyenga seminary*  
 CONJ SUBJ.2PL-continue.LOC P nyenga seminary  
 ‘We did not have (no one passed) with third grade. **So** they recommended us and we continued to Nyenga seminary’
53. *...eka nga ndi mwana wa mpisa; so I was-it was easy for me (BG122)*  
*e-ka nga n-di mu-ana wa mpisa so* I was- it was really easy for me  
 IV-home HAB SUBJ.1SG-be 1-child of discipline **so**  
 ‘At home, I was always a disciplined child **so** I was-it was really easy for me’
54. *...balina amaanyi mangi nnyo ate nga balamu. So\_ (KG25)*  
*ba-lin-a a-maanyi ma-ngi nnyo ate nga ba-lamu so*  
 SUBJ.3PL-have-FV IV-strength 6-a lot very and yet 3PL-healthy **so**



‘...they have a lot of energy (people from a certain region in Uganda) **and yet** they are healthy.

So\_’

55. **So** for a given interview, *olina okubeerako ne* critical minimum? (BV119)

**So** for a given interview *o-lina o-ku-beera-ko ne* critical minimum  
SUBJ.2SG-have IV-INF-possess-PARTv with critical minimum

‘**So** for a given interview, you must have a critical minimum {number of PMs obtained}?’

56. ....*omukyala naye yeewa ekitiibwa. So nga waliwo byatasobola kkola.* (BG192)

*omukyala naye ye-ewa e-ki-tiibwa so nga wa-li-wo*  
wife herself 1-give IV-7-respect so HAB 16-be-there  
*bya-ta-sobol-a ku-kol-a*  
8.REL-NEG.3SG-can-FV INF-do-FV

‘The {my} wife also respects herself. **So** there are things that you could not do’.

57. *Kati bwe twatuuka e Mityana ne nfuna kammunguluze ow’amanya so ne nkoma okutegeera.* (KA146)

*kati bwe tu-a-tuuk-a e mityana ne n-fun-a*  
now when SUBJ.1PL-PST-reach-FV P mityana and SUBJ.1SG-get-FV

*kammunguluze owa a-maanyi so ne n-kom-a o-ku-tegeer-a.*  
dizziness 3.REL IV-strong so and SUBJ.1SG-stop-FV IV-INF-understand-FV

‘Now, when we reached at Mityana, I became very dizzy and **consequently** I became unconscious’.

58. [<sub>CP</sub> My father had a home *e* Bukomero *mu* town [<sub>CP</sub> **so** [<sub>IP</sub> it was near [<sub>CP</sub> *nga* [<sub>IP</sub> *tukomawo* for lunch]]]]] (BG 158).

my father had another home *e* bukomero *mu* town **so** it was near *nga*  
at bukomero P HAB

*tu-komawo* for lunch  
SUBJ.1PL-return

‘My father had another home at Bukomero in town, **so** (because?) it was near and we would return home for lunch’.

59. *Kati oli<sup>61</sup> bw’aberaYO, YE OLI WA? MWANA GGWE! So nga every time nga akasinglinga out, ekyavaamu n’a-ηnamba nti, “naye maama...”*(NJ 117).

*kati o-li bwa-a-beera-yo ye o-li wa mu-ana ggwe*  
 now 2SG-other when 3SG-be-LOC PM 2SG-be INTEROG 1-Child you

**so** every time *nga a-ka-singling-a out ekyavaamu*  
 HAB SUBJ<sub>x</sub>3SG-DIM-singling-FV out eventually

*ne a-n-gamb-a nti naye maama*  
 and SUBJ<sub>y</sub>3SG-OBJ.1SG.tell-FV that but mother

‘Now, whenever the other one (visitor) was around, (she would scream) “And where are you!? what kind of child are you!?” So she would single her out every time, eventually my child told me, “but mother...’ {Context, a mother describes a visitor who used to discriminate against her children}

### Excerpt 1

JN162: *Namugamba ALINGA*

ML136: *So takalina*

.....

JN162: *n-a-mu-gamb-a a-li-nga*  
 SUBJ.1SG-PST-OBJ.1SG-tell-FV SUBJ.3SG-be-like  
 ‘I told her she LOOKS LIKE (the virus that causes AIDS)’

ML136: *so ta-ka-lina*  
 but NEG.3SG-12-have  
 ‘**BUT** she does not have it’

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<sup>61</sup> *Oli* can be a second person demonstrative or a second person auxiliary.

{Context: JN (as a child) insults a friend by telling her she looks like the actual HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus). However, when the insultee reported JN, she claimed that JN had said that she has HIV} Capitalisation for emphasis.

## Excerpt 2

MNS65: *Nze ngalaba, si nti* boredom but I must watch news

BI54: **So**, *tubuulire*

.....

MNS65: *nze n-ga-lab-a si nti* boredom but I must watch news  
 I SUBJ.1SG-6-see-FV NEG that  
 ‘I watch them {news}, not out of boredom but I must watch news’

BI54: **so** *tu-buulir-e*  
 now 1PL-tell-SUBJtv  
 ‘So/now, tell us’

60 a. ... *agamba nti takyaweerera*, **so nga** (ate) *aba* mummy *wange bakyasoma* (SJ 40).

*a-gamb-a ta-ki-aweerer-a so nga* (ate) *a-ba* mummy  
 SUBJ.3SG.PRES-say-FV NEG.3SG-PROG-fund-FV and yet IV-POSS mummy  
*wa-ange ba-ki-asom-a*  
 1-POSS.1SG 2-PROG-study-FV

‘(He {our father} says that he retired from paying tuition, and yet the children of my mother have not completed their studies’.

60 b. ... *tetwalina nanny*, **so nga** *tumuzazika awo n’eqhenda n’ensoma* (NJ 96)

*te-tu-a-lina-nga nanny so nga tu-mu-zazika awo*  
 NEG-SUBJ.1PL-PST-have-HAB nanny so PROG? 1PL-OBJ.1SG-place there  
*ne n-gend-a ne n-som-a*  
 and SUBJ.1SG-go-FV and SUBJ.1SG-study-FV

‘We did not have a nanny, **so** we would often place him {the baby} there {in some room} and I would go to class’

61. So, every time *nga akasinglinga* out (NJ 117)

**So**, every time *nga a-ka-singling-a* out  
 HAB SUBJ.3SG-DIM-singling-FV out

‘Every time she would single her out’.

62. *Ggwe nga weewaana nti, “Eh, omwana wange tafuka ku buliri” so nga\_* (NS 1338)<sup>62</sup>

<i>ggwe</i>	<i>nga</i>	<i>we-ewaan-a</i>	<i>nti</i>	<i>eh</i>	<i>o-mu-ana</i>	<i>wa-ange</i>
SUBJ.2SG	PROG	1SG.REFL-brag-FV	that	see	IV-1-child	1-POSS.1SG
<i>ta-fuk-a</i>	<i>ku</i>	<i>bu-liri</i>	<i>so nga</i>			
NEG.3SG-pee-FVP	14-bed	and yet				

‘You then show off that, ‘Sure, my child does not wet the bed’ **and yet\_**’.

{Context: Participants are comparing bed-wetting habits among young children in villages and in towns. The argument is that urban children will be restricted as to what to eat/drink and so they may not wet their beds. So a parent in town need not to brag about their children for if they allowed them to eat/drink as much as they wanted, they would, wet their beds}

- 63.a. ... *ng'alumye amannyo. So kati, n'ayita baganda be abalala* (NMS10).

<i>nga</i>	<i>a-lum-ye</i>	<i>a-ma-nnyo</i>	<i>so</i>	<i>kati</i>	<i>ne</i>
PROG	SUBJ <sub>x</sub> .3SG.PRES-bite-PERF	IV-PL-tooth	<b>so</b>	<b>therefore</b>	and
<i>a-yit-a</i>	<i>ba-ganda</i>	<i>be</i>	<i>a-ba-lala</i>	<i>a-ba-lenzi</i>	
SUBJ <sub>y</sub> .3SG.PST-call-FV	2-sibling	POSS.2SG	IV-2-other	IV-2-boy	

‘...while he {grandfather} had bitten his teeth {convulsed}. And so he {his son} called on his male siblings... {and they took their father to hospital}’

63. b. My father was born in Ntwetwe but his grandfather was born there; his father migrated nearer to Kiboga *kati ye n'amigratinga, migrated to Bukomero... So kaakati when the lutalo came naddirayo ddala ewa jjajjawe* (BG31).

<sup>62</sup> NS was the interviewer. For validity purposes, utterances produced by NS were not included in the main analytical arguments. There are only two illustrations which refer to NS's utterances because they were the only utterances in the data to substantiate a given discussion. This example and example 96.

My father was born in Ntwetwe but his grandfather was born there; his father migrated nearer to Kiboga *kati ye ne a-migrating-a* migrated to bukomero  
 so him and SUBJ.3SG.PST-migrate-FV migrated to bukomwero

so *kaakati* when the *lu-talo* came *ne a-ddira-yo*  
 therefore? now when the 11-war came and SUBJ.3SG.PST-return-LOC

*ddala ewa jjajja-we*  
 EMPH at grandfather-POSS.3SG

‘My father was born in Ntwetwe but his grandfather was born there (but in another place); his father migrated nearer to Kiboga so for him, he migrated to Bukomero. Yeah. **And? now**, when the war broke up, he had to return to his ancestral home.’

64. a. *Kuba babeera n’ensonga zaabwe ate nga zitegeerekeka...So kaakati\_* (KA169)

*kuba ba-beera ne e-nsonga za-abwe ate nga zi-tegeerekeka*  
 because SUBJ.3PL-be with IV-reasons 10-POSS.3PL and while 10-genuine

so *kaakati*  
 now now

‘For they (children) also have genuine reasons (for doing whatever they do), **so now (therefore)**... {they deserve to be listened to}’

64. b. *Mukama singa y’ali akituwadde kyandibadde kirungi. So kaakati\_* (KA145).

*Mukama singa a-a-li a-ki-tu-wa-dde*  
 God if SUBJ.3SG-PST-have SUBJ.3SG-7-OBJ.1PL-give-PERF  
*ki-a-ndiba-dde ki-rungi so kati*  
 7-PST-willbe-PERF 7-good now now

‘If God had given it to us (made KA a priest) it would have been good, **so...** {now that he is not we should accept it}’.

65.a. ...So I said, “AAA, **me I** wanted what? I wanted PCB”. (DN99)

65. b. *Kati nze n’enyamba, “AAA, nze njagala ki? njagala PCB”*

*kati nze ne n-gamb-a “AAA nze n-jagal-a ki*  
 now I and SUBJ.1SG-say-FV no I SUBJ.1SG-want-FV  
 INTEROG

*n-jagal-a PCB*  
 SUBJ.1SG-want-FV PCB

‘Then me I said, “NO WAY, me I-want what? I-want PCB”’.

65. c. *Nzannyirayo akayimba* (X)

*N-zanny-ir-ayo a-ka-yimba*  
 SUBJ.1SG-play-APPL-PARTv IV-DIM-song  
 ‘Play for me a sweet song’

66. *Saagisuspectinze naye* I didn’t want to come, *nga bw’omanyi awaka nga tolina muntu...so teebeereza buli kimu nkiresse awo...*(HK10-11).

*sa-gi-suspectin-ze naye* I didn’t want to come *nga bw’omanyi*  
 NEG.1SG-PST-9-suspect-PERF but .... as you know

*a-waka nga to-li-na muntu so teebeereza buli*  
 IV-home while NEG.2SG-have person Just? imagine every

*ki-mu n-ki-resse awo*  
 7-thing SUBJ.1SG-7-leave.PERF there

‘I did not suspect it {students’ strike} but I didn’t want to come, as you know, a home without a nanny. Now? just imagine, I left everything {housework} undone’.

67. **But because again** of my problems, *nga sisobola kusiibaayo* (LM40).

**But because again** of my problems, *nga si-sobol-a ku-siiba-yo*  
 But because again of my problems, HAB NEG.1SG-can-FV INF-spend a day-LOC  
 ‘**But because** {again} of my problems, I could not spend the whole day {at school}’.

68. ...*abaana ne batulika ne baseka. Naye* since then, okay not since then, may be later alone  
*natandika okwebuuz-a lwaki...*(LM155)

*a-ba-ana ne ba-tulik-a ne ba-sek-a naye* since then...  
IV-2-child and 2-break-FV and 2-laugh-FV but

*n-a-tandik-a o-ku-ee-buuz-a lwaki*  
SUBJ.3SG-PST-begin-FV IV-INF-REFL-ask-FV INTEROG

‘And children broke into laughter. And since then, okay not since then, maybe later alone I started to ask myself why {certain words have silent letters}’

69. ...quite a few times I joke **and so** *kizibu bo okutegeera* speech behaviour *zange* (KM110).

quite a few times I joke and so *ki-zibu bo o-ku-teegeer-a* speech behaviour  
7-difficult OBJ.3PL IV-INF-understand-FV

za-ange

9-POSS.1SG

‘...quite a few times I joke **and so** it becomes difficult for them to understand my speech behaviour’

70. ...*oba tebaakola bulungi oba* whatever so *tebaasobola. So naye mu baana mwe baasomesa abato mwemwasigala abo.*(DN138)

*oba te-ba-a-kol-a bu-lungi oba* whatever so  
perhaps NEG-SUBJ.3PL-PST-do-FV 2-well perhaps

*te-ba-a-sigal-a so naye mu ba-ana mwe*  
NEG-SUBJ.3PL-PST-remain-FV so but P 2-child REL

*ba-a-som-esa a-ba-to mwe mu-a-sigal-a a-bo*  
SUBJ.3PL-PST-teach-CAUS IV-2-young REL 1-PST-remain-FV IV-those

‘...perhaps they did not perform well or whatever so they were not retained. **But then** from the younger students they taught, that is where they retained those ones’

71. *Ndwooza baali beeraliikirira nti nnali sigenda kuwona! So kati, kubanga ebiseera ebyo era tebyali bya mirembe kati nga n'amakubo si mangu kkola ki?kuyitamu* (KA146).

*N-lowooz-a*            *oba*            *ba-a-li*            *ba-eraliikirir-a*    *nti*    *n-a-li*  
SUBJ.ISG-think-FV    perhaps    3PL-PST-be    3PL-worry-FV    that    SUBJ.ISG-PST-be

*si-gend-a*            *ku-wona*    **so**    **kati**    **kubanga**            *e-bi-seera*            *ebyo*  
NEG.1SG-go-FV    INF-heal    **now**    **now**    **because**            IV-7-time            8.DEM

*era*    *te-bi-a-li*            *nnyo*    *bya*    *mirembe*    *kati*            *nga*            *a-ma-kubo*  
indeed    NEG-7-PST-be    very    7.of    peace            and            PROG            IV-6-road

*si*    *ma-angu*    *ku-kol-a*            *ki*            *ku-yita-mu.*  
NEG    6-easy            INF-do-FV    INTEROG    INF-pass-LOC

(I think perhaps they were worried that I would not recover...**Now, because** those times were (indeed) not very peaceful, and the roads were not accessible).

72. ...they had an accident and he was driving. **So** he hit his face *ku ki? ku mmotoka* I think *n'afuna* internal bleeding or something. (AS6)

they had an accident and he was driving. **So** he hit his face            *ku*            *ki*            *ku*  
P            INTEROG            P  
*mmotoka*    I think    *ne*            *a-fun-a*                            *oba*            internal bleeding or something...  
motor car                            and            SUBJ.3SG.PST-get-FV    perhaps

‘...they had an accident and he was driving. **So** he hit his face on what? on the car. I think, and he perhaps got internal bleeding or something...’





'I think we overslept and we got to school when the assembly was underway. **So** when we got there-when we entered like this inside the gate, we wanted to retreat and they ordered the gate keeper to 'arrest' us'.

74. It's common sense; *omwana obeera naye mu lubuto* for nine months, *n'afuna ku BULI KIKYO kubanga* background *ne mwakulidde mu lubuto*. **So** that was her philosophy. *Ye nga "Omukazi omusiru azaala omwana omusiru" kubanga y'amulera mu lubuto*. (KG200)

It's common sense; *o-mu-ana o-beera ne-aye mu lu-buto*  
IV-1-child SUBJ.2SG-be with-1SG P 11-stomach

for nine months *ne a-fun-a ku buli ki-kyo kubanga*  
and SUBJ.3SG-get-FV P every 7-POSS.2SG because

background *ne mu-a-kul-idde mu lubuto* **so** that was her philosophy  
and LOC-PST-grow-PERF P stomach

*ye nga o-mu-kazi o-mu-siru a-zaal-a o-mu-ana*  
REFL PM IV-1-woman IV-1-stupid SUBJ.3SG.PST-produce-FV IV-1-child

*o-mu-siru kubanga a-a-mu-ler-a mu lu-buto*  
IV-1-stupid because SUBJ.3SG-PST-OBJ.1SG P 11-stomach

'It's common sense; you keep the baby {foetus} in your stomach for nine months, and the baby gets a portion of EVERYTHING FROM YOU...Because {the child's} background is dependent on the mother and the child grows in her stomach {uterus}. **So** that was her philosophy. For her, "a stupid woman bears a stupid child" because she nurtures her in her stomach {womb}'.

#### Excerpt 4

KM 44: So, I still remember that girl's name was Victo, *nkyajjukira ne bwekaali kafaanana era nkyalaba nga mwana muto*. *Nkyakalaba era ne gyebakaziika ndabayo*. Er, **so**

So, I still remember that girl's name was Victo *n-kya-jjukir-a*  
SUBJ.1SG-still-remember-FV

*ne bwe ka-a-li-nga ka-faanana era n-kya-lab-a nga*  
and how DIM-PST-be-HAB DIM-look and SUBJ.1SG-still-see-FV while

*mu-ana mu-to n-kya-ka-lab-a ne gye*  
1-child 1-young SUBJ.1SG-still-DIM-see-FV see and where

*ba-a-mu-ziika n-laba-yo Er so*  
SUBJ.3PL-PST-OBJ.1SG-burry-FV SUBJ.1SG-see-LOC yes so

NS 481: *So wagenda?* ((KM: *Ee*)) You watched all the details?

So *a-a-gend-a* (Yes) You watched all the details?

So SUBJ.3SG-PST-go-FV

KM 45: *Ee, ee. Baatutwalayo*

*ee ee ba-a-tu-twala-yo*

yes yes SUBJ.3PL-PST-OBJ.1PL-take-LOC

.....

KM44: ‘So, I still remember that girl’s name was Victo, I still remember how she looked like, and I still see her as a young child...I still see her (as a little child). I still see where she was buried, I still see there. Er **so**\_\_’

NS481: ‘So did you go (for the funeral)? ((KM: Yes)). You watched all the details...’

KM 45: ‘Oh yes, they took us there...’

### Excerpt 5

MNS 65: *Nze ngalaba, si* boredom but I must watch news

*nze n-ga-lab-a si nti* boredom but I must watch news.

I SUBJ.1SG-6-see-FV NEG that

(I watch them (news), not out of boredom...)

BI 54: So, *tubuulire*

**so** *tu-buulir-e*

now SUBJ.1PL-tell-SUBJtv

(So/Now tell us)

NMS 66: There was a time...

**Excerpt 6**

BV108: **So** all those people *be nnalabye mu gundi*, that seminar, you've already interviewed?

**So** all those people *be n-a-lab-ye mu gundi*  
REL SUBJ.1SG-PST-see-PERF P something

'So all those people that I saw in what, that seminar, you've already interviewed them?'

NS 3462: Teaching staff, yes

75. *Ee, oba zibeera mu line zibeerewo. So, em\_ the-so* I think I am just endowed with language skills (KM94).

*Ee oba zi-beera mu line zi-beere-wo so em the-so ...*

Yes if 9-be P line 9-be-LOC

'Yes, if it means them staying in the queue, let them stay {documents to be translated}. **So, em\_ the-so** I think I am just endowed with language skills...'

76. *Hmmm, n'azannya n'eneemalayo.* I played to my full, to me, because I played everything. I broke my limbs, actually I didn't break my limbs but I fell down and I got hurt. Bicycle riding, *nalinnya emiti*, I got scratches. Generally, I think I had a share of plays, **so** I am good (NA28).

*Hmmm n-a-zanny-a ne n-ee-malayo n-a-linny-a*

Yes SUBJ.1SG-PST-play-FV and SUBJ.1SG-REFL-full SUBJ.1SG-PST-climb-FV

e-mi-ti

IV-4- tree

'Yes, I played to the maximum. I played to my full, to me, because I engaged in all plays, I broke my limbs-actually I didn't break my limbs but I fell down and I got hurt. Bicycle riding, I climbed trees I got scratches. Generally, I think I had a share of plays, **so** I am good'.

77. So long as I am decent, she has no problem with it. **SO NZE IŋŋAMBA** it comes from home. (KS94)

So long as I am decent, she has no problem with it **so nze n-gamb-a** it comes  
I SUBJ.1SG-say-FV

'...So long as I am decent, she has no problem with it. **SO I WANT TO THINK** it comes from home'

78. I did mature {exams} as well as senior six. I failed mature miserably ((laughs)) I think

because *so*– (LM66)

79. **So**, *e-o-oba-oba*-(inaudible) *okkikakasa nti abantu balina ebizibu*. (SJ101)

*so o-ku-ki-kakas-a nti a-ba-ntu ba-lin-a e-bi-zibu*  
 so IV-INF-7-confirm-FV that IV-2-person SUBJ.3PL-have-FV IV-8-problem  
 ‘**So**,...for you to know that people have problems?’.

80. ...But those were already there. We had mattresses at home but, like people would see me now coming on a *kagaali* (bicycle), you know *kabike* (small bicycle) from the nearest trading centre to my home. **So**, a suit case. (DN43)

81. *Abantu baalowooza nti bagenda kujja babaggye mu bibanja byabwe bateekemu abantu abalala so okubakyusa mu ngeri eyo*. (MH352)

*a-ba-ntu ba-a-lowooz-a nti ba-gend-a ku-jja*  
 IV-2-person 2-PST-think-FV COMP SUBJ.3PL-go-FV INF-come

*ba-ba-ggy-e mu bi-banja bi-abwe*  
 SUBJ.3PL-OBJ.3PL-remove-SUBJtv P 7-plot 7-POSS.3PL

*ba-teeke-mu a-ba-ntu a-ba-lala so o-ku-ba-kyus-a mu*  
 SUBJ.3PL-put.SUBJtv-LOC IV-2-person IV-2-other ? IV-INF-2-change-FV P

*ngeri e-yo*.

way IV-that

‘...People thought that they (authorities) will come and remove them from their land and replace them with other people **PM?** to change them like that?’

82. ...*Eby’edda ka biyingire mu bipya so si ebipya mu by’edda*. (KG49)

*e-bi-edda ka-bi-yingir-e mu bi-pya so si e-bi-pya mu bi-edda*  
 IV-8-classic let-8-enter-SUBJtv P 8-new but not IV-8-new P 8-classic

‘Let the old things flow into the new **BUT NOT** the new, in the old’.

83. *Yajja so twalina meeting awo mu main building oba yali 2012 oba 2013?* (KG 270)

*a-a-jja so tu-alin-a meetinga-wo mu main building*  
 SUBJ.3SG-PST-come PM 1PL-have-FV IV-LOC P

*oba a-a-li 2012 oba 13*  
 perhaps it-PST-be 2012 or 13

‘He came, **PM** {I vaguely remember} we even had a meeting there in the main building, in 2012 or 2013 {there about}’.

84. A: We would save a lot of time if we use him as a mediator

B: *So wamma/So nno (wamma)/wamma nno (so)!*

[Metarepresented as PERSUASIVE *so!*].

85. *So yandabula!*

*So a-a-n-dabul-a*

PM SUBJ.3SG-PST-OBJ.1SG-warn-FV

‘And yet he warned me!’

86. Not all of us can be engineers, or medics or language experts but there will always be a community of practice for-for every particular training *kubanga* it deals with a specific class of problems which problems can only be solved properly, at least, by professionals (KM124).

87. ...*Nti* sometimes *n'ebyo byennyini bibakosa. Kuba nze bwe nnakimugamba nnamulaba ng'akiwelcominze nnyo.* (HK58)

*nti ne ebyo bi-enyini bi-ba-kos-a kuba nze*  
 COMP and 8.DEM 8-exact 8-SUBJ.3PL-affect-FV **because** I

*bwe n-a-ki-mu-gamb-a n-a-mu-lab-a nga*  
 when SUBJ.1SG-PST-7-OBJ.1SG-tell-FV SUBJ.ISG-PST-OBJ.1SG-see-FV COMP

*a-ki-welcominze nnyo*

IV-7-welcome.PST very

‘HK is describing her nanny who wanted to take leave}. That sometimes even those things (such as denying them visits) affect them. Because when I told her {about visiting her family}, I noticed that she welcomed the idea very much’.

88. ...*munnage*, life was not easy. *Tusabe Katonda atukwatireko abafumbo kubanga*\_(HK315, 316)

*munnage* life is not easy *tu-sab-e* *katonda*  
my dear SUBJ.1PL-pray-SUBJtv god

*a-tu-kwat-ire-ko* *a-ba-fumbo* *kubanga*  
3SG-1PL-help-APPL-PARTv IV-2-married because

‘My dear, life is not easy. Let us pray to God to help us the married people because\_’

89. Er I think back in 2002 *kuba* I was in P.2, ... (AS2)

90. [CP My problem was school fees; [CP *kubanga* [IP *zennalinga nnoonya* [CP actually [IP not only then [CP but [IP up to when I finished my Bachelors]]]]]]]. (LM17)

my problem was school fees; *kubanga* *ze-n-a-li-nga*  
because REL.9-SUBJ.1SG-PST-be-HAB

*n-noony-a*

SUBJ.ISG-search-FV

‘My problem was school fees. Because that is what I always looked for actually not only then but up to when I finished my Bachelors’.

91. ... Retake *estressinga...olina okwattendinga* lectures *kuba akimanyi oli* retaker *olina obbeerayo* (BN268).

retake *e-stressing-a* *o-lina* *o-ku-attending-a* lectures *kuba*  
IV-stress-FV SUBJ.2SG-have IV-INF-attend-FV because

*a-ki-manyi*          *o-li*          retaker          *o-lin-a*          *o-ku-beera-yo*  
 SUBJ.3SG-7-know    SUBJ.2SG-be                   SUBJ.2SG-have-FV    IV-INF-be-LOC

‘Doing a retake paper can be stressful...you have to attend lectures because he/she {lecturer} knows that you are a retaker and that you must be there {in lectures}’.

96. *Kubanga ki ?* (NS2456)

Because INTEROG

‘For what justification?’

97. *Baakitugamba si kuba nti bo byabaanguyira... (ML152)*

*Ba-a-ki-tu-gamba-nga*          *si*          *kuba*          *nti*          *bo*          *bi-a-ba-anguy-ir-a*

SUBJ.3PL-PST-7-tell-HAB    NEG    **because**    that    them    8-PST-SUBJ.3PL-easy-APPL-FV

({Context: Teachers used to counsel and warn students about university academic life} ‘They used to tell us **not because** for them it was easy; {but to motivate us}’)

98. *Yee, era yali takimanyi kuba yali akola mu section ndala; kubanga era n’ono namugamba taata takimanyi kuba yali tajja kunzikiriza* (KA65).

*yee*          *era*          *a-a-li*          *ta-ki-manyi*          *kuba*          *a-a-li*  
 yes          and          SUBJ.3SG-PST-be    NEG.3SG-7-know    **because**          SUBJ.3SG-PST-be

*a-kol-a*          *mu*          section          *ndala*          *kubanga*          *era*          *ne*          *o-no*  
 Agr-work-FV          P                   different          **because**          and          even          IV-DEM

*n-a-mu-gamb-a*          *taata*          *ta-ki-manyi*          *kuba*  
 SUBJ.1SG-PST-OBJ.1SG-tell-FV    father          NEG.3SG-7-know    because

*a-a-li*          *ta-jja*          *ku-n-zikiriz-a*.  
 SUBJ.3SG-PST-be    NEG.3SG-will    INF-SUBJ.1SG-allow-FV

({Context: KA seeks employment in a department where his father was employed, but chooses to keep it a secret}. ‘Yes, and he never knew **because** he used to work in a different section; **because** I also



informed this one {his father's workmate} that my father was not aware of it {KA's employment} **because** he would not have allowed me {to work because KA was juvenile}'.

99. ...It's Buganda *olwokubanga* it's the centre of so many other tribes...  
for the reason that  
{Context: BM explains why Buganda tribe may not succeed in preserving its cultural values}.(BM22).
100. ...We need a more strategic approach *ku-* because this business is very profitable (BV15).
101. I used before *okubeeranga mu* office *kubanga* there was always work to do, Monday to Saturday. (KM143).

I used, before *o-ku-beera-nga* *mu* office *kubanga* there was always work to do...  
IV-INF-be-HAB P because

'I used, before {before KM started farming}, to be in the office **because** there was always work to do, Monday to Saturday {but now KM does not go to office on Saturday}'.

103. *Hmm. Naye kyampisa bubu nnyo kuba* I used to cry every day... (HK165)

*hmm naye ki-a-n-pis-a bubu nnyo kuba* I used to cry every day  
yes but 7-PST-SUBJ.1SG-treat-FV bad very **or**

'But it {studying in a boarding school} affected me so much that I used to cry every day'

104. 'You should just read' 'cause *twali tugenda mu*-actually it was third term... (AS7).

'You should just read' 'cause *tu-a-li* *tu-gend-a* *mu* actually  
SUBJ.1PL-PST-be SUBJ-1PL-go-FV P

'{Father advises a daughter before examinations} you should just read. 'Cause we were about to-actually it was third term {the promotional term}'.

106. [CP1...*Tuyita mu bizibu biyitirivu*; [CP2 we make mistakes [CP3 *kuba* [IP *tetuyina batuguidinga*]]] (SJ81).





‘They {fruits} used to be fresh, more fresh<sup>63</sup> than is the case now...Very fresh. The reason (now) is that the mango has something which they call what? fibers; it digests very fast {easily} anything in the stomach and it leaves {the stomach}’.

113. *Wano ku campus mbadde nzijawo ennaku bbiri; nga nzija lwa Thursday na Friday. Naye kati olwokuba wakyaliwo problems za marks, Mwami X tajja kumalako yekka.* (SJ201)

*wa-no ku campus n-ba-dde nzi-ja-wo e-n-naku bbiri nga*  
16-DEM P SUBJ.1SG-be-PERF I-come-LOC IV-10-day two HAB

*nzi-ja lwa thursday na Friday naye kati olwokuba wa-ki-ali-wo*  
I-come on and but now because there-7-exists-LOC

problems za marks *mwami X ta-jja ku-mala-ko ye-kka*  
of mr X NEG.3SG-will INF-finish-PARTtv him-  
alone

‘Here at Campus, I have been coming twice (a week); I would come on Thursday and Friday. But for the reason that there are still problems with (students’) marks, Mr X (the head of department) will not manage them alone’

114. *Kati bwe nnoonya akeeyo of course olwokuba time yali empeddeko nga sirina time nti nnoonye mpolampola ku last minute nkubirire nkubirire nga the only available job eyali eyabannaYuganda – cleaning.* (NJ39)

*kati bwe n-noony-a a-keeyo of course olwokuba time a-a-li*  
now when SUBJ.1SG-look-FV IV-DIM.job for the reason that 9-PST-be

*e-m-peddeko nga si-rin-a time nti n-noony-e*  
9-1SG-finish.PERF PROG NEG.ISG-have-FV COMP SUBJ.ISG-search-SUBJtv

*mpolampola ku last minute n-kub-ir-ir-e nkubirire nga the only*  
slowly P 1SG-rush-APPL-APPL-SUBJtv ITER PM

<sup>63</sup> *More fresh* is a generalised usage which some studies have described as Uglishism. However, such usages are stigmatised (Isingoma, 2013, 2014).

available job *e-a-a-li* *eya* *a-ba-nnayuganda* cleaning.  
REL-9-PST-be REL IV-2-Ugandan

‘Now, when I looked for a simple job, of course for the reason that time had gone; I did not have time to search slowly at the last minute and I needed to work a lot (and earn something), and the only available job Ugandans used to do was cleaning’.

115. *Si nnyingi, kubanga n’oalready oba* rumour *oba si* rumour *waliwo omukazi eyagambye nti baagambye buli ali ku lane ye* Namugongo *bwoba tosobola kuzimba kalina vvaawo...*(HK137).

*si nnyingi kubanga ne already oba* it’s a rumour *oba si* rumour  
NEG many because and already perhaps perhaps NEG

*wa-li-wo o-mu-kazi e-a-a-gamb-ye nti ba-a-gamb-ye*  
16-be-LOC IV-1-woman REL-1-PST-tell.PERF COMP SUBJ.3PL-PST-say-PERF

*buli a-li ku lane ye namugongo bwoba to-sobol-a*  
every Agr-be P of if NEG.2SG-can-FV

*ku-zimb-a kalina vaa-wo*  
INF-build-FV flat vacate-LOC

‘They (chances of returning to work) are limited **because even already**, perhaps it’s a rumour or maybe not a rumour, some woman who told me that whoever is selling goods by the roadside leading to Namugongo, ... whoever cannot build a storied building should vacate’

118. a. ...*Kati mwekangabwekanzi nga babaguddeko and so abasajja baba bajja kubonaabona* (KM13)

*kati mu-ekanga-bwekanzi nga ba-ba-gudde-ko and so*  
now 2PL-surprised-ITER PROG SUBJ.3PL-OBJ.3PL-reach.PERF-PARTtv and so

*a-ba-sajja ba-ba ba-jja ku-bonaabona*  
IV-2-man 2-be 2-will INF-suffer

‘Now, you would be caught unawares **and so** men would have to suffer’

c. \*...*Kati, mwekanga bwekanzi nga babaguddeko so and abasajja baba baja kubonaabona...*

119. a. ... *ko kaali elastic nga sibuuka nnyo...so ate buno obwaffe obwa bulijjo...*(NB35-36).

*ko ka-a-li elastic nga si-buuka nnyo so ate bu-no*  
it DIM-PST-be and NEG.ISG-jump very **and yet** 14-DEM

*o-bu-affe o-bwa bu-lijjo...*  
IV-14-POSS.1PL IV-REL 14-common

‘For it it was elastic and I would not jump high...**And yet** for the ordinary ones {you need to jump so high}’.

119. b. *ko kaali elastic nga sibuuka nnyo...ate so buno obwaffe obwa bulijjo...*

120. Yeah, the next day I went to school *naye nga yafa* in the night but I went to school...(AS13)  
but while he had died

(Yeah, the next day I went to school **but while** he had died in the night but I went to school)

121. I don’t know how old he is, *naye nga* he’s finished! He could hardly walk! (BG13).

122. a. ...*So nga ate luli mu myaka nga kkumi n’etaano emabega ng’owulira ate olungereza lweluliikiriza* (Oluganda)(KA 235)

*So nga ate lu-li mu mi-aka nga kkumi ne e-taano e-mabega nga*  
AND YET 11-then P 4-year about ten and IV-five IV-behind PROG

*o-wulir-a ate olungereza lwe lu-liikir-iz-a*  
2SG-hear-FV PART English REL 11-feed-CAUS-FV

‘...AND YET in about the last 15 years you would hear English feeding (into Luganda)’

b. *Ate nga so luli mu myaka nga kkumi n’etaano emabega, ng’owulira ate olungereza lweluliikiriza.*

c. *So ate nga luli mu myaka nga kkumi n’etaano emabega, ng’owulira ate olungereza lweluliikiriza.*

d. *Nga so ate luli mu myaka nga kkumi n'etaano emabega, ng'owulira ateolungereza lweluliikiriza.*

123. a. *Kweggamba nga tusoma naye ate nga tolaba nnyo nti batumpumpinga* (KG6)

*kweggamba nga tu-som-a naye ate nga to-lab-a nnyo*  
In other words PROG SUBJ.1PL-study-FV **but while yet** NEG.2SG-see-FV very

*nti ba-tu-pumping-a*  
COMP SUBJ.3PL-OBJ.1PL-pump-FV

'In other words, we would study very hard but (at the same time) you could not feel like we were over pumped'

b. *Kweggamba nga tusoma naye nga ate tolaba nnyo nti batupumpinga*

c. *Kweggamba nga tusoma nga naye ate tolaba nnyo nti batupumpinga*

d. *Kweggamba nga tusoma nga ate naye tolaba nnyo nti batupumpinga*

124. a. *AA! kyekyo kyennyini. Yeah. So kati ffe tulackinga both* (MS174)

*aa ki-ekyo ki-enyini yeah so kati ffe tu-lacking-a both*  
*yes 7-that 7-indeed therefore? now yes SUBJ.1PL SUBJ.1PL-lack-FV*

'INDEED. Yeah. So for us we lack both {both English and Luganda proficiencies}'

125. a. *AA!kyekyo kyennyini. Yeah. Kati ffe tulackinga both*

c. *AA!kyekyo kyennyini. Yeah. So ffe tulackinga both*

126. a. *Yali takimanyi, naye of course, balaba ekifaananyi...* (KA3)

*a-a-li ta-ki-manyi naye of course ba-lab-a ekifaananyi*  
SUBJ.3SG-PST-be NEG.3SG-7-know and of course 2-see-FV IV-7-picture

'He did not know **but of course** they could recognise his image'.

{Context: A friend to KA's father saw that KA resembled his father much as had not met KA before}

126. b. *\*Yali takimanyi, of course naye, balaba ekifaananyi...*

