A Review of the China – Africa Arms Trade and its Relationship to Issues of Gender and Human Security

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Declaration

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Taylor Angas Jeken
March 2017
Abstract

As emerging powers in Africa aim to secure resources, the relationship between China and Africa has been scrutinized regarding China’s arms transfers to fragile African states. Inquiry into China-Africa arms transfers led to the studies focus on how these transfers affect African women’s human security, and to question whether or not there is evidence that China’s arms transfers to Africa escalate violent conflict. This study determines if there is a correlation between these factors exist and to what extent China’s small arms transfers affect the individual security of women in fragile African states. This was researched to raise awareness to the most salient threats to women’s human security in Africa. Throughout this study, the small arms and light weapons supplied by China to Africa have been found to be both direct and indirect causes of these threats.

This research uses perspectives from feminist human security theory, which originally emerged as a means of consolidating the concepts of individual protection, human rights, and the welfare of these individuals, to focus on the security of women through human development and the advancement of international society. Through this perspective it was discovered that there is a correlation between the China-Africa arms trade and the ongoing violent conflict in Africa due to the availability of small arms in socio-politically and economically fragile African states. China has supplied small arms to African states, these weapons have destabilized the region, exacerbated existing conflicts and provided armed groups with the ability to attack and oppress women and children. During armed conflicts women are exposed to increased levels of armed gender based and domestic violence that include brutal acts of rape, sexual enslavement, torture, and murder perpetrated by state forces and armed rebel forces. In this regard, China has negatively influenced women’s human security in these regions, albeit indirectly. While it has always been China’s responsibility to monitor the effects of its international affairs on African states, it has slowly begun to adjust its foreign policies to more carefully consider African humanitarian issues. This study indicates that an important requirement to further reduce the effects of small arms in Africa is that more stringent and effective arms transfer controls are developed throughout Africa.

Although African women are victimised by ongoing arms proliferation throughout Africa, their activism and inclusion in peace negotiations and post-conflict disarmament and reintegration operations, is potentially the most important source of resistance to the effects of armed violence in Africa. It is therefore important to formally include women in African peace processes and operations to be able to improve women’s human security in Africa. The inclusion of African women can potentially improve the outcome of these operations, ultimately determining how successful they are at reducing the effects of armed violence. This research will hopefully improve international awareness of the current situation in women’s human security in Africa. To further underestimate and ignore the potential influence of women as crucial actors in preventing and mitigating the effects of armed conflict will lead to peace-making and peace-building efforts remaining ineffectual at producing sustainable long-term solutions towards peace, stability and security in Africa.
Opsomming

Terwyl opkomende magte in Afrika poog om hulpbronne te verseker, is daar ‘n groter fokus op China se verhouding met Afrika state as gevolg van sy wapenoordrag na brose Afrika-state. ’n Ondersoek na China en Afrika se wapentuig het geleidelik tot hierdie studie wat fokus op hoe wapenoordrag die menslike sekeriteit van inheemse Afrika vroue beïnvloed. Daar word ook gepoog om die vraag, of daar bewyse bestaan dat China se wapenoordrag na Afrika lei tot verhoogde gewelddadige konflik, te beantwoord. Hierdie studie probeer bepaal of ’n verband tussen hierdie faktore bestaan en in watter mate China se klein wapenoordrag invloed op die individuele sekeriteit van vroue in brose Afrika-state uitoeft. Die navorsing poog ook om bewusheid oor die opvallendste bedreigings vir menslike veiligheid van vroue in Afrika te verhoog. Hierdie studie wys dat die hand-vuurwapens en ligte wapens wat deur China aan Afrika verskaf word, beide direk en indirek hydra tot bogenoemde bedreigings.

Hierdie navorsing gebruik perspektiewe van feministiese menslike sekeriteitstorie, wat oorspronklik ontwikkel is as ’n middel tot die bevordering van die konsepte van individuele beskerming, menseregte en die welsyn van individue. Die teorie plaas die fokus op die veiligheid van vroue wat verhoog kan word deur middel van menslike ontwikkeling. Deur die aanwending hierdie perspektief is daar gewys dat daar ’n verband is tussen die China-Afrika wapenhandel en die voortdurende gewelddadige konflik in sommige Afrika-state. Dit is ’n gevolg van die beskikbaarheid van ligte wapentuig in sosio-politieke en ekonomiese brose Afrika-state. China voorsien wapentuig aan Afrika-state om streke te gedestabiliseer. Hierdie wapentuig vererger bestaande konflikte en gee gewapende groepe, die vermoë om geweld teenoor vroue en kinders te pleeg. Gedurende gewapende konflikte is vroue blootgestel aan verhoogde vlakke van geslags gebaseerde aanvalle en gesinsgeweld wat wrede dade van verkraging, seksuele slawerny, marteling en moord deur die staat se magte en gewapende rebelle insluit. In hierdie verband, het China ’n indirekte as ook negatiewe invloed op die menslike sekeriteit van vroue in hierdie streke. Omdat dit China se verantwoordelikheid is om die gevolge van sy internasionale verhoudinge met Afrikastate te moniteer, het China stadig begin om sy buitelandse beleid aan te pas, om meer versigtig te besin oor Afrika se humanitêre aangeleenthede. Hierdie studie dui aan dat dit ’n belangrike vereiste is om die gewelddadige impak van ligte wapentuig in Afrika verder te verminder, en dat ’n strenger en meer effektiewe beheer oor wapenoordrag regoor Afrika ontwikkel moet word.

Aangesien vroue in Afrika geviktimiseer word deur die voortgesette verspreiding van wapentuig is hul aktivisme en insluiting in vredes onderhandelinge en post-konflik ontwapening en herintegrasi die belangrikste bronne van weerstand teen die gevolge van geweld in Afrika. Dit is dus belangrik om vroue formeel in vredesprosesse en operasies in telsluit. Hopelik sal hierdie navorsing bewusheid kweek oor die toestand van geweld teen vroue in Afrika. Die voortslepende uitsluiting van vroue uit vredesprosesse sal hydra daartoe dat vredespogings en onderhandelings oneffektief bly.
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List of abbreviations

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economy of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>Forum of China African Co-Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUC</td>
<td>United Front for Democratic Change (<em>Front Uni Pour le Changement</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Doctors Without Borders (<em>Médecins Sans Frontières</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORINCO</td>
<td>China North Industries Group Corp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army (China’s armed forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>Sudanese Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
<td>State-owned Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA-IO</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>United Nations Development Fund for Women</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This section introduces the research study, by providing a background to the study and the methods used to complete this research. Hereafter, the aims, objectives, assumptions and limitations of this study are provided, along with a contextualization of the specific terminology used throughout the thesis.

The particular approach used in this study has not been taken before, focusing on the humanitarian cost, and more specifically, the gendered influence, of the China–African arms trade on African human security. The purpose of this study is to research the humanitarian influence of the China–African arms trade versus the information supplied by China’s public relations experts. In the past China has used intricate public relations to shift the general perspective of what occurs in reality.

This chapter will help to create further awareness of the ambiguity, and the lack of transparency, of China and African states on matters concerning irresponsible arms transfers, the humanitarian cost of these transfers and the purpose to which these weapons are put to use, which will become apparent later in the study.

1.2. Background to research problem and question

China’s rise to power and its increasing involvement in Africa over the past decade has resulted in doubt and speculation as to its intentions. As emerging powers in Africa are aiming to secure resources, the growing relationship between China and Africa has become the subject of intense scrutiny. Various conclusions have been drawn about China’s involvement in Africa and it has been depicted as an economic competitor, partner state and neo-colonizer by critics. Regardless of the disagreements and controversy surrounding its rise as a prominent emerging power in Africa, there exists a need for further study on China’s involvement in African affairs in general, but for the purpose of this study the focus will be China’s role in the African arms trade and the effects of small arms and light weapons in Africa. It must be noted that while China is not the only large-scale supplier of small arms in Africa, it is the primary focus of this study. Other major international arms suppliers include Russia, France and US, and have also been involved in the African arms trade.
Emerging powers play an increasingly consequential role in Africa and are set to deepen their impact upon the political, economic and security dynamics of the continent. The developing relationships between emerging actors and African states are becoming more substantial and complex as developments in trade, infrastructure and support progress. These states have taken different stances on Africa, both in terms of the goals pursued and the means used. Military support, humanitarian aid, foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade agreements are the most prominent forms of interaction by which emerging powers engage the continent.

China has become the most prominent non-Western emerging power on the continent. Through various trade agreements and historical links to the continent, which include China never having colonized Africa and sharing ties to communism, China has become more widely accepted in Africa than many Western states. In its path to developing diplomatic relations with Africa, China has successfully created diplomatic ties with fifty-one of the continent’s fifty-four states. Its growing influence on the continent, towards the development of South-South cooperation, includes trade, infrastructural development, knowledge transfer, FDI and aid across Africa and it has subsequently become Africa’s largest trading partner.

Sino-African relations have been praised for their efforts towards African development, peace-building and strong diplomatic relations. These relations have also been widely criticized as attempts at neo-colonialism, exploitation of weaker states and providing arms to states and non-state actors who have misused these weapons to fuel African conflicts. Therefore, further study is required into the supply of arms by China to known authoritarian regimes and providing direct military support to states like Sudan, South Sudan, Libya and Zimbabwe, which have all been known to commit varying degrees of violent human rights abuses.

Emerging powers are bringing financial capital, new models of development, technology and diplomacy to the continent, but sometimes these investments have a detrimental effect on the stability and propagation of peace and security. In providing arms and military support to Africa in exchange for resources, does China see a partner, a market opportunity, or a fragile geopolitical space in which it can leverage its growing influence? Assessing these dynamic are crucial to developing and understanding Africa’s growing importance in the global supply chain, its growing relevance as a market, and in analysing the intentions and consequences of its emerging powers, and whether African states are being exploited for their mineral wealth at the cost of expanding their military capabilities.
To understand the potential effects of providing arms and military supplies to Africa and to argue for and contribute to the better control of arms flow to Africa, it is necessary to know that arms should be acquired for genuine security purposes, such as self-defence, to maintain internal security or to be able to participate in international peace operations. The decision to buy arms should be based on an adequate threat assessment and should not contribute to destabilizing the region. The arms supplied must be suited for the envisioned tasks and they must represent their value for money. A key challenge to understanding the motives for and effects of arms procurement in Africa is the supplier and recipient state’s lack of transparency, which presents an obstacle to meaningful debate about how a state’s military needs should be taken into account in discussions about arms control in the region (SIPRI, 2011).

In certain African states, the controversial trade in arms and the transfer of military knowledge from China to Africa can be seen as detrimental to the development of peace and stability among African states, of which many have a tendency towards resorting to violence as a means of maintaining and gaining power. This will be demonstrated in a case study on South Sudan, which has been selected as a case study due to its turbulent political nature both before and after its secession from Sudan in 2011, as well as its relationship with China, and therefore, provides this study with a platform to test theories of human security, gender relations and how they are affected by the African arms trade in a single region. These African states are often politically and economically fragile, having either young democracies, dictatorships or being traditionally inclined towards utilizing their military capability as a means of oppressing their populations and waging war against other African states. The consequences of providing military support to African states are that, rather than utilizing these capabilities defensively and even rationally, these states may resort to the misuse of their increased military capacity to further destabilize the region and render the ongoing efforts to introduce peace, stability and democracy to the region ineffective (SIPRI, 2011).

China has been criticised regarding their apparent lack of discrimination in trading arms to authoritarian regimes which use these weapons maliciously, rather than solely trading these weapons for peaceful purposes in order to support peacekeeping missions and security diplomacy, which promotes peace and stability in Africa. The use of a case study on South Sudan as a later chapter documents the relationship between small arms supplied by China how it affects issues of human security in an African state.
This research examines the relationship that China’s arms transfers to Africa have with issues of gendered African human security, by specifically looking at the effects that the increasing supply of arms and weaponry provided by China, has on African violent conflicts in the region. Many of these conflicts are fuelled by the availability of weapons in order to wage wars over natural resources, territorial disputes, political interests, religion and issues of ethnicity.

1.3. Research problem and rationale

Women in Africa face numerous threats to their individual security. The most salient threat is gender based violence, which increases in times of violent conflict. Whilst this is a globally occurring phenomenon, African women are additionally exposed to threats that include sexual slavery, mass rape, and economic pressures that place them in dangerous situations, and being displaced as refugees (Kirsten, 2007). As psychological and economic tensions rise in African households during conflict, the number of cases of armed domestic violence also increases, placing the lives of women in danger in their own homes (Farr, 2006). Armed groups in African conflicts have also been reported to have specifically targeted women, raping, enslaving, torturing and murdering them as a tactic of warfare (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2009). There is a distinct lack of human security for women in these situations.

The predominance of patriarchal society in Africa has reduced women to being seen as weak and treated subordinately by the men of these societies. In many cases when women report an injustice against them, including rape and domestic violence, they are themselves either prosecuted for disobedience, or the perpetrator of these crimes is given a minor sentence or fine as punishment. This has led to violence against women becoming a cultural norm in some of these societies, where community elders and even state leaders condone gender based violence. In many African societies, the lack of justice that African women receive for wrong doing against them has allowed men to believe that they may rape, abuse or oppress women with impunity (HSBA, 2012b).

The stigma attached to African women for reporting cases of gender violence against them have led to low numbers of women who are willing to report these crimes. Their communities and families may shun them for reporting these crimes, believing that it is these women who have brought shame upon themselves and their families, rather than being the victims of horrific experiences that were forced upon them.
During conflicts, the economic burdens that women face increase as male casualties of armed violence leave their widows behind to lead their households and support their families both domestically and financially. This cycle is often passed on to the daughters of these families, barring them from later access to education and further forcing them into a role of being subordinate to male figures. This subordination manifests through limited economic opportunities, and forced marriages out of the families financial necessity (Pytlak, 2010).

African women are also limited in the quality of healthcare available to them, especially in times of conflict, when access to health facilities may be lost or when they cannot afford the costs of necessary healthcare. These situations affect entire families, as the risk of disease increases, or when they are forced to leave their homes. Conflict in Africa has displaced thousands of non-combatants, especially women, children and the elderly who are forced to leave their homes in search of safer areas (Mogire, 2004).

Migrating refugees are at risk of being targeted by armed groups, being forced in sexual slavery, raped, robbed of their possessions or caught in the cross-fire of warring factions. Once these refugees have reached areas of 'safety', they are often at risk from the same factors that primarily caused them to flee (HSBA, 2012a). Gender violence and violent crime in and around refugee camps is often linked to the fact that women in these camps are widowed, vulnerable and forced to leave their make-shift homes among other refugees in search of work, which includes looking for firewood, water and food (Le Billion and Spiegel, 2009).

In the majority of these situations policing, protective and legal services in African states during conflict are nearly non-existent. This leaves women especially vulnerable to being abused and oppressed by armed men, who are nearly guaranteed to be left unpunished. These human security issues need to be addressed if women are to prosper in African societies (HSBA, 2012b).

Further research into the most salient threats to the human security of women in Africa, allowed me to make the following observation. I suspect that in South Sudan, violent conflicts in which civilians have been targeted and human rights violations have been committed, have been fuelled by the China-Africa arms trade and the increasing availability of indiscriminately transferred small arms and light weapons. This in turn has negatively affected the lives of African women, children and non-combatants; as well as the development of peace, security and diplomacy (Lindsay, 2015).
China’s has been involved in numerous underhanded arms transfers in Africa, many of which have been to regions that have violently targeted civilians including women and children in order to achieve their political aims. There have been several cases of China having transferred arms to Sudan and South Sudan, shortly after which numerous civilians were killed by government forces (Stohl and Myerscough, 2007). The case of the China-Zimbabwean arms deal in 2008, which was followed by politically motivated violence against civilians (Taylor & Wu, 2013). While these cases are discussed in further detail throughout this research study, it is important to understand upfront how China’s arms trade with Africa potentially affects women’s human security. It is also import to ask why China would continue to supply illegal SALW to certain African states, as in the case of South Sudan; but not to others, where it now focuses its developmental efforts and investments. This can be seen in African states like Angola, Ethiopia, Zambia, Namibia and South Africa, where China has aided in investments, peace-keeping and developmental efforts.

1.4. Research question

Is there evidence that China’s arms trade with Africa fuels violent conflict? What is the relationship between violent conflict and the human security of African women?

1.5. Research aims

The aims of this study are:

- To determine the existence of a relationship between the African arms trade, and more specifically the arms supplied by China to Africa, and the ongoing violent conflicts in Africa due to the availability of arms and weaponry.

- To determine the extent of the gendered influence that the Chinese arms trade in Africa has on African women, children and other non-combatants.

- To use Sudan and South Sudan as the case study in determining the above.

1.6. Contextualization of terminology

The purpose of this section is to clarify what is meant by the following terms in the context of this study:
‘Africa’: The continent as an actor in the global political economy comprised of African states relative to the study and used as a dependent variable and platform to describe the effects that China has on African states in general.

‘Arms and Armaments’: Weaponry and support systems including small arms, but due to limitations on available small arms data acquisition, the term more specifically describes all land, sea and air vehicles and systems that may be used militarily, defensively or offensively.

‘Arms Trade’: The legal trade in weaponry and military support systems between African states and China, when including the mention of illegal arms in the study it will be specifically mentioned.

‘Arms Embargo’: Restrictions preventing the legal trade of arms, placed on African states deemed unfit to import arms by the United Nations and specified other institutions, which are in place to prevent human rights abuses and the misuse of military technology in these states.

‘Bilateral Relationship’: The relationship between two states, in this case the relationship between China and a specified African State.

‘China’: This refers to the government, or Peoples Republic of China as an actor in the study.

‘Emerging Powers’: States foreign to Africa that have substantial African interests and have developed relations with a number of African states, these states are considered important to African development and attained a measure of inter-dependence with specific African States. This refers specifically to China for the purpose of this study.

‘Gender based violence’: Any physical, sexual or mental harm or suffering to women, including sexual harassment, rape, threats, coercion or the arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.

‘Gender Relations’: The power dynamics between men and women, where men are most often in positions of dominance.

‘Military Capability’: This refers to the military capacity and capability in terms of personnel and arms that affect the states capacity to defend itself, wage war or be used in any military act of conflict by a sovereign African state.
‘Military Support’: The training of personnel, supply of arms, supply of currency for the production or purpose of increasing arms and the military capability of an African state by an emerging power in Africa and more specifically by China.

‘Natural Resources’: This refers to any natural minerals, fuels, energy or other naturally occurring commodities in Africa that are exported to emerging powers, or imported by African states in order to facilitate trade and development.

‘Small arms and light weapons (SALW)’: These are Individual-use weapons, including all types of rifles, handguns, grenades, grenade launchers, machine guns and portable anti-vehicle weapons systems.

‘South-South Cooperation’: The unofficial agreement between developing states towards cooperation and the promotion of peace and security, traditionally more to the South as opposed to the Northern more developed states. In this study this specifically refers to China-Africa relations. The term is an alternative to the West-East bloc of the Cold War era.

1.7. Significance of the research

The significance of this study is in the possibility of understanding the relationship between China’s roles in the African arms trade on human security.

While China has done much to improve its public image and construct its identity as a partner and pillar of support in Africa and the global community, there remains much criticism and a sense of distrust towards China as an emerging power and its role in Africa.

I feel that it is important to further the available research on a heated issue that is brought up often in debates, but has little factual information available; namely China’s role in the African arms trade and its effects on the lives of African women.

1.8. Theoretical framework

As realism and its state-centric focus have become less effective at providing explanations to issues that are not typically confined to the borders of a state, there has been a shift in focus from realism and its traditional views on national security issues, towards non-traditional
concepts such as human security, which focuses on protecting the lives of individuals within societies.

Human security theory emerged as a means to consolidate the concept of individual protection, human rights and the welfare of these individuals as an instrument for the advancement of international society. This concept changes the traditions of state-centric security, a system of exclusive focus on the national interests and the security of the state, security through armaments and territorial security; to focus on the security of people, security through human development and security of food, employment and the environment (Khong & MacFarlane, 2006).

The emergence of the concept of human security changed the focus of security policies to development, it facilitated the transition of production that is focuses on defence to civilian manufacturing, and it encouraged the process of SALW disarmament in developing states, instead allowing these states to focus on the development of new alliances and peaceful relations; all with the primary objective of preventing conflict (Khong & MacFarlane, 2006).

This study is therefore, theoretically grounded in both Feminism and Human Security theory and this theoretical framework draws from both of these fields towards a feminist perspective of human security theory.

In order to place limitations on the existing and interrelated issues of small arms proliferation, security and its effects on gender, it can be more easily categorized as a human security issue. By doing so I am able to include the various perspectives of human rights, social development and peace building in this research (Farr, Myrntinen & Schnabel, 2010).

According to Hudson (2005) feminism in international relations refers to both the theory and practice of transforming the unequal power relationships between women and men. She goes on to state that it is not only an intellectual transfer of knowledge but rather that feminism takes into consideration the actions of women’s movements and the experiences born of their struggle towards equality in masculine dominated societies. In terms of human security, a redefinition of power would enhance the security of women and men who are threatened by conventional security approaches (Hudson, 2005).

The issue with only using feminist theory to describe issues of human security is that to represent women as a universal group conceals important differences found between cultures and societies where women face different daily challenges and security requirements. The
security needs of women in first world states and those in the developing world, and more specifically women in African states in conflict, are so different that to universally group women into a single category as some feminist theories do, would be to marginalize the specific groups of women focused upon in this study, women facing the effects of armed conflict in African states.

As a response to the tendencies of scholars and social movements to universalize the experiences of women, African women have begun to develop and assert their own theories of both feminism and human security in order to underline the differences between the struggles that women in the developing world face as opposed to those in developed states. In order to make sense of African human security issues using a gender perspective, we need to focus on the unique and specific set of variables presented to us by African feminism (Hudson, 2005).

Human security acknowledges the differences in the degree that the state protects and empowers individuals. A feminist perspective on human security can allow more critical interpretations of security discourse to take place. It allows for more accurate feedback on the events taking place, by expanding upon conventional human security discourses through the inclusion of feminist ideals and the inclusion of the experiences of women as individuals in the states in which they face security challenges.

According to Forester (2012), a feminist based perspective of human security is more effective to resolve existing security issues because of the innate feminist devotion to ending social inequality, especially when observing the social and gender imbalances traditionally found in security studies and the practical application of security (Forester, 2012).

Conventional notions of security focus on bolstering hard power through increasing military capacity and their capabilities, utilizing these forces to secure territorial boundaries, oppress dissidents or otherwise forcibly control the populations of African states. The application of a gender perspective to human security allows for alternative security discourse by considering the humanitarian effects of hard power decisions on the lives of the individual, regardless of their ethnicity, age or gender.

State centric definitions of security have been criticized as too limited as they neglect to include individual level experiences of those facing security threats. A state is often secure from interstate conflict; however certain groups within the population of the state may be at
risk from ongoing conflict that conventional security studies fail to observe. A gender perspective further focuses on the quality of life of marginalized groups, and especially the lives of women in states who live in constant fear of ongoing interstate conflict in many African regions.

Militarism and masculinity are directly linked to the well-being of women and other marginalized groups within the state. The continued emphasis on security and increasing military capacity results in imbalances of power between women and men, where men are defined by their willingness to go to war and offer protection, whilst women are relegated to support roles and defined as needing protection (Hudson, 2005).

Literature on feminist human security includes more than the difference between genders, it focuses on social divides between race, ethnicity and the level of power between individuals and the security threats faced by these different groups. A common misconception is that feminism is an anti-male school of thought; instead it recognizes that the term gender includes the relationship between men and women. It also acknowledges that men and women have different positions in society, devised by an overwhelmingly patriarchal system which often leaves women under represented. This failure to represent the ideas and perspective of women has left practical applications of security severely limited in their potential to prevent and avoid security threats as the source of these threats at an interstate level are often overlooked in conventional approaches.

Feminist perspectives analyse the various levels of human security through the use of social identifiers which include gender, race, ethnicity and class. The information gained through the experience of individuals facing daily threats to their security can potentially provide alternate solutions to conflict that would not be gained by the conventional disregard for variable humanitarian concerns in ongoing conflict zones.

The United Nations Development Programmes (UNDP) concept of human security moves away from the traditionally state centric focus of security and rather focuses on individual level issues faced by people living in conflict areas. The corresponding report on human security (UNDP, 1994), distinguishes contemporary threats to human security as economic, food, health, society, political, environmental and personal. The problem with using the variable in the report as a theoretical framework is that they are too broad; they cover everything human security related, but only to the point of being of general use to any particular case study.
Alkire (2003) defines human security as being focused on protecting human lives from critical threats in a way that will not disrupt human long term fulfilment. However, she does not provide a particular framework within which to apply this definition. What is missing is a feminist based definition of human security that focuses on gender, ethnicity, race and class struggles within society (Alkire, 2003).

Hudson (2005) argues that feminist scholarship is derived from the experiences of women who have faced and lived through injustices, and therefore, security differences based on race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender and class within society. It is because of these ongoing injustices that a gender perspective on human security needs to include these factors.

In 2000, the UN adopted Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. Resolution 1325 emphasizes the importance of the role of women in conflict prevention and that the inclusion of women in peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid operations and in post-conflict reconstruction and conflict resolution can increase the success and viability of these operations towards creating and maintaining peace, gender equality and security. It also requests that states in conflict take special measures to protect girls and women from gender based violence, rape, sexual abuse and enslavement, especially during armed conflict (UNSC, 2000).

A feminist based definition and perspective on human security is that human security ensures the survival, protection and existence of individuals, the stability of these factors and a guarantee to their well-being through analysing and preventing critical threats to these individuals, across gender, racial, class and ethnical divides. It is therefore, this definition that is most important to the theoretical framework used in this study to guide and limit discourse on the effects of the China - African arms trade on women in Africa.

1.9. Research design and methodology

The nature of my research for this study will primarily be descriptive in that it provides a detailed account of China’s role in the African arms trade as well as ongoing conflicts in Africa that have “benefit” from this trade over a specific time period.

It is exploratory in that it explores the nature of China’s political economic relations with Africa and the emerging powers’ motives behind the decisions that lead to its interactions in Africa.
It is also partially *explanatory* because it explains their activities and answers the why question of the arms trade in Africa as it looks for the causes and reasons behind these interactions.

### 1.10. Data collection

The method of data collection employed in this study is primarily the analysis of secondary sources. Most of the research has come from the reports of institutions, journals, books and some grey literature. The facts, arguments and opinions that come from these sources will be used to form a coherent argument from the available literature.

It will also contain quantitative analysis from existing statistics as well as ensuring the validity of these facts by cross checking them wherever possible. Due to the limitations provided, it would be a challenging and dangerous undertaking for the researcher to collect primary data and statistics.

Therefore, due to the ever present risk of misinterpreting secondary sources of data, the time span of the study required to complete such an undertaking and the costs involved in the collection of primary quantitative data, the study will rely on specialist institutions in the field such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and others.

An overview of arms acquisitions by governments in the region can be based on information on international transfers of major conventional arms, small arms and light weapons, and other military equipment, and on official data on arms export licenses.

### 1.11. Assumptions

The key assumptions that are made in this study are the following:

- There is ongoing violent conflict in Africa.
- The arms trade in Africa has an ambiguous position, that of peace-keeping and that of exacerbating violent conflict.
- African states play a role in deciding how these weapons are put to use.
- China has the ability to decide whether or not the sales of “arms for resources” are ethical.
• African armed conflicts are responsible for the death and injury of human beings every year, many of them being non-combatants.

1.12. Ethical considerations

The topic of violent conflict, gender violence and the aftermath on non-combatants, as well as the secrecy involved in the global arms trade may prove sensitive to work with. I have ensured avoiding personal mention of those involved in traumatic experiences relating to my research. I have also ensure that only legitimate public data, as provided by institutions such as SIPRI, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and arms export companies that have made their data public, is used.

1.13. Overview of chapters

Chapter 1

This chapter introduces the study by relating background information on China involvement in Africa, including both positive and criticized developments in the past decade and it also details the research problem, aims, methods and predicted objectives of this study.

Chapter 2

This chapter provides a literature review of current known information for the study and a critical analysis of sources and conflicting information. This includes a short background and a contextualization of the research.

Chapter 3

This chapter will examine China’s motives and incentives for supplying arms to African states and explore the ethics behind trading arms for resources, a policy that China and African states have embraced in the past decade. It includes reasons why I chose China as the primary subject of research, Chinese arms companies and their relationship to the state, China’s duplicity in supplying arms and promoting peaceful relations, China’s long term interest in Africa and its domestic gender policies.

Chapter 4
Chapter four focuses on the effects of small arms and light weapons on Gender, these subsections include: the roles of African women in conflict and the realities of gender violence, the specific effects of SALW proliferation on women in conflict, the effects of the presence of SALW on women in the post-conflict aftermath and what women in Africa are doing to resist gender violence at gun-point.

Chapter 5

This chapter focuses on data and findings of previous chapters and applying them to the case study of South Sudan. This includes a background and contextualisation of the situation in South Sudan, the socio – political impact of SALW in South Sudan, China – South Sudan’s oil diplomacy and relations, Chinese small arms proliferation in Sudan and South Sudan, and the gendered effects of SALW in South Sudan.

Chapter 6

This chapter concludes the study by providing the overall findings of this study on the gendered effects of the China-Africa arms trade and how SALW proliferation exacerbates violent conflict in African states.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1. Introduction

The following literature review investigates China’s role in the African arms trade, and its consequential effects on the dynamics of African conflicts. It examines existing literature on the topic and separates it into four categories, Resource Diplomacy, Arms Trade, Accountability and Consequences. The review covers literature that examines the accountability of China as an emerging power in Africa as well as African states with regard to the arms trade, and the consequences of both the arms trade and China’s policies on resource diplomacy.

The literature review intentionally excludes the study of non-arms related trade, economic and structural development efforts undertaken by China in Africa, regional blocs such as BRICS, the AU and regional trade agreements between China and Africa, unless the above is considered relevant to the study, or in certain case studies that have been included to further the understanding of the reader.

The general findings of the review have been extensive, there exists evidence that China has in the past had little regard for humanitarian concerns and that it is more concerned with the economic and political leverage it can acquire in order to further trade. The trade that motivates China is for African natural resources and minerals that China requires for the upkeep of its own economic growth. There are cases where China has the security dynamics of a state in mind when it trades arms; however, according to the literature, the purpose behind the trade is the defence of its own national interests, rather than those of the African state. Other data provides evidence that China will go to any length to acquire the desired resources, including bypassing the laws of states and international law through the provision of arms and military support to states and non-state actors who control the geographic location of its desired resources. The review also reveals that China views each African state individually in its dealings, rather than considering Africa as a single entity. This has a twofold effect; China has little regard for the interlinked geopolitical dynamics of Africa and by focusing on individual relationships it allows China to act differently in its dealings with each state, with little concern to the consequences its actions may have on a neighbouring state or region.


2.2. Resource diplomacy

Taylor (2006) examines the manner in which China seeks to further its resource diplomacy in Africa, and his results have proven that the state will go to extreme lengths in order to achieve these goals. It has traded arms for oil and other resources in the Sudan, where these arms have been used to violate human rights by authoritarian regimes (2006, pp. 949-950). These arms were traded illegally in violation of a UN arms embargo in the Sudan and have contributed negatively to the political stability of the region (2006, p. 952). Taylor argues that China is in an energy race against Western powers to secure oil and trade in other resources, by using political leverage and providing arms and military support to African regimes. The very act of providing arms that are then knowingly used in human rights violations goes against China’s non-interference policies (2006, p. 940).

According to McFarland (2010), who adopts a rational actor theoretical stance on the matter by stating that China has developed diplomatic and trade relations with African states and Sudan in particular because it is solely in their national interests to do so. China faces controversy in its development of African relations with many critics believing that the main driving force behind China’s investment in Africa is for natural resources and thus focuses on a few resource rich countries, and for selling arms to authoritarian regimes in Africa In the last decade China has sold arms to Sudan, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Cameroon, Namibia, Morocco and Algeria, the latter two of which have been the largest legal arms importers on the continent (Beraud-Sudreau, Wezeman & Wezeman, 2011, p. 10).

African states generate the financial capital to purchase arms imports from China with their export of mineral resources that China and other emerging powers have come to depend on. African leaders are willing to resort to extreme measures in an effort to maintain power and such systems become fertile grounds for violence, according to Chabal (2006, p. 4). Driving arms purchases in the continent is Algeria’s long-standing rivalry with Morocco and Uganda’s involvement in South Sudan’s civil war. Cameroon and Nigeria have increased their demand for imported weapons to fuel the ongoing fight against the Islamic fundamentalist group Boko Haram. The involvement of Uganda, Ghana and Kenya in military operations mandated by the African Union (AU) and the UN also contributed to a rise in arms imports.
Taylor (2010) mentions that instead of being centrally planned and controlled, Chinese efforts in Africa are profit-driven efforts that are deeply grounded in pragmatism. China’s projected appearance in Africa represents more opportunities than political challenges to the continent. Based on such findings, the author offers constructive suggestions to the West and the world as to how to engage China in becoming a more positive force for Africa’s development through encouragement rather than criticism and scapegoating of China’s policies on Africa.

Taylor’s constructivist perspective and balanced approach in looking at both the criticisms of China and its merits is a valuable addition to the existing literature that is otherwise heavily dominated by realist thinking. By offering a systematic analysis of China’s policy towards Africa, which covers almost all major aspects of China’s Africa policy that have stirred up international controversy, ranging from oil diplomacy, manufactured products, human rights, to arms sale and peace keeping, Taylor argues that, “the positive effects that China has on Africa outweigh its criticisms and the need to maintain and develop strong economic and political relations with China is a key to overcoming many challenges that face Africa” (Taylor, 2010).

Mahtani (2010) and Chang (2009) argue that the motive behind Chinese arms transfers to Nigeria, Rwanda and Zambia have been an instrument to improve relations in order to ensure China’s access to oil, tin and tantalum in these countries which is in contrast to Large (2008) and Shinn (2008, p. 173) who argue that China’s arms transfers to Sudan and Zimbabwe may be better explained by a desire to strengthen or maintain longstanding military ties than by gaining access to resources. Shinn (2008, p. 161) also highlights China’s provision of arms and military assistance to Tanzania, from which it imports few natural resources, and shows that access to resources cannot be China’s only motive for supplying arms to Africa.

Luo and Zhang (2011) assess the current situation of China’s multilateral cooperation with African and Western states for the promotion of peace and development. They make strong recommendations on what the Chinese government should do in order to develop strong relations with Africa and African regional organizations such as the AU. However, it becomes clear that these policies are not yet being correctly implemented and that in order for the development of peace, security and stability to take place in Africa, through multilateral cooperation, China needs to develop a better strategy when dealing with Western emerging
powers as well as in its policies of providing the aid required by African states for the
development of security in Africa.

Campbell (2007) demonstrates that China has set itself apart from the West as not having
historically colonized Africa, which allows it to gain the trust of African states over the West.
At the same time it extracts mineral resources from Africa as a colonial power would have,
for trade in arms and military support. China identifies with African states in political
struggles and provides them with the required support that they need in order to gain political
leverage.

Corkin (2014) uses a sample of two hundred interviews on Chinese, African and Western
interests regarding the relationship between China and Africa. She concludes that China
favours more gradual diplomatic policies in Africa over Western “shock-therapy” policies
and that China’s developmental success is more easily related to by African states, who find
China’s diplomatic strategies more appealing than Western ones. The fact that China has no
prior identity as a colonizer in Africa and shares similar national interests to many African
states, allows African elites to accept Chinese diplomacy over those of the West (2014, p.
65). This general acceptance of Chinese diplomacy is present regardless of China’s
occasionally “shady” dealings with many African states, in which the African state as a
recipient is fully aware and as guilty as China in facilitating these trades, usually in terms of
arms-for-energy.

Firsing and Williams (2013) place the emphasis of their article on the dynamics of Chinese
diplomacy. They mention that China utilizes its military in assisting UN peacekeeping
operations in Africa, and that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has thwarted efforts
against pirates and naval threats, protecting Chinese ships off the coast of Africa and rescuing
captured vessels (2013, p. 90) According to the authors, China has focused its peacekeeping
efforts towards building better defence relationships with Uganda and Ethiopia, in attempts to
bring stability to the region and consolidate trade and resource security in the region. The
authors fail to mention that China was supplying both Ethiopia and Eritrea with arms during
their border war in order to secure resources and political leverage. The article includes
defence initiatives undertaken by China in Angola and Zimbabwe, mentioning specifically
the length China would go to secure resources and strengthen diplomatic relations (2013, p.
91). The relationship between Sudan and China is where the article differentiates from US
relations with African states, the US holding its stance that the Sudan has been implicated in
terrorist activities, while China maintains its defence alliances with the state. The authors go on to describe China’s involvement with UN peacekeeping operations as increasingly important. As of 2012, China is the 15th largest contributor to these operations in Africa. China has developed peacekeeping training and support centres and has provided bilateral military training to various African states over the past decade.

Criticisms from the West on China’s involvement in trading arms to authoritarian regimes like those of Zimbabwe, Sudan and Libya are found in most of the literature, however, Firsing and Williams argue that there is little criticism of US resource diplomacy, intelligence and military operations which have cooperated with the same regimes in the past, in a similar manner (2013, p. 96).

### 2.3. Arms trade in Africa

Multi-lateral frameworks on SALW in Africa include the endorsement of the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) in cases where land-mines have claimed the lives of women and children, often long after conflicts have ended. The Bamako Declaration (2000) on an African Common Position on the Circulation and Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, which most African member states signed, the Nairobi Declaration (2000) and Nairobi Protocol (2004) against the illegal proliferation of small arms, as well as prevention, control and reduction methods between certain African states. There is also the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons (2006) which aimed to reduce violence from SALW and implemented a monitoring mechanism to determine how efficient the new protocols were within the ECOWAS sub-region.

According to Taylor and Wu (2013, p. 58) between 2006 and 2010, China was Africa’s largest arms supplier, China alone accounted for 25 percent of African arms trade. More specifically small arms have proven a key element in the destabilization of African polities, contributing to crime and disorder as well as facilitating political violence (2013, p. 460). This is in alignment with the results of Beraud-Sudreau, Wezeman and Wezeman (2011, p. 8) provided in their policy paper, *Arms Flow to Sub-Saharan Africa*. The researchers at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), a prominent source for African arms trade data, argue that arms procured from abroad play an important, but ambiguous role in the peace and security of Africa. In some cases the arms trade exacerbates the many conflicts across the continent and in others these weapons are used legitimately for the
purpose of defence or in multilateral peace operations. The analysis states that China is the largest supplier of arms to Africa. They argue that the motives for the supply of these weapons is for direct financial gain as well as in gaining political leverage in Africa in order to gain access to resources and to further the security of their suppliers. It must be noted that the report does not specify whether these suppliers are governments or private organizations.

China has been criticized for its involvement in Sudan and the role it has played has been seen as detrimental to development of diplomacy in the region. Taylor (2004a, pp. 95-96) mentions that China’s role in the Sudan has further exacerbated the conflict by providing arms and financing the civil war in order to gain access to Sudanese oil. The funding and support gained from China have been used to wage ongoing violence against both rebel forces and civilians by the government. This is in accordance to the research of Shin and Eisenman (2005), who emphasize that China’s trade in arms and military support to countries besides the Sudan, such as Eritrea and Ethiopia in exchange for resources. China’s drive for resources undermines the diplomatic relations that are being constructed to develop peace and bring stability to African states.

Boutwell (1999) highlights the effects of the African arms trade in detail from its exacerbation of African conflicts to the use of child soldiers in African states and the negative effect that the large flow of unemployed, ex-combatants has on the stability of a state. He describes the reasoning behind and success rates of various weapons destruction programs in Africa. The article links small arms proliferation to threats against aid workers, and mentions that the illegal small arms trade is fuelled by mineral trade in diamonds and other means by giving examples in Angola, Liberia and the DRC. He concludes that the actions taken have not been sufficient to curb the light weapons trade; however, action is being taken in an attempt to address the issues. Wyatt (2001) agrees that not enough has been done to address the issues of the arms trade, arguing the dangers of the small arms trade by mentioning that small arms are responsible for most of the casualties faced in conflict situations and that it is important to make progress in the control of small arms imports in conflict ridden regions because the availability of these weapons increases the likelihood that they will be used violently, rather than as a means of peacekeeping. The author emphasizes that arms are not inherently dangerous themselves but rather it is their potentially abusive and violent use in the hands of those responsible for waging conflict in order to achieve political goals and consolidate power.
Boutwell (1999) also states that the problem with controlling arms proliferation is further exacerbated by various African states that violate the arms embargoes by supplying weaponry to rebel groups in other states as well as encouraging the strong financial and political incentives motivate governments and black markets behind fuelling civil wars with weaponry. Moore (2010) places further emphasis on the violation of arms embargoes, by agreeing that states which violate arms embargoes do so because of the unique benefits involved. These benefits, like those mentioned by Boutwell, include political leverage within the embargoed state, profitability from the arms transfers and the development of strategic relations. The benefits most often outweigh the cost of supplying embargoed states and therefore the closer the political interests of the two states are, the more likely the supplier is to violate the arms embargo. An example of the political leverage seen from violating embargoes is in China’s dealings with the Sudan in which Chinese access to the development of oil in the Sudan was traded for arms and military support with which the Khartoum government supplied its conflicts (2010, p. 597).

Onigbinde (2008) mentions the root causes and effects of the small arms and light weapons trade in West Africa. The underlying source of the arms trade, according to him, are in 80-90 per cent of cases fuelled by state sanctioned arms trading that makes its way to the black market. In some cases African governments fuel the proliferation of illegal arms by supplying rebel groups and other non-state actors with the funding and supplies that they use to purchase illegal weapons. The article highlights the importance of the Economy of West African States (ECOWAS) and its role in controlling and attempting to limit the proliferation of small arms in West Africa, however, membership of ECOWAS is voluntary and the institution faces setbacks in trying to hold its members accountable and prevent further trade and manufacture of small arms in West Africa. Onigbinde explains the importance of civil society’s role in the prevention of smuggling and highlights the role that intergovernmental organizations have played in recovering and destroying illegal arms. He concludes that security sector reforms are not given enough emphasis and that these are of key importance to curbing the small arms and light weapons trade.

Craft and Smaldone (2003) argue that the arms trade is a direct cause and means of fuelling violent political conflict in Africa; however, the evidence used to prove this is somewhat inconsistent. It can safely be established, however, that most conflicts in Africa have almost exclusively been fought with imported weapons, according to Rosh (1990). Maniruzzman (1992) found that arms imports increased the incidence of political violence, coup d’état and
the duration that military rulers lead African states. However, several studies funded by the World Bank omit arms imports as a contributing factor to a variety of African political outcomes, much less the influence that the arms trade has on conflicts (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). This research goes against that of Wang (1998), who studied 35 African states and discovered that although in the short term arms imports contribute to political instability, they reduce the likelihood of coup d’etat in the long run.

2.4. Accountability

According to Vines (2005, p. 359), the proliferation of light weapons and small arms into Africa can only be halted if regional organizations like ECOWAS and their heads of state and subsequent governments fully commit themselves to abiding by legally binding agreements that prevent the illicit import of these weapons and control the use of them diligently. The responsibility falls under the leaders of these organizations to work together to curb the arms trade and use legally proliferated weapons solely for the purpose of peacekeeping and security in their regions, and to be held accountable for their actions if they stray from the agreements.

Researchers at SIPRI report that, the biggest challenge towards the implementation of sustainable peace, security and stability in Africa is in being able to understand and determine, which arms suppliers “provoke, prolong or aggravate violent conflicts and which suppliers contribute to security and stability.” (Beraud-Sudreau, Wezeman & Wezeman, 2011, p. 41) In her conclusion, however, McFarland (2010) provides a contrasting argument that emerging powers should act “in order to bring about sustainable peace, rather than increasing arms sales” suggesting that the arms trade does not in fact play a role in creating sustainable peace but only exacerbates violence in Africa (2010, p. 478.)

Le Billion and Spiegel (2009) analyse the geopolitical tensions surrounding some of China’s most controversial arms alliances in Africa, specifically examining the ethics of resistance to which various actors resort. The article focuses on the geopolitical tensions that the 2008 arms deal between China and Zimbabwe caused, when China attempted to send shipments of arms to the Mugabe regime which was involved in oppressive human rights violations during the states election process. The ship was blockaded by South African dock workers who refused to offload the weapons shipment. Le Billion and Spiegel link the debates on how the event affects diplomacy, arms embargoes, regime violence and Chinese criticisms. They
argue that more stringent diplomatic efforts should have been used to block the arms deal. According to Le Billion and Spiegel (2009, p. 325), “China’s weapons trading provides occasion for rethinking the relationships between violence, complicity responsibility and resistance”. The authors further emphasize that China’s active role in thwarting broader UN arms embargoes has been a serious concern of international advocates for peace (2009, p. 325). According to SIPRI between 1979 and 2007 China has exported more arms to conflict affected states than non-conflict affected states, which means that rather than the actual arms trade, it is China’s list of recipients of arms and military support that is questionable. The majority of these arms deals have been used to fuel political, social and religious based conflicts, rather than for the promotion of peace, security and stability in these regions. Le Billion and Spiegel conclude that China has adopted a discourse in Africa that, “effectively legitimizes human rights abuses and undemocratic practices under the guise of state sovereignty and non-interference” (2009, p. 344).

In 2000, Chinese small arms were exchanged for eight tons of ivory from Zimbabwe, and in 2004, $1 million of ivory was sold by the Mugabe regime to pay for thousands of assault rifles, “in preparation for the next elections”, as well as supplying Zimbabwe with military aircraft, arms, electronics and defence equipment, which the Mugabe regime has been using to oppress and monitor its population. Taylor states that, “[A]s in the instance of Sudan, by facilitating arms sales to Harare, Beijing stands accused of supporting a regime that in turn stands widely accused of human-rights abuses and thus is involved in the perpetuation of political violence” (Taylor & Wu, 2013, p. 468).

Lukhele (2015) examines Chinese accountability in his case studies on the illegal Mozambique timber trade, which is financed through military support and training. This has led to illegal Chinese firms exploiting Mozambique’s natural resources, including timber, in order to satisfy its own demands and has led to environmental and political strife in Mozambique. Lukhele underlines the dangers of short-term profit seeking to diplomatic relations, environmental sustainability, ongoing poverty and political stability in African states (2015, pp. 20-24).

According to Taylor (2013, p. 460) The Iran-Iraq War proved that China was willing to sell arms to both belligerents in an armed conflict, a policy which it has maintained in Africa. China has been accused of arming both Eritrea and Ethiopia during their border war. Chinese corporations dispatched nearly U.S. $1 billion in weapons to both countries. This war went
on to claim as many as 100,000 lives. Taylor (2013, p. 461) quotes Samuel Kim as saying: “China has no principles, only interests, driving its arms sales to the Third World”. One the most important setbacks involving the Chinese arms trade, however, is in the Chinese government’s lack of transparency. China’s energy-for-arms policies are notoriously difficult to pin-point and prove; however, known Chinese arms proliferators are known state owned enterprises that have been linked to providing arms in trade of resources.

Taylor and Wu (2013, p. 468) examine a Human Rights Watch report which claimed that at least thirteen covert shipments of weapons, three of which were in violation of international arms embargoes, were delivered from China to Dar-es-Salaam, their final destinations mislabelled and the weapons disguised as agricultural equipment. A critic mentioned that if the sales were traded legitimately between states, the Chinese would not need to enact such elaborate subterfuge (2013, p. 468).

Manyeruke, Mhandara and Nyemba (2013) debate China’s role in Africa and depict it as being less concerned in Africa’s prosperity and more interested in how to bolster their political leverage and power, in order to gain an economic advantage. This is made clear in the authors’ findings when they present the following:

It comes not as a surprise that China is favoured primarily and clearly for political considerations. The award of economic favours to China in the form of preferential investment contracts can be regarded as a form of political bribery that is part of a strategy to use China to underwrite political survival of political partners in Africa (2013, p. 88).

This statement follows data that examines China’s diplomatic ties to anti-democratic regimes; among the cases mentioned is Zimbabwe, in which the authors claim that China is engaged in a “smart-colonization” campaign in African states. The campaign is considered smart because it uses no coercion and is met with no resistance by African states (2013, pp. 88-89).

On China’s non-interference policy, Manyeruke, Mhandara and Nyemba (2013) state that African states like Guinea, Mali, Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Central African Republic and Sudan are examples of countries that continue to be plagued by varying types of conflicts yet they have all benefitted from Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI). The FDI specifically relevant in these studies are the arms trade, which exacerbates violent conflict in these regions by providing these states and rebel groups with the means to
continue and escalate these conflicts. In Africa, an arms race between states is most often not simply a display of power, these weapons are used offensively to decimate opposition and achieve politically motivated goals. The authors go as far as to say that,

By avoiding human rights censure in dealing with African governments, China is promoting policies and practices that are designed to capture the wealth and resources of Africa for the benefit of a small section of the African society which is politically connected. China is dominating the continent by proxy, or in other words, using the political leadership to implant economic dependence (Manyeruke, Mhandara & Nyemba, 2013, p. 92).

The authors explain the current situation perfectly, one in which a few African elites enjoy the benefits of a China-Africa relationship, while China exploits Africa’s wealth of resources and often repays the state with arms, used to further consolidate their entrenched regimes. This trade creates a dependency of African states on China for financial and political gain; however it is China that truly gains from this trade. The authors conclude that although they risk oversimplifying the relationship, China’s current economic offensive in Africa eloquently illustrates the evolution towards a form of economic colonialism (2013, pp. 95-96).

2.5. Consequences

Case studies have shown that suppliers of small arms, light weapons (SALW) and major arms play a role in armed conflict in Africa and that even volumes of relatively small quantities of older weapons can have a notable impact on conflicts. The uncertainty about the effects of arms transfers to conflict areas in sub-Saharan Africa is reflected in the experience of 2006 to 2010 in Sudan of rebel forces acquiring substantial volumes of SALW from abroad, however, researchers argue that it is difficult to make an accurate assessment of the total volumes of small arms involved (Lewis, 2009, p. 22). It is also important to note that most African countries are fully dependent on arms imports, with South Africa being the only exception (Beraud-Sudreau, Wezeman & Wezeman, 2011, p. 13).

It is widely assumed that under certain circumstances there is a risk that arms suppliers may provoke, prolong or exacerbate violent conflict. This assumption is reflected in the use of arms embargoes and other restrictions on arms exports as a conflict management tool by the United Nations, other multilateral organizations and individual countries. The SIPRI analysis
details how rebel groups and illegal arms are transferred and imported by suppliers in Africa (Beraud-Sudreau, Wezeman & Wezeman, 2011, pp. 32 – 39).

Stohl (2007) and Myerscough (2007) describe the above by arguing that although China remains within the legal bounds of the laws governing the international arms trade, the illegal flow of arms between African states and those under UNSC arms embargos remain a critical threat to the stability of the continent. An example of this illegal trade is that China provides arms to South-Sudan, which is not under an arms embargo. However, these arms are then knowingly transferred into the war-torn Darfur region of Sudan which is under UN arms embargo. China, they argue, has continued to supply weapons to Sudan despite the implementation of a UN arms embargo (Stohl and Myerscough, 2007).

As early as 2007 Amnesty International and other human rights organizations alleged that Sudan breeched the UN arms embargo by receiving weapons from China. The report written by Amnesty International was a descriptive account of the human rights violations that occurred at the hands of the Sudanese government and it was a plea for specific countries to stop selling arms to the Sudanese government. Reporting by the Human Rights First organization also indicated that China has sold millions of dollars in weaponry to the Sudan since the institution of the 2004 arms embargo (Amnesty International, 2007).

Hall (2015) discusses the consequences of supplying various African rebel and terrorist organizations with arms by highlighting prior conflicts in Africa and briefly discussing the causes behind each conflict. The article accurately labels these armed conflicts as being politically involved and that the proliferation of illegal arms is the reason that rebel and terrorist groups can continue fighting. Eavis (1999) examines 49 African conflicts that have occurred since 1990 and the data presented attribute up to ninety percent of casualties in conflicts and crime related incidents in Africa to the use of small arms and light weapons due to their mobility, affordability and accessibility. According to Eavis, the small arms trade results in African cultures steeped in violence as the demand for light weapons increases, for defensive purposes and other.

In his assessment of the Chinese development approach as an African trading partner, which is slanted towards the building of a strong partnership between the two entities, Schierre (2010, p. 617) explains that civil wars have not only resulted in the loss of economic growth opportunities in Africa, but also led to the circulation of small arms over porous borders and the spread of instability across the African region. However, he fails to mention that China
has been a prominent factor in the financing of regimes that have resorted to civil wars as well as trading in arms that have further fuelled these conflicts.

Africa is home to 26.7 percent of the world’s violent conflicts that weapons purchases divert much needed finance away from development in Africa and that arms are directly linked to an increase in politically motivated violent conflicts. Supplying weaponry to Africa is inherently problematic (Taylor, 2013, p. 457). Amnesty international accused China of being one of the most secretive and irresponsible arms exporters. This is supplemented with examples of China’s weapons sales to the Sudan which led to the “genocide” in the Darfur region. Another important example Taylor (2013) mentions is China’s $200 million arms deal between China and Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in Libya in 2011 even while China was establishing diplomatic relations with the post-Gaddafi National Transitional Council. The importance of the Sino-African arms trade, is not in the volume of arms, but rather the consequences and destination: “Even a relatively small amount of weapons can have important impacts on peace and security in Africa, contributing to political violence in a way that is out of proportion to their numbers or notational monetary value” (Taylor, 2013, p. 457; also mentioned by Lewis, 2009).

Muggah, Pinto and Sharma (2011) make use of an vector-agent-host-environment model, much akin to that used to evaluate and control epidemic viral outbreaks, in order to make a contribution to finding a solution to the small arms and light weapons trade, which the authors claim is responsible for over sixty percent of intentional violent fatalities. The article rephrases the arms trade as a health issue. The authors find a definite link between increased violence and the presence of arms, as well as stating that war-related violence resulted in the violent deaths of approximately 55,000 combatants and civilians per year between 2004 and 2009 and that armed violence also results in the deterioration of the quality and quantity of healthcare services available and reduces access to educational facilities. This is due in part to the collapse of public infrastructure and displaced populations fleeing armed conflict, it is estimated an additional 200,000 people die each year as a result of preventable illness and disease because of the lack of health care available to them during violent conflicts (2011, pp. 112-113). The authors do a breakdown of each factor of the arms trade and making suggestions as to how the problem can be rectified (2011, pp. 116-121). The article succeeds in providing a unique perspective on the situation as well as achieving a three-fold goal using their unorthodox but intriguing method of analysis. They firstly prove that small arms and
light weapons can be viewed as a health problem, thereby secondly, gaining a broader field of support based on the fact that in the past, health care professionals have had a major influence over the arms trade and types of weapons considered legal and justifiable in a combat situation. Finally their analysis singles out the arms industry, which places both international attention and pressure on arms suppliers and manufacturers (Muggah, Pinto & Sharma. 2011).

Carmody and Taylor (2010) suggest that China utilizes strategic leverage and pressure points in their dealings with Africa. This is explained in terms of its soft power strategies to gain resources, as well as its construction of arms factories and trading arms to support authoritarian regimes. The authors mention that by keeping authoritarian regimes authoritarian, they ensure that they keep these states diplomatically and strategically close to the Chinese. This allows China to stand as an alternative global power point in Africa, which is attractive to African states whose historical interactions with Western powers have included colonialism and exploitation.

Smaldone (2002) presents empirical research that strongly supports a broad conceptualization of armed conflict in Africa and addresses a critical gap in the literature on the arms trade and war. The research presented finds that arms transfers are significant and positive predictors of increased probability of war. Smaldone supports the view that weapons acquisitions are necessary for a dispute to escalate into war, and that meaningful restraint by suppliers and recipients alike is needed to break the bond between arms and conflict in Africa (2002, p. 693).

According to Karp (1994:96), arms transfer recipients are more likely to become involved in war than in a hypothetical scenario typified by no weapons imports. Schrodt (1983) studied the relationship between arms transfers and political events in East Africa between 1948 and 1978, finding that the arms transfers resulted in negative changes in recipient's military and political conflict and cooperative behaviour. Craft's (1999) study revealed a positive relationship between arms imports and conflict involvement. His models tested propositions on a sample of 16 countries, between 1950 and 1992, were able to correctly predict about 73% of all the cases included.
2.6. Chapter summary

The material reviewed in this study focuses on the security dynamics of Sino-African relations and specifically the effects that China’s actions have on the dynamics of African conflicts. The study takes into account, using the data provided, the assumption that the increasing availability of arms in unstable regions increases the likelihood of violent confrontations. This theory is a topic in itself that requires further study, as the availability of information is limited and the existence of contested academic opinions of its accuracy has sparked much debate. Some studies have found little evidence to explicitly prove the theory. Others have found overwhelming proof that the increased trade in arms exacerbates violent conflicts in unstable regions. This study does not serve to consolidate either opinion; however, it must be accepted that because China has illicitly traded arms to states facing a UN arms embargo as well as other states actively involved in conflicts, China has provided these states with the means to further their political, social or religious agendas, and it is therefore justifiable that the study includes this assumption.

The literature has provided invaluable insight into the China – African arms trade and the effects it has on conflicts in various regions in Africa. From the sources reviewed various points can be made with regard to the feasibility of further studying the topic. The review has found overwhelming evidence that China has provided weapons to African states which have used these weapons in violation of human rights and to fuel politically motivated conflicts. Reputable sources have linked the arms trade to an increase in violent conflict across Africa, therefore China’s role in the African arms trade can be considered detrimental to the security and stability of African states, especially when considering the manner of conduct and subterfuge used to mask the destinations and purpose of the weapons.

The authors suggest that China has little regard for humanitarian concerns and that it is more concerned with the trade and political leverage it can acquire in order to further trade. The trade that motivates China is for the natural and energy resources and minerals that China requires for the upkeep of its own economic growth. The literature has revealed a number of cases where China has traded weapons in return for resources, which gain China political leverage and an economic advantage in the recipient states. Some of the articles have explained that it is difficult to pin-point exactly what the weapons are used for, however, in cases like the 2008 Zimbabwe elections it can be simplified by reports following the arms deal.
There are cases where China has the security dynamics of a state in mind when it trades in arms; however the purpose behind the trade is the defence of its own national interests, rather than those of the African state. Other data provides evidence that China will go to any length to acquire the desired resources, including bypassing the laws of states and international law through the provision of arms and military support to states and non-state actors who control the geographic location of its desired resources. The review also reveals that China views each African state individually in its dealings, rather than considering Africa as a single entity. This has a twofold effect, China has little regard for the interlinked geopolitical dynamics of Africa, rather by focusing on individual relations, and it allows China to act differently in its dealings with each state, with little concern to the consequences its actions may have on a neighbouring state or region.

When looking at the resource diplomacy initiated by China in African states, the articles generally illustrate realist orientated displays of power on the part of China. This is seen when observing the specifics of its trade agreements in Africa. China holds its own interests above those of other states, and will go to seemingly any length in order to ensure it achieves these interests. This has included arms deals to both sides in a conflict, the supplying of arms to authoritarian regimes for a wealth of natural resources found in these states and supplying arms to gain political leverage. The fact that China has recently played a larger role in peacekeeping opens up new questions to consider as a possible study. Its motives as to whether it is simply doing so to protect its resource security or whether it involves itself in peacekeeping to legitimately better the humanitarian situation in Africa through the provision of peace and security support, remains unanswered.

Looking at the literature on the arms trade, which seems to be dominated by negative criticisms, it becomes clear that the authors believe that more stringent arms control is necessary and the way to achieve the levels of control needed require the unanimous cooperation of African regional leaders to prevent the proliferation of arms becoming an even more significant threat. It is worth mentioning again that in volatile regions it is not the volume of arms that becomes significant but rather their destinations and possible abuses. In Africa alone, many of the UN arms embargoes have been breached by suppliers and recipients in order to achieve the interests of both supplier and the regime receiving the weapons. This leads to another finding in the literature, regardless of the author’s beliefs as to whether or not the arms trade exacerbates conflict; the arms trade does not provide an answer to ending conflict in Africa. Holding a firearm to a person’s head is not a negotiation, and
therefore peacekeeping forces which have been used extensively across Africa may be a necessary short term solution in certain situations but it is diplomacy that will eventually bring an end to these conflicts.

The literature on accountability shows that China needs to be held accountable for its irresponsible actions in Africa and African leaders need to be held accountable by the international community when receiving arms. The authors emphasize China’s role as an arms supplier as both sly and reckless, trading arms for the resources it requires but without regard to the humanitarian consequences of its arms deals.

China has become one of Africa’s leading developmental partners and provided African states with an alternative and often better option towards economic consolidation which will in turn benefit the state and all of its trading partners if successful. This show of diplomacy and seemingly earnest ‘care’ for the wellbeing of Africa means little when the diplomacy is compromised by reckless arms deals which cost human lives and serve to break down the stability and development efforts of a region. Conflict destroys infrastructure, economy, political credibility and most importantly human lives and reduces human security; all of which are required for a state to prosper. The literature repeatedly mentions China’s non-interference policies; however as a supplier of illegal arms, interference in a state’s internal affairs is a realistic consequence of China’s arms trade.

The consequences of the arms trade in Africa focus on literature that underlines the side effects and real consequences of the China – African arms trade. The findings illustrate the divide between the image and identity that China has built over the last decades and the shady arms deals between China and African states including Zimbabwe, the Sudan, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Libya to mention but a few of the more serious examples. According to the authors, the decisions China has made in the past have negative consequences on humanitarian missions and undermine the efforts made to bring stability, peace and security to the region. Not all of the literature is negative, however, and some authors commend peacekeeping efforts undertaken by China to support African states in their defence against domestic and inter-state threats. However, the field that requires further inquiry is how China’s actions regarding the gendered relationship between the small arms and light weapons trade affects African human security; which will be discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter 3: Small Arms, Light Weapons and China

3.1. Chapter overview

The first section of this chapter focuses on the motive of this study to include China, as opposed to other major emerging powers and international arms traders like Russia and the United States, as the primary focus and research subject for the gendered effects of small arms and light weapons in Africa.

Thereafter, the study reviews the relationship between China as a state entity and Chinese arms trading companies. This is done in order to understand whether Chinese arms traders in African states are acting of their own accord or do these arms deals form a part of the Chinese state’s central planning. This is an important factor to consider due to the nature of the research as well as the human cost of the Sino–African arms trade in African states. If the arms companies are private entities attempting to make profit in Africa, how much control does the Chinese government have over these arms deals, and what can be done to ensure that Chinese SALW are traded responsibly in Africa.

The third section of the chapter examines the duplicity surrounding the Chinese arms trade and Chinese actions. On one side the Chinese have been striving to create a positive public image and are making their presence known as peacekeepers, neutral mediators and developmental partners, however, on the other side they have breached their own policies of non-interference in the case of Sudan as well as through providing SALW to states and non-state actors which have been traded and used illicitly.

The fourth part of this chapter aims to discover the ethical, political and economic motives behind China’s actions in Africa. It would appear that China has long term interests in Africa and African states, however by indirectly encouraging conflict in and between African states, China adds to the instability of these states. If China is in fact interested in long term African interests, it should instead focus on bolstering the stability of these states and this can only be achieved by focusing not only on its own economic interests but the humanitarian interests of Africa as well.

The final section of this chapter outlines important information on China’s domestic gender policies. In order to perceive how China may react to and adjust its arms deals in order to
reduce civilian casualties in African conflicts, and more specifically, reduce gender-based violence fuelled by irresponsible arms deals in Africa, it is important to first determine China’s domestic gender policies.

3.2. China as the primary subject of research

China has become an important emerging power in Africa, its influence has quickly spread across the continent and its interests have broadened from a solely economic perspective to include involvement in the political, military, developmental and economic environments of African states. The role that China plays has become as important, if not more so than that of other emerging powers in African relations, partly due to its immense potential as an economic and developmental partner, peacekeeper and its apparent disregard for many of the fundamental flaws commonly found in African leadership and amongst the elites of African states. Whereas other emerging powers in Africa have been limited in their interactions with these pariah states, China has often chosen to support them and has provided them with the necessary tools to enable them to continue functioning, if not prosper (Taylor, 2010).

Although China is not the largest emerging power in Africa, across the many forms of interaction between the continent and emerging powers, it has been selected for the focus of this study for a number of reasons. China is seen to be unique in its interaction with African states, it has no prior history of colonization, as several European powers do, and at the same time it has never attempted to coerce African states into selecting a side in past conflicts, as was the case of the United States and Russia during the years of the Cold War. The only past interactions between China and many African states were those of China supporting African independence, providing support as a neutral actor, one who sympathized with African states and itself had known the horrors of being influenced by external powers, as experienced during the years that Japan invaded Chinese soil (Campbell, 2007).

Due to not having had a prior reputation of negative consequence, African states are more willing to embrace China’s ambitious interactions with open arms, free of bias and suspicions as to their current intentions. This then leaves much to be researched as to China’s current intentions in Africa, as it continues to provide arms and military support to African states, but at the same time it publically builds up an image of intending to aid in African development of an economic, infrastructural, political and peaceful nature (Corkin, 2014).
The unique challenges posed by the question of China’s actual intentions in Africa are often masked through intriguing public relations reports that fail to explain the actuality of various interactions undertaken by the Chinese. This can be seen in a later case study of South Sudan, where China makes assured claims that no arms will be traded with the state and soon after this announcement, a massive arms deal took place between the Chinese and South Sudan government. There have been a number of cases where elaborate subterfuge has taken place, which leads to the question of why these elaborate measures are needed to disguise certain interactions unless there is something the international community needs to be concerned about (Taylor & Wu, 2013).

Ambiguity plays an enormous role in Sino–African relations, on one hand China has developed a public image of being a developmental partner working towards the betterment of Africa, to strengthen African relations and to ensure stability in the various regions in which China’s interests are situated. On the other hand, irresponsible trading of SALW is seen in numerous underhanded arms deals, in some cases these weapons have later been used to oppress, terrorize and eliminate civilian populations and political opposition (Smaldone, 2002).

Further research is required into the ethics and accountability of these states, and the question needs to be posed about whether or not supplying SALW to these states is at all a rational action undertaken by a state which is concerned with building positive long term relationships with Africa. Long term interests and relationships need to be nurtured carefully in order to maintain them, therefore, supplying weapons to Africa, African states and militant groups, which are later used to assault and oppress African civilians, and potentially destabilize the region; is not a viable means of nurturing a positive long term relationship (Taylor, 2013; Hall, 2015).

China’s interests in Africa, and likewise African interests in China are established with the long term in mind, therefore, this should reflect in all inter–state relations, which include the ethics surrounding the trade of arms to African states under arms embargoes, states which have used arms against civilians in the past and states who are prone to political and ethnic violence. It is important for China to become selective in their arms trading policies to ensure that they do not add to the destabilization of a region, for although it is up to the user of the weapons to decide how and when to use these weapons, it is equally up to the exporter to decide whether the target state is going to use these weapons responsibly or abuse them in
human rights violations and then adjust their arms exporting policies accordingly (Carmody and Taylor, 2010).

As an important emerging actor in Africa, China should reflect the responsibility that comes with this power. Hypothetically, the long term interests of China in Africa will be negatively affected if it continues providing arms to states who misuse them. The African international community is becoming more aware of its surroundings and the importance of the safety and security of its neighbours, the high availability of arms on peace and stability in the regions surrounding these states, as well as the humanitarian costs and consequences that conflict has on development, sustainable peace and stability (Corkin, 2014). In time, China may find that if it continues with its underhanded deals and arms policies, as well as the ruthless exploitation of African resources and notoriously difficult to pin point arms for energy policies, many of its long term interests may begin looking elsewhere for support.

Many critics are quick to judge China’s every action as detrimental to Africa, and just as many supporters quickly jump to defend China’s actions, however, there is a distinct lack of hard facts and therefore, further evidence and a neutral point of view are needed to discover the reality of the current status of the China–African arms trade.

3.3. Chinese arms company’s relationship to the state

China has been criticized for its irresponsible sales of arms to states who have abused these weapons towards political and ethnic objectives, which have led to high civilian casualties but few of these studies look into the relationship between Chinese arms companies and the Chinese state. This is an important consideration to factor into the research, as the ethical consequences of these illicit arms deals have been placed squarely on China, labelling the state entity as the sole cause and motivator of these arms deals. This section serves to delve deeper into the source of these arms deals to African states, in order to be able to separate Chinese arms traders from the state, unless it is discovered that the above are in fact one and the same.

The system that China developed for its arms transfer controls are share similar characteristics to China’s political system. This system maintains an important distinction between administrative regulations and the existing laws within the Chinese legal system. Arms transfers and the system of arms transfer controls are handled exclusively as administrative matters, rather than legal matters. This allows government agencies to control
arms exports conducted by China’s arms trading companies, which are all state owned enterprises (SOE’s).

Due to these SALW controls being defined as administrative matters, the system used to control small arms transfers is permitted to lack transparency, one of China’s SALW proliferations most prominent trademarks. These administrative regulations are not publically available, and while it remains possible to identify the main actors involved in these transfers and controls, it becomes difficult to identify the reasoning, interpersonal networks and internal politics behind the decisions that lead to these transfers (Bromley, Duchâtel & Holtom, 2013).

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Chinese military equipment is used in more than two-thirds of African states. This imported Chinese military equipment is manufactured by state-owned industry and represents government to government agreements between China and Africa, which have been enabled by Chinese loans or as a part of infrastructural development packages (Cowburn, 2016).

According to Amnesty International, China has a long history of supplying arms to African states which have later been used to commit human rights violations. The weapons and munitions manufactured by China have spread across Africa through illicit arms deals and have been found to be used by armed groups and government forces in South Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Darfur region of Sudan (Cowburn, 2016).

In 2012 Chinese-manufactured ammunition was used to commit human rights violations in the Darfur region of Sudan, which was under a United Nations arms embargo. While two separate issues exist in the Sudan region, the first being Sudan’s political turmoil prior to South Sudan’s secession in 2011 and separate issues which occurred after South Sudan’s independence. Amnesty International considered the arms embargo during these time periods ineffective, due to the continued trade in Chinese and Russian arms in the region. The weapons and ammunition were used in targeted and ethnically motivated assaults on civilians, as well as indiscriminate attacks and bombings on civilian settlements, which led to the displacement of tens of thousands of non-combatants from their homes in the region. Since 2012, Chinese state owned companies have continued to supply weapons and munitions to Sudan, despite the knowledge that these weapons have been used against non-combatants including women and children in the western region of Sudan (Amnesty International, 2012).
According to Amnesty International, China has sold arms and munitions to the Sudanese government, knowing that many of these weapons were likely to be used to commit human rights abuses in the region. In order to support this claim, Amnesty International provided evidence that witnesses’ had found bullet casings marked with Chinese arms manufacturers codes dated to indicate that the ammunition had been imported into Sudan after the UN arms embargo had been imposed. It is believed that the continued supply of small arms and light weapons in the region, after the UN arms embargo began, has sustained and exacerbated the conflict and human rights violations reported in Sudan (Amnesty International, 2012).

Amnesty International concludes that there is an urgent need for more effective SALW transfer control policies, which would compel China to halt further weapons transfers in regions where there are high risks of these weapons and munitions being used in human rights violations or war crimes (Amnesty International, 2012).

Although it is not illegal to supply weapons to Khartoum, the capital of the Sudanese government, arms suppliers are required to maintain guarantees that the weapons being supplied will not be used in the Darfur region. For this reason, Amnesty International believes that the UN arms embargo should be extended to the entire region, because these weapons have been transferred and utilized in Darfur. Since 2003, and the implementation of the UN arms embargo, rebel forces took up arms in Darfur against the Sudanese government, who in turn set out to quell the rebellion. The ensuing violence has been considered by activists and Washington analysts to be an ethnic genocide, especially since arms and munitions have been turned indiscriminately against women, children and other non-combatants (Abbas, 2011).

Arms sales from China, Russia and Belarus, have been fuelling human rights violations in Sudan, however, it is believed that more effective arms legislations would compel international arms suppliers to stop transfers of small arms and light weapons into regions that will use them against civilians to commit human rights abuses. Chinese–manufactured small arms have been used by the Darfur SAF and other Sudan Armed Forces backed militia groups in attacks on unarmed women and refugees. During the attack on the 1st December 2011 at the Zam-Zam refugee camp it was reported that Sudan military forces opened fire on refugees previously displaced from their homes in which Chinese manufacturer codes and dates on the munitions indicate the weapons and ammunition used by the SAF put China in breach of the UN arms embargo. This is only one example of Chinese weapons being used in
human rights violations, as was again observed in Southern Kurdufan in 2011 (Amnesty International, 2012).

The United Nations reports that in 2015 that China’s largest state–owned arms manufacturer China North Industries (Norinco) sold SALW and munitions to South Sudan’s government. The South Sudan regime has been accused of committing severe human rights violations, razing entire civilian settlements, burning people alive and raping women and children (UN, 2015).

In 2014, China promised to stop all arms sales to South Sudan after a US$38 million arms deal was uncovered between China and the South Sudanese government. It was later discovered that the state–owned Norinco, was reported to have sold the South Sudan government a further US$20 million worth of missiles, guided missile launchers, grenade launchers and close to 10,000 automatic rifles, along with 24 million rounds of ammunition (Kuo, 2015).

China–South Sudan relations are unique in that China breached its long–standing policy of international political non-interference when its economic interests became affected by South Sudan’s political concerns. The Swiss research group Small Arms Survey reported that a consortium led by Chinese state–owned oil concern, the China National Petroleum Company, is funding Sudanese militia groups to guard oil fields in South Sudan, as China is one of South Sudan’s largest oil importers (Kuo, 2015).

South Sudan has faced one of worst humanitarian crises, according the United Nations, and since its civil war erupted, the Chinese Foreign Ministry has repeatedly called for an end to hostilities. The ambiguity of China’s involvement becomes more relevant with reports that US Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, Donald Booth, reports that he had raised the issue of the arms deal with Chinese officials while in Beijing during July 2014 (Gridneff, 2014).

According to Lan Kun, an attaché at the Chinese embassy in South Sudan in 2014, China had stopped all Norinco weapons being transferred into South Sudan. He alleged that Western media reports have criticized the Chinese government for being responsible for the illicit arms deals in South Sudan and that these reports try to undermine the ongoing peace process with their accusations. Kun went on to claim that these media reports were completely untrue (Gridneff, 2014).
In 2014, Yu Ruilin, the head of the political section at the Chinese embassy in South Sudan, also mentioned that China’s government had asked all relevant Chinese arms exporters to stop trading weapons with South Sudan, and said that the Chinese government maintains its stance on the matter. She claimed that the Chinese government aims to restore peace to South Sudan, and according to both Kun and Ruilin, the embassy was unaware of which Norinco arms shipments had been stopped because the deal for the weapons had been made before the civil war had started in South Sudan (Gridneff, 2014).

International Crisis Group’s South Sudan analyst, Casie Copeland, believes that China’s support in halting arms flows to all belligerents in South Sudan’s civil war is critical to reaching a resolution of the conflict. According to Norinco, however, the Chinese state-owned enterprises observe all international laws and regulations as well as those of the Chinese government, but the Norinco spokesperson later refused to speak about the company’s internal affairs (Gridneff, 2014).

It must be considered that Norinco is a state-owned arms manufacturer and exporter, and while the Chinese embassy staff claims that they had no prior knowledge of the aforementioned arms deals, the Chinese government only halted the arms transfers after it had made international news and China received pressure from the international community. According to Conflict Armament Research’s director of operations, Jonah Leff, China’s decision to halt arms deals with South Sudan is made conveniently after a large shipment of weapons arrived in South Sudan (Gridneff, 2014).

It can be surmised that although Chinese arms exporters are state-owned, according to its public relations staff, the Chinese government apparently has little knowledge of the administrative actions of its state-owned arms manufacturers that conduct China’s arms deals. While these manufacturers are primarily responsible for supplying Chinese SALW to African states and the Chinese also know that certain African states misuse SALW in human rights abuses; the Chinese government shows its lack of both transparency and coherence by using an illogical *argumentum ad ignorantiam* to proclaim its innocence regarding irresponsible arms transfers (Bromley, Duchâtel & Holtom, 2013; Gridneff, 2014).

That China is unaware of the actions of its arms exporters appears to be unlikely for a state that is known for central planning and the degree of control it exerts over its other state-owned concerns, however, this claim serves to indeed conveniently clear the Chinese state from direct accusations of knowingly supplying arms to states who are at substantial risk of
using these armaments to commit human rights violations against women, children and other non-combatants.

3.4. China’s duplicity in supplying arms and promoting peaceful relations

China has defined its role in Africa as that of a developmental partner, a relationship determined by its actions in providing African states with the FDI and support needed to bolster and develop its infrastructure, economy, trade and political stability. China oversees many of these developmental efforts in Africa to ensure that they have the greatest chances of success, that their agreements are met on time and that they make the most of the relationships being developed between the African state and China.

It has often claimed that it aims to better Africa through development and by becoming a partner with African states with South–South cooperation in mind at all times, as well as being one of few emerging powers willing to deal with and support certain African regimes. China’s political non-interference policies have enabled these relationships to prosper through fair trade. These African states provide China with natural and energy resources in return for the aid that these states require of China, which often takes the form of FDI, infrastructural development and other forms of support aimed at bolstering the economy of the African state.

China has claimed that it has been developing long term relationships with African states with the objective of not only being a developmental partner, but also towards bringing peace, security and prosperity to the region. With the development of the Forum on China African Co-operation (FOCAC), China shifted its focus to Africa to provide political support and because of the numerous economic opportunities, the availability of natural resources and the market potential in Africa. Through FOCAC, China officially institutionalized its diplomatic ties with Africa, which revolutionized Sino–African relations across the continent.

The following are examples of cases in which China’s interactions with African states have been beneficial according to public relations reports, but in the same time span there were arms related trades which led to an increase in violent conflict, abuse and oppression against civilians and opposition to the state.

In the case of China-Zimbabwe relations, the most prominent event in the development of stronger relations was the crisis surrounding Zimbabwean land and constitutional reforms,
which began in 2000. The Zimbabwean government implemented its new land acquisition policy in 1997, and following its Fast Track Land Reform Programme in 2000 to 2002, reports of political violence against opposition and civilians by ZANU–PF became widespread. During this time, the West, which included the United States, European Union, United Kingdom and other NATO states, imposed sanctions against Zimbabwe and withdrew their political and economic support initiatives. This provided a unique opportunity for China to strengthen relations with Zimbabwe, and take over as an economic, political and military supporter of the Mugabe regime (Zhang, 2014).

Zimbabwe has faced many political and social economic challenges over the past decade, which, due to its government’s decisions, have compromised the lives of its civilians and eroded both its political credibility and economy. China has been one of few states in the international community to continue supporting the regime, in the wake of US and EU sanctions against the Zimbabwean state for ongoing human rights violations and political violence (Le Billion & Spiegel, 2009).

The effects of these sanctions weighed heavily on Zimbabwe’s ability to prosper, being isolated from the assistance usually provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The crisis of this isolation, unfortunately, affects the general population of the state far more than it directly affects the ruling elites, which led to its being characterized by political instability, weakening infrastructure, and increasing levels of poverty, high unemployment, hyperinflation and economic meltdown (Zhang, 2014).

The reality of these effects is that there is less access to healthcare required by women and mothers, higher child mortality rates, a lack of quality education, high levels of Zimbabwean refugees as well as a “brain drain”, which occurs when educated citizens are forced to leave their home state in order to work elsewhere due to the states native economic and political circumstances being less than ideal.

In 2003, Zimbabwe adopted its “Look East” policy due to ongoing sanctions and a dangerously escalating political and economic situation. With this policy, China–Zimbabwe relations became critical to counter the effects of UN sanctions. China in turn has played an important role in Zimbabwe, but has also been criticized for undermining the efforts of the West to end political violence, human rights violations and oppression. China’s actions in the case of Zimbabwe have been to veto UN Security Council decisions, using its own status as a developing–country to gain political leverage in Zimbabwe, and using its non–interference
policy to provide support to Zimbabwe without taking accountability for the full consequences of these actions (Zhang, 2014).

As China’s relations with Zimbabwe became more economically orientated, China also supported the efforts of regional organizations like the African Union and Southern African Development Community (SADC) in trying to renegotiate Zimbabwe’s position and resolve their ongoing political stalemate (Zhang, 2014).

The military relationship between China and Zimbabwe has been criticized often, especially since most of this relationship is characterized by the arms trade between the two states, specifically transfers of SALW while Zimbabwe has been under UNSC arms embargoes. The events which brought these illicit dealings to light were the An Yue Jiang’s cargo transfer in 2008, in which a ship containing arms and munitions destined for Zimbabwe were to be offloaded in South Africa to be later transported to Zimbabwe (Zhang, 2014).

This cargo was refused to be offloaded by South African dockworkers, as it was feared that the Mugabe regime would later use them against civilians in politically motivated oppression. It had been attempted to keep the shipment quiet in order to draw as little attention to the arms transfer as possible, however, once discovered, this event brought with it a new level of awareness and scrutiny into China-African relations, as China had knowingly supplied the shipment to Zimbabwe, being fully aware that the weapons were to be used in political oppression. Later reports of political violence in Zimbabwe surrounding the elections mention how civilians, including women and children, were targeted in order to ensure that Robert Mugabe was re-elected (Le Billion & Spiegel, 2009).

In the case of South Sudan, where conflict has claimed thousands of lives and displaced more than 1.5 million civilians according to the UN, China has been making its efforts to end the conflict publicly known. In 2014, Chinese Foreign Ministry officials have called for an end to the conflict and Chinese diplomats have been working with the AU and Western states in order to resolve the ongoing conflict. China planned to diplomatically engage the belligerent parties in the conflict, as well as to send additional peacekeepers to contribute to the UN South Sudan mission (Gridneff, 2014).

Whilst both the South Sudan government and rebel forces claim to be interested in ending the conflict through peaceful resolutions, it remains clear that both parties are just as intent on
continuing to destroy one another through violent conflict, and human rights violations against women and civilians (Gridneff, 2014).

A UN report states that all belligerents in the conflict have targeted and assaulted civilians during military operations. Through this targeting of non–combatants, thousands of civilians have lost their lives, been tortured, raped, and maimed. The report also states that children have been targeted and recruited as child soldiers, and are then forced to fight and commit atrocities against both opposing forces and non–combatants. The side effects of this ongoing conflict are that human rights are blatantly ignored, women are raped, murdered and abused and that more than 1.6 million people have been internally displaced. A further 4.6 million South Sudanese are facing food insecurity and the effects of a collapsed economy (Tiezzi, 2015).

At the same time that China attempted to resolve the conflict in 2014, it was selling South Sudan’s government over $38 million of small arms and light weapons. Since the war in South Sudan began, the government has spent over $1 billion on SALW and munitions, even though humanitarian concerns have appealed for $1.3 billion in relief and humanitarian aid to those affected by the conflict. The state is facing a famine and humanitarian crisis, yet continues spending its revenue on arms instead of addressing this crisis, the accountability of arms suppliers needs to be addressed, as they encourage and exacerbate the conflict through their continuing to supply weapons used against civilians including women and children, rather than concentrating on legitimately resolving the conflict (Gridneff, 2014).

China and the South Sudan government went through with the arms deal, regardless of the humanitarian crisis facing South Sudan. Documents from the arms shipment packing lists, gained from Pioneer Insurance and Reinsurance Brokers, who insured the cargo, list 9,574 assault rifles, 2,394 grenade launchers, over 4 million rounds of assault rifle ammunition, 2 million rounds of pistol ammunition, 319 machine guns, 660 pistols, 20,000 rounds of antipersonnel grenades and around 4,000 rounds of hi–explosive anti-tank rockets. Another packing list details a further $14.5 million worth of anti–tank missiles and weapons (Gridneff, 2014).

There was no arms embargo against South Sudan during these arms deals, and to trade these weapons is by no means illegal, however, the consequences of these arms sales on South Sudan’s women, children and non–combatants has been devastating. The Chinese knowingly
supplied arms to South Sudan even though reports of human rights violations were public knowledge at the time1 (Tiezzi, 2015).

According to the UN report on the crisis, the supply of SALW to the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition, and other rebel forces, have been a major factor in prolonging and exacerbating the conflict. Even though UNSC sanctions have been proposed continually against South Sudan, these have been vetoed, due to civilians suffering further under the effects of sanctions than the ruling elites (Tiezzi, 2015).

3.5. China’s long term interest in Africa

Analysts on China–Africa relations constantly question China’s intentions and long–term goals in Africa. China is in a unique position in that it is both a developing and developed state, which gives it an advantage in achieving its political, economic and diplomatic interests. China’s foreign policies and political-economic interactions show that it is focused on developing its position in the international community as a leader and partner in achieving its strategic goals, especially in Africa.

China’s current African foreign policies represent bold, forward–looking initiatives which are inspired by its long term strategic objectives. Through its position as a leading emerging power in Africa, and having gained the political and economic support of a coalition of African states, China has strengthened its position on the UN Security Council, gaining leverage among other international institutions and being in the position to prevent African states being disregarded in decisions made by the UNSC and other institutions that affect them.

The growing demand of natural resources by China’s rapidly expanding economy has motivated many of its relations with African states, as China does not have the natural resources required to sustain its domestic economy. However, long term interests dictate the types of relationships between China and African states and bring the sustainability of the current forms of existing trade into question. China is aiming to aid Africa by reducing

1 China’s domestic small arms policies forbid civilians to carry weapons except in exceptional circumstances. These policies have potentially led China to underestimate the danger that it places on African human security when it indiscriminately sells certain African governments SALW, which are later used violently against women and children.
hunger, unemployment and instability in ways that go beyond commerce and profit seeking on the part of China (Muekalia, 2004).

China aims to develop strong relations and partnerships with African states, even though constant political instability in Africa threatens the balance of these relations. This instability has increased the pressure on China to become politically involved in African matters, which it would prefer to leave to African states to resolve (Gcoyi, 2016).

Through its becoming involved in African issues, China has taken a step in the direction required for long term interests to be possible and sustainable. Many African states tend to downplay their own responsibility and agency in developing relations with other states, in that these states allow foreign investment without designing and implementing solutions that address their fundamental domestic issues. This has led to China using its own initiative, however hesitantly, to find solutions to specific African issues, especially where its own political and economic interests are at stake (Gcoyi, 2016).

The strengthening of China–Africa relations has developed certain prominent trends which characterize the long–term aims of China, one of these being the increasing investment into Africa’s manufacturing sector. Utilizing its own experiences of development, China has aimed to demonstrate the potential that industrialization could have on African economies. This is believed to be one of the most important factors to developing sustainable growth in Africa, in which China believes its own experiences can serve as a model for African countries to imitate. In return for its knowledge on export–led growth, technology transfer and job creation, China aims to expand its soft power on the continent.

Chinese soft power has become important to the success of its foreign policy, and especially China’s efforts to aid in African development and industrialization. Critics claim that China is neo–colonizing Africa because the majority of Africa–China export is in the extractive sector. China’s need to import vast quantities of natural resources to fuel its domestic economy as well as its actions in initiating and developing infrastructure in Africa has been seen as serving its own interests rather than those of Africa and its development. Soft power has become important in order to counter these arguments, through differentiating itself form traditional Western powers and their prior actions in Africa and becoming an alternative political and economic partner to African states (Kim, 2015).
China’s domestic labour changes have resulted in a rise in the costs of labour, providing Chinese investors with the incentive to globalize Chinese enterprises and turn to Africa to provide cheaper labour. A side effect of this migration to the use of African labour is that the African Growth and Opportunity Act provide companies with quota and duty–free access to US markets. The US has stringent regulations against importing Chinese products; therefore Africa provides it with a loophole to enable further expansion of its trade quotas. The expansion of Chinese soft power in Africa through industrialization has provided African states with extended political support and diplomatic interaction, as well as the financial support needed from the Chinese government for Africa to continue development (Kim, 2015).

At the FOCAC summit of 2015, Chinese and African leaders gathered together to plan and consolidate the development of stronger China–Africa relations, to emphasize their long term strategies of cooperation and mutual partnership in order to further development goals and strengthen existing relations. This summit saw China initiating new proposals to improve its African foreign policy, which included consolidating the “five major pillars”, policies which include consolidating mutual trust and cooperation, striving to establish a win–win economy with African states, a new level of enhanced exchanges and learning more about the others culture, assisting one another in security issues and consolidating unity and international affairs. The results of this summit demonstrate that China plans to maintain an influence in Africa for the long term (FOCAC, 2015).

Several decades ago China was one of the least developed and poorest states in the world, however, today its real capital GDP is growing so quickly that it may possibly overtake the US as the largest economy in the near future. Even with the recent economic slowdown, China has continued to provide Africa with FDI, political, economic and military support. The issue with this relationship however, is the escalating trade imbalance (Tiffen, 2014).

The trade imbalance between China and Africa can be seen in nearly every area of trade, in favour of China. In extractive resources this imbalance is at its greatest, with China’s demand for copper, iron and timber, which has led to trade agreements where China has near exclusive access to these African resources. In exchange for these resources, China has granted loans to African governments and provided military supplies and support including SALW. The problem with these loans however, is that until recently they required Chinese only companies to tender for the development work which the loans paid for, rather than
relying on local African companies and labour to do the work, which would stimulate local economies, growth and development. These policies have changed recently to incorporate African labour, however, the lack of technology transfer in development fields have had little success towards reducing unemployment and training African labourers the skills that are required to complete these projects (Tiffen, 2014).

The reality of the situation is that China is motivated to develop these relationships with African states solely for its own interests, by gaining exclusive access, and protecting these rights, to billions of dollars’ worth of natural resources and commodities. African states face political pressure to demonstrate developmental progress and are forced to barter natural resources as their primary source of generating wealth, for development plans which offer little in the line of actually developing their economies, while China provides them with a fraction of the value of the resources being extracted for them to make ends meet. This form of trade lacks the long term sustainability required for a true partnership to develop, and creates a long term dependence of African states on China, for their ability to sustain and maintain their own economic interests (Tiffen, 2014).

In order to improve the viability of long term China-Africa relations, China needs to adjust the focus of its interests to also include African human security. To perceive the potential humanitarian effects that its decisions have on Africa, China should take the interests of African women and their individual security into consideration. The following section briefly analyses China’s domestic gender policies in order to determine the likelihood that China will adjust its foreign policies and consider women’s human security in Africa.

3.6. China’s domestic gender policies

China’s intentions are to develop and consolidate long term relationships with African states, but a requirement to further the longevity and potential success of these relations is that China includes the human security of African women. This is especially necessary because most interactions between China and African states equally affect the lives of women and men. In order to determine the level of importance that China potentially places on the security and well-being of women in Africa, it is first necessary to perceive how China treats its own women. This can be achieved by studying China’s levels of gender equality and how its gender policies may influence the lives of women when applied to Africa.
The UN Development Programmes Human Development Report of 2010 placed China only one position lower than the US in its Gender Equality Ranking. Women in leadership positions, however, are far fewer than men, a trend that can be seen across all sectors. The imbalanced number of men compared to women in places of employment may be partially attributed to the abnormal imbalance of China’s male birth ratio, which was caused by the high abortion rate of Chinese girls. Thousands of unborn girls in China have been aborted because of China’s one-child policy and a traditional preference for male children, who are perceived to be able to provide financial security for their families later in life. However, it may be more accurate to place this imbalance on a more diverse array of issues (O’Sullivan, 2012). China has been characterized by over-population and a large number of educated citizens. Due to these factors, employment opportunities that could be given to Chinese women, are often given to their male counterparts (O'Sullivan, 2012).

In modern China the role of women and China’s gender policies have undoubtedly changed. Economic development has changed the way that China perceives women, and economic growth across all sectors has created more opportunities for women and given women more public and economic freedom and accessibility. Similarly gender relations and equality really have improved in China, but only to the extent one may come to expect from a patriarchal and communist state. The Chinese government wants the international community to believe that women in China are living in prosperity, equality and commonly maintain careers in positions of leadership, and while many do, these lifestyles are the exceptions and not the norms.

The following source lists some of the propagated developmental breakthroughs made by the Chinese government that it has made towards the betterment of the lives of Chinese women. This information, although interesting, is more than likely compromised by the state and should not be taken at face value.

According to China’s Information Office of the State Council\(^2\) white paper released in September 2015, China has taken many important steps towards the promotion of gender equality. The Information Office argues that gender equality and women’s development are themes that the Chinese state have pursued and used to measure social progress, these factors are equally important in realizing sustainable development (IOSC, 2015).

\(^2\) The information derived from this source is undoubtedly propaganda, but it is useful in determining the perspective that the Chinese government would like the international community to adopt of its domestic gender policies.
China has progressively improved its laws, developed policies and made progress with gender equality and women’s development. The state has implemented national programs to further promote women’s development. Three of these programs target various age groups of Chinese women, which encompass the overall aims, most important areas of development and policies implemented for women’s development and gender equality. Equal participation in the economy and access to economic resources are, according to the Information Office, the basic conditions for the well-being and development of women. The strategic adjustment of its economic structure and innovations to its model of growth allows China to fully protect the economic interests of Chinese women (IOSC, 2015).

Poverty alleviation through development in rural areas has remained one of China’s key points of focus to improve the development capacity of women and open them to more state benefits. Through its efforts, the number of impoverished women has been reduced and the quality of life of those who remain impoverished continues to improve. The Chinese government has recently made attempts to improve the national employment structure for women, according to the report, in 2013 women accounted for 45 percent of the total employed population (IOSC, 2015).

The states' policies actively implement and support international conventions concerning gender equality and women’s development. China has been involved in international bilateral and multilateral cooperation and exchanges involving women, as well as recently strengthening its ties with, and supporting, global women’s organizations. China’s role in promoting regional and global gender equality has led to cooperation efforts with UN agencies, and it continues to support the steps taken by the UN to promote gender equality and women’s development (IOSC, 2015).

Over the last two decades, China has carried out joint international projects concerning women in the fields of health, economy, education, environment, combating domestic violence as well as poverty and disaster management. According to the Information Office report, and within the continued framework of South–South cooperation, China has provided training and resources to women in African states, as well as having helped to improve their living and working conditions (IOSC, 2015).

The information provided above is difficult to contest as there are relatively few sources giving potentially accurate contrasts to what the IOSC (2015) claims, however, it is recommended that this information is not taken at face value. Instead it remains relevant in
order to show that although the Chinese government claims that it has revolutionized the lives of women across China, other sources prove the opposite: that Chinese women, although having access to more opportunities than in the past, are still suffering the effects of gender inequality, hierarchy, patriarchy and dominant masculinities in Chinese societies.

One of the largest gender inequality issues facing modern day China are gender-based abortions, which are a direct cause of China’s one-child policy, introduced in the 1970s (O’Sullivan, 2012). China’s one-child policy limited Chinese families to having a single child, or have to face severe taxes. Male offspring were traditionally favoured as they could more easily obtain employment and provide financial support for their parents as well as traditionally keeping the family name after marriage. The gender imbalance found in modern Chinese societies developed inadvertently from state social engineering policies. Women were expected to have only one child and thereafter, had to insert an intrauterine device (IUD). This device is a contraceptive that slowly releases copper ions. These copper ions confound the natural enzymes in a women’s body which then render these women unable to become pregnant (BMJ, 2009).

In 1982, in order to ensure that women were obediently keeping their IUD contraceptives in place, the government introduced portable ultrasound devices around China to scan for the devices. These scanners are compact and accessible, eventually numbering several per village. Unfortunately the government did not foresee that these devices would be used in another manner, and it wasn’t long before pregnant women realized that the ultrasound machines could identify the gender of an unborn child. According to the report, a conservative estimate is that more than 8 million unborn girls were aborted in the first decades of the one-child policy alone (O’Sullivan, 2012).

According to the US Congressional Executive Commission China’s ratio of male to female births in 2010, were around 123 males for every 100 females, which are far higher than the global average of 107 males for every 100 females (US CECC, 2010). Analysts have reported that the gender imbalance caused by this ratio is what prompted Chinese lawmakers to adopt a two–child policy in October 2015, the official explanation was that the policy was implemented to improve the balanced development of the population. Information from 2010 UN census reports show that China had an estimated 51.35 million more males than females; to put this data into perspective, the same census reports that South Africa’s total population in 2010 was only 50.13 million, meaning that the number of males in China who would not
be able to marry or create a family in 2010, outnumbered the entire population of South Africa in the same period of time (Fores, 2013). In 2005, Chinese men were already facing the issues created by past government policies and the current gender imbalance, Chinese people between the ages 35–39 were assessed, because people in this bracket are the most likely to have gotten married if they were planning to marry. The results of this analysis were that 88 percent of all single Chinese people in this bracket were male and that 99 percent of women in this age group were already married (Tucker, 2005).

The high female abortion rate in China led to laws making it illegal to determine the gender of the child, which the government hoped would reduce the number of female abortions. Unfortunately the problem persists and it is closely related to traditional misconceptions about female inferiority. This type of thinking leads to the widespread belief in China that women are not as capable as men outside a domestic environment. Due to these beliefs, gender inequality and discrimination is common in places of employment and women face many difficulties from trying to find work to policies regarding maternity leave, as well as the general preference of male employees outright being advertised and regarded as an acceptable practice (O’Sullivan, 2012).

One of the existing issues is that although official government policies forbid gender discrimination, companies are rarely held accountable for it. The costs of maternity leave are covered by the company, rather than the state, which means that women are often dismissed from employment after giving birth. The mentality behind these actions transfer discrimination against women into other areas, such as social, professional, family and schooling, of a women’s life, leading to lower levels of female literacy and participation in the work force (Hudson & den Boer, 2005).

3.7. Chapter summary

This chapter has attempted to address the most common misconceptions, motives and critiques surrounding China–African relations with regard to arms deals in small arms and light weapons and the continued misuse of these weapons in harming women, children and civilians in Africa. This study finds that although China has long term interests in Africa it also contributes, albeit indirectly, to increasing levels of gender violence and ongoing conflict.
The first section of this chapter explains why China is an important focus for this study, this is due to its growing prominence in African relations and the importance assigned to it by African states that rely on China as an alternative to traditional western powers and see the potential in developing and consolidating relations with China. It is important to question the actions and motives behind emerging powers in Africa; therefore, by focusing on a negative aspect of China-African relations, the influence of the arms trade brings to account the actions of China in African states where these actions have had a negative influence.

The second section of this chapter looks at the relationship between the Chinese government and the Chinese companies trading small arms and light weapons to African states. The results of this research have determined that although these companies are state-owned and the Chinese are well known for central planning, certain aspects of the arms trade are kept hidden from different departments. This is counter-productive to the development of sustainable peace, gender equality and reducing gender violence and conflict which affects non-combatants. As companies trade small arms and light weapons with volatile African states, sometimes even to states under a UN arms embargo, these weapons feed ongoing conflict and have been reportedly used against women and children. The reports that these weapons are of Chinese origin are denied by their government, however, the reported findings come from several credible institutions that specialize in operating in conflict zones as neutral observers. It can be surmised that the Chinese state does not have as much control over its actions as it may believe, if these arms deals are allowed to continue without the knowledge of other state departments attempting to consolidate peace and stability, as well as working alongside the UN and AU to resolve ongoing African conflicts.

The above statement leads to the following section which examines the duplicity surrounding the negative effect of certain Chinese arms deals on the one hand, and the positive results that China has achieved toward developing peace, security, political stability, gender equality and prosperity in Africa on the other. Using case studies, the research has shown that China markets itself as only having a positive influence on Africa, being a development partner and focusing on South-South co-operation to build and consolidate mutually beneficial relations. China completely forgoes mentioning the relationship that its arms deals have had in the past, on a humanitarian and environmental level. It is true that China-African relations have had many positive outcomes and the benefits of developing and consolidating these relations outweigh the potential setbacks African states, and China, may face without these levels of interdependence; however, China and Africa need to take responsibility to minimize the
effects that their irresponsible actions have on women, children, male non-combatants and the environment, in order to maintain mianzi, or ‘keep face,’ in the long run.

As China is in fact interested in long term relations with Africa, they need to focus on minimizing the negative effects of their actions. In order to do so, it is important to understand that China’s motives in Africa are to primarily serve is economic interests and secondarily spread soft power, used to further its economic interests in the long run. This is an unfairly simplistic version of China’s long term interests, as there are other factors influencing them, however, it is also one of the most accurate in that it adopts a realistic approach to what China aims to achieve. That the government seeks to consolidate China-Africa relations is unquestionable, however its motives behind this are to serve its own economic interests. Labour has become more expensive in China, therefore it has begun to transfer the knowledge and technology required to industrialize African states, aimed towards achieving export led growth in Africa. This serves China because now it can indirectly export its produce to western markets that have no quotas on African made goods.

China’s trade imbalance with Africa has always been criticized as a form of neo-colonialism and exploitation; however, the Chinese do not actually perceive their relationships in this manner. Perspective is a powerful tool when directed by soft power campaigns aimed at African states, campaigns which provide these states with tangible benefits in trade for resources otherwise stagnating. In this regard, African states are as much to blame as China for trying to fulfil their short term interests by trading away their means of long term sustainability, and potential. Many of these states require FDI, developmental aid, agricultural implements or consumer goods but others, albeit a slowly declining minority, require weapons, military training and support.

These weapons are often used not to keep the peace, protect their sovereign border from an external threat or to combat criminal elements, but to eliminate political opposition, oppress civilians and fuel civil conflicts. The indirect effect of these arms deals is often the deaths of thousands of unarmed women and children, their forced sexual slavery, the deaths of their loved ones and families in conflict, the loss of access to crucial medical services and the complete shutdown of an economy required to feed those who survive direct violence. It can be argued that it is not China who pulls the trigger, or is responsible for how a state uses its weapons, however, institutions like the UN exist in part to determine whether a state will misuse an influx of weaponry and then label them with an arms embargo, flag them as
unsuitable for arms deals and explain these thoroughly. China has been one of few international powers to ignore these arms embargoes, knowing what these weapons would be used for, and continuing to trade arms with these states that have abused human rights and continue to do.

The final section of this chapter studies China’s gender policies within its national borders. The research is aimed to determine the perceptions that an authoritarian state has of its own women and gender equality, and therefore how it would consider the lives of women in foreign states. The findings conclude that although China has made some progress in its gender policies, towards gender equality and women’s rights, there remains a powerful reality wherein women are treated with disrespect and inequality outside of their homes. The Chinese government, in reality, does little to protect its own women from gender inequality and gender-based violence, which can be seen in its treatment of women under the authoritarian regime, as well as by how limited the average Chinese women’s opportunities are. This inequality is partly due to existing gender imbalances which stem from the high abortion rate of unborn girls, and because of the state’s refusal to acknowledge that its authoritarian government is steeped in traditional patriarchal society and is not interested in resolving gender-inequality.
Chapter 4: Small Arms, Light Weapons and Gender in Africa

4.1. Chapter overview

There is a lack of sufficient research on the subject of the effects of prolific SALW on African gender roles in times of conflict, as well as on the increasing number of cases of gender based violence that occurs in African conflict situations, therefore, the first section of this chapter expands upon this research through specifically focusing on African women, their various roles in conflicts and their experiences of gender violence. While multi-lateral frameworks on African SALW exist, the lack of political will behind their implementation has led to circumstances where women and children are affected by prolific small arms.

The second section of this chapter describes the various roles of African women involved in armed conflicts. It goes on to describe the realities of gender violence that these women are forced to experience, whether they are victims of these conflicts or the perpetrators. The subsections include women as victims of armed violence, women as combatants and perpetrators of violence, women in peace-building and demobilization, women as the heads of households and their support roles, girls as child soldiers in Africa.

The third section analyses the specific effects of prolific SALW on women in times of conflict. Women are not only the direct victims of armed violence in these conflicts, but they become the economic victims too. The subsections include refugees and civilian displacement, how African women become the victims of an increased economic burden, the occurrence of rape and sexual violence in conflicts, physical and psychological trauma and domestic violence in times of conflict.

The fourth section of the chapter examines the effects that the presence of small arms and light weapons in post-conflict environments has on women. Its subsections include discussing the gendered phenomenon of SALW usage after conflict, the roles of women in post-conflict processes, the ongoing exclusion of women from disarmament and peace-building programmes, how domestic violence and psychological trauma increases post-conflict.
4.2. African women in conflict and the realities of gender violence

The roles of women in times of conflict, post – conflict and peace change drastically. This is an important factor to consider when researching gender violence, power, security and their relationship to small arms and light weapons. As women become involved in DDR programmes, others are actively fighting as combatants. According to Farr, Schnabel and Schroeder (2005), women can also occupy several roles simultaneously, as activists, violators and victims of these conflicts. At either side of this spectrum women are frequently abused and victimized whenever firearms are involved.

The proliferation and widespread availability of SALW and their potential misuse has become a threat to all human lives in the vicinity of their use, including women and children as non-combatants, armed forces and the efforts of peace–keeping forces in these regions. This issue provides a solid basis from which to initiate further gender-aware research, policy making and the eventual transition from the current affairs in conflict zones in Africa towards peaceful and gender - equal solutions (Farr, Myrttinen & Schnabel, 2010).

There is a lack of concrete evidence in the field of gender behaviour and the effects of SALW proliferation on gender and human security; however, thanks to feminist researchers and the work of international organizations, there exists enough evidence to confidently argue that small arms and their increasing availability most definitely contribute to increasing levels of gender violence (Farr, 2006).

4.2.1. Women as victims of armed violence

The physical and psychological trauma caused by the proliferation of SALW, as well as the way in which it affects societies, families and the quality of daily life, harms women far more profoundly than men in most cases, due to their roles in these environments (Farr, Schnabel & Schroeder, 2005).

The experiences of women in war and armed conflicts vary according to their location, culture and the society in which they survive. As victims of armed and gendered violence women are often seen as spoils of war and raped by the victor of a conflict. Many African women are widowed by conflict and have to become the bread winners and head of their
households. In African conflicts sexual violence has been used as a weapon of war to bring psychological trauma and dishonour to the women, and separates them from their husbands and families, while forced pregnancies are used to eliminate and taint ethnic groups and create schisms between members of a community (Kirsten, 2007).

Modern warfare has destabilized both the social and cultural traditions of conflict and how it is waged. This destabilization, which is in part due to the increasing accessibility to readily available SALW, has also affected the ways in which women face violence perpetrated against them by men, and as the traditional gender balance of power changes, so change the roles and identities of those who are available to be mobilized in support of conflict.

The traditional notion of political agency is synonymous with the male stereotype of one who protects. This notion leads to women being relegated to a position of requiring protection, regardless of the reality of these situations. In recent years, this stereotype has changed significantly, mostly due to globalization, pressure from international organizations and social movements. The issue remains, however, that women have been and continue to be marginalized by masculine societies and that international programmes and interventions have failed to address existing gendered insecurities (Farr, Schnabel & Schroeder, 2005).

The act of sex-role stereotyping is not the only way in which women have been victimized and excluded from human security decision making, other factors including their cultures, class, location and perceived abilities of African women have been responsible for how societies relate to small arms and the various post – conflict disarmament processes that occur in conflict ridden African regions (Farr, Myrttinen & Schnabel, 2010).

According to Farr (2006), gun ownership and the abuse of firearms are, for the most part, a gender orientated phenomenon. The misuse of these weapons broadens the gap between existing social inequality and the constructed traditional hierarchies in place that encourage men to not only dominate women but to exacerbate racial and economic tensions in violent societies (Farr, 2006).

While men are most commonly the victims of gun violence during conflict and post-conflict situations, significant percentages of gun-related casualties are among women and children, who are often completely innocent victims in these conflicts. Women and children are among the most tragic casualties in a conflict because they are the most important members of
society; women are the creators, teachers and guardians of the legacy of these societies and children are quite literally the future of these societies (Gartner, 2000).

4.2.2. Women as combatants and perpetrators of violence

As the availability and ease of access to SALW increases, women and children are no longer solely the victims of violent conflict, but have also been recruited to serve as combatants in armed conflicts, especially in an African context. This process has become well established and shows that women also participate in these violent conflicts, often against their will and from an early age. This addition to ongoing African conflicts has challenged the aged and traditional practice of only men going to war, and women being assumed to be in a position of weakness, needing the protection of men (Farr, 2006).

Through the analysis of African conflicts, researchers have learnt that due to SALW becoming more easily obtained, easily used and maintained, both women and children have become as proficient with these weapons as men. The efficiency of a bullet to kill or maim is not measured by how much training, which gender, or age group fires the bullet, and therefore a bullet fired from a gun held by a woman, or child is just as effective as one fired from a man. As Farr mentions, “The tradition of labelling women and children as ‘vulnerable’ in war-time has given them an increased capability to participate in the new style of waging war because they are less easily identifiable as assailants than men.” It can be said, therefore, that these bullets are often more effective as an opponent may hesitate before opening fire on either a women or child in conflict (Farr, 2006).

4.2.3. Women in peace-building and demobilization

The distinct lack of a gender perspective in peace-building operations has resulted in many post conflict peace-building programmes, such as Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), failing to achieve their goals in Africa and the continued proliferation of SALW and the effects that these weapons have on societies. These programmes have been implemented by international organizations and governments and therefore they often fail to factor in the existing actualities of local cultures and their individual practices and traditions,
which in turn determine the potential success of the DDR programmes, as the local communities remain alienated from decision making (Farr, Myrttinen & Schnabel, 2010).

Disarmament programmes and peace-building operations are often accompanied by development incentives to encourage SALW disarmament among local communities in African states. These incentives are usually small-scale construction projects that aim to benefit the entire community. Although these communities are the intended beneficiaries of DDR incentives, the gendered imbalance of the decision making process has led to the marginalization of women in these projects (Farr, Myrttinen & Schnabel, 2010).

As an example of this marginalization, when these communities are given several options of potential projects that could be undertaken as a reward to the community for SALW disarmament, men and women have been shown to select different projects. While men mostly decide on larger and more ambitious projects such as tarred roads and bridges, women often only request smaller projects that will have an immediate influence over their quality of life, such as water pumps or flushing toilets. While in theory this process should be equally decided on, in practice the projects that are proposed by men are usually the ones selected in these situations (Kirsten, 2007).

According to Farr, Schnabel and Schroeder (2005), the refusal of international DDR, human security and peace-building operations to include and integrate gender into these programmes not only borders on the abuse of women’s human rights, but has also left these operations less effective and in some cases, futile and counter-productive. Human security programmes must also include those situations where SALW are associated with gender violence in times of war, post-conflict and peace.

There are activists from international non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) who have been challenging the patriarchal tradition of silencing the opinions of African women and their gendered experiences of armed violence both during and in post-conflict situations. This research is invaluable in understanding how deeply this issue runs and in discovering potential solutions to these SALW created gender issues (Farr, Myrttinen & Schnabel, 2010).
4.2.4. Women as the heads of households and their support roles

Men and women participate in conflicts in vastly different ways. Where men are statistically the more likely to make up the majority of armed combatants, women and girls have often provided support to combatants in times of conflict through services which include nursing and taking care of the wounded, cooking, cleaning, carrying both information and supplies (Farr, Myrttinen & Schnabel, 2010).

Women in Africa often face severe economic pressure during periods of conflict as they are required to fulfill their increased domestic duties as well as ensure that they can provide economically for their families as their men become combatants, are wounded or killed in action. In South Sudan, as an example, women have to fulfill roles in society which would otherwise be reserved for the men, working in agriculture, trading goods at the market and filling in as hard manual labour (Kirsten, 2007).

Although these roles may continue in post-conflict situations, due to the traditions of their societies and gender inequality these women forgo the social benefits of these positions, the economic power and the better quality of life that men in these positions would. This increased economic and domestic burden often affects the girls in the family most as they are required to aid their mothers and in many cases, forgo their education to do so. This cycle often creates further situations within families and communities that lead to increased domestic and gender violence, as well as exacerbating cycles of conflict (Kirsten, 2007).

These support roles are occasionally filled by women and children who volunteer their services to the war effort, but more commonly they are forced into these positions against their will. When children, and especially young girls, are the victims of these forced recruitment experiences, the result is often the creation of child soldiers under certain African regimes.

4.2.5. Girls as child soldiers in Africa

An estimated 120,000 children have been recruited as child soldiers across Africa. In Sierra Leone, more than 48,000 child soldiers have served in armed conflicts and of these, about 30 percent of them are girls. The experiences of these girls, both as coerced combatants and
victims, have been that of horror and brutality. In some of these conflicts, girls have joined the ranks of armed forces voluntarily. In the case of Sierra Leone, most of these girls were forced into becoming combatants, being abducted and through coercion, intimidation, rape and brutality, these girls suffered not only from gun and gender violence, but from being separated from their families (Farr, Schnabel & Schroeder, 2005).

After they had been abducted, these girls were forced to fulfil three primary roles, which were dependent on their age, strength and the particular armed group they had been forced to join. In a domestic role, the girls were tasked with cooking, caring for others, carrying supplies, washing and cleaning. If these girls failed to meet the expectations of the group they were submitted to violent punishment, which sometimes resulted in death. Most of these girls were used as sex slaves and were constantly sexually assaulted by men, often being gang raped by various members. Some of the girls became combatants during periods of conflict and were trained to fight alongside the men in the group, regardless of whether they were uncomfortable with gun violence and killing (Kirsten, 2007).

The violence that these girls experienced became apparent during their interviews as they related their experiences of being victimized and brutally raped and assaulted. The girls would often diligently obey every command to ensure their survival. As the girls built up the trust of the soldiers they became allies, even after their victimization. This change was not a given and neither was it a smooth transition from being victimized and becoming the perpetrator, the status of these girls changed constantly and in a non-linear manner across this spectrum (Farr, Schnabel & Schroeder, 2005).

4.3. The specific effects of SALW proliferation on women in conflict

In order to understand the specific effects of SALW proliferation on women during periods of conflict, it is important to acknowledge that armed violence and the perspectives of those who experience this violence differ vastly according to their gender. In Africa, it has not always been possible to separate the experiences of women and armed violence during conflict from other forms of violent experiences including sexual and domestic violence (Kirsten, 2007).

While patriarchal African cultures often support traditions of militarized masculinity, where power and manliness is measured by a man’s aggression, ability and willingness to use small
arms and light weapons, these traditions contribute, in part, to the high tolerance of modern African societies towards the gender violence and abuse at gun point that has become a major characteristics of African states in conflict (Farr, 2006).

Women in Africa are often the victims of different forms of violence, perpetrated by various groups. These groups vary according to the region and type of conflict, but may include state armed forces, rebel forces, gangs or family members. Research on conflicts has indicated that domestic violence increases both during conflict and in post-conflict situations, when tensions in the home arise for a number of reasons. The causes of this increase in domestic violence are broad and include the assertion of power by male family members who resort to violence as an ‘accepted’ means of resolving domestic conflict, lawlessness and a lack of policing during and after conflict, the changing role of women within a community due to conflict, as well as ineffective integration of armed forces back into society and as a side-effect of male psychological trauma (Kirsten, 2007).

Although many of the cultural norms of African societies are consequences of violent conflict, small arms proliferation and their misuse, these norms are also responsible for contributing to the ongoing cycles of gendered violence found across African regions. SALW provide these societies with the means to facilitate conflict, and therefore, the norms of these African cultures exacerbate cycles of conflict, fear among civilians and further small arms proliferation (Farr, Schnabel & Schroeder, 2005).

### 4.3.1. Refugees and displacement

The proliferation of SALW and one of its most destructive effects is the internal displacement of civilians from their homes and the subsequent creation of refugees. The loss of access to private property, agrarian land, jobs, healthcare, food security and public services are some of the most devastating effects that displacement caused by conflict, has on African societies (Kirsten, 2007). Refugee camps are mostly populated by women and children, and the presence of small arms and light weapons in the regions surrounding these camps significantly increase the insecurity of these women (Cukier, 2000).

Internal conflict has created refugees in various African states, forcing large numbers of civilians to flee their homes towards areas where they may become involved in the conflict,
or which are often otherwise unsafe. The movement of large numbers of refugees into other regions can create its own problems; there are cases where these refugees become involved in external attempts to reclaim or end the struggle in their homeland, becoming involved in illegal practices or become victimized in their new environments and face a lack of support from their host state (Farr, 2006).

Through the analysis of SALW as a tool used in conflict, they are seen to be neither a direct cause of conflict, nor does their presence imminently assure that either conflict, domestic or gender violence will ensue. These weapons do, however, exacerbate existing conflicts and fuel the ability and motive of various groups to attack, oppress or provoke others. Therefore, when armed, these groups become an increased risk and their misuse of SALW adds to the human cost of these conflicts, among which women and children are frequently counted, especially in refugee situations. In African refugee outposts, women and children are targeted by armed groups to spread fear among their enemies, as they provide easy targets, a devastating psychological effect and they are often under-protected in these environments (Farr, Schnabel & Schroeder, 2005).

4.3.2. Increased economic burden

The human cost of armed violence during conflict rises beyond statistics of casualties and reports of state security forces attacking civilians, criminals and armed combatants; the imbalance of men killed during conflict often leads to the destruction of families, their income and security. This places an enormous socio-economic burden on the women of African societies, forcing them to support and uphold the economic and social burden of their family, while having to deal with the loss of loved ones, being forced to leave their homes as refugees and trying to ensure the survival of themselves and their children (Kirsten, 2007).

The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) researches the relationship between small arms and light weapons on gender relations, accordingly their research has led to the conclusion that SALW affect women severely because women, in particular, are victims of not only direct casualties but the side effects of conflict which include the interference of access to basic needs, enhanced economic burdens and psychological trauma related to gender violence (Mogire, 2004).
The fear of violence increased by small arms proliferation and misuse, the political participation of many and their ability to take care of their families, and themselves is drastically reduced. In these oppressive and violent environments, women struggle daily to access their places of employment, healthcare, education and marketplaces to receive basic goods that their families require, all because of the threat caused by prolific small arms, light weapons and their misuse (Mogire, 2004).

Some of the secondary effects of violent armed conflict are the reduced accessibility to food, agriculture and education. Schools and tertiary institutions can often no longer function during periods of conflict and even in the aftermath of these conflicts, as the risk to children of physical harm is multiplied and that armed groups in Africa often use schools as a place of both voluntary and forced recruitment. The upheaval and displacement caused by armed conflict also exposes women and children to instability, diseases, sexual assault, gun violence and various forms of recruitment (Pytlak, 2010).

4.3.3. Rape and sexual violence

The prevalence of small arms exacerbates violent confrontation, displacement and sexual abuse among other women’s human rights violations. The trauma that women face due to the proliferation of SALW and the manner in which armed men are empowered by these weapons has become commonplace in African regions where gang rape, sexual violence, forced prostitution and slavery take place. In African states such as Sudan, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo, young girls and women have been systematically abducted by armed groups from their families, schools and public areas. These women are later subjected to forced recruitment as combatants, gang rape and sexual slavery (Mogire, 2004).

In African regions in conflict, as well as during periods of the post-conflict aftermath, both women and girls are threatened by the constant misuse of small arms through sexual violence and assaults like rape, gender mutilation, sexual slavery and being forcibly impregnated, which are usually committed at gun-point. In case studies on the effects of conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, women and girls numbering in their thousands were raped by armed soldiers and rebels. Similarly, in Kenya at the Dadaab refugee camp, most of
the reported cases of rape and sexual assault were committed by armed men at gun point (Pytlak, 2010).

In 2010, for example, the Islamist terrorist organization Boko Haram began to systematically target women across Nigeria. While more than 7000 people have been killed in the conflict, kidnappings, rape and forced marriages have become a brutal tactic that is commonly used by the group to instrumentally use women as a weapon against their enemies. Since 2013, Nigeria has seen a dramatic rise in gender based and sexual violence against women and girls in the northern regions of the state, with numerous reports of mass rape, torture and murder against women, and more specifically Christian women (Pearson & Zenn, 2014). Human rights watch also explicitly documented numerous cases of sexual violence, rape, post-rape mutilation and forced marriages which have become a favoured tactic of Boko Haram, these horrifying reports depict how the misuse of SALW can completely destroy the lives of women and prevent them from getting an education (Human Rights Watch, 2014).

Attacks against women in Africa have become far more common than in past decades due to the effectiveness of these attacks at disrupting the threads of societies, causing chaos and destabilizing the lives of civilians. The ease of access to SALW has facilitated this change in tactics, and has allowed conflict to affect women more radically than before. The weapons used in many of these attacks, how they are used and how they are obtained have blurred the distinction between soldiers and civilians, as uniforms are rarely worn when these attacks are carried out. These attacks affect civilian women more severely in that they are often conducted in areas frequented by women and target women specifically, who are forced to leave their homes daily in search of food, work, safety and protection (Farr, 2006).

### 4.3.4. Physical and Psychological trauma

Women are most affected by the destruction that SALW in conflict has on institutions that provide basic services including access to healthcare, basic foods and supplies, education and services. Children are also uniquely affected by the misuse of SALW, they are unable to defend themselves and are more susceptible to being injured and kidnapped. The psychological effects of being exposed to various forms of violence at a young age feed into a cycle of becoming less sensitive to violence, which can strongly influence the decisions of
children once they have matured. This insensitivity and constructed assumption that violence is a norm within these societies carries the added risk of encouraging the young to become armed combatants themselves (Pytlak, 2010).

The effects of exposure to violence and a growing social insensitivity towards it can have a much larger impact when it affects an entire generation of the population in a conflict ridden region. The development of the nation itself is therefore influenced by conflict violence and the proliferation of SALW which fuel and allow conflict to continue (Pytlak, 2010).

4.3.5. Domestic violence in times of conflict

Cukier (2000), who examines the links between SALW, violence, and cultures from a gender perspective, mentions that women are the targets of certain forms of gender violence which involve SALW, especially domestic violence. In conflict situations a disproportionate number of men are the users and victims of SALW, which results in demographic shifts due to casualties in conflict. The effects of this demographic shift include increases in the total number of women led households, an increase in the number of dependents requiring state support and rising pressure on women to support themselves and their families, especially in situations where the state is unable to aid widowed women and their families (Cukier, 2000).

The violent changes that occur due to conflict have produced gendered effects across Africa. The consequences of these changes to the lives of those affected by war are a lack of boundaries between what is considered to be acceptable conduct, and unacceptable practice. Where conflict appears, horrific violence in the home against women and children follows. War was once forbidden in residential areas, in Africa, it forces those residing in these areas, including women and children, to leave their homes and themselves take up arms against their abusers (Farr, 2006).

The broadening of boundaries caused by the proliferation and availability of SALW means that conflict is no longer confined to specific zones away from civilians. In African conflicts the domestic environment has become a target during conflicts for the spread of fear among enemies through the violation and abuse of women and children in these areas (Farr, 2006).
4.4. Effects of SALW on women in the post-conflict aftermath

Africa has experienced increases in the accessibility of small arms and light weapons, which have increased destabilization, insecurity and social dislocation in times of pre-war tensions, during the conflict and in the post-conflict environment of African states. Although these weapons explicitly affect the lives of women, men and children in vastly different ways, research into the most salient effects of SALW on gender has had little effect in reducing these effects through the implementation of policies, smart disarmament programmes and non-human security and gender orientated small arms research.

In order to counter the effects that SALW has on gender relations, it is important to fully understand the role that small arms plays in exacerbating gender based violence, especially after a conflict, which is when acts of armed, gender and domestic violence occur just as frequently but are often overlooked due to lack of policing and the social, political and economic chaos surrounding a ceasefire.

The focus of international arms control policies moved even further from the effects of these weapons on people and instead these policies basically became economic guidelines within which to find loopholes to bypass trade regulations in the existing system. Therefore, researchers and academics took it upon themselves to become more informed on the complex nature of the relationship between SALW and human security in the lives of those affected by it, but it was not until very recently that these issues have been given the consideration that they deserved when the debate began.

4.4.1 The gendered phenomenon of SALW usage after conflict

The fact is that there has been little attention given to the gendered effects of small arms ownership and the misuse of these weapons. These weapons are used to reinforce imbalanced social hierarchies that have traditionally given men power over women, and exclude them from access to socio-economic and political power, encourage tensions between through widening racial, ethnical and class divisions, and in violent cultures, these traditions of
masculine dominance present themselves through the abuse of SALW against women, children and sexual minorities (Anderson, 1999).

While men are primarily the perpetrators of gun and gender violence, women have become especially vulnerable to these forms of violence in domestic settings during post-conflict situations, where men using SALW try to control, oppress, intimidate, harm and murder their intimate female partners (Kirsten, 2007).

The perceptions of men and masculinity in traditional African regions are often accompanied by the ownership of small arms and light weapons. This tendency leads to further complications in the disarmament process of states in the position of a post–conflict transition. According to Kingma and Sayers (1994), these traditions lead to men being reluctant to give up their weapons as they have been instructed and drilled on the idea that a man without his weapon is not a man (Kingma and Sayers, 1994).

Although the rate of gender violence in Africa is high, the lack of political interest in identifying and remedying the underlying causes of gender violence has led to SALW based violence becoming a socially accepted norm and insensitivity, rather than resolving to reduce these forms of violence.

It is equally important to understand that prolific SALW can completely change the social and culturally constructed roles of men, women and children in various contexts. An assumption commonly used in small arms control debates is that women lack the knowledge to be able to significantly and meaningfully contribute to DDR programmes, and this assumption is the reason that these programmes provide often underwhelming results (Anderson, 1999).

4.4.2. The role of women and their exclusion in post-conflict processes

Women and men fill a broad variety of roles during and after conflict, of which many of these roles are contradictions of stereotypical and traditional roles that both men and women are expected to fill. Women have become more active in disarmament work, providing they are included in the process; however, their influence on the success of these programmes has
been largely underestimated in many African regions. Women have also been known to actively support and encourage combatants in these conflicts when they feel that they are providing their support for a good cause. In this sense, women may be active in either encouraging or controlling small arms. In the transition phase of a state in conflict to peace, there are sometimes also opportunities for gender inequality to be addressed which allows women to partake in certain activities and fulfil roles in society that were otherwise off limits to them (Anderson, 1999).

Women have different perspectives on security than men; in many communities when conflict ends it does not necessarily mean that the violence experienced by women will end too. Therefore, once conflict has ended, women often have different priorities and interests with regard to DDR programmes and increasing security, as domestic violence and other forms of gender violence usually become more prominent in post – conflict situations, before policing and organization can occur (Kingma and Sayers, 1994).

Besides facing an increased economic burden, African women have been further burdened in post-conflict environments with taking care of the wounded and survivors of these conflicts who are permanently maimed and disabled by SALW during these conflicts and who will require care indefinitely (Farr, 2006).

The UN has introduced various initiatives such as UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the Department for Disarmament Affairs Gender Action Plan, in order to help ensure that UN member states will include more women in their disarmament and peace-building operations. However, Farr, Schnabel and Schroeder (2005), found that many of the gender concerns that these initiatives originally aimed to resolve had been completely ignored when these operations were planned and executed (Farr, Schnabel & Schroeder, 2005).

The UN has committed itself to gender mainstreaming policies and has made several changes to existing policies which include appointing gender advisors to peace-building operations and designing new sets of DDR protocol that include gender issues and how to resolve them with equality. Another initiative worth mentioning is the Joint Action to Stop Rape in War, which serves to prevent and respond to gender and sexual violence during conflict (Kirsten, 2007).
According to Farr, Myrttinen and Schnabel, traditional justice has been an effective medium used in controlling small arms and gun-violence, but it has the added downside of potentially being misused by those in power to further oppress women and gender minorities:

Often recourse to traditional justice can be an effective and culturally appropriate means to manage small arms and small arms violence, but it needs to be kept in mind that traditional justice can also be problematic, failing to provide legal remedy to those not in power, including ethnic and gender minorities as well as those in a socioeconomically disadvantageous position (Farr, Myrttinen & Schnabel, 2010).

Traditional justice systems in Africa are often accompanied by brutal sentences and forms of justice that may be counter-productive to peace-keeping and disarmament operations if the community judges these processes unjust or ineffective, if they fail to address the source of the problem.

Many armed groups throughout Africa recruit women into their ranks as combatants. Unlike many of their male counterparts, female combatants are either not given their own SALW during the conflict or they are required to return their weapons after the conflict has ended. This occurrence has also played a role in the exclusion of women who partake in the conflict from post-conflict disarmament processes. This also includes correct debriefing, demobilization and reintegration of female ex-combatants after the conflict, where women and girls are forced to demobilize and deal with the after effects of the conflict themselves, which has had devastating consequences on their psychological health and the lives of themselves and their families (Farr, Schnabel & Schroeder, 2005).

Due to women and girls having different needs during these disarmament processes, having faced sexual trauma, exposure to violence and the psychological effect of forced separation from their families, these programmes often fail to adequately address these differences between the way men and women perceive and experience conflict situations. This failure to address gender differently has led to many of these DDR operations being rendered ineffective at promoting the social changes and peace-building ideals that they aimed to achieve when reintegrating female ex-combatants back into society (Farr, Schnabel & Schroeder, 2005).
This lack of gendered sensitivity in post-conflict disarmament processes is also acknowledged by Kirsten (2007), who claims that, although it has become well known that these DDR operations inadequately address the needs and concerns of different genders, not enough has been done to prevent women and girls involved in the conflict from being rendered invisible.

The post–conflict effects on the situation that women refugees and those who were otherwise displaced during conflicts in Africa find themselves in are usually as negative as their situation was during the period of conflict. Many of these girls and women are forced to beg and rely on temporary labour, as well as prostitution for an income on which to survive. The sheer number of people moving into cities after a conflict has ended often applies immense pressure to existing infrastructure and services which have usually been damaged during the conflict, which sometimes leads to an employment, crime and housing crisis (Kirsten, 2007).

### 4.4.3 Domestic violence and psychological trauma increases post-conflict

Research has not only shown that post-traumatic stress is explicitly linked to increased risk of violent confrontation, but also that the rate of gender and domestic gun violence increases substantially once a war has ended (Farr, 2006). The difficulty that African men have in distinguishing the differences between the sanctioned use of violence during war and violence in the private and domestic sphere is made more complicated during post-conflict transitions as there is often a distinct lack of successful disarmament and reintegration taking place directly after a conflict (Farr, 2006).

Tensions and post-traumatic stress become multiplied by changing variables within these states; these include political, economic and social changes that have occurred during the conflict, which serve to create a chaotic environment in which the successful reintegration of combatants into society becomes one of the most important tasks to reduce post-conflict gender violence. The presence of small arms in the private sphere in these situations has led to minor domestic disputes being ended in violently armed confrontations, which ex-combatants often perceive to be the simplest resolution if they are have not been correctly debriefed and disarmed, as is the case in many of these conflicts (Farr, 2006).
After a conflict has ended, many of those affected return home and bring with them the psychological trauma faced during these conflicts. These men and women frequently become post-conflict perpetrators of armed violence, turning on their own families. They believe that the only means of expressing their rage, pain and injury is to use the weapons that have kept them alive during the conflict against the people closest to them, including women and children (Farr, 2006).

4.5. Chapter summary

This chapter has essentially determined how, and to what degree, small arms and light weapons proliferation influences the lives of women in Africa. The findings include that the roles of women in regions in Africa differ according to their circumstances, location and cultural norms, but that small arms proliferation in times of conflict enable men to victimize women in all of their roles.

In times of conflict the roles that African women fill are varied and many women are forced into these positions. These forced roles are usually initiated under duress of armed violence and risk to the human security of the women involved. Some of these roles that have been discussed include women as the victims of armed violence, in which women are murdered, raped, tortured and otherwise abused by armed groups in the vicinity of African conflicts.

Women have also been combatants and perpetrators of violence, however, these women are also usually forced into these roles, being threatened, raped or murdered if they refuse to follow orders. While women combatants are not uncommon, neither are they treated as equals to the male combatants that they fight along-side.

Women involved in peacebuilding, anti-war activism and demobilization are beginning to realize the innate potential that they have to end conflict, however, they remain marginalized and excluded from decision making in many official peace agreements and peace-building operations, reducing the efficiency of these programmes and reducing women to positions of subordination and inequality to their male counterparts. This is an ongoing issue in African states made worse by the lack of support that women receive from international organizations when decision making affects their lives as well.

Conflict has created numerous cases of families headed by widowed women, who in addition to suffering from the loss of loved ones, are forced to support their families economically too.
These women are often forced into support roles in conflicts, tending the sick and wounded, cleaning and cooking for soldiers or carrying messages and supplies. Thereafter they have to tend to their families and attempt to lead their households as the sole breadwinners. This consequence of armed conflict has barred many women from accessing schools, healthcare and needed services that they or their families may require, due to their added economic burdens.

The fate of girls who have been abducted and forcibly recruited as child soldiers in African conflicts is a brutal one. These girls are forced to fill most of the aforementioned roles, in addition to being raped, forced into marriage to attain a certain degree of security and being abused by those that they fight alongside both physically and psychologically.

The specific effects of the small arms and light weapons trade on women during conflict include that they are forced into becoming refugees and internally displaced from their homes. This places women in positions of increased risk to their safety and being violently targeted by armed groups, raped, sexually enslaved and abused. These women are often widowed or murdered, leaving their families struggling to survive and in positions where they are forced into prostitution, crime or enlisting with armed groups to survive. The trauma caused by small arms proliferation in Africa has far reaching consequences for entire communities, numbing them to the realities of violence and creating a cycle of further violence and strive through conflict. Another reality of small arms proliferation in conflict is that during these times, domestic violence has been shown to increase drastically, causing further gender based violence and inequality in the domestic environment as well as across communities.

The gendered effects of SALW in post-conflict situations is just as brutal on women as it is during conflict, except that it has been found that it is primarily men that use these weapons post-conflict, especially as African women are forbidden from keeping their weapons after a conflict has ended, as well as falling victim to increased domestic and gender violence while policing and legal structures have yet to be correctly implemented.

Women are also further excluded from peace making and peace building in post-conflict situations and as importantly during disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes. This marginalization and exclusion of women leaves these post-conflict peace processes vulnerable to reverting to conflict when certain terms are not met and encourage
cycles of gender inequality, in which African women are considered less than equal to their male counterparts.

Women in post-conflict situations in Africa also receive less access to the healthcare and psychological treatments that they often require from being exposed to violence, rape and abuse at the hand of armed men. These women, and especially ex-combatants, are forced to endure their experiences alone and without undergoing sufficient reintegration processes that allow them to return to society.
Chapter 5: The Case of South Sudan

5.1. Chapter overview

This chapter draws upon the evidence provided throughout previous sections of this thesis and focuses this information on the African state of South Sudan. The case study of the situation in South Sudan has proven to be an excellent platform from which to define the findings of this thesis.

The reasons for selecting this state for this case study include the nature of the relationship that has developed between China and South Sudan, the manner in which this relationship has been tested due to ongoing armed conflict between South Sudan and Sudan, as well as South Sudan’s own civil war between ethnic groups and political differences.

South Sudan faces numerous social, political and economic challenges such as a failing economy and legal system, severe gender inequality, armed sexual violence against women, and both government and rebel armed forces have targeted civilians with small arms, light weapons and explosives. There have been numerous cases of displaced civilians due to conflict and ethnic cleansing, and cases of these refugees later being sexually and violently assaulted by various armed groups; most of which have been exacerbated by the uncontrolled proliferation of SALW (HSBA, 2012a).

China has adapted the unique position of becoming involved in South Sudan’s internal affairs in order to resolve the conflict, which has more to do with its economic interests than a newfound humanitarian concern for the well-being of the Sudanese. China’s irresponsible involvement in providing affordable SALW to South Sudan throughout its conflicts have increased the number of small arms related casualties in the state considerably, but more importantly; these weapons have been constantly misused against thousands of civilian women and children.

The Chinese government knew that these weapons were being used to commit human rights violations, but only decided to stop supplying South Sudan with SALW after the international community had discovered several of its arms shipments, placing pressure on China to halt further weapons transfers to the region.

Theories of both human security and feminism apply to the case study of South Sudan through the issues presented throughout the chapter. The perspectives offered by these
theories create potential solutions to ongoing issues of gendered human security caused by prolific SALW in the South Sudan region. These perspectives are used to identify the causes of the situation and analyse their effects on women in South Sudan and ways to improve their individual security and how threats to their wellbeing both during and after armed conflicts differs. Finally, the analysis of the situation in South Sudan using a feminist based perspective on human security provides unique solutions towards improving the living standards of those in South Sudan as well as potential long term solutions towards disarmament and conflict resolution.

This chapter provides evidence of China’s actions in supplying the South Sudanese government, as well as indirectly supplying rebel forces within South Sudan, with SALW and focuses on the effects of these weapons on the Sudanese people.

5.2 Background and contextualisation

In December 2013, only two years after its independence, South Sudan was drawn into a civil war that has left tens of thousands of people dead and wounded. The United Nations have claimed it is one of most severe modern humanitarian crises, with more than 1.8 million people internally displaced, and due to conflict and the consequential economic meltdown, more than 4 million people are in need of humanitarian aid (Gridneff, 2014a).

The civil war in South Sudan officially began shortly after President Kiir claimed that Vice President Machar loyalists had attempted a coup to overthrow him, which his government forces had successfully repelled. Machar immediately denied his involvement in the coup, instead accusing President Kiir of fabricating the coup in order to remove Machar as his opposition. Violence between supporters of either side quickly erupted in South Sudan’s capital city, Juba, where hundreds of people on both sides were killed. Further rebellions against Kiir spread quickly across South Sudan, and as the dynamics of the conflict shifted from the political sphere into an issue of ethnicity, the Dinka and Nuer, two of South Sudan’s major ethnic groups, became sworn opposition (Tiezzi, 2013).

The violence had disrupted what the international community had hoped would be a long lasting time of peace in South Sudan, especially after the end of the brutal civil war that had led to its independence from Sudan in 2011. China became especially concerned with the outbreak of conflict in South Sudan as it had heavily invested into the oil rich state and at the time, the state was supplying around 5% of China’s total oil imports. Many Chinese nationals
were in South Sudan at the time, and China had only recently dealt with numerous past issues relating to the split between Sudan and South Sudan (Tiezzi, 2013).

The government forces and rebel groups involved in South Sudan’s civil war have been accused of crimes against humanity and human rights violations which include massacring women and children and using rape as a weapon of war. These armed groups have specifically targeted civilian settlements, recruited child soldiers and attacked unarmed women and children across South Sudan (Gridneff, 2014a).

Neither of these belligerents has been inclined to end the conflict, as there is no shortage of weapons and ammunition with which to continue fighting. Many of the weapons that have been found in the possession of these armed groups are of Chinese origin (Gridneff, 2014a).

China has been considered one of Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest suppliers of SALW, as well as one of the least transparent major arms exporters. Although China has officially stated that it conducts its SALW transfers responsibly, that it is committed to preventing illicit small arms proliferation in Africa, and that it acknowledges the effects that these weapons have on political stability, economic development, peace and security. Chinese weapons have been found and misused in African states under UNSC arms embargoes and in states known internationally for human rights abuses.

While China has recently become more open to reaching agreements on acceptable arms control policies and preventing the illegal proliferation of SALW, in the past its role was one of indifference. The reports that have been provided by China, detailing its small arms transfers and controls, have become more in line with United Nations requirements in recent years, however, according to Bromley, Duchâtel and Holtom (2013), there are still discrepancies in these reports.

China’s lack of adherence to UNSC arms embargos in Africa in the past have been overlooked to some extent, due to its long standing foreign affairs policy of non-interference in the political affairs of foreign states. The manner that China has chosen to conduct its arms transfers in Africa in the past should no longer be overlooked, especially as its involvement in the conflicts of South Sudan and Sudan have interfered, according to China’s own standards, with the internal affairs of these states.

In the late 1990s China began to establish more efficient arms control systems that ensured its SALW related transfers would be handled as administrative matters. In 2002, China
implemented a system known as the Regulations on the Administration of Arms Exports. This system ensures that the Chinese state and military have fully centralized control of its SALW transfers in order to prevent illicit and potentially destabilizing weapons exports (Bromley, Duchâtel & Holtom, 2013).

The system employs analysts to determine whether the requested SALW transfer are conductive to the defence capabilities of the recipient state and what these weapons’ potential influences are on the stability, peace and security in the recipients region would be, as well as if these weapons could interfere with the internal affairs of the state (Bromley, Duchâtel & Holtom, 2013).

This is an important factor to take into consideration in the case of South Sudan and the numerous post-2002 reports of Chinese weapons being used in human rights violations, as well as statements made by the Chinese government that they did not realise that their state-owned arms manufacturers and exporters, including NORINCO, had been transferring SALW into Sudan and South Sudan.

China is a major supplier of SALW to African states who are usually affected by conflict and have fragile economies in need of development, but many of these states are also rich in natural resources. The intended recipients of Chinese small arms and munitions have caused international concern that the potential effects of China’s weapons on these states may destabilize the state and negatively affect human security and peace operations. As mentioned previously, China’s willingness in the past to supply African states in violation of UNSC sanctions, known human rights abuses and internal oppression, adheres to its non-interference policies (Bromley, Duchâtel & Holtom, 2013).

Analysts have observed that although China’s actual revenues gained from SALW transfers to South Sudan are low, it is one of its most important suppliers. A reason for these low reported revenues may be attributed to China’s lack of transparency, competitive pricing and alternative financing options which include, bartered trade, mining concessions and soft loans, but may also include China’s notorious arms-for-energy policy (Bromley, Duchâtel & Holtom, 2013).

The ongoing civil war in South Sudan has seen the state purchase over US$1 billion on small arms, light weapons, heavy weapons and delivery systems since December 2013. Over the same period, 114 international humanitarian organizations, including UN agencies concerned
with the situation in South Sudan, have appealed for more than US$1.3 billion towards humanitarian aid and relief for those who have been affected by the conflict (Gridneff, 2014b).

South Sudan purchases weapons from China because other major arms exporters, including Europe and the United States (US) will not sell them these weapons. The US advises that other states should finance South Sudan’s humanitarian assistance efforts rather than further providing the state with weapons which continue to fuel the conflict (Gridneff, 2014b).

The South Sudanese government and rebel forces have claimed that they are looking to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict, however, neither party has done much to end the fighting, instead both sides are locked in an arms race and continue to obtain more SMALW (Gridneff, 2014b).

While there is currently no arms embargo on South Sudan, analysis and reports have consistently described the devastating consequences of SALW proliferation on human security, peace and development in the state. China is not the only international agent supplying one or more South Sudan’s factions with SALW, compared to others like Sudan, who has been accused of supporting and supplying rebel groups with SALW too, China is in a position of responsibility and as a partner of South Sudan, it knows that these weapons will be used in direct contravention of human rights and the development of peace and stability in the region (Tiezzi, 2015b).

The violence in South Sudan can partly be attributed to the diverse ethnic divisions across the state and the subsequent ethnic intolerance between these groups. These divisions are further caused by the political dynamics of South Sudan’s government, with President Salva Kiir being a member of the Dinka ethnic majority, and Vice-President Riek Machar a member of the Nuer ethnic group (Tiezzi, 2015b).

Armed forces of both sides in South Sudan’s civil war have been reported to have targeted civilians of their opposing ethnic group as a part of their tactics. Thousands of civilians have been raped, murdered, displaced, tortured, burned alive and mutilated throughout the conflict, while the supply of SALW and ammunition to the Kiir loyal Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and to the Machar loyal Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SLPA-IO) has increased, which has escalated and prolonged the conflict (Tiezzi, 2015b).
5.3. Socio – political effects of SALW in South Sudan

The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 had put an end to the ongoing civil conflict that South Sudan (the Southern region of the state before its independence from Sudan) had been experiencing. After South Sudan had become an independent state from Sudan, however, the consequences of these past conflicts were even more noticeable. Some of these consequences include chronic underdevelopment, mass internal displacement and inter-community armed conflict between traditions, ethnic divisions and religion (BICC, 2007). The situation was made worse by the distinct lack of government presence, combined with the actions of armed rebel groups around South Sudan, which had led to high levels of criminal activity along its borders, including smuggling, arms proliferation, and armed bandit raids on communities for their cattle, food and supplies (Farr, Myrttinen & Schnabel, 2010).

There are various levels of conflict in South Sudan, each with different causes, ranging from individual disputes, to larger scale in-fighting between groups over issues of marriage, cattle ownership, pastures, religion, water and political conflict. The presence of SALW in these situations often encouraged them to resort to violence when a solution could not be found. Historically in South Sudan, violence between livestock and crop farmers over grazing rights, ownership and cattle raiding was common, but before the introduction of small arms, these conflicts had almost always been settled with spears and melee weapons. These weapons, while brutal, required a more specific target in close quarters and therefore there were fewer fatalities in these disputes (BICC, 2007).

The proliferation of small arms during the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983 – 2005) led to a changing conflict dynamic in rural South Sudan, when spears were replaced with firearms. A cattle raid inter-tribal dispute in the past, which was fought with close quarters weapons, now lead to tens or even hundreds of casualties. Many of the traditional means to resolve conflicts through negotiations between community’s elders have also been rendered less effective through the introduction of small arms in these situations, as these weapons empower those who wield them, usually armed young men, leaving the elders powerless to intervene (BICC, 2007).

The Jonglei region in South Sudan, as an example, is among one of the least developed within the state. It has a population of around 1.3 million Sudanese spread across a number of ethnic communities. Following their pastoralist traditions, many of these inhabitants migrate
seasonally in order to keep their cattle well fed. These seasonal migrations have become primary triggers of inter-communal violent conflict, through territorial struggles that govern grazing rights and access to water in the region (International Crisis Group, 2009).

Communities within Jonglei become increasingly involved in conflict as the tension between them is aggravated by their traditions of tribalism which govern territorial rights, their political affiliations and perceptions of justice. Armed conflict has become a prevalent means of resolving these disputes, furthered by members of these communities having been former soldiers and retaining their small arms and light weapons from past conflicts. Many of these fighters also maintain their past allegiances which, when faced with opposition, tends to escalate a minor issue into an armed confrontation between larger groups (International Crisis Group, 2009).

In a similar manner to Jonglei, the state of Eastern Equatoria in South Sudan has seen some of the worst famine and food shortages in the region. Food Insecurity has been reported as one of the most salient factors for increasing levels of armed conflict and violence. As with Jonglei, while in search for water and grazing, cattle farmers are required to migrate extensively during periods of drought, leading their communities into areas where they become involved in conflict with hostile communities. This area has seen the number of people injured by SALW increase from about 2 injuries per month, to more than 2 per week by 2009 (HSBA, 2010).

Conflict has all but destroyed the official justice system of South Sudan. Most of the already limited judicial system that was in place before South Sudan’s civil war was crippled as development, legal education and the implementation of an efficient legal system was halted. As a result of the conflict, there has been limited reintegration of a formal legal and judicial system in South Sudan which lead communities to rely on traditional courts and a customary justice system. These customary laws provide a much needed source of order and cohesion among South Sudanese communities, especially in times of conflict, through which issues are resolved. However, customary law often negatively impacts women through its traditional patriarchal bias (HSBA, 2012b).

The existing traditions of Sudanese customary law are patriarchal; some of these laws reduce women to a lower status in their community and family’s hierarchy, while some of their enforced customs are directly harmful to these women. Women in these traditional societies are seen to have an equally important position in society as that of men, which is to ensure
the survival of their families; however their role in these positions is that of subservience to their husbands (HSBA, 2012b).

Throughout South Sudan, official law enforcement services are ineffective, police training is rudimentary and the force itself is usually under-resourced both financially and numbers. Police, therefore, are given little training on dealing with gender violence, and often lack important knowledge concerning women’s rights in these cases. Police have also reportedly been known to arrest victims of rape, charging these women with adultery or keeping them in police custody until a perpetrator has been caught (HSBA, 2012b).

While Sudanese law explicitly prohibits sexual violence, section 247 of the Penal Code Act excludes forced marital sex from its legal definition of rape, regardless of whether or not the act is accompanied with violence. Rapists who are convicted of these crimes often face minor sentences, such as facing a few months in prison or being required to pay a fine to the woman’s family. According to a Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment report in 2012, these mild punishments and lack of policing have, to a great extent, led to the belief that men can rape with impunity (HSBA, 2012b).

Customary law also permits a certain level of domestic violence against Sudanese women, as long as that woman is either the wife or daughter of the man. Domestic violence is considered acceptable in customary courts if the woman is found guilty of failing to fulfil her ‘duties’ as a wife or daughter. These duties include cooking, cleaning, not speaking out of turn or insulting their husband or father and not consuming alcohol. Women who take their husbands to court in cases of excessive domestic abuse are often themselves sentenced by these customary courts. As a result of these dynamics, women are often afraid to report cases of domestic violence out of fear that their husbands will become act more aggressively towards them (HSBA, 2012b).

The traditions of Sudanese customary law also include that the death of a woman’s husband does not automatically terminate their marital contract. A widow is legally considered still married to her late-husband which means that, although the estate is distributed among his male relatives, many of these widows become financially dependent on their late-husbands families. This law has commonly left widows in South Sudan evicted from their family’s homes and left on their own to survive. During times of conflict, this problem is exacerbated by the number of married male combatants killed in the fighting and leaving their widows with nothing (HSBA, 2012b).
The lack of an efficient legal system combined with the prevalence of SALW in South Sudan have increased the number of cases of rape, domestic violence and other forms of sexual and gender violence across the region. The perpetrators of these crimes are rarely charged with the crime, and the victims have nowhere to report the injustices against them, lest they are themselves charged or shunned from their own communities (Hudson, 2005).

5.4. China – South Sudan oil diplomacy and relations

China’s traditional views of its military relations with African governments follow its policy of non-interference. In South Sudan, however, both sides of the conflict have committed human rights violations and have threatened China’s economic interests, forcing the Chinese government to become uniquely involved in the internal affairs of South Sudan, while also trying to find a long term solution to peace and stability in the region (Gridneff, 2014b).

Although China has maintained its policy of political non-interference in the internal-affairs of other foreign states, in the case of South Sudan it realised that it would have to make an exception to its policy if its national resource and energy interests in Sudanese oil were to be protected (Tiezzi, 2013).

China’s government purchases oil from Sudan in order to meet its energy demands that fuel the states domestic economy. South Sudan supplies around 5% of China’s total oil imports, making it around the fourth largest supplier after Iran, Oman and Saudi Arabia. According to Lindsay (2015), in return for its oil, China exports small arms and light weapons to South Sudan as well as providing FDI to support the African state’s growing demand for military systems and support (Lindsay, 2015).

China is one of South Sudan’s largest buyers of oil, the supply of which dropped to a third of the state’s production capacity when the South Sudanese civil war began between President Kiir’s government forces and rebel forces which are loyal to Vice President Machar (Gridneff, 2014a). China consumes over 80 percent of South Sudan’s oil export. Through ongoing conflict its production capacity dropped from 245,000 barrels per day in 2013, to only 163,000 barrels per day by July 2015. This too has encouraged China to become more active in resolving the conflict in South Sudan, in order to repair the damage and once again improve the oil production capacity of the African state in conflict (Tiezzi, 2015b).
Throughout the 1990s, well before South Sudan became independent, China invested heavily into Sudan’s oil industry. Oil fields that were originally discovered by US oil company Chevron were developed by China who built Sudan’s oil refinery and other production facilities, pipelines between the interior to Port Sudan on the Red Sea. While Sudan’s oil production and export capabilities were functioning as intended, the smaller African state supplied between 5 and 6 percent of China’s total global oil imports (Shinn, 2012).

Southern Sudan faced a six year period of indecision before it decided to vote on whether or not it would become independent of Sudan or remain a single state. China realized early on in this process that Southern Sudan would most likely become an independent state, as well as the fact that the largest oil fields were situated in the South. China’s priority became that of diplomatically improving its relations with the soon to be South Sudan, in order to ensure it retained access to its oil investments (Shinn, 2012).

This diplomacy was further complicated by the fact that China had been an important SALW exporter to Sudan’s government, who used these weapons during the civil war against Southern Sudan. While China continued to consolidate its relationship with Sudan, it began to improve its position among the Southern government that was being created in Juba. China became one of the first foreign states to establish an embassy in South Sudan. The Beijing government also invited high profile South Sudanese politicians, including President Salva Kiir, to visit China and promised to prioritize investments and support for the new government in South Sudan.

In July 2011, South Sudan formally became an independent state, leaving only 25 percent of the original oil capacity and most of the production facilities in Sudan, while around 75 percent of the state’s oil became the property of South Sudan, which did not have the capacity to refine this oil. Besides an imbalanced oil settlement, the independence of South Sudan left numerous other issues between Sudan and South Sudan, including how to divide the revenues from oil exports once production resumed. In 2012, Sudan and South Sudan were still unable to agree upon the amounts that would be paid to South Sudan for its oil, leading the Southern state to halt all further oil production (Shinn, 2012).

This situation was least beneficial to China, who quickly became more actively involved in diplomatically encouraging both Sudan and South Sudan’s government to come to an agreement on the terms and conditions of the future of their oil industry, successfully ending
the deadlock between the two states and re-enabling oil to be exported within a year (Shinn, 2012).

In the case of South Sudan’s civil war, in which its factions are ethnically divided between the Nuer and Dinka, China’s national interests in South Sudan, and the potential damage that the conflict may have on its capacity to export oil, have taken preference over its policy of non-interference and forced China into a more active role than it usually plays in mediating between factions and finding a means to end the South Sudan’s civil war (Tiezzi, 2015).

China has become increasingly involved in resolving the conflict peacefully, and has contributed to UN operations by providing the UN in South Sudan with an additional 700 peacekeepers, effectively tripling the number of Chinese peacekeepers that had previously been engaged in UN operations. China’s funding to aid South Sudan has been actively increasing too, as of 2015 China has sent at least US $21 million towards humanitarian aid (Tiezzi, 2015). According to a Small Arms Survey report, China’s involvement in South Sudan also includes funding an armed militia group to protect its oil interests in the state, which are run by China’s state owned China National Petroleum Company (Kuo, 2015).

This unique form of involvement by the Chinese government in South Sudan has been criticized by the international community as having been sent selfishly in the protection of its own economic interests in South Sudan’s oil industry, rather than being concerned with the humanitarian crisis. In contrast to this argument, as oil is the state’s primary export industry, ongoing conflict and any damage to the oil industry would have a negative economic impact on the South Sudanese people the most, worsening their ongoing plight (Tiezzi, 2015).

Regardless of how powerful and resourceful a state may be, it is limited in its time and resources that it can dedicate to any one place at a given time, therefore, even a state in China’s current position as a global economic power and development partner to African states, its focus can only be in a limited number of places which have to be decided by the state. In a scenario like the above, it can be argued that China focuses on foreign states where its own national interests need protecting and where the economic value of peace in these states are worth becoming actively involved, if only to implement a short term solution for the time being. As China’s interests in South Sudan are long term and economically valuable, it will seek to actively resolve the ongoing conflict more actively than it would in another state with similar issues.
During the UN Security Council votes to impose sanctions and arms embargoes on Sudan’s Darfur region in both 2004 and 2005, China abstained from voting but gave three reasons as to why it was against the arms embargo. It argued that the situation in Sudan was not a threat to regional or international peace and security and therefore Chapter 7 of the UN charter was not applicable to the issues being voted on. China’s second arguments against the arms embargoes were that neither the Sudanese government nor its sub-regional organizations were requesting aid or a response to their actions from the UNSC and should be left to resolve their own disputes. A final point made in defence of its decision to abstain from a vote for the implementation of an arms embargo was that it was strictly against its principle of non-interference to become involved in the domestic affairs and actions of another sovereign state (Bromley, Duchâtel & Holtom, 2013).

In 2010 to 2011, China also attempted to block the UN panel of expert’s reports from being published as they contained information and recommendations for sanctions against Sudan’s Darfur region. In particular, the 2010 report of the UN Panel of Experts on Darfur got the full attention of the Chinese government when it became aware that information in these reports claimed that the SALW that had been used to attack members of the UN/AU joint operation in Darfur (UNAMID) were of Chinese origin (Bromley, Duchâtel & Holtom, 2013).

These reports did not directly imply that China had violated the UN arms embargo in Darfur but they note that China had not responded to requests pertaining to information on the origins of the ammunition, and because China had supplied weapons and ammunition to parts of Sudan not under an arms embargo, knowing that these weapons would end up being misused in Darfur. Behind the façade of being offended by these reports, the international community began to realize that there is more to Sudan and South Sudan’s China relations than had been apparent in the past (Bromley, Duchâtel & Holtom, 2013).

5.5. **Chinese small arms proliferation in Sudan and South Sudan**

Sudan began exporting oil in 1997, after which, its military expenditure rose drastically. Most of the financing used to supply Sudan with these weapons came from the profits that it made selling oil to China. A large portion of these profits flowed back to China as it supplied Sudan with SALW, military vehicles and support.
Between 2003 and 2006, China sold Sudan over US $55 million in SALW to Sudan’s government. Over the same period of time, some of the worst human rights violations in Sudan’s history were committed by its government against its people. Post 2004, after the UNSC had imposed an arms embargo on Darfur, China has been almost exclusively providing Sudan’s government with small arms. In 2004 China’s SALW transfers consisted of 89.95% of Sudan’s small arms imports, 94.16% in 2005 and in 2006 it supplied 87.66% of the total SALW imported. These figures only include transactions that have been declared, while yearly illicit small arms imports cannot as be calculated (Human Rights First, 2011).

In 2004 the UNSC implemented resolution 1556, which imposed a mandatory arms embargo, prohibiting all UN member states from transferring arms into Darfur. While both China and Sudan were included in this resolution, the terms of this embargo were ignored through loopholes, which ‘permitted’ agents of Sudanese government to operate within Darfur, who were transferring arms into the region. Resolution 1591 of 2005 was implemented to counter this influx of weapons in the region, and extended the embargo to all agents of the Sudanese government from transferring weapons and operating in the Darfur region.

In 2010, UNSC resolution 1945 was imposed in response to reports that weapons that were legally transferred to Sudan were being used in the Darfur conflict. This resolution forced all arms imports to contain detailed end user licensing agreements and was passed unanimously except for China, which abstained from the vote (Small Arms Survey, 2012).

Chinese government officials denied that they had been selling weapons to Sudan because of the arms embargo in place; but later admitted to these sales claiming instead that the transfers were not later redirected into Darfur. UN observers in Darfur however, reported a wide variety of Chinese weaponry being used in the region, including small arms, machine guns, anti-aircraft weaponry and mortars (Human Rights First, 2011).

Chinese companies have also assisted the Sudanese government in constructing at least three manufacturing facilities for SALW and ammunition outside of Khartoum. These facilities produce Chinese designed weapons including machine guns, rocket launchers, mortars and anti-tank weaponry, while Chinese engineers had been supervising the manufacturing process at these facilities (Human Rights First, 2011). Some analysts also note, however, that there is a shroud of secrecy regarding China’s actual direct involvement in the manufacturing process in these facilities (Bromley, Duchâtel & Holtom, 2013).
While the continued sale of these weapons means that China must have known that its weapons were being used in human rights violations, as well as failing to comply with the standards of the UNSC embargo, it continues to supply these weapons to the region, albeit more carefully in the post-independence era (Gridneff, 2014a).

In 2014, the Chinese government suspended its weapons sales to South Sudan after its state owned arms manufacturer China North Industries Group Corp (NORINCO) had been discovered to have sold more than US $38 million worth of SALW and equipment to the South Sudanese government, which has been engaged in a brutal civil war. After the fact had been discovered, the Chinese government claimed that it would be inappropriate to further supply South Sudan with weaponry, although this came after a major shipment of SALW had been delivered to the state (Gridneff, 2014a).

The weapons shipments were originally confirmed through marine-insurance documentation sent by brokers handing the weapons shipment insurance. Although South Sudan’s Defence Minister, General Juuk, claimed that the SALW and munitions from China were ordered before the violence broke out in South Sudan in December 2013. These documents include detailed packing lists that include transfers of 9, 574 assault rifles, 2, 394 grenade launchers, 4 million rounds of assault rifle ammunition, 2 million rounds of handgun ammunition, 319 heavy machine guns, 660 pistols and over 20, 000 40mm grenades and 4000 rounds of high-explosive anti-tank rockets. Another packing list contains over US $14.5 million in SALW, including 100 anti-tank weapons systems, 1, 200 missiles and spare parts (Gridneff, 2014b).

According to China’s Sudan embassy, its government had asked that China’s arms manufacturing and export companies halt all SALW transfers to South Sudan once the war began. Considering that Chinese arms manufacturers and transfers are centrally controlled and state owned industries, it is surprising that the government did not know that it was still supplying South Sudan with SALW until the international community discovered and mentioned these transfers (Gridneff, 2014a).

The reports of these weapons sales saw Amnesty International form a coalition with several dozen NGOs to impose an arms embargo against South Sudan in order to prevent further SALW from entering the war-torn state. Some critics have noted that the Chinese government’s sudden decision to halt further weapons sales to South Sudan were conveniently timed to ensure that at least one major shipment arrived in the state, before the transfer’s contract was frozen (Gridneff, 2014a).
In 2015, the Chinese government was again accused of transferring weapons to South Sudan, even after the government had been accused of murdering entire villages, burning down the villages of these communities with their people still inside the buildings and raping women and children indiscriminately. China’s arms company NORINCO had again transferred more than US $20 million worth of SALW including over 10,000 assault rifles, grenade launchers, missile launchers, munitions and 24 million rounds of ammunition (Kuo, 2015).

During the 1990s Chinese weaponry began appearing more frequently in conflicts across Sub-Saharan Africa. While many of these weapons were recycled between African states and conflict zones, China was also found to have directly supplied many of these weapons to opposition groups during these conflicts. Reports appeared of China’s arms for energy trading policies, especially regarding Sudan’s oil exports to China post 1997. China has remained a major supplier of conventional SALW throughout. While its motives for supplying arms to African states vary, they include a combination of political leverage, security and economic factors that drive these transfers (Bromley, Duchâtel & Holtom, 2013).

China has gained criticism and unwanted attention on published reports correlating the relationship between its chosen African sources that provide the Chinese economy with its required natural resource and energy imports, and the value of exported small arms and light weapons to these states. It has been suggested that China focuses on securing exclusive access to sources of energy and raw materials in Africa, by providing its intended target with SALW regardless of the political balance and potential human security issues of these states. The value of these transactions and their volume may not necessarily need to be enormous for the effects of these weapons, when sent to fragile and conflict prone states, to be devastating (Bromley, Duchâtel & Holtom, 2013).

Sudan reported SALW imports of only US $3 million worth to UN Comtrade over 2008-2009. While there has been criticism of China’s unofficial small arms for oil policy, and certain figures correspond with one another, there is not enough evidence to definitively prove this. It remains a possibility as the South Sudanese government’s SPLA is primarily armed with some modern Chinese made SALW (Bromley, Duchâtel & Holtom, 2013).

The official position of the Chinese government is that SALW should not be transferred to unauthorized non-state actors however there is significant evidence that armed non-state actors across sub-Saharan Africa are armed with Chinese manufactured SALW. A number of
these weapons are stolen from government forces, but in many cases these weapons are imported from China and later redistributed by the government to non-state actors. An example of this retransferring is that in 2006, members of the Chadian United Front for Democratic Change (FUC) were photographed with Chinese made QLZ-87 35mm automatic grenade launchers in Sudan, where these rebels had been openly supported by the Sudanese government (Bromley, Duchâtel & Holtom, 2013).

The constant flow of SALW into South Sudan has created a legacy of violence which has manifested itself in the instability of South Sudan. In the regions of this violence civilians are suffering the most. Between 2011 and 2012 more than 900 bombs were dropped indiscriminately, killing and maiming hundreds of innocent civilians. These bombings increased in 2014, due to more advanced technologies that the government had obtained from China (Lindsay, 2015).

Armed forces have been targeting civilians throughout the conflict, and these new technologies have allowed them to strike from further away and more accurately target homes, schools, hospitals and churches across the region. One of the deadliest weapons that were supplied by China is the Weishi series of WS-1 rockets, which can reach targets over 45km away with extreme precision. These four meter long rockets have been used to target ‘rebel’ forces throughout the region; however, these weapons have caused wide-spread devastation to the lives of civilians and created a large number of refugees (Lindsay, 2015).

The lack of state controls and infrastructure in South Sudan have allowed many of these SALW to remain in use and the possession of ex-combatants after a conflict has ended, which has led to armed violence becoming a norm during domestic and communal disputes. While these weapons are challenging to recover, the violation of sanctions and new arms transfers by Chinese actors have further added to the problems in the region (Lindsay, 2015).

5.6. Gendered influence of SALW in South Sudan

The destruction of values caused by violent conflict, including the violent disruption of political, economic and social norms of African societies, play a large role in changing the dynamics of gender relations. The way that a society is reshaped both during and amid post-conflict turmoil is also affected by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.
In Sudan, as arms proliferation, armed violence and displacement continues to plague the state, the rights of women in the region are ignored as they are continually sexually assaulted and forced into sexual slavery. The case of Tabit, in which 221 young girls and women were systematically raped by armed government forces, is an example of how gender violence and sexual assault are being used as a weapon in these conflicts, where civilians are targeted in order to provoke, destroy and terrify opposition forces (Lindsay, 2015).

Conflict persists across large parts of Sudan and South Sudan where local armed conflicts are exacerbated by the proliferation of small arms. These conflicts disrupt communities and cost the lives of civilians in the vicinity of the violence, and are targeted specifically. While men are almost exclusively the perpetrators of armed violence in South Sudan, women make up many of their victims. The increasing number of women casualties in these conflicts has shown that they are no longer caught in the cross-fire of these conflicts but that they have become a deliberate target in order to destroy communities (Hutchinson and Jok, 2002).

The influx of SALW in South Sudan began during the Second Sudanese civil war; hereafter firearms became an important symbol of masculinity and power in South Sudan, even becoming a form of dowry in some regions. Firearms, although efficient, depersonalized the act of killing and wounding opponents, in South Sudan this contributed to othering and dehumanization between communities and ethnic groups. Through this depersonalization, targeting the women and children of other tribes became a natural extension of acceptable practices in conflicts (Farr, Myrttinen & Schnabel, 2010).

A tragic example of violence against women in the region occurred in 1991, when South Sudanese women and children were targeted by the SPLA in Bor. The SPLA soldiers killed over 2,000 civilians and created more than 200,000 refugees. In this attack, there were a disturbingly high number of South Sudanese women raped and brutally mutilated at gunpoint. This event set a new precedent of violence during the civil war among the South Sudanese (HSBA, 2012a).

During focus groups that were set up in South Sudan to discuss the experiences of women during conflict in 2010, very few of the women interviewed wanted to speak of their own experiences, instead relating their experiences as though speaking of a friend or person that they knew. Almost all of these women had been raped by soldiers over the duration of the conflict. Most of these women claimed that their abusers were northern soldiers of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), but it was later discovered that many of these women had
also been raped and abused by southern SPLA soldiers. These women were afraid to mention that the SPLA were as much to blame for their pain and psychological trauma as the SAF, because there was the possibility that they would be victimized after having spoken out against them (HSBA, 2012a).

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have reported instances of rape carried out by SPLA forces against individuals and as a part of a policy that encourages retaliatory rape against entire communities in South Sudan. There are also numerous cases of sexual violence causing internal displacement, as well as increasing due to the vulnerability of refugees as they flee to other regions (HSBA, 2012a).

While sexual violence in South Sudan is often ethnically or politically motivated, in refugee camps it has been found to be the result of cultural notions of sexual enslavement and forced marriages. The patriarchal norms in South Sudan often followed women, even as refugees, where they are abducted from these camps and often sold into sexual slavery or forced marriages to the highest bidders across the region (HSBA, 2012a).

In 2009, Doctors Without Borders (MSF) reported that at least eight attacks specifically targeting women and children had killed more than 1,200 people. These attacks were increasingly focused on villages and targeting women and children as a tactic to weaken the resolve of opposition forces (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2009).

One of these attacks on a village in the Upper Nile state saw armed forces surrounding the village, leaving only the river open to escape. These attackers then began to systematically massacre the women and children in the village. Over 3 hours, 71 women and children were shot and killed and more than 57 were wounded. The range at which the attack took place meant that the group knew that it was specifically targeting women, as well as survivors mentioning that the attackers had been singing and laughing as they slaughtered these civilians (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2009).

In another focus group in 2012, South Sudanese Nuer women blamed the inter-tribal conflict and violence on a lack of food security. The women claimed that they put pressure on their husbands to bring them food, which encouraged these men to raid other tribes. This leads to a cycle of reducing agricultural activities and increasing food shortages, as cultivating food then makes a community vulnerable to being attacked by other tribes. This has led to the
present situation in which food insecurity and inter-communal violence and raiding has become the norm (HSBA, 2012a).

In April 2015, South Sudan’s military turned its focus to the Upper Nile region, which intensified the conflict and led to excessive armed violence against the civilians in the region, which claimed the lives thousands and spread terror as women and children were specifically targeted in these attacks. South Sudan’s government forces began this offensive because they had recently received the means to conduct these operations through the transfer of new military equipment, including SALW, helicopters and amphibious vehicles which were used to quickly overwhelm the rebel forces in the area (Tiezzi, 2015b).

Armed violence has contributed to the exclusion of women from making security decisions in South Sudan, while the causes and effects of sexual violence against these women need to be addressed if they are to play a part in disarmament and peace building activities in the region (Farr, Myrttinen & Schnabel, 2010).

5.7. Gendered resistance and exclusion from peace processes

Women have specific needs, perspectives, priorities and ideas that need to be included in peace negotiations to ensure that their requirements are met during the implementation of peace agreements. If, however, South Sudan focused on reducing its gender inequality, women can make positive and lasting contributions to peace, security and justice in post-conflict negotiations.

While women’s rights activists and civil-society movements in Sudan have struggled to consolidate and hold their communities together through conflict and in times of peace, Sudanese women have invariably been excluded from the formal peace process. Women’s organizations in Sudan have been registered as observers and throughout Sudan and South Sudan’s conflicts women have provided their findings and perspectives that are both viable and sustainable towards successful peace agreements, yet these findings have never been included in the peace process. During the 2005 peace talks between the northern and southern factions of the Sudanese civil war, Sudanese women were physically prevented from attending these peace talks by government employees. The physical exclusion as well as academic exclusion of women in South Sudan has become a major issue, yet one which is consistently ignored (Yahia, 2014).
In Sudan, women’s organizations are involved in peace-building regardless of which side of the conflict they are on. These organizations and social movements have various capacities with which they can empower women to become involved in the formal peace-building process. Women’s organizations face obstacles that include poverty, diseases, governance, funding, human rights abuses, small arms proliferation and gender based violence, all of which are further complicated by ongoing conflict and their exclusion from the peace-process so that they are given the chance to make a difference (Yahia, 2014).

Women in Africa have taken on roles of leadership in combatting and preventing armed violence through raising their community’s awareness of DDR operations, through social movements and by petitioning the international community for their support. Despite their ongoing efforts, many of these women and their movements have been disregarded during the decision making processes that determine the methods that will be used in small arms control policies. The UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000), was a strong and positive step forwards for the inclusion of women in the decision making process, towards conflict prevention and peace-building. Unfortunately, disarmament and post-conflict weapons collections programmes have been shown to disregard women as a viable means of encouraging disarmament and as such, very few of these programmes have treated the interests of women as that of an equal or as strategically important. In practice, according to UNSC resolution 1325, women have neither been implemented in arms control and disarmament process decision making in a meaningful manner, nor have they been included in their full capacity of participation as active and influential actors in peace and security operations (Pytlak, 2010).

South Sudanese society stereotypically reduces women to the role of support, encouraging them to remain in a domestic environment and denying women the ability and right to partake in decision making processes. This has left men even making decisions on issues that mostly relate to women. Sudanese women have potentially important roles to fill in positions of governance and leadership, and their unique perspectives through having gendered values, which include more careful analysis of human security issues than men, should not be denied by male members of society (Kong, 2016).

Women in South Sudan can act as powerful catalysts for change, and while there are educated women in positions of power in South Sudan’s larger cities like Juba, the most salient issues of gender inequality need to be addressed in the rural parts of the state. In these
areas, tribal communities are in need of transformation away from gendered inter-tribal politics which currently encourage further ethnic and political divisions, leading to outbreaks of armed conflict in the region (HSBA, 2012a).

The potential strength that Sudanese women have if they work together can undoubtedly bring peaceful, positive change and development to South Sudan. Women need to be made aware of the power that they inherently possess to overcome the decades of oppression, abuse and exclusion cast onto them by patriarchal masculinity in South Sudanese societies. These women’s movements and women’s rights activists have the ability to actively become the most important brokers of peace during negotiations, to take back their homes, transform their communities and later, their nation, into a peaceful and prosperous state.

5.8. Chapter Summary

This chapter examines South Sudan in a case study that uses concepts mentioned in previous chapters. The first section provides background information on the situation in South Sudan; this is followed by research done on the socio-political effects of small arms in the region. The findings include that a major source of conflict in South Sudan are its political and ethnic divisions, however, this conflict is further fuelled by the availability of small arms. China has keen interests in South Sudan’s oil and its interests and actions have changed over time, earlier in its relationship with South Sudan, China was supplying weapons in order to gain access to oil in the region. Since conflict in South Sudan became a civil war (in which weapons were supplied by China) and consequently a threat to its oil industry, China is doing everything possible to protect its oil interests in the region, including mediating and attempting to broker peace agreements to end the conflict. Throughout South Sudan, however, women have been targeted by armed groups on both sides, and raped, abused and murdered brutally.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

6.1. Introduction

This chapter concludes the research study, presents important findings made throughout the study, discusses several limitations that the researcher encountered, and provides recommendations for future study. This study set out to determine if a relationship exists between the China-Africa arms trade and ongoing violent conflict in Africa. More importantly, it aimed to determine to what extent the SALW supplied by China to Africa influence issues of human security in Africa.

This study has determined that there is a relationship between the China-Africa arms trade and the ongoing violent conflict in certain African states due to the availability of small arms in socio-politically and economically fragile states. This argument has been discussed throughout the study, but it is important to conclude that regardless of speculation on the effects of arms proliferation, the arms trade does not provide an answer to ending conflict in Africa.

In times of conflict, China has supplied small arms to African states that have used these weapons to supply their armed forces and rebel groups in neighbouring regions with SALW. These weapons have destabilized the region, exacerbated existing conflicts and provided armed groups in volatile African states with the ability to attack, oppress, and terrorize opposition forces and civilians. China has supplied many of the weapons used in human rights violations in Africa, especially in fragile states including Sudan, South Sudan and Zimbabwe.

Through looking at how women in Africa have been affected by violent conflict, this study has also determined the extent of the effects of China’s SALW transfers on African women’s human security. During armed conflicts women are exposed to brutal acts of rape, sexual enslavement, torture, being specifically targeted and murdered by armed groups, as well as increased levels of armed domestic and gender based violence. Through focusing on a specific few African states, and more closely at the situation in South Sudan, it can be argued that the China-African arms trade has negatively influenced women’s human security in these regions, both directly and indirectly.
The actions that the Chinese government have taken in the past have led to authoritarian regimes in Africa, some of which have UN Security Council arms embargoes imposed on them, being supplied with SALW from China. These weapons have been used to repeatedly attack civilians including women and children, creating refugees and exposing African women to horrors that could have been avoided if these states were deprived of these weapons to begin with.

This study has also discovered that while China has made numerous arms transfers that have had a negative influence on human security in Africa, they are slowly beginning to adjust their foreign policies to more carefully deal with humanitarian issues. Although certain African states have proven themselves to equally irresponsible in their misuse of SALW, as their supplier, it remains China’s responsibility to change the way that it conducts its international affairs with African states. As an emerging power in Africa, it is up to China to take responsibility for its past actions in supplying already unstable authoritarian regimes in African with SALW, and refrain from providing these states with further weapons transfers.

Lastly, this research study has determined that the most prominent source of resistance to armed violence against women in Africa is women. For this reason, their formal inclusion in processes of small arms control, peace-making, peace-building and disarmament operations are of utmost importance to the success and viability of these operations, and therefore, to improving women’s human security in Africa.

6.2. Findings: Women in Africa are resisting armed violence

In order to take gender properly into account, it is important that we acknowledge that while the statistical majority of fatal casualties in African armed conflicts are men, women are more frequently abused, raped, tortured and victimized by armed groups both during and after conflicts. For this reason it is important to fully and formally include women in processes of small arms control, peace-making, peace-building and post-conflict disarmament, as they are the key to successfully preventing and reducing gender and gun violence.

In several ongoing studies, women continue to be misrepresented as the largest percentage of fatal casualties of armed violence, while their contributions and potential to reduce violence, improve security, and enhance peace-building operations, especially during the disarmament process, have gone largely unnoticed. The contributions that women have made in peace-building and security receive little support and are usually referred to in passing or are
dismissed as of little consequence to the viability and success of these fields (Farr, Schnabel & Schroeder, 2005).

This ignorance has allowed the work that women have done to resist, reduce and prevent armed violence to be underestimated and brushed aside in situations where the actions of women would have clearly made a difference. It has allowed for women to be portrayed as being solely the victims of small arms and gender violence, rather than allowing women to realize their true potential as key members of society in resisting these forms of violence.

According to Far, Schnabel and Schroeder (2005), post-conflict weapons collection and disarmament programmes have not taken the interests of women into account equally, and while these projects may have achieve some degree of success in the past, the inclusion of women will be the step that needs to be taken in order to convince men to give up their weapons. Women have also played a significant role in disarmament in post – conflict situations in Africa, through encouraging combatants, especially family members and friends to give up their weapons, as well as contributing to the peace building process (Farr, Myrttinen & Schnabel, 2010).

Many small arms collection programmes in Africa offer incentives for handing in these weapons, community development projects and funding in trade for weapons caches and personal weapons kept post-conflict. Case studies have shown that women will usually contribute to these programmes without these added incentives, for no other reason than to rid their communities of small arms and other lethal devices. One of the key roles that women play in these situations is to encourage their friends and family members to give up stockpiled SALW, and these contributions have had an immense influence on the success rate of disarmament operations (Farr, Schnabel & Schroeder, 2005).

International agreements on women’s security work has rarely been recognized or discussed in security and human security related discourse. According to Kirsten (2007), small arms agreements show that weapons proliferation is usually culturally sanctioned by the manipulation of gender ideologies. These documents completely ignore gender concerns and the potential of women being included in DDR operations, except in cases where these documents are designed to focus on gender mainstreaming related topics (Kirsten, 2007).

There is still a need for the international community, especially in Africa, to include women in the peace-building process as called for in the UN Security Council Resolution 1325
(2000), which encourages and recognizes the importance of the inclusion of women in all aspects of peace-building and SALW control. Without the inclusion of women in DDR and other forms of arms control and peace-building, the viable sustainability and success of these programmes are compromised from the start (Farr, 2006).

The importance of involving women in disarmament programmes and their implementation is often understated. This involvement can be achieved through consulting women in threat assessment surveys, the campaigning of information in the private and public sphere and community incentives on how their actions may affect ongoing efforts and that their aid and diligence may be rewarded within their communities. Community based solutions should become a priority (Farr, Myrttinen & Schnabel, 2010).

Women have come up with many ways in which to resist armed violence in Africa, however it is also left to the international community to support these women and women’s movements that are making a stand against the effects of SALW in their homes and communities. Without full equality, inclusion and understanding of the motives and abilities of women against conflict and SALW proliferation, there will be no further progress and these existing DDR programs will continue to see only reduced and marginally successful results.

6.4. Theoretical contributions to feminist human security

This research has taken a different a more specific approach towards improving the human security of women in Africa. While it would be unrealistic to assume that this research has the potential to improve international arms control standards, the manner in which China conducts African international relations and African gender equality in terms of women being formally included in peace building and negotiations, it can be hoped that this research will improve international awareness of the current situation in women’s human security in Africa.

This study has detailed the past actions and events of the China-African arms trade with the aim of creating awareness of the fact that while China is not necessarily the world’s largest arms supplier, the destination of many of its arms transfers have been to fragile and authoritarian African states or states that have been embargoed for good reason. The quantity of small arms and light weapons supplied is less important than the weapons’ destination,
which in the case of China supplying Africa, has led to numerous civilian casualties and human rights violations being committed. While it is legally the sovereign right of a state to maintain a supply of SALW for defensive purposes, the targeting of unarmed women and children, exposing them to rape, violence, economic strife and insecurity has stripped these states of their right to access SALW.

The key theoretical contribution of this research to feminist human security is that although women are victimised by SALW proliferation in Africa, their activism and inclusion in peace negotiations and post-conflict DDR operations are potentially the most important means to reduce the effects of SALW proliferation and armed violence. The dangers of continuing to exclude women in African peace processes are that women in patriarchal African societies will remain victimised, oppressed and perceived as of little consequence to the outcome and resolution of a conflict. To underestimate and ignore the potential influence of women as crucial actors in preventing and mitigating the effects of armed conflict will lead to peace-making and peace-building efforts remaining ineffectual at producing sustainable long-term solutions towards peace, stability and security in Africa.

6.5. Limitations to research

There were a number of limitations that were encountered by the researcher in this study that need to be acknowledged. A limitation to the scope of this study was that existing sources of information on the African arms trade are either limited or outdated. These sources were unable to include comprehensive figures that accurately reflect the quantities, suppliers and locations of small arms and light weapons that have specifically been used in African civil wars, human rights abuses, terrorist activity and crime in their data.

The next limitation that was encountered was the lack of transparency on the part of African states regarding their reported imports of weapons, arms and military support. This has severely impaired data collection, and when available, this data is not consistently reliable. Due to the lack of transparency of information on the China-Africa arms trade, African states and the Chinese government have been able to deny their responsibility for the violent reactions exacerbated by these transfers in unstable African states.

A further limitation caused by the aforementioned lack of transparency, is that there has been limited empirical evidence to suggest that there is a direct causal link between supplying SALW and the outbreak of conflict. It is important to note that while the availability of
SALW exacerbates existing armed conflicts and gender based violence in times of conflict, there is limited evidence to prove that the arms trade actually causes these conflicts.

As the particular perspective used in this study has not been researched before, specifically an analysis of the relationship between the gendered effects that the China-Africa small arms and light weapons trade has on women’s human security in Africa; specific information was challenging to cross-reference. There was a shortage of information relevant to this study on the topics of the effects of small arms on African women, the China-Africa arms trade, and African women’s human security.

6.6. Recommendations for future study

The findings of this study have identified a number of gaps in the literature that would benefit from further research. These fields include African women’s human security, the China-Africa arms trade and the extent that small arms influence human security. The following three areas have been identified as potential topics for further research:

The question of whether or not increasing the availability of small arms and light weapons in unstable regions, either, directly cause conflict or facilitate the escalation of non-violent conflict to violent conflict in these regions. This study should aim to provide evidence of a definitive nature, as this question remains unanswered.

Further study is recommended on China’s role and motives for recently involving itself in African peacekeeping. Is it simply involved to ensure the security of its resource interests and to otherwise protect these interests? Or is it involved in peacekeeping operations to legitimately enhance the level of stability, human security and the humanitarian situation in Africa, through its provision of peacekeepers, military equipment and support?

There is a distinct lack of international awareness, intervention and consideration regarding the effects of SALW on African women’s human security. Ongoing issues of gender inequality, gender based violence and how these issues need to be addressed, should be further researched in order to more effectively understand how to eradicate armed conflict, violence and instability in Africa.
6.7. Conclusion

This study set out to further the readers understanding of the most salient threats to African women’s human security, and more specifically the threat to their individual security by the prolific small arms supplied by China. This was achieved through the provision of research that evidences the various forms of armed violence and how it manifests against women in Africa. Prolific SALW force women to face challenges that, besides direct violence include, increasing their economic burdens, widowing them, internal displacement into other regions that are potentially as unsafe and inflicting lingering psychological trauma upon them.

One of the most pressing changes that need to occur to reduce the effects of SALW proliferation in fragile African regions is to improve and more stringently enforce arms transfer controls throughout Africa. The African international community need to hold one another accountable for their actions, their misuse of these weapons, and aim to prevent further arms transfers to authoritarian and otherwise irresponsible African states through legal international and domestic pressure. While the required multi-lateral framework exists, what is most required in order to make these changes possible is political will, the role of civil society, the financial capacity to re-purchase arms from owners, the collection and destruction of existing excess small arms, and better trans-border law-enforcement in fragile states.

In order to reduce the effects of armed violence against African women, the international community, most importantly including African states, international organizations and social movements, need to formally include women in peace processes, post-conflict DDR and awareness programmes. The inclusion of women in these operations is by no means the be all and end all solution to eradicating armed violence against women. However, by empowering women through encouragement and increasing their awareness to the innate potential that they have to resist violence; the actions, input and perspectives of empowered African women can have an immense impact on the outcome of these operations and how successful they are at reducing the effects of armed violence.

In a United Nations press statement released in 1998, a powerful point was made by Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the United Nations:

For too long, conflict in Africa has been seen as inevitable, intractable, or both. It is neither. Conflict in Africa, as everywhere, is caused by human action, and can be
ended by human action. But, that action requires imagination, persistence, patience and, above all, will (United Nations, 1998).

This statement effectively supports the key findings and arguments made in this research study, that the actions of women and men working together can end conflict in Africa. This goal, however, will require the perseverance, passion, and determination of empowered African men and women to end conflict and change the lives of all Africans for the better.
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