Ministry of Reconciliation in the Context of Ethnic Ideology and Genocide:
A Theological Evaluation of the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda

By

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DECLARATION

By submitting this dissertation electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the authorship owner thereof (unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated) and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

December 2016

Signature:
ABSTRACT

This dissertation frames the 1994 genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi in Rwanda, which took over a million people’s lives as a result of the contextual factors emerging from Rwandan history. Given the destruction of social cohesion after the 1994 genocide, this study employs a realist evaluation approach proposed by Pawson and Tilley (1997; 2004) to develop a theological understanding and definition of reconciliation, which incorporates the need to truly address the context of modern Rwanda. A realist approach includes interrogating the context of interventions in order to understand how and why mechanisms can trigger particular outcomes. In conducting this realist evaluation of the history leading up to the 1994 genocide, ethnic ideology is identified as the main factor creating division. This ideology was a phenomenon artificially created and introduced by policies of colonialists and missionaries, exploited by the “Hutu power” movement after independence, and reinforced by the sectarian policies of the Rwandan government. This ideology sought to categorize the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa communities as ethnically and racially distinct, despite the fact that they all share one ethnicity, one language and a common heritage as Banyarwanda. Taking this understanding of ethnic ideology as a description of the underlying problem in Rwanda, this dissertation seeks to apply theological resources for understanding reconciliation in a way that can undo the effects of ethnic ideology. This new vision of reconciliation will be used to evaluate how the ministry of the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda (PCR) also referred to by its French name, l’Eglise Prébytérienne au Rwanda (EPR), addresses ethnic ideology and responds to the effects and consequences of the 1994 genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi. A closer look at the development of ethnic ideology through Rwandan national and church history, as well as consideration of the various government-led attempts at reconciliation will inform this evaluation. It was found that the EPR has shown significant achievements in the process of reconciliation, but that ethnic ideology still persists. This finding highlights the need for the EPR to provide a clear theology of a shared identity versus one national ethnic identity “Ndì Umunyaranda” (I am a Rwandan) provided by the government in post-genocide Rwanda, which will help church members and other Rwandans to overcome divisions related to ethnicity.
Hierdie verhandeling omvat die 1994-volkslagting van die Tutsi's in Rwanda waar meer as 'n miljoen mense uitgemoor is, 'n direkte gevolg van die kontekstuele faktore wat uit die Rwandese geskiedenis verry het. In ag genome die verwoesting van sosiale samehang ná die 1994-slagting, implementeer hierdie studie 'n realistiese evalueringsbenadering voorgehou deur Pawson en Tilley (1997: 2004). Deur middel van hierdie evalueringsbenadering word 'n teologiese begrip en definisie van versoening te ontwikkel waarby die behoefte geïnkorporeer word om die konteks van moderne Rwanda werklik te ondersoek. 'n Realistiese benadering behels 'n beoordeling van die konteks van interspersies ten einde te verstaan hoe en waarom mekanismes sekere uitkomste kan sneller. In die uitvoer van hierdie realistiese evaluering van die geskiedenis wat die 1994-volkslagting voorafgegaan het, word etniese ideologie as die hoofaktor in die ontstaan van verdeeldheid geïdentifiseer. Hierdie ideologie is as kunsmatige verskynnseur die beleide van kolonialiste en sendelinge geskep en ingevoer, deur die "Hutu-mag" uitgebuit en deur die sektariese beleide van die Rwandese owerheid versterk. Die ideologie was daarop gerig om die Hutu-, Tutsi- en Twa-gemeenskappe op grond van etniesiteit en ras van mekaar te onderskei, ondanks die feit dat hulle een etniesiteit, een taal en 'n gemeenskaplike nalatenskap as Banjarwanda gedeel het. Deur die implementering van hierdie definisie van etniese ideologie as 'n beskrywing van die onderliggende probleem in Rwanda, soek die navorser na teologiese hulpmiddels om versoening op 'n manier te verstaan wat die gevolge van etniese ideologie ongedaan kan maak. Hierdie nuwe siening van versoening sal gebruik word om die wyse te evaluer waarop die leraars van die Presbiteriaanse Kerk in Rwanda (PKR, in Frans le Eglise Prebytérienne au Rwanda, of EPR) etniese ideologie hanteer en op die uitwerking en gevolge van die 1994-volksmoord op die Tutsi reageer. 'n Nader beskouing van die ontwikkeling van etniese ideologie deur die loop van Rwandese nasionale en kerkgeskiedenis, sowel as die oorweging van verskeie regeringsgeleide pogings vir versoening, sal hierdie evaluering onderlê. In hierdie tesis word daar bevind dat die EPR merkwaardige sukses in die versoeningsproses bereik het, maar dat etniese ideologie steeds bestaan. Hierdie analyse bekleemtoon die behoefte aan die daarstelling van 'n duidelike teologie van 'n gedeelde identiteit deur die EPR tenoor een nasionale etniese identiteit “Ndí Umunyaranda” (Ek is 'n Rwandees) wat deur die owerheid in die post-volkslagting Rwanda verskaf is. Sodoende sal kerkliedmate en ander Rwandese in staat gestel word om etnies gebaseerde verdeeldheid te bowe te kom.
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I am indebted to a number of people who have supported me during the course of my doctoral studies. Each person mentioned played a significant role in helping me get to where I am today. I am deeply grateful to all of you:

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to:

The memory of my father-in-law Laban R. Ndisabiye, your desire was to see me with higher education but you were killed before that dream could become a reality.

All the innocent people who were assassinated because of their identities. May your souls rest in peace!

To all Rwandan survivors of the 1994 genocide. May God, who reconciled us to Himself in Christ, heal your wounds.
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AEE</td>
<td>African Evangelism Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFD</td>
<td>Centre for Formation and Documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Centre for Conflict Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>Context–Mechanisms–Outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMOCs</td>
<td>Context Mechanism, Outcome pattern Configurations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNLG</td>
<td>National Commission for Fighting Genocide Ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPR</td>
<td>Rwandan Protestant Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Dutch Reformed Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EER</td>
<td>Eglise Episcopale au Rwanda (Episcopal Church in Rwanda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMLR</td>
<td>Eglise Methodiste Libre au Rwanda (Free Methodist in Rwanda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPR</td>
<td>Presbytérian Church in Rwanda (Presbyterian Church in Rwanda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Forces Armées Rwandaise (The Rwandan national army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBO</td>
<td>Faith-Based Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Forces for Democratic Liberation of Rwanda (Forces democratiques delibration du Rwanda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTR</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDs</td>
<td>Identity Cards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILPD</td>
<td>Institute for Legal Practice and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOUCECORE</td>
<td>Mouvement Chrétien Pour L’Evangelisation, Le</td>
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Counseling et La Réconciliation

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>MRND</td>
<td>Mouvement Revolutionnaire Nationale pour le Développement (Revolutionary National Movement for Development)</td>
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<td>NAR</td>
<td>Never-Again Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NURC</td>
<td>National Unity and Reconciliation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARMEHUTU</td>
<td>Parti du Mouvement de l’Emancipation Hutu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RGB</td>
<td>Rwanda Governance Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTLM</td>
<td>Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Colline</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACC</td>
<td>South African Council of Churches</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIT</td>
<td>Social identity theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUMA</td>
<td>Tumaini University Makumira</td>
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<tr>
<td>UEBR</td>
<td>Union des Eglise Baptist au Rwanda (Baptist Church in Rwanda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAR</td>
<td>Union Nationale Rwandaise</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNR</td>
<td>National University of Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>WARC</td>
<td>World Alliance of Reformed Church</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>World Council of Churches</td>
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the study

The beginning of the twenty-first century has been marked by significant turbulence fuelled by brutal violence, wars and genocide in many countries across the globe. This justifies why Schreiter (2005:74) suggests that reconciliation and healing provides a new paradigm for mission theology. As such, reconciliation has come to the fore in many different contexts and has caught the imagination of people both inside and outside the church (Isaak, 2011:331). Reconciliation is needed for the sake of peaceful coexistence not only between neighbouring countries but also within one’s own borders, as much conflict today takes place within one’s own country. After the successful conclusion of a peace settlement following a civil war, former enemies, perpetrators and survivors must return to living side-by-side just as they did before the violent atrocities were committed. Since peaceful coexistence is necessary and should be lasting, the need for reconciliation is profound (Brounéus, 2008:9). However, attitudes and behaviours seldom, if ever, change from genocidal to collegial at the moment peace is declared. Reconciliation, therefore, must address the attitudes that facilitated the violence in the first place. This study seeks to understand the specific conditions that led to the 1994 genocide¹ in Rwanda, and theologically understand what reconciliation should look like in this context. Finally, this study will assess the reconciliation efforts of the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda.

¹The word ‘genocide’ was coined by a Polish lawyer, Raphael Lemkin, who fled the German occupation and lost his family during the Jewish Holocaust of the Second World War. Lemkin derived the word from the Greek genos, race, or tribe and ‘cide’, from the Latin caedere, ‘to kill’. Genocide is intended to signify a co-ordinated plan of different actions, Lemkin wrote, aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.’ Genocide is directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of a group. Lemkin’s definition of genocide was published in 1944 and used in the Genocide Convention that was unanimously accepted by the UN General Assembly, in 1948 (cited in Melvern, 2000:249).
According to the latter convention, Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) killing members of the group;(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (Dawson & Boynton,2008:243). The term genocide is used in this study to connote the intention to destroy and kill a group.
As such, the realist approach proposed by Pawson and Tilley (1997; 2004) with its context–mechanisms–outcomes (CMO) descriptive and explanatory method will be used in this study as an appropriate way to deal with the complexity and dynamism of the condition (context). The CMO method also helps us to deconstruct ideas, beliefs, practices and their negative consequences in order to propose and construct alternatives or expand on positive developments of reconciliation.

Reconciliation will be explored from an interdisciplinary approach based on a theological perspective, but informed by a sociological perspective. The researcher refers to Robert Montgomery (2012:289) who defines missiology as “an interdisciplinary field that draws on a variety of areas of study, including the social sciences. The social sciences, just as the natural sciences, are useful tools for increasing knowledge and benefiting humanity”. Thus, the role of missiologists is to integrate the social sciences with their theological understanding of the missio Dei, especially in the field of missiology (Montgomery, 2012:289).

In this study, it is argued that the root cause and influencing factors that contributed to the 1994 Rwandan genocide lie in the complex and multiple realities of the political and ethnic ideologies that had been invented, constructed and were put in place by the former colonial administration and policies of the missionaries. According to the Rwandan missiologist Gatwa, this ideology, in the post-colonial period, had been exploited by the “Hutu power” hard-liners of the regime of President Juvenal Habyarimana who ruled Rwanda from 1973 to 6th April 1994(Gatwa, 1999:347). Furthermore, it will be shown that the genocide against the Tutsi, which happened in 1994, was not an unplanned event. It was, rather, “the consequence of ethnicity-based ideologies leading to increased exclusion and discrimination that were

---

2 Ideologies can be regarded as ‘systems of thought’, ‘systems of belief’ or a ‘symbolic system’ which pertain to social action or political practice. Ideology is present in every political program and is a feature of every organised political movement (Thompson, 1990:5). The word “ideology” will be used in this study to refer to a system of ideas and values socially constructed to provide a false picture and false consciousness regarding social differences (Gatwa, 1999). Another Rwandan, Mafeza (2013), who wrote on ‘The role of education in combating genocide ideology in the post-genocide’ defines ‘genocide ideology’ as “a set of organized thoughts and beliefs centered on ethnic identity that drives competition for power and dignity using hatred, conflict and violence in order to attain its objectives” (Mafeza, 2013:2).

3 Ethnic ideology planted by colonialists and missionaries will be discussed in detail in chapter 3 (section 3.4 and 3.10.2) and chapter 4 (section 4.3.)

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institutionalised by successive powers” (Shyaka, 2005:35). In fact, a prolonged period of successive corrupt regimes from 1960 to 1994 saw the entrenchment of ‘divide and rule’ as the principle of governing in Rwanda. Inevitably, this oppressive culture led to massive human rights violations, which culminated in the 1994 genocide that saw over one million Rwandans perish. The speed and ferocity with which the genocide was executed left the country almost entirely destroyed. Over a million people were killed and many were left unburied; innumerable were orphaned, widowed and handicapped, leaving a very vulnerable population severely traumatized (Mutamba & Izabiliza, 2005:10). The economy was completely destroyed and there were no functioning state institutions remaining. This resulted in various efforts to reconcile the people of Rwanda in the wake of the genocide. In turn, reconciliation has become a priority for both government and non-government organisations (NGO’s) including faith-based organisation (FBO’s) and churches — these have all, to some extent, tried to ensure reconciliation.

Therefore, there is a need to explore how and whether the ministry of reconciliation can address ethnic ideology as it responds to the effects and consequences of the 1994 genocide. This dissertation will assess the efforts made towards reconciliation since 1994, particularly by the Presbyterian Church of Rwanda, and propose new possibilities for a theological approach to deconstructing ethnic ideology.

The current introductory chapter provides a background to the study, as well as introduces the methodology and literature review that provides the theoretical framework for the study. The background focuses on two core concepts: First, it briefly outlines the historical context of Rwanda before and during the colonial period. This historical context reveals that the development of the ethnic ideology in Rwanda was already arbitrarily created during the period of colonisation. Along with the colonial authorities, the missionaries propelled the hardening of the social structure of ethnicity and aggravated the social problems inherent between the two ethnic groups (Hutu and Tutsi) that resulted in the 1994 genocide. Second, it points out that the ministry of reconciliation requires the healing of broken relations and trauma caused by the 1994 genocide. In the Rwandan context, reconciliation must
become a mechanism to deconstruct the ethnic ideology and respond to the effects and consequences of genocide.

In Rwanda, the nature of the Hutu-Tutsi-Twa\(^4\) identities in the pre-colonial era has been hotly debated since the genocide, e.g. the mere fact of the existence of distinctive Hutu/Tutsi/Twa identities. Check (2008:249) maintains that the concept of ethnic\(^5\) differences was foreign to pre-colonial Africa. Indeed, Wielenga (2011b) has argued that part of the discussion of what the terms ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ stand for has to do with whether these groups are of different origins or not. For those who perceive the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa to be unique groups with distinctive origins, it is assumed that the Twa, being pygmoid, were the earliest inhabitants of Rwanda; the Hutu, of Bantu origin, travelled upwards from the south perhaps some two thousand years ago and the Tutsi were possibly a southern Ethiopian tribe who immigrated to Rwanda around the fifteenth century or even several centuries before that. This argument is based on the work of early European anthropologists, bringing with them their Eurocentric racial perspectives, believing that the Tutsi were the descendants of Ham,\(^6\) a race closer to Europeans than the Bantu Hutus. With their stereotypical tall, thin features—as opposed to the ‘short and stocky’ Hutu—Tutsi were seen by the Europeans as being a superior race (Wielenga, 2011b:2). However, this view, which shows that the three ethnic groups are different based on their origins and perception that the Tutsi are descendants of the ‘Hamitic’ race, is rejected by some researchers, especially in the post-genocide Rwanda where the focus is more on “unity of Rwandans prior to the arrival of the Europeans and have contended that ethnic identity was purely a colonial creation” (Longman, 2004:31).

\(^4\)The Twa is a very small group that does not feature either as victims or perpetrators in the genocide. Although the Twa will not be mentioned often in this study, the implications and reconfiguration of ethnic ideology should be understood as applying to them as well. Before the 1994 genocide, the Hutu constituted the majority with 85% of the population, whereas the Tutsi made up 14% and the Twa 6% (Gatwa, 2005:xvi). Interestingly, all three of the ethnic groups are known as one nation called “Banyarwanda”. They share the same culture and speak the same language called “Ikinyarwanda”. They all live together in the same location. However, for the purpose of this study on genocide, only the Hutu and Tutsi will be mentioned because of the long-standing history of conflict between them and the development of an ethnic ideology that led to genocide against the Tutsi, as shall be discussed in this study.

\(^5\)The term ethnic group is generally understood in anthropological literature to designate a population which is: biologically self-perpetuating; shares fundamental cultural values, is overtly uniform in cultural forms; makes up a field of communication and interaction; has a membership which identifies itself and is identified by others as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order. “Ethnicity” is defined as “a people’s collective consciousness of who and what they are, their social identity, common memories and interests, and so on” Aboagye-Mensah (1994:21).

\(^6\)Ham was one of Noah’s three sons (cf. the Book of Genesis).
Contemporary scholars on the Rwandan situation and officials of the current government have argued that it is this ‘Hamite myth’ that has played a significant role in the cause of this ethnic division, even contributing to the genocide (Wielenga, 2011b:2). They argue that these ethnic categories did not exist prior to the arrival of the Europeans and that Rwandan identity was unified on a national level, though differences according to clan and region did exist (Bazuin, 2013:41). In my view, I rather agree with the proponents who argue that the existence of a common language and shared culture used by all three groups points toward Rwandans having a shared single identity before the advent of colonialism in the region.

According to Bruce (2001:17), in pre-colonial Rwanda, the terms *Hutu* and *Tutsi* referred to “a complex set of social relations that had some of the elements of class and social status. Hutu and Tutsi as classes were not fixed categories but fluid ones”. These two categories “varied through time and location depending on factors such as wealth, military prowess, family and control over precious commodities or occupation of prestigious social positions” (Bruce, 2001:17). When the German colonial administration arrived in Rwanda (in the 1920s, the Belgian colonisers took over the country’s administration), they “encountered an organised state with well-established institutions such as the military, a judicial system, and an elaborate administration that dated from the fifteenth century. Rwandan society existed in harmony before the colonial era. The Banyarwanda, whether Tutsi, Hutu or Twa, shared the same culture, religion, spoke the same language, intermarried and lived side by side on the same hillsides” (Uma Shankar & Yahad, 2003:28). In fact, Rwandan people lived in peaceful coexistence, the demarcations between the Tutsi and Hutu were not deep and the division was more economic than cultural (Anthea, 1999:12). The point is not whether the society was just or equitable but that it was not organised according to ethnic lines; thus one’s membership to a particular group may change, and that is what happened.

Of significance then, the labels ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ were not ethnically based. There was mobility among the “classes,” i.e. Hutu could become Tutsi through the ownership of cattle, and vice versa. However, during the colonial era, these labels
were changed from descriptions of status and economic activity to fixed, institutionalized racial categories (Clark, 2010:142). Firstly, the colonialists introduced the *racial* theory that emphasized the archetypal differences in height and physiognomy between Tutsi and Hutu. In this view, the Tutsis were “black Caucasians” who had immigrated to Rwanda and conquered the local Hutu Bantu people. This theory claims the supremacy of the Tutsi over the Hutu, who are identified as an inferior and uncivilized Bantu people, subjugated by superior Hamitic Tutsis on their arrival in Rwanda (Carney, 2016:192; Ferdinando, 2009:52). Secondly, they introduced the *identity card* in order to maintain the fluid classes to fixed classes and to identify individuals according to the label on their identity cards (Clark, 2010:142). For Ian Linden (1997:43), the transformation of a complex “feudal” society with social mobility into a bureaucratic colonial state hardened social and economic differences into ethnic differences and finally resulted in “tribal” conflict.

However, the change in the meaning of Hutu and Tutsi from economical to ethnic categories was not only due to colonial powers and administration. Check (2008) echoes the above viewpoint when he quotes Lemarchand (1999), who notes that studies conducted by missionaries and European explorers concerning the traditional African cultural and socio-political setting ‘invented’ a particular form of tradition and ethnicity. Furthermore, tracing back the root cause of the 1994 genocide, he explains that the propaganda of ethnic conflict during that time bore all the hallmarks of invented theories of ethnic superiority (Check, 2008:249). In the same way, the current president of Rwanda Paul Kagame, affirms that the colonial powers in the Great Lakes region sowed the seeds of antagonism and conflict (cf. Uma Shankar & Yahad, 2003:28).

In this study, it is fundamental to understand that the 1994 genocide was fuelled by an ethnic ideology that emphasized the division and hatred between the Hutu and the Tutsi. However, Longman (2004:29) reminds us that the “genocide was a complex and catastrophic event that cannot be explained with simplistic accounts”. Consequently, this study argues that in order to understand the genocide—why it happened and how—“one must have a thorough understanding of Rwanda’s historical
background and the social, economic, and political developments that took place in the decades prior to the violence” (Longman, 2004:30). In other words, to understand the genocide in Rwanda, it is essential to place the events of 1994 within a broader context (Longman, 2004:30).

Given the fact that the Hutu and Tutsi once lived harmoniously, the pressing question is, “How did this ethnic hatred come about?” This gives rise to further questions, “What caused the separation between the Hutu and Tutsi? “What were the motivating and influencing factors that led to the kind of hatred and distrust necessary to cause the 1994 genocide?” Many scholars have conducted research on the Rwandan genocide and have discussed the complex and multiple realities of the causal and influential factors that contributed to this ethnic ideology. These scholars can be categorized according to different schools of thought. Three such theoretical schools have generally come to dominate studies of the Rwandan genocide. These are:

The first theory, the primordial or essentialist school of thought, argues that ethnic conflict generally arises in Africa because Africans are inherently tribal, and this cannot change. This view regards ethnicity as something that is deeply embedded in the self and can be the root cause of conflict, especially in highly ethnically-diverse regions such as Africa (Doornibs, 1991:19). Primordialism argues that ethnic conflict stems from ‘ancient hatreds’ between ethnic groups and that frustration comes with differences in ‘natural ties’ that derive from religious, racial, or regional connections. For primordialists, conflict between two ethnic groups is inevitable because of unchanging, essential characteristics of the members of these categories. Therefore, ethnic violence results from antipathies and antagonisms that are enduring properties of ethnic groups (Fearon & Laitin, 2000:849). In this respect, Weir (2012:1) states, “What we have witnessed in Rwanda is a historical product, not a biological fatality or ‘spontaneous’ bestial outburst. Tutsi and Hutu have not been created by God as cats and dogs, predestined from all eternity to disembowel each other. The massacres in Rwanda are not the result of a deep-rooted and ancient hatred between two ethnic groups”. Therefore, Primordialism inadequately answers the question regarding the

7 Viewed from: http://www.academia.edu/1526597/Primordialism_Constructivism_Instrumentalism_and_Rwanda. [Date accessed: 16 May 2014]
explanation of ethnic conflicts such as the Rwandan genocide. Hence, one must look beyond biological ties to find motives for these killings. This brings one to the notion that ethnic conflicts are driven by the aims of political leaders (Weir, 2012:1).

The second theory, the instrumentalist school, views political manipulation and the behaviour of elites as the cause of conflict. This analysis takes a fuller account of the complex causes of genocide. Unlike primordialists, instrumentalists see ethnicity itself as ever-changing. However, ethnicity is perceived as a tool used by elites. As such, ethnicity does not cause conflict simply because it exists; ethnicity is able to cause conflict because of manipulation by elites. Since time immemorial elites have accentuated ethnic differences in an attempt to leverage political gains. Understood this way, instrumentalists argue that ethnicity has been used to create a class system in Africa. By emphasizing ethnic differences, elites belonging to a certain ethnic community have been able to transfer hostilities resulting from political and economic inequalities within their communities to other ethnic groups (Brown, 2010:413). Instrumentalism is based upon the notion that ethnic conflict is driven by either the relationship between economic wants—greed and grievance—or the active manipulation by political leaders based on their rational decision to encourage or incite ethnic conflict for their political gain (Weir, 2012:1, 4). At first glance, the example of the Rwandan genocide clearly seems to support the instrumentalist school that views political leaders’ manipulation and the behaviour of elites as the cause of conflict. This is because Hutu elites used ethnicity as a political weapon to prevent power-sharing and to reassert their social, economic and political dominance; incitement to ethnic hatred and violence was used as a method of power consolidation. This analysis is an improvement upon the primordialist view, as it places the dimensions of identity as well as political and economic factors in historical context, highlighting the intervention of external forces (Kimonyo, 2001:30).

A third theory, constructivism, argues that ethnic conflict is a product of historical processes over time that result in divergent ethnic identities and created hostility between them (Weir, 2012:1). The constructivist school of thought aims to combine influences from both essentialism and instrumentalism. In doing so, it seeks to show
the processes through which ethnic groups have emerged and become socially significant (Hempel, 2004:413). Constructivists will agree with primordialists that ethnicity is an inheritance, but they do not agree that it is unchanging. Constructivists tend to criticize the idea that ethnicity should be equated with a common culture. Instead, they argue that ethnicity arises out of the construction of “social boundaries”. These social boundaries come to exist because of self-ascription and ascription by others (Lentz, 1995:306). Unlike primordialists, constructivists believe that our identities can be reshaped (Brown and Langer, 2010:413).

Unlike instrumentalists, constructivists do not see ethnicity as simply a product of elitist manipulation. For them, social settings and norms are the forces that change the role of ethnicity, rather than elite power. Both of these theories can accept that the genocide in Rwanda was in some respect orchestrated by elites in order to retain political power. The difference, however, is that the instrumentalists accept that two distinct ethnic identities exist in Rwanda, awaiting manipulation by elites. Though, the constructivists question the very origin of these ethnic identities. They allow for the possibility that “ethnicity” in the Rwandan context is actually an arbitrary creation of the colonial era, which has hardened as a result of political conflict.

Regardless of the precise mechanisms by which ethnic ideology arose, the point is that, for both the instrumentalist and the constructivist theories, some combination of elite manipulation and the social and historical processes factors reinforced the arbitrary ethnic divisions that were exploited in the genocide. In order to understand how ethnic identity was manipulated, as well as how it was constructed in the Rwandan society, it is necessary to take a closer look at the history of Hutu/Tutsi relations and the legacy of colonialism in the country, this will be explored further in chapter 3.

According to Gourevitch (1998:133), the Rwandan genocide “was the most efficient mass killings since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.” On average, the perpetrators terminated five and a half lives per minute. While there are numerous and often interlocking consequences of the 1994 genocide, the major consequence is the rending of the Rwandan social fabric, producing much anger, hatred, resentment,
the need for retaliation, and feelings of mistrust. In addition, the genocide has resulted in fractured families, business partnerships, government coalitions, neighbourhoods, civic organizations, churches, friendships, and even marriages. The survivors of this brutal treatment have been physically and psychologically affected (Lowe, 2008:6). For Sarkin (1999:782), Rwandans are “living in a state of fear”. How can Rwandan people who have experienced such tumultuous situations once again live in harmony and peace, trust one another in their daily occupations, and rid themselves of memories of the past? How can reconciliation heal Rwanda in such a way that it prevents recurring, reciprocal violence? How can we avoid another genocide in the future? All of these questions require an understanding of the ideology that caused the genocide in the first place.

If it is the case that Rwanda was an essentially harmonious and ethnically united country before European colonisers introduced their racial ideology, then the ultimate source of the genocide was not a longstanding Hutu-Tutsi division, but rather the colonial imposition of a false consciousness, which created that division. The goal of reconciliation within the church must parallel the present goal of government policy, which is to re-establish the pristine ethnic unity of the pre-colonial Banyarwanda (Ferdinando, 2009:53). This will be discussed further in chapter five (5.4.1.2). However, for the church to be faithful to its mission, the logic of this reconciliation must be theologically constructed. Despite the efforts of many FBOs, little has been done to theologically evaluate the ministry of reconciliation in a way that addresses the problem of ethnic ideology. This is one of the shortcomings this study wishes to address.

1.2 Motivation and contribution of the research

The motivation for this research comes, firstly, from my personal background as a Rwandan minister dealing with the aftermath of the 1994 genocide. I was challenged by the fact that my congregation was composed of both victims/survivors and perpetrators. Moreover, many genocide survivors, mostly Tutsi, were fearful and understandably, mistrusted almost everyone. They could no longer live normal lives. Many survivors perceived all Hutu as perpetrators. Feelings of anger, blame and
revenge were overwhelmingly strong in victims. The families of perpetrators who were imprisoned harboured similar feelings of anger due to their relatives’ imprisonment (Mukabera, 2012:111). After the 1994 genocide, fear and mistrust were prevalent amongst relevant parties. My involvement in pastoral ministry missiological studies made me realise the urgency to carry out studies on reconciliation to help Rwanda towards normalcy, as well as overcome past alienation, enmity, hatred and mistrust.

A second motivation to carry out this research is a conviction that I share with Isaak, namely:

Reconciliation also is vitally important because the possibility of reconciliation is one of, if not the most compelling way of expressing the meaning of the gospel today. In the midst of violence, pain and indelible scars on people’s memory, the church as God’s minister of reconciliation proclaims that in Jesus Christ and in his community, healing is possible. To put it differently, the church must be in the thick of the process of reconciliation (Isaak, 2011:324).

Establishing reconciliation is no easy task. It is not something that can be achieved in a simple way or over a short period of time, as it is a multidimensional process. Moreover, it is not only the work of the church but also the work of an entire society aided by different approaches. My hope is that this study will provide information and insight that will help raise the church’s awareness of its mission of reconciliation, as well as enable other researchers to discover the best way to contribute towards the ministry of reconciliation.

The third motivation for this study is a theological one. An understanding of the ethnic ideology and genocide, as well as a theological evaluation of it is crucial to the field of missiology. That the church in Rwanda could be implicated in ethnic ideology and genocide is sufficient reason to challenge the church worldwide to examine its theology of reconciliation. The effectiveness of the future ministry of the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda depends in part on its ability to develop a theology of reconciliation which can first be of use to Rwandans given their own history, and then to be a testimony to other nations finding themselves in similar situations of violence, mistrust and fear.
The fourth motivation is my involvement in theological education and participation in the ministry of reconciliation, which prompted me to do research for my MTh studies at Tumaini University Makumira (TUMA) in Tanzania. The title of my thesis was, ‘The contribution of the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda towards mission of reconciliation after the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi: A case study of Remera parish (2002-2012)’. After that experience, I saw the need to further explore how the ministry of reconciliation addresses ethnic ideology and responds to the effects and consequences of the 1994 genocide, while *theologically evaluating* the role played by the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda as a whole, and beyond the confines of only one parish.

The final motivation concerns the missiological contribution and closing some of the gaps in the literature. This study wishes to apply missiological and theological perspectives of reconciliation by focusing on how and why practices and processes have not worked, and what can and should be done in a specific context, i.e. Rwanda. At the same time, this study adds to the theological understanding of reconciliation, as it introduces the ‘realistic approach,’ a sociological method of reading literature from the perspective of practices and processes in theological and missiological studies.

1.3 Research problem

In 1994, over a million Tutsi and moderate Hutu were brutally killed in Rwanda during a three-month long genocide. Since then, the world has sought to understand what happened. Due to the fact that the cause of the 1994 genocide seems to centre on ethnic ideology, one effort to understand what happened has been to explore Rwanda’s identity politics. Thus, the first problem this study will explore is how ethnic ideology was constructed by colonialists, missionaries, and Rwandan leaders, and how ethnic ideology impacted the formation of Hutu and Tutsi identities and divisions that led to the 1994 genocide (Wielenga, 2011:1-2). It will be argued that the roots\(^8\) of the 1994 genocide may be found in (A) an ethnicity-based ideology leading to (B) exclusion and discrimination, which has been institutionalized by

\(^8\)A detailed discussion of the causal and influential factors of the 1994 genocide will be given in chapter 3.
successive powers, and (C) as a result, massive human rights violations have swept across the country devastating rural social structures. The Rwandan genocide challenges the mission and ministries of reconciliation in all churches. Therefore, this research also needs to attend to the following problems: How have efforts at reconciliation succeeded or failed to adequately address the roots of ethnic ideology? This question relates to how and why the Presbyterian Church has used its work as a mechanism within the Rwandan context to achieve the outcome of reconciliation. Furthermore, how can the ministry of reconciliation in the Presbyterian Church address the root problem of ethnic ideology?

1.4 Key research questions

In light of the above, the primary research question for this study is formulated as follows: “On theological grounds, and in light of the link that exists between ethnic ideology and genocide, what has the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda done, is currently doing, and is expected to do with regards to the challenges created in the Rwandan society by the legacy of genocide?”

To answer this question the following sub-questions will be addressed:

1) What are the contextual, ‘causal’ and influential factors that contributed to the 1994 genocide?
2) How did the Rwandan Church contribute to the construction of the ethnic ideology that led to the 1994 genocide?
3) What are the post-genocide effects and consequences in the Rwandan society? Moreover, how does reconciliation address ethnic ideology and respond to these effects?
4) Which theology of reconciliation has informed the current practices and processes of the Church in Rwanda to undo ethnic ideology?
5) To what extent is the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda involved in the ministry of reconciliation in the country? If this involvement exists, is it effective and what theological guidelines inform or may inform its involvement?
6) Is the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda an ‘effective’ body and instrument to address ethnic ideology and respond to the effects of genocide and promote reconciliation in Rwanda?

7) The problem statement and research questions are related to three key interrelated concepts of this study, as indicated in Figure 1 below:

![Figure 1. The three key interrelated concepts of the study.](image)

1.5 Research aim and objectives

The aim of this research is to investigate and realistically evaluate how and whether the ministry of reconciliation in Rwanda addresses ethnic ideology and responds to the effects and consequences of the 1994 genocide by theologically evaluating the role played by the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda. This aim will be achieved through the following related objectives:

1) To identify the contextual and influential factors that contributed to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the post-genocide effects thereof, and in particular, to investigate the role played by the Rwandan Church.
2) To identify the various existing processes of reconciliation in Rwanda, whether organised by the government or the churches, and to reflect on these actions and practices theologically.

3) To evaluate how and whether the ministry of reconciliation, specifically in the Presbyterian Church, has addressed ethnic ideology and responded to the challenges and consequences of the 1994 genocide.

1.6 Research design and methodology

The study takes the form of a literature study. Because this research is conceptual in nature, it relies on existing literature. As such, it refers to a variety of forms of literature on reconciliation in the context of ethnic ideology and genocide. Books, theses, journal articles, government reports, reports by NURC and NGOs as well as newspaper articles will be used in this research. Secondary data such as speeches of political and religious actors and reports on the testimonies of victims will be used and, of course, academic papers dealing with the topic. Here, the primary focus is on the theological literature (especially within the theological disciplines of practical theology and missiology and, to a lesser extent, biblical science), but sources from other disciplines, i.e. psychology, anthropology, history, political science and sociology are also referred to, making this an interdisciplinary study.

Given the fact that this study is partly focused on the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda, the input of Glenn A. Bowen is important, as he examines the place and function of documents in qualitative research. According to Bowen (2009:29-30), documents can serve a variety of purposes in a research undertaking by providing a background and context. Accordingly, I will analyse documents that are found in the Presbyterian Church archives for a realistic evaluation as part of this study. These documents include: agendas, minutes of church meetings, letters and institutional reports, church newspapers, synodal statements and declarations, messages and teachings from events commemorating the genocide, as well as policies, statements and institutional reports. The focus of this analysis will primarily be based on the theology and ministry of reconciliation as described in these documents. The above-mentioned documents will mainly serve in the analysis and discussion in chapter six of this study.
It is important to be reminded that this dissertation evaluates the reconciliation efforts achieved by the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda. However, due to the fact that it is not an empirical study, it is difficult to evaluate whether the programme of reconciliation had any significant impact or outcome. Therefore, the empirical study conducted in the Remera Presbyterian congregation during my master’s research (see section 6.5) will serve as an example to show the impact and outcome of reconciliation activities amongst people in local communities. Words and content from their narratives will also be analysed in more detail.

Writing from a practical theological perspective, Osmer (2011:3) proposes the models of cross-disciplinary work, which is the task of bringing two or more fields into conversation with one another. It includes the selection of dialogue partners and the way in which they are related to theology. With regards to the subject of reconciliation in the context of ethnic ideology and genocide, much has been written. In this respect, a variety of scholars (theological as well as those from other disciplines) are referred to and all make valuable contributions to the theme of this study. This literature will be approached historically within the realistic approach and from the perspective of context–mechanisms–(identity responses)–outcomes (CMO), as described by Pawson and Tilley (1997; 2004). This is a descriptive and explanatory method for analysis and interpretation of cause–effect responses, outcomes and consequences.

Babbie and Mouton (2011:74) define a research design as “a plan or a blueprint of how you intend conducting the research”. The research design of this study is aligned with the research problem and questions with regards to the theological and sociological dimensions of reconciliation in the Rwandan context. For this reason, the study is an interdisciplinary missiological research that falls under the qualitative research category. The research design of this study is, therefore, a qualitative, epistemological stand of critical realism applied to missiology (Yip, 2013:1). Wan describes qualitative research as a broad methodological category which encompasses a variety of approaches to interpretive research (Wan, 2003:4). Qualitative research methods aim to answer questions concerning the ‘what,’ ‘how’ or ‘why’ of a phenomenon (Brikci and Green, 2007:2-3). The importance of qualitative assessment
in this research lies in the fact that it deals with the assessment of attitudes, opinions and behaviour in a literary study (Kothari, 2004), related to how and why the Presbyterian Church has responded to ethnic ideology, as stated in the research question (see section 1.4).

As mentioned above, the theme of reconciliation will be explored from an interdisciplinary approach. As such, the whole of the study will be carried out from a theological perspective, informed by sociological perspectives. It is thus clear that I am in agreement with Montgomery (2012:289), who maintains that missiology, by definition, is an interdisciplinary field that draws on a variety of areas of study, including the social sciences. Missiologists have the task of incorporating the social sciences within their theological understanding of the missio Dei.

1.6.1 A realist evaluation methodology

In his paper, ‘Rethinking missiological research methodology: exploring a new direction,’ Enoch Wan (2003) explores various categories of missiological research and suggests that the theory and methodology of integrative missiological research has recently become relevant to the discipline of missiology. He argues that, in the theological world, the convergence of social theory and theological methodologies is becoming a necessity (Wan, 2003:9). Furthermore, he maintains that interdisciplinary and integrative research will be the direction of missiological methodology leading into the new millennium. In agreement with the argument above, this study will follow Wan’s integrative missiological research approach, drawing on the work of social scientists (Wan, 2003:3).

The main approach of this study is a “realist evaluation,” as described by Pawson and Tilley (1997; 2004). Tilley outlines three investigative areas that need to be addressed when evaluating the impact, inputs and resources of a program within any given

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9 To support his argument, Wan (2003) uses the example provided in David Bosch’s (1991) *Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in Theology of Mission*. Bosch used a model from the philosophy of science—particularly Kuhn’s *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* and Hans Kung’s *Paradigm shifts in the history of Christianity*—to understand the development of a theology of mission. This enabled Bosch to conclude that, with regards to mission, a new paradigm is emerging: the ecumenical missionary paradigm (Bosch, 1991:368).
context: 1) Mechanism: what is it about a measure that may lead it to have a particular outcome pattern in a given context? 2) Context: what conditions are needed for a measure to trigger mechanisms to produce particular outcome patterns? 3) Outcome patterns: what are the practical effects produced by causal mechanisms being triggered in a given context? (Tilley, 2000:7). The model involves developing “context mechanism, outcome pattern configurations” (CMOCs) that allow a researcher to understand “what works for whom in what circumstances” (Tilley, 2000:7).

Pawson and Tilley (1997) explain how the CMO model/approach yields three main investigative areas, which are as follows: First, is the “context” which the system is expected to impact. This refers to the conditions needed to trigger mechanisms to produce particular outcome patterns. Second, there are the “mechanisms” through which the system might achieve its impact. This relates to what it is about the measure that might lead it to produce a particular result in a certain context. Finally, the “outcome” of introducing the measure is explored. This relates to the observed result of introducing the measure, that is, what impact it has had. Pawson and Tilley suggest that the three elements of context, mechanism and outcome should be related in the form of a pseudo equation — Context + Mechanism = Outcome — that they term a CMO configuration. This can then be tested by gathering appropriate data for each of the three elements. The main strength of the realistic approach is its attempt to link specific contexts to mechanisms in a way that has perhaps not been considered quite so thoroughly before. This approach differs from previous evaluation methodologies, which have tended to focus primarily on the outcome of an evaluation to the detriment of the mechanism and context aspects. In short, the CMO is a strategy to identify and explain the ‘cause-effect’ from the perspective of contexts, responses/mechanisms and outcomes. These three features can be woven together to form a fundamental explanatory strategy for social research, as Pawson (1995:14) explains:

The basic task of sociological inquiry is to explain interesting, puzzling, socially significant outcome patterns (O) between events or happenings or social properties. Explanation takes the form of positing some underlying mechanism (M) which generates these outcomes and thus consists of propositions about how the interplay between agency and structure has constituted these outcomes. Explanatory closure requires that, within the same investigation, there is also an
examination of how the workings of such mechanisms is contingent and conditional, and thus are only fired in particular historical or institutional contexts (C).

In their article, ‘Critical realism as emancipatory action: the case for realistic evaluation in practice development,’ Wilson and McCormack (2006) discuss the relevance of a realistic evaluation approach by using Pawson & Tilley’s (1997) argument. The strength of the approach lies in the mechanism–context–outcome connections, which has the potential to offer researchers a more complete picture of what is happening and why it is happening. In reference to Pawson & Tilley (1997), Wilson and McCormack (2006:50-51) argue that evaluations of social programs take place in environments that are rapidly changing and in which the setting is just as important as the intervention being evaluated. Realist evaluation sets out to understand why a program works, for whom it works, and in what circumstances it works. Realist evaluation takes into account both the process and context of change. This results in exploration of not only the outcomes but also the conditions that were present to enable those outcomes to occur.

Realist inquiry can be located in every social science discipline (Pawson & Tilley, 2004:10). In this study, the CMO configuration approach will be used as a methodology to explore the ‘cause-effect’ of the contextual, identity and influential factors that contributed to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the post-genocide effects thereof, and in particular, to investigate the role played by the Rwandan Church. Realist evaluations do not ask, ‘what works?’ or, ‘does this program work?’ but instead asks, ‘what works for whom in what circumstances and in what respects, and how?’ (Pawson & Tilley, 2004:2). Therefore, the CMO is also employed to evaluate how and whether the ministry of reconciliation in the Presbyterian Church has addressed the ethnic ideology and responded to the challenges and consequences of the 1994 genocide. Figure 2 below illustrates how CMO is used in the literature.
1.6.2 Practical and missiological methodology

This study evaluates how the ministry of reconciliation is fostered and achieved in the Presbyterian Church in the post-genocide Rwandan context. Furthermore, it will be informed by Kritzinger’s (2008) description of mission as a so-called praxis cycle. The pastoral circle (or praxis cycle) originated in activist circles and its original purpose is to serve as a mobilising tool for action groups working towards transformation in a particular context (Kritzinger, 2008:773).

Kritzinger (2008:772) suggests an interactive theological-practical method that focuses not only on the other, but also on who we are, what the context is, and what happens when we meet other people of other faiths. What happens in the encounter
between us and others? For this, missiology needs an approach that integrates all the significant factors shaping the dynamics of interreligious encounter or intergroup contacts. Such an approach takes us beyond “othering” into an ethos of “one-anothering”. Kritzinger discusses seven dimensions of praxis, which include: personal agency, context analysis, ecclesial analysis, theological reflection, spirituality, practical projects and reflexivity. This study should be understood as contributing to one of these seven dimensions, namely, the analysis of the Rwandan context.

**Context analysis** as part of a praxis cycle focuses on the historical and structural factors that have given shape to a society and continue to influence how people within that society relate to each other. Factors such as gender and cultural identity, racist societal structures, poverty and privilege, nationalism, etc., have a decided effect on interfaith relations and intergroup relations (Kritzinger, 2008:776). Furthermore, power relations (or perceived power relations) in a society affect attitudes between people of different faiths. This context analysis will prove useful in informing how the future praxis of the Presbyterian Church must take into account factors that have shaped Rwandan society, namely, the history of ethnic ideology. These considerations will be addressed in chapter 7, where suggestions will be made for future forms of the ministry of reconciliation in the Presbyterian Church.

Additionally, the fact that Allport (1954) argues that intergroup contact (see section 2.7.2) facilitates learning about the outgroup, and that this new knowledge leads to prejudice reduction is equated to what Kritzinger (2008:781) calls “mutual witness”. By mutual witness, Kritzinger means that if a creative interaction leads to deep listening, the partners will not merely repeat the orthodox doctrines of their traditions but attempt to reformulate their beliefs in terms of the questions asked by the other religious tradition or ethnic group. To this, Neudfelt (2011:350) adds that deep and genuine encounters produce profound relationships that suggest communion between people. The outcome of positive perceptions and opinions, and positive relationships amongst participants are achieved as they develop greater compassion, empathy and trust through sharing personal stories, Christian insights, and by directly engaging in spiritual practices such as praying together.
Applied to Rwanda, intergroup contact theory is a useful starting point for reconciliation. In an interview conducted by Benda (2012), one church leader describes how it is hard to listen in Rwanda, given the depth of people’s pain and guilt. However, he describes how a program that provided structural encounters between genocide survivors and perpetrators made it safe for people to really sit down and listen to each other. He said the forgiveness and reconciliation that emerges from these encounters is real and honest (Benda, 2012:200).

Figure 3 below gives a clear picture of how this model can be applied in the Rwandan context.

In addition to Kritzinger’s praxis model, this study will also follow the methodology proposed by Richard Osmer (2008). It consists of four tasks of practical theological...
interpretation as “a constructive theoretical framework for practical theology”. Osmer emphasises that in order to understand and be able to explain why some patterns and dynamics in the field of research occur the way they do, one needs to draw on theories from the arts and social sciences (Osmer, 2008:4). He identifies the four core tasks of practical theological interpretation as follows: The descriptive-empirical task, the interpretative task, the normative task and the pragmatic task.

In reference to a paradigm of reflective practice as suggested by Osmer (2011), the researcher starts with the descriptive empirical task, which seeks to answer the question: what is going on in a particular Rwandan social context? The descriptive-empirical task pays special attention to gathering information that helps one discern patterns and dynamics in particular episodes, situations, or contexts. Then, I will continue with the interpretive task. According to Osmer, this task means placing findings in an explanatory framework, thereby addressing the question: Why are these things going on? Simultaneously, entering into a dialogue with the social sciences to interpret and explain why certain actions and patterns are taking place (Osmer, 2011:2). In this regard, this study will describe and interpret how ethnic ideology has affected the relationships and interaction between individuals and groups from the same and different ethnic groups in the Rwandan society in general, and in the congregations and presbyteries in particular. The normative task addresses the question: What ought to be going on? Thus, normative questions are raised from the perspectives of theology, ethics and other fields. While the pragmatic task seeks to answer: How might we respond? Forming an action plan and partaking in specific responses that seek to shape the episode, situation or context in a desirable direction (Osmer, 2011:2).

Considering the above, it is important to be reminded of the necessity to use a number of different methodologies such as the realistic approach, Osmer’s reflective practice and the interactive theological–practical method proposed by Kritzinger. These methodologies do not contradict each other but aim at describing, explaining and analysing the context in which reconciliation must occur. However, the realistic evaluation method has been used as the main method throughout this study, as it is
considered an appropriate strategy to identify and explain the “cause-effect” from the viewpoint of contexts, mechanisms and outcomes.

1.7 Procedural framework and structure of the study

This study intends to contribute to the existing academic literature in the field of practical theology and missiology. However, the framework and the structure of this dissertation will not be limited to these fields, but will move freely across a range of social science disciplines. This study comprises seven chapters, each focusing on specific interrelated questions:

Chapter one highlights what this study is about. As such, it provides the contours of the study. In addition, in this chapter the motivation and background are presented; key questions are formulated; the research design and methodology used to carry out the research is outlined; and lastly, the problem statement is identified.

Chapter two addresses the question: “Which theology of reconciliation should inform the practices and processes of the Church in Rwanda in order to undo ethnic ideology?” As such, it offers an analysis of social theories on reconciliation in order to inform a theology of reconciliation from a biblical-missiological perspective. The chapter focuses on how and why the ministry of reconciliation constitutes part of the missio Dei and mission ecclesiae. It also conceptualises reconciliation as praxis and process in a new paradigm of mission and constructs the theological framework of reconciliation by exploring the missio Dei model of reconciliation based on two biblical texts, Genesis 50:15-21 and 2 Corinthians 5:17-21.

The focus in chapter three shifts to the specific context of this study. It offers a detailed answer to the question, “What are the contextual, identity and influential factors which contributed to the 1994 genocide?” The chapter provides a scholarly survey on the subject of genocide. It describes the development of the Rwandan crisis before and after independence and shows the genesis of the social construction of ethnic ideology that led to genocide in 1994. It also suggests some historical, social-political and economic issues in which ethnic ideology has been manifest. The chapter
will also discuss the various facets of ethnic ideology, from identity based-conflict to Hamitic theory and racial myth making.

**Chapter four** focuses on Christian mission and ethnic ideology in the Rwandan Church, taking into account how missionaries contributed by planting a seed of ethnic ideology among Rwandans, which was later adopted by Rwandan churches. The chapter focuses on missionary–state relationships. It also examines the involvement and complicity of the Rwandan churches in the post-missionary period.

In **chapter five**, the leading question is what are the post-genocide effects and consequences in Rwandan society and how does reconciliation address ethnic ideology and respond to these effects? The chapter explores a variety of approaches that Rwanda has used to deal with its past, including: the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), a traditional dispute resolution mechanism in the form of *Gacaca* trials, the creation of a National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) and various responses from Rwandan churches.

The problem of ethnic ideology and the task of reconciliation will be brought together in **chapter six**, which investigates the ways in which the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda has participated in the reconciliation process. The chapter answers the following questions: “How does the Presbyterian Church address ethnic ideology and respond to the effects of genocide and promote reconciliation in Rwanda?” “To what extent is the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda involved in the ministry of reconciliation in the country and, if this involvement exists, is it effective and what theological guidelines inform or may inform its involvement?” It also asks how and whether the reconciliation efforts resulted in significant impacts as well as brought about any changes in the attitudes and behaviours of individuals and groups.

Finally, in **chapter seven**, the study finishes with some concluding remarks, recommendations and suggestions for further research. Having laid the foundation for the dissertation, I now turn to the next chapter, which deals with the theoretical perspective of reconciliation.
CHAPTER TWO
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF RECONCILIATION

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews existing literature on the main themes of reconciliation from a wide variety of contexts and offers a conceptual analysis of reconciliation. However, the focus here will be on different understandings of reconciliation from a variety of perspectives. As such, this chapter adds an important interdisciplinary perspective to the study, which will inform theological reflections on reconciliation. Simultaneously, this chapter seeks to find an operational definition of reconciliation that will be brought into conversation with a biblical and theological reflection on reconciliation. Chapter 2 presents reconciliation as a mechanism to address ethnic ideology and respond to the effects and consequences of the 1994 genocide, specifically the broken relations and trauma of the past in the Rwandan context, as will be described in chapters 5 and 6.

To the above ends, this chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part provides a theological reflection on reconciliation from a biblical-missiological perspective (section 2.2 and 2.3). The chapter focuses on how and why the ministry of reconciliation constitutes part of the missio Dei and mission ecclesiae. It also conceptualises reconciliation as praxis and process in a new paradigm of mission. This section also constructs a theological framework of reconciliation by exploring the missio Dei model of reconciliation based on two biblical texts, namely, Genesis 50:15-21 and 2 Corinthians 5:17-21.10

The second part of this chapter provides the conceptualization of reconciliation (section 2.4). Reconciliation is conceptualized as the process by which relationships between alienated individuals are restored through engagement with one another. This process requires groups who were former enemies to work together and dialogue with one another for their mutual benefit and for the sake of a peaceful future. Thereafter,

10All biblical references in this study are taken from King James Version of the Bible (KJV), unless otherwise stipulated.
the second part of the chapter culminates in a four-dimensional definition of reconciliation as relationship-building, truth telling, forgiveness and healing (section 2.5). This in turn provides the foundation for the theological evaluation of reconciliation in the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda, as will be discussed in chapter 6.

The third part of the chapter focuses on the social phenomenon of reconciliation and highlights some social theories on reconciliation studies (section 2.6 and 2.7). These social theories should be understood as tools, which help us understand how to apply a theological definition of reconciliation to the reality of contemporary Rwandan life. As we shall see, the concrete tasks of reconciliation will always have to be cognizant of the influence of ethnic ideology, and so reconciliation cannot help but bring us back to deconstructing the conditions that fostered the 1994 genocide in the first place.

2.2 Some theological perspectives on reconciliation

This section considers some of the various theological reflections on reconciliation. The main argument here is as follows: reconciliation is at the centre of theology of mission and rooted in Christian doctrine. It is the work of God through Christ, while human beings are the agents of God’s mission. The theological reflection on the ministry of reconciliation in this research is based in the *missio Dei*, that is, God’s love and commitment to the world, as will be seen in the writings of theologians like Schreiter (1992, 2005), de Gruchy (2002), Okure (2006), Livingston (1989), and Bosch (1988; 1991).

According to Langmead (2008:6), “Reconciliation lies at the heart of a theology of mission. It is a central to mission because it is an integrating metaphor that helps to understand both the essence of mission and the way in which the Church is called to engage with the world”. The term ‘reconciliation’ has been one of the guiding concepts in Christian discourse in the South African context, at least since the publication of the famous *Message to the People of South Africa* in 1968. In the 1980s the term was used in conflicting ways in the Belhar Confession, the Kairos Document
and the National Initiative for Reconciliation. The contribution of the Christian Church has been remarkable; it played a leading role in the preparation for, and proceedings of, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in the 1990s. Since then, reconciliation has often been used to offer theological reflection on social conflict in South Africa and elsewhere in the world (Conradie, 2013:13). To this, Trimikliniotis (2012:248-9) asserts that the contemporary understanding of reconciliation has its roots in Christian religious and ethical origins. Roman Catholic traditions of reconciliation emerged as a kind of post-liberation theology, particularly in Central and South America. Manickman (2007:328-9) also adds that reconciliation which springs largely from a religious context, has gained political attention. Furthermore, this New Testament word came out of a secular usage, namely, ‘making peace after a time of war’.

Many theologians believe that reconciliation cannot be reduced to the work of a human being; it is divine work that is at the core of a theology of reconciliation. Livingston, for example, stresses how reconciliation is the work of God through Christ and that human beings are agents of God’s mission. Livingston (1989:422) states: “Reconciliation is not a human possibility but a divine gift. Reconciliation is ultimately the work of God himself. In one sense reconciliation is the work of God’s ambassadors, as they build bridges with the gospel of Christ to all those around them”.

Livingston’s point of view is very important as it refers to the centrality of the work of God through Jesus Christ as an essential aspect in trying to understand reconciliation theologically. To emphasize that reconciliation is divine work, Livingston (1989:422) cites Bosch (1988): “Christians are not so much bridge-builders as bridge-crossers. The bridge is already there; it is our Lord, who in his own body of flesh and blood has broken down the enmity which stood like a dividing wall between us. He is the Bridge over which we cross to each other, again and again”. De Gruchy (2002:26) also suggests that theological reconciliation refers to reconciliation between God and humanity. This implies that the doctrine of reconciliation is the inspiration and focus of all doctrines of the Christian faith. Therefore, “The doctrine of the reconciliation of humanity with God, or of God with humanity, is the centre of
every religion” (Gunton, 2003:26). Along this same line of thought, Hay in his book titled *Ukubuyisana: Reconciliation in South Africa* states that in Christianity, the notion of reconciliation is key to understanding the ministry and mission of Jesus, and therefore, the ministry of the church (Hay, 1998:119). He also notes that reconciliation is not simply being rid of sin, or being forgiven, but of becoming one with God and with others (Hay, 1998:92-93).

Scholars such as Schreiter (1992, 2005) and Okure (2006) use the biblical text of 2 Corinthians 5:17-21 to explain the theology of reconciliation. Indeed, these scholars shed more light on how the Bible as a resource has triggered an understanding of the theology of reconciliation. Upon close inspection of the Scriptures, Schreiter (1992:59-62; 2005) outlines five key points of a theology of reconciliation, with reference to the Pauline writings, particularly 2 Cor. 5:17-21. These are briefly explained below:

First, Schreiter (2005:2) states “God is the author of all genuine reconciliation. We but participate in God’s reconciling work. We are, in Paul’s words, ‘ambassadors in the name of Christ’ (2 Cor. 5:20)”. Thus, Christians hold to the idea that it is God who brings about reconciliation through Jesus Christ, rather than ourselves. We are but agents of God’s activity—“ambassadors for Christ’s sake”—in the words of Paul (2 Cor. 5:20). That implies that mission of reconciliation is rooted in the *missio Dei* (Schreiter, 2005:2).

Second, according to Schreiter (1992:60), reconciliation is “…more spiritual than strategic. Reconciliation is largely discovered rather than achieved. We experience God’s justifying and reconciling activity in our own lives and in our own communities and it is from this experience that we are able to go forth in the ministry of reconciliation. Thus, through a relationship with God, reconciliation happens. Reconciliation becomes a way of life, not just a set of discrete tasks to be performed and completed”.

Third, “reconciliation makes both the victim and oppressor a new creation. Reconciliation connotes restoration; it brings to a place where they have not been
before” (Schreiter, 1992:60). It is more than having the burden of the past lifted. It is the making of a “new creation,” as referred to by Paul in 2 Cor. 5:17. It is this vision in the heart of the healed victim that provides the surest guide to the reconstruction of a society after conflict. This new creation of both victim and wrongdoer is a sign of God’s presence and also indicates the restoration of humanity. It includes the painful experience of violence, but also the rediscovery of one’s identity, and thus, his/her transformation toward a new end.

Fourth, Schreiter (1992:61) maintains, “The new narrative that overcomes the narrative of the lie is the story of the passion, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. The death of Jesus Christ is an act of deep solidarity with suffering humanity; only by going into the throes of suffering, violence, and death can these be overcome”. It is the belief in the power of the resurrection; a power that is antithetical to death, a power that comes from the living God that makes the suffering more than the destruction of an individual person in society. For the Christian working towards reconciliation, the placement of one’s own suffering in such a framework can help give meaning to an otherwise meaningless suffering. The resurrection confirms and manifests God’s power over evil and the manifestation of God’s power for healing and forgiveness.

Fifth, according to Schreiter (1992:61-62), reconciliation is “…a multidimensional reality. Reconciliation involves not just God’s reconciling activity. It involves coming to terms with the otherness and the alienation that situations of violence and oppression have created. It involves lament and the healing of memories”.

Like Schreiter, Okure takes the view that the theology of reconciliation underlines God’s initiative. In her article, ‘The Ministry of Reconciliation (2 Corinthians 5:14–21): Paul’s Key to the Problem of ‘the other’ in Corinth,’ Okure (2006) considers reconciliation as a theological key to deal with the complex reality of our world, specifically the issues related to “the other”. According to Okure (2006:107), “The ministry of reconciliation as described by Paul in 2 Cor. 5:18 is the key response to the issue related with “the other””. This implies that what Paul did in his Corinthian context may shed light on how we too can proclaim this same gospel in our diverse
contexts. In other words, Paul’s approach should help us to respond and answer the issue of the other in our own diverse multi-cultural, religious, political, and economic contexts. Okure, therefore, considers the issue of “the other” to be a challenge to the church and society today. This is why she offers a way forward that requires each missiologist to take “the ministry of reconciliation (diakonian tès katallagèς; 5:18–19) as the key to the problem of the other” (Okure, 2006:116). Thus, the ministry of reconciliation is key to relating to “the other,” not only in the Corinthian context, but also in any other community. Such reconciliation leaves no room for engaging in any type of divisive activity or nourishing a prejudiced attitude towards others (Okure, 2006:116).

To this end, de Gruchy (2002:51-52) offers a way forward by summarizing the relation of divine activity and human participation in reconciliation: “Reconciliation has to do with the way in which God relates to us, the human ‘other’, and in turn with our relationship to ‘the other’, whether understood as an individual person or a group of people. It has to do with the process of overcoming alienation through identification and solidarity with ‘the other’, thus making peace and restoring relationships”.

This is related to what Schreiter (2013:13) refers to as the “vertical” and “horizontal” dimensions of reconciliation. For Schreiter, the vertical dimension—what God has done for humanity through Jesus Christ—is the foundation of all Christian discourse on reconciliation. What is receiving increasing attention, however, is the horizontal dimension of reconciliation; that is, reconciliation between humans—both individuals and groups, as described in Paul’s teachings (2 Cor. 5:17-20; Eph. 2:12-20).

Bosch (1991) supports the argument that reconciliation is God’s work when he states that the cross stands for reconciliation between estranged individuals and groups, between oppressors and the oppressed. Mission, according to Bosch (1991:512), is “the missio Dei, which seeks to reveal itself in the missiones ecclesiae, the missionary programs of the church. It is not the church which “undertakes” mission; it is the missio Dei which constitutes the church”. Livingston (1989:422) summarises Bosch’s theology of reconciliation as follows: First, Bosch sees “the process of reconciliation
and the demand of obedience as an urgent call to the church”. True reconciliation, says Bosch, “is really a challenge to us as the church, not the world outside. If there is no reconciliation, it is because we have not been the church. It is as simple as that”. Second, Bosch’s understanding of reconciliation, according to Livingston (1989:422), lays the foundations for his practical ministry within South Africa. In particular, it defines and shapes his response to the policies of his own denomination, the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC). Bosch attacks the DRC’s tacit support of apartheid because it undermines the true identity of the church. For Bosch, the church is called to be a community of reconciliation.

2.2.1 Reconciliation: A new paradigm for mission

In the post-violence context, reconciliation has recently been recognised as a necessary component to heal and reconstruct broken relations. Based on the writings of theologians and missiologists like Schreiter (2005) and Bosch (1991), this section argues that in the *missio Dei*, the mission of the church is located within the mission of God, which is the church’s participation in God’s work and its contribution to the common good of the world. This means that reconciliation should currently be the focus of our theological and missionary activities.

In this respect, Schreiter (2005:81-82) articulates, “Christians today are witnessing an emerging paradigm of reconciling mission and mission as reconciliation. Recent years have witnessed a discussion about reconciliation and healing as providing a new paradigm for mission. From a Christian and theological standpoint, reconciliation and healing constitutes a paradigm for mission”. For this reason, like other missiological paradigms, reconciliation has become a main concern in the transformation of our societies today. Schreiter further presents reconciliation as a new paradigm for

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11In his book *Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in Theology of Mission*, Bosch (1991) used a model from the philosophy of science—in particular, Kuhn’s *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* and Hans Kung’s paradigm shifts in the history of Christianity—to understand the development of a theology of mission. This enabled Bosch to conclude that a new paradigm is emerging: the ecumenical missionary paradigm (Bosch 1991:368). Bosch (2011:185) also identified six historical paradigms of mission beginning with the apocalyptic paradigm of the church and concluding with the emerging ecumenical paradigm. Each of the paradigms reflected a broader sense of how the church viewed mission or missions in the missionary process. To this, Schreiter (2005:74) adds that since the work on paradigms in the history of science developed by Thomas Kuhn, and the path-breaking work of missiologist David Bosch that adapted Kuhn’s approach, it has become more common in missiological circles to consider the history of mission as a series of paradigms.
mission by saying that the need for reconciliation is indispensable for humanity in a broken world. The ministry of reconciliation, as Schreiter (2005:3) puts it, is “[…] about participating in God’s healing of societies that have been wounded deeply and broken by oppression, injustice, discrimination, war, and wanton destruction”.

Of paramount importance, the idea of reconciliation is well captured in the Athens document, “Mission as Ministry of Reconciliation,” which states:

Since the late 1980s new aspects emerged and mission has been increasingly connected with reconciliation and healing. The language of reconciliation has to come to the fore in many different contexts and catches the imagination of people inside and outside the churches. In this situation we have come to discern anew that reconciliation is at the heart of Christian faith (cited by Schreiter & Jorgesen, 2013:184).

In the light of the church’s mission, some African scholars like Munachi Ezeogu (2009) relates reconciliation as an emerging paradigm directly to a shift in the priorities of African missions. Ezeogu (2009:250), in his writing entitled, ‘From Evangelisation to Reconciliation, Justice and Peace: Towards a Paradigm Shift in African Mission Priorities’, insightfully states that the “reconciliation of people in situations of conflict and tension, such as those in which many Africans live today, is therefore an essential part of the Church’s mission”. He quotes Pope John Paul II, who acknowledged the role played by the African Church in promoting peace and reconciliation in African countries by stating that: “I feel it my duty to express heartfelt thanks to the Church in Africa for the role which it has played over the years as a promoter of peace and reconciliation in many situations of conflict, political turmoil and civil war” (Ezeogu, 2009:250).

To work for reconciliation is as much a part of the mission of the church as evangelism. It is another way of proclaiming the good news of the Gospel. Ezeogu (2009:251) further describes, “Commitment to reconciliation and peace is actually commitment to evangelisation. In other words, a better understanding of evangelisation is commitment to reconciliation, justice and peace, which are tangible

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12CC’s Athens 2005 World Conference on Evangelism and Mission, see Preparatory Paper no. 10: Mission as Ministry of Reconciliation (May 10, 2005).
signs of the presence of God among His people”. Barton (2012:230) also proposes, “The mission of God fundamentally seeks communion between former enemies. This implies that reconciliation—more than social progress, economic development, or church growth—is primary criteria for determining whether reports of missionary success are legitimate”.

2.2.2 Reconciliation: A process and praxis

This section indicates the framework of reconciliation in this study, which focuses on reconciliation as both a process and praxis. By process, this study maintains that reconciliation is a long-term endeavour that cannot be achieved in a short period of time. As a process, it is assumed that one’s understanding of reconciliation will inevitably influence the praxis of mission, including its methods and application. Reconciliation as praxis, therefore, entails theological reflection and concrete actions aimed at the transformation of human beings. In other words, transformation means that mission is to be understood as an activity that purposively transforms reality (Bosch, 2011:523). This reconciliation model falls within the transformative perspective of the conceptual framework in a post-genocide Rwandan context. For this reason, reconciliation forms the central focus of mission in the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda, as will be discussed further in chapter 6.

As noted earlier, reconciliation is a complex term, and there is little agreement among experts regarding its definition. This is mainly because reconciliation is both a goal and a process. A source of complexity is that the process of reconciliation happens in many contexts. The process of reconciliation, according to Bloomfield (2003:13), entails: “Finding a way to live that permits a vision of the future; the (re)building of relationships; coming to terms with past acts and enemies; a society-wide, long-term process of deep change; a process of acknowledging, remembering; and a voluntary process that cannot be imposed”.

On the one hand, reconciliation is often described as “a goal or end-state, something to be achieved”. On the other hand, reconciliation is both a process and a goal, and as such, it is uncertain, uneven and often unfinished (Trimikliniotis, 2012:245). This implies that elements such as mutual acceptance, respect, trust, or even love, are
essentially aimed at the restoration and building of relationship between individuals, or groups, and societies (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004:14-22). For example, Daly and Sarkin (2007:258) assert, “Reconciliation is never achieved but is an ongoing process that nurtures itself”. These and other authors rightly stress the importance of promoting reconciliation as a long-term, evolutionary process (Sasaki, 2012:12-3). In the same vein, Kubai (2007a:61) understands reconciliation as “…a process that has to take time and move at its own pace. For her, reconciliation cannot be accelerated. It must be inclusive—all sectors of society, not only the victims and the perpetrators, must be included in the process because violence has certain ramifications for the whole society”.

In light of the above argument, Huyse (2003) claims that reconciliation is both a goal and a process. To better understand reconciliation as a process, what Huyse (2003:2-3) observes may be helpful here because he identifies and summarises five profound notes concerning this process:

i. Reconciliation is a long-term process because it involves a range of stages.

ii. Reconciliation is a broad and extensive process. It involves individuals and communities. The approach to it must be both top-down and bottom-up.

iii. Lasting reconciliation must be home-grown. It cannot be imported from the outside. Each post-conflict situation has its particular context.

iv. There is no one road to reconciliation. Reconciliation includes: healing programs, truth-telling, punitive and restorative justice, and reparation. No single tool will solve the whole problem. Depending on the context, different instruments need to be used.

v. Reconciliation is only one of the many challenges in a post-conflict situation. The end of a violent conflict creates a complex agenda such as stabilizing a delicate peace accord, rebuilding the political machinery and the civil service.

In their book titled, Reconciling All Things: A Christian Vision for Justice, Peace and Healing, Katongole and Rice (2010:156-162) use the word ‘journey’ instead of ‘process’ Interestingly, they conclude with ten theses of reconciliation. They write:
Reconciliation is not a theory, achievement, technique, or event. It is a journey. The end toward which the journey of reconciliation leads is the shalom of God’s new creation—a future not yet fully realized, but holistic in its transformation of the personal, social, and structural dimensions of life. Reconciliation is always a journey of transformation toward a new future of friendship with God and people.

It is important to note that reconciliation is a journey towards a new transformation. Reconciliation is journey from the painful past caused by injustice into the peaceful and just future, a journey from enmity to friendship and communion. In this case, we can conclude that the outcome of reconciliation aims at transforming the lives of people (Katongole & Rice, 2010:35, 37).

Reconciliation, as an on-going process, should combine a variety of aims. It should be comprehensive, reshaping relationships towards acceptance and mutual trust. This will involve a range of initiatives. Witnessing, telling the truth, exposing lies, healing memories, justice and forgiveness—these are all necessary for the journey of reconciliation.

With regards to the praxis of reconciliation, de Gruchy (2002:21) indicates, “Reconciliation is, indeed, an action, praxis and movement before it became a theory or dogma”. Both words and deeds are necessary in the process of reconciliation. Furthermore, Isaak (2011:223) maintains, “The model of God’s mission as praxis for reconciliation means to bring the good news to the oppressed”. By oppressed, Isaak includes not only the poor and marginalized but also the victims of injustices.

If mission become a praxis, Isaak (2011:223) is correct when he posits, “The church remains both a place of studying and pursuing theology, mission, ministry and diaconal service (diakonia). It is a place of continual accompaniment that reflects the interaction between context, theology and practice, while proclaiming and teaching the good news to the oikoumene, the whole inhabited earth”. In other words, it is about the “missional church and its missionary praxis, or what God in Jesus Christ together with the Holy Spirit is doing in the world to bring about healing, reconciliation, wholeness, liberation and salvation” (Isaak, 2011:223). This implies
that Christian mission today is to be a healing community, realizing an “emerging paradigm of reconciling mission and mission as reconciliation” (Isaak, 2011:223).

From the same viewpoint of missions as praxis, Karecki (2009) in her article, ‘Contemplative Encounter and Mission Praxis’ credits Klippies Kritzinger for making a profound contribution to the discipline of missiology, capturing the essence of mission praxis as God’s mission. In his argument for transforming encounter, he uses Kritzinger’s words saying:

Mission as praxis is about concrete transformation; it is specifically about transformative encounters: among people, and between the living God and people, leading to people being called, sent, healed, and empowered. It is about the Reign of God that has entered into this broken world as a transformative power in Jesus; that continues to be manifested transformatively in our midst by the work of the Holy Spirit; that takes hold of our lives and transforms us so that we may encounter other people, thus creating the church as the community of the kingdom, working for and waiting for the coming Reign of God. God’s mission, the arriving of the Reign of God, is about transformative encounters. That is why missiology – which critically reflects on mission – is “encounterology”, the scholarly study of such transformative encounters (cited by Karecki, 2009:33).

It is with regards to this that one may say that reconciliation as praxis of mission entails concrete transformation of God’s people. Reconciliation is a key task of diakonia, as noted by the Lutheran World Federation: “Reconciliation first of all refers to God’s action, through which human beings get their relation to God restored. At the same time restoration implies being transformed and empowered for the ministry’ (Greek: diakonia) of reconciliation as part of its mission to the world. 2 Corinthians 5: 18” (cited by Arulnathan, 2013:48).

Diakonia is an act of liberation and an act of reconciliation, healing, caring for and empathizing with those most marginalized as well as bringing empowerment and dignity. Diaconal care brings people towards reconciliation through its spiritual and practical actions, meeting people in vulnerable situations where reconciliation can seem impossible or indeed hopeless. Diaconal care can also give people a sense of hope that reconciliation is possible and that it is accessible to all (Arulnathan, 2013:43, 48).
Reconciliation is a common ground for witness, *diakonia*, and *koinonia*. The proclamation of the Word of God articulates the reconciliation event in a particular situation and time, awakening a new hope for God’s reign. Though it is a concrete act, *diakonia* reconciles the separated to each other, empowering the lives of the marginalized and advocating that the abandoned receive new life in God’s reconciliation (Chung, 2008:24). Indeed, Schreiter (2013:18) also believes that reconciliation is an act of healing the past and building the future. Based on the *missio Dei* itself, he further argues that it is these concrete manifestations of reconciliation in the practice of ministry that should form our model of mission. If reconciliation, then, is the model and form of praxis for mission, the next section inquires about how to give this model a biblical foundation.

2.3 Biblical-missiological perspective of reconciliation

A theological account of reconciliation must be responsive to the witness of Scripture. This section will explore the understanding of reconciliation present in the Old and New Testaments. This section also constructs the theological framework of reconciliation by exploring the *missio Dei* model of reconciliation based on two biblical texts, namely, Genesis 50:15-21 and 2 Corinthians 5:17-21.

The Old Testament text of Genesis 50:15-21 is considered to be the most relevant to the process of reconciliation in the post-genocide Rwandan context. According to Bazuin (2013:143), religious explanations of suffering have been a comfort to many Rwandan people. The hermeneutical meaning and interpretation of this text is also relevant to the Rwandan context, as it recalls what happened in the narrative of Joseph and his brothers. Thus, due to how people speak about the text and identify themselves with the conversation and reconciliation that took place, the relevance of this text is clearly noted.

The relevance of the New Testament text of 2 Corinthians 5:17-21, among the many other texts that mention reconciliation in the Bible, is due to the unanimity of many scholars (cf. Schreiter, 1992, 2005; Okure, 2006) that this text clearly describes the doctrine of reconciliation; hence, it is the key text for reconciliation as a new
paradigm of mission. Another reason behind the choice of these above-mentioned biblical texts is that they were considered to be key theological and missiological resources in the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda (EPR) in its reconciliation program, as will be discussed further in chapter 6.

2.3.1 Reconciliation in Genesis 50:15-21

Despite the fact that the word ‘reconciliation’ does not occur as such in the Old Testament, and appears only fourteen times in the New Testament, the Bible shows us that there are numerous examples of reconciliation, for example, between Esau and Jacob, between Joseph and his brothers, as well as the story of the Prodigal Son found in the parables (Schreiter, 2005:1). In their own way, these stories reveal the struggle to achieve reconciliation.

In the Old Testament, to sin is first to break the covenant between God and humanity, but also includes the breaking of fellowship between human beings. Reconciliation restores the union between God and humans. Reconciliation carries the idea of appeasing God’s anger, first by expiation on the part of sinful humans, concretised by a specific rite (cf. the Book of Leviticus). Expiation as a condition for reconciliation has a whole history in the Old Testament. Primitively, expiation means appeasing God’s anger through punishing the guilty party or by enacting a ritual act that is agreeable to God. These acts include purification through the merits of the purifying blood of a sacrificed victim13 (Leviticus 8:14ff; 16:14ff).

Prophetic action spiritualises the process of reconciliation. God is perceived less as a sovereign power whose anger must be appeased than as a God who reconciles. Therefore, reconciliation does not bring about a change in God, but only in sinful humans, who returns to God and is welcomed by him. In this return to God, sacrifice plays an important role, signifying the change in the human whose faults are expiated.

At the same time, reconciliation with God in the Old Testament is inseparable from reconciliation with one’s neighbour. Genesis 50:15-21 will serve as an example of

reconciliation in this sense. By choosing this text, I assume that the story of reconciliation between Joseph and his brothers would be relevant in the Rwandan context. Therefore, to deal with the issues raised in this section, I shall first do the exegesis of the mentioned text in the light of reconciliation. Second, I shall highlight the meanings and relevancy of Genesis 50:15-21 for reconciliation in Rwanda.

2.3.1.1 The Reconciliation between Joseph and his Brothers (Gen. 50:15-21)

Before Jacob died, he left instruction to his family. Joseph’s reconciliation with his brothers is based on putting this instruction into practice:

“And when Joseph’s brethren saw that their father was dead, they said, it may be that Joseph will hate us, and will full requite us all the evil which we did unto him” (Gen. 50:15).

In this verse the brothers express apprehension about how Joseph will treat them now that their father has died, fearing that he may decide to seek retribution. Given the lack of resolution in chapter 45, this is understandable. Moreover, in the face of death of a common parent, particularly a parent of such influence and renown, typical patterns of behaviour may no longer continue. Life among the siblings has to be renegotiated.

According to Walter (1982:370), the brothers are not yet rid of their guilt (vv. 15-17). Although chapter 45:1-5 has already given assurances on this score, the brothers do not know whether this will hold. Now that Jacob is dead, perhaps Joseph will now unleash his long restrained resentment. The brothers face a new circumstance requiring new assurances. The enduring power of guilt and its resultant fear is something every family knows. These brothers know that the only one who can break the cycle and banish the guilt is the wronged party, the one whom they most fear. Their suspicion is that Joseph will hate and loathe them.

“And they sent a message unto Joseph, saying, thy father did command before he died, saying” (Gen. 50: 16).
Rather than face Joseph directly, the brothers send a message to him. This is an attempt to avoid direct confrontation with one’s adversary. Hamilton (1995:703) retains that the brothers adroitly refer to Jacob as ‘your father.’ Their choice abika (your father), rather than abinu (our father), is deliberate. They wanted to make their case as strongly as possible by suggesting to Joseph: ‘Joseph, it was your very own father who….’ They prioritise their concerns in terms of their father’s deathbed wish, rather than a direct personal request. The upshot of Jacob’s request was that the brothers be reconciled, more specifically, that Joseph should forgive them for the crime they committed (Hamilton, 1995:703). In this regard, ‘your’ father rather than ‘our’ father refers to categorisation and identity.

“So shall ye say unto Joseph, forgive, I pray thee now, the transgression of thy brethren, and their sin, for that they did unto thee evil…” (Gen. 50:17).

The theme of forgiveness occurs twice in this verse, first in Jacob’s request, then again in the brothers’ request. The words for “sin” and “evil” are used four times in these two requests. Their high degree of consciousness about their crime suggests that the encounter in chapter 45 did not resolve the matter for the brothers. Even with the assurances given to them by Joseph, they still live with the guilt of what they have done.

“And his brethren also went and fell down before his face; and they said, behold, we be thy servants” (Gen. 50:18).

The brothers turn from referring to themselves as “servants of your father’s God” to simply “your slaves”. The former expression suggests that these men share an equal status with Joseph. They are all children of the same God. The latter expression suggests subordination, something they had advocated earlier (Gen. 44:9). Having sent a message to Joseph (vv. 15-17), the brothers now follow up with a personal appearance before their brother (v. 18). The latter follows so closely upon the former that Joseph has no time to respond to their message before they are in his presence (Hamilton, 1995:704).
“And Joseph said unto them, Fear not; for am I in the place of God? I will nourish you…” (Gen. 50:19-21).

The words “fear not” enclose Joseph’s response. This signals an oracle of comfort and assurance. Joseph gives three reasons to ease their fears. Firstly, he responds in a tone that both rebukes and reassures: ‘am I in the place of God?’ The question portrays a profound judgment in this matter, not a humble declaration of non-competence. It probably has a double reference to their request for forgiveness and to their offer to become slaves.

i. Joseph is not God, thus they can be assured that he will not behave as a Pharaoh to them. He remains subject to God as the brothers are; they stand together under the authority of a divine other who works purposefully on behalf of them all.

ii. Regarding forgiveness, Joseph seems to reject a guilt/forgiveness approach (as in Gen. 45:3-8). Instead, he leaves it up to God. At the same time, his words and deeds reveal a conciliatory spirit.

By naming their evil (Gen. 44:4-5), Joseph assures his brothers that their actions have been drawn into God’s larger purpose. God’s goodness has prevailed. So, in verse 21, Joseph comforts them and speaks kindly to them, assuring them that he will provide for them, giving special attention to their children, and hence, their future (Gen. 45:10-11; 47:12). This involves not just words, but concrete practical realities.

2.3.1.2 Perspectives of Gen. 50:15-21 in the process of reconciliation in Rwanda

Joseph’s reconciliation with his brothers can serve as a biblical perspective in the Rwandan context. Joseph, as the victim of his brothers’ evil intentions, serves as a parallel to the survivors of the 1994 genocide. The similarity is clear: the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa have traditionally been understood as belonging to the same father, Kanyarwanda. Joseph’s reconciliation with his brothers who perpetrated evil against him is a relevant biblical model of reconciliation for present-day Rwanda.
As mentioned previously, the reconciliation that took place between Joseph and his brothers did not come from their repentance, or from the guilt of what they bestowed on him, but was because of Jacob’s instructions before he died. In the case of Rwanda, reconciliation was mainly initiated by the government through the NURC and other organisations like African Evangelism Enterprise (AEE) and Prisons Fellowship, and not because the people who participated in the killings during the genocide wanted to reconcile.

In verse 20, Joseph says, “God meant it for good….” This means that God did not intend Joseph to suffer. Despite all the injustice he has suffered, Joseph could see God’s hand at work in the outcome of the events that took place. Joseph’s confidence in God’s purpose is mirrored in the words of many genocide survivors: most of them respond, “It is God’s hand which protects us”. In other words, by ‘God meant it for good,’ Joseph does not mean that God approved or justified the evil actions, but that Joseph witnessed God’s protective power over him.

Although the brothers first sent Joseph a message, they quickly came to face their victim. And they said unto Joseph, “Forgive us the crime…. then Joseph wept”. Both of these elements remind us of how the survivors of genocide in Rwanda wept when they came together with the perpetrators during the Gacaca14 courts, hearing how their relatives were killed. As Joseph said unto them, “Am I in the place of God?” Like Joseph, most victims, as well as other Tutsi, were ready to forgive and not seek revenge.

2.3.2 Perspective of Reconciliation in 2 Corinthians 5: 17-21

The concept of reconciliation appears in New Testament theology, especially the theology of the Apostle Paul. Though many texts are referred to, this section focuses on 2 Corinthians 5:17-21, because it shows how Paul understood reconciliation as both “a restoration of a broken relationship between God and humanity and a ministry of reconciliation that attempted to bring human enemies together and create a state of real peace” (Volf, 2000:166). Christian reconciliation is therefore “based on the fact

14Gacaca is a traditional way of judgment and reconciliation adapted in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide (see section: 5.3.2).
that God reconciled us to Himself in Christ. Christ suffered our iniquity on the cross, restored us to the fellowship with God and with each other, and involves us in God’s act of reconciliation by the power of the Spirit” (Nurmerger & Tooke, 1988:84).

All the words directly related to the doctrine of reconciliation come from the same root. Probably the most important is καταλλάσσω, found twice in the active voice (2 Cor. 5:18, 19) and four times in the passive voice (Rom. 5:10 (twice); 2 Cor. 5:20). It is defined simply as “to reconcile” or in the passive “to become reconciled”. It is ordinarily used to describe the relationship effected by God in which humanity is reconciled to Himself. In every reference where God is spoken of as reconciling humanity, that is, in five out of six instances, humanity is spoken of as reconciled to God rather than God as being reconciled to humanity. In keeping with the preliminary definition, this usage would indicate that reconciliation is effected by God in His transformation of humans.

The second Greek word is καταλλαγή, a noun form of the preceding word. Its definition is the same as the verb, and in all four instances (Rom. 11:15; 2 Cor. 5:18, 19; as well as in Rom. 5:11 where the Authorized Version translates it as atonement) the work of reconciliation is spoken of as originating in God and effective toward humankind.

A third Greek word is ἀποκαταλλάσσω, which is found three times in the New Testament (Eph. 2:16; Col. 1:20, 21). This word does not occur in any previous Greek literature, and some feel Paul coined it to express the completeness of reconciliation. It means to reconcile completely. In this definition, reconciliation is viewed as dealing with humanity’s position with enmity in their sinful state and the resultant work wipes out that enmity and transforms the individual into a new creature, making their eternal fellowship with God possible.15

Indeed, Manickman (2007:329) maintains, “Paul is the principal resource for the concept of reconciliation. Some form of ‘katallassein’ or ‘katallage’ derived from the

word *allaso*, which means ‘exchange, alter change’. Paul uses the word in three ways: first, the restoration of relationships between human beings and God (Rom. 5:11; 2 Cor. 5:18-19); second, reconciliation between two estranged groups, the Jews and the Gentiles (Eph. 2:11-20), and third, cosmic restoration (Col. 1:15-22) or the eschatological consummation when God will reconcile all things through Christ”.

Reconciliation is so important between persons in the New Testament that it even takes precedence over other forms of religious activity. In the words of the prophet Amos, “How can two walk together unless they be agreed?” (Amos 3:3). Jesus agreed with this principle in his Sermon on the Mount when he said, “So if you are offering your gift at the altar and there remember that your brother has something against you, leave your gift there before the altar and go. First, be reconciled to your brother and then come and offer your gift” (Matthew 5:23-24). Here, reconciliation between estranged brothers takes priority over even the worship of God. This text illustrates the importance of the social meaning of the concept reconciliation.  

Reconciliation between two persons takes place when the parties in a conflict are willing to confess and redress wrongs they have inflicted upon each other, forgive each other and restore full fellowship between each other. To confess, redress and forgive wrongs assumes suffering; this suffering can be interpreted as participation in the cross of Christ (Nurnberger & Tooke, 1988:85).

On the one hand, it is clear that something is required on the part of the offender before he/she can be the recipient of forgiveness. “If thy brother turns again to thee saying I repent” (Lk 17:3-4, Matt.18:15-17). This is the condition: there must be the consciousness of sin, recognition of wrongdoing and a turning away from it. On the other hand, “Jesus did not wait until those who were nailing him to the cross had asked for forgiveness. He was ready, as they drove in the nails, to pray to his Father to forgive them” (Tutu, 1999:271). Jesus’ example of forgiveness concurs with Desmond Tutu’s argument, who clearly claims that, “If the victim could forgive only when the culprit confessed, then the victim would be locked into the culprit’s whim, locked into victimhood, whatever her own attitude or intention” (Tutu, 1999:271).

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Against this background, it is essential to conclude that the biblical foundation of reconciliation as a model for mission helps us to set out a theology for missionary praxis today. Consequently, “Such a theological elaboration makes possible a bigger framework in which to examine the challenges for bringing about reconciliation in the world as well as seeing how the distinctive characteristics of the Christians understanding of reconciliation respond to those challenges” (Schreiter, 2013:14).

2.4 Conceptualizing reconciliation

According to Trimikliniotis (2012:251), conceptualizing ‘reconciliation’ means, “…trying to capture multiple processes, ideas and practices, official, semi-official and unofficial, state-sponsored or sanctioned, or anti-state or non-state sanctioned that lead to very diverse, often contradictory societal processes”. Consequently, defining reconciliation is an inherently interdisciplinary project. There are numerous definitions of reconciliation, depending on the field in which it is implemented. Scholars from diverse approaches and backgrounds have attempted to define the concept reconciliation. Schreiter (1998:13), for example, makes it clear that “there is no single understanding of reconciliation”. Mukherjee also suggests that in the post-conflict context, the term reconciliation is “understood differently by different stakeholders. However, every culture and language has concepts of who needs to be involved in reconciliation and how it should be accomplished” (Mukherjee, 2011:333).

According to Desmond Tutu (cited in Komesaroff, 2008), reconciliation will always be a long and complex process. It will require on-going study and reflection and different approaches to practice. But, it is of crucial importance because it provides inspiration and hope that a peaceful and harmonious future is possible. Moreover, Piet Meiring (2005:4), a minister in this field of reconciliation and missiologist views reconciliation as not only a complex phenomenon but also an unavoidable feature of a contemporary society. For this reason, his hope is that:

Leaders in fields of philosophy and linguistics may help analyse the history and meaning of the concept of reconciliation. Sociologists and psychologists need to
define the context as well as the process of reconciliation and theologians are challenged to develop a theology of reconciliation.

Having briefly explored the concept reconciliation and the complexity of trying to define this term, we have to ask ourselves then: “What is reconciliation?” The word reconciliation means reconstructing new relationships between the two parties involved in a conflict aiming to live together. Reconciliation has been conceptualized as “the process of reestablishing relations between opposing ethnic groups, the cessation of active conflict, and the transformation of previously conflictive issues into a more compatible relationship” (Mukherjee, 2011:333). Reconciliation can also mean, “Transforming a previously hostile relationship between warring parties to one where there are peaceful relations in the present as well as the likelihood of continued peace in the future” (Mukherjee, 2011:333). This definition clearly shows that the rebuilding of relationships between individuals or groups is a key concept in the reconciliation process.

In his paper, ‘Reconciliation – Theory and Practice for Development Cooperation,’ Brounéus (2008:12) defines reconciliation as follows: “Reconciliation is a societal process involving mutual acknowledgment of past suffering and the changing of destructive attitudes and behavior into constructive relationships toward sustainable peace”.

Brounéus (2008:12) further conceptualizes that “reconciliation involves changes in emotion (mutual acknowledgment of suffering), attitude, and behavior”. He emphasizes, “Reconciliation is a societal process after armed conflict, and thus involves changes within and between former enemy groups after the war has ended”. Finally, he highlights that “reconciliation is a process, not a specific state at a particular moment in time”.

Staub (2014), in his research article, ‘The Challenging Road to Reconciliation in Rwanda: Societal Processes, Interventions and their Evaluation, defined reconciliation in the Rwandan context as follows:
Reconciliation in Rwanda requires mutual acceptance, acknowledgment by each group of its past harmful actions; humanising each group in the eyes of the other and increased trust; as well as constructive vision/ideology is necessary to bring people together. Lastly, moving toward a shared or inclusive history of past events in place of conflicting histories will lead to reconciliation. Understanding the roots and impact of violence can contribute to more positive attitudes by members of the two groups toward each other, and empower people to resist the influences that lead to violence and engage in reconciliatory activities (Staub, 2014:515).

From the contextual reality of Rwanda, reconciliation can mean a process in which “victims and perpetrators, or members of hostile groups, do not see the past as defining the future. It means that they come to see the humanity of one another, accept each other, and see the possibility of restoring a damaged relationship” (Staub, 2006:868). The above definition of reconciliation sheds lights on the view that reconciliation in Rwanda needs to be institutionally facilitated on a larger scale. This is justified by the fact that reconciliation in the Rwandan context applies not only to the victims, but also to the perpetrators, and therefore requires institutionally implemented interventions to help both groups reflect on the way they see their pasts differently and how they will transform their futures.

2.5 Dimensional approach to reconciliation

Reconciliation is a complex, multidimensional phenomenon. It encompasses processes as well as particular aspects of the relationship between two or more persons or collectivities (Kriesberg, 2007:251). In his book Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, Lederach (1997:28) establishes four essential elements of reconciliation, namely, truth, mercy, justice and peace. These four elements are taken from two lines in Psalm 85, which read: “Truth and mercy have met together; peace and justice have kissed”. For Lederach, even though the four elements may seem to be contradictory, they are interconnected. He argues that truth without justice is impossible, especially for victims who faced brutal violence. Without justice, they fear future recurrences of violence. At the same time, justice without truth is difficult because it ignores the memories of those who suffered, consequently, it may create future conflicts. In addition to truth and justice, mercy is needed. However, mercy does not promote the culture of impunity, but rather
recognizes that perpetrators are still responsible for their deeds even after the act of mercy. Finally, peace is useful for the people to build their new relations (cf. Molenaar, 2005:34-35).

According to Lederach (1997), these four elements, are proposed as a framework in which reconciliation, if people desire and work for it, can be realized. For the process of reconciliation to be successful, he suggests that all four categories need to be balanced. It is important, however, to acknowledge that particular contexts may require an emphasis on one pillar over the others. He further argues that different pillars of the model may come into effect at different times in the reconciliation process. Trimikliniotis (2012:245) also clearly emphasises that “there is no universally accepted mode of reconciliation”. In addition, Schreiter (2008:7) rightfully supports this view by stating, “There is no formula or strategy for reconciliation that will be applicable in every instance”. The above arguments testify that the concept of reconciliation has been and is often used in different ways for various purposes, and in particular situations.

In order to apply Lederach’s insights to the Rwandan context, I have re-conceptualized reconciliation as having four essential dimensions: (1) relationship-building, (2) truth telling, (3) forgiveness, and (4) healing. The choice of these dimensions is not arbitrary; rather it is based on the priorities of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) in Rwanda. For the NURC, the guiding principles for unity and reconciliation is “to mutually strive to heal one another’s physical and psychological wounds while building future interpersonal trust based on truth telling, repentance and forgiveness” (NURC, 2007:10). Figure 4 below summarizes the four dimensional approach of reconciliation and shows how the elements are interconnected to each other.
These four dimensions will serve as a model of reconciliation, which will guide my analysis of reconciliation in the Rwandan context. These are examined in closer detail below.

2.5.1 Relationship building dimension

Some scholars like Assefa (1996), Kriesberg (2007), Schreiter (2005) and Isaak (2011) consider relationship building as an essential element or factor in the reconciliation process. Assefa (1996:46), for instance, posits that reconciliation denotes “the act by which people that have been apart and removed from one another begin to re-establish their connection. It means the restoration of broken relationships or the coming together of those who have been alienated and separated from each other by conflict, to create a community again”.

With regards to reconciliation as relationship building, a Lutheran theologian from Namibia, Paul Isaak, asserts that the ministry of reconciliation refers more generally to the process of bringing different parties into relationships of mutual benefit and enrichment. This implies that healing broken relationships and restoring new relationships is important for reconciliation to happen (Isaak, 2011:335). Nevertheless, for relationship building to happen, healing of memories for the victims is needed to free them from the pains of the past. It means that the perpetrator must repent and acknowledge his/her wrong deeds and apologize to the victim in order make amends (Schreiter, 2005:4).

Relationship building remains the key term among many scholars who seek to define the concept of reconciliation. Kriesberg (2007), for example, suggests that:
“Reconciliation refers to the process by which parties that have experienced an oppressive relationship or a destructive conflict with each other move to attain or to restore a relationship that they believe to be minimally acceptable”.

Molenaar (2005) provides three profound meanings of the above definition of reconciliation, as proposed by Kriesberg. Firstly, reconciliation is seen as a “process” since it takes time to heal the wounds of the past and to build new relationships. Secondly, Molenaar maintains that when Kriesberg talks about “parties that have experienced an oppressive relationship or a destructive conflict,” it means that this negative situation presents the starting point for any reconciliation process. There is a broken relationship between a perpetrator and a victim. Thirdly, there is a “move to attain or to restore a relationship,” which refers to the ultimate goal of reconciliation. This goal has to be pursued together (Molenaar, 2005:32).

2.5.2 Truth-telling dimension
Reconciliation is about the present and the future, which somehow requires managing past differences, divisions and polarisations around which violence was historically organised (Trimikliniotis, 2012:245). Reconciliation is also seen as breaking the silence about the past via the recognition of ‘the truth;’ acknowledging the wrongdoing is as much about the future as it is about memory (Trimikliniotis, 2012:247).

In order for relationships to be restored, it is important to tell the truth about what caused the rupture in the relationship. Isaak (2011:335) argues, “Truth-telling is a medicine that has healing power. It creates safe and sacred spaces where people can gather to remember while grieving”. Likewise, Schreiter (2005:3) accurately claims “…truth-telling means overcoming and correcting the lies and distortions that bring unearned shame on the innocent and isolate people from one another so as to exercise hegemony over society. Truth-telling has to be a constant effort to tell the whole truth, both for victims and wrongdoers”. Schreiter (2005:3) notes that the practice of truth-telling must comprise the following four points:

- It must be a truth that resonates with my experience of events.
- It must be in a language I can understand.
• It must conform to my understanding of truthfulness.
• It must come from someone I can trust.

Again, Schreiter (1992:71) emphasizes that the best approach in any process of reconciliation is to consider the following elements:

Victims of violence and suffering must tell their story over and over again in order to escape the narrative of the lie. As they recount their own narrative, little by little they begin to construct a new narrative of truth that can include the experiences of suffering and violence without allowing those experiences to overwhelm it. This includes, in the first stage, establishing a kind of geography of violence and suffering; that is, bounding it so as to tame its savage power. The more that the violence is so bounded, the less formidable it becomes. Without such boundedness, it roams at will in the life of the victim devouring, like the roaming lion in 1 Peter 5:8, whomever it will. The ministry of reconciliation at this stage is the ministry of listening.

We can therefore assert that reconciliation is about the ministry of listening. Romocea (2004:161) asserts, “In the absence of a willingness on the part of the antagonistic groups involved in the conflict to re-narrate history from the perspective of those who were its agents and its victims, there will be little opportunity for bringing social reconciliation and the restoration of a moral society”. Romocea (2004:162) further adds, “An important element in the process of reconciliation is the re-narration of the history of enmity that will allow the victims to gain a new memory of the past”. At the same time, Romocea (2004:162) cautions about the danger of re-narrating history, by saying that “it may generate new tales of historical glory and plausible explanations for past failures, so that hope for reconciliation is again lost”. Despite the necessity of truth-telling in the process of reconciliation, Bloomfield (2003:14) states, “Truth in itself will not bring reconciliation. Truth-seeking is a key ingredient, but only one ingredient, in reconciliation”.

In exploring truth-telling from the Christian perspective, we are reminded of the following by de Gruchy (2002:23):

Truth-telling is more than relating facts in a credible manner. It also involves God, who is the author of all truth. It is truth-telling at this deep, theological level that is the basis for healing a broken society. What that means on a practical level is that the Church must endeavour to create safe, hospitable
spaces where truth can be spoken and heard, where the silence can be broken and where pernicious lies can be laid bare and overcome. Truth in the biblical sense is communicated primarily through remembering and retelling past events in ways that relate to present issues and struggles (de Gruchy, 2002:23).

Writing from the South African context, Meiring (2013:7) maintains that, “Reconciliation and truth go hand in hand”. He adds, “Searching for truth can be painful and difficult, even hazardous. It can disrupt the journey towards reconciliation. But in the long run, it is the only way to go. Reconciliation is about uncovering the truth, not about amnesia”. Meiring (2013:7) also suggests that it is not “only the victims and the perpetrators that needed the truth-telling, the nation needed it as well – to listen to the truth, to be confronted by the truth, to be shamed by the truth, to struggle with the truth and finally to be liberated by the truth”. To emphasize the importance of truth-telling, he uses the words of Ellen Kuzwayo, a celebrated South African author: “Africa is a place of storytelling. We need more stories, never mind how painful the exercise may be. This is how we will learn to love one another. Stories help us to understand, to forgive and to see things through someone else’s eyes” (cited by Meiring, 2013:8).

Brounéus (2008:15) notes, “Truth-telling has come to play a pivotal role in reconciliation processes around the world”. It has been indicated that truth-telling contributes to “any of the following…truth, assisting victims, reconciliation, healing, interracial unity, reconstruction, public deliberation, rule of law, justice, accountability, and institutional reform” (Brounéus, 2008:15). In fact, in the Rwandan context, truth-telling is a key element in the process of reconciliation. There is a Rwandan saying: “Ukuri kurakiza,” which means, “The Truth Saves”. In post-genocide Rwanda, “The Truth Saves” has become the popular slogan among people who promote reconciliation.

In the light of the above discussion, it can be affirmed that truth-telling is an essential element of the reconciliation process. However, it does entail some risks. Brounéus (2008:15) highlights three such findings within recent psychological research: First, there were reports in South Africa indicating a risk of re-traumatization for victims

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when they gave testimony to the TRC. Second, there are recommendations that the practice of one-session debriefing, an early psychological intervention after trauma, should cease as it may increase the risk of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression. A single session of debriefing and testifying in a reconciliation court both involve short and intensive trauma exposure. Third, there are novel theoretical explanations in cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) and neuro-psychology for why short durations of trauma exposure may lead to re-traumatization (Brounéus, 2008:15-16). In the case of Rwanda, Brounéus investigates the risks related to truth-telling among the genocide survivors. He states that witnesses in the Gacaca traditional courts suffered from significantly higher levels of depression and PTSD than non-witnesses. The results of his study strongly challenge the claim that truth-telling is healing, suggesting instead that there are risks for the individuals on whom the truth-telling processes depend (Brounéus, 2008:15).

2.5.3 Forgiveness dimension

This section looks at forgiveness as a crucial component in the process of reconciliation. Here, forgiveness is considered as an obligation and mandatory (Bosch, 1988) as it opens a new beginning for the future (Tutu, 1999). While forgiveness can contribute to reconciliation in significant ways; it is argued that forgiveness will not produce the expected positive changes in all contexts. This is due to the fact that forgiveness is also difficult as it can be seen as a betrayal of the past (Schreiter, 1989) and as being unpleasant, especially in the post-genocide context (Molenaar, 2005).

In his book, No Future without Forgiveness, Tutu (1999) describes his experience of addressing a rally in the Kigali stadium after the Rwandan genocide. He made a passionate plea for forgiveness and reconciliation, in spite of everything that had happened in the past, arguing that without these there would be no future for Rwanda and its people. Tutu (1999:220) stressed the following:

In the act of forgiveness we are declaring our faith in the future of a relationship and in the capacity of wrongdoer to make a new beginning on a course that will be different from the one that caused us the wrong. We are saying here is a chance to make a new beginning. It is an act of faith that wrongdoer can change.
For Tutu (1999:270), true reconciliation does not come cheaply. Forgiveness cost God the death of His only begotten Son. Forgiving and being reconciled are not about pretending that things are other than they are. It is not about patting one another on the back and turning a blind eye to the wrongs committed. True reconciliation exposes the awfulness, the abuse, the pain, the degradation—the truth. It could even sometimes make things worse. It is a risky undertaking but in the long-run it is worthwhile because dealing with the real issues helps to bring about healing. Spurious reconciliation can only bring spurious healing.

In his twelve theses of reconciliation in ‘Processes of Reconciliation and Demand of Obedience: Twelve theses,’ Bosch (1988:110-111) emphasises that forgiveness is not optional but mandatory. He clearly affirms that we cannot expect the unconditional pardon of God when we have a radically different attitude towards our neighbour, an attitude that is restricted and conditional upon whether the neighbour properly repents. For Livingston (1989:420-421), “To refuse to repent, forgive and be reconciled is tantamount to declaring that what Christ did on the cross was of no consequence. To refuse to act on the divine mandate for interpersonal reconciliation is a denial of the Lord, because true reconciliation with God necessarily involves being reconciled with those around us”.

Although Bosch claims forgiveness to be mandatory, I find that what Schreiter (1989:55) observes is more relevant, especially when he points out that forgiveness seems to be impossible in situations where the wrongdoer does not acknowledge what has been done. On the one hand, Schreiter affirms that forgiveness is one of the thorny parts of the reconciliation process. Forgiving can be seen as a betrayal of the past, and especially a betrayal of the dead. To forgive seems to wipe out the memory of what has happened. Forgiving can feel like negating a past that has changed the present and the future irrevocably. Simply to forgive is to pretend that all the pain never happened. Forgiving seems to be a way of punishing the victim once again, this time by erasing a memory.

In post-genocide Rwanda, forgiveness is possible on the one hand, but at the same time, impossible on the other. In an interview conducted by Molenaar (2003) on the
subject of forgiving, one survivor named Priscilla, who had lost her husband and two children among others, stated the following:

It is incomprehensible what they did. Although they had not any tug of war before, they [the perpetrators] were hunting my husband as if he was an animal. And when they caught him over there in the valley, they were hitting him with a machete as if he was a banana tree. I saw it! And now they want me to forgive them while back then they didn’t show any mercy. How can they expect me to forgive? (Molenaar, 2005:40).

Like Priscilla, many survivors of genocide see forgiveness as an unpleasant duty and moral obligation; hence, for them, forgiveness is impossible. On the other hand, some survivors see forgiveness as an essential component in the reconciliation process.

Mrs. Adela Sefuku\textsuperscript{18}, for example, is a resident of Rwamagana district in the Eastern Province where I live; she has a unique story of repentance and forgiveness. She is a widow of the genocide whose husband, a former pastor in the Seventh Day Adventist Church, was killed in 1994. Three of her children were also killed. A group of Interahamwe attacked her home and threatened to kill her. One of the killers, Kagabo, was from the neighbourhood. Adela asked Kagabo to have mercy on her since there was no grudge between them. Instead of giving her mercy, Kagabo ruthlessly cut her on the head, on the back of her neck and on her thighs and legs, and then pushed a long knife through the top of her head. She lost consciousness and fell into a coma. Adela describes her spiritual experience in the following words:

While I was in coma two men dressed in white appeared to me in a form of a dream. In the dream I saw many dead bodies and the two men told me that ‘these are God’s children whom He loves very much. They did not die because God hated them. You will one day meet these people in Heaven’ the two men told Adela ‘but only on condition that she did not in any way take revenge on those that killed her husband, children, relatives and friends and instead forgive them’.

Later on, Adela regained consciousness and is alive today. Like other Rwandan women after the genocide, Adela went through many hardships and traumatizing experiences. She started a ministry of preaching in prisons so that those who are

\textsuperscript{18}The story of Adela when she forgave Kagabo is found in the NURC document, ‘The Role of Women in Reconciliation and Peacebuilding in Rwanda: Ten Years after Genocide 1994-2004: Contribution, Challenges and Way Forward,’ written by Mutamba & Izabiliza (2005:44).
imprisoned can repent of the crimes they have committed and seek forgiveness. Adela once preached in a local prison known as Ntsinda, in the Eastern Province of Kibungo. When she began to speak about repentance, something unusual happened. A young prisoner stood up, and said:

> After listening to the message I have decided to tell you the truth. ‘You will forgive me I did something terribly bad to you. I am the one who cut you with a machete and I killed your husband and children’.

This young man was Kagabo, her attacker. He went ahead to confess before a gathering of prisoners and visitors. This was received well by Adela, who made the following declaration:

> You killed my husband whom I loved so much that it is impossible for a human being to forgive but I have forgiven you because God has enabled me. From now on, you will be my ‘son’ and you will be staying with me. I will build a house for you where my last-born was supposed to build his own house.

This made many prisoners burst into tears. Thereafter, Adela used to carry food and other items to Kagabo when he was still in prison. When Kagabo was later released from prison after confessing to the crimes, he joined Adela at her residence after staying for one day in his own home. Adela received Kagabo with joy and genuine love. She has since then built a house for him in her own compound and set up a small chicken-rearing project for him.

The relatives and neighbours of both Adela and Kagabo find this strange. They were suspicious at first. Over time, some are now amazed, while others remain opposed to this arrangement. This kind of extraordinary forgiveness is rare, but possible. Rwanda is filled with similar examples of radical forgiveness, which creates the possibility of reconciliation (Mutamba& Izbiliza, 2005:44).

### 2.5.4 Healing dimension

Some scholars of reconciliation look at healing as another dimension of reconciliation. Proponents of this dimension view healing as any strategy, process or activity that improves the psychological health of individuals following extensive violent conflict. As such, healing is not only about assisting individuals to address...
their psychological health needs in an isolated way, but is dependent upon and integrally linked to repairing and rebuilding communities and the social context. This implies restoring a normalized everyday life that can recreate and confirm people’s sense of being and belonging (Hamber, 2003:77).

Hamber (2003) outlines some of the healing strategies that have been used in different contexts, and discusses how they can be useful sources of inspiration and guidance when building a healing program. However, he reminds us to keep the following in mind: (a) all strategies should ideally grow out of the local context; and (b) most contexts demand that multiple strategies be undertaken simultaneously. Healing-oriented programs which might be relevant in a post-conflict situation include: psychosocial programs; individual counselling and support interventions; training of local communities with psychosocial support skills; self-help support groups; and symbolic forms of healing (Hamber, 2003:82).

However, Hamber (2003) reminds us that there is no magical solution when it comes to dealing with the impact of extensive violence. Truth commissions, criminal trials, or even extensive counselling and support will not miraculously deal with the legacy of violence in any society. For him, healing is inevitably a lengthy and culturally bound process. He is also strongly convinced that there is often no clear starting point and there will be few markers along the way—indeed, it is rare for the psychological impact of the past ever to be completely dealt with. Yet, he argues that this does not mean that programs in pursuit of healing are a waste of time—it is quite the contrary. Assistance with healing can be invaluable for individuals and their communities.

With regards to healing memories, Schreiter (2008:13) asks, “What does ‘healing’ actually entail?” He maintains, “Some healing can take place with the passage of time. As one generation leaves the scene and is replaced by the subsequent one, the burden of the past is necessarily shifted. Healing of memories takes more than a generation to accomplish”. Schreiter (2008:13) proposes three stages through which the process often moves. These are: 1) acknowledging loss, (2) making connections, and (3) taking new action. He also explains that acknowledging loss does not mean abandoning the past, but rather means, a new relationship to it.
Staub stresses the necessity of healing in the process of reconciliation. He asserts that healing strengthens the self, moderates the perception of the world as dangerous, and makes it more likely that positive changes in the other group are perceived (Staub, 2006:873). As a psychological researcher, Ervin Staub is also involved in reconciliation programs and interventions in Rwanda aimed at healing its citizens. Considering how genocide affected huge numbers of people, Staub (2006:874) promotes healing by providing information about the impact of traumatizing events on people through radio drama known as “Musekeweya”. The purpose of this is to help people understand changes in themselves and in others around them as a natural, normal consequence of extreme, and in their case, horrendous events. The radio programs seek to educate the community by means of informational programs and radio dramas, whereby the stories of the characters help people to support each other through empathic listening.

Understanding reconciliation from the biblical-theological perspective, the missio Dei demands that we talk about reconciliation holistically. It requires acknowledging that reconciliation is multi-dimensional. The four dimensions of reconciliation presented in this chapter are relevant in the Rwandan context, but require additional tools in order to be implemented. A closer look at the social mechanisms involved in human interaction can provide us with tools to pursue the actual work of reconciliation. The next section will turn to various social theories that provide methods and strategies for achieving the theological goal of reconciliation.

2.6 Reconciliation: asocial phenomenon

The previous section focused on the theological and biblical perspectives of reconciliation. It was stated that reconciliation lies at the heart of mission, as reconciliation is God’s work. A four dimensional approach to reconciliation was suggested as a model for reconciliation, namely: Relationship-building, truth-telling, forgiveness and healing. The current section will now focus on the sociological perspective of reconciliation, as it enriches our understanding of the social dynamics, which must be taken into account as we pursue reconciliation. In this respect, our
theological understanding of reconciliation is informed by the social understanding of reconciliation because reconciliation is both a spiritual and social phenomenon.

In his article, ‘Can Missiology Incorporate More of the Social Sciences,’ Montgomery (2012) accurately affirms that the social sciences, when used responsibly and critically, are useful instruments for missiology. He stresses that missionaries working in larger, more socially complex countries sometimes appeal to sociology to help them understand the situations in which they work (Montgomery, 2012:285). De Gruchy (2002:26) makes an insightful narration of reconciliation from a social perspective when he says that social reconciliation refers to reconciliation between alienated communities and groups at a local level, such as the healing of race relations in a housing estate or at school, especially in the wake of an outbreak of violence. Furthermore, Hay (1998:121) asserts that social reconciliation involves not just the individual but also the whole community or society. Additionally, Schreiter (1998:112) clearly describes social reconciliation as the process of reconstructing the moral order of a society. It also refers to changing the structures in society that provoked, promoted and sustained the violence. Furthermore, Romocea (2004:160) refers to Volf’s (1996) idea of “theology of embrace” when he says that social reconciliation in an ethnic conflict is a process that involves both parties working towards resolution.

As we come to a better understanding of reconciliation from a sociological perspective, we find that there is no doubt that the concept of reconciliation, as it is used in social and political discourse, has its roots in the language of Christian proclamation. In the post-genocide Rwandan context, for example, the term reconciliation refers to a wide range of processes that aim at helping groups of people to move from a state of conflict to one of peace and harmonious coexistence. This framework must provide a comprehensive approach to the transformation of conflict that addresses structural issues, social dynamics of relationship building, and the development of a supportive infrastructure for peace (Benda, 2012:217).

From these ideas we learn that although reconciliation primarily involves individuals, groups and communities, it has to be viewed within a social context. Reconciliation
cannot be isolated from the social context and should therefore not be comprehended exclusively from a theological perspective, but rather be regarded as a socio-theological phenomenon.

2.7 Social theories and models used in reconciliation studies

Having explored some theological definitions of reconciliation and examined its social meaning as they appear in scholarly discourse, I now turn to some theories and models of reconciliation, which have been developed in order to apply reconciliation to the lives of people. In this section, the following three theories that have been applied by some scholars in reconciliation studies are described further: the needs-based model, social identity theory and intergroup contact theory.

2.7.1 A needs-based model

Nadler and Shnabel (2008:116) have developed a needs-based model of reconciliation that posits that being a victim is associated with a threat to one’s status and power, whereas being a perpetrator threatens one’s image as moral and socially acceptable. To counter these threats, victims must restore their sense of power, whereas perpetrators must restore their public moral image. The needs-based model of reconciliation is predicated on the idea that following an episode in which one side has been victimised by another, both the victim and the perpetrator are deprived of certain unique psychological resources. For Nadler & Shnabel (2008:116-117), “This deprivation brings about different emotional needs in victims and perpetrators, and until these needs are satisfied, they serve as barriers to reconciliation. Reconciliation is facilitated when victims and perpetrators receive emotional ‘commodities’ through post conflict interactions”.

Nadler & Shnabel (2008:117) maintain, “When a successful social exchange takes place between victim and perpetrator, both sides satisfy their emotional needs and cease to feel weaker than, or morally inferior to, their counterpart. This generates a process of symbolic erasure of the roles of victim and perpetrator, which places the involved parties on a more equal footing and thus leads to a greater willingness to reconcile”. The needs-based model of reconciliation with my own emphasis of the
adoption of the CMO logic configuration model (adapted from Nadler and Shnabel, 2008:117) is summarised in Figure 5 below:

![Figure 5. Merged CMO and Needs-Based model. Source: adapted from Nadler and Shnabel (2008:117).](image)

As the researcher seeks to understand how and why the Presbyterian Church examines the reality of reconciliation in its mission, the needs-based model together with the CMO logic framework have been used in Figure 5 above to shape a realistic evaluation of the context, what triggered the event and how people understand and respond to it.

### 2.7.2 Intergroup contact theory

Intergroup contact theory is a sociological theory that was first proposed by Gordon Allport (1954). Allport’s theory stipulates that contact between groups lead to reduced intergroup prejudice and, in turn, may foster a positive change in attitudes towards members of the ‘other’ group if certain conditions of the contact are met. There is extensive evidence that positive interaction between antagonistic groups can lead to reductions in prejudice and hostility (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998), and that contact is considered one of the most effective strategies for reducing intergroup conflict. If contact between groups in post-conflict societies is intense and deep, it can promote reconciliation and the prevention of renewed violence in a society. This is because intergroup cooperation may contribute to the development of a new, shared identity among previously hostile groups (Tobias & Boudreaux, 2010:218).
Allport (1954) suggests that positive effects of intergroup contact occur in contact situations characterised by four key conditions: equal status, intergroup cooperation, common goals, and support by social and institutional authorities. According to Allport (1954), it is essential that the contact situation exhibit these factors to some degree. Indeed, these factors do appear to be important in reducing prejudice, as exemplified by the unique importance of cross-group friendships in reducing prejudice (Pettigrew, 1998). Multiple mechanisms have been proposed to explain how contact reduces prejudice. In particular, the following four processes of change have been proposed:

1) Learning about the outgroup: When new learning corrects negative views of the outgroup, contact should reduce prejudice.

2) Changing behaviour: Behavioural changes are often the precursor of changes in attitude. New situations require conforming to new expectations. If these expectations include acceptance of outgroup members, this behaviour has the potential to produce attitude change.

3) Generating effective ties: Emotion is critical in intergroup contact. Anxiety is common in initial encounters between groups, and it can spark negative reactions. Such anxious, negative encounters can occur even without intergroup prejudice. Continued contact generally reduces anxiety, though bad experiences can increase it.

4) In-group reappraisal: Optimal intergroup contact provides insight about in-groups as well as outgroups. In-group norms and customs turn out not to be the only ways to manage the social world. This new perspective can reshape your view of the in-group and lead to a less biased view of outgroups (Pettigrew, 1998).

Likewise, Pettigrew and Tropp (2008) supported Allport’s contact theory by specifically examining mediating mechanisms in contact, and found that contact situations which promote positive effects and reduce negative effects are most likely to succeed in conflict reduction. Pettigrew (1998) provides a comprehensive review of the contact hypothesis and its derivatives. He suggests that an optimal sequence of contact between antagonistic groups would be to first attempt to de-categorise the
intergroup encounters. Pettigrew (1998) also mentions a second stage in which subgroup identities are allowed to regain some salience in order to facilitate the generalisation process. Finally, to capitalise on the benefits of a common in-group identification, he proposes that policies that re-categorise the subgroups into meaningful superordinate units may be an optimal, if not always achieved, end stage of the sequence (cf. Brown, 2000:765).

2.7.2.1 The application of intergroup contact theory
A number of psychological processes have been hypothesised to explain how and why intergroup contact is able to reduce prejudice and improve intergroup relations. Firstly, Allport (1954) argues that intergroup contact facilitates learning about the outgroup, and in turn, this new knowledge leads to prejudice reduction. Secondly, intergroup contact is believed to reduce the fear and anxiety people have when interacting with the outgroup, reducing their negative evaluations of the outgroup. Thirdly, intergroup contact is hypothesised to increase people’s ability to take the perspective of the outgroup into account and thereby empathise with their concerns (Stephan & Finlay, 1999). Staub (2006) also argues that contact between groups can promote reconciliation and the prevention of renewed violence in a society. This is because intergroup cooperation may contribute to the development of a new, shared identity among previously hostile groups.

In their article, ‘Entrepreneurship and Conflict Reduction in the Post-Genocide Rwandan Coffee Industry,’ Tobias & Bourdreaux (2010) present the applicability of intergroup contact theory in a post-conflict Rwandan context. These scholars particularly evaluate the differential effect of the government’s coffee sector liberalization efforts on the Hutu and Tutsi and their intergroup relations. Tobias and Boudreaux (2010:221) convincingly argue that the application of intergroup contact theory to the newly created coffee enterprises may be linked with positive changes in attitudes between Hutu and Tutsi coffee workers in Rwanda. This also implies that contact and collaboration may mediate the relationship between institutional/industrial changes and conflict resolution.
Similarly, Staub (2007:278) demonstrates that contact theory is also relevant amongst students in post-genocide Rwanda. He explains that approximately 3,000 Rwandan pre-university students undergo ingando camps each year organised by the NURC. Staub agrees that these camps create opportunities for contact that is indispensable for reconciliation to take place. He maintains, “Real contact is important for the beginning of a positive connection” (Staub, 2007:278).

Having discussed the intergroup contact theory and its applicability, the question to be asked now is: “How and why can the intergroup contact theory be applied in the Presbyterian Church’s ministry of reconciliation?” The researcher’s view is that intergroup contact theory is a useful theory for two reasons. Firstly, in the case of Rwanda, both the victims and perpetrators of the genocide go to the same church. They spend time together in training, seminars, worship, Bible studies, sharing meals, prayer meetings, Holy Communion, and so forth. Interaction between the two groups (Hutu and Tutsi) helps them to reduce their fear and anxiety, which in turn reduces their negative attitudes towards each other. In other words, the contact model leads the two parties to a restoration of friendly relations between them.

Secondly, as already noted, reconciliation is both a spiritual and social phenomenon. For this reason, intergroup contact theory, as one of the models of reconciliation in the social sciences, is proposed in this study as a supplement to the missiological model of encounter, as suggested by Kritzinger (2008). Put differently, I propose that the intergroup contact theory is brought in relation to what Kritzinger’s model calls the encounter of “us” to the “other” or “face-to-face” contact.

In short, the intergroup contact hypothesis has been used by many intervention programs aimed at improving relationships between individuals and groups formerly in conflict, believing that increased contact between former enemies leads to mutual understanding and dialogue that over time decreases prejudice and increases goodwill.

2.7.2.2 The role of social and identity change in reconciliation

In the previous section, I explored intergroup contact theory and its relevancy in the post conflict society. This section discusses how the reduction of prejudices and fear
among the groups lead to social and identity change. For Bar-Tal (2000) reconciliation requires a change in societal attitudes. Reconciliation, as social change, is important because individuals move from a conflictive to a peaceful attitude. At the personal level, Bazuin adopts Shapiro’s (2005) argument, which suggests that individuals can develop new knowledge or find new ways of framing a situation through emotional change. They might also gain emotional control over their previous trauma or develop a better understanding of their emotions after having experienced a traumatic event. They can focus on changing their behaviour, and learn and rehearse new ways of solving problems and doing things. They might also prioritize changing relationships, as learning about their former enemies will re-humanize them (Bazuin, 2013:28). On the social level, peaceful change can happen through appeals to rationality, convincing leaders and their followers that it is in their best interest to pursue peace and reconciliation. Peace builders can try to change the norms of society through education and other means by trying to reduce the acceptability of violence and increase the desire for peace in the society and culture (Bazuin, 2013:28).

In Sasaki’s (2012:19) view, deep-rooted conflicts in the world are between identity groups. Thus, issues of identity are central to the process of building relationships between social groups that have developed deep-seated fear and animosity toward each other. Citing Staub (2001), Sasaki observes that after decades of violent exchange, each group involved in the conflict defines its identity in terms of enmity towards the other: ‘the other is our enemy, and we are the enemy of the other’. Similarly, the identity of each group may be defined around victimhood: ‘we are the victim of the other group, and they are our victimisers, not victims’. The negation of the other group’s identity as victims or the narrative of their victimhood is deeply entrenched in each group’s own victim identity or their own narrative of victimhood.

In response to identity issues that lie at the heart of intractable conflicts, Sasaki (2012) takes note of Kelman’s (2004) conception of reconciliation, which focuses on identity change. Kelman describes reconciliation as a process of identity change through which each party revises its own identity just enough to accommodate the identity of the other. For him, reconciliation as identity change is the process of disassociating
one’s own identity from the negation of the other’s identity. Kelman (2004) defines reconciliation as follows:

Changing one’s collective identity by removing the negation of the other from it implies a degree of acceptance of the other’s identity—at least in these sense of acknowledging the legitimacy of the other’s narrative without necessarily fully agreeing with that narrative. The change in each party’s identity may go further by moving toward the development of a common, transcendent identity—not in lieu of, but alongside of each group’s particularistic identity (cited by Sasaki, 2012:20).

Reconciliation as identity change is a very deep process, which must take place in the psyche of each identity group who has a stake in post-violence peacebuilding (Sasaki, 2012: 20-21).

2.7.3 Social identity theory
Social identity theory is one of the reconciliation theories that some scholars have applied when explaining and analysing the phenomenon of reconciliation in a post-violence context. Social identity theory (SIT) starts with the assumption that social identity is primarily derived from group membership. It further proposes that people strive to achieve or maintain a positive social identity, thus boosting their self-esteem, and that this positive identity is largely derived from favourable comparisons that can be made between the in-group and relevant outgroups. In reference to Tajfel and Turner (1986), Brown (2000:747) notes that there are three classes of variables that might influence intergroup differentiation: people must be subjectively identified with their group; the situation should permit evaluative intergroup comparisons; and the outgroup must be sufficiently comparable to the in-group.

In the words of Tajfel and Turner (1979), Tobias and Bourdeaux (2010:222) explain that through SIT, we derive part of our personal identity from our social identity. This occurs primarily through a process of categorisation, namely, we naturally categorise ourselves into our own “in-group”. Examples include the social category that we identify with, and how we categorise others into different “outgroups” due to their different skin colour, religion, and so forth. We fundamentally strive for positive self-esteem, and we often do this through a favourable comparison of our social identity or in-group, with relevant yet different outgroups. By comparing our own group to
another in a positive light, we aim to become positively distinct from this outgroup, and in this way enhance our socially derived self-esteem (Tobias and Boudreaux, 2010:222).

Holding a stereotypical, prejudiced image of outgroup members is the result of a competitive social categorisation of one’s own in-group in relation to a particular outgroup, and it is one of the main predictors of committing violent acts toward the outgroup. Consequently, in-group bias and outgroup prejudice are a major impediment to overcoming social categories based on group differences. However, the above-mentioned dynamic nature of social categorisation and identity creation implies that no socially created group category is ever fixed in time, and hence, it is possible to reverse destructive intergroup categorical perceptions over time and change environments. Social re-categorisation makes intergroup contact more effective if these participants will replace the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ ideology with a more socially inclusive and overarching identity (Tobias and Boudreaux, 2010:222).

SIT has provided three approaches aimed at improving intergroup attitudes. The first is the de-categorisation model. Brewer and Miller (1984) believe that the best way of reducing intergroup differentiation was to make those categories less useful as psychological tools. This implies personalising the intergroup situation or finding additional categorical dimensions that cut across the original categories, which should ‘de-categorise’ the operational categories in the current situation and thereby make the occurrence of in-group bias less likely.

A second approach seeks to redraw the boundaries of the category so that any outgroup becomes subsumed into a new and larger superordinate category. Because in-group and (former) outgroup members now share a ‘common in-group identity,’ they should be drawn closer together and intergroup discrimination should be reduced. Both the de-categorisation and common in-group identity models involve the dissolution of category boundaries, and hence, the abandonment of subgroup identities. In the case of Rwanda, this de-categorisation and common in-group identity model is reflected in the so called “Ndi Umunyarwanda” (I am a Rwandan) concept, instead of Hutu or Tutsi ethnic categorizations (see heading 5.3.1.1).
The third approach argues that some subgroup salience was retained while also optimizing contact conditions (Brown, 2000:752). Social identity theory points out that we must interrogate the origin of the identities that define us. While intergroup contact is a useful starting point for diminishing fear in order to open up a space for reconciliation, true reconciliation requires de-categorisation that leads to a renewed identity. This insight will inform the turn towards the history and context of the Rwandan genocide, as the origin of the identities that define the Hutu and Tutsi as distinct groups will be explored further in chapter 3.

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter provided the theoretical perspective for reconciliation. Here, the term “reconciliation” was explored from a biblical-missiological, theological, and socio-missiological perspective. To summarize, the chapter discussed various definitions of reconciliation in theology and praxis. It also showed that from a Christian and theological perspective, reconciliation constitutes a new paradigm for mission. This means that mission of reconciliation is based on the *missio Dei* and reconciliation has become an essential part of the church’s mission (*missio ecclesiae*). This implies that it is God who initiates reconciliation. Reconciliation is first and foremost the work of God. Thus, Christians hold the notion that it is God who through Jesus Christ brings about reconciliation, not ourselves. We are merely agents of God’s activity.

Based on the available literature, this chapter constructed a four-dimensional model of reconciliation (section 2.5). These dimensions include: relationship-building, truth telling, forgiveness and healing—a key model for theological reconciliation. These dimensions will guide the analysis part of the study, which will examine how and whether the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda has fostered a ministry of reconciliation, which will be further discussed in chapter 6. Given the destructive ethnic ideology that culminated in the 1994 genocide, the study now turns to review the broad historical context, with the aim of answering the following questions: What are the contextual and identity factors that contributed to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and how did colonial authorities in collaboration with Rwandan elites construct an ethnic ideology that resulted in genocide? (This will be elaborated on in chapter 3). Why and
how did the Rwandan church and people respond to ethnic ideology and participate in the genocide? (See chapter 4). Chapter 5 and 6 will then seek to answer the question: How does reconciliation address the problem of ethnic ideology and the effects of genocide? Should the church respond, and thereby contribute to addressing this problem? And if so, how should it respond?
CHAPTER THREE
CAUSAL FACTORS OF THE 1994 GENOCIDE IN THE
HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF RWANDA

3.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to explore ethnic ideology in colonial and post-colonial Rwanda by seeking to understand the history of the relations between the Hutu and Tutsi. This chapter begins with a survey of scholarly literature on the phenomenon of genocide. Different theories will be considered that offer a general background to which the Rwandan context can be compared (section 3.2). This chapter will then turn to survey the history of Rwanda, offering a detailed presentation of the background to the 1994 genocide over three phases, including the pre-colonial (section 3.3), colonial and post-colonial context. This will be covered in depth, since the specifics of names and events are important contextual elements for understanding the genocide. These details will allow an analysis of the origins and history of the development of the Rwandan crisis during the colonial period (section 3.4) and after independence (section 3.5), as well as highlight the stages (section 3.6), genesis and preparation (section 3.7) of the social construction of ethnic ideology that led to genocide in 1994 (section 3.8). The plan and preparation of genocide leads to the next section (3.9), which maintains that the spread of ethnic ideology among Rwandans resulted in the mass participation of Hutu civilians in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. The chapter also suggests some historical, social-political and economic factors that are central to the Rwandan genocide. In light of Rwanda’s history of conflicts, violence, ethnic massacres and crimes related to ethnic ideologies, five “causal” and influential factors (section 3.10) related to ideology will be identified as contributing to the 1994 genocide: (1) the identity based-conflict, (2) colonial ideology based on Hamitic theory, (3) myth making ideology, (4) political ideology, and (5) economic constraints.

Bearing in mind that this missiological study is a realist evaluation, the intention is to further understand the context of reconciliation. Considering the CMO model
described in section 1.6, the goal is to define the context (C) so that that the mechanisms (M) for reconciliation used by the Presbyterian Church can be appropriately evaluated and directed towards the desired outcomes (O).

The chapter argues that it will not be possible to understand the historical context of the 1994 genocide unless we consider how the rigid dichotomy between the Hutu and Tutsi was constructed by colonial and missionary authorities in collaboration with Rwandan elites and later hardened as a result of multiple, recurring genocides. The role played by missionaries and the Rwandan church in planting a seed of ethnic ideology will be discussed in chapter 4. First, however, chapter 3 will give a general description and explanation of the factors that have contributed to the social construction of ethnic ideology in historical Rwanda.

3.2 Causes of genocide: A survey of scholarship

This section considers the broad range of scholarly views regarding the causes of the phenomenon of genocide at various times and places. The goal, however, is not to discuss the causes of genocide at length, but rather to show that genocide is extremely complicated, and that many complex factors need to be considered. The theoretical debate in this section therefore offers a point of comparison and contrast for understanding the specific causes of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. As the scholarship on genocide has developed from one generation to another, there has been an increasing emphasis on the contextual and historical factors leading to organised violence. This emphasis will help us to consider Rwandan history in greater detail. At the same time, however, even contemporary, second-generation theories of genocide tend to focus on the decisions of elites who orchestrated acts of violence for political or economic reasons. This aspect of the scholarship on genocide contrasts sharply with the Rwandan situation, where the more pressing questions concern the broader factors that facilitated the mass participation in 1994. This discussion of

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19 This section discusses the causes of genocide in reference to Scott Straus’ (2006) writings entitled “New Directions in Comparative Research on Genocide”. Straus, whose primary research interests include the study of genocide, political violence, human rights, and African politics, classifies scholars of genocide as first and second generation genocide scholarship. The second generation in this paper includes Valentino (2004), Weitz (2003), Midlarsky (2005), Mann (2005), Sémelin (2005), and Levene (2005).
genocide from a theoretical perspective will thus highlight two issues for further consideration: firstly, in what way did Rwandan history create the conditions for 1994? And secondly, in what way did this history create the conditions for the unique factors of the Rwandan genocide, namely, the widespread mass participation in violence?

The idea that genocide emerged from “deep divisions” between groups in a country was a foundational concept for the first generation of theorists in the comparative study of genocide. Citing Israel Charny (1982), Straus (2006) for example, focuses on intergroup dehumanisation as the key mechanism leading to genocide. For Staub (1989), according to Evin Staub as quoted by Straus (2006a:6), the “difficult life conditions, but argues that, aggression arising from them is funneled through prejudice dominant in a particular society. These claims are also among the most well-known outside the academy: racism, prejudice, dehumanisation, ancient hatreds, and anti-Semitism (in the case of the Holocaust) are often the first ideas that spring to mind when the causes of genocide are considered”.

However, the second generation of genocide scholarship challenged these claims or sought to move beyond the idea that genocide has a single cause. According to Straus (2006a), the unusually deep, pre-existing social cleavages are neither sufficient nor universally necessary conditions for mass killing. There are several elements to this argument. First, deep divisions, prejudice, and discrimination occur more frequently than genocide (Straus, 2006a:6). Many societies are fractured ethnically, racially, culturally, and religiously, but genocide occurs only rarely. Second, cultural explanations cannot explain the timing of genocide. Deep divisions, prejudice, and discrimination are fairly constant; genocide is not. Third, evidence from several cases suggests that divisions, prejudice and discrimination do not necessarily predate the violence. Rwanda and Bosnia were fairly integrated ethnically, for example, with much intermarriage across ethnic groups. Fourth, authors cite social psychology experiments and studies of perpetrators showing that individuals do not necessarily commit violence because of ethnic or religious hatred (Straus, 2006a:7).
The second-generation scholarship also consistently rejects arguments about a link between authoritarian regimes and genocide. This hypothesis appears to be prominent in the first-generation scholarship on genocide. For example, Irving Louis Horowitz (1994) argued that genocide is the “operational handmaiden of a particular social system, the totalitarian system” (cited by Straus, 2006a:7). For the second generation of scholarship, however, authoritarian regimes are more common than genocide, and an argument about authoritarianism cannot explain the timing of when genocide happens. Among first-generation genocide theorists, Staub (1989) argues that during difficult periods of social stress, such as economic depression or loss after wars, individuals seek to blame others or scapegoat outgroups to increase their own feelings of self-worth. Scapegoating is then channelled through dominant cultural frames and prejudices, for example, anti-Semitism in the German case. However, the second generation of genocide scholarship challenges a link between deprivation and social stress, on the one hand, and genocide, on the other (Straus, 2006:8). For these reasons, the scholars tend to look elsewhere to explain why and when genocide occurs.

Again, Straus (2006) cites Weitz (2003) who argues that genocide happens when leaders attempt to engineer a “society bereft of difference and marked by a homogenous population”. Weitz points out that race and nation are the organising principles around which such perfections are attempted. For Weitz, according to Straus (2006:9), genocide “is rooted in modernity; it is top-down; it emerges from revolutionary attempts to change societies; and above all it has ideological origins. Genocide is more likely to occur under particular conditions. Genocides tend to happen after targeted groups experience discrimination and exclusion”.

Like Weitz (2003), Sémelin (2005) argues that major social upheavals and war matter. Furthermore, in the midst of unrest, Sémelin (2005) maintains, “Leaders seek to redefine who belongs to a community and who does not. Leaders in turn use ideology to unify in-groups and to transform any anxiety they experience into fear of an identifiable enemy. When leaders seek the total unity of their own groups that quest leads to efforts to create purity, which in turn leads to the desire to get rid of out-groups” (cited in Straus, 2006a:12). Moreover, in war, when security is threatened, leaders advocate the use of violence for self-protection (Straus, 2006a:12).
Valentino’s (2004) analysis is that genocide and mass killings emerge from the “strategic” calculations of leaders. Genocide and mass killings are calculated, instrumental, and deliberate policies that leaders choose in order to accomplish certain goals. Like Weitz and Sémelin, Valentino’s argument is top-down, but he pushes the argument one step further. Valentino (2004) argues, “Genocide is the outcome of decisions and actions that a relatively small group of leaders make. The mass public is largely inconsequential to the outcome. Genocide and mass killing happen with the passive acceptance of the rest of society” (cited in Straus, 2006a:13).

Like Valentino, Midlarsky (2005) focuses on leaders’ decision-making. Midlarsky (2005) locates “the origins of genocide in leaders’ attempts to manage threats and to defend states, what he terms realpolitik” (cited in Straus, 2006a:15). Midlarsky turns to “prospect theory” to argue that genocide occurs in the context of loss. By loss, Midlarsky means the transfer of territory or the authority over a population from one state to another; large numbers killed in war; and significant socioeconomic contraction. Loss creates vulnerability, anger, and a desire for revenge, and over time increases the probability that leaders will choose genocide as an “imprudent” method for safeguarding their states (cited in Straus, 2006a:16).

Whereas Valentino (2004) and Midlarsky (2005) focus primarily on proximate conditions—the strategic calculations of leaders and loss in war gives rise to “imprudent realpolitik”—Mann (2005) situates genocide in the broad historical development of modern states and modern political ideologies. Mann argues, “Murderous ethnic cleansing” is a perversion of a democratic ideal of rule by the people. Cleansing can occur when “the people” (the “demos” of democracy) is defined as an ethnic group (an “ethnos”), to the exclusion of other ethnic groups that share the same territory” (cited in Straus, 2006:18). Mann (2005) also analyses and disaggregates perpetrators into three main categories: radical elites running states, violent paramilitary bands and core constituencies. All three provide mass (if not majority) support and are essential for murderous cleansing to ensue (cited in Straus, 2006a:18). Mann (2005) suggests, “Ethnic nationalism is the negative by-product of a democratic ideal, but other factors might also explain the rise of organicist ideologies. Similarly, almost all the cleansing campaigns occurred during transitions, but not
necessarily democratic ones. Rwanda fits that bill, as does the former Yugoslavia, arguably” (cited in Straus, 2006a:18).

Like Mann, Levene (2005) argues, “Genocide is not so much a series of isolated, aberrant, and essentially unconnected events but is at the very heart of modern historical development” (cited in Straus, 2006a:20). Levene’s argument is two-fold. On the one hand, he highlights long-term, slow-moving, global processes, in particular the rise of the West, modernity, and the nation-state. Genocide, he argues, is embedded in the very international system of nation-states dominant in the world today. Like Mann, Levene sees a greater likelihood for genocide among late developers, which seek to manufacture social cohesion using state power in order to catch up with early developers. On the other hand, Levene focuses on short-term factors. He argues that genocide is a contingent outcome, not the inevitable result of the world historical developments he emphasises. The following factors are of significance: Firstly, Levene points to what he calls a “perpetrator-victim dynamic”. Secondly, genocide crystallises in acute crises, usually wars. Thirdly, there is an element of phobia. Levene argues that people make genocide possible and leaders must have popular support to succeed (cited in Straus, 2006a:20).

In summary, for first-generation scholars, both difficult life conditions and intergroup dehumanisation are the key mechanisms leading to genocide. Second-generation scholarship, however, moves beyond the idea that genocide has a single cause. For these reasons, these scholars look elsewhere to explain why and when genocide occurs. When we examine the complex factors in the Rwandan context, we find that genocide arose from a popular ideology, which developed from the racial mythmaking that originated during the colonial era. In this regard, the researcher agrees here with Levene’s argument that genocide is related to historical developments and cannot be blamed on elites alone but also arises from popular ideology. Valentino’s (2004) ideas, as described by Straus (2006a), further calls our attention to the fact that genocide and mass killing are calculated, instrumental, and deliberate policies that leaders choose in order to accomplish certain goals. While this is true of the immediate causes of the events of 1994, the deeper underlying root cause is the widespread ethnic ideology, which prepared the populace to be
manipulated by elite propaganda. The line of argument in this dissertation is that one must understand the contextual origin of the distrust between the Hutu and Tutsi in order to understand why such a large percentage of the Hutu population participated in the 1994 genocide. According to Waheed (2011:2), many academics have reached a consensus that “…the central cause of the genocide is clear: it was the result of an over-powerful government and regional elite attempting to maintain their hold on power by creating ethnic tensions”. Although this factor is important as an explanation, it was also preceded by an ethnic ideology, which created tension long before 1994. Issues related to ideology will be explored in this chapter, including identity-based ideology, colonial and missionary ideology, the Hamitic race mythology, and political and economic ideology.

3.3 Pre-colonial Rwandan context

In order to understand why the genocide happened in Rwanda, it is essential to understand the historical background of the labels “Hutu” and “Tutsi.” These words do not describe separate tribes or ethnic groups but, as we shall see, were class constructs abused by the colonisers to create artificial ethnic divisions. In order to understand how these descriptions could harden into a genocidal ethnic ideology, it is important to understand the social, economic, and political history of Rwanda even prior to the colonial era.

In his article, ‘From Categorization to Communion Ethnic Identity and Catholic Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda,’ Carney (2016:191) maintains that the history and understanding of “Hutu” and “Tutsi” are indeed complicated. This is because, for different scholars, the terms Hutu and Tutsi are used in varied and even contradictory ways. For some, these labels refer to racial categories, for others, they refer to categories of class, and for still others, they refer to social categories. Despite the complexity of these categories, this study supports the view of scholars who assert that in the pre-colonial era, Hutu-Tutsi relations were largely complementary and harmonious. The problems came with European colonizers and missionaries who ethnicized and racialized these formerly fluid lines, thereby hardening the division between the Rwandan people (Carney, 2016:192).
Before the arrival of the European colonialists, Rwandan society was organized as a monarchy ruled by a supreme king, or *Umwami*. This pre-colonial society had its own institutions and culture that united people of different social categories. The king ensured the cohesion of the people by performing social functions and was considered as “*Umwami wa rubanda,*” meaning the “king of the people”. The monarch was considered to be the owner of all lands and cattle, the supreme chief of armies, and a guarantor of the land’s fertility. The monarch emerged from a consensus between the different social groups. Rwandans acknowledged the phrase, “*Umwami nta bwoko yagiraga, yari Umwami wa Rubanda rwose,*” meaning the king did not belong to any distinct social group, he was a king of all “Banyarwanda”. This society shared a common language, Kinyarwanda, and a single culture with values that promoted harmony, stability and peace. This is illustrated by the fact that there is no history of killings and genocide between the social groups of Banyarwanda. Values such as patriotism, integrity, heroism, excellence, protection of those in need and who seek protection from imminent danger, preservation of life and certain taboos like killing children and women were inscribed in the Rwandan culture. All these cultural values were eroded with the advent of Western culture, colonial rule and the policies of post-independence regimes (Mutamba and Izabiliza, 2005:8).

Kiminyo recalls that, historically, Rwanda’s three ethnic groups have been identified in relation to distinct aspects of the economy: the Tutsi were cattle keepers, the Hutu were farmers, and the Twa lived in the forests. The monarchy served as an important unifying symbol, representing the interest of all three ethnic groups. Hutu and Tutsi were also linked together throughout much of the territory in a system of cattle vassalage, in which Tutsi patrons provided cattle to Hutu clients. During the pre-colonial era, there was remarkable social mobility and intermarriage between the Tutsi and Hutu (Kiminyo, 2001:30). These connections were an important element of social cohesion. At that time, as described by Shyaka, the point of reference for the Rwandan identity was first the clan. When a person was required to disclose his/her identity, he/she would mention his/her clan without ambiguity. Furthermore, the myths related to the origin of the Banyarwanda tie the Hutu, the Tutsi and the Twa, to the same ancestral father, called Kanyarwanda (Shyaka, 2005:5). In addition, Shyaka (2005) explains that “Tutsiness” and “Hutuness” did not refer to an unchanging
identity. The mechanisms of social promotion to “Tutsification” for the Hutus and the Twas were characterized by the gain of an important herd of cows, which could be the result of three fundamental acts: the King’s decision, marriage with an “important Tutsi,” or adoption by a Tutsi. The reverse phenomenon, “Hutufication,” a kind of social deterioration, was also true for the Tutsis who could find themselves deprived of their herds. These facts clearly show that in the pre-colonial period, “Tutsiness” and “Hutuness” did not have, in the concerned person’s mind, a genetic dimension contrary to clan belongingness (Shyaka, 2005:5-6). In pre-colonial Rwanda, the labels referred to wealth and social status; they were not static, and social mobility was possible by marriage and changes in economic circumstances.

Those who were called ‘Tutsi’ were mainly living on cow breeding; a Tutsi who had no more cows, and who was then living on agriculture, was counted among the Hutus. Those who were called ‘Hutu’ were mainly living on agriculture. A Hutu who had many cows and who was mainly living on cow breeding was counted among the Tutsis. The Twas were mainly living on pottery and hunting animals in the forest. They were kept away by other Rwandans, while some were made Tutsi such as Busyete and others (Buckley-Zistel, 2009:34).

Before the arrival of the colonisers, the various ethnicities did not exist, all people equally considered themselves to be Rwandan. Hutu-Tutsi antagonism occasionally emerged as efforts were made to structure society around the differing needs of agriculture and cattle breeding. However, this conflict over resources drew on distant notions of identity that had little significance otherwise in the highly integrated society of central Rwanda. Relationships were based on conviviality making it impossible to categorise the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa as ethnic groups.

3.4 Colonial Rwanda Context

As noted in the previous section, the terms Hutu and Tutsi had no significant ethnic meaning in pre-colonial Rwanda but denoted fluid social or professional categories. However, the Europeans colonizers saw the social differences among the Rwandans in exclusively ethnic terms, struck by the imposing appearance of the Tutsi. This
study considers ethnic identity to be a purely colonial creation which re-shaped social classes transforming them into ethnic groups. It is argued that colonizers created pseudo-racial ethnic identities to deliberately divide Rwandans against each another. As a result, the evil of genocide is traced directly back to these European colonial divide-and-rule strategies and the racial ideology they imported (Hintjens, 2008:15). This section, therefore, describes how the colonial construction of ethnic identity impacted the formation of Hutu and Tutsi identities and divisions among Rwandans, later developing into the ethnic ideology that led to the 1994 genocide. The role played by the colonizers (see also section 3.10.2) in planting a seed of ethnic ideology can be classified into three main categories:

1) **Racial** theory initiated and propagated by the Belgian colonialism, which constructed Hutu as *indigenous* Bantu and Tutsi as *alien* Hamites (Mamdani, 2001:16).

2) Introduction of the *identity card* in order to maintain the fluid classes to fixed classes and to identify individuals is according to the label on their identity cards (Clark, 2010:142).

3) Theory of *origin*, which portrays Tutsi as foreign invaders. According to Ferdinando (2009:51), “The notion that the Tutsi were relative latecomers, even if they had come some hundreds of years earlier, had immense ethnic significance in the context of bitter economic and political rivalry, and in 1994, it was used to justify their annihilation and the repatriation of their corpses”.

First, we must understand the racial theory presented by the colonial authorities. Bruce traces the historical roots of conflict by saying that the German explorers and early colonial representatives were the first exponents in Rwanda of an anthropological/social argument known as the Hamitic thesis. This thesis became the first seed of genocide because it argued that the Hamites, a race of people that included the Egyptians, had spread through parts of Africa, carrying with them their greater sophistication than the Negroid races of equatorial Africa. The Germans first experience of Rwanda was of a sophisticated kingdom inhabited by people with a developed court system, including a rich language specific to its functions. Seeming
to dominate this system were a tall, light-skinned people—the Tutsi—who appeared to rule over a shorter, darker people—the Hutu. In the imagination of the colonialists, here was “graphic evidence of the truth of the Hamitic thesis: these tall, light-skinned people had migrated to Rwanda from the north and imposed their dominance on the lesser, Negroid Hutu” (Bruce, 2001:17-18).

After gaining control of the area from the Germans, the Belgians chose to rule at a distance through the established power structure of the local Tutsi chiefs. Influenced by the Hamitic theory, the Belgians “tended to view the Tutsi as racially similar to themselves, as ‘Europeans under a black skin’” (Destexhe, 1995:38). Thus, “The Hutu were identified as an inferior and uncivilized Bantu people who had been subjugated by the racially and indeed militarily superior Hamitic Tutsis on their arrival in Rwanda” (Ferdinando, 2009:52). As a result, Belgian colonial authorities conferred political and social privileges on the Tutsi minority whom they closely associated with their administration (Ferdinando, 2009:52). Under the influence of the Hamitic ideology, the Europeans saw the Tutsi as “born rulers” on account of their presumed ‘Hamitic’ descendancy (Baur, 1994:455).

Thus, the Hamitic theory, as propagated by John Henning Speke, was one of the first theories to justify the stratification that informed colonial policies in Rwanda, and in turn, propagating a powerful myth: that “the tall Tutsi had immigrated into Rwanda some centuries earlier, bringing with them their long-horned cattle and imposing their ‘natural’ superiority over the Hutu peoples” (Bruce, 2001:18). Wielenga (2011b:3) adds to this,

Finding in Rwanda a well-advanced, complex state structure, colonialists concluded that the reigning Tutsi monarchy could not be Bantu. From this came the further conclusion that in the hierarchy of superiority, Tutsi would rank just under the Europeans themselves, followed by the Hutu and under them the Twa. Along with this hypothesis was the implied racial separateness of Hutu and Tutsi. Although Hutu and Tutsi shared the same culture, language and religion, it was concluded that Tutsi must have infiltrated Rwanda from the north and subjugated the Hutu.
Such assertions became myths that gained considerable ground in colonial Rwanda and later played a major role in the interplay of ethnic relations in post-colonial Rwanda.

According to Prunier (1995:6), “The Belgian colonisers viewed the Hutu as ignorant, vile, as slaves by nature with no ambition. Hutu features were ‘ugly’ and indicative of the ‘inferior Negro’”. A 1925 colonial report cited by Prunier (1995:6) describes the Hutu as follows: “The Bahutu display very typical Bantu features. [...] They are generally short and thick-set with a big head, a jovial expression, a wide nose, and enormous lips. They are extroverts who like to laugh and lead a simple life”.

As for the Twa, they were described as being the most primitive of the three groups. “Member of a worn out and quickly disappearing race… the Mutwa presents a number of well-defined somatic characteristics: he is small, chunky, muscular, and very hairy; particularly on the chest. With a monkey-like flat and a huge nose, he is quite similar to the apes whom he chases in the forest” (Prunier, 1995:6).

In contrast to the “intrinsically inferior” Hutu and Twa, The Tutsi received much praise from their Belgian colonisers. The colonial minister in Rwanda in 1925 is quoted as saying:

The Mututsi of good race has nothing of the Negro, apart from his colour. He is very tall, 1.80m at least, at least 1.90 m or more. He is very thin, a characteristic which tends to be even more noticeable as he gets older. His features are very fine: high brown, thin nose and fine lips framing beautiful shining teeth. Batutsi women are usually lighter skinned than their husbands, very slender and pretty in their youth, although they tend to thicken with age…Gifted with vicious intelligence, the Tutsi displays a refinement of feelings which is rare among primitive people. He is natural born leader, capable of extreme self-control and calculated goodwill (cited by Prunier, 1995:6).

This implies that the myth of the superiority of the Tutsi over the Hutu and Twa was created and supported by colonialists and extended into a policy of Hutu suppression. These distinctions emphasised by the Belgians became engrained in the Hutu belief system and developed into ethnic ideology and jealousy toward the Tutsi that transformed into rage in 1959 and 1994.
This superiority was emphasised when the colonial authorities introduced identity cards in Rwanda (Clark, 2010:142). By issuing identity cards, colonialists privileged the Tutsis. They were to maintain control of both the army and the country’s cattle supply (Hintjens, 1999:251). Over time, identity cards were used:

To identify Tutsis so that they gain acceptance into secondary schools, attend universities and seminaries, or secure posts within the government which accounted for the vast majority of paid employment. In 1994, however, they were used as gruesome winnowers for the wholesale slaughter of Tutsis. These cards are a record of how an entire society became so consumed by the fear of a Tutsi invasion that the only viable option seemed to be the complete annihilation of every Tutsi and sympathizing Hutu in Rwanda (Horner, 2014:1-2).

As shall be seen in chapter 4, these cards also “stand for a church that was not only powerless to stop the genocide, but had a disturbing role in formulating the ideology that eventually convinced so many Hutu to participate in the genocide” (Horner, 2014:2).

These initiatives by the colonisers changed what it means to be a Hutu or a Tutsi. Instead of being an indicator of class or economic status, these labels now specifically denote separate races. The meaning of Tutsi and Hutu quickly changed from fluid to fixed, and the connection between race and power was created (Clark, 2010:142). Kroslak, with reference to Prunier (1995) argues, “The Belgians, from a mixture of expediency and pseudo-scientific racial fascination, reconstructed a neo-traditionalist Rwanda, which by 1945 had become more real than the Rwanda on which Count Von Gotzen first laid eyes in 1894” (Kroslak, 2007:30). The interesting thing is that the Hutu ‘democratic revolution’ of 1959 did not change the main traits of that ideological construct, but merely inverted its sign. Consequently, in post-colonial Rwanda, “Tutsi were still regarded as ‘foreign invaders’ who had come from afar, but now this meant that they could not really be considered as citizens” (Kroslak, 2007:30). European colonisers largely exaggerated differences between the two ethnicities, and had only “theories” of where each group originated (Hintjens, 1999:251). This became a key ideological ingredient of the emerging Hutu revolution, which believed that Rwanda had been overrun by Tutsi invaders who had enslaved the Hutu.
Competition between the Hutu and Tutsi intensified as pressure for democratic change mounted in Rwanda. The acme of ethnic tension in pre-independence Rwanda began when emergent Hutu elites, who had been given increased access to education provided by the Catholic Church, and thus higher social status, began to react against the dominance of the Tutsi. They used this Tutsi dominance as a focal point for generating political support. For instance, Bruce (2001:19) asserts, “Political leaders used ethnic identification to generate political mobilisation against competing elites. The crucible of political competition forged a new, combative set of relations between Tutsi and Hutu elites that ultimately became violent”.

In the late 1950s, Rwanda’s first political parties were created and were established along ethnic lines. The Parti du Mouvement de l’émancipation de Hutu (PARMEHUTU) was a Hutu party, a movement of educated Hutu elites who circulated manifestos calling for Hutu freedom, not only from Belgian colonisation but also from Tutsi overlordship. The opposition party, created on 3 September 1959, was mainly a Tutsi party, The Union National Rwandaise (UNAR), which was pro-monarchist and anti-Belgian. Another party was the Rassenbement Democratique Rwandais (RADER), founded by two moderate Tutsis, with the objective of economic and cultural development for both Tutsi and Hutu (Melvern, 2000:13).

On 24 July 1959, Rwanda’s forty-six year-old Tutsi King Mutara III Rudahigwa died under suspicious circumstances. Some Tutsi elite were convinced that the king had been killed by the Belgians, with the Hutu in on the plot. In the royal court, an extremist group sought to destroy the Hutu leadership and there were brutal political assassinations. Political tension increased but the fuse was said to have been lit on the 1st of November 1959 when a group of young UNAR militants attacked the PARMEHUTU leader Dominique Mbonyumutwa. Violence spread like wildfire from hill to hill. The Hutu started to attack the Tutsi authorities, burning Tutsi homes, and large numbers of Tutsi fled the country. Guy Logiest, a Belgian colonel, immediately began to replace Tutsi chiefs with Hutu and announced to Belgian administrators that in the future, the Hutu would be favoured within the administration (Melvern, 2000:13-14). The government together with the Belgian authorities were to blame for the rising racism, which bordered on ‘Nazism against the Tutsi minorities’. 
Dismissive of this accusation, the Belgians removed half the Tutsi serving as local authorities and replaced them with Hutu. This opened the door for even more overt racism against the Tutsi (Melvern, 2004:7).

In January 1961, Logiest and the Hutu party leaders met in Gitarama. A newly appointed Hutu official announced an end to ‘feudalism’ and to the monarchy, and Rwanda was declared a republic. Mbonyumutwa was declared president, and Kayibanda, the PARMEHUTU leader, was named prime minister (later that year he became president). The announcements sealed Rwanda’s political transformation from a Tutsi-dominated monarchy to a republic founded on Hutu rule, though formal independence was not granted until July 1962 and limited violence continued until then. The revolution became a “Hutu revolution”. The Belgians’ critical role in the events of the period thus further consolidated the political relevance of ethnicity (Straus, 2006:182-183).

During this process, Hutu leaders exonerated Belgium and the Catholic Church for their thirty years of systematic ethnic discrimination, choosing instead to blame Tutsi nobles and Tutsis as a whole for the oppressive colonial policy. The Hutu counter-elite internalised the colonial racial vision and violence accompanied both the struggle for independence (by Tutsi elite) and the struggle for democracy (by the Hutu counter-elite). Ordinary Tutsi, including women and children, became the victims. From November 1959 to September 1961, killings and insecurity threatened tens of thousands of Tutsis and also a number of Hutus who left their homes and took refuge outside the country or in the resettlement sites within the country. This period serves as a prelude no only to the genocide of 1994 (Kimonyo, 2001:31), but also to the decades of violence and instability that followed independence.

The role of colonialists is expressed in President Paul Kagame’s speech during the commemorations of the tenth anniversary of the genocide in 2004:

Our history over the past century is a complex product of the interaction between Rwanda’s culture and external influences. In many ways, the genocide in Rwanda stems from the colonial period, when the colonialists and those who called themselves evangelists [the catholic missionaries] sowed the seeds of hate and division. This is evident from the 1959 massacres and subsequent ones,
which had become the order of the day in Rwanda and in which the international community had become habitual bystanders. These massacres culminated in the 1994 genocide (cited by Buckley-Zistel, 2009:39).

In short, ethnicity ideology was socially constructed and intensified through the policies of the colonizers (Buit, 2011:108). The colonizers privileged the Tutsi minority and discriminated against the Hutu majority. This led to different forms of structural violence, discrimination and exclusion of Hutu. As Waheed (2011:2-3) puts it, “These tensions of ethnic divide and colonial domination resulted in the 1959 Hutu revolution where power was taken by those of a Hutu ethnicity, followed by killings of many Tutsi’s, which provoked a mass flow of Tutsi refugees to neighbouring countries”. After the Hutu revolution in 1959, the tables were turned and the myths about history and ethnicity were used against the Tutsi. For decades, the structural violence against Tutsi only turned into direct violence in times of political turbulence (Buit, 2011:108). Therefore, the description of the colonial history in this study serves as the introduction and foundation of the ethnic ideology that resulted in the 1994 genocide. In other words, as a result of the colonial manipulation between 1900 and 1960, categories and tensions between the Hutu-Tutsi were created, becoming the ethnic ideological roots of post-colonial Rwanda (Carney, 2012:173).

3.5 Post-colonial Rwanda

The aim of this section is to explain how Rwandan elites, during the post-colonial era, inherited and spread the ethnic ideology that had been constructed during the colonial era. For Carney (2012:172), “The resulting racialist interpretation of Hutu and Tutsi categories poisoned Rwandan society and laid the groundwork for postcolonial ethnic violence”. Although the details of the Hamitic race theory were no longer accepted in academic circles by the 1960’s, in the post-colonial era it remained influential in radical Hutu Power discourse until the eve of the 1994 genocide itself (Carney, 2016:191).

Hintjens correctly posits that in the post-colonial Rwandan context, elites were able to use ethnicity to foster hatred and fear. She argues, “Such hatred and fear were sometimes latent, and could be manipulated, but more commonly were deliberately
created in the context of well-prepared massacres” (Hintjens, 1999:248). According to Waheed (2011:2), “The history of Rwanda’s over-powerful government highlights a pattern; in normal times ethnic awareness was simply maintained to justify a concentration of power”. In times of crisis, however, perceived ethnic differences were intensified and used for scapegoating.

In the next section, I argue that throughout the history of post-colonial Rwanda, ethnic ideology began to spread across Rwandan society. At the time of Rwandan independence, this ideology primarily belonged to Hutu extremists, but by 1994 it was taken as fact by a much larger portion of the Hutu population. This section will consider three moments in the history of ethnic violence between 1962 and 1994. The details of these ethnic massacres do not only demonstrate the escalating tension between the Hutu and Tutsi, but also the way in which numerous Hutus began to participate in violence and discrimination against the Tutsi. Their participation signals that ethnic ideology, under the influence of elite manipulation, was spreading within the Hutu population. One of the difficulties facing reconciliation efforts post-1994 is the fact that a significant portion of the Hutu population participated in the violence. Addressing this issue requires understanding the history and context of their willingness to use violence against their neighbours, fuelled by ethnic hatred. Prior to 1994, there had been repeated events in Rwandan history where thousands of Tutsi were killed in violent ways. As ethnic ideology spread from the elites to the masses, more and more people began to participate in the ethnic massacres of Tutsi that occurred in different contexts and times, as will be described below:

3.5.1 Ethnic Massacres: 1962-1964

‘Ethnic massacres’ here refers to “the large-scale killing of civilians—men, women, and children who were targeted on the basis of their categorical identity, because they were Tutsi” (Straus, 2006b:184). The genocide that happened in 1994 was not “the first massacre of Tutsis at the hands of Hutu extremists. Indeed, the Republic of Rwanda was founded on systematic violence directed against the Tutsis as Hutu Power emerged in the late 1950s. This pattern of violence had its roots in colonial rule and the postcolonial process” (Brannigan & Jones, 2009:193).
Rwanda began to transition out of colonialism during the 1950’s. After World War II, Tutsi leaders, like many others in Africa, sought independence for their country. Fearful of losing control, Belgium responded to these demands by supporting a violent coup waged by a Hutu opposition group. Thus, in 1957, Tutsi domination came to an end. The pent-up anger of aggrieved Hutus, encouraged by the country’s new Hutu leadership, led to mob violence and tens of thousands of Tutsi deaths. Hundreds of thousands fled across the borders into Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania (Salem, 2000:11). The Hutu elite rejected the Tutsi movement of cultural nationalism as “Hamitization”. Later they went as far as calling the Tutsi “colonialists of the Ethiopian race” and inviting them to go home to “their fathers in Abyssinia” (Baur, 1994:457). Consequently, the Hutu turned the “Hamitic theory” against the Tutsi, who were recast as “Hamitic invaders” and “colonialists” (Salzman, 1997:17-19). Hutu ethno-nationalism remained an important ideology in Rwanda and was used to assert that the Tutsi were not ‘true Rwandans.’

In the period between 1962 to 1964, massacres and killings of Tutsis took place under a discriminatory, genocidal regime led by the Hutu elite President Grégoire Kayibanda, a new ally of Belgium whom they transferred power to on the 1st of July 1962. By the time of the proclamation of independence, it was estimated that 300,000 to whom Tutsi had already been displaced, of which 120,000 were outside the country. The majority of these refugees were peasants who had left the country with the hope of returning soon. Abroad, the leaders of the exiled Rwandans organised a diplomatic offensive, especially at the United Nations headquarters. Some of the leaders of the exiled refugee groups launched a number of attacks against Rwanda. Between March 1961 and November 1966 there were a dozen significant strikes, generally aimed at officials along the borders. Reprisals followed targeting Tutsis in these areas (Kimonyo, 2001:31).

As early as 1961, UNAR leaders (Tutsi) in exile began developing plans for armed opposition. They launched small scattered attacks in February and March 1962 in northern Rwanda, in Byumba. The March 1962 raids triggered an ethnic massacre. The violence began a day after the UNARraid and lasted for two days. It claimed the lives of one to two thousand Tutsi civilians (Straus, 2006:184). On 21 December 1963
a band of Rwandan Tutsi exiles armed with bows, arrows, and home-made rifles invaded Rwanda from Burundi at Nemba. With local Tutsi joining their ranks, and reaching about 600 in number, they attacked a military camp at Gako; taking weapons and vehicles, they drove towards Kigali. Some miles from the capital, they were intercepted and at Kanzenze Bridge on the river Nyabarongo they were decimated by units of the Gendarme National Rwandaise, who were commanded by Belgian officers and armed with semi-automatic weapons and mortars. The invaders were overwhelmed by the superior fire-power (Melvern, 2000:17).

Kayibanda immediately reacted to the invasion with the elimination of the internal opposition and the murder of the most prominent political opponents. The murders would mark the end of the role of Tutsi in public life. Three days later, an organized slaughter of Tutsi began. Kayibanda organized ‘self-defence’ groups. Kigali Radio repeatedly broadcast emergency warnings that the Tutsi were coming back to enslave the Hutu. The killings began on the 23rd of December in Gikongoro, where the Prefect Laurent Bucyibaruta was said to have understood that the Tutsi must be killed before they killed the Hutu. Armed with spears and clubs, a group of Hutu started to kill every Tutsi in sight—men, women and children alike. This region had a high concentration of internally displaced Tutsi. Hutu militia killed between 5,000 and 14,000 Tutsi while thousands more took refuge at local Catholic missions in Kaduha and Cyanika. There was also violence against Tutsi civilians in Bugesera, Kibungo and Cyangugu, though on a much smaller scale (Melvern, 2000:17; Carney, 2011:361).

The 1963 massacre can be understood as an ominous precursor of what was to come in 1994. Melvern (2000:17) notes the similarity when she explains that the people who died during the massacres were killed under the most atrocious and cruel circumstances by the local population, using whatever arms were available, mostly hoes and pangas, the long knife for cutting grass. The Hutu carried out the most hideous mutilations on their Tutsi neighbours. The element of planned annihilation links the killings in 1963 to the genocide in 1994. The planning and methods used, some thirty years apart, are eerily similar.
A Catholic missionary publication cited by Straus (2006b:188) describes how the violence in 1963 closely resembles the 1994 genocide as follows:

The entire Hutu population, Christians and pagans, catechists and catechumens, attacked the unfortunate Tutsi, in bands of about a hundred people, led by Party “propagandists” and with the authorities’ blessing. This time, the objective was not loot, but to kill, to exterminate all who had the name “Tutsi.” ... The massacre was horrifying: except for a few notables or Party propagandists who carried guns, the mass of killers only had large knives and indigenous billhooks. The families who did not want to leave their huts were barricaded inside and burned alive. Some had their necks or limbs slashed on the spot and were left to suffer for days.... They call it “to wage war: niintambara!”

The British philosopher, Bertrand Russell (cited by Melvern, 2004:9) claims, “The 1963 killing had been the most horrible and systematic extermination of the people since the Nazi extermination of the Jews. Most Europeans living in Rwanda were indifferent, considering the massacres to be the result of the ‘savagery of the negro’”. The massacre at Gikongoro serves as the first example of widespread participation in ethnic violence, although in a much more localized way than what happened in 1994.

3.5.2 Ethnic massacre: 1973

In January 1973, another outbreak of violence against Tutsi resurged in Rwanda. This violence coincided with the increasingly systematic popularization of ethnic ideology. At the same time the violence broke out, an extensive campaign within the educational system began to promote ethnic ideology. Beginning in 1973, the link between ethnic ideology and mass participation in violence became increasingly clear.

After a failed coup against the Tutsi-led government of Burundi, which led to a massacre of Burundian Hutus, the Hutu President of Rwanda, Grégoire Kayibanda, used these tragic events to conduct a further crackdown against the Tutsi in Rwanda. Pointing to the violence against Hutus in Burundi, he started a campaign to “purify” Rwanda of the supposedly “foreign” influence of Tutsis (Melvern, 2004:9). The revolution and the republic were depicted as a victory for the Hutu majority over their feudal oppressors, the Tutsi. In terms of this propaganda, ethnic antagonism was logical and necessary.
A movement was organised at the level of secondary schools and by university students, aimed at reducing or totally eliminating the presence of Tutsi in schools and the private sector. Tutsi were reproached for having historically monopolised these two areas. The private sector had been an economic refuge for Tutsi faced with exclusion from public services by the quota system. Lists of Tutsi were posted at workplace entrances forbidding them to report to work. The movement that began in the towns spread to the countryside within a month. In some areas the 1959 scenario was repeated with the burning of huts and Tutsi being hunted down and killed. Settling of old scores ensued as people took the law into their own hands. Assailants attacked not only the Tutsi but also the rich Hutu. Estimates of the death toll varied from 500 to 1000.

In addition to the killings of Tutsi, 190 students were forced out of the National University of Rwanda (UNR) on the evening of February 15-16, 1973. After students divided along ethnic lines at Nyundo’s St. Pius X minor seminary on February 25, twelve major seminarians and an equal number of Tutsi professors fled the seminary for the Congolese border. Meanwhile, the violence spread to banks, commercial centres, and other Rwandan civil institutions seen as havens of Tutsi influence (Carney, 2011:382).

In charge of the nationwide anti-Tutsi campaign was the army chief, Major Juvénal Habyarimana, a northern Hutu. For years, northern Hutu had been complaining that the southern-led government was not doing enough to subject the Tutsi. Melvern (2000:22) observes, “It was Habyarimana who, in July 1973, ousted Kayibanda in a coup and declared himself president. Twenty-one years later Habyarimana would be ousted too, and in more dramatic circumstances”.

3.5.3 Ethnic massacres: 1990-1994

With an entire generation of Rwandans now schooled in ethnic ideology, it is no surprise that between 1990 and 1994, ethnic killings became more wide spread. The planning behind these served as a preview to the systematic methods of extermination used in 1994. The violence of this era virtually mirrored the 1994 genocide, although
it involved somewhat less participation of the Hutu population compared to the events of 1994.

On 1 October 1990, an army of Tutsi refugees, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), invaded from across the Ugandan border. For Melvern, (2000:13), the RPF requested: “An end to the ethnic divide and the system of compulsory identity cards, a self-sustaining economy, a stop to the misuse of public offices, the establishment of social services, democratisation of the security force, and the elimination of a system that generated refugees”. In response to the RPF attack, President Juvénal Habyarimana planned to use the “invasion” as a way to carry Hutu favour and support for his fledgling regime against the Tutsis. The army acted with extreme brutality. Some Tutsi were tortured to death and others that were brought to the camp died of starvation (Melvern, 2000:14).

On 5 October, the following day, Habayrimana blamed the RPF for the shooting, claiming that the rebels had infiltrated the capital. The RPF and their “accomplices” posed a risk, the president said. Mass arrests followed. Between 6,000 and 13,000 civilians were arrested; most of them were Tutsi, but the group also included Hutu opponents of the regime (Des Forges, 1999:49). Ten days after the invasion, meetings of local officials were called. They mobilised Hutu people to kill the “inyenzi” (cockroaches), referring to the Tutsi, and to burn their houses, because the Tutsi were coming to exterminate the Hutu. At least 348 people were killed in forty-eight hours and 550 houses were burned (Melvern, 2000:15).

On the night of 22 January 1991, RPF guerrillas attacked Rwanda’s most notorious prison in the northern prefecture of Ruhengeri. The RPF held Ruhengeri for a day and then withdrew before reinforcements arrived. The regime reacted brutally. An organised campaign to kill the Bagogwe—pastoralists said to be of Tutsi descent, followed in the wake of the attack. In one commune, buses were sent to collect the victims, in another case, a lorry. The Bagogwe were killed with spears, batons and even guns, and their houses were looted and destroyed. In Kinigi the order went out to “cut them to pieces”. In some cases, the killings were carried out to eradicate “enemies”. In the prefecture of Gisenyi, Bagogwe people disappeared into several
army camps and were never seen again. A genocide of the Bagogwe (Tutsi) happened, as some people were calling it. The victims were killed for belonging to one particular ethnic group, and the intention had been to destroy them as a group (Melvern, 2000:16, 18).

In November 1991, Tutsi were killed in the commune Murambi. The organised killing of Tutsi became more evident in March 1992 in Bugesera where there was a higher percentage of Tutsi than anywhere else. An estimated 300 people died in Bugesera. People were thrown in the rivers or were burned in their homes. The killing in Bugesera bore all the hallmarks of the genocide to come. It lasted from the 4th until the 9th of March. After Bugesera, similar incidents occurred in the Kigali prefecture, as well as Kibuye, Cyangugu and Gisenyi. The government explained the killings in Bugesera as self-defence (Melvern, 2000:45-46).

On 22 November 1992, a ferocious anti-Tutsi campaign was launched. Melvern (2000) recalls the racist speech of Leon Mugesera, the vice-president of the MNRD in the northern stronghold of Gisenyi and a political science professor, who addressed a party of militants in a rabble-rousing, sensitizing the murder of Tutsi:

…what about those accomplices here who are sending their children to the RPF… we have to take responsibility in our own hands… the fatal mistake we made in 1959 was to let them [the Tutsi] get out…they belong in Ethiopia and we are going to find them a shortcut to get there by throwing them into Nyabarongo river. We have to act. Wipe them all out (cited in Melvern, 2000:47).

Straus is right when he points out that the 1994 genocide was “by far the most intensive episode of violence in Rwanda’s recent history, but it is not the first” (Straus, 2006:175). For him, “Violence broke out in 1959, in the early 1960s, in 1973, and at several points in the early 1990s. In each case, the violence had a similar character to the 1994 genocide. In each case, civilians almost always Tutsi civilians were attacked and on some occasions, massacred” (Straus, 2006:175). Though, again, the episodes were considerably less intense than the 1994 genocide. What does this imply? My viewpoint is that all these enumerated massacres were actually untold acts of genocide against the Tutsi. In their own ways, these smaller genocides against the
Tutsi were manifestations of the spread and influence of ethnic ideologies. In fact, the
ethnic ideology in Rwanda is rooted in the colonial era. It was enforced and spread
during the First and Second Republic regime lead by Hutu ideologue President
Grégoire Kayibanda and President Juvénal Habyirimana. This ideology, according to
Mafeza (2013:2):

Has been characterized to encourage discrimination against Tutsi, leading to
their exclusion from key power spheres. The stronghold of discrimination
against Tutsi was present in all key sectors of national life, such as the army,
education and administration. Under these regimes, ethnic ideology was
essentially anti-Tutsi. Hutu were considered to be the only Rwandan people.
This ideology was taught in all social spheres (families, schools, surrounding,
work places, political parties, and mass media) and resulted in the polarization of
Hutu against Tutsi.

### 3.6 Stages of Genocide

What follows is a shift in focus from the historical context of Rwanda to a more
careful description of the mechanisms of the 1994 genocide itself. As we shall see, the
plans and procedures for carrying out the extermination of the Tutsi all made use of
the existing ethnic ideology in Rwanda. Gregory H. Stanton (2004), in his article
titled, ‘Could the Rwandan genocide have been prevented? identifies eight stages of
genocide, with each stage having distinctive warning signs. He argues that at each
stage there are specific strategies to prevent and stop the genocidal process. The hope
is that a better understanding of the genocidal process will help policy-makers prevent
future genocides. According to Stanton, each of the eight stages manifested in
Rwanda. In this section, these eight stages will be briefly summarized, highlighting
that in the case of Rwanda, each of these stages were constructed on top of the current
ethnic ideology. The aim here is to demonstrate the connection between ethnic
ideology and the mechanisms of genocide before considering in greater detail the
events leading up to April 1994.

Stanton’s first stage of genocide is *classification*. At this stage, social groups are
classified into “us versus them”. They are sometimes categorized in cultural, racial,
ethnic or religious groups. As this dissertation argues, in pre-colonial Rwanda the
concepts ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ referred to a social class that varied over time. However,
during the colonial period, the differences between the Hutu and Tutsi were interpreted in racial terms by the European colonizers. The racist ideology based on the Hamitic theory of the colonial era attributed superiority to the Tutsi over the inferior Hutu race. Tutsi were privileged in education, the church, the economy, and government services. Colonial rulers thus exacerbated these divisions of classification. In the post-colonial period, the Hutu regimes adopted these same theories, in order to portray Tutsis as foreign invaders who had dispossessed Hutus of their rightful control of Rwanda (Stanton, 2004:213). This categorization of Hutu and Tutsi is considered to be the first stage in a genocidal process because it classified them into ethnic groups.

The second stage, according to Stanton, is symbolisation. At this stage, the classifications are symbolised. Groups are given names and other symbols, and are required to wear them either by cultural tradition or laws. In Rwanda, the Belgian colonial government began to issue identity cards (IDs) around 1926 and required them in the 1933 census. The identity cards included each individual’s group identity—Tutsi, Hutu, or Twa, thereby refining the group identity for each person, and making changes from one group to another much more difficult. During the genocide, ID cards became facilitators of killing, because they permitted the killers to quickly determine who was Tutsi.

Dehumanisation is the third stage of genocide; this is where the death spiral of genocide begins. The victim group is dehumanised. It is called the names of animals or likened to a disease: vermin or rats, cancer or plague, or in Rwanda, “inyenzi”—cockroaches. The reason this stage is necessary is that it gives ideological justification to the “genocidaires,” who claim they are purifying the society. It overcomes the normal human revulsion against murder. If the other group is not human, then killing them is not murder. In Rwanda, the dehumanisation of Tutsis was already a feature of genocidal massacres that took place in 1959, 1962, and 1972. Cartoons and articles in Kangura referred to Tutsis as cockroaches and snakes, and regularly expounded the myth that they had invaded from Ethiopia. Tutsis were “devils” who ate the vital organs of Hutus. In the Rwandan context, Huyse (2003:71) accurately asserts that the use of such dehumanizing language is a well-known technique that can turn ordinary
citizens into violators of human rights. In connection to Boraine’s (2000) argument, Huyse (2003:71) clearly affirms that “[t]he moment one designates a person as sub-human, one can act against them as an object with very little feeling. After all, if they are not quite human, then they don’t feel as we do, they don’t hurt as we do, and in a sense they don’t bleed as we do”.

Indeed, the first three stages clearly indicate how ethnic ideology was introduced and spread, preparing the way for the 1994 genocide. Symbols and language, which dehumanised the Tutsi, were powerful resources that resulted in the hatred and killings described in stage 4, 5 and 6.

As we shall see in the next section (3.7), there could be no genocide without a plan. This view brings us to the next stage referred as organisation. All genocides are organised and prepared by individuals. At this stage, hate groups are organised, militias are trained and armed, and the armed forces are purged of members of the intended victim group as well as officers and others who might oppose genocide. Propaganda institutions, such as newspapers and radio stations, are also strengthened. However, it was the organisation of extremist militias that marked the turn toward genocide. In Rwanda, as we shall see, every means were put in place to prepare for the ‘final solution’ to kill every Tutsi.

Stanton lists polarisation as the fifth stage of genocide. At this stage, hate propaganda emphasises the “us versus them” nature of the situation. There is no middle ground. Moderates who attempt to negotiate peace are denounced as traitors and even targeted or assassinated. Rwandan moderates had formed several opposition parties and had won seats in the National Assembly. On April 6, 1992, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a moderate Hutu, was named Minister of Education. When she proposed ending the quota system that restricted Tutsi access to higher education, she was attacked in her home by twenty armed men. In November 1993, after she had been named Prime Minister in the government formed after the signing of the Arusha Accords, Radio (Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Colline ‘RTLM’) publicly called for her assassination. She was one of the first officials to be murdered after the genocide commenced on April 7, 1994.
During the *preparation* stage, plans are made for the genocide. Death lists are compiled. Trial massacres are conducted, both as training for the genocidaires, and to test whether there will be any response such as arrests, international denunciations, or sanctions. If the murderers get away with their crimes, if there is impunity, it is a green light to finish the genocide. The trial massacres began in Rwanda soon after the RPF invaded in 1990 (Stanton, 2004:215).

The seventh stage is *extermination*. At this stage, the killing that is legally defined as genocide begins. Those who do it often enough, think they are “purifying” their society by “exterminating” those who are less than human and are a threat to them (Stanton, 2004:217). The fact that the mass murders began within hours after the crash of President Habyaramana’s French plane on April 6, 1994 reveals how the organizers of the genocide were prepared for the extermination of the Tutsi groups.

The last stage is *denial*. During and after genocide, the perpetrators deny that they committed any crimes. They portray their murders as justified killings during war or repression of terrorism. They dig up and dispose of the bodies and try to minimise the number of victims. They try to blame the victims, often claiming that the victims’ own behaviour brought on the killing. They portray the murders as spontaneous outbreaks in response to the victims’ depredations, or as the actions of rogue army commanders, rather than as an intentional government policy. They challenge the veracity of eye-witnesses and assassinate the character of their accusers. The perpetrators claim to have been powerless to prevent the killings by others, and even have the audacity to claim they assisted their victims. All of these strategies of denial operated during and after the Rwandan genocide (Stanton, 2004). More important, however, is the way ethnic ideology persists among some people, even twenty-two years after the genocide (see section 5.4). Deniers even include scholars with ties to the genocidal regime, politicians, activists with malicious intent, and perpetrators themselves. They continue to deny the genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi by

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20On 6 April 1994, a regional summit of heads of states had been summoned in Dar es Salaam during which it appears President Habyarimana finally yielded to the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement (also referred to as the Arusha Accords) with the RPF. On his way back to Kigali, the presidential plane was hit by two missiles near Kigali airport. No final proof has yet been produced to identify the perpetrators of the crime.
claiming that the killings took place in self-defence and under the conditions of civil war.

The act of denying that the violence of 1994 constituted genocide requires us to take a closer look at the specific plans for genocide put into place immediately prior to the start of the violence. These mechanisms for mass killing not only point out the obvious genocidal intent of the extremist Hutu government but also reveal how these planners made use of the categories of ethnic ideology to encourage mass participation in the violence. The next section will consider the immediate mechanisms put in place to make the overwhelming ethnic violence of 1994 possible.

3.7 Preparation and propaganda of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi

Much has been said about the development of the ethnic ideology that led to the 1994 genocide during the colonial and post-colonial period. In this section of the study the planning and preparation for genocide in the years before 1994 will be described. This planning capitalized on the existing ideology of ethnic hatred that dated back to the colonial era. It was this ideology that created the conditions for many people to participate in genocide. The propaganda, organization of militias, and arranging of death lists was all orchestrated in a way that emphasized the artificial ethnic hatred between Hutu and Tutsi.

Scholars do not agree on the exact time the “final solution” to kill every Tutsi in Rwanda was introduced. For example, Prunier (1999:169) dates it at 1992, when Habyarimana began negotiating with the RPF. Melvern, on the other hand, connects it to the invasion of the RPF in 1990. By all accounts, the idea that the genocide of the Tutsi would solve all of Rwanda’s problems was being discussed at a series of secret meetings towards the end of 1990 just after the RPF invasion (Melvern, 2004:19). Already by the spring of 1992, the Belgian ambassador in Kigali had warned his government that the Akazu (Habyarimana circle) was planning the extermination of the Tutsi (Melvern, 2000:43; Buit, 2011:62).
Furthermore, Pottier (2002:30-31) argues, “Preparation for genocide had started some two years before the actual slaughter when every nyumba kumi (every ten houses)—every cell, the smallest administrative unit—received a gun from the national army. The availability of about 150,000 guns meant that the state authorities could mobilise every prefecture, commune, sector and nyumba kumi in a matter of hours”.

Another factor showing the preparation of the genocide was the recruitment and mobilization of militias who would be trained in order to put genocide into practice. It was clear to the planners that they would require many more people than just police and army personnel. The idea of mass mobilisation was not new—there had been “self-defence” groups organized as early as the 1963 genocide—but in 1994, the mobilisation was larger and more systematic than ever before. The national army, the Forces Armees Rwandaise (FAR), trained death squads whose recruits came mainly from among the landless and unemployed youth. These deadly militias were known as interahamwe. The interahamwe, “those who attack together,” and the impuzamugambi, “those with a single purpose,” were trained to kill 1,000 human beings every twenty minutes. Local administrators organised the disposal of bodies in garbage trucks (Melvern, 2004:5). Training camps were set-up to indoctrinate men with hatred against the Tutsi minority and equip them for mass murder. Provisional lists of massacre sites were distributed. There were more than six sites in the towns of Gitarama and Cyangugu. At Nyundo, three septic tanks had been used to try to get rid of 300 people. Throughout the country, tools for killing were bought and distributed. These tools include half a million machetes, hundreds and thousands of hoes, axes, hammers, and razor blades. The purchase of weapons by the regime began two years prior to the genocide (Melvern, 2000:227).

Carroll (2000:170) relays the words of a Special Rapporteur to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and an independent Commission of Experts who, in 1994, concluded that the mass atrocities were “concerted, planned, and systematic” for a number of reasons. First, using radio broadcasts, the government orchestrated a campaign of incitement to ethnic hatred and violence. Second, the government distributed arms to the militias and civilian population. Third, lists of names of people to be executed were discovered. Finally, the speed with which the systematic
massacres were carried out after the April 1994 plane crash supported the conclusion that the government had been planning these acts of violence prior to April 1994.

Although the *interahamwe* was attractive to jobless young men looking for an affiliation that promised identity and power, it is necessary to be reminded that disenfranchisement alone cannot explain the participation of young militias in such senseless killings. Instead, it was the widespread ethnic ideology that spread among the young men that persuaded them the Tutsi were enemies to be eliminated. The militias used symbols of wealth and power to attract the youth and initiate them into the practices of terror. Gourevitch (1998:93) vividly captures the development of the militia as follows:

Hutu Power youth leaders, jetting around on motorbikes and sporting pop hairstyles, dark glasses, and flamboyantly colored pajama suits and robes, preached ethnic solidarity and civil defense to increasingly packed rallies, where alcohol usually flowed freely, giant banners splashed with hagiographic portraits of Habyarimana flapped in the breeze, and paramilitary drills were conducted like the latest hot dance moves. The President and his wife often turned out to be cheered at these spectacles, while in private the members of the *interahamwe* were organised into small neighborhood bands, drew up lists of Tutsis, and went on retreats to practice burning houses, tossing grenades, and hacking dummies up with machetes.

Stephen Smith, a writer for the French paper *Liberation*, reported how the Habyarimana regime had hardened its stance in the early 1990s before developing its ‘tropical Nazism’. The theoretic of Hutu Power ideologues adopted the vocabulary of German Nazism. Smith (1994) wrote:

Where Nazis spoke of ‘vermin’, the anti-Hamitic ideologues call the RPF fighters *inyenzi*-‘cockroaches’. Radio Mille Collines propagates in Kinyarwanda, the collective murder of Tutsi are made with greater and greater urgency. ‘Come on, get out, I need to warm myself!’ urges the sibylline voice of the broadcaster. Then, following news of some local assaults and killings, the incitation to violence becomes more explicit and general: ‘The tomb is only half full. Who will help us fill it?’ We thus move on to the project of extermination (cited by Pottier, 2002:32).

This dehumanised language broadcasts on radio emphasised how ethnic ideology was used as resource to organize and prepare the 1994 genocide.
The use of propaganda was a key resource in the government’s plot and also reveals its close ties and immediate connection with the spread of the ethnic ideology that led to the genocide. The earlier forms of media propaganda were in 1990 through a newspaper such as Kangura (a local newspaper; it literally means “wake it up”). The editor of this newspaper was Hassan Ngeze, who was from Gisenyi, the same region where president Habyarimana was from (Waheed, 2011:3). Kangura disseminated hate-propaganda about Tutsi who ‘owned a disproportionate amount of wealth,’ and its editorials promised ‘the defence of the majority of the people’. In December 1990, Kangura published the famous “Hutu Ten Commandments,” which were instructions to mistreat and discriminate against Tutsi. Copies of Kangura were read aloud at public meetings (Melvern, 2000:70-72).

The Hutu Ten Commandments provided an outlet for Hutu rage, which advocated the killing of Tutsis. Ndahiro (2014:5) indicates that the last three ‘Commandments’ are particularly significant. The eighth Commandment said that the “Bahutu should stop having mercy on the Batutsi,” while the ninth read: “The Bahutu, wherever they are, must have unity, solidarity and be preoccupied by the fate of their Hutu brothers; the Hutu, both inside and outside Rwanda, must constantly look for friends and allies for the Hutu cause, starting with our Bantu brothers; they must constantly counteract the Tutsi propaganda. The Hutu must be firm and vigilant against their common enemy who are the Batutsi”. Ndahiro (2014:5-6) explains that the tenth Commandment went back to the roots: “The 1959 social revolution, the 1961 referendum and the Hutu ideology must be taught to every Hutu and at all levels. Every Hutu must spread widely this ideology. We shall consider a traitor any Hutu who will persecute his Hutu brother for having read, spread and taught this ideology”.

In addition to the Kangura newspaper, a new radio station called RTLM began broadcasting in Rwanda. It started one month before the signing ceremony for the Arusha Accords on 8July 1993. The purpose of this new radio station was to:

21The Arusha Accords installed a United Nations Peacekeeping force and the core of the agreement was a compromise which would involve five cabinet seats, eleven transitional national assembly seats, forty percent of the army, and fifty percent of officer corps consisting of RPF members (Lemarchand, 1995; Waheed, 2011). The demonization of the RPF was a crucial tool in undermining the Arusha Peace Accords, as growing ethnic hatred would eliminate any basis for cooperation (Newsbury, 1995).
…prepare the people of Rwanda for genocide. A propaganda weapon unlike any other, its campaign was to demonise the Tutsi, and to circumvent key clauses in the Arusha Accords that barred both sides from incitement to violence and hate. The pro-Hutu message of RTLM was anti-Arusha and anti-Tutsi. RTLM would eventually broadcast the names of certain government opponents, individuals who ‘deserved to die’. Its announcers told the people that all supporters of the Tutsi RPF were traitors, the Tutsi were lazy foreign invaders who refused to work the land (Melvern, 2000:71-72).

To this, Wallis (2006:6) adds: “Hutu hate radio RTLM warned listeners that Rwanda’s troubles had begun by letting children and pregnant women survive the anti-Tutsi pogroms of the early 1960s”. Thus, during the 1994, the laughing DJs demanded that no Tutsi should be allowed to survive. Wallis (2006:133), therefore, affirms that, “RTLM was more responsible than anything else for fixing in the minds of ordinary Rwandans, the need to take an active role in the genocide for the ‘good’ of the nation”.

Waheed (2011:3) refers to RTLM as the most crucial propaganda tool of the government, able to reach even rural areas of the country. He further argues that before, during, and soon after the genocide, RTLM played a significant role by creating and spreading the ethnic ideology that fuelled the killings. For example, in 1994, it claimed that the RPF’s ideology was “ethnic purification” and mentioned names of Tutsi and moderate Hutu who were to be killed.

In reference to Des Forges, Kroslak (2007) argues that the hate propaganda dispersed through the RTLM and other radio stations in Rwanda, provoked fear and incited, even commended, its listeners to kill. Detailed instructions were given to the population as follows:

I would ask that each neighbourhood try to organise itself to do communal work (umuganda) to clear the bush, to search houses, beginning with those that are abandoned, to search the marches of the area to be sure that no inyenzi (cockroaches) have slipped in to hide themselves there (cited by Kroslak, 2007:49).

On 20 June 1994, a Rwandan radio announcer, Kantano Habimana (RTLM), called upon his listeners to join him in singing a song, praising genocide by saying:
Friends, let us rejoice…All Inkotanyi have perished…Friends, let us rejoice-God is fair.” On 2 July, the same announcer was not only praising genocide, but also using God’s name to justify it. “Let us rejoice: the ‘Inkotanyi’ have been exterminated! Oh dear friends, let us rejoice, God is equitable… The God Lord is really equitable. These evildoers, these terrorists, these people with suicidal tendencies will end up being exterminated… In any case, let us stand firm and exterminate them, so that our children and grandchildren do not hear the word ‘Inkotanyi’ ever again (Ndahiro, 2014:11-12).

These ideas portrayed how the propagandists of ethnic ideology could use religious messages to condone their action of killing. With this idea in mind, their participation in the killings was justified.

Throughout the genocide the announcers of RTLM spread hate messages of ethnic ideology:

The inherent differences between Hutu and Tutsi, the numerical superiority of the Hutu —the rubanda nyamwinshi, the majority people,— the cleverness of the Tutsi infiltration, their cruelty, their cohesiveness, their intention to restore past repression, the risk they posed to the gains of the 1959 revolution, and, above all, their plan to exterminate the Hutu. Such messages concluded with calls to action, like the following by Kantano Habimana: “Fight them with the weapons that you have at hand, you have arrows, you have spears…go after those inkotanyi, blood flows in their veins as it does in yours”…One RTLM announcer promised that a “shining day” would dawn when there would be not a single Inyenzi left in the country and the word could be forgotten (Des Forges, 1999:364-5).

The RTLM rebuked those who failed to participate enthusiastically in the hunt by saying: “All who try to protect themselves by sympathizing with both sides, they are traitors. It is they who tell a lot to the Inyenzi-Inkotanyi. It is they whom we call accomplices (ibyitso). They will pay for what they have done” (Des Forges, 1999:366).

At the same time, the RTLM announcers warned, “Those who refused to search could expect sanctions and they cautioned that those who deserted the barriers could expect severe punishment, just as did soldiers who deserted the battlefront” (Des Forges, 1999:366).
Indeed, the media created the hatred and fear that was needed to spread the ethnic ideology and carry out the genocide against the Tutsi. Gallimore (2008:249) observes, “The Rwandan genocide stands alone for the way its organizers aimed to mobilize mass participation in murder. The planners of genocide advertised their goal of exterminating the Tutsi citizens of Rwanda in song and chant, through the press and over the radio”. They mobilized and exhorted the Hutu to join the killing campaign, insisting that it “concerned everyone”. In reality, the media propaganda is considered to be “the cause” of the 1994 genocide. By means of “fear mongering and hate propaganda, RTLM and Kangura paved the way for genocide in Rwanda, whipping the Hutu population into a killing frenzy” (Gallimore, 2008:249).

3.8 The 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi

The idea or ideology of genocide begins with the process of identification and stigmatization of the ‘other,’ that is, labelling the ‘other’ and eventually separating the ‘other’ from the rest of ‘us’. The cumulative process of segregating the ‘other’ is initiated by the political leadership and disseminated through various means. The ‘other’ is presented by ‘us’ as dangerous, unreliable, and like a dangerous virus, must be destroyed (Odora, 2007:4). Mafeza (2013:1) describes the genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi as resulting “from an ethnic ideology and hatred, whereby Rwandans were posited to be different from one another”. More specifically, the Tutsi population was segregated, stigmatized and perceived as an enemy of the Rwandan Hutu political regime. In this section, the events of the genocide itself will be considered in more detail as well as the way in which the killings manifested ethnic ideology as its motivating principle.

Prunier (1995:238) maintains that in Rwanda, the word ‘genocide’ is used “not only because of the magnitude of the killings, but because of their organised and selective nature and because there was an attempt to carry them to the point where populations would be completely annihilated”. A few hours after the plane of President Habyararmana was brought down, the Presidential Guard set up roadblocks. Carrying nominative lists, they began executing the leaders of the opposition parties at their residences. Following this series of massacres, a transitional civil government was
formed on 9 April 1994 composed of MRND members and leaders of the factions. The government organised, supported and actively encouraged the implementation of genocide. The first days were devoted to killing intellectuals, human rights activists, journalists, as well as prominent members of the Tutsi community. Once the selective phase was completed, Tutsi all over the country were targeted and systematically massacred under the supervision of the government forces. Between April and the beginning of July 1994—less than a hundred days—an estimated one million Tutsi were massacred (Kimonyo, 2001:38-39).

Ethnic ideology was so embedded in people’s minds that murder quickly became commonplace. Wallis (2006:6) vividly explains:

The killings became a daily ritual throughout the country. Hundreds of thousands either took part or quietly looked on as their neighbours were murdered. For the ‘workers’ it became as typical as getting in the harvest, using the same equipment—machetes, hoes and axes, but this time cutting down limbs and lives instead of sorghum, banana and mango. For some interahamwe, there was great joy to be had in literally cutting proud Tutsis down in size; tall Tutsi women sometimes had their legs hacked off before being left to die as a way of ‘teaching them a lesson’ for their alleged superior size and manner. Yet, despite the numbers involved, the killing in each commune was systematic, precise and structured. Transport was laid on for the murderers to travel swiftly to their place of ‘work’, and they were rewarded with food and endless drink. Husbands killed their Tutsi wives and in-laws.

At an individual level, the evolution of violence is well illustrated in a case discussed by Zarembo (1997). He interviewed a farmer named Innocent Nsengiyumva imprisoned for killing two children. His story demonstrates how murder can simply become part of a day’s work:

Killing was a job. The local Hutu official had a list of victims, and each morning the peasants gathered with their weapons—machetes for most, a homemade wooden club spiked with nails for Innocent. For the first week he only watched, he says, ‘like a child watching something his father is doing’. The killers drank at the bars they passed, went home for lunch, and resumed in the afternoons. His turn came when the crowd spotted the two children. They didn’t try to escape, he says, and didn’t scream until he sunk the nails into the side of one of their heads (Zarembo, 1997:70).

Like so many perpetrators before him, Innocent claimed that he was following the dictates of the government. Local officials told him that he was fighting for his
country, and he believed them. After Zarembo asked what might have happened had Innocent refused to kill, Innocent replied: “Nobody refused” (Zarembo, 1997:70). Consequently, the people of Rwanda lost their humanity. Mamdani (2001:6) outlines the different ways in which the killings took place. He claims that about forty-eight methods of torture were used countrywide. These ranged from burying people alive in graves they had dug themselves, to cutting and opening the wombs of pregnant mothers. People were quartered, impaled and/or roasted to death. On many occasions, death was the consequence of the ablation of an organ, such as the heart, from people who were still alive. In some cases, victims had to pay astronomical amounts to their killers for a quick death.

Kubai (2007a:54) provides a new perspective on the genocide. She argues, “The genocide that shocked the world and left the country so deeply traumatised has been described as unique because it was not just Hutu killing Tutsi, but husbands killing their wives, uncles killing their nephews, and mothers killing their children”. Kaggwa (2003:1) graphically describes it as follows: “The fighting was hand to hand, intimate and unspeakable, a kind of blood lust that left those who managed to escape hollow eyed and mute”. People who knew one another well carried it out: neighbours killed their neighbours and teachers killed their students, while colleagues killed their colleagues at places of work, including hospitals and church premises.

Melvern (2004) further describes how difficult it is to understand the genocide. She recalls Tito Rutamara’s experience—one of the first on the scene to investigate in detail what had happened. He documented fifty-six common ways in which the militia killed people using machetes, screwdrivers, clubs with nails and other implements including hammers. Rutaremara thought that the more he studied the genocide, the more he might understand it. In the end, he decided that it was beyond his understanding. He said, “There was one woman who pulled out another’s uterus”. The aggressor was a thirty-five-year old from Murambi, and when Rutaremara went to the prison to see what she looked like, she appeared to be quite ‘normal’ to him: “‘Rwanda destroyed its humanity,’ he said. Our generation is lost. The people are going to have to slowly come to realise they must not kill” (Rutaremara, cited in Melvern, 2004:251).
According to Kroslak (2007:45), “The Rwandan genocide has often been classified as a third clear case of genocide in the 20th century. Although it possessed certain comparable traits with the Holocaust or the Armenian genocide, it remains, of course, a unique atrocity”. One million victims were slaughtered within three months. Kroslak (2007:45) quotes Prunier (1995) who declared, “this is a speed of killing not even achieved by the Nazis: ‘the daily killing rate was at least five times that of the Nazi death camps’”. But the reality is, the genocide was not a spontaneous outburst of ancient hatred. This brings the discussion to the following section, which argues that the spread of ethnic ideology became popular and lead to mass participation in the genocide.

3.9 Mass participation in the Rwandan genocide

The genocide, as Mamdani (2001:7) puts it, was the result of both planning and participation. Mamdani (2001:6) further argues, “The Rwandan genocide was not just a small group that killed and moved, because the genocide was so extensive, there were killers in every locality— from ministers to peasant— for it to happen in so short time on such a large scale”. Adding to this, Odora (2007:13) notes, “The level at which the individual perpetrators participate is significant to the extent that crimes of genocide never develop from the ‘bottom up’ but are always ‘top down’ affairs. On the other hand, without the “bottom” the plans of genocide articulated by those at the ‘top’ cannot be implemented”.

The genocide was planned by a small elite, but the level of participation was extremely high. Genocide, as Gourevitch (1998:95) ironically observes, is after all an act of community building. According to Mamdani (2001:7), the 1994 genocide poses a set of deeply troubling questions, for instance: “Why did hundreds of thousands, those who had never before killed, take part in mass slaughter? Why did such a disproportionate number of the educated— not just members of the political elite but, civic leaders such as doctors, nurses, judges, human rights activists, and so on- play a leading role in the genocide?” This study argues that the mass participation was due to the dissemination and indoctrination of ethnic ideology in schools, which spread
throughout Rwanda. The ethnic ideology propagated during the colonial period became a widely held truth.

In his article, ‘Ethnic Norms and Interethnic Violence: Accounting for Mass Participation in the Rwandan Genocide,’ Bhavnani (2006) outlines a number of reasons for the mass participation in the 1994 genocide. Bhavnani connects his idea of mass participation to Straus’ (2004) theory about mass participation, delineating the following seven categories: (1) abnormality, deviancy, and dispositional theories; (2) frustration aggression and deprivation theories; (3) intercommunal enmity and identity theories; (4) collective behavioural theories; (5) ordinary evil, social influence, and obedience theories; (6) security fears and dilemmas; and (7) theories of material opportunism. With regards to mass participation, Straus (2004a) suggests that the motivation to participate is likely to have been heterogeneous, and that several theories are probably right (cited in Bhavnani, 2006:653). What is of significance here is that some of the above theories are applicable to the Rwandan context. Several explanations relate to mass participation in Rwanda are given:

First, the deeply ingrained ethnic identity, which divided Hutu and Tutsi, has been one common explanation for mass participation in the genocide.

Second, one variant of the identity-based explanation emphasises the particularity of the Rwandan culture, arguing that a culture of conformity and unquestioning obedience to authority existed amongst the Hutu, facilitating mass participation in the genocide (Bhavnani, 2006:654). Prunier (1995:142) agrees with this view of unconditional obedience to authority and demonstrates how it played a key role in the mass killings. He argues that most people were illiterate. Given their authoritarian tradition they tended to believe what the authorities told them. And what they were told was quite radical. The RPF Tutsi fighters were pictured as creatures from another world, with tails, horns, hooves, pointed ears and red eyes that shone in the dark. Anybody who could be his or her accomplice (ibyitso) was bound to be a very evil creature. However, the culture of obedience to authority is found in many African countries, which do not experience genocide. Why should Rwanda be unique? Rather,
this study maintains that ethnic ideology was the root cause and was used as a mechanism by the elites to manipulate the ordinary people to be partakers.

The third explanation highlights structural violence including discontent driven by relative deprivation. Exclusion, oppression, land and resource scarcity, and difficult life conditions all encourage a culture of animosity, generating violence (Staub, 1989:13, Prunier, 1995:142). Mamdani (2001:231) goes so far as to say that mass participation by hundreds of thousands of Hutu who had never killed before or been previously affected by ethnic violence can be explained by a desire to both maintain and expand the ranks of the Hutu middle class.

Fourth, psychological explanations suggest that ‘deviant’ individuals may be predisposed to engage in violent behaviour, or that social psychological forces bring out latent group identities which are conditioned by early childhood experiences and hateful representations of rivals (Kakar, 1996). The result is that fear, anxiety, and panic all serve to heighten the salience of group identity, making the crowd more susceptible to manipulation. Rumours, propaganda, and a catalyst can then set the crowd off, resulting in ‘collective bloodlust’ (Scherrer, 2002:113).

The fifth explanation of mass participation is related to specific triggering events such as the Tutsi-led RPF invasion and subsequent assassination of Hutu President Habyarimana, which culminated in a situation of collective psychosis and begins to explain the mass Hutu participation in the violence. However, this explanation is challenged by the argument indicated in this study, which states that the preparation of genocide was in place two years before the 1994 genocide; hence, the assassination of Habyarimana on 6 April 1994 was only the trigger that set the whole strategy in motion.

Furthermore, Des Forges (1999:231) reports, “Executing an extermination campaign rapidly required the mobilisation of hundreds of thousands of ordinary people, tens of thousands to actually slaughter and others to spy, search, guard, burn and pillage. In some situations, crowds were needed immediately and for only a few days to
participate in a massacre; in others, a reliable supply of long-term ‘workers’ was required to do patrols, man the barriers and track survivors”.

Of significance, however, is that not all Hutu were willing to participate in the killings. In fact, Bhavnani (2006:657) claims, “Mass participation by Rwanda’s Hutu population was essential for the genocide. Yet, it is important to note that behavioural conformity among the Hutu was by no means assured. Rather, conformity was cultivated through compulsion over the course of the genocide”.

In the broader scope of this study, the phenomenon of mass participation creates both the need and the greatest obstacle to reconciliation. Mass participation of Hutu civilians presents a two-fold dilemma: (1) to understand the 1994 genocide, and (2) for reconciliation (Mamdani, 2001:266). How can a victim continue living next door to someone who was a participant in the genocide? The ethnic ideology that became so deeply entrenched in the minds of the people, creating the conditions for mass participation, did not immediately disappear once the violence ended. This theme will be discussed further in chapter 5, when I consider the various ways in which the new RPF-led government and the churches attempted to address the need for reconciliation. As will become evident, given the deep-seated presence of ethnic ideology up to the present day, any attempt at reconciliation will need to deconstruct the foundations of this mind-set inherited from the colonial era.

3.10 Contextual, ‘causal’ and influential factors that contributed to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda

Twenty years after the genocide, McGarty (2014) analysed the role of psychology in the reconciliation and reconstruction process in Rwanda. He (2014:376) also stressed that, “instances of mass violence and genocide cannot be understood at a single point of time without an accompanying close consideration of the causes and consequences”. For this reason, he suggests that the reality of the genocide is complex and includes multiple causes.
In this regard, the pressing problem in the aftermath of 1994 was to identify a causal explanation for the tragedy that had occurred. What could explain this genocide and mass participation in the killings? Any event as sudden and widespread as this one will be complex. However, returning to the aim of this chapter—exploring Rwanda’s historical context—the argument of this study is that the 1994 genocide was firmly entrenched in ideology. This ideology includes various aspects, which will be examined in this section, but in all respects it is related to the colonial construction of “Hutu” and “Tutsi” as ethnic categories. As will become clear further below, over the course of Rwandan history this ethnic ideology incorporated the following aspects: identity-based conflict, the historical colonial ideology which includes Hamitic theory and mythmaking ideology, political and economic ideology, and the social context of Rwanda. All these ideological factors emphasise how ethnic ideology became the fault line that split Rwanda apart, and became the seed that culminated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

3.10.1 Identity-based conflict ideology

On January 28, 2005, the NURC presented its research on the origins of the Rwanda conflict. This included an analysis of its nature, its root causes, and the challenges and opportunities faced by Rwandan society. This research was conducted under the guidance of Dr. Anastase Shyaka, a professor at the National University of Rwanda (NUR) and researcher at the Centre for Conflict Management (CCM) based at the NUR. Currently, Shyaka is the director of Rwanda Governance Board (RGB).

Shyaka (2005:8) maintains, “The conflict which has been devastating Rwanda for several decades is “identity-based” and fuelled by fears that one group feels threatened by another and thereby perceived as an enemy”. According to (Shyaka, 2005:25), the identity mechanisms in place in Rwanda between the Hutus and Tutsis arose from a complex interweaving of both external and internal factors. By external factors, he refers to how colonisation of Rwanda by European oppressors brought a foreign ideological conception of the racial heritage and makeup of the Rwandan people. The internal factors refer to the efforts to reinforce Hutu identity during the post-colonial era, which led Hutu extremists to engage in a pervasive campaign of devaluation of the Tutsis. The major problem of Rwanda, according to Shyaka, is not
only the dichotomy of “Hutu-Tutsi,” but also the syndrome of “us versus them”. The phenomenon of “us versus them” was vested with an “ethnist” flavour.

It is important, however, to discuss how identity became the fault line that split Rwanda apart. The dynamics of identity in Rwanda are complex. This is because it could be based on history, ideological constructions and political affiliations. Shyaka (2005:8-9), therefore, classifies the origin of identity-based conflict ideology into the following three phases: First, there was a perfect entity, the sedentary Bantu “Hutuness”. Second, there arose a disturbing element, the Nilo-Hamitic invading “Tutsiness,” and in the third phase, in order to restore the primitive state, it is up to Hutuness to mobilise the whole group in order to destroy the threat of that “deadly” otherness namely “Tutsiness”.

As suggested earlier, ethnic categorisation in Rwanda is invented by colonial legacy. The colonial discourse of ethnicity had established the Hutu as unequal to the Tutsi. Des Forges (1999:3) explains how the identities carried by the Tutsi and Hutu became pervasive psychological elements of the genocide, by saying:

The identity used to justify Tutsi domination in the past was used to justify the need for their elimination. The Hutu leaders portrayed the nation as vulnerable to Tutsi aggression, even claiming that the RPF intended to commit genocide against the Hutu-unless the Hutu struck first. Threatened on several fronts—by the RPF, militarily, and by opposition parties, politically—they needed to unify Hutus against a common enemy. The Hutu extremists differentiated between “us” and “them” by dividing their world into faithful Rwandans and “accomplices of the enemy”.

The key to the genocide was labelling the Tutsi population as accomplices of the RPF; thus, the entire Tutsi population became the enemy that needed to be exterminated.

3.10.2. The Hamitic theory: colonial ideological factor
This section situates Hamitic theory as an essential contributing factor to the 1994 genocide. The use in genocidal propaganda of a modified “Hamitic theory” has become a key feature seeking to explain the 1994 Rwandan genocide (Eltringham, 2006:425). Shyaka (2005:10) states that the colonial heritage of Rwanda contributed
to its many conflicts through the Hamitic myth. Colonial powers passed on to Rwanda identity antagonisms brought violence upon Rwanda. The Rwandan conflict, as Shyaka (2005:38) put it, “Is neither racial nor ethnic nor caste-based. The Hamitic theory and divisionist ideologies which have been derived from it are its main leitmotiv”.

By the end of the 18th century, archaeological findings led to the conclusion that pharaonic Egypt was black. This conception brought scientists to once again consider the idea of the repopulation of Africa by Noah’s descendants, asserting this time that the curses called down by Noah were only upon Canaan, the son of Cham, and his descendants. The descendants of Canaan were understood to be negroid or “genuine negroes”. However, a second, non-cursed line thought to be descended from Canaan’s brother encompassed other races, such as the Egyptians, Berbers and Abyssinians (Shyaka, 2005:12). This hypothesis allowed Europeans to affirm that among the populations in the depths of Africa, there were significant variations. Some of these races were thought to be related to the Hamites, and so certain groups of people like the Tutsis, the Himas and the Masais were associated with a supposedly superior race. For this reason, despite the absence of cultural or linguistic otherness in Rwanda, ideological activity around ethnicity has been very prolific (Shyaka, 2005:12). These mythical and ideological constructions in the colonial imagination established a relation between distant, unrelated communities based on their supposed origins, while at the same time disrupting the actual unified roots of communities which had lived for a long time together in harmony (Shyaka, 2005:12).

To this Shyaka (2005:14) adds, “Through that “ideological trend,” communities of Rwanda went through an ontological rupture unknown during the previous periods” (Shyaka, 2005:14). The Hutu, deprived of all political power and materially exploited by both whites and Tutsi, were told by everyone that they were an inferior race who deserved their fate. They came to believe this lie. As a consequence, they began to hate all Tutsi, even those who were just as poor as them, since all Tutsi were members of the ‘superior race’ (Prunier, 1995:38-9). The ethnic ideology based on Hamitic theory is considered to be the main cause of the genocide, the divisions, and the
recurring tragedies, which plunged Rwanda into mourning from 1959 until the 1994 genocide (Gatwa, 2005:29).

3.10.3 The myth making ideology factor

In his article, ‘Myth and Memory. The Construction and Deconstruction of Ethnic Ideology in Post-Colonial Rwanda,’ Check (2008) critically examined the role myth and memory played in perpetrating the Hutu and Tutsi divide. In a functional approach myths are always explanatory, and in some instances so dominant that any other societal function becomes secondary. In Rwanda, myths became the datum through which ethnic identity was realised, and as such, myths became a contributing factor to the genocide (Check, 2008:250). Check further argues that these myths made a Tutsi and a Hutu world more tangible within the social constructs of Rwandan identity (Check, 2008:251).

Kaufman (2006:47) believes that “extreme acts of ethnic violence such as genocide are caused by “group myths” that justify hostility, fears of group extinction, and symbolic politics of chauvinist mobilisation. The hostile myths produce emotion-laden symbols that makes mass hostility easy for chauvinist elites to provoke and make extremist policies popular” (cf. Jean, 2006:2). Symbolists support the idea of a “myth-symbol complex” that identifies elements of shared culture and an interpretation of history binds the group and distinguishes it from others. Myths have deep roots in history and culture that cannot be easily ignored (Kaufman, 2006:50, cf. Jean, 2006:2).

Kaufman (2006:50), the most prominent advocate for the symbolic political theory, notes that Rwanda’s genocide “…must have been motivated by an exceptionally hostile, eliminationist Hutu mythology aimed against the Tutsi. Extreme mass hostility against Tutsi, and chauvinist mobilisation based on manipulating ethnic symbols—all resulting in a predation-driven security dilemma”. The importance of myths and their effect on relations between groups is vital to the symbolist argument. The creation myth of the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa has many variations, but the same outcome on the hierarchy of Rwandan society. Kaufman believes, “The Story of the Origins” [below] is the foundation of the Hutu hostility toward Tutsi. Kaufman states:
…There was Kigwa, who fell from heaven and has three sons: Gatwa, Gahutu, and Gatutsi. When he decided to choose his successor, he entrusted each of the three sons a pot of milk to watch over during the night. At daybreak, Gatwa had drunk the milk; Gahutu had fallen asleep and in the carelessness of the sleep, had spilt the milk; and only Gatutsi had kept watch throughout the night, and only his milk pot was safe. So it was clear to Kigwa that Gatutsi should be the successor and by that fact should be exempt of any menial tasks. Gahutu was to be his servant. The utter unreliability of Gatwa was to make him only a clown in society. As a result, Gatutsi received cattle and command whereas Gahutu would acquire cattle only through the services to Gatutsi, and Gatwa was condemned to hunger and gluttony and would not acquire cattle (Kaufman, 2006, cited by Jean, 2006:3).

Such myths were common knowledge in Rwanda and used to justify the Tutsi minority rule over the Hutu majority and the marginal Twa. Rwandan myths also suggested that Tutsi were natural leaders. These myths were supported by the European colonisers and extended to fit the Eurocentric idea of superiority (Jean, 2006:4). In Kaufman’s (2006) words, Jean (2006:5) affirms the following:

Myths and their incorporation in all areas of the Rwandan society planted early seeds of angst of the Hutu toward the Tutsi. After the 1959 Rwandan independent revolution, there was a great increase in hate driven sentiment towards the Tutsi by the Hutu, who had gained political control of the country after independence. Based on the myth of origins, the Tutsi were viewed as foreigners from northeast Africa with no right to Rwandan land with the 1990 invasion by the RPF as background, the Hutu elite used the threat of another Tutsi invasion as a justification for ethnic cleansing in 1994. The mythology surrounding ethnic divides made genocide a fathomable solution.

It is clear that myth making which support the ethnic difference between the Hutu and Tutsi played an important role in sowing a seed of ethnic ideology.

3.10.4 Political ideological factor
Political ideologies are normally bound to and exclude someone or something, such as another religion, race, ethnicity, political creed, and so forth (Verdeja, 2012:315). In this study, ethnic ideology has been described as a key resource and influential factor that contributed to the 1994 genocide. This does not excuse the decisions of political elites, but highlights the way the Hutu elite exploited feelings of ethnic identity to pursue political or economic goals of their own (Ferdinando, 2009:53).
According Longman (1995:20), “The genocide resulted from deliberate choice of a modern elite to foster hatred and fear to keep itself in power”. He (1995:20) further states, “The 1994 genocide was not a spontaneous expression of public outrage over the assassination of a beloved president. Rather, the massacres represented a calculated and systematic attempt by embattled elites to reassert their social, economic, and political dominance and to eliminate any challenges to their authority”.

Faced with RPF success on the battlefield and at the negotiating table, these few power holders transformed the strategy of ethnic division into genocide (Diamond, 2005:318). They believed that the extermination campaign would restore the solidarity of the Hutu under their leadership and help them win the war. Thus, they chose genocide as a strategy to eliminate their opponents and regain popular support (Longman, 2001:176).

It is noteworthy here, that political manipulation exploited the underlying ethnic ideology. Des Forges (1995:460) indicates that “from the 1960s until 1994, the ideology promoted by the Hutu ruling elite was as follows: Tutsi were foreign invaders, who could not really be considered citizens. The Hutu had been the ‘native peasants’, enslaved by the aristocratic invaders. They were now the only legitimate inhabitants of the country”. The RPF thus represented the fear of a return to repressive Tutsi rule. Thus, in Rwanda, ethnicity was used as a political weapon to prevent power-sharing and democracy; incitement to ethnic hatred and violence was used as a method of power consolidation (Carroll, 2000:171). The Rwandan president Paul Kagame emphasises, “It is not reference to Hutu/Tutsi terminologies that forms the basis of the problem of ethnicity in Rwanda. Rather, it is distortions and prejudices that for decades were associated with these terms for political ends” (Kagame, 2008:xxiii, cited by Clark, 2010:143).

### 3.10.5 Economic ideological factor

In addition to political ideology, this section describes how the economic predicament of Rwanda was another factor that contributed to the 1994 genocide. Citing Pottier (2002) Ferdinando (2009:55) asserts, “The genocide grew out of an explosive struggle for resources which embattled politicians ethnicized to their advantage. A crisis
rooted in political elite interests was turned into a conflict for which an ethnic minority, “the Tutsi,” was held responsible.

The period from 1974-1984 represented a phase of significant economic growth, the causes of which were mainly external. Rwanda enjoyed the financial benefits of international aid as well as favourable terms of exchange for its primary export products, i.e. tea and coffee.

However, beginning in the 1980s\textsuperscript{22}, the external factors that had encouraged economic development reversed. Terms of trade deteriorated and external aid decreased. Ferdinando (2009:53) adds, “In the early months of 1994, the Habyarimana regime faced many challenges and its extremist allies exploited the ethnic issue as the most promising strategy for survival”.

Firstly, Rwanda faced a devastating economic decline. This is due to the fact that Rwanda had possibilities of exporting its coffee, whose value dropped drastically in world markets after 1987.

Secondly, the country’s national debt rose from $189 million to $844 million, and according to the U.N, Rwanda became the poorest country in the world.

Thirdly, Rwanda was increasingly overpopulated. From 2 million inhabitants in 1940, the population in 1991 had reached 7.15 million (Waller, 1993:47), with a huge population of young men under twenty-five with no formal employment prospects (Linden, 1997:45). Longman (2001:176) emphasises, “The problem of overpopulation, poverty, and gross income disparity created a disaffected population, susceptible to manipulation by extremist elements”.

\textsuperscript{22}During the 1980s, power was concentrated in the hands of politicians who originated from Bushiru (Gisenyi), especially members of Habyarimana’s wife’s family. The group became known as \textit{akazu} (literally translated as a small house), in reference to the restrictive or narrow circle that surrounded the Mwami. The concentration of power among this group and its cohorts gave them control of much of the country’s wealth. Towards the end of the 1980s, a state of political delinquency prevailed in Rwanda (Kimonyo, 2001:34-36).
Fourthly, Rwanda’s aggregated gross domestic product (GDP) decreased from $355 million in 1983 to $260 million in 1990. With the devaluation of the Rwandan franc by 40%, the International Monetary Fund stepped in to provide economic aid. The Habyarimana government was incapable of solving the economic woes of the country. (Jean, 2006:7).

Fifthly, there were environmental stresses and a crisis of arable land that led the wider Hutu population to fear that the return of the RPF to Rwanda would increase the scarcity of land (Bruce, 2001:39).

Finally, the country’s major employer was the government. In the late 1980s, the central government was employing 7,000 people and the local governments 43,000. By law, only nine per cent of these employees could be Tutsi. Eliminating the Tutsi would open up 4,500 more government jobs for Hutu. Because the country had no social security program, the thousands of unemployed young people who entered the job market each year lived on the very margins of survival. Many became easy targets for recruitment and manipulation.

The economic crisis created the perfect conditions in which ethnic tensions could be exploited (Staub, 1989:13). Difficult life conditions were certainly present in Rwanda before the genocide. According to Shyaka (2005:22), extreme poverty, the scarcity of resources, an increase in population and high unemployment made living conditions particularly difficult for the population, and catalysed crises and identity-based conflicts in Rwanda.

What is worth noting, however, is that even the economic inequality in Rwanda was framed within the construct of ethnic ideology. Shyaka (2005:23) rightly confirms that, “Hutu extremists managed to mobilize the killers by encouraging them to “kill the Tutsi so that they could take over their possessions (houses, banana plantations, plots, cows…)”. He concludes, “The objective of the Hutu killers in Kibungo prefecture, for example, was not simply to kill the Tutsis for what they were, but also for what they owned” (Shyaka, 2005:23). Prunier (1995:142) supports the same standpoint when he observes that all these people who were about to be killed had
land and, in some cases, cattle. In a poor and increasingly overpopulated country, Prunier argues, the opportunity to seize resources was not a negligible incentive. Indeed, some Hutu believed that mass exterminations of Tutsi were necessary to wipe out an excess of the population and bring numbers in line with the available land resources.

Poverty was clearly a relevant factor in the 1994 genocide. It created a perception of opportunity in violence for participants, both to exclude economic competition (the RPF and the Tutsi returnees who would come with them) and to grab land and goods from the Tutsi being killed (Bruce, 2001:39-40). Social conditions such as poverty, environmental degradation, land and population density and economic collapse are all resources that triggered the development that culminated in the 1994 genocide (Bruce, 2001:45). The argument here, however, is that ethnic ideology was so pervasive in Rwanda that all of these significant factors were framed within the artificial divisions of “Hutu” and “Tutsi.”

3.11 Conclusion

Chapter three was divided into four main sections: Firstly, it provided a scholarly survey on the subject of genocide and its causes. Secondly, the chapter examined the historical context of Rwanda before the colonial period. After a detailed analysis of this section, the literature revealed that in pre-colonial Rwanda, the terms ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ referred to a complex set of social relations that had some of the elements of class, cattle, and social status. These were not fixed categories but fluid ones. They varied through time and location depending on such factors as wealth, military prowess, family, and control over precious commodities or occupation of prestigious social positions. Thirdly, the chapter demonstrated that during the colonial period, the social divisions in Rwanda were recast as ethnic divisions. Mythical and ideological constructions from colonial inspiration established a relation between the Hutu and Tutsi. The colonial authorities propelled the hardening of the social structure of ethnicity, aggravating the social problem inherent between the two groups (Hutu and Tutsi) that resulted in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. Finally, in the post-colonial context, Rwanda was also characterised by ethnic ideology, exclusion and
discrimination inherited, promoted and propagated by the Hutu ruling elites in order to retain their political power.

The 1994 genocide in Rwanda was therefore the culmination of earlier genocides and massacres, which occurred in 1959, 1963, 1964, 1973, 1990, 1992 and 1993. These killings were driven by factors related to ethnic ideology: discriminatory policies pursued by post-independence governments, a culture of impunity and violence created by the government, which actively and publicly promoted the killings of Tutsi individuals, and suspicion between the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa communities, due to divisive policies and a state ideology which sought to categorize these communities as ethnically and racially distinct, despite the fact that they all share one ethnicity, one language, and a common heritage as *Banyarwanda* (Nantulya, 2006:51). Ethnic ideology thus became the fault line that split Rwanda apart, resulting in ethnic massacres, and eventually, the genocide of 1994. Since this dissertation is aimed at a missiological understanding of reconciliation, we cannot simply stop with the history of politics and ideology, but must press on and ask: “Where were the Christian churches in the midst of this ethnic ideology?” This will be discussed further in chapter four.
CHAPTER FOUR

CHRISTIAN MISSION AND ETHNIC IDEOLOGY IN THE RWANDAN CHURCH

4.1 Introduction

In chapter 3, it was argued that the ethnic ideology that led to the 1994 genocide was artificially constructed by colonial authorities and later hardened by Rwandan elites in order to maintain their power. Chapter 4 should be read as a supplement to chapter 3, exploring in greater detail the history of Rwanda from the perspective of Christian missions and theology. Chapter 4, therefore, attempts to critically examine the role the missionaries played in perpetrating the Hutu and Tutsi divide within the context of ethnic ideological thinking.

This chapter begins with a brief description of mission theology in Africa, and Christian mission and ethnic ideology (section 4.2 and 4.3), as well as the background of the mission-state relationship in the colonial era. Thereafter, this chapter will focus on ethnic ideology in Rwandan churches, taking into account how missionaries contributed to planting the seed of ethnic ideology among Rwandans (section 4.4), which post-independence was inherited by Rwandan churches (section 4.5). Section 4.6 addresses the involvement of Rwandan churches in genocide by asking the question: “To what extent can the church be held responsible for its involvement in the genocide?” Section 4.7 describes the complicity and failure of churches leading up to the genocide. In section 4.8 it is argued that, as in the broader society, the Rwandan churches also allowed ethnic ideology to infiltrate their mind-set. Hence, the mission of the churches was diminished by their allegiance to oppressive elites, preventing them from exercising their prophetic role, as is stated in section 4.8.

In the context of the CMO methodology described in chapter 1, the present chapter should be understood as an attempt to further realistically define the context in which reconciliation must occur. Drawing on the CMO logic framework, which is a strategy
to identify and explain the “cause-effect” from the viewpoint of contexts, mechanisms and outcomes, this chapter explores how and why the people of Rwanda and church leaders responded to ethnic ideology. The next section will therefore start with the bigger picture, by discussing the relation of Christian missions in Africa to ethnic and racial ideology.

4.2 Christian modern missions in Africa

As already indicated in the previous chapter, the social and political history of Rwanda before 1994 is essential in order to understand the genocide. In the same way, it is significant to be reminded that one cannot understand Christian mission and ethnic ideology in Rwanda without explaining the historical background of Christian missions in Africa. However, it is important to keep in mind that the history of Christian missions in Africa is complex.

This complexity hinges on what the missiologist Paul G. Hiebert (2002:24) says, “In the past missionaries, as people of their time, sought to both civilise and Christianise people around the world”. Chapter 4, as a descriptive and explanatory chapter, explains the role of missionaries and their theological and mission orientations, which had an influence on their role—before and after—the 1994 genocide. More importantly, this section indicates that during the time of the missionaries, Christian mission was influenced by European imperialism. In other words, mission concerned the expansion of territories and churches. This was done through: (1) colonisation, (2) civilisation, and (3) conversion. This is expounded upon below:

Mission as expansion through colonisation. Scholars hold very different views regarding how mission and colonialism are intertwined. For example, in her book, Christian Mission: How Christianity Became a World Religion, Dana Lee Robert (2009:98) states, “From the late fifteenth to the mid nineteenth century, the expansion of Europe went hand in hand with much missionary activity. Missionaries operated in a larger context of western colonialism and inevitably participated in the system”. The missionaries, irrespective of their national origin, became part of the colonial state. The missionaries had an important place in the colonial state, for they
provided a high proportion of the educational and medical infrastructure. The missionaries were the major agents in producing the modern state with a literate population and technologically based communications (Walls, 2002:103).

With regards to mission and colonialism, Bosch (1991:306) similarly stresses that during the Enlightenment, mission and colonialism were intertwined, hence “to colonize is to missionize”. He further points out that since the sixteenth century, if one said “mission,” one in a sense also said colonialism (Bosch, 1991:300). From the point of view of the colonial government, the missionaries were indeed ideal allies. For this reason, missionaries were seen as agents of colonies, as they could help in the submission of natives to the colonial government. Colonial expansion could acquire religious overtones and also be intimately linked with mission. This is justified by the fact that missionaries adhered to their own governments, for instance, British missionaries labored in British colonies, French missionaries in French colonies, and German missionaries in German colonies, respectively (Bosch, 1991:303-304). Bosch further argues, “Whether they liked it or not, the missionaries became pioneers of Western imperialist expansion” (Bosch, 1991:304). This clarifies the possibility of seeing Christian mission as Western cultural imperialistic expansion. Bosch (1991:306) quotes the Catholic missiologist J. Schmidlin, who in 1913 said:

> It is the mission that subdues our colonies spiritually and assimilates them inwardly. The state may indeed incorporate the protectorates outwardly; it is, however, the mission which must assist in securing the deeper aim of colonial policy, the inner policy, the inner colonisation. The state can enforce physical obedience with the aid of punishment and laws; but it is the mission which secures the inward servility and devotion of natives … [Hence] “to colonize is to missionize and to missionize is to colonize.”

In addition, Bosch (1991:305) emphasises that missionaries tended to welcome the advent of colonial rule since it would be to the advantage of the “natives”. Here, Bosch cites John Philip, superintendent of the London Missionary Society at the Cape of Good Hope, who wrote:

> While our missionaries… are everywhere scattering the seeds of civilization, social order, happiness, they are by the most unexceptionable means, extending British interest, British influence and British Empire. Wherever the missionary...
places his standard among a savage tribe, then prejudices against the colonial

And again:

My stations are the most efficient agents which can be employed to promote the
internal strength of our colonies, and the cheapest and the best military posts that a
wise government can employ to defend its frontier against the predatory

The above two quotations led Bosch (1991:306, 310) to conclude that missionaries
served the interests of the colonizers. The Western missionary enterprise comprises
complicity in imperialism and colonial expansion. Some missionaries and mission
societies were very skeptical about an alliance between nation and mission. This
understanding from the above quotations clearly shows the mind-set of Western
missionaries towards Africans and their relationship with colonialists. Bujo (1992:36)
also echoes a similar view when he claims that, “missionaries worked hand in glove
with the colonial power”. Bujo (1992:36) further indicates, “Missionaries did indeed
preach the gospel, but they preached it within the framework of a tainted system.
Christian churches were thus established during the colonial period not simply as
allies of the government but as important players in the contestation for state power”.

In fact, during the colonial time in Africa, Manickman (2007:330) notes that “the flag
followed the cross, implying that the relationship of some missionaries to Africans
prepared the latter subjugation by the colonial powers; many times the missionaries
sided with the colonial masters”. He refers to one of the popular African sayings:
‘Gutiri ngurani ya Mubia Muthungu,’ meaning ‘there is no difference between the
colonial administrator and the missionary’.

**Mission as expansion through civilization.** The work of civilisation did not lie in the
hands of the government alone, but also in the hands of the missionaries, as religious
teachings and religious institutions were of great importance. The colonial endeavour
had three arms—government, mission, and commerce—and all had to function
together. Some missionaries were identified as agents of the colonial interest, since
they struggled to establish churches of national interest and often failed to resist the
injustices perpetrated by the colonial administration against the Africans. The
administrators, however, were more interested in the social and political impact of missionary activities. If the missionaries could teach the Africans to become obedient subjects, then even they could receive financial support from the colonial office (Bujo, 1992:37, 41).

As described by Bosch (1991:292), under the imperialism motive, Western missionaries were interested in propagating their culture. He argues, “Just as the West’s religion was predestined to be spread around the globe, the West’s culture was to be victorious over all others”. Furthermore, Hiebert (2002:23) adds, “Most westerners assume the superiority of Western peoples and western civilization. Members of other races might share in their goodness and wisdom, but westerners are the leaders, and will remain so for a very long time. This led to the Enlightenment agenda that it is the White Man’s burden to educate and civilize the ‘natives’”. In Rwanda, the mentality of superiority influenced them to initiate the idea of a ‘superior race,’ thus referring to the Tutsi as superior to the Hutu, and hence, creating dissension and discrimination.

According to Mugambi (1992:23), Christianity was presented to Africans as the religion and culture of Europeans, who at the same time thought of themselves as the perfect and highest model for the rest of humanity to emulate. To be Christian meant to be “civilised,” to be civilised meant abandoning African life, which was described as “primitive” and “savage,” and mirroring the Western European way of life. Missionaries considered themselves to have attained the highest possible level of civilisation, which the “primitive savages” were expected to copy in order to “develop” from “paganism to civilisation”.

This resulted in the negation of indigenous African culture and its replacement by the so-called superior Western culture. For this reason, the relationships between Western power and missions have drawn multiple critiques. Critics of missions have focused largely on missionary paternalism. It was clear that the nonwestern people saw mission as another aspect of Western oppression. Missions have been condemned for introducing social or cultural changes, or for being connected to outside global forces such as imperialism, colonialism, Western norms, or modernity (Robert, 2009:88, 90).
**Mission as expansion through conversion.** Missionaries arrived in Africa as part of the general expansion of European powers abroad, motivated by a desire to spread the Gospel (Sanneh, 1991:159). Missionaries in Africa sought to attract converts not simply through the power of their message, but also through various material incentives. They built schools and hospitals, introduced new crops and farming techniques, and began money-making projects to attract new converts (Longman, 2001:170). At the same time, Hiebert (2002:9) maintains that for “many missionaries, conversion was related to alcohol, tobacco and gambling, taking baptism and communion and attending church regularly”. In other words, for them, aspects such as these provided evidence of being truly converted.

However, this strategy of attracting people is challenged by Hiebert (2002:9) when he says that this way of conversion “did not necessary mean that underlying beliefs had changed. People could adapt their behaviour to get jobs, win status and gain power without abandoning their old beliefs”. Consequently, the nature of missionary work as part of the colonial project affected not only the structures of the Christian churches established in Africa but also the Christian message (Longman, 2001:182).

In fact, modern missions originated in the context of modern Western colonialism and missionaries became pioneers of Western imperialistic expansion. In other words, the link between colonialism and mission was complicated, but most certainly undeniable. This reflection on mission as the expansion of European power is important for the purpose of this study, as it indicates the negative impact the relationship between the missionaries and colonizers had on Africans in general, and Rwandans in particular. Thus, illuminating their influential role—before and after—the 1994 genocide. Against this backdrop, the next section focuses on Christian mission and ethnic ideology.

### 4.3. Christian mission and ethnic ideology

This section provides an analysis of Christian mission and racial ideology. It is argued that while thinking that they were “civilizing” the people of Africa, the colonizers and missionaries managed to strip them of the best part of their values before destroying.
their cohesion and sowing the seeds of conflict (Shyaka, 2005:11). This is owing to the fact that, “during the colonial period, many Europeans had become obsessed with race, and this had a negative impact on indigenous people’ lives” (Gatwa, 2001:128). Due to the limited scope, this study will not be able to cover the topic of Christian mission in all African countries. I would therefore prefer to focus on some relevant points from the South African context, which I consider of great importance for the present discussion. These will serve as examples of Christian mission and racial ideology. The Rwandan context will be discussed in section 4.4.

The reason for choosing South Africa as an example in this study is because it exemplifies how an African country has been affected by the racial ideology of both European colonial administration and missionary policies. However, the intention is not to draw a comparison between South Africa and Rwanda, as both countries have experienced their own distinct tragedies. Rather, this section begins with a review of the relationship between missionaries and colonizers in the South African context in order to identify the factors and characteristics of the colonial church that may be relevant in Rwanda. As will become evident, the church in Rwanda similarly shares complicity in the colonial racial project as the church in South Africa.

In his contribution, ‘Apartheid in South Africa as a sin and heresy: some of its roots and fruits,’ Nico Smith (1984), a prominent anti-apartheid activist and theologian, traces the historical background of the racial ideology among Westerners. He recalls that racial prejudice was characteristic of Western people since the very early history of Western civilization. In Africa, Asia, and the Americas, people of color were treated by Westerners as inferior, and used as slaves and servants. As early as the 5th century AD, the monks started painting images of the devil in black. For Smith (1984:145), “The association of black as being evil and bad remained part of Western humanity’s conception of Black people, influencing their attitude towards them. At a later stage in history, the West came into contact with Blacks. In turn, they were seen as the cursed sons of Ham, and it was believed that it was God’s will, or predestination, for the White race to have authority over the coloured races”. This situation in the South African context echoes the Hamitic race theory, which was prevalent in Rwanda. In both cases, the European colonizers sought to explain the
organization of society according to fixed racial categories dating back to pre-historic origins.

In this respect, Saayman (2008) stresses that the white colonists found any physical contact with the indigenous people very difficult. For example, he argues that upon their arrival in Cape, the settlers had already formed stereotypes of the black people. Even if they are not termed racist, according to Saayman (2008:2), “They certainly were strongly ethnocentric, with no doubt about the superiority of white, civilised and Christian Europeans over black, uncivilized and pagan indigenes”. As a result of contact, the idea of separateness was strongly implemented (Smith, 1984:145). Specifically, from the very beginning, the churches of European origin in South Africa were challenged with the problem of separation amongst people although more in a cultural-economic sense than in a focused racial sense (Naude, 2005:164). The connection with the Rwandan context is clear at this point. As we have seen in chapter 3, the colonial government in Rwanda was equally interested in differentiating indigenous people according to perceived racial characteristics, even if this was done for its own political or economic advantage. The South African example, however, alerts us to the way that the church might be guilty of participating in this differentiation. As we shall see later in this chapter, this concern is relevant to the history of the church in Rwanda as well.

The Christian churches played a significant role in the evolution and establishment of apartheid. This is justified by the fact that segregation of the population on the basis of color officially began when the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) agreed to allow its members to segregate their worship services along racial lines (Ménard, 2015:89). By the late 1850s, different church buildings were in place for colored congregants gathering to hear the Word and receive the sacraments (Naude, 2005:164).

For many authors, separate worship became the resource for apartheid. Scholars like Ménard (2015), for example, suggest that separate worship was the precursor to separate development, and was a political strategy that helped promote a racist agenda. Ménard (2015) quotes Nico Smith (2004), who convincingly highlights the
influence of the Christian churches in the making of an apartheid state. He refers to the DRC as the “mother of apartheid” in the following words:

[The] DRC can therefore to some extent be said to be the main instigator of the concept of separation between peoples of colour in South Africa and may rightly be called ‘the mother of apartheid’, by deciding to follow the will of its white members who were demanding that people of colour not be accommodated in the church. Instead of guiding its members to change their attitudes, the Synod took the church into a deformation of the essential character of the church. How different the history of South Africa could have been if the DRC had in 1857 taken a decision not to allow any separation within the church (Nico Smith, 2004, cited by Ménard, 2015:98).

It is clear that the question raised by Smith highlights the influence of the Christian churches in the making of an apartheid state. Ménard commented on Smith’s question, “How different would South Africa be today if the DRC had indeed refused to allow separate worship?” He maintains that Smith implied that the apartheid social experiment between 1948 and 1994 would have been less successful, perhaps impossible, without the passive or, in the case of the DRC, the active support of the Christian church (Ménard, 2015:100). Citing Allan Boesak (1981), Villa-Vincencio (1983:59) affirms, “Apartheid has been born in the womb of the white NGK (DRC). Details of the policy were worked out by that Church and it has provided moral and theological justification for apartheid”.

Although the Rwandan context differs on this point, we can nonetheless see the general outline of an idea that will be relevant here. In South Africa, the church permitted its own conception of mission to be subordinated to the economic well-being of the Afrikaner-dominated system, which found its origin in the colonial era. Similarly, as we shall see in the Rwandan context, the churches became so indebted to the colonial economic structure that they began to lose their own sense of mission, with the result that there was as much a financial reason to join the church as a theological reason.

In addition to supporting the establishment of apartheid policy, the DRC developed a contextual theology that justified apartheid. The theological thoughts of Abraham Kuyper, an influential Dutch theologian, were the foundation on which the DRC built
its theological justification of apartheid. Kuyper’s concept of God’s creation is pluriform instead of uniform. Through Kuyper, the policy of apartheid found expression in the church. For this reason, the policy of apartheid, as described by Smith, may correctly be termed a “church policy” (Smith, 1984:147). The theology of the DRC developed within the context of the Afrikaner’s rise to political dominance in South Africa. These two civil phenomena—the rise of Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid theology—developed in tandem, with the DRC theologically supporting the Nationalists plan to segregate the races (Ménard, 2015:83).

Ménard (2015) quotes Professor Nukhet Sandal (2011), the Director of the War & Peace Studies Program at the University of Ohio, who observed the effectiveness of using biblical references and theological justification as a means of marketing the segregationist message. The apartheid system of racial segregation, according to Sandal, was inspired by the policies of the DRC. She also emphasizes that the DRC’s influence was felt early on in the Afrikaner’s rise to social and political dominance in South Africa. Citing Sandal, Ménard (2015) wrote that in 1857,

[...] it was a synod of [the] DRC that had introduced separate services along racial lines and this policy had been represented as ‘the will of God’ by using various textual references from the Bible pointing to the differences among people. Almost all these racist policies were legitimated by references to the sacred texts and stories, thereby making their ‘marketing’ to the public much easier than secular ideologies. The tower of Babel story (Genesis 11:1–9) became a ‘cardinal tenet of apartheid theology’ – it was normal for people to be treated differently because they were different and the difference in treatment was the divine will. Apartheid quickly became the prevalent mode of life in South Africa, unquestioned by the majority of domestic institutions (Sandal, 2011, cited by Ménard, 2015:94).

Consequently, the DRC had been quite complicit in the rise of ‘Afrikanerdom’ and its racist policies. Based on theological grounds, the DRC openly supported apartheid and the Nationalist regime. As described in Ménard (2015), Smith recalls that from 1857 to 1935,

[...] The decision of 1857, whatever good intentions the synod might have had, had put the DRC on a path that would lead directly towards an ideological theological understanding of apartheid. This came about in 1935 when the DRC accepted a new mission policy in which the idea of multiple nations instead of one united South African nation was introduced, it was said, from a biblical
point of view. Racially defined nationalism was thus formulated in ecclesiastical terms (Smith, 2011 cited by Ménard, 2015:101).

The 1857 event, as Brunsdon (2015:109) indicated, shows that the link between church mission and apartheid was now firmly cemented. Indeed, the seed planted by the Synod of 1857 had now come to fruition. In this way, Western ethnocentricity and the ethno-superiority of the early settlers developed in the social and missionary context into a theologically sub-structured racist superiority in which service to the fatherland could be equated to participation in the missio Dei.

The themes of ethno-superiority and racialized segregation will become apparent in the history of the Rwandan church as well. Although the Rwandan church never implemented segregated worship, as in the case of the South African DRC, it did condone and even encourage an apartheid-style economic segregation, which disadvantaged the Hutu during the colonial era and disadvantaged the Tutsi after the colonial era. Moreover, because the Rwandan church accepted Hamitic race theory as a biblically justified account, there was a theological rationale for the Rwandan church’s participation in discrimination, just as we see in South Africa.

The theology that justified apartheid, however, has been challenged. In June 1982, during the National Conference, the SACC explicitly declared that apartheid was sinful, and its moral and theological justification, a heresy. Two months later, the WARC at its international meeting in Ottawa agreed with the declaration of heresy and suspended the powerful and influential DRC for theologically supporting apartheid (Borer, 1998:105). For Villa-Vicencio (1983:60), “If apartheid is a policy which safeguards the political and economic privileges of the Whites at the cost of blacks it is both ‘sinful and heretical’”. In what sense, then, is apartheid a heresy?

De Gruchy maintains that it is in the first instance, an anthropological heresy. It is based on a false view of humanity. This, in turn, leads to a false doctrine of the church and reconciliation, which was achieved in the death and resurrection of Jesus (de Gruchy, 1983:82). De Gruchy critically challenges this kind of theology, which he considered as a theology that had become ideologically captive to the prevailing political ideas within the Christian churches’ context. According to de Gruchy (cited
in Ménard, 2015:90), “The Christian church is called to bear witness to the reign of God and to confront oppressive policy and law-makers with the Gospel. But any church that serves the politics of its context could not necessarily serve God as well”. Therefore, de Gruchy (1983:75) asserts, “It became necessary not only to recognize apartheid as a sinful policy, but also to reject it as heresy that divided the Church and compromised its proclamation of the gospel of Jesus Christ”. Tutu also adds that apartheid is a heresy and evil because it denied the central act of reconciliation achieved by God through Jesus Christ. Therefore, it deserved to be condemned as morally reprehensible because it has caused so much human suffering (Tutu, 1983:40, 46).

In these examples, we see that in the South African context, the theological justification for discrimination was opposed by a prophetic theological critique, which called the church back to its mission. This critique not only came from outside the DRC, but also emerged from some voices within Afrikanerdom who cried out against apartheid. In the Rwandan context, however, it is difficult to find prophetic voices that were willing to turn against the interests of their own group. For example, there were no critical theologians from within the Hutu-dominated church in the 1960’s and 70’s who were willing to critique the discrimination of their era. Although the church has made much effort since 1994 to rectify its complicity in ethnic ideology, the purpose of this dissertation is to continue a theological critique of the church’s efforts, with the hope of bringing the church into the service of God rather than ideology.

In summary, from the very beginning of this section, the history of Christian mission in Africa is complex. The relationship between Western power and mission has drawn multiple critiques. Critics of missions have focused largely on missionary paternalism. Missions, as Robert (2009:88; 90) puts it, “have been condemned for introducing social or cultural changes, or for being connected to outside global forces such as imperialism, colonialism, western norms, or modernity”. The nature of missionary work as part of the colonial project affected not only the structures of the Christian churches established in Africa but also the Christian message (Longman, 2001:182). In South Africa, for example, racial prejudice among White Afrikaners influenced their attitudes towards Black people, which led to the establishment of
apartheid supported by the DRC’s theological justification. As Tutu (1983:44-5) explains, “Apartheid says the most important fact about us is our ethnicity, some biological attribute that is really an irrelevance in determining our human worth. It exalts a particular biological characteristic to a universal principal, determining what it means to be human. Skin colour and race became salvation principles, since in many cases they determine which people can participate in which church services”. In fact, the Whites saw themselves as a superior race over the inferior Black race. In Rwanda, this mentality of categorizing people according to categories of superiority influenced both missionaries and colonists. This idea will be elaborated on in the next section. But before I get there, it is important to explore the specific history of Christian mission in Rwanda, which provides a background and the foundation of ethnic ideology, as introduced by the European missionaries.

4.4 Christian mission in Rwanda before independence

Considering the problem of mass participation in the 1994 genocide, particularly the problem of Christian participation, it is important to understand the history of the Christian missionaries in Rwanda. The nature of the early European missions created political and economic incentives for people to convert to Christianity apart from any real commitment to the faith. As will be made clear, European missionaries sought to convert the masses by converting the king, which put into place class distinctions, which also became ethnic distinctions, while simultaneously permitting people to identify with the church without surrendering anything of their localised interests.

Before the arrival of the missionaries in 1900, Rwandans were God worshippers and knew that God was almighty. This was clearly visible in the way they gave their children theophoric names, such as Hakizimana (God saves), Harerimana (God raises), Ntakirutima (nothing greater than God). Even their proverbs show that they were believers. These are some examples “Imana iruta Imanga,” which means God is transcendent. Imana yirirwa ahandi igataha i Rwanda (God spends a day in another place and spends a night in Rwanda), which means that Rwanda is God’s home. God was called Rurema, which means creator of everything. Rwandan greetings show that they were believers: Gahorana Imana (Be always with God). They knew that “peace
and luck” were from God and so used to say: “N’ahimana” (it is up to God), “Nagize Imana” (God was with me, meaning that I had a chance) (Gatwa & Karamaga, 1990:41).

The Roman Catholic Cardinal, Charles Lavigerie,23 one of the Missionaries of Africa, also known as ‘The White Fathers,’ inaugurated the evangelisation of Rwanda in 1900. The Protestant missionaries of the German Bethel Mission followed in 1907. More missionary societies arrived after the First World War, including, in chronological order: the Seventh Day Adventist missionaries from America, the Anglicans of the Church Missionary Society, the Rwanda Mission, the Danish Baptists, the American Free Methodists, and the Pentecostals from Sweden. From then on, Christianity became a major social actor, with more than eighty percent of Rwandans claiming to be affiliated to a church (Gatwa, 1999:1; cf. Gatwa and Karamaga, 1990).

Léon Classe, the Catholic Vicar Apostolic of Rwanda between 1922 and 1945, followed Lavigerie’s top-down vision of evangelization and established the church as a close ally of the colonial state and the Tutsi-dominated royal court (Carney, 2012:174). According to Horner (2014:9), “Converting the king and the ruling elite ensured that the rest of the population would follow suit. This approach, however, was not always met with enthusiasm from Rwandan chiefs. They tended to see the missionaries as threats to their regional power. Rwandan governmental leaders were hostile to the European presence”. In the first place, the coveted noble Tutsi, the court of Musinga and the queen mother were not interested in embracing the new religion. They feared that Christianity would destroy their sacred rites and they opposed baptism. (Benda, 2012:59-60). For this reason, top-down Tutsi evangelization did not succeed; hence, the first priests in Rwanda, and lay Christians to be converted to

23Lavigerie was convinced that once the elites were won over to the gospel, their subjects would follow suit. The best way to earn the chief’s favor was to trust them, take their power seriously and seduce them with gifts before finally introducing them to Christian doctrine. Lavigerie instructed the missionaries not to forget to point out to the local political elites that the Christian doctrine was in fact their ally because it taught that they were the true representatives of God on earth in secular matters. In this case, the ruling elites were the primary targets of the missionaries’ efforts and attention. With assiduity, they courted them, keeping the friendliest rapport with them and working ceaselessly for their conversion (Benda, 2012:59).
Christianity came from lower class Hutu peasants and poor petit Tutsi. At the same time, the first Rwandan Christians were referred to as inyangarwanda, literally meaning “haters or repudiators of Rwanda” —not exactly the term one would associate with top-down evangelization (Carney, 2016:3).

The colonial governors and missionaries were dissatisfied with king Musinga, who remained hesitant of the Christian mission. King Musinga had no place in the emerging Belgian-Catholic order because he was very committed to traditional religion and Rwandan sovereignty (Carney, 2011:62). Consequently, in 1931, the colonial governor dared to depose king Musinga for the sake of “material, moral and social progress” and had him replaced by his son, the catechumen Rudahirwa, who assumed the name Mutara IV. Rudahirwa started his reign as a Christian king and a Constantinian wave of conversion followed (Baur, 1994:454). The new cult gave the king and nobility a new legitimacy, switching the Mwami (king) from the focus of Imana’s divine power to the Christian king as God’s earthly representative. The new religion was accepted as a civic cult, and as such was not able to effect any substantial change in social behaviour, for in traditional Tutsi life a civic cult does not influence morals ((Baur, 1994:454).

In 1935, Classe believed that in order to establish a Christian kingdom in central Africa and reach Lavigerie’s dream “the catechumen king and the Christian chiefs are great forces for the mission”. Three years later, Classe stated, “Giving confidence to our Christian chiefs is the first duty of all of us” (cited in Carney, 2011:66). In the Rwandan context, elite opinion was an especially influential resource given a hierarchical society in which patrons brought clients with them into the church (Carney, 2011:66).

According to the Rwandan historian Paul Rutayisire, in 1943 king Rudahigwa, a replacement for his exiled father, was baptised. His baptism was followed by a wave of conversions, including those of chiefs and also resulted in the establishment of Catholicism as a state religion, especially after king Rudahigwa’s consecration of Rwanda to Christ the King (Rutayisire, 1987:321-346).
In 1946, Rudahirwa, dedicating Rwanda solemnly to Christ the King, addressed himself to the Lord Jesus, saying:

Lord Jesus, it is you who have formed our country. You have given us a long line of kings to govern in your place, even though we did not know you. When the time fixed by your Providence had arrived. You have been made known. You have sent us your apostles; they have opened to us the light...Now that we know you, we recognize publicly that you are our Lord and our King (cited by Carney, 2011:71).

Rwanda is a remarkable example of Africa’s mass conversions in the 1930s and 1950s. Baur argues that the factors facilitating this extraordinary event were first (at least for Rwanda), the positive example set by the Mwami (king) in whom the creator God (Imana) was in a special way present; second, the thirst for education that led to power and progress; and third, an almost complete absence of polygamy. There are some theological and missiological effects related to mass conversion. According to Baur (1994:453), “The effect of the mass conversions was, in the first place, a “mass-church” in which the priest had no time for pastoral care. The people remained in their ancient social old habits and the solutions to social problems were postponed to a future time. Secondly, mass conversion created a quasi-established church in which bishops enjoyed all the privileges and influenced all sectors of life, especially education”.

In addition, Sylvester Kahakwa (2010:79), a theologian, minister and missiologist from Tanzania, affirms that the conversion of the kings led to the conversion of the people to the king’s religion. Mass positive response to the king’s conversion was rooted in the faithfulness of his subjects, who did not want to refuse to follow their king. Such a refusal would be as anathema as committing the crime of incest. Therefore, Gatwa (2005:90) clearly affirms the conversion to Catholicism of the young, new king and ruling class produced a psychological impact on the masses who followed his example.

According to Gatwa (2005:90), there was a common perception that the king had ordered his subjects to convert to Catholicism. This sudden mass conversion was referred to as a “tornado” in the missionary literature. Gatwa (2005:90) argues, “For
some scholars, the tornado was considered as the greatest Catholic missionary
to the continent—a miracle, ‘the hand of God on earth discovered by
Europeans’. Others described the movement as the spirit blowing a tornado from
above”. In fact, the conversion of the king of Rwanda (C) caused the people to be
baptised in the masses (M), and as a result, Rwanda became known as the most
Christian country in Africa (O).

These conversions, however, were not the result of a profound faith; the missionaries
were only interested in baptising as many people as possible (Rutayisire, 1987:328-
33). This baptism of the new king marked a milestone when many people turned to
Catholicism out of mere opportunism, a movement that came to be known as “the
word of the king”, irivuze Umwami, or simply “toe the line of the leader”. The
Protestant churches also gained some momentum with the outbreak of the East
African revival in 1936 that spread from Gahini (from the Anglican Church in
Rwanda) and reverberated within and far beyond the borders of the country (WCC,
2004:54).

Like Rutayisire, Niwagila (1991:159), a Tanzanian Lutheran theologian, adds:
“Where the kings had accepted the Gospel, there was more response to baptism”.
However, theologically and missiologically speaking, Niwagila is right when he
exposes the weakness of this model of conversion. Rather than converting out of
sincere belief, he indicates that many are baptised following the religion of their king
or the head of the household or any other important person in their society. In such
cases, conversion leads to a religion that does not necessarily touch the heart of the
individual but demands obedience to a civic authority (Niwagila, 1991:159).

Accordingly, Rutayisire (1987) critically comments that in the case of Rwanda, there
was an increase in the number of geographical centres for disseminating Christianity,
as well as an increase in church personnel. In these circumstances, the evangelisation
could not reach the hearts of the people; it was superficial. This quantitative rather
than qualitative growth became another source of future disaster (Rutayisire,
1987:333-336; Ndahiro, 2014:2). This superficial Christianity in Rwanda, according
to Rutayisire, and in my view as well, might be one of the factors that contributed to
the mass participation of Rwandan Christians in killings during the 1994
Unlike Rutayisire, Longman does not agree with the idea of superficial Christianity. For Longman (2010:10), “Christian involvement in the genocide cannot reasonably be attributed to insufficient conversion. Rather, something in the nature of Christianity in Rwanda made it unable or unwilling to restrain genocide. The Christian message received in Rwanda was not one of “love and fellowship,” but one of obedience, division, and power”.

As already noted by Hiebert in section 4.2 above, conversion in Africa meant getting jobs, obtaining status and gaining power without abandoning any old beliefs. Like Hiebert, Longman (2001) also notes that in Rwanda, people joined the church for the resources and power gains rather than spiritual enrichment.

Missionaries in Rwanda sought to attract converts not simply through the power of their message, but also through various material incentives. Both Catholic and Protestant missionaries established schools and health centres, introduced new crops and farming techniques, and began money-making projects to attract public interest. Hence, from the inception of Christianity in Rwanda, local parishes were much more than spiritual centres. Churches possessed substantial independent resources, which they distributed in a similar manner as the chiefs, obtaining support from the population by providing them with consumer goods, seeds, health care, and other amenities (Longman, 2001:170).

Furthermore, Longman (2001:170) points out, “People sought to employment within the churches as priests, catechists, teachers, or lay leaders because it brought not only social status, but also power in the form of influence over the distribution of resources and opportunities”. Consequently, conversion to Christianity became a means of material gain. Buit (2011:32) observes, “Unintentionally, missionaries confirmed these ideas. Many converts benefited from the fact that mission stations quickly became commercial centers”. In reference to Rutayisire, Buit (2011:33) further asserts that conversion to Christianity became particularly lucrative for Tutsi. This is because “the missionaries provided education for young Tutsi students and helped them to gain important positions in the colonial bureaucracy. Many young Tutsi turned to Catholicism to get a job within the Belgian administration. The mission schools became the key to the conversion of the Tutsi elite”.

Gatwa (2005:98) agrees with this view when he quotes Father Sibomana (1997):
The Catholic Church was the first beneficiary of the evolution. Under the authority of Mg. Class, it became the first power in the land; the first employer, the first landowner, the first purveyor in education and health care; as an ecclesiastical institution, it developed in perfect harmony with the colonial authority. The church in Rwanda was growing beyond all expectations, in comparison with what was happening in other colonies, all because Belgium was a Catholic monarchy.

Indeed, “Churches as they developed in colonial Rwanda were centers of political contestation where people struggled for influence and access to resources” (Longman, 2001:170). The next section discusses the role of the missionaries in introducing ethnic ideology, which culminated in the 1994 genocide.

4.4.1 Role of missionaries in ethnic ideology
Given the close relationship of the missionaries to political power in Rwandan history, it is no surprise that we would find the missionaries to be complicit in the development of ethnic ideology. This section argues that the link between church mission and ethnic ideology can be explained according to three factors. These are:

Firstly, like the colonial government the missionaries held two convictions from the beginning: on the one hand, the theory of a Hamitic race, and on the other, the need for an elite from that Tutsi community that could assist them in promoting Western civilisation (Gatwa, 2005:67). The close link between the colonial authorities and the missionaries were the result of a formal co-operation through which the colonisers enrolled the missionaries in promoting and propagating the idea of a “superior race” and other matters (Gatwa, 2005:67).

Secondly, missionaries had been contributors during the colonial period in the consolidation of Tutsi power and the replacement of the king. Conversely, after independence, as Longman (2001:171) indicated, “They played an important part in the consolidation of Hutu power, and the new president was once again a leader hand-picked by Catholic Church officials. The missionaries changed their dominant loyalty from Tutsi to Hutu but continued to engage overtly in ethnic politics”.

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Finally, missionaries introduced the kind of historical and anthropological study popular at the time, which allowed for the construction of ethnic identities where previously there had been none. This pseudo-academic work progressively turned into ethnic ideology (Ndahiro, 2014). Later, the post-independence churches in Rwanda inherited and adopted these views from the missionaries.

In the light of the role of missionaries in ethnic ideology in Rwanda, Longman (1997:5) summarises their roles in the following way:

Missionaries played a primary role in creating ethnic myths and interpreting Rwandan social organization— not only for colonial administrators, but ultimately for the Rwandan population itself. The concepts of ethnicity developed by the missionaries served as a basis for the German and Belgian colonial policies of indirect rule, which helped to transform relatively flexible pre-colonial social categories into clearly defined ethnic groups. Following independence, leaders who were trained in church schools relied extensively on ethnic ideologies to gain support, thus helping to intensify and solidify ethnic divisions.

Carney (2012:173) therefore affirms, “The Catholic missionaries’ racializing of the Hutu-Tutsi distinction ensured the long-term division of Rwanda society along a tribal axis”.

As indicated in section 3.5, the post-colonial era was marked by different massacres against the Tutsi. How did the missionaries respond to this violence? Carney (2011) recalls that Mgr. André Perraudin (Mgr or Bishop), a Catholic leader, described the 1959 and 1962 massacres organized by local Parmehutu as “popular rage” and “violent reactions of the population”. The root of the problem in this interpretation lay with recalcitrant Tutsis’ failure to embrace the new Parmehutu government. As a result, Tutsi victims were blamed for their own suffering. During the Gikongoro massacres, for example, Vatican Radio broadcast referred to it as “the most terrible, systematic genocide since the genocide of the Jews by Hitler”. To this, Perraudin and the White Fathers reacted by sending a message to the Vatican Radio broadcast to defend themselves and Kayibanda’s government. Perraudin also sent a protest telegram to the Vatican disputing the broadcast’s usage of the term “genocide,” explaining that the Gikongoro massacre did not represent a systematic government
plot to eliminate the Tutsi. “To speak of genocide without having proof in hand is a
gravely reckless judgment…The comparison with Hitler is monstrous and gravely
offensive for the head of a Catholic state” (Carney, 2011:364,365, 367).

Carney commented that throughout history, ethnic ideology has been embedded in the
mind-set of Catholic leaders. He argues that Perraudin’s basic conceptual paradigms
from the early 1960s remained in place in the early 1990s, namely, his dualistic and
racialist vision of Rwandan society, and pro-Hutu analytical partisanship. In April
1994, when he was in Switzerland, Perraudin offered an unqualified condemnation of
the massacres, exhorting Rwandans to “stop, stop this escalation of horror! No more
war between you, nor ever more. Reconcile yourselves, love one another!” Yet while
denouncing the recent massacres committed by Hutu extremists, Perraudin also
expressed his empathy for the Hutu killers, “I condemn them but I try to understand.
They act out of anger and fear. By anger against the death of their president, Juvenal
Habyarimana…and by fear of returning to slavery” (cited in Carney, 2011:394).

The massacre that happened in the 1959 Hutu Revolution, proved how racial
categories was an essential factor in the Catholic Church’s thinking (Horner,
Parmehutu because their leaders offered rhetorical commitment to Catholic doctrine
and social teaching”. Consequently, missionaries were silent in the face of
Parmehutu’s ethnicist foundations and supporting of political violence.

In his book entitled, The Churches and Ethnic Ideology in Rwandan Crisis 1900-
1994, Gatwa (2005) further explains the role of the churches—Catholic and
Protestant—in the development of the ethnic ideology that led to the 1994 genocide.
He also exposes the extremely intimate relationship that existed between the
ecclesiastical hierarchy and the ruling administration, which ought to have prevented
the genocide. For Gatwa, the role of the missionaries is clearly seen in the promotion
of racial ideology through the “Hamite theory,” which made the Tutsi dominant and
the Hutu dominated. Both Catholic and Protestant churches accepted and promoted
this theory of racial supremacy. To explain the role of missionaries and their ethnic
ideologies, it is worthwhile quoting Gatwa (2001:128) once more:
The Germans believed that the Tutsi ruling class was a superior racial type who, because of its apparent “Hamitic” origins in the Horn of Africa, was more “European” than the Hutu. In the independence period, the Rwandan conflict developed into Tutsi-Hutu or Hamite-Bantu conflict, entailing exclusion, even amongst the members of the Church. The missionaries and Church leaders, Catholic as well as Protestants, adopted and followed this ethnically-based ideology in their dealings with their subjects.

In addition to the ‘Hamite myth,’ another ethnic ideology introduced by missionaries was the philosophy of “rubanda nyamwinshi,” a Kinyarwanda expression meaning ‘numerous people’ or ‘the unwashed masses,’ which politically came to mean “the Hutu majority.” This term, according to Gatwa (1999:362), “Was adopted by ethno-politicians after independence in order to express the power of the majority. However, its use implied the hidden meaning of the power of the Hutu (the majority) and the exclusion of the Tutsi (the minority) whose elite had just lost power”. Gatwa (2001) further demonstrates how the colonisers and the missionaries, owing to the political and cultural developments of the 1950s, changed from promoting the Tutsi supremacy into promoting a new master, the Hutu. This counter version of the supremacy ideology called for the rule of the majority “rubanda nyamwinshi”. In the same way, Ndahiro also indicates that “recurrent genocides in Rwanda since 1959 were meant to maintain the “Hutu majority” in power by killing the Tutsi. Distributive justice became equivalent to regional and ethnic quotas; and revolution came to mean legitimised genocide of the Tutsis. From the late 1950s, some concepts became distorted: thus democracy became mere majority rule” (Ndahiro, 2014:2).

During the 1950’s, the missionaries advocated for Hutu majority rule. What caused the missionaries to shift from the Tutsi domination to the Hutu rule? (Carney, 2012:193) Carney (2012) asserts, “Catholic missionaries downplayed anti-Tutsi violence not because they hated Tutsi; many of these same missionaries in fact welcomed thousands of Tutsi refugees to the grounds of their missions. Rather, missionaries feared that the Catholic Church would lose institutional privileges if it critiqued the emerging Hutu government’s complicity in the violence”. However, Gatwa (1999:357) believes that “…the change of alliance was due rather to a desire on the church’s part to anticipate the events from the perspective of inevitable political changes which were being strongly advocated in the UN and by the
influential Non-Aligned Movement together with the socialist block”. As a result, the Catholic Church remained silent while Tutsi who still lived in Rwanda suffered massive reprisals. The leadership of the Church did not raise its voice to address the structural and direct violence against the Tutsi that prevailed in Rwandan society (Buit, 2011:41).

Longman (2001:168) maintains, “Ethnicity was crucial element that affected missionary understandings of exactly who should be considered elite, and thus, who should be targeted for conversion and education”. Consequently, Longman (2001:169) notes, “Missionaries excluded Hutus from political opportunity and privileged the Tutsi because they believed in the natural superiority of the Tutsi. Churches accepted engagement in ethnic politics and discrimination as legitimate”.

Mafeza (2013:3) adds, “The missionaries used the colonial educational system in the country as “a divisive instrument” and stressed differences between Hutu and Tutsi pupils, putting them into categories in and out of school”. In a similar vein, Gatwa (1999:353) considers missionary schools as “wombs of racial ideology”. For Gatwa (1999), “Both missionary schools and the catechumenate have been used to shape a model of society based on Hamite supremacy. These schools aimed at preparing a local elite to be auxiliaries to the colonial administration”. Gatwa recalls the 1927 colonial report as follows:

With the Batutsi Christians the missionaries hope to achieve the creation and formation of a social elite that is pro-European. Such an elite is needed. Christianity will provide it. Cardinal Lavigerie repeated to the missionary societies of Africa that it was necessary to give a firm foundation: that foundation rests on our civilization, namely Christianity. If this did not happen the Negroes would not understand the civilization which is its offspring (cited by Gatwa, 1999:353).

To the above ends, the Catholic Church is accused of “not only having been the vehicle of the ideology of the genocide but also of having engaged in a revisionist process” (Gatwa, 1999:349).

To summarise this section, the role of missionaries in sowing the seed of ethnic ideology can be classified into the following four main points: (1) Catholic
missionaries transformed relatively flexible pre-colonial social categories of Hutu and Tutsi into fixed ethnic groups. (2) Missionaries promoted the racial ideology of the “Hamite theory,” which made the Tutsi dominant and the Hutu dominated. (3) During independence, the missionaries switched from promoting Tutsi supremacy to supporting Hutu rule under the logic of “rubanda nyamwinshi”. This shift in missionary support led to the Hutu revolution of 1959. (4) Missionary schools promoted and increased the ethnic divisions in Rwanda. Therefore, missionaries and the mission of the churches have been criticized because of their visible role in introducing and furthering ethnic ideology. This discussion brings us to the next section, which focuses on ethnic ideology in the post-independence church.

4.5 Ethnic ideology in the post-independence church

In this section, the study argues that churches in Rwanda inherited and adopted the missionaries’ views of ethnic ideology. Churches allied themselves with the Hutu-led government, rarely criticizing the government for the many abuses it committed. Even Rwandan church leaders adopted and followed this ethnically-based ideology in their dealings with their subjects. This section focuses on churches-state relationships in Rwanda. After independence, the Rwandan churches also gained autonomy from the structures of the mission churches, but the new Rwandan-led churches retained many ways of thinking from their colonial-missional heritage. These ways of thinking influenced the relations between Rwandan churches and the post-colonial Rwandan state. It is argued, “Church involvement in the genocide can be explained in part because of this link between church and state and the acceptance of ethnic discrimination among church officials” (Longman, 2001:163). Thus, the next section focuses on the relationships between the churches and the state in Rwanda. This includes exploring how church leaders became prominent public figures closely associated with and supportive of the political regime.

4.5.1 Church-state relationship in Rwanda

It was indicated in section 4.2 that Western missionaries understood the gospel as part of Western civilization. In this regard, developing a Christian civilization required a close link between the church and state. In this respect, over time, the tight links
between the Catholic Church and the colonial powers led to intimate relations between the Rwandan church and the post-colonial state (Carney, 2011:90; Buit, 2011:33, 45). Consequently, church leaders were actively involved in political institutions, which later became one of the factors that contributed to the ethnic ideology that led to the 1994 genocide (Longman, 2001:166).

Church leaders, according to Longman (2001:164,166), were closely linked with the state and involved in battles over state power. The leaders of the Catholic, Anglican, Presbyterian and Baptist churches were not only influential in in the political arena but they were also close associates of President Habyarimana and his government, and local pastors and priests were often closely allied with local burgomasters and communal councillors. As a result, church leaders supported the regime and added to its legitimacy.

Anne Kubai (2007b) agrees with this view. In her article, ‘Walking a Tightrope: Christians and Muslims in Post-Genocide Rwanda,’ she emphasises that “the Catholic Church became linked with the highest echelons of the state and completely enmeshed in Rwandan society from top to bottom” (Kubai, 2007b:219). Until he was forced to resign by the Vatican in 1985, the Catholic archbishop of Kigali, Vincent Nsengiyumva, for example, was a member of the Central Committee of the ruling party, the Mouvement Revolutionaire Nationale pour le Developpement (Revolutionary National Movement for Development, MRND), and he served as the personal confessor of Habyarimana’s wife. In the Anglican Church, both the Bishop of Kigali and the Bishop of Shyira (later named Archbishop) were vocal in their support for the regime (Longman, 2001:171; Linden, 1997:50).

During a 2004 World Council of Churches (WCC) conference in Kigali, church leaders from different countries in the world challenged pre-genocide relationship between the churches and the state in Rwanda:

[...]The church from the very beginning, particularly the Catholic Church had sided with the political regimes. The Roman Catholic Church seemed imbedded in the social and political fabric of Rwanda to such an extent that many analysts had difficulty dissecting the connections between the two. While the Protestant churches adopted a distant position, keeping away from what some missionaries
called “worldly matters” like involvement in politics. The end result is that the Church has been either too close to the system and has shared its fate, or too distant and has become a bystander. The different injustices, the plight of the Tutsi refugees in the settlements, the different crimes committed against the Tutsi or against the members of the first republic, were all overlooked and never challenged (WCC, 2004:54).

The prophetic voice of the church was either silenced by its close proximity to power or by keeping too great a distance from political matters. Therefore, the church became an accomplice to the whole system of impunity that led to genocide (WCC, 2004:54).

From a theological and missiological perspective, we can affirm that the church in Rwanda became excessively intertwined with the state. The Habyarimana regime felt it gained a degree of legitimacy from its association with the church. Consequently, the church is rightly criticized for having failed to publicly condemn ethnic ideology, discrimination and violence. The latter comment brings us to the next section, namely, the role of Rwandan churches in ethnic ideology and genocide.

4.5.2 Role of Rwandan churches in the endorsement of ethnic ideology

The Rwandan churches after independence not only retained a particular relation to political power from their missionary forbearers, but also retained the legacy of ethnic ideology. This section describes how ethnic ideology planted by missionaries was inherited and spread by the Rwandan church leaders, and thereafter, promoted and legitimised political regimes, which supported the racists.

In his contribution, ‘The Church’s Blind Eye to Genocide in Rwanda,’ Tom Ndahiro (2014), a former member of the Human Rights Commissioner in Rwanda, argues that in Rwanda, the leadership of the Christian churches, especially that of the Catholic Church, played a central role in the creation and furtherance of racist ideology. They fostered a system which Europeans introduced and encouraged by reconfiguring Rwandan society through the manipulation of ethnic identities (Ndahiro, 2014:1-2). Ndahiro (2005) then affirms that “there is no doubt that throughout the history of Rwanda, church leaders have had ties with political power. The church of Rwanda
was also involved in the policy of ethnic division, which degenerated into ethnic hatred24.

To add to the abovementioned discussion, Gerald van’t Spijker, a theologian and missionary from the Netherlands who worked in the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda, asks whether religion and the influence of the churches and church leaders have, in fact, fueled the genocide, or if Christian missionary activity was even the ultimate cause of the genocide? Effectively, van’t Spijker answers, it is argued that the presence of Christianity, more precisely the activities of the Roman Catholic Church, has not only contributed to the possibility of the genocide, but has been at the root of the political constellation that led to the genocide, and that during the genocide, Church leaders were actively involved in it. In many documents, he says, it is argued that the Rwandan genocide would never have taken place if Christian missions, particularly those of the Roman Catholic Church, had not been established in Rwanda (van’t Spijker, 2014: 340).

Buit (2011), in his thesis, ‘God spends the day elsewhere, but He sleeps in Rwanda: About Catholicism, conflict and peace in Rwanda,’ offers an interesting perspective on the role of the Catholic Church in ethnic ideology by comparing the involvement of the church to the stages of genocide, as described by Stanton (see section 3.6). In parallel ways, the church paved the way for genocide. For instance: (1) The church had a large share in the formation of the ethnic identity of Hutu and Tutsi. (2) It contributed to the classification of Rwanda’s people into Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. (3) The Church promoted a history of Rwanda that pictured Tutsi as rulers and Hutu as servants. (4) The leadership of the Church supported the state that eventually turned into a genocidal power. (5) In the aftermath of the genocide, the leadership of the Church denied any responsibility for the massacres (Buit, 2011:112-113).

The analysis of ethnic ideology with special reference to the role of the church is reflected in Hugh McCullum (1995)’s book called, *The Angels Have Left Us: The

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Rwanda Tragedy and the Churches. McCullum (1995) recalls Aaron Mugemera’s experience. When asked about the role of the church in the genocide, he accurately identified the underlying problem in the following lament:

Why did the message of the gospel not reach the people who were baptized? What did we lose? We lost our lives. We lost our credibility. We are ashamed. We are weak. But most of all, we lost our prophetic mission. We could not go to the president and tell him the truth because we had become sycophants to the authorities. We have had killings here since 1959. No one condemned them. During the First Republic, they killed slowly, slowly, but no one from the churches spoke out. No one spoke on behalf of those killed. During the Second Republic there were more killings and more people were tortured and raped and disappeared; and we did not speak out because we were afraid, and because we were comfortable (cited in McCullum, 1995:75).

Thus, we can hear in Mugemera’s lamentation the echo of another man who suffered greatly in his own fight against injustice, Beyers Naudé (1995):

How is it possible that our preaching was so ineffective, that our actions were so timid, that we did so little to ease the pain of the victims, to confront the rulers of the country, the exponents of the ideology of apartheid?” (Naudé (1995), cited by Meiring, 2005:157).

Naudé, like Mugemera, saw his church failing to confront a fundamental ethnic ideology, which undergirded the whole of his society. It does seem that Mugemera expressed the fear that ran through the church as well as its uncomfortably close association with the political power in Rwanda (Horner, 2014:21). He attributes the genocide to the ethnic tensions among church leaders. Instead of healing these ethnic tensions, the churches rather accommodated them (McCullum, 1995:75, 78).

4.6 The involvement of Rwandan Christians in the genocide

This section analyses the involvement of the Rwandan church in the genocide by asking the question: “To what extent can the church be held responsible for its involvement in the events of 1994?” In his doctoral research conducted in Rwanda on the topic: ‘Religion in the Remaking of Rwanda after genocide,’ Bazuin (2013) highlights three reasons that explain the involvement of the Rwandan church in the

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25Aaron Mugemera is a Tutsi Presbyterian Church minister, who watched as his wife and six children were slaughtered in front of him.
genocide: Firstly, the genocide took place in what has been called the most Christian country in Africa, one in which over 90% of the population professed membership in a variety of Christian denominations. Secondly, some of the leaders of the genocide were also religious leaders, priests, pastors and nuns. Moreover, many of the killings were conducted in churches, as these locations had served as sanctuaries during periods of past violence. Thirdly, religious institutions and leaders did relatively little to use their power to either save people or condemn the genocide (Bazuin, 2013:52). Bazuin (2013:53-56) offers a remarkable perspective on church involvement in the genocide in the following points: (1) Christians as killers, (2) churches as sites of genocide, and (3) churches failing to prevent genocide.

1) By Christians as killers, Bazuin (2013) indicates that many of the people who participated in the genocide were Christian. Although statistics have not been collected on the religious affiliation of people who have been accused, the religious demographics of Rwanda at the time means that the vast majority of those implicated in the genocide were Christian. Some of the most high-profile participants in the genocide were religious leaders—both ordained clergy and lay leaders. The Catholic parish priest of Kaduha, for example, led groups of killers to seek out people in hiding throughout parish buildings and in the grounds. The priest at Nyange paid a roadwork crew to bulldoze his church in order to kill the thousands of people who had taken refuge there (Bazuin, 2013:54). As Des Forges (1999:359) pointed out, “Some clergy, Rwandan and foreign, turned away Tutsi who sought their protection. Some clergy and other religious persons have been accused of having incited genocide, delivered victims to the killers or even of having killed themselves”.

It is essential to be reminded that, on the other hand, religious leaders were also targets of the killings, and some risked a great deal to shelter all the people they could. A small number of people sacrificed their own lives in an attempt to protect people who were targeted for death (Bazuin, 2013:54). In reference to Gourevitch (1999), Bazuin recalls that religious leaders at the Catholic schools at Ndera near Kigali and in Gisenyi who otherwise would have been spared were killed because of their attempts to save people.
Sometimes this resistance was somewhat more effective, as the priest in charge of the Pastoral Center at Saint Paul managed to save many people’s lives who had taken shelter in his facility (Bazuin, 2013:55). Lowe (2008:4) affirms, “Without a doubt, Rwandan clergy displayed many acts of courage and heroism during the 100 days of slaughter”. Despite the silence of many clergy, as Des Forge (1999) puts it, some did defend Tutsi, even at the risk of their own lives. Bishop Frédéric Rubwejanga went to the local military camp to ask for protection for Tutsi attacked at the St. Joseph Centre in Kibungo. A Hutu sister, Felicitas Niyitegeka, is well recognized for her courageous action to oppose the genocide. At the beginning of the genocide, she gave shelter to many Tutsi in Gisenyi, and then helped them across the border to Zaire to get refuge. Her brother, Col. Alphonse Nzungize, who commanded the nearby Bigogwe military camp, heard that she was threatened with death for her work and asked her to give it up. She refused. On April 21 she was taken to a cemetery for execution along with forty-three persons, including other religious sisters and Tutsi who had sought refuge with them. She refused to abandon the others even after thirty prisoners were slain. She was then shot and thrown naked with the others into the common grave (Des Forges, 1999:360).

2) Churches as sites of genocide are another factor that show the involvement of the church in genocide. As already noted, many people were killed in religious buildings across Rwanda. This is because in the massacres of 1959 and 1960s, churches had served as effective places of refuge (Rutayisire, 1995:115). Unfortunately, in 1994, the killers did not respect the sanctuary offered by the churches. At two sites south of Kigali, Ntarama and Nyamata, the killers surrounded the church buildings while people barricaded themselves inside. They broke holes into the walls and tossed in grenades, whereupon the people inside were hacked to death with machetes (Bazuin, 2013:55-56). At the Roman Catholic parish of Cyahinda (Butare), Longman (1997:5) recalls, “The burgomaster subsequently personally supervised gendarmes and civilian militia who surrounded the parish complex and, over a four-day period, systematically slaughtered more than 20,000 people. The church sanctuary,
the last building to be attacked, still bears the marks of bullets and grenades and the stains of blood and brains on its floors and walls”. These scenes repeated themselves at multiple other sites in Rwanda in the Catholic as well as Protestant church buildings.

3) The final element regarding the churches’ involvement in genocide is their simple failure to prevent the genocide. Apart from active participation, religious leaders and institutions either failed to use their considerable power to condemn the genocide or else deliberately minimised the violence to the benefit of the genocidal regime. Several high ranking clergy, according to Bazuin (2013:56), served as effective mouthpieces for the genocidal regime. They justified the violence by saying that the government had been attacked first, and they completely denied that civilians were being deliberately targeted (Bazuin, 2013:56).

Grey (2007:24), in his book To Rwanda and Back: Liberation, Spirituality and Reconciliation, also agrees that “the role of the church is visible, traceable and real in the making of the genocide”. For Martin (1995:1-3), “There is no escape from the truth that the Christian church has been a player in the tragic events in Rwanda which have horrified observers throughout the world in 1994. Churches have been the scenes of massacres and the church leaders acquiesced to hideous cruelty”. McCullum (1995:68) correctly observes that the church in Rwanda could have been used to save many people who were killed during the genocide. The church knew of the impending disaster and could have stopped it: “Church pulpits could have provided an opportunity for almost the entire population to hear a strong message that could have prevented the genocide. Instead the leaders remained silent”. In the past, churches have been places of refuge for those threatened with violence. Conversely, in 1994, churches became chambers of death, and perpetrators of the massacres. People who sought sanctuary in church buildings were instead slaughtered there (Rutayisire, 1995:15-16).

Equally important, Longman (2001:163) echoes the same standpoint by affirming that:
Christian churches were deeply implicated in the 1994 genocide of ethnic Tutsi in Rwanda. Churches were a major site for massacres, and many Christians participated in the slaughter, including church personnel and lay leaders. Thousands of Tutsi sought refuge in Catholic and Protestant parishes. But death squads surrounded the churches and systematically slaughtered the people within, tossing grenades through church widows, firings into the crowds with rifles, then finishing off the survivors with machetes, pruning hooks, and knives.

In addition, Longman (2001:163) quotes a human rights group who claimed that “…more Rwandese citizens died in churches and parishes than anywhere else” (African Rights, 1995:865). However, for some Rwandans, “the country’s churches stand as reminders of the violence that decimated their families. The image of bodies piled at the altar does not easily fade from the minds of those who survived the carnage” (Longman, 2001:163-4). Similarly, McCullum (1995:66) also declares that it is clear that the genocide shook the very foundations of the churches, because “none remained without blood on its hands”. Some people wish to remain Christians; others view the old churches as gravesites rather than places of worship.

For that reason, the involvement of Rwandan churches in their ethnic ideology and its genocide support did not only affect the social life of the people, but also their spiritual life. After the 1994 genocide, many people inside the church and outside the country struggled to understand the involvement of Rwanda’s churches in the genocide. Martin (1995) asks: “So how is it that a Christian country deeply affected by the revival should have perpetrated a holocaust of ethnic purification in the same league as the former Yugoslavia?” After the genocide, many people stopped going to church, others moved from the mainline churches to new denominations that claimed non-involvement in the killings. Many do not trust pastors, priests and the church of Rwanda because of their complicity in the genocide.

This has resulted in a missiological challenge as it has affected the mission of the Rwandan church. Citing Kubai (2007b), Buit (2011:100) is right when he maintains that the religious demography in Rwanda changed after the genocide. Protestants churches, for example, surged by nearly twenty percent in half a decade, while the number of Catholics declined by nearly eight percent during the same period. Buit explains that some left the church because they were disappointed with its leaders.
Others were haunted with memories about the things that happened in their local churches during the genocide. Karasira Venuste, one of the tens of thousands who left the Catholic Church, explained to a reporter: “I no longer go to Mass because of what I saw and heard’. The killers yelled: ‘Even God has forsaken you’. ‘I no longer see the church as a holy place’” (cited by Buit, 2011:100). Longman also reports an interview with a Rwandan woman who told him: “I was a Presbyterian before the genocide. But I cannot go back to the church now. Not after what happened there. Not after what church people did” (Longman, 2001:163). It is, therefore, not surprising that many Rwandans turned to new charismatic communities.

Another effect caused by the church’s involvement in the genocide is the fact that the leadership of the church lost its credibility; hence, the church lost its identity of being ‘salt and light’ in the world. It seems as if the 1994 genocide affected Rwandans’ faith in God. The most unanswered question asked by the Rwandan people is: “Where was God during the genocide, and why did God allow it to happen? They believed: “Imana yirirwa ahandi igataha i Rwanda,” which means “God spends the day elsewhere, but He sleeps in Rwanda”. However, by that time, many Rwandans thought of their ancient saying and whispered that God had been asleep during the genocide (Buit, 2011:3). Many people have wondered “how such carnage could have taken place in one of Africa’s most Christian countries” (Longman, 2001:164).

According to Ndahiro (2004:1), for Jean-Pierre Karegeya (1999), the genocide is defined as “morally hideous, an evil expressed in forgetting God, and hence, a new form of atheism”. Ndahiro repeats Karegeya’s questions as follows:

Christians killing other Christians? How could Rwandan Christians who manifested commitment to their faith have acted with such intense cruelty? How did ordinary people come to commit extraordinary evil…? Does the sin of genocide disturb the relationship between God and the perpetrators in official Catholic Church discourse? How can we explain the strange situation of priests involved in the crimes of genocide who are still running parishes in Western countries? Why are they protected by the Vatican against any legal proceedings?” He concludes: “The church’s attitude towards genocide seems to suggest that the hierarchy of religious values is not usually in proportion to the hierarchy of moral standards (Karegeya, 1999, cited by Ndahiro, 2014:1).

In fact, the Rwandan church is accused of participating in the genocide of 1994. This is due to the fact that church leaders were involved in ethnic ideology and failed to
prevent or to speak against violence and mass killings. The 1994 genocide against the Tutsi was a Rwandan tragedy but a universal failure. It was a failure in the ethics of Rwandan society and the Christian community.

4.7 Complicity and failure of the churches in the Rwandan genocide

The previous section highlighted the involvement of the churches by reflecting on the involvement of Christians in the killings, the churches being sites of genocide, and how churches failed to prevent the genocide. For this reason, this section exposes critics of the churches for its complicity and failure by asking questions such as how and why did the church remain passive whilst Hutu extremists and the Habyarimana regime perpetrated genocide against the Tutsi? What was the church’s role in terms of its actions and inaction during the genocide? What are the outcomes of church passivity?

According to Ndahiro (2014), the failure of the Rwandan churches is reflected in how the church leaders failed to speak out against racial discrimination as well as political and social injustices, and for not condemning the first mass killings or those that followed. He claims that leaders took the side of political regimes and consequently were unable to exercise the church’s prophetic voice. As a result, Longman (2001:166) vividly claims:

> Most critics have condemned the churches not for their actions but rather for their inaction, for not doing more to halt the bloodshed. Churches are accused of ‘sins of omission’, failing to act in the face of evil, rather than actively supporting or facilitating the genocide. Rwanda’s Christian churches were implicated in the violence not simply because they failed to prevent it, nor even because they legitimised the regime that carried out the genocide. Instead, churches helped make genocide possible by making ethnic violence understandable and acceptable to the population.

Like Ndahiro and Longman, McCullum (1995:69) also stresses, “Rwanda’s church leaders were cautious to the point of missing the prophetic and pastoral calling rooted

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26 As stated by Gatwa Tharcisse (n. d) when he was the General Secretary of the Council of Protestant Churches in Rwanda. In Churches and Reconciliation in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda Delegations of Norwegian Church Aid, Churches of East DRC and the Council of Protestant Churches in Rwanda. Viewed from: http://www.cpr-rwanda.org/documents. [Date accessed: 13 April 2014].
in biblical and church imperatives to speak justice in all seasons”. Additional critiques are highlighted by Rutayisire, who faults church leaders for keeping quiet when they were supposed to speak, and for speaking out when it would have been better for them to remain silent. The Christians who were born again (abarokole) were so heavenly minded that they forgot their role and responsibility of being salt and light in the world (Rutayisire, 1998:114-115). Prunier (1995:250) also challenges the churches in Rwanda for being bystanders. For him, the church leaderships were at best useless and at worst accomplices in the genocide.

Both the Roman Catholic and Protestant church leaders remained silent in the face of injustice, unwilling to exert the authority of their positions in the moral vacuum within Rwandan society in Habyarimana’s last years. Their statements during the genocide and in the chaos that followed were inadequate and insignificant. For this silent acquiescence and lack of courage, the churches in Rwanda lost their relevancy in the society. They will continue to live under a cloud of suspicion for years to come. Meanwhile, the church internationally was unable or unwilling to provide anything like the unquestioning support and solidarity it gave for more than twenty-five years to the victims of apartheid in South Africa (McCullum, 1995:66). Rwanda illustrates the ambiguous position of Christianity in African political regimes where prophetic voices have been silenced (Gatwa, 2005:138).

In the words of Archbishop Desmond Tutu (1995):

The story of Rwanda shows both sides of our humanity. The churches were sometimes quite superb in what they did in the face of intimidation and at great cost to themselves. But there were other times when [they] failed dismally and seemed to be implicated in ways that have left many disillusioned, disgruntled and angry with the churches and their leadership, many have been alienated and feel badly betrayed (quoted by McCullum, 1995:ix).

Though Tutu laments the failure and the complicity of the churches in the Rwanda genocide, he still believes that the church can be involved in the ministry of healing, restoration, forgiveness and costly reconciliation.

In short, Longman (1997:10) summarizes the complicity of Rwanda’s Christian churches in the 1994 genocide by saying that “the churches actively shaped the ethnic
and political realities that made genocide possible by acting to define and politicize ethnicity, legitimizing authoritarian regimes, and encouraging public obedience to political authorities”. Indeed, church leaders firstly failed to use their influence to condemn injustice, violence and killings perpetrated against the Tutsi. Secondly, churches failed to provide a theological guideline of ethnicity and failed to find a Christian common identity in Christ for both Hutu and Tutsi. Thirdly, they sided with political regimes, and consequently, were unable to exercise the church’s prophetic voice. All of these failures can be attributed to the church’s captivity to ethnic ideology. In the next section, we will explore how this ideology was manifested through discrimination and exclusion in the church, even prior to 1994.

4.8 Discrimination and exclusion in the Rwandan church

Ethnic ideology within the church after independence is evident in the church’s participation in the broader societal discrimination and exclusion of Tutsi. Such discrimination, just as one could find outside the church, was also common in the Rwandan church. The church was assumed to be the only institution where Tutsi could have some sort of a career. But due to structural discrimination, they never made it to the most important positions in the community (Buit, 2011:110; Longman, 1995:19). Tutsi could become pastors and priests, but no leadership position was offered to them. In 1994, for example, there was not a single church leader from a Tutsi background in the Protestant churches. Within the Catholic Church, on the eve of the 1994 tragedy, three diocesan bishops out of nine had a Tutsi background. This absence of inclusiveness in the churches might have had political implications, in that sympathy with the rulers of a similar group identity could go unchallenged (Gatwa, 2005:137).

The Rwandan president, Juvénal Habyarimana, who took power in 1973, continued a discriminatory system that banned all Tutsis from working in the army, civil service and professional jobs (Wallis, 2006:1). He installed the policy known as regional and ethnic equilibrium. It established quotas for ethnic groups and regions proportional to their representation in the population. This policy affected access to jobs and education in the public and private sectors. The Hutu from the north, whom the
regime claimed had been historically disfavoured, received the vast majority of opportunities. The Tutsi were awarded a quota of 9% in most areas (Melvern, 2000:22). There were no Tutsi prefects or bourgmestres (mayors), only one Tutsi minister, two Tutsi members of parliament out of seventy, and one Tutsi officer in the army (Melvern, 2004:12; Prunier, 1995:75).

According to Mafeza (2013:4), in the 1970s, a racial discrimination termed “équilibre éthnique et régional” (ethnic and regional equilibrium, a quota system) was introduced. It required the educational system to reflect the theoretical ethnic composition of the country: 90% for the Hutu, 9% for the Tutsi, and 1% for the Twa population. In 1982 to 1983, for example, only 28 of 424 students (6.6%) at the National University of Rwanda (NUR) in Butare were Tutsi. This discriminatory policy in the educational system intensified division and hatred among Rwandans.

The quota system was advocated by Catholic priests in April 1972. This discriminatory policy had long been introduced in the seminaries within the Catholic Church. According to Fr. Jean Ndolimana (1994), as quoted by Ndahiro (2014:5), the enrolment of Tutsis in the Nyundo diocese was limited to 4%. On the school card, every seminarian had to indicate his father’s ethnic group. The Church fully supported the quota system, as expressed in the Bishops’ letter of 28 February 1990:

“…One hears, at times, people complain that due to their ethnic origin, employment or admission to school has been refused them. They are either deprived of an advantage, or justice has not been impartial in its treatment towards them…You do not ignore the fact that the law of ethnic balance in employment and schools is aiming to correct this inequality that favoured one, to the detriment of the other. It is evident that such policy cannot please everybody, and is unable to produce all the results they were hoping to gain (Ndahiro, 2014:5).

The above statement shows the mind and attitude of church leaders, and how they contributed to a discriminatory policy and taught their church members to accept a morally condemnable policy. The church, as Ndahiro (2014:5) puts it, “Regrettably took the side of the political regimes, and thereby could not exercise its prophetic role. It did not denounce political and social injustices, nor did it condemn the first mass killings, nor those which followed”.
In Kranish’s (2010) words, Mafeza (2013:4) argues, “It was not only the structure of the education system that reinforced division, but also the content. The teaching of the false history of the differences between Hutus and Tutsi inflamed ethnic hatred and violence that eventually culminated in the 1994 genocide”.

Ndahiro (2014:8) points out how Bishop Focas Nikwigize of Ruhengeri was unequivocal in supporting the ideology of exclusion and genocide. Even after the genocide, in reference to the 1990 RPF invasion, Nikwigize (1995) told a Belgian newspaper the following:

The Batutsi would like to restore their power and to reduce the Bahutu to slaves! Their objective was to take Kigali by force, whatever the cost; not to share power, but to govern. In order to fulfil this objective they used two sorts of weapons: their guns, which came from Europe, and their women. They gave their women to Europeans and so remained in a strong alliance with them. That is how bad they are! A Muhutu is simple and right but a Mututsi is cunning and hypocritical. They seem fine, polite and charming, but when the time comes, they force themselves on you. A Mututsi is deeply bad, not because of her education, but because of her nature (Nikwigize (1995), cited in Ndahiro, 2014:8).

These declarations, as Ndahiro (2014) asserts, bear witness to the racist stereotypes of this priest towards the Tutsi. Considering a people as naturally bad is similar to the explanation used by the Nazis to justify the extermination of Jews in order to maintain the purity of the Aryan race. This justifies the claim made by Rev. Jorg Zimmerman, “What I witnessed was a sort of collective psychological repression phenomenon. Rwanda has to be re-evangelised and quite differently if we do not want such carnages to come back regularly. But unfortunately, the minds are not ripe yet” (cited by Prunier, 1995:251). The church, however, chose to remain silent and use slander as a defence mechanism.

It is difficult for institutions like the Catholic Church that are known to command respect worldwide to admit that they have been party to policies of racial discrimination and genocide (Ndahiro, 2014:10). This problem of not accepting the failure is reflected in the speech given by Pope John Paul II addressed to the Rwandan people in March 1996. He says: “The church cannot be held responsible for the guilt
of its members that have acted against the evangelic law; they will be called to render account of their own actions. All church members that have sinned during the genocide must have the courage to assume the consequences of their deeds they have done against God and fellow men” (cited by Ndahiro, 2014:10).

Although Ndahiro concludes that there is no doubt that church leaders have had ties with political power throughout the history of Rwanda, he still believes that the church in Rwanda has a mission of uniting people and can regain its credibility. In my opinion, I think that Ndahiro is right to suggest that the church must now change its vision regarding ethnic issues. If all Christians belong to the same family of God whose head is Jesus Christ, the message has to prevail that there are no more Hutu, Twa, and Tutsi—but simply “Ndi umunyarwanda,” which means “I am a Rwandan” (cf. section 5.4.1.2). Ndahiro (2014:12-13) thus emphasises that in order to restore church credibility, the church must contribute to the reconciliation process; hence, unity can be re-established among Rwandans, in general, and among Christians, in particular. It is the only way that the church can be a witness to truth and help the state to save Rwanda from future suffering and bloodshed.

4.9 Conclusion

The focus of this chapter was on Christian mission and ethnic ideology in the Rwandan church context. The intention of this chapter was not simply to explore the involvement of Rwandan churches in the genocide, but rather to critically evaluate how and why Christian churches in Rwanda made this involvement possible. The following three main arguments were presented in this chapter:

Firstly, European missionaries embraced Hamitic racial ideology, which was imposed on Rwandan society together with the artificial hardening of ethnic identities, making violent ethnically-based conflict far more likely than it otherwise would have been (Gatwa, 1999; 2005; Longman, 2007; Ndahiro, 2014; Bazuin, 2013). Catholic missionaries and lay elites, according to Carney (2012:177), propagated the Hamitic thesis, which became the foundation for future ethnic violence. Therefore, the
Catholic Church has been criticized for sowing the seeds of genocidal discourse in colonial Rwanda.

Secondly, the superficial faith of individuals also explains the mass participation of Rwandans in ethnic ideology and genocide. It was argued that Christianity, in the Rwandan context, became a religion that did not necessarily touch the heart of the convert but provided them with social and political motives for conversion (Niwagila, 1991:159; Rutayisire, 1989). Longman (1997:9) adds, “Despite the high rates of conversion and the magnitude of the churches’ presence in Rwanda, they lacked “intensive” power, having attracted many members for social and economic reasons without significantly shaping their beliefs”.

Thirdly, many scholars attribute the genocide to the church’s embrace of ethnic ideology. As a result, the complicity and failure of the church lies in its close tie to the political regime and its refusal to speak out against ethnic ideology and racial discrimination that led to the 1994 genocide (Linden, 1997; McCullum, 1995; Longman, 2001; Gatwa, 2005).

Despite the fact that Rwandan churches have been accused of active complicity in the genocide, today Rwandans continue to look toward the same Christian churches for guidance during the reconciliation process. This is a huge task considering the extent of the genocide Rwanda experienced and the broken relationships, wounds and trauma resulting from it. However, to address and deconstruct ethnic ideology would be difficult because even the church was ensnared by it. For these reasons the churches cannot shy away from their obligation to engage their members and communities, and fully participate in the reconciliation process. The next two chapters will discuss various efforts of reconciliation in the post-genocide era. Both chapters ask: “How can reconciliation efforts address ethnic ideology and the effects of genocide?” Chapter five focuses on the government’s initiatives of reconciliation and chapter six focuses on the efforts achieved by the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROCESS:
A RESPONSE TO THE EFFECTS OF GENOCIDE

5.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to describe the extent of the genocide’s impact on Rwanda, and the various government-organised attempts to bring about reconciliation. The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part analyses the impact the genocide had on the Rwandan society. Given that more than twenty years have passed since the genocide, we can now divide the consequences of the genocide into two phases: the short-term effects and the long-term effects. The short-term effects included the physical, psychological and economic devastation Rwanda faced in the immediate aftermath of the genocide. The long-term effects include the continuing legacy of these problems, as well as the recurring cycle of an ideology of ethnic division leading to hatred and the threat of future violence. Section 5.2 provides a brief background describing the short-term and long-term effects, which will be addressed by means of reconciliation. In the second part of this chapter, sections 5.3 and 5.4, the study will examine the Rwandan government’s various attempts to redress the effects of genocide, first by seeking justice, then by pursuing reconciliation.

As already noted in chapters 3 and 4, ethnic ideology was a colonial and missionary invention. After independence, it was hardened by Hutu political elites and used as an instrument to maintain their powers. Thereafter, this construction of ethnic ideology resulted in the 1994 genocide that left the Rwandan society fractured and relationships shattered. To address the problem of ethnic ideology and respond to the effects of the genocide, reconciliation is pivotal in restoring the broken relationships and building social cohesion between groups, as well as to prevent the desire for revenge.

Similar to the previous chapters, chapter 5 offers a realist review of the literature on interventions with the aim of identifying the different mechanisms at work across the
range of interventions, and thereby reach a deeper understanding. In this respect, this chapter employs the realist approach to explore and interpret the links between the contextual factors and mechanisms that contribute to outcomes (CMO). A realist approach highlights the importance of the context in which interventions are implemented and the different levels at which they operate. The purpose of this approach is to understand an intervention’s underlying theory of change by postulating mechanisms which are triggered by the interaction of the context and the intervention (Spangaro et al., 2015:1, 2). Therefore, using the realist approach to evaluate, it is argued that various effects caused by the 1994 genocide (C) triggered the Rwandan government and churches to initiate intervention programs for social reconciliation (M) with the aim of restoring broken relations and prevent future violence (O).

With regards to the abovementioned approach, chapter 5 examines a variety of initiatives and interventions that the Rwandan government used to deal with the past and promote reconciliation, for instance, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Tanzania, a traditional dispute resolution mechanism in the form of Gacaca (read: ga-cha-cha) trials, and the creation of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC). Furthermore, this chapter will broadly describe the Rwandan church’s response to genocide before looking more closely at the Presbyterian Church in chapter 6.

As we shall see in this chapter, the ICTR and the Gacaca courts were useful for addressing the short-term effects of the genocide, especially in bringing justice and stability, which would make reconciliation possible. The NURC, however, not only addressed the short-term effects of trauma but also attempted to address the long-term effects of the genocide by reshaping Rwandan identity. The work of Rwandan churches has complemented the NURC’s initiatives in this regard. The lessons from these attempts at deconstructing ethnic ideology in order to recapture a pre-colonial Rwandan identity will be useful in chapter 6 for evaluating the ministry of reconciliation within the Presbyterian Church of Rwanda.
5.2 The aftermath effects of the 1994 genocide

In July 1994, the invading RPF put an end to the genocide and installed a new Government of National Unity. However, due to the numerous effects of the genocide this government faced many challenges with few resources. The genocide that occurred was devastating, not only for the people of Rwanda, but also for the entire population. The purpose of this section is not just to list the effects of the 1994 genocide, but also to show how these triggered the Rwandan government to initiate intervention programs for social reconciliation with the aim of restoring broken relations and preventing future violence.

The immediate, short-term effects of the genocide were immense. The most obvious sign of the impact of the genocide was the complete absence of people. Furthermore, those who survived were severely traumatised. Buit (2011) outlines the effects of the 1994 genocide on the lives of the people. Of a population of almost 8 million people, about 1.1 million lost their lives during the genocide, the majority of whom belonged to the Tutsi group. About 2 to 3 million Rwandan refugees, mainly Hutus fearing reprisals, eventually fled to the neighbouring countries and followed their leaders into exile abroad. Many were taken as hostages by the ex-FAR (former Rwandan government forces) and interahamwe (militia who participated in the genocide). Most of them have settled in the neighbouring border regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burundi and Tanzania. In the aftermath of the genocide, about 1 million people were internally displaced. On the other hand, over half a million Tutsi refugees returned to Rwanda after decades of exile (Buit, 2011:77). In addition to the devastating effects on families and communities, these returnees were not accepted and integrated in the countries of their former refuge, which strengthened their identities as Tutsi from Rwanda (Staub et al., 2005:300).

The speed and ferocity with which the genocide was executed left the country almost entirely destroyed. Over a million people were brutally murdered, there were numerous unburied dead, the economy was completely destroyed, and there were no functioning state institutions remaining. Approximately 400,000 children were separated from their parents or orphaned. Moreover, the genocide left a legacy of
countless widows and widowers, thousands of handicapped people, and a very vulnerable population in its aftermath. Furthermore, 150,000 suspects of genocide were awaiting trials, and over 120,000 persons were detained in jails with very poor legal infrastructure and limited human resources (Mutamba & Izabiliza, 2005:10).

According to Huyse (2003:55), “Genocide causes immense suffering to all people, but it also has a different impact on men and women, because victimization is partly gender specific”. Rape was used as a weapon of destruction during the genocide. More than 250,000 women were raped and between 2,000 and 5,000 pregnancies resulted from war rape. Consequently, 66% of women who were raped tested positive for HIV and other infectious diseases. This situation had an impact not only on the physical well-being of women, but on their mental health as well. Most of the survivors of the genocide—the majority of whom happened to be women—experienced serious economic deprivation. The level of mistrust among the families of those who survived the genocide and those whose relatives were suspected of having committed genocide was high and deeply rooted. The population was severely traumatized and deeply divided. The 1994 genocide had terrible consequences for the people of Rwanda and society as a whole. It left the Rwandan cultural and moral fabric torn to shreds (Mutamba & Izabiliza, 2005:10, 15).

The distrust that permeated every corner of the Rwandan society predictably followed the lines of ethnic ideology. The survivors continued to live next door to perpetrators and as a result, obviously lived in extreme terror. Meanwhile, the Hutus, whether they were perpetrators or not, feared being denounced and suffering reprisals. Many fled the country as the RPF invaded in July 1994. Distrust has since fluctuated all sides as a function of the steps and processes related to the reintegration and re-composition of communities (Desmarais, 2004:17).

Relationships are superficial and remain largely functional. Children, in particular, bear the marks of the violence and traumatic events. The genocide also affected the elderly, who lost their traditional family support. Cultural, social and religious values have been scorned, undermining the credibility of different symbols and institutions, and the scale of values has been shaken (Kimonyo, 2001:39-40). Many survivors have
to cope with severe physical disabilities. Many lost hands, arms, legs and/or other body parts when they were attacked with machetes. On top of that, they have had to deal with the traumatic memories of the violence they witnessed. The Kinyarwanda expression *Guhahamuka Syndrome* describes the psychological aftermath of the genocide—the feelings of despair, hopelessness, worthlessness, excessive crying, attempted suicide, being easily startled, repeatedly dreaming of bad events, and experiencing mental chaos or flashbacks (Boris et el., 2006:584). Indeed, the impact of genocide on survivors is enormous. Staub and his colleagues observe that “their basic psychological needs are profoundly frustrated—their identity, their way of understanding the world, and their spirituality disrupted. These disruptions, along with those of interpersonal relationships, and the ability to regulate internal emotional states, co–exist with and give rise to intense trauma symptoms” (Staub et el., 2005:299).

More than twenty years have passed since the Rwandan genocide, and in that time a second level of long-term effects have emerged, beyond the immediate problems of trauma and devastation. These long-term effects have reinforced the predictable pathways of ethnic ideology, which remains entrenched in people’s minds. Consequently, Rwandan society carries the continuing effects of sorrow and psychological wounds, on-going prejudice, disagreement about the correct interpretation of Rwandan history, a lack of trust in society, a loss of ethical and cultural values that used to unify Rwandans, and the continued economic difficulties of recovery (NURC, 2007:8).

However, what must be realised is that lurking beneath these various problems is still the presence of an ethnic ideology that continues to manifest in the minds of Rwandans. This ideology poses a serious obstacle to reconciliation and has the potential to renew cycles of violence in the future (Tuyisabe et el., 2008:7). The pressing question here is, “What can be done about this ideology?”

In his paper presented on 7 April 2016, during the 22\textsuperscript{nd} anniversary of the genocide, Dr. Jean Damasene Bizimana, executive secretary of the National Commission for Fighting Genocide Ideology (CNLG), explained that ethnic ideology had become
deeply entrenched in Rwandans’ consciousness. The mass participation in killings of the civilian population, the enormous number of people killed in a relatively short period of time, and the terrible cruelty of the methods used are all signs of the magnitude and violent nature of genocide ideology.\textsuperscript{27}

According to Rusagara (2010:24), the division caused by ethnic ideology took place over a span of a hundred years (1894-1994), starting with the arrival of colonialism. It implies that three generations of Rwandans lived with the enduring nature of the falsehood of ‘racial’ and ‘ethnic’ division through racial indoctrination in the colonial and post-colonial periods.

In post-genocide Rwanda, ethnic ideology has manifested in different ways. According to the December 2007 report by the Commission of the Chamber of Deputies, 84 out of 637 secondary schools presented elements of genocide ideology. Out of 32 secondary schools visited by a parliamentary commission, 26 were undermined by this ideology, which emerged through the marginalization of pupils who survived the 1994 genocide. To illustrate this point, two secondary schools are mentioned as examples. In the Gaseke Secondary School in the Northern Province, a text of 10 points was circulated, recalling the 10 commandments of the Hutu extremists published by the newspaper Kangura, on account of which the editor-in-chief was sentenced to 35 years of imprisonment by the ICTR. In the Shyogwe Secondary School, tracts were found, which threatened the Tutsis with another mass extermination (Tuyisabe et al., 2008:117).

In his writing, ‘Tackling genocide ideology in schools,’ Emanuel Ntirenganya (2016:2) notes that Dr Joseph Nkurunziza, the president and co-founder of “Never-Again Rwanda” (NAR), a human rights and peace-building organisation, affirms that “genocide ideology among students is adopted from parents, educators, and those who committed the genocide”. In response to genocide ideology among students, in 2002 a group of university students initiated ‘Never-Again Rwanda’. According to Ntirenganya (2016:2), NAR aims at “promoting sustainable peace and tolerance

among the young generation as a means of preventing a reoccurrence of the genocide”.

Citing Nkurunziza (2016), Ntirenganya (2016:2) notes, “Never-Again Rwanda equips the youth with leadership and mediation skills, adding that there are so far 84 Never-Again clubs in schools and 20 clubs for the schools graduates to work with communities. These clubs have been crucial in uprooting genocide ideology among the youth.”

Odora (2007:10) stresses, “To fight genocide ideology, it is imperative that every person must play his or her positive part”. In addition, Tuyisabe et al. (2008:120) propose, “In order to fight against ethnic ideology and hatred it is necessary to bet once again on solidarity camps for teachers, pupils of secondary schools and students of higher education”. Moreover, it would be essential to introduce in the national education system a course on the eradication of ethnic and genocide ideologies (Tuyisabe et al., 2008:120).

As described in section 3.6, denial of the genocide is another way in which ethnic ideology continues to be expressed. According to Rwamucyo (2015:3), “denial is always the final stage of genocide whereby statistics are minimized, access to evidence and archives are denied, and witnesses are killed or intimidated. The victims are mocked and presented as the cause of what befell them. What happened is referred to as a civil war and not genocide. Denial is aimed at evading accountability, justifying what happened and is a larger part of the continuation of the genocide project”.

In present-day Rwanda, denial is manifested in two ways: First, it intensifies as each annual commemoration day draws near, particularly when people question the continuing need to remember the events of 1994. In the aftermath of the genocide, denial was expressed in the form of an absolute denial of the crime and its

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specificities. Subsequently, evidence of the genocide became indisputable and received judicial recognition from the ICTR and the United Nations (UN). Since then, deniers have adopted new strategies. They have succeeded in winning over the sympathy of the judicial institutions of some Western states, NGOs, and international organizations using them for political ends.\(^{30}\)

In response to the immediate and long-term effects of genocide, the Rwandan government set out mechanisms and strategies for reconciliation. The next two sections will explore these efforts. The government’s long-term focus has shifted to fighting the continued presence of ethnic ideology, as we shall see.

**5.3 Restorative justice towards reconciliation in the aftermath of genocide**

In addition to the trauma experienced by victims, the large numbers of suspects in prison after the genocide had a serious impact on the justice and reconciliation process, as well as on the national economy and on the survival of their own families. For this reason, the international community and the new Rwandan government recognized that reconciliation needed to first restore some measure of stability and justice. In terms of the four dimensions of reconciliation from section 2.5, truth-telling about the events of 1994 became the first step in promoting healing, forgiveness, and the restoration of relationships. Uncovering the truth about the events of the genocide was a task taken up first by the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, in order to bring the leaders and planners of the genocide to justice. However, given the mass participation in the genocide, not every perpetrator could be prosecuted. So the task of telling the truth in order to reconcile broken communities later became the responsibility of the government-initiated *Gacaca* courts, as will be discussed later in this section. Both of these organizations were focused on illuminating and addressing the immediate circumstances surrounding the 1994 genocide, but despite this rather narrow focus, they were essential in the process of reconciliation.

In post-genocide Rwanda, the Government of National Unity was faced with several important questions. Carroll (2000:164) highlights some of the questions as follows: “How to achieve justice for the victims and survivors, hold individuals accountable for serious violations of international humanitarian law, deter future mass atrocities, and establish lasting peace”.

At the same time, the brutality of modern conflict such as genocide has led the international community to identify new crimes and find new ways of dealing with these issues (Mukherjee, 2011:331). For this reason, justice is pertinent to Rwanda post-genocide. According to McCullum (1995:xxiv), justice is the only way Rwanda can be healed and reconciled. For McCullum, justice is a means of naming the genocide, recognising the root cause of the madness, punishing the perpetrators, and perhaps above all, supporting Rwandans in their overwhelming grief.

In his article, ‘Justice as a Tool for Peace-Making: Truth Commission and International Criminal Trials’, Goldstone (1996) proposes five positive contributions that justice can achieve in the reconciliation process. These are:

- First, exposure of the truth can help to individualise guilt, and thus avoid the imposition of collective guilt on a group.
- Second, justice brings public and official acknowledgment to the victims.
- Third, public exposure of the truth is the only effective way of ensuring that history is recorded more accurately.
- Fourth, there is only one way to curb criminal conduct and that is through good policing and the implementation of efficient criminal justice.
- Fifth, exposure of the nature and extent of human rights violations frequently will reveal a systematic and institutional pattern of gross human rights violations. It will assist in the identification and dismantling of institutions responsible for past violations and deter future recurrences (Goldstone, 1996:488-490).

Justice, from a theological perspective, is considered a key component of reconciliation. Schreiter, for example, asserts that there can be no reconciliation without justice. For him, reconciliation without justice leads to new outbreaks of
violence and oppression. It is an attempt to establish peace and unity without truth, and for that reason is bound to fail (Schreiter, 1992:65). Writing from a South African theological perspective, Meiring (2013:8) also acknowledges the relevance of justice in the reconciliation process. He describes, “Justice and reconciliation are two sides of the same coin”. In the same vein, Kubai (2007:230) believes that, in the post-genocide Rwanda, “one cannot demand reconciliation and reconciliation cannot occur in a vacuum. Hence, there is a necessity of justice”.

Furthermore, Meiring highlights the importance of both restorative justice and retributive justice. He states that in South Africa, justice “brings a number of issues to the fore, not only the issue of proper government reparation to the victims of human rights abuses to balance the generous granting of amnesty to perpetrators of the abuses. It also includes the wider issues involving every South African: unemployment, poverty, affirmative action, equal education, restitution, the redistribution of land, reparation tax, et cetera” (Meiring, 2013:8-9). Archbishop Tutu often made an important distinction between retributive justice and restorative justice. In this regard, Meiring refers to Tutu’s argument, explaining that retributive justice has as its raison d’être the need to punish the perpetrator. Restorative justice is not punitive but restorative and healing (cited by Meiring, 2013:8-9). However, it is important to be reminded that this research is carried out in the Rwandan context. This explains why restorative justice is underlined, as described in section 5.3.2.

5.3.1. The international criminal tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)

In collaboration with the Rwanda government, the UN initiated legal procedures for prosecuting and punishing those responsible for Rwanda’s genocide. The ICTR was set up by the UN in the neighbouring country of Tanzania to prosecute leaders of the genocide. In her analysis, Christina M. Carroll (2000) did an ‘Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rwandan National Justice System in dealing with the Mass Atrocities of 1994’. By doing so, she highlights the purpose for the establishment of the international tribunal. Carroll (2000:167) puts it clearly as follows: “No one was prosecuted or otherwise held accountable for the cycles of violence against Tutsi from 1960 to 1994. Thus, a
culture of impunity developed in which citizens did not feel obligated to a rule of law and did not fear retribution for their actions”.

At a Security Council meeting concerning the creation of the ICTR, Rwandan ambassador to the UN, Manzi Bakuramutsa, stated, “It is impossible to build a state of law and arrive at true national reconciliation if we do not eradicate the culture of impunity which has characterised our society” (cited by Carroll, 2000:171). Therefore, the ICTR was created “to prosecute serious violations of international humanitarian law, to establish law and order, and thereby to contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace and national reconciliation in Rwanda” (Carroll, 2000:171-2).

As Carroll (2000:172) described it, there are various reasons that forced the international community to create an “international” criminal tribunal, as opposed to relying on the Rwandan national justice system. First, like any other Rwandan institution, the Rwandan judicial system was in ruins after the 1994 genocide and had no human and financial resources to deal with the massive number of perpetrators. For example, out of the 800 lawyers and judges of the national and provincial courts, only 40 were alive and in the country after July 1994. Thus, Carroll (2000:172) affirms, “An international tribunal was needed to begin prosecuting offenders while the Rwandan government rebuilt the domestic judicial system”. Second, an international tribunal was needed in order to achieve justice and accountability in Rwanda but also to prevent other crimes in other parts of the world (Carroll, 2000:172-173). Consequently, the tribunal was established not only to restore peace and justice in Rwanda, but also to maintain international peace and security as a new institution which could pave the way for the prevention of such atrocities in the future on a more general level.

In reflecting on the purpose of the ICTR, it is important to bring into the discussion the contribution of the ICTR towards reconciliation processes in Rwanda. Scholars such as Gallimore (2008:242) maintain that, “The ICTR has been successful in its mandate to hold accountable the highest level of perpetrators who organized and carried out the genocide in Rwanda”. As noted in chapter 3, numerous massacres of
Tutsi civilians have taken place throughout Rwandan history, with no punishment being handed down to those involved. The ICTR, therefore, has challenged the historical impunity that existed in Rwanda for government and military officials who conducted previous massacres. The primary contribution of the ICTR, as Gallimore (2008:259) noted, is “through its holding accountable the main perpetrators of the genocide or the planners of genocide. This may have the effect of breaking the mimetic cycle of violence and revenge that characterizes the history of impunity in Rwanda”.

In her research paper, ‘Hybrid models of justice and Rwanda’s post response,’ Rachel Andrew (2014:38) points out that besides its success, “The ICTR has been often criticized on the basis that it is bureaucratic, costly, slow, and inaccessible and detached from ordinary Rwandans”. Andrew (2014:38) also asserts, “The fact that the ICTR was located in Tanzania, and the fact that the proceedings were conducted in English and French (only in 2000 did the ICTR also include Kinyarwanda) made it difficult for the Rwandan people to attend court proceedings or hear news of it”. Furthermore, Andrew (2014), with reference to Bornkamm (2012), asserts that from a local and community standpoint, the ICTR has not been considered in a positive manner by ordinary Rwandans:

Most of them believe that the form of justice that the tribunal represents has nothing to do with them and is simply incapable of helping them to solve their problems. Often the ICTR is just associated with scandals… In fact, it actually appears that more Rwandans are largely unaware of the ICTR’s work (Andrew, 2014:39).

According to Andrew (2014:39), the ICTR criticism lies on it geographical location, and is thus inaccessible to many Rwandans. Again, the lack of community ownership and distance from the post-conflict population limits the effectiveness and reach of the ICTR’s contributions. In fact, despite some shortcomings, Andrew believes that “the ICTR has successfully achieved its mandate of fairly prosecuting the main orchestrators and those most responsible for the Rwandan genocide” (Andrew, 2014:39).
However, it must be noted that due to the large numbers of people to be tried and the weak national court system, the process of justice was very slow and the system was overwhelmed. The Rwandan government thus established a third system of justice called the “Gacaca” courts to try to speed up the process and bring justice to the people.

5.3.2 The Gacaca: Truth and restorative justice

As indicated in the previous section, justice is considered an essential precondition for reconciliation in Rwanda (Brannigan & Jones, 2009:198). However, Wielenga (2011a:43) contends, “There was no judicial system left in place and the government had to rebuild the country from scratch, while hundreds of thousands of people accused of genocide were crowded into prisons”. Therefore, in order to address the genocide crimes within Rwanda and promote coexistence and reconciliation between victims and perpetrators, the government turned to a traditional justice system called Gacaca. According to Wielenga (2011a:43), the Gacaca involved “holding court cases within local communities, outside on the grass, with respected community leaders acting as judges. Through this process, thousands of court cases could be held across the country simultaneously, and members of the community were directly involved in resolving the cases”.

In order to understand the significance of the Gacaca courts for the reconciliation process, we must remember that reconciliation cannot be imposed upon a community, but must be owned by a community. Citing Desmond Tutu, Bloomfield et al., (2003:i) states that “reconciliation cannot be imposed from outside, nor can someone else’s map get us to our destination: it must be our own solution”. Furthermore, Huyse (2003:23) makes it clear that “societies and communities affected by large-scale violence need to own the reconciliation process; it is not something that can be imposed from outside or from the top down”. For Huyse (2003:23), “Lasting reconciliation must be home-grown, because in the end it is the survivors who assign meaning to the term and the process”.

With this mind, the Gacaca courts represented the transfer of ownership over the reconciliation process to local communities, encouraging them to become the primary
actors. Nantulya (2006:45) has suggested, “Rwanda is one of the few African countries that has integrated traditional and modern peace mechanisms practically and holistically”. Nantulya argues that in the aftermath of genocide, the designers of Rwanda’s peace and reconciliation models studied in significant detail the experiences of other countries, but no clear solutions emerged. The rooted patterns of ethnic ideology and discrimination, which led to the 1994 genocide, had affected Rwanda to such an extent that reconciliation strategies could not be borrowed from elsewhere. In an interview with Nantulya (2006:46), Fatuma Ndangiza (2006), the former Executive Secretary of the NURC, stated the following:

We had to think of fresh, original and unique models and not just copy others blindly. For us, perpetrators and survivors had to continue living side by side. If we had resigned ourselves to the conventional way of doing things and forgotten our own rich traditions and heritage of dealing with conflicts, we would have ended up with a rather formalized, legalistic and elite driven mechanism, with little or no relevance at all to the grassroots. That, is not the route we wanted to follow (cited by Nantulya, 2006:46).

Mass participation in the 1994 genocide put more than 100,000 prisoners in jail, a backlog which would have taken the formal judicial system a century to resolve. In order to ease this burden, the Gacaca courts were spread around the country in over 9,000 communities. In most cases, the courts were convened weekly by elected judges and community members were legally required to attend. Accused perpetrators, except those categorised as most culpable, were judged in these Gacaca courts (Staub, 2014:506-7). Kubai (2007a:57) points out the purpose of Gacaca as follows:

The Gacaca courts were not just a way to deliver justice to the huge number of prisoners awaiting trial, but were envisioned as a key restorative mechanism, a means to contribute to the national process of social reconstruction. The goal of Gacaca was to promote reconciliation by providing a platform for victims to express themselves, encouraging acknowledgement and apologies from the perpetrators, and facilitating the coming together of victims and perpetrators ‘on the grass’. This restorative justice approach was predicated on the assumption that in a conflict situation, victims and offenders have all been hurt. It therefore emphasises the reconciliation of the parties and the healing of wounds arising from the atrocities.

Essentially, the Gacaca courts were “a platform for telling the truth about the genocide that claimed a million lives; it is hoped that this will lead to healing for both victims and victimisers” (Bloomfield et al., 2003:112).
Traditionally, the Gacaca serve four important functions, these are: it brought together the offenders and the offended; it sought the truth; it addressed the conflict; it reconciled parties (Kubai, 2007a:55). Frank Rusagara (2010:20), writing on ‘Gacaca as a Reconciliation and Nation-building strategy in the post-genocide Rwanda,’ indicates that Gacaca was a “strategy for conflict management through restorative justice, while serving its historical role as the lubricant that ensured unity and cohesion in the society” (Rusagara, 2010:20). Gacaca were traditional councils and tribunals made up of elders to resolve conflict and administrate justice. Gacaca literally means ‘a resting and relaxing green lawn in the Rwandan homestead’ where community, family members or neighbours met to exchange views on issues directly affecting them, especially issues related to conflicts. The Gacaca’s participatory approach derived its impetus and legitimacy from ubumwe bw’ Abanyarwanda (the unity of Rwandans); in as much as, it complemented the same unity by being the cement that strengthened social relations in the name of justice (Rusagara, 2010:20). In this respect, the Gacaca courts not only solved a practical problem in a restorative way, but also made a claim on identity, restoring pride in their common traditions and providing a way to solve their problems in a uniquely Rwandan way (Zorbas, 2004:3).

In the post-genocide context, Gacaca was a mixture of the traditional and modern legal system—a voluntary process set up in all villages across the country for a limited period of time. Most of the work was done at the local level where the acts of genocide were committed. Nine judges were elected by the population from among people of integrity—called Inyangamugayo. They were trained to hear the cases for three of the four categories of perpetrators and to pronounce judgment. Prisoners and their files were transported from the central prison to communal prisons where they had allegedly committed genocide; they were returned to the communal prisons after the Gacaca audiences. The villagers were required to attend the Gacaca once a week. One day per week was set aside to allow the villagers to attend the Gacaca (Kubai, 2007a:55).

On the other hand, Andrew contends that despite being an innovative response to the 1994 genocide and shortcomings of the criminal justice system, the Gacaca courts were not without their faults or controversy. The criticisms brought to the Gacaca
courts were that “they were overly retributive, hindered by a deep sense of mistrust and fear of safety, and created more suspects rather than less” (Andrew, 2014:47). In addition, like the ICTR, the Gacaca struggled “to cope with the deep sense of mistrust, insecurity, and destruction of social relationships. These feelings diluted the quality and quantity of participation, which in turn diminished the powerful potential of the Gacaca courts. This is evidenced by the fact that many Rwandans have cited fear of exposing themselves to reprisals for participation in the justice system” (Andrew, 2014:47-49).

Despite some shortcomings and challenges of the Gacaca, other scholars acknowledge its merits. Professor Nick Johnson (2012), Rector of the Institute for Legal Practice and Development (ILPD) in Nyanza, Rwanda, in his article titled, ‘Law, Justice and Reconciliation’ points out that the Gacacas were an extraordinary imaginative response to an almost impossible situation. It is difficult to conceive of a formal justice system that could have worked as effectively in the post-genocide period in Rwanda. Justice is never perfect but in any judicial calculus, the fact that Rwandans in every district and cell were able to participate in its processes made a decisive impact on reconciliation in Rwanda and the processes of justice. A survey of opinion in Rwanda shows general approval of Gacaca. Here is atypical comment from a genocide survivor:

In truth if the Gacaca process hadn’t been there, people wouldn’t even have asked for water from their fellow Rwandans. We feel that the Gacaca allowed the truth about the genocide to come out. It allowed us to exhume and find our killed loved ones who had been left in the hills so that we could bury them in the memorial sites for genocide victims in sector (Johnson, 2012:50).

The Gacaca finally completed their work in 2011, after attending to nearly 2,000,000 cases. Many more cases remained unsolved, but it was decided that these would be pursued by the national court system of Rwanda (Johnson, 2012:50-51). For the Rwandan authorities, Gacaca emerged as a response to an immediate crisis in the judiciary, but it also served as a method to achieve reconciliation. Gacaca has encouraged a large number of prisoners to confess and request forgiveness.
Due to the merits of the Gacaca mechanism, it is an approach that could be implemented even in other African countries to solve conflicts. Molenaar (2005:157) observes:

Gacaca offers the people on the ground a mechanism to deal with this legacy themselves, without too much interference from outsiders. For this reason, gacaca has been found to be important to provide lessons too many African societies because they share the problems of civil war and its aftermath. However, these societies also share these informal, accessible and restorative legal traditions that are incorporated in communities and whose main goal is to reconcile conflicting parties. For these reasons, gacaca’s relevance goes beyond the borders of this small country Rwanda.

In fact, according to Nantulya (2006), the lesson to learn is that “hybrid peace and reconciliation models which integrate culture and modern approaches holistically and practically can be just as useful as strictly formal mechanisms. Therefore, it is clear that Gacaca has been an essential part of the truth and reconciliation strategy”. Gacaca was a people-driven authority in search of truth, justice and social reconstruction. For the purpose of reconciliation, it was necessary to first uncover the truth of what happened, a role well played by the Gacaca.

5.4 Reconciliation and the future of Rwanda

Here I ask, “Is reconciliation even possible after genocide?” “How can it be achieved?” Considering these questions, Minow (1998:5) maintains, “No response can ever be adequate, where one has to factor in the terrifying existential crisis faced by survivors of genocide,” their brush with the attempted annihilation of “not only yourself, but also everything that constitutes your world, everything that makes your life worth living…your work, your family, your children…all that was on the point of being wiped out, too”.

Despite the overwhelming task at hand, I support Zorbas’ (2004:1) viewpoint when she correctly argues, “In the case of genocide, inaction is unacceptable because it leaves grievances, fears of reprisals, and cultures of impunity to fester, encouraging a cyclical outburst of violence by the perpetrators of tomorrow”. For Zorbas (2004:1), reconciliation is thus “the only sustainable and genuine form of prevention in
societies that have undergone mass violence”. In the Rwandan context, reconciliation is extremely important both politically and socially. If Rwanda is to be healed, reconciliation is the compelling priority of the contemporary times. While the various judicial interventions described in the previous section were a necessary part of the reconciliation process, they could not bring about true unity around a new Rwandan identity. For this reason, the NURC introduced a wide range of society-level interventions to promote reconciliation. The following section discusses the role played by the NURC in the reconciliation process.

5.4.1 The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) in Rwanda
In the aftermath of the genocide, the Rwandan government worked to reconstruct Rwanda. The reconciliation process in Rwanda focused on reconstructing the Rwandan identity, as well as balancing justice, truth and peace and security in the country. Different measures have been taken by the Rwandan government to bring perpetrators and victims together to live side-by-side in peace. For example, the Constitution now states that all Rwandans share equal rights. Laws have been passed to fight discrimination and divisive genocide ideology. The government established the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) in 1999 (Department of Public information, 2012). According to Clark (2010:139), the NURC was finally established by an Act of Parliament on 12 March 1999.

It is very significant to remember the complexity of the post-genocide reconciliation process. The dilemma, as Mamdani (2002) observes, is due to the proximity between the perpetrators and the victims. This dilemma of knowing your abuser is what complicates a reconciliation process. For this reason, the NURC set a common understanding of reconciliation. Thus, NURC defines unity and reconciliation as:

A consensus practice of citizens who have common nationality, who share the same culture and have equal rights; citizens characterised by trust, tolerance, mutual respect, equality, complementary roles/interdependence, truth, and healing of one another’s wounds inflicted by our history, with the objectives of laying a foundation for sustainable development (NURC, 2007:6-7).

As it is stated in its mandate, the NURC has organised several meetings, conferences, and workshops on the themes of unity and reconciliation.
Between October and December 2005, a complete evaluation of the impact of the NURC was conducted by Paul Nantulya, an expert from the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in South Africa. He managed the activities of the Institute in the Great Lakes region. Nantulya and his team conducted random interviews, focus group discussions, beneficiary workshops, stakeholder meetings and field visits to communities and NURC projects in all provinces. They also randomly interviewed 765 respondents in six regions.

As a result of this research, an article titled, ‘African Nation-building and Reconstruction: Lessons from Rwanda,’ was published in 2006 by Nantulya in collaboration with the NURC. According to Nantulya (2006:47), unlike other post-war reconciliation commissions, the NURC “is not modeled on a strict mandate with a limited time-frame. It is designed to stimulate reconciliation at the grassroots level and to gradually transfer ownership of the reconciliation process to communities. It is a non-prosecutorial mechanism which complements the Gacaca courts”. Madame Aloisie Inyumba, the former Executive Secretary of the NURC, summarized the achievements of the commission as follows:

In our experience, we found out that the people had to come first. The only thing they need is an enabling environment… and once that is in place… they will take up the reconciliation agenda on their own. We wanted to have a structure that would evolve from within communities. For a whole year, we carried out consultations with communities throughout the country, which were very successful. That is when we realized that the people are a resource in themselves. We followed suit, and worked hard to set up programmes based on those consultations (cited by Nantunya, 2006:47).

It is clear that from the above statement, the programs are based on grassroots reconciliation and individuals in the community have to contribute a crucial role, as reconciliation is a Rwandan agenda and should not be imposed from the outside.

5.4.1.1 Tools of reconciliation used by the NURC

The Rwandan government believes that aspects of Rwandan culture and traditional practices are valuable to enrich and adapt its development programmes to the country’s needs. Consequently, traditional mechanisms continue to play a role in the conflict resolution and reconciliation process. The NURC offers tools to culturally
integrate reconciliation techniques that honour indigenous knowledge. As described by Nantulya (2006:48), the NURC has adopted the following tools in its approach to reconciliation.

**Ingando**

*Ingando*, known as a solidarity camp, is taken from the Rwandan verb *Kuganda*, which refers to halting normal activities to find solutions to national challenges. Historically, *Ingando* were first established by the military. Whenever Rwanda experienced issues such as disasters, wars, natural calamities, etc., the king of Rwanda called and prepared the population through *Ingando*. These were communal retreats where people shared in the decisions on war and peace, and how Rwanda should be governed. Currently, the NURC formally adopted *Ingando* as one of its key interventions to bring about community engagement. It entails problem-solving retreats for different categories of people. In the beginning, the programme focused on refugees and demobilized soldiers. By 2002, the training was extended to informal traders, and other social groups including survivors, released prisoners, community leaders, women, youth and people with disabilities. Approximately 3,000 students undergo *Ingando* each year. To cope with the intake, a National *Ingando* Centre was built in Nkumba, Ruhengeri, as a permanent facility to house programmes (Nantulya, 2006:48).

The *ingando* tool later expanded to include youth and students at secondary and tertiary levels. Consequently, the NURC acknowledges that education is a useful tool for both promoting reconciliation and preventing future violence. To that end, Mafeza (2013:9) reminds us, “Prior to genocide, education was a channel through which hatred and ethnic ideology were conveyed. However, after the genocide, the same education is now used as a tool to reconcile Rwandans and to combat genocide and its ideology”. Emphasis is placed on peace and unity in the primary and secondary school curricula to ensure that students learn to coexist free from discrimination and exclusion. The goal is to build unity and encourage reconciliation by promoting peace and tolerance, which in turn prevents the recurrence of future violence (Mafeza, 2013:9). The purpose of focusing on Rwanda’s problems and history is to tell the truth about what happened in 1994. A deeper understanding of Rwandan history is
needed in order to de-construct and de-mythologize ethnic ideology. In addition to *Ingando*, Buckley-Zistel (2009:46) asserts, “The Commission distributes its particular narrative about the past through civic education programmes, including song competitions; sport events; training materials; youth theatre; poems, cartoons and radio broadcasts. NURC is, therefore, an effective vehicle for distributing a particular interpretation of Rwanda’s history”.

In fact, Shyaka (2005:37) states, “Solidarity camps, which initially were thought out to ease the reintegration of refugees who were mainly coming from DRC, have been extended to various categories of population, in order to let them, through discussions and open debates, grasp first-hand the unity and reconciliation process, its challenges and numerous opportunities”. Indeed, *Ingando* also constitutes an activity of paramount importance for the commission and for the process as well. It is a resource in the reconciliation programme fostered by the NURC triggering responses of decision-making that leads to the building of coexistence within communities.

**Abunzi**

The word *Abunzi* can be translated as “those who reconcile” or “those who bring together” from the verb *kunga*. According to Nantulya (2006:48), Article 159(4) of the Constitution established a Mediation Committee in each sector. The mediation committee members, or *Abunzi*, are responsible for mediating conflicts between parties. It is only when the *Abunzi* fail that disputes can be brought before ordinary courts. Each committee comprises 12 residents of every sector who are persons of integrity and acknowledged for their mediation skills. The NURC works through them as part of its peace-building and conflict management programme. It equips them through conflict management courses, technical support and training resources.

**Abakangurambaga**

The creation of the *Abakangurambaga* was an innovative strategy of the NURC. They are “peace volunteers” selected from within communities to promote reconciliation and build confidence. They also help communities to solve basic problems and address wider social conflicts that do not fall within the purview of the *Abunzi*. There are 720 *Abakangurambaga* countrywide. They work voluntarily for the NURC, which
provides them with training manuals, reference material and bicycles to facilitate their access to communities. Plans are underway to train more *Abakangurambaga* as part of the NURC’s local peace network.

**Ubudehe**

*Ubudehe* is a tool to encourage communities to become more involved in their own welfare. In ancient times, it brought communities together to support one another in various activities including farming and harvesting. Currently, it has been adopted by formal institutions including the NURC and the Ministry of Local Government to place communities at the centre of development planning. The process entails community-based consultations and dialogue on specific issues. Ideas are then taken up through community development committees, which form the basis for policy making. The NURC has integrated this approach in all its interventions. In 1999, when it was established, community-based consultations were used to elaborate the programmes of the commission. Since then, the community consulting approach has been used to evaluate programmes and highlight new or emerging issues (Nantulya, 2006:48).

**Ubusabane**

The NURC supports the community festivals to promote reconciliation in Rwanda (*ubusabane*), with the idea that culture determines the regeneration of these conditions. The shared products of our culture, with particular emphasis on theatre and art, have responded to the post-genocide circumstances of Rwanda and continue to play a meaningful role in the new reconciliatory order (NURC, 2008:23).

The NURC has organised events to try and foster an understanding of the roots of genocide, and by extension, to prevent future genocides. To do so, the government also introduced socio-economic reforms. For example, twelve years of basic education is now free. It eliminated official discrimination based on group identity (as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa) in admitting students to schools and universities, as well as in employment. Differences in power and privilege are one of the central sources of conflict between groups. Equal access is essential to make people feel that they are all
Rwandans and that members of each group are able to develop their potential (Staub, 2014:506).

Although the NURC was established in 1996, from its inception it has focused on addressing the long-term causes and effects of genocide, beyond the specific events of 1994. In summary, the NURC’s project has been less about alleviating the particular traumas resulting from the genocide than about creating a new vision for Rwanda. Its initiatives have attempted to rebuild the fabric of Rwandan society and restructure Rwandan identity around shared, traditional ideas and institutions. In this way, each of these initiatives seriously considers the ethnic ideology dividing Rwandans as the source of conflict for generations, and must be deconstructed so as to return Rwandans to the unity of their pre-colonial identity. In a sense, the NURC began working on the future reconciliation of Rwanda, even while the trauma of 1994 was still fresh. The main purpose of this dissertation could be described as the attempt to draw the Presbyterian Church’s attention to the NURC’s priorities, although from a theological perspective. While the Presbyterian Church may have done well in addressing the short-term effects of genocide, the next step, as we shall see, is to turn its attention to long-term issues by offering a theological deconstruction of ethnic ideology. Up to today, this theological deconstruction has been needed but never explicitly offered.

5.4.1.2 “Ndi Umunyarwanda” (I am a Rwandan) Program

The previous section described many tools of reconciliation used by the NURC to accomplish its mission of reconciling Rwandans. Even though many things concerning reconciliation have been achieved, and despite the fact that the aim of the National Policy of Unity and Reconciliation is to resist any form of divisionism and discrimination, as well as fight against genocide and its ideology, it is significant to highlight here, that twenty years after the genocide, ethnic ideology still persists (NURC, 2007:11). Therefore, this section demonstrates that the “Ndi Umunyarwanda” (I am a Rwandan) program was founded as a strategy to address the current ethnic ideology.
During the Senate plenary session of 10 February 2015, the NURC presented its 2013-2014 annual activity report and its 2014 – 2015 action plan. The commission outlined challenges faced by the NURC in carrying out its mission. Chief among these challenges was the continued existence of ethnic ideology. This is evident in different strata of the Rwandan society, in the presence of some media outlets that still spread genocide ideology in churches where members still cling to divisive thoughts, practices and behaviours, and in the neighbouring Congo where genocide ideology is still well maintained and nurtured by the Forces for Democratic Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) terrorist group. In response to these challenges, the NURC offered “Ndi Umunyarwanda” (I am a Rwandan), which is a common Rwandan identity programme. A common identity is needed in order to undo the divisions and ethnic ideology of the past. For this reason, the Rwandan government promotes a notion of collective identity, which is no longer based on ethnicity but on the civic identity of all its citizens. The strategy is centred on an interpretation of Rwanda’s history according to which ethnicity did not exist prior to the arrival of the colonialists (Buckley-Zistel, 2009:31).

In the year 2013, the NURC initiated the “Ndi Umunyarwanda” (I am a Rwandan) program, with the ultimate goal of building a national identity to foster a Rwandan community that is based on trust and unity. It was initiated as a way to strengthen the solidarity of the people, uphold their moral and spiritual values, as well as make them understand their fundamental rights as Rwandans. As already noted, Rwandans spoke the same language, practiced the same cultural rituals, and worshiped the same God. Only upon the arrival of European colonisers were group divisions exploited as a means of securing control. The modern conception of Tutsi and Hutu as distinct ethnic groups in no way reflects the pre-colonial relationships between them. The “Ndi Umunyarwanda” initiative seeks to address this fact. This programme has helped Rwandans understand their origins and the meaning of tribes and clans in pre-colonial times, before the distortions of the colonial era. With “Ndi Umunyarwada,” Rwandans today critically examine their dark history towards shaping a bright future.

They seek to uphold the moral values of all Rwandans, restore their unity in building their country, and eradicate genocide ideology for the sake of prosperity.32

Ambassador Amandin Rugira (2015:1) argues that “Ndi Umunyarwanda” is “a tool to make an objective audit of different policies put in place from the pre-independence period up to 1994. That audit in my opinion is like a cost and benefit analysis of the ethnic ideology on which the previous regimes were founded”.

Most important is the way in which reconciliation programmes pivot on the abolition of tribal identity: “There would be no talk of Tutsi and Hutu... there are no Hutu and Tutsis: “we are all Rwandans,” one Rwandan people “Banya-Rwanda” (Andrew, 2014:52). This strategy aims against ethnic and racial prejudice (Andrew, 2014:52). In reference to Jarvis (2000), Andrew argues that the “Ndi Umunyarwanda” strategy “is aimed at what sociologists would term ‘redrawing group boundaries,’ where individuals in different social groups come to see themselves as members of a single group. This is believed to lead to more positive attitudes towards each other, more positive contacts between groups, and reduces intergroup bias further” (Andrew, 2014:52).

Despite the relevance of this strategy, some scholars disagree with the underlying philosophy of “Ndi Umunyarwanda” (I am a Rwandan). This is because the desired results have not been achieved in Rwanda, as the identities are firmly entrenched in the society. Consequently, Andrew, (2014:53) states, “For some survivors, this may feel like a form of re-victimization, as their identity as Tutsi was degraded before the genocide and is subsequently stripped away after the genocide”. In addition, even though ethnic groups are not referred to as Hutu and Tutsi, Kubai (2007a:54) also maintains that “the post-genocide population was roughly divided into three broad categories: the returnees, that is, a large proportion that returned from exile; those who did not leave the country during the genocide; and the génocidaires, who were accused of perpetrating the genocide and are in prison or are yet to be brought to justice”.

32Viewed from: www.newtimesco.rw/section article/2015. [Date accessed: 20 February 2016].
In my view, the new categories, as indicated by Kubai, are related to the old ethnic ideological categories of Hutu and Tutsi. As much as “returnees” or “génocidaires” are relevant categories in contemporary Rwanda, these categories are not entirely separate in the minds of the people from “Tutsi” and “Hutu.” This is why this study, particularly section 5.4, argues that ethnic ideology is still visible even twenty years after genocide. However, even if Rwandan people see themselves as different categories this is not a reason to preserve ethnic identities, considering that ethnic division between Hutu and Tutsi was artificially constructed by the colonialists and missionaries. Therefore, the “Ndí Umunyarwanda” programme is the right strategy in the reconciliation process because it addresses and deconstructs ethnic ideology, and thus establishes a new national identity based on trust and the unity of one nation as found in the pre-colonial period.

As will become clearer in the sections that follow, in order for true reconciliation to take place, institutions are needed to facilitate the process. Since 1994, various reconciliation efforts initiated by the Rwandan government were launched, including the ICTR, the Gacaca restorative justice courts and the NURC. In addition to these initiatives, many churches and church organisations took action based on the biblical mandate of being given “the ministry of reconciliation” (2 Cor 5:18-19). The following section discusses the role of Rwandan churches and church organisations in the reconciliation process.

5.4.2 Rwandan churches in the process of reconciliation

In chapter 4 it was argued that in the aftermath of the genocide the Christian churches in Rwanda faced extensive criticism. The church has been accused of active complicity in violence through its close relationship with the government. A vital question for the mission of the church in Rwanda after the genocide is how to address the issues of healing and reconciliation when the church has been accused of complicity and a failure to act prophetically.

In his assessment, ‘Peace building initiatives of the Presbyterian Church in the post-genocide Rwandan society,’ Celestin Nsengimana (2015), a theologian and minister of the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda, highlights the role played by Rwandan
churches in the process of peace building and reconciliation. He recalls that from 4-6 March 1997, a workshop organised by the Protestant Council of Rwanda (CPR) gathered 50 people from the following churches: the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda (EPR), the Anglican Church of Rwanda (EAR), the Union of Baptist churches of Rwanda (UEBR), the Association of the Pentecostal Churches of Rwanda (ADEPR), the Free Methodist Church of Rwanda (EMLR), and the Catholic Church (Nsengimana, 2015:20).

According to Nsengimana (2015), the participants reflected on the topic: ‘The Church before, during and after the Genocide’. As the workshop ended, all the churches present declared that they needed to take the following actions, as described by Nsengimana (2015:20-21):

- Recognising their responsibility in the genocide and consequent repentance and reparation.
- Involvement in the process of reconciliation according to the requirements of the Word of God found in 2 Corinthians 5, 19-20 in respect of a tripartite requirement of truth, justice, and reparation, creation of spaces of shared speech within Christian communities where Church members (victims, perpetrators or witnesses) can reconstitute the truth on the past through debate and confession in order to heal memories of genocide.
- Encouraging repentance and forgiveness without avoiding classic justice for the eradication of the culture of impunity.
- Breaking the routine and the folklore of rites and stereotyped symbols to engage deep change, debate and conception of liturgy and sermons related to the post-genocide context inspired by the text of Mathew 5, 23-24;32.
- Condemning ethnic ideologies, attitudes and speeches of negationism, which are obstacles to the process of reconciliation among Rwandans, requesting different media, international and ecumenical organisations to cease using ethnic and globalising vocabulary which encircle Rwandans in the box of lifeless vocabulary of Hutu-Tutsi.
- Become a Church of hope, more attentive to human preoccupation and challenges of the society to which it should react in an evangelical way.

The above declaration highlights the importance of Paul’s message in 2 Corinthians 5:19-20. According to the Pauline message in 2 Cor. 5:17–20, Romenceo (2004:16) notes, “The church understands itself to be delegated with the ministry of reconciliation. Thus it is because of its moral place in society that the church should
aid the creation of reconciled communities, particularly in situations of ethnic conflict”. This perspective is related to what scholars like Schreiter (1992, 2005) and Okure (2006) stated in chapter 2 of this study. This message became the starting point for churches in Rwanda to get involved in the process of reconciliation and to address ethnic ideologies that are a major obstacle to reconciliation.

However, Schreiter (1992:67) argues, “The church cannot assume automatically that it has a mediating role between victims and oppressors. Because the church mirrors society, it may find that the lines dividing society run right through the center of the church”. Thus, the ministry of reconciliation is not just something the church administers, but something that the church needs in its own midst.

Considering Schreiter’s argument, Rutayisire explains that the Rwandan church has been led to self-questioning and some church leaders have confessed their failure as a representative of the church to prevent and stop the genocide. Some individual churches, like the Presbyterians and Anglicans, and the churches collectively, through the Rwandan Protestant Churches Council, having recognised their failings and have publicly begged for pardon. This recognition of weakness has been an important step in helping the victims to regain trust in church leaders and for the church to begin the process of healing wounded memories and promoting the reconciliation process (Rutayisire, 2012:77-8).

At the ecumenical level, this confession also happened in 1996. A group of twenty-four Christians from different Rwandan and foreign churches met in Detmold, in Germany, and published the “Detmold Confession.”33 They declared themselves as Christians from different churches in Rwanda and elsewhere, gathered at Detmold/Germany from 7th – 12th December 1996 at the invitation of Dr. Fulgence Rubayiza in collaboration with the ecumenical community of Hiddesen, to pray and reflect on our common commitment to build a Rwanda where all people can live together in harmony. After holding discussions, challenging opinions and much

deliberate prayer, the participant made the declaration below, as it is indicated by Gatwa (2005:231-2):

I. The Rwandan people will never be reconciled with each other unless each party accepts to kneel down before the suffering of the other party, to confess their own offense and to humbly ask forgiveness of their victims.

II. Therefore:
We, Hutu Christians, present at Detmold, recognise that our group has oppressed the Tutsi in various ways since 1959. We confess the massacres committed by the Hutu against the Tutsi group at different periods of Rwandan history, culminating in the genocide of 1994. We are ashamed of the horrors and atrocities committed by the Hutu towards the Tutsi: torturing, raping, slitting pregnant women open, hacking humans to pieces, burying people alive, hunting people with dogs as if they were animals, killing in churches and temples (previously recognised as places of refuge), massacring old people, children and sick in hospitals, forcing people to kill their own relatives, burning people alive, denying burial and thousands of other ways of cynically degrading an mockingly putting to death.

We carry the terrible weight of this unspeakable crime and we accept to bear the consequences without resentment. We implore our Hutu brothers and sisters not to forget this terrible past when they judge the present reality in Rwanda. We humbly demand forgiveness of God and our Tutsi brothers and sisters for all the evil we have inflicted upon them. We commit ourselves to do whatever we can to restore their honour and their dignity and to regain our lost humanity in their eyes.

This confession by the Hutu highlights their role in the oppression and massacre of Tutsi at different periods in Rwandan history. They call on other Hutu not to forget this terrible past. The Tutsi people also repented of their wrongdoing on behalf of their group. They recognised that their belief of superiority over the Hutu throughout history was wrong.

We, Tutsi Christians, present at Detmold are happy and feel comforted by the demand of forgiveness made by the Hutu brothers and sisters. We likewise demand God and the Hutu to forgive the repression and blind vengeance which members of our group have taken, depassing all claims to legitimate self-defence.

“Inkoni ikubise makeba uyirenza urugo” (Justifying evil on the pretext that it effects a rival, ends up by turning back on the person who justified it).

We also demand God and our Hutu brothers and sisters forgiveness for certain arrogant and contemptuous attitudes shown to them throughout our history in the name of ridiculous complex of ethnic superiority (cited by Gatwa, 2005:231).
Like the Tutsi, Western Christians repented of their sense of superiority and involvement in dividing the Rwandan people. They regretted their failure to condemn the violence and their inaction during the 1994 killings, as well as silence towards the refugees after the genocide.

We, western Christians present at Detmold, grateful for the friendship and trust and for the invitation of our Rwandan brothers and sisters to share in their prayer and reflexions and to listen to their sufferings and hopes, confess that since the arrival of the first Europeans in Rwanda, we have seriously contributed to the increase of divisions in the Rwandan people.

We regret that, feeling too sure of our superiority, we discriminated between people by generalizing and judging some as good and others as bad.

We regret that our countries have conduced violence by delivering arms to all parties. We regret our silence and our neglect of the refugees of the years of the Independence. We also regret our silence and our abandon of the Rwandan people during the genocide and massacres in 1994. We regret our silence and regret when it was question of finding a viable solution to return the refugees after the genocide. We regret our failure to listen and to share in the suffering experienced by our Rwandan friends.

For all this harm, we demand God and our Rwandan brothers and sisters to forgive us for not respecting them as they are and we want to commit ourselves with Jesus to a path of listening, respect and solidarity.

Then all together, the Hutu, Tutsi and Western Christians present at Detmold claimed:

We urge all members of Rwandan society and their friends in the International Community to feel all equally concerned by each other’s misery. We exhort them to work together to comfort and rehabilitate all who have been wounded by the Rwandan tragedy: the widows, the orphans, the prisoners, the refugees both old and recent, the homeless, and the marginalised Batwa. May everyone find recognition and respect in Rwanda and be rooted in the midst of brothers, sisters and friends.

We thank the Father, who has given us his Spirit to break our “hearts of stone” and to free us from the mistrust and fear which separated us. He has remade us brothers and sisters committed to the Way of His Son, who died and rose again to reconcile man to God and to one another.

The outcome of this confession, firstly, shows the importance of repentance and forgiveness in the reconciliation process. Secondly, it creates awareness and teaches individuals that reconciliation of the Rwandan people is only possible when its
different constituents recognise the suffering of others, confess their own crimes, and ask the victims for pardon.

It is also significant to be reminded that the role played by the churches in the reconciliation process is not only limited to confession. Furthermore, Rutayisire (2012:73, 78) affirms that churches and ecclesiastical organisations have played a vital role in the reconciliation process, preaching a message of forgiveness, offering pastoral care, as well as providing material and psychological assistance to genocide survivors, orphans, widows and other victims of this crisis. Churches have accepted that they have a responsibility to rebuild the country by participating fully in the Gacaca jurisdictions as part of the reconciliation process.

Campaigns were organised countrywide as well as in prisons by individual churches and church-related organisations. These actions contributed to telling the truth, the confession of guilt, and asking for forgiveness. A joint workshop organised in September 1999 by the Council of Protestant churches welcomed the Gacaca plan and helped to prepare church leaders to get involved, so as to resolve the clogged legal system. The churches have been teaching the biblical basis of confession, repentance and forgiveness, as paths to reconciliation and peace. Different FBOs, such as the African Evangelical Enterprise (AEE), Prison Fellowship, or groups like the one that formulated the Deltmold Confession, have worked hard to bring about confession, repentance and forgiveness.\(^{34}\)

The 1994 genocide left many traumatised survivors. Starting in 1997, the Council of Protestant Churches in Rwanda (CPR) initiated trauma counselling. The CPR and its church members have been engaged since 1996/7 to examine the root causes of the 1994 genocide. For their failure to address the ethnic ideology prior to the genocide many different groups, associations and individual churches as well as the CPR itself

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\(^{34}\) As stated by Gatwa Tharcisse (n.d) when he was the General Secretary of the Council of Protestant Churches in Rwanda. In Churches and Reconciliation in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda Delegations of Norwegian Church Aid, Churches of East DRC and the Council of Protestant Churches in Rwanda. Viewed from: http://www.cpr-rwanda.org/documents. [Date accessed: 13 April 2014].
have sought to address the issue by confessing and repenting on behalf of their members.

One of the religious values that have become important in post-genocide Rwanda is the idea that there are no fundamental differences between people who have different family, ethnic, racial, or cultural identities. Rwandan churches teach that all people are equal, no matter which group they come from. Reflecting on the government’s commitment to erase the ethnic identities that led to the conflict and genocide, religious groups have found various theological bases to support this change (Bazuim, 2013:144).

Indeed, churches have played an important role in post-genocide Rwanda. People who participate in religious programming more frequently demonstrate higher levels of forgiveness and reconciliation than people who participate less frequently. People use religion to make sense of what happened to them and to explain the changes they see in Rwanda after the genocide. Religious beliefs help people find meaning in their suffering, and participating in religious activities makes them feel less lonely. Religious friendships provide comfort and solace. Religious organisations teach, and provide resources and the context for important interpersonal encounters to occur (Bazuim, 2013:139, 172).

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter set out to answer how reconciliation addresses ethnic ideology and responds to the effects and consequences of genocide on Rwandan society. Based on the literature discussed in this chapter, it was found that the 1994 genocide created many devastating short-term consequences. It did not only affect the people but also destroyed their properties. The loss of livestock had an impact on economic and social life. Many people lost their trust; Rwandan children in particular witnessed extreme forms of brutality and lost all hope for their future. On the one hand, the survivors bear the brunt of the 1994 genocide. On the other hand, the perpetrators suffer guilt because of their wrongdoings. This chapter also indicated that genocide caused immense suffering for all. However, it had a different impact on men and women
because victimization is partly gender specific. Rape was systematic and used as a weapon by the perpetrators of the massacres. War rape continues to have consequences for the victims, including social isolation. Female rape survivors said that they had lost their dignity, respect and identity, and because of the social stigma attached to rape, many hid their status.

The task of restoring justice, peace and stability to Rwanda in the 1990’s was so overwhelming that it had the potential to distract from long-term, recurring issues arising out of Rwandan history. These long-term consequences of genocide not only include the on-going effects of trauma, but also the possibility that the violence reinforces ethnic ideology in a way that creates the conditions for another genocide in the future.

The chapter considered reconciliation as being necessary to address both ethnic ideology and the mentioned effects of genocide. Accordingly, a variety of initiatives and well-defined efforts to achieve reconciliation were described as a means of dealing with the past. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) handles cases involving the architects and implementers of genocide.

In addition to the ICTR, the Rwandan government made use of its own domestic judicial system—the Gacaca restorative justice system—that emanates from traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution. The chapter maintained that the Gacaca courts were not just a way to deliver justice to the huge number of prisoners awaiting trial, but also to facilitate the coming together of victims and perpetrators at the grassroots and to promote reconciliation amongst them.

Turning to the long-term effects of genocide, the NURC has worked towards healing communities, building confidence and establishing reconciliation. The NURC has organised many conferences, camps and workshops aimed at helping people better understand the roots of genocide, and how to proceed with life in its aftermath. The chapter revealed that the achievement of the NURC is designed to stimulate reconciliation at the grassroots level and to gradually transfer ownership of the reconciliation process to communities. The NURC also initiated the “Ndī
Umunyarwanda” (I am a Rwandan) programme, with the ultimate goal of building a national identity. This programme aims to undo the effects of colonial rule by creating “one Rwanda for all Rwandans.” For this reason the government urges Rwandans to no longer see themselves as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa, because ethnicity is an invention that was created by Rwanda’s colonizers. For sustainable peace and reconciliation to prevail, the “Ndi Umunyarwanda” programme stresses that an ethnic unity that Rwanda enjoyed before the coming of the European colonialists must be reaffirmed and taught to all Rwandans.

In addition to what the NURC has done, the churches in Rwanda, particularly the Presbyterian Church, have effectively engaged in reconciliation processes and addressed the short-term effects of genocide by caring for the widows, orphans, victims and perpetrators. However, looking at the bigger picture, these churches have not dealt with the long-term causes and effects of ethnic ideology. There is still the need for a theological rationale, which can deconstruct ethnic ideology in a similar way to what the “Ndi Umunyarwanda” programme is attempting to accomplish. In the light of the above findings, the following chapter will ask: If reconciliation is a necessity in the Rwandan context, and as such, is biblically and theologically based, then (1) why should the church, on theological grounds, participate in the ministry of reconciliation? And, if it should, (2) how may it, once again on theological grounds, do so? This in turn lays the foundation for chapter six, which focuses on evaluating how reconciliation initiatives and programmes fostered by the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda address ethnic ideology and respond to the post-genocide effects.
CHAPTER SIX
EVALUATING THE MINISTRY OF RECONCILIATION IN THE
PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN RWANDA

6.1 Introduction

Reflecting back on the previous chapters, chapter 1 set the stage as an overview and introduction to the study. Chapter 2 provided a conceptual analysis of the term reconciliation, with specific reference to its sociological and biblical-theological meanings. The dimensional approach to reconciliation and its implications were also discussed. Chapter 2 ended stating the following: “reconciliation revealed the heart of a theology of mission” (Langmead, 2008:6). It also indicated that reconciliation is both a “process and the goal of mission” (Huyse, 2003). Furthermore, from a theological and biblical perspective, reconciliation was shown to be God’s work and human beings are His agents in the ministry of reconciliation. Chapter 3 presented the broad historical context of Rwanda and asked how colonial authorities, in collaboration with Rwandan elites, constructed the ethnic ideology that resulted in genocide. Chapter 4 reviewed the historical background of mission in Africa, as well the Rwandan church’s response to ethnic ideology and its participation in the genocide. Moreover, the Rwandan church was accused of being actively involved in the violence through its close relationship with the government. However, Rwandans continue to look toward the same Christian church and governmental institutions for guidance during the reconciliation process. These institutions have a large role to play here, as was discussed in chapter 5.

Given the extent of the Rwandan genocide, chapter 6 returns to the Rwandan context and asks whether and how the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda has been or is engaged in addressing ethnic ideology and promoting reconciliation. Being a realist evaluation study, this chapter employs the realistic evaluation with it context–mechanisms–outcomes (CMO) approach, which sets out to understand why a programme works, for whom it works, and under what circumstances it works. Therefore, the CMO is
employed to evaluate how and whether the ministry of reconciliation in the Presbyterian Church has addressed ethnic ideology and responded to the challenges and consequences of the 1994 genocide. This chapter critically analyses the content, processes and outcomes in the EPR’s documents and literature, as well as evaluates expectations of reconciliation by clarifying explicit and implicit suppositions of how and why things will change because of reconciliation.

The current chapter comprises five sections. Section 6.2 briefly presents the historical background of the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda and its mission activities. In reference to the research questions of the study (stated in section 1.3), section 6.3 answers the question, which theology of reconciliation and theology of mission have informed the current practices and processes of the Church in Rwanda. This question bring us to section 6.4 which describes the role of the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda (EPR) and discusses in details four main activities in which the EPR addresses the effects of genocide and promotes reconciliation. Section 6.5 evaluates whether these programs led to significant impacts and changes in attitudes and behaviours, particularly in relation to the existence of ethnic ideology, taking into account the four dimensions of reconciliation proposed in section 2.5. Section 6.6 focuses on the question of whether the Church is an effective instrument through which to address ethnic ideology and respond to the effects of genocide in Rwanda.

It is important to be reminded that the research aim of this study is to investigate the ministry of reconciliation as a response to ethnic ideology and genocide and theologically evaluate the role played by the EPR. This chapter therefore discusses research findings from church documents and archives in line with other literatures. This involves testing three sets of research key questions mentioned in chapter one (see 1.4):

- Which theologies of reconciliation and theology of mission has informed the current practices and processes of the Church in Rwanda to undo ethnic ideology?
• Is the Church an ‘effective’ body and instrument through which to address ethnic ideology and respond to effects of genocide and promote reconciliation in Rwanda?

• To what extent is the EPR involved in the ministry of reconciliation in the country and, if this involvement exists, is it effective and what theological guidelines inform or may inform its involvement?

6.2 The historical background of the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda

In 1900, a team of German missionaries led by Pastor Ernest Johanssen came to Rwanda via Bukoba, Tanzania. On July 22 1907, Johanssen went to see King Musinga and asked him for permission to work in Rwanda. From that meeting, he was allowed to build the first mission at Zinga in Gisaka ( Rwamagana District, Eastern Province). Pastor Johanssen was granted the privilege of building a house in Kigali and also built a second mission in Kirinda on the 28th of August 1907.

From 1916 to 1921, there were no missionaries situated in these mission stations because war had broken out between Germany and Belgium. At the same time, Rwanda was experiencing a devastating famine. This harmful situation slowed the progress of the evangelisation campaign. After the war, Rwanda fell under the colonial administration of the Belgians, and so the Belgian state asked the Belgian Protestant Mission Society to send missionaries from the Congo to Rwanda to carry out the evangelisation campaign started by the German missionaries.

In 1956, the first synod took place with the purpose of gathering the three mission stations at Kirinda, Rubengera and Remera into one church. In 1959, the Belgian Protestant Mission Society decided to hand the church leadership over to the synod, and from that time onwards, the church became independent (Gatwa & Karamaga, 1990:42). All congregations and church programmes are accountable to their presbyteries. The presbyteries are in turn accountable to the general synod, which is the leading organ of the church and coordinated by the president of the church assisted by the vice president. The Presbyterian Church in Rwanda maintains a close partnership with its traditional partners including Belgium, Switzerland, Germany,
and the Netherlands, and remains an active member in many ecumenical organisations in and outside Rwanda.

After it became autonomous in 1959, the new church became known as the Evangelical Presbyterian Church in Rwanda (Eglise Evangelique Presbyterienne au Rwanda, ‘EEPR’ in French). Later on, the name was changed to the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda [Eglise Presbyterienne au Rwanda (EPR)]. For the EPR, the title “evangelical” seemed too narrow because of their ecumenical involvement. The Presbyterian Church in Rwanda focuses on both evangelism and social work through its health, education and development projects, with its main aim being to respond to the dire needs of misery, poverty, hunger, illness and ignorance. The EPR’s understanding of evangelism is related to the teaching of a transformative gospel, especially in a context where the newer Christian denominations stress prosperity and salvation, ignoring the daily realities of everyday life. These ideas are well captured in Bevans and Schroeder (2004:8) who state that mission of the church is not expansion, but integrating men and women into a community as an expression of God in the world through preaching, serving, and witnessing. In this respect, the mission of EPR is fulfilled through saying (proclamation) and doing (action) that involves the social reality and meets a person’s life at a particular point of need.

David Bosch’s understanding of a missional church provides a helpful way of thinking about the mission of EPR. For Bosch (1991), a missional ecclesiology entails that the church engage with and challenge the world. This is implies that service, mission and evangelism are stressed. Neither focus should ever be at the expense of the other; rather, they stand in each other’s service (Bosch, 1991:385). Accordingly, the vision of EPR is “to be a strong Church, whose members are spiritually mature, social environment fully blossomed and able to testify of God’s Kingdom in the world” (Nsengimana, 2015:72). In order to fulfil its vision, the EPR mission on the one hand entails “evangelisation through the proclamation of the love and the salvation offered by God in Jesus Christ, and on the other hand manifesting the love of God through concrete actions of social and human development” (Nsengimana, 2015:72). The EPR achieves its mission by focusing on three main pillars, namely,

35Viewed from: www.vemission.org. [Date accessed: 2 September 2015].
“preaching the Word of God, promoting the socio-economic welfare of Church members in particular and the whole Rwandan community in general, and promoting peace, unity, tolerance and reconciliation” (Nsengimana, 2015:72). It is clear that the mission of the EPR is to be relevant and contribute to the common good of people in society.

Even though the aim of this chapter is to evaluate the ministry of reconciliation achieved by the EPR in the aftermath of genocide, it is important to be reminded that throughout history the EPR was not immune to the development of ethnic ideology that culminated in the 1994 genocide. As indicated in chapter 4, like the White Fathers, Protestant missionaries could not escape the racial and ethnic theories that were widespread in Europe and the social divisions of the societies in which they had grown up and studied (Benda, 2012:69). In the case of Rwanda, Gatwa states that the protestant missionary societies did not challenge the notion of the superiority of the Tutsi above other ethnic groups; rather, they also promoted and propagated the ideology of a ‘pure race’ (Gatwa, 2005:76). With regards to socio-political and cultural life, Pastor Johanssen of the Bethel Mission expressed an opinion which suggested a belief in the superiority of the ‘pastoral race’ when he wrote:

The population of Rwanda comprises organically three races: the Watutsi, the Bahutu and the Batwa. The Watutsi are a clan of Hamitic pastoralist origin who, by their stature, their colour and their intellectual possibilities, differ fundamentally from the two other races which it has subjected under domination though it represents less than ten percent of population…. The Hamitic pastoralist clans did not only introduce the hump bovine from Asia, but also intellectual values of a different nature. Where they succeeded to establish their domination through their legend and graduations, they exerted an influence on the cult, even the spiritual life of the population (quoted by Gatwa, 2005:78).

According to Gatwa (2005:81), the Bethel missionaries were admirers of the Tutsi and their structure of society. They believed in the supremacy of the Tutsi. In the post-colonial period, Gatwa explains that, like their Catholic counterparts, the Protestant hierarchy adhered to the government’s policies. In the case of the Protestants, this adhesion can be traced to the regime of Habyarimana (Gatwa, 2005:136).
With regards to the position of the EPR, Gatwa affirms that the EPR endorsed all the forms of pressure and repression utilized by the Habyarimana regime and his MRND party (Gatwa, 2005:141). The President (moderator) of the Presbyterian Church, for example, served on the regional committee of the ruling party (MRND) in his home region. The cooperation between the church and state was not only at the level of high-ranking church leaders but also at the local level of the congregations. Consequently, local pastors and priests were often closely allied with local burgomasters and communal councillors (Longman, 2001:166, 171).

For example, Longman (1995) wrote an article titled: ‘Genocide and Socio-Political Change: Massacres in Two Rwandan Villages’. It encompasses his research conducted in Rwanda, especially concerning the Kirinda and Biguhu Presbyterian Church parishes. Longman (1995:19) rightly concludes that the elite in Kirinda almost universally remained loyal to President Habyarimana’s party. They benefitted from the status quo and considered it in their interest to oppose a transfer of power. Longman recalls how, in 1992, one of the pastors, the high school principal of the Presbyterian school, and a leading businessman secretly formed a local chapter of the Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique (CDR), an extreme anti-Tutsi political group. In this case, this close link between the church leaders and the state led to the involvement of the same church leaders in the 1994 genocide. More than a week after the massacres began in Kigali, the local Hutu elite, including the burgomaster and some church leaders, organized a mob to kill Kirinda’s Tutsi (Longman, 1995:19). This is but one example; there were many pastors in different congregations of the EPR who held the same view of ethnic ideology.

The starting point of the EPR’s work on reconciliation therefore involved its public confession. Indeed, Gatwa (2005:227) explains that during the 36th General Synod held at Kigali from 10-15 December 1996, the EPR became the first church to repent before God and the whole nation of Rwanda for its failure to prevent and denounce the preparation or the execution of the 1994 genocide. The message of confession and repentance as Gatwa puts it, is also addressed to all Christians around the world to denounce and oppose murder of any kind and to resist ethnicism:

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Dear Rwandans and Christians, the time has come to proceed with self-criticism because the Church of God is ashamed of having been incapable of opposing or denouncing the planning and execution of the genocide. As God servant Nehemiah did (Neh. 1:5-11), so, we the Synod, in the name of the members of the Presbyterian Church of Rwanda, repent and ask forgiveness before God and the nation for our weakness and lack of courage when these were needed. The Synod asks the people of Rwanda and the world-wide Christian family to oppose every rejection of God’s will for his creatures, to denounce and resist strongly ethnicity, regionalism and religious divisions. For God, there is no Jew, Greek, Hutu, Tutsi nor Twa. We are all one in Christ (Gatwa, 2005:227-228).

This historical background of the EPR brings us to the next section that discusses the theology of reconciliation, which has informed the current practices and processes of the Church in Rwanda.

6.3 Theology of reconciliation: Practices and processes of the church in Rwanda

This section argues that reflecting on a theology of reconciliation is necessary for the church to achieve their full potential of promoting reconciliation in Rwanda. On the one hand, this section shows that in the aftermath of the genocide, there was no systematic and cohesive reflection on the theology of reconciliation. On the other hand, theology of reconciliation was not entirely absent from the Rwandan churches. As such, theology of reconciliation was contextual (Bosch, 1991), as it focused on understanding the mechanisms of reconciliation, from the way individuals comprehend their realities.

In the post-genocide era, the terms “ubumwe” (unity) and “ubwiyunge” (reconciliation) are often heard and used. For Rwandans, ‘unity’ and ‘reconciliation’ are the two cornerstones of Rwanda’s future, because there is no future without unity and no unity without reconciliation (Benda, 2012:221). Nonetheless, Benda challenges churches in Rwanda by suggesting that Christians have been as sluggish in addressing reconciliation as they were in denouncing ethnic ideology. Christian leaders failed to critically offer clear guidelines on how believers should negotiate the genocide’s aftermath. Also, Christian leaders and thinkers delayed a necessary and urgent reflection on the possibilities of reconciliation. Therefore, Benda concludes that there is no clearly articulated Christian theology of or even a cohesive reflection on reconciliation (Benda, 2012:221).
In this assessment, Benda is both right and wrong. He is wrong in the sense that a theology of reconciliation was not entirely absent from the Rwandan churches. These churches, including the EPR, clearly understood the work of reconciliation to be part of their mission in post-genocide Rwanda, and as we shall see, undertook a number of programmes to address trauma and material devastation. At the same time, Benda is correct in the sense that these acts of reconciliation were not conceived under a systematic, theological understanding of reconciliation. As such, there may be elements of reconciliation that the Rwandan churches have overlooked. In this regard, it is argued here that the element of reconciliation most often overlooked is the need to deconstruct ethnic ideology.

However, there is the possible danger that a more cohesive theology of reconciliation will be imposed from the top down. Ethnic ideology must be addressed by Christian theology, especially because it still has an impact on the lives of Rwandans at ground level. In this case, the Rwandan church leaders’ theologies fall under Bosch’s proposal that all missions should be contextually defined. For Bosch, contextual theology is theology from below, from the “underside of history,” its main interlocutor is the poor or the culturally marginalised. The emphasis is on the priority of praxis (Bosch, 1991:423). To put it differently, contextual theology should be based on the experience, understanding and perspective of individuals and groups in the congregations. Based on Bosch’s argument, it therefore holds that a missiological-theological study could be developed from the Rwandans own understanding of reconciliation mechanisms, from the way they comprehend the reality of ethnic ideology, genocide and reconciliation within their context. Such engagement of theology with those who suffer will hold great implications for the transformation and construction of a new world (Bosch, 1991:424).

In accordance with Bosch’s viewpoint of contextual theology, Isaak (2001:325) also says:

A missional church understands its participation in Missio Dei as contextual, addressing faithfully the challenges of ever changing and complex contexts, and thus, in comprehensive and holistic ways. Mission is contextual with regard to its aim, practice, and location. Its aim encompasses the whole of creation (ecological concerns), the whole of life (spiritual, social, political, economic, and
cultural), and the whole human being (soul and body). Its practice calls for the participation of the whole church, women and men, young and old. Being contextual, the church seeks and works for reconciliation and healing. That is the being-ness and the sent-ness of the church.

According to Bate (1998:4), contextual theology therefore means “…the attempt to reflect upon the experience of faith which is lived in a particular context. It is the lived experience of faith within the community. Contextual theology is by its very nature communitarian”. In the context of Rwanda, Benda refers to Grey (2007) who suggests that reconciliation can only come out of strong Christian communities where structural and generational sins are confessed. A Rwandan theology of reconciliation will have to be a public liberation theology, which is (1) in dialogue with Rwandan history, culture, tradition and religious rituals, (2) in dialogue with other world religions; and most importantly, (3) a public theology from the periphery that allows the victim and the theologian to speak and bring God back to the centre of humanity’s affairs in Rwanda (Benda, 2012:231).

In the aftermath of the 1994 genocide, the EPR was informed by a theology of reconstruction, and then only later on adopted a theology of reconciliation. The question to be asked then is: “What does a theology of reconstruction entail in the EPR?” As was indicated in chapter 5, the effect of the 1994 genocide on the Tutsi was enormous. Nsengimana (2015:18-9) states, “Besides the great loss of human lives, physical and psychological injuries, hopelessness and uncertainty about the future, the Rwandan social fabric was destroyed and the infrastructure and environment were critically damaged. The 1994 genocide against Tutsis left more or less 300,000 survivors. Among them werewidows, orphans and disabled people who were deeply affected both psychologically and physically”.

To that end, André Karamaga, the first president of the EPR after 1994, called for the reconstruction of the damaged country. He saw the church and Rwandan society like a valley of bones36 (Ezekiel 37:3-6). Karamaga’s hope, however, lay in the fact that the church has a mandate and obligation to ‘construct’ a new future of hope and

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36Karamaga’ Speech during the 36th General Synod of EPR held in Kigali from 10th to 15th December 1996. Dr. André Karamaga is a Presbyterian theologian and minister, he served as President of EPR after the genocide. Currently, he is a General Secretary of All African conference of churches (AACC).
harmony. He argued that a better future for Rwanda would depend on how the church will engage in the process of reconstruction. This is why, during the 1996 General Synod of the EPR, the proposed biblical theme was ‘Let us rise up and build,’ from the book of Nehemiah 2:18. This theme was suggested as a motto for all Presbyterians. Songs and sermons in all congregations were composed around the theme. The theme played an important role in the theology of reconstruction because it called people to work together for the reconstruction of a new Rwanda. The theme also called all church members to participate in the rebuilding of the country. However, it is important to bear in mind that the idea of reconstruction is different to the well-known “theology of reconstruction” found among scholars in the field of theology. In the aftermath of the genocide, the idea of reconstruction was related to the numerous effects of genocide that destroyed the lives of people and their properties.

The first place where the theological challenge of genocide manifested itself in the life of the EPR was in theological education. For this reason, Elisée Musemakweli was called in 1995 from Belgium to serve as a teacher of theology. On his arrival, Musemakweli (2014:2) lamented, “The school had been in operation before the genocide but some students had been killed and lecturers fled, everything was destroyed, so we had to start from scratch”. ‘Starting from scratch’ had a new meaning in a post-genocide Rwanda. Those who wanted to learn and grow their faith had new kinds of questions and a new kind of world view. As Musemakweli (2014:2) said, “It was not easy to teach to the same way and theological ideas we did before the genocide”, He adds, “I remember the first student who asked me a very tough question. He said, ‘You’re going to teach theology but we know that before the genocide that theology was taught in this school. We know that many ministers have been involved in the genocide – (and they are supposed to be) serving God in this country. Now, what kind of theology are you going to teach us?’” Part of this section is aimed at answering this student’s complex question.

37 This is from an interview with Dr. Elisée Musemakweli, who from the theology college as a teacher became President of the Presbyterian Church of Rwanda, with Rev. Debbie Braaksma, African Area Coordinator for the Presbyterian Mission Agency PCUSA (March 6, 2014). Viewed from: www.pcusa.org/news/. Rwanda 20 years later. [Date accessed: 19 February 2016].
Musemakweli (2014:2) commented that he had to reflect on what had changed and what kind of lessons must be taught. Musemakweli (2014:2) said his answer was found in his faith. “I knew we needed a message from the Bible, from God, to these people who are suffering. We had to understand the meaning of God in the Rwandan context. What is the meaning of Christ? What is the meaning of faith in this kind of situation?” Within scripture he found texts relating to reconciliation. He said the story of Joseph became very meaningful and was relevant to what many had gone through during the genocide. He also used books related to examining the reconciliation process. Students read these and discussed them, learning how to facilitate healing between people. In this regard, Rutayisire (2012:78) explains, “The Church in Rwanda has been led to rediscover the gospel of reconciliation in its components of repentance and confession as well as healing and forgiveness, which both lead to real reconciliation”. Benda also uses Rutayisire’s (2010) idea when he maintains that the flourishing of the Rwandan church in the aftermath of the events of 1994 is related to the rediscovering of the gospel of reconciliation. This rediscovery came in the shape of six important themes: (1) a new perspective on sin and alienation, (2) the power of preaching Christ crucified, (3) a new perspective on identity, (4) a new perspective on the gospel of reconciliation, (5) a new perspective on social relationships, and (6) a new perspective on the power of unity38 (cited by Benda, 2012:222).

Rutayisire (2010) adds that for the majority of Christians, reconciliation is inseparable from soteriology; Rwandans cannot enter into reconciliation without a strong faith. Only faith can empower them to initiate the process and possibly see it through. For Rutayisire, the answer is to bring the grace of the Lord to these people through the preaching of the logos of reconciliation, intentionally and repeatedly, until reconciliation becomes a lifestyle and not a mission or program (cited by Benda, 2012:223).

38For Rutayisire, rediscovering in this new perspective means: (1) sin is seen as the dividing factor among Rwandans, (2) Christ is the pain-bearer as well as sin-bearer, (3) identity is rooted in Christ rather than ethnicity, (4) the church is the depository of reconciliation, (5) it is not Hutu or Tutsi but a ‘holy nation’ unto God, and (6) unity entails a life of discipleship.
The Christian methodology of reconciliation takes its cue solely from this theological stance: the gospel is the only possible source of reconciliation. The majority of Christian churches and organisations working in the area of reconciliation have adopted this way in practice. The difference is in the channels that the gospel travels through. Churches privilege sermons, biblical studies and prayer meetings. Organisations such as African Evangelism Enterprise (AEE), Catholic Relief Service, Norwegian Church Aid, Solace Ministry, and others, use seminars, conferences, workshops, short films, plays and radio programmes (Benda, 2012:224).

For Gatwa (2007), as suggested by Benda (2012:231), a theology of reconciliation is structured around at least seven themes. These are: (1) repentance, (2) justice, (3) a pedagogy of peace that focuses on young generations, (4) mediating between the three Rwandan communities through a revisiting of the whole spectrum of Rwandan fundamental values, (5) restoring relational harmony through an ‘ecclesiology of listening’, (6) the healing of memories by telling stories of suffering and violence, and (7) interpreting suffering with an appropriate hermeneutics.

From the perspective of the themes used by the General Synod of the EPR as mentioned earlier, and the views of Musemakweli, Rutayisire and Gatwa, I propose that after the 1994 genocide the church mainly based its theology of reconciliation on a biblical framework, focusing on rediscovering the gospel of reconciliation and interpreting suffering with an appropriate hermeneutics. This is well captured in Bazuin (2013:143), when he argues that religious explanations for suffering have been a comfort to many Rwandan people. Biblical stories and characters inspired them to find strength in the face of suffering and adversity. Similarly, people were inspired by stories, for instance, about Ruth and Naomi, and Jonah, but more especially, by stories where God provided protection to those facing adversity and trials, eventually blessing them. These Rwandans found meaning in their own suffering (and, for some, the suffering of their country) by applying similar principles: God saw them through the genocide, even if they did not emerge unscathed, and they hope for future blessings. Many other people cited the suffering of Job as their archetypal model for perseverance. For some Rwandans, going to church includes hearing these types of stories, reinforcing beliefs that God will satisfy their needs.
6.4 The role of the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda in the process of reconciliation

This section looks at the mechanisms by which the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda has promoted reconciliation. This section maintains that the EPR strongly involved itself in addressing some crucial issues related to the effects of genocide. The EPR has also undertaken various initiatives to promote reconciliation in the country. In order to share information, reconciliation aims to spur activities at multiple levels of the church. This means that reconciliation does not remain an activity of the elite; instead, it involves grass root actors, as well as high-level influential leaders. Multi-level engagement aims to establish a base network of people who act to address the root causes of genocide and its effect on the Rwandan society.

To this, the EPR added to its confession made by the synod of the EPR in 1996, conveying a message to all Rwandans showing the position and commitment of the EPR towards the ministry of reconciliation:

The EPR supports and is engaged in the process of reconciliation.

Reconciliation is the only way to help Rwandans to recover the social cohesion.

Reconciliation can only be achieved when there is: justice, truth-telling, repentance and forgiveness.

The EPR is committed to care and support survivors of the 1994 genocide.

In each parish, a club will be formed composed of people with integrity to follow up the reconciliation process carried out amongst the communities.

In December 1999 another EPR General Synod took place at Kigali. The leading theme was from Colossians 3:15, where Paul says: “The peace that Christ gives is to guide you in the decisions you make. For it is to this peace that God has called you to gather in the one body and be thankful”. This statement was adapted as follows: “We have been called to form one body”. The EPR’s vision of reconciliation reflects its role in raising awareness of reconciliation among the people and its desire to build a country in which all Rwandans can live in unity and peace with one another.

39 From the proceedings of the General Synod of the EPR held at Kigali in December 1999.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: four main activities related to the ministry of reconciliation done by the EPR are discussed in section 6.4. These include: (1) The Centre for Formation and Documentation (CFD) program and reconciliation, (2) Holistic missions and reconciliation, (3) Promoting a missiological perspective of the ministry of reconciliation by taking into account story-telling, listening and social services in the reconciliation process, and (4) Commemoration of the 1994 genocide in relation to reconciliation. Furthermore, these abovementioned activities are evaluated in section 6.5 according to the four dimensions of reconciliation as mentioned in chapter 2 (section 2.5), namely: relationship-building, forgiveness, truth-telling and healing.

6.4.1 The Centre for Formation and Documentation (CFD) program and reconciliation

Reconciliation in the post-genocide era requires building the capacity of people in order to respond to their needs and to build new relationships. Capacity-building incorporates a range of skills, such as the comprehension of the development of ethnic ideology throughout the history of Rwanda, peace building, conflict resolution and violence prevention. These skills are generally passed down through intensive training, seminars and conferences where the basic concepts are provided and applied. In this section, I examine how the EPR is contributing to reconciliation efforts via CFD training.

The CFD is one program of the EPR. The program’s main focus is to unite the faith traditions of Rwanda in a mission of reconciliation. Why is the EPR interested in involving other denominations? The pastors seem to be determined that the church of the future should transcend denominationalism. Rev. Aaron Mugemera said, “How can we talk to our people about reconciliation when we are divided?” (Cited in McCullum, 1995:74). For this reason, the Presbyterian Church started the CFD

Pastor Aaron Mugemera is alone. His entire family, all six of his children including his wife, were butchered by militias before his eyes. He was in hiding when the Interahamwe burst into the house where they had fled for safety. As he watched, unable to do anything, the seven members of his family were hacked to death. To add to his pain, the killers were members of his congregation, some of whom he had baptized. His sad eyes reflect his loneliness and pain.
program acknowledging that if they are to preach reconciliation to their members, then they also needed to be united with other confessions and denominations.

The EPR decided that there is a need to study the Bible and other key texts to see how to respond to the genocide to promote unity and reconciliation. From this effort came official statements supporting Christian work for peace and reconciliation. In addition, the CFD also produced written documents\(^\text{41}\) (books and booklets) outlining the newly developed reconciliation theology, and a two-year training programme for pastors and lay leaders in their local churches. It is important to note that these books are used not only in EPR congregations but also in other denominations, including the Anglican Church in Rwanda (EER), the Free Methodist in Rwanda (EMRL), and the Baptist Church in Rwanda (UEBR).

Reconciliation conferences organised by the CFD are typically held in church guesthouses as well as in institutions of learning. They are organised around the theme of, ‘The role of the religions in fostering unity and reconciliation of the people of Rwanda.’ These conferences are facilitated by an interreligious team made up of a Catholic priest, a Protestant minister, a Muslim leader, and a Presbyterian minister (who serves as the coordinator and presents the objectives of the programme). The Protestant minister and Catholic priest discuss the role of religion in Rwanda as being to address the causes and effects of the 1994 genocide and to describe their vision in the process of reconciliation, whereas the Muslim leader comments on the importance of Islamic teachings on unity and reconciliation.\(^\text{42}\)

The CFD program promotes not only reconciliation but also inter-faith dialogue and inter-denominational relationships. According to Neufeldt (2011:358), interfaith dialogue from a peace building perspective aims at correcting attitudes and

\(^{41}\) For example: in the book entitled Christian life written in 2009, topics of reconciliation are emphasised, among them: 1) the work of reconciliation, 2) what does the bible says about reconciliation, 3) justice and forgiveness, 4) understanding forgiveness from the biblical perspective, 5) justice and forgiveness as reconciliation, 6) reconciliation and development and 7) the church as agent of mission of reconciliation) source of real. (In Duhugurane, amahugugwa y’ibanze mu bya theolojiya: Imibereho y’umukristo. Umwaka wa kabiri, 2009).

perceptions of the ‘other’. At the same time, negative stereotypes and dehumanization of the ‘other’ are to be eliminated. The participation of peace building and reconciliation will help to develop a joint platform to address the root causes of the conflict as well as its consequences. Benda (2012:220) clearly affirms that Muslim leadership in Rwanda, for example, has taken an important practical step by being actively involved in different interreligious initiatives whose main objective is reconciliation. Different Muftis of Rwanda have been active in the creation and leadership of inter-faith initiatives with the purpose of addressing major issues affecting Rwandan society at large, such as reconciliation, HIV-AIDS, poverty and education. In most of the inter-faith bodies interested in reconciliation, a Muslim leader is either the chairperson or the deputy chairperson. For instance, in one meeting of such bodies, Sheikh Harelimana Saleh delivered a keynote speech and encouraged all faith groups to work together in order to streamline reconciliation activities towards achieving effective reconciliation for the good of the nation. Together, these confessions engaged in promoting unity and reconciliation as well as training, focusing particularly on reconciliation workshops.

Training the trainers of community workers and leaders of groups has proved to be effective in promoting healing and reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda. This is because staff, working from various perspectives in multiple settings, could integrate into their ongoing work (Staub et al., 2005:303). In this respect, the EPR sees reconciliation seminar programs as important in the reconciliation process. Church administrators working in the central office of the EPR under the leadership of the president of the church, conducts seminars teaching the Christian concepts of forgiveness and reconciliation in congregations across the country. The goal of the office is to reach each of its congregations in the country and train other local trainers. The curriculum is based upon biblical precepts of reconciliation and other documents related to unity and reconciliation. The main topics addressed in these seminars are the Christian understanding of love, forgiveness, peace and reconciliation. The Presbyterian Church targets a wide range of individuals for these seminars with the intention of bringing divided groups together.

43 A Mutif is a Muslim leader.
After the training, some pastors felt it was necessary to deliver messages promoting peaceful coexistence. Some were involved in more concrete actions such as reconciling people during eruptions of conflict, sensitising perpetrators to plead guilty, and seek forgiveness from the victims and their families, encouraging youth to form clubs, and encouraging Christians to help orphaned survivors of genocide. Others also mobilised Christians to tell the truth in Gacaca, to help orphans of the genocide, and where possible, to get involved in mediation and peaceful conflict resolution. Other actions included preaching in prisons, especially raising the awareness of prisoners towards truth-telling, caring for traumatised people and fighting against the growth of ethnic ideology, particularly among the youth.

6.4.2. Holistic missions and reconciliation

The EPR is convinced that evangelisation and preaching the Word of God will have a definite impact on the living conditions of the addressees. Through evangelisation, church leaders and ministers do their best to make the EPR a church characterized in the following two ways: In the first way, the EPR focuses on evangelisation, since preaching the Good News is the core of mission. By evangelisation, the EPR refers to Bosch (2011:11) who states, “Evangelism is the proclamation of salvation in Christ to those who do not believe him, calling them to repentance and conversion, announcing forgiveness of sin, and inviting them to become living members of Christ’s earthly community and to begin a life of service to others in the power of the Holy Spirit”.

In the second way, the EPR focuses on holistic mission, which includes all activities that are meant to improve social welfare among Rwandans in general. As part of its holistic mission, the EPR promoted constructive engagement, which has improved people’s lives and their community as a whole. As such, at the grassroots of the reconciliation programme, the EPR initiated activities that responded specifically to community needs, such as developing small income generation projects.

The context of the EPR’s social activities is to consider all aspects of people’s lives. The EPR is involved in several activities such as educational and developmental programmes, especially in rural areas, since over 80% of its church members live in rural settlements. The EPR is also involved in the medical and health sector. Part of
the programme is dedicated to fighting HIV/AIDS and also providing charity work to some of its members who are deprived.

As indicated in section 3.10.5, extreme poverty and economic constraints contributed to hardening the ethnic ideology that resulted in the 1994 genocide. Thus, the EPR also identified economic factors as a source of division in Rwanda. For this reason, it has created economic development seminars to combat economic inequalities in and around their congregations. The EPR thought that the message of reconciliation would go unheard if people were suffering from a relative deprivation of material resources. This is why the EPR is now providing educational seminars on how to improve agriculture and farming, family planning and HIV/AIDS prevention. The EPR also initiated activities of associations for church members; these involve income generation, small businesses, sensitization, and the promotion of reconciliation.

In its mission, the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda focuses on holistic salvation. Thus, a successful economic project, for instance, can help contribute to the well-being of the people. Similarly, failed economic projects can destroy people’s self-confidence. The theme of the 40th synod held at Kibuye in December 2001 was: ‘life in abundance’ taken from John 10:10. This is why the church continues to encourage its members in their parishes to work together in association and cooperative development. It also creates awareness of the need to save money in the bank, with the aim of reducing poverty.

As has been indicated in this study, throughout the history of Rwanda, social, economic and political ideologies have been considered as contributing to the genocide. For this reason, the Rwandan government sees the unity and reconciliation of the Rwandan people as the basis for defeating these issues. In post-genocide Rwanda, victims and perpetrators live peacefully in the same villages and communities. However, some victims are still traumatised whenever they remember the terrible acts of torture they faced, which has affected their social and economic livelihoods. In this regard, the primary focus of reconciliation programmes conducted by the EPR is to overcome discrimination, division and economic inequality.
6.4.3. Promoting a missiological perspective in the ministry of reconciliation

This section focuses on how the EPR played a significant role in the reconciliation process, and in its mission of caring for the community. This is owing to the fact that in the case of Rwanda, both the perpetrators of the genocide and the survivors attend the same church. This means that the pastoral role of the ministry of the EPR is to serve as a healing place for both victims and perpetrators.

There is a Rwandan proverb that reads as follows: “amarira y’umugabo atemba ajya mu nda.” Which literally means “the tears of a man flow into his stomach”. It reflects the cultural norm that pain should be kept inside. But the prevailing ‘model’ of reconciliation, as Trimikliniotis (2012:245) puts it, is “the need to address past violence, oppressions and divisions by connecting to an accepted narrative of ‘truth’ about the past violence”. For him, reconciliation is also seen as “breaking the silence about the past via the recognition of ‘the truth’; acknowledging the wrongdoing is as much about the future as it is about memory” (Trimikliniotis, 2012:247). In this respect, the role of the EPR would be to provide spaces and opportunities for individuals to tell their painful stories related to the 1994 experience.

6.4.3.1 Story-telling in the reconciliation process

In post-genocide Rwanda, trauma and post-traumatic stress disorders are some of the main issues that have impacted on the health of individuals, and their potential for development and social change. Hence, effective recovery and trauma healing programmes were necessary to balance the emotions and thoughts of traumatized individuals, as a way of re-integrating them back into society and promoting their holistic development (Mukabera, 2012:101). At the same time, “reconciliation must find ways to address the past without getting locked into a vicious cycle of mutual exclusiveness inherent in the past. In the reconciliation process, people need opportunity and space to express to and with one another the trauma of loss, their grief at that loss, and the anger that accompanies the pain and the memory of injustice experienced” (Lederach, 1997:26)

Many scholars consider storytelling a key component in the healing and reconciliation process. De Gruchy (2002:22, 23), for example, emphasises the necessity of
storytelling in the process of reconciliation by proposing that, “the best way to speak about reconciliation is through story-telling rather than through systematic expositions of dogma. Story-telling is, in fact, the most appropriate genre for introducing the Christian understanding of reconciliation; it was also a primary form discourse at the TRC”. Furthermore, de Gruchy (2002:23) believes that “for many victims, their stories related to the Christian narrative of salvation history. Their stories were personalised cameos of lives shaped by faith, forgiveness and hope derived from the Gospel but lived out amidst the social and political traumas of their time”.

For victims, sharing their stories is seen by some as a powerful way to redefine the past, reimagine the future and affect social change. It is also a way to re-establish commonly shared values and a shared past. Sverrisson (2006:11) observes that “…reinterpretation is the key word, enabling the survivor to ‘re-humanise’ the perpetrators. The facts can’t be changed, but the meaning given to them and the perceptions can be altered by gathering and introducing credible account of the events”. This is the central issue concerning reconciliation is described by Lederach (1997:27, 26) in the following excerpt:

Reconciliation, in essence, represents a place, the point of encounter where concerns about the past and the future can meet. Reconciliation-as-encounter suggests that space for acknowledging the past and envisioning the future is the necessary ingredient for reframing the present. For this to happen, people must find ways to encounter themselves and their enemies, their hopes and their fears. Acknowledgement through hearing one another’s stories validates experience and represents the first step toward restoration of the person and the relationship.

For this reason, the EPR advocated storytelling in its congregations. It provided victims and perpetrators with a safe space to tell their stories and dialogue with one another. During the liturgical service, there is an open time called “gutanganga ubuhamya,” which means ‘giving testimony’. This opportunity helped church members to open up and tell their stories, hear one another, and testify to God’s power in terrible situations. This has facilitated the healing of their wounds caused by the 1994 genocide. Boers (1992:88) also supports the notion of storytelling when he states: “Victims need to know that they have been heard and that their experience is recognised as significant. Victims need someone to listen to them. They must have opportunities to tell their story and to vent their feelings, perhaps over and over. They
must tell their truth. And they need others to suffer with them, to lament with them the evil that has been done”.

6.4.3.2 Counselling, listening and social services

Counselling has been another strategy to promote reconciliation in the EPR, especially at the level of the local congregation. The successful results of reconciliation in the parishes are due to the involvement of pastors because they were well-equipped and trained in conflict resolution and trauma counselling. Pastors offer counselling by listening to both victims and perpetrators, focusing on the importance of helping both groups through the trauma they experienced. The main function of pastoral care and counselling is on sustaining, empowering, guiding, reconciling, nurturing and healing people in need of psychological and spiritual care (Nagaju, 2013:91).

In Rwanda, churches were understood as civil society organisations best situated to provide immediate and direct services at the grassroots level. The church in mission is obligated to help the needy in society. In the EPR congregations, through diaconal service, pastors, evangelists, elders and deacons are aware of the needs of their church members and surrounding community. They are also better able to mobilise members when the need arises in the community. The deacons were faced with a huge task after the genocide. There were many vulnerable people. The EPR has been sensitising deacons so as to launch charity projects to improve the conditions of the vulnerable. For children from poor families, orphans, or child-headed households, deacons and church members have the moral obligation to help them obtain school fees. The EPR also helps street children. There were several children roaming the streets of Kigali, as they had no families with sufficient means to support them. Therefore, in response to the consequences of genocide, the EPR created a centre to take care of these children whose future otherwise seems bleak.

Huyse (2003:54) maintains, “Victims are at the heart of all dimensions of the reconciliation process in societies emerging from violent conflict. It is crucially important that policy makers and civil society leaders are aware of the many faces of victimhood. This awareness must guide the search for adequate victim programs”.

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This idea of victims being at the center of the reconciliation process justifies the reason why the EPR gives special attention to victims.

**Services provided to the victims.** Among the survivors of the Rwandan genocide were thousands of widows and orphans. Richters and Van Brakel (2008:26) point out that after seeing all the problems that orphans face, many programmes were set up nationwide to protect orphans; these included both government and private initiatives. The national programme was called “Ijisho ry’umuturanyi,” meaning “the eye of a neighbour” or “take a child as yours”. This means, if you see a child of a neighbour with a problem you intervene as though that child was yours. This national initiative was put forward by Rwanda’s First Lady to help orphans, but also to protect all Rwandan children in general. The EPR has played a part in this by assisting orphans and street children.

The EPR supports the needs of Rwandan genocide survivors by providing financial assistance, building houses, providing medical and psychological assistance, and paying school fees. In this regard, Bazuin (2013:170) affirms that churches have historically been and still are significant economic actors in Rwandan society. After the genocide, they have mobilised large amounts of material and economic resources to build houses and pay school fees for survivors, and to a lesser extent, assist families where the main breadwinner has been imprisoned. Both social support and economic resources are important components.

**Services provided to perpetrators.** Like victims, perpetrators also command our attention in the reconciliation process. According to Volf (2006:66), “The wrongdoers would need to accept “the consequences of their misdeeds, repent, and provide restitution as far as possible the wronged would need to nurse their wounds and restore a measure of wholeness to their self, forgive those who have offended them, and seek to mend broken relationships with their offenders” In this regard, reconciliation seeks to rebuild social relations and helps both victim and perpetrator to live together, peacefully without hatred, fear or bitterness. Perpetrators were not excluded from the EPR’s reconciliation programmes.
The ministry to prisoners is seen as an important way of promoting the process of reconciliation among perpetrators who are still in prison. Therefore, the visitation of genocide perpetrators by pastors, elders and Christians in prison helped them to confess their crimes and reconcile with their victims. The church also taught them the necessary steps to meet survivors, tell the truth, and confess the wrong they have done.

6.4.4 Commemoration of the 1994 genocide in relation to reconciliation

In his book, *The end of Memory: Remembering rightly in a violent world*, Miroslav Volf (2006) understands that to remember a wrongdoing is to struggle against it. For Volf, the central question is how to remember rightly. He (2006:11-12) claims that “…remembering rightly the abuse I suffered is not a private affair even when it happens in the seclusion of my mind. Since others are always remembering abuse is of public significance”. This implies that remembering does not only help the individual but also for the wrongdoer and the community at large. Along the same vein, Schreiter (1989:66) reminds us, “To urge the forgetting of painful memories and events is to trivialize the events themselves. To urge victims to forget is to victimize them once again, saying that they could not possibly be as hurt as they claim to be. We cannot forget what happened to us. To erase part of our memory is to erase part of our very identity as persons”.

It is worth quoting Volf (2006:204) again who correctly stresses that, “The obligation to remember is an extension of the obligation to attend to the wrongs committed. Sometimes no more will be possible than to offer victims ‘the most elementary compensation’ which is to give them a voice, the voice that was denied to them”. For victims, remembering is then part of the pursuit of justice. For Christians, we remember so that we can forgive and reconcile. Volf reminds us that non-remembrance of an offense is even less a unilateral act. It makes sense only after the victim has been redeemed, the perpetrator transformed, and after a relationship between them has been redefined through reconciliation (Volf, 2006:205).
André Karamaga\textsuperscript{44} (n. d.) claims that the mission of reconciliation is imperative for the EPR. For him, Rwandan people should avoid taking a short cut and denying the reality of the past. In this regard, the EPR initiated a memorial for its pastors and church members who were killed in the 1994 genocide. A Rwandan theologian, Jean Gakwandi (2008:18), affirms that the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda is the only Church in Rwanda that has managed to build memorial sites where the bodies of the victims who were identified were buried. Three genocide memorials have been built, one at Remera-Rukoma where pastors, their families, church members and other Tutsis were killed, and two at Kirinda respectively, one near Kirinda hospital and the other near the river of Nyabarongo where the bodies of those killed were thrown. Annual commemoration events are held at these mentioned sites. It is also important to note that the EPR has suggested an annual commemoration of the genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi that happened in 1994 within all congregations and other institutions of the church such as schools and hospitals.

In the aftermath of the 1994 genocide, the survivors were severely traumatised by the fact that many of their loved ones had been brutally massacred, and also because their remains were treated disrespectfully. This is because in most cases, the genocidaires (the killers) left the bodies of their victims wherever they had been murdered, leaving churches, schools, government buildings, forests and swamps alike littered with human remains. In other instances, “the genocidaires dumped the bodies of their victims in pit latrines, caves, ravines and shallow mass graves in order to hide the smell of decomposition and to prevent the spread of disease” (Des Forges, 1999:216).

Commemoration of the 1994 genocide is important and has helped people in the process of reconciliation. The act of reburying survivors’ family members with respect provided enormous comfort. Commemoration serves as a reminder to Rwandans of the atrocities committed during the genocide, while also teaching the younger generation about the history of the nation. The youth need to know how the genocide was prepared and carried out in order to make long-lasting strategies to prevent genocide forever. It shows survivors that they are not alone but that we grieve.

\textsuperscript{44}Kramaga (n.d). The statement mentioned here is found in his paper titled, ‘Aucune mort ne doit etre gratuite: En memoire de victims du genocide de 1994’.
together. It reinforces the commitment to make sure genocide does not happen again (Nagaju, 2013:95).

Archbishop Desmond Tutu shares the same idea of remembering what happened in the past. He states, “In forgiving, people are not asked to forget. On the contrary, it is important to remember, so that we should not let such atrocities happen again” (Tutu, 1999:271).

Commemoration day is observed nationally on the 7th of April each year. In the beginning, some people thought that commemoration was a matter for survivors. In this regard, Musemakweli reminds us of the standpoint of church members of the EPR towards the commemoration. He explains that when the EPR initiated the commemoration, only the survivors attended. While others stated, “It is not our business”. But later on, as commemoration continued year after year, then more and more began to join in on the ceremony and gradually take part. Musemakweli claims that the focus of the EPR is based on the message of God during the ceremonies of remembrance. Speakers and preachers emphasize forgiveness and repentance because what happened in 1994 was a shame and needs to be corrected. Musemakweli also emphasises that if the church failed to prevent genocide and to speak against ethnic ideology, now is our time as Christians to correct our failure. During the event of remembering the 1994 genocide, church leaders and governmental officials place an emphasis on the message of repentance, forgiveness, love, truth-telling, unity and reconciliation.

In short, Schreiter (2008) stresses the importance of remembering as a tool for the healing of memories. He adds, “For societies to suppress memory can make them dangerously explosive, especially when those suppressed memories burst forth in a displaced manner, cut off from their original source”. Therefore, he affirms, “In forgiving we do not forget, for how we could forget something that has so irrevocably changed our lives without diminishing ourselves and undervaluing the loss we have incurred? To forgive is not to forget, as the old saying goes, but to remember in a different way. Healing does not mean forgetting, for to urge victims simply to forget is to make them victims yet another time” (Schreiter, 2008:9-10).
The purpose of this section has been to outline the various efforts of the EPR in pursuing reconciliation. Within the context of the CMO framework, the focus here has been on the mechanisms that led to the desired outcomes of reconciliation. Table 1 below summarises the abovementioned activities and their outcomes.

Table 1. Summary of the four main activities/initiatives done by the EPR with regards to the ministry of reconciliation, indicating its impact and outcomes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context/resources (EPR’s activities)</th>
<th>Mechanisms/Responses</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centre for training and documentations (CFD). Conferences, seminars and training.</td>
<td>- To train church leaders how to approach the concept of peace, unity and reconciliation.</td>
<td>- Sensitising perpetrators to plead guilty to their crimes and asking victims to forgive.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- To organise trainings and other activities that bring people together to discuss and promote reconciliation.</td>
<td>- Promoting positive attitudes towards government policies related to reconciliation and participation in Gacaca courts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- To organize seminars and workshops to deal with conflict prevention and resolution within parishes and communities.</td>
<td>- Helping individuals to repent, forgive, fellowship and restore broken relationship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- To bring together survivors and perpetrators, to undergo teachings and training about reconciliation in order to promote a real reconciliation.</td>
<td>- Helping people to reduce, solve and prevent conflicts, heal emotional wounds, have peace of mind.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Help control negative feelings such as anger, grief, hopelessness, hatred, and division.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Being together, strengthening each other, sharing the Word of God without hypocrisy, love and fellowship is seen among Hutu and Tutsi as brothers and sisters in Christ.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Economic and development cooperatives/associations

- To work together in associations and cooperatives and create awareness of the necessity to save money with the aim of economic development and poverty reduction.
- To overcome divisions, discrimination and economic inequality.
- To bring people together in a community where they can build interdependent social and economic relationships.

Pastoral approach, pastoral care, counselling and social services

- To provide social assistance towards vulnerable people such as orphans, widows, refugees, repatriated people, survivors of genocide and prisoners.
- To engage trauma healing in relation with reconciliation.
- To mobilize people for effective participation in Gacaca courts.

- Social cohesion such as religious conversions, Sunday worship, prayer meetings, and social gatherings had an impact on interpersonal change and intergroup relationship-building.
- Reconciliation, peace, unity, truth-telling, repentance, forgiveness, the process of trauma-recovery and healing.

Remembering and commemorating the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi

- The EPR appointed a commission to address unity, reconciliation, fighting against genocide and its ideology.
- To relive the past and to learn from the history of Rwanda and to prepare for a bright future.
- To make sure genocide like the 1994 Rwandan genocide never happens again, “Never again!”

- Social cohesion such as religious conversions, Sunday worship, prayer meetings, and social gatherings had an impact on interpersonal change and intergroup relationship-building.
- Reconciliation, peace, unity, truth-telling, repentance, forgiveness, the process of trauma-recovery and healing.

- Healing memories.
- The younger generation learn about the 1994 genocide and its effects to Rwanda.
- Remembering victims has shown survivors that they are not alone but we grieve together, we suffer with them, we support them to improve their social welfare. People relate to the past in such a way that it becomes the source of
6.5 How do people speak about and understand reconciliation: the example of Remera Parish

It has been argued in this dissertation that a theology of reconciliation in Rwanda must address the problem of ethnic ideology. In order to make sure that the EPR’s efforts to achieve reconciliation are contextually relevant, it is important to consider how reconciliation and ethnic ideology are being understood at the congregational level. For this reason, even though this study is not an empirical one, I have chosen to use some examples from an empirical study conducted in Remera Presbyterian congregation during my master’s studies. The purpose is not only to show the impact and outcome of reconciliation activities amongst people in local communities, but also to analyse words and content from their narratives.

The choice of Remera parish is not arbitrary. The Remera congregation was severely impacted by the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. One hundred and thirty eight church members and pastors as well as other people in surrounding areas were killed. This negative impact has disrupted relationships and social cohesion. Hence, there was a dire need for reconciliation in Remera parish.

Remera parish is located in Kamonyi District, Rukoma sector, Remera cell, Kabande village. It is 10 km away from Kamonyi centre and 34 km away from Kigali, the capital city of Rwanda. Remera parish was one of the mission stations founded by missionaries. Remera parish has 4 sub-parishes and 15 chapels (congregations). It has currently 85 church elders, 85 deacons, five thousand eight hundred forty six (5846) church members and 40 choirs ministering in all sub-parishes. (Archives: ‘Presbyterian Church Remera Parish, 1912-2012, jubilee of century’, pp. 13, 39).

All information quoted in this study concerning Remera parish can be found in the research conducted by Nagaju Muke (2013) for her MTH degree at Tumaini University Makumira (TUMA) in Tanzania. The title of the thesis was, ‘The contribution of the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda towards mission of reconciliation after the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi: A case study of Remera parish (2002-2012)’.
A theology of reconciliation that is truly contextual will need to consider how ordinary Christians in congregations speak and act toward one another. This section will look at particular examples from the Remera parish in order to see how the communities perceive the contribution of the EPR in their ministry of reconciliation. The ministry of the EPR will be evaluated along the four dimensions of reconciliation mentioned in section 2.5. However, the standard by which these ministries will be evaluated is not merely whether they are effective in achieving their proposed outcomes, but whether they are effective in deconstructing ethnic ideology. There have been many valuable efforts initiated by the government and churches aimed at addressing the issues arising from the 1994 genocide. The argument of this thesis, however, is that such efforts, no matter how worthwhile, are too narrowly focused if they do not understand the 1994 genocide in its historical context. Understood in light of Rwandan history, reconciliation requires a much deeper and broader attempt to help Hutu and Tutsi see their differences as an artificial inheritance from the colonial era. This section will focus on the EPR’s efforts in Remera, but in light of Rwandan history, asking in what way the ministry of reconciliation might deconstruct the effects of ethnic ideology.

6.5.1 Relationship-building

The 1994 genocide caused a serious ethnic divide that is evident in its aftermath. The social fabric of society was completely ripped apart. Fear and mistrust abound between victims and perpetrators. The goal of this section is to show how the EPR contributed and responded to the challenge of these broken relationships. Reconciliation means “finding a way to live alongside former enemies, to coexist with them, to develop the degree of cooperation necessary to share our society with them, so that we all have better lives together than we have had separately” (Bloomfield, 2003:13).

As noted in chapter five, shattered relationships, broken threads in the social fabric, and intense distrust were part of the effects of the 1994 genocide, and were clearly visible among the people. The EPR introduced “Itorero ry’ibanze,” which literary means “basic church” or referred to as the “house fellowships”. Here ten to twenty families of Presbyterian members gather for prayer and Bible study once a week. This
strategy of house fellowship worked not only as a new way of doing mission and evangelism but also as a strategy of reconciliation, as it helps people to reduce their prejudices, fear and facilitates the restoration of relationships. The EPR provided a booklet that contained teaching guidelines for the year; the theme of reconciliation was included in it. The aim of the EPR is to help its members grasp a biblical understanding of reconciliation and thereby facilitate reconciliation.

**Impact and outcome of reconciliation**

People in Remera understand reconciliation as relationship building. The ministry of reconciliation started in 2002, and was led by Rev. Jerome Bizimana, the minister in charge. He is currently the president of Remera Presbytery in the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda, and serves as chaplain at the Remera Rukoma Secondary School. He has been instrumental in initiating and training a peace making group working to heal the wounds of the genocide, including groups composed of genocide perpetrators released from prison and the people whose family members were slaughtered in the attacks. The seminar of reconciliation is held on Friday every week; the gathering is made up of people of all different ages, both male and female. The study revealed that the situation today in terms of relationships and social-cohesion has changed compared to the situation before the programme of reconciliation was initiated. Respondents whom I interviewed during my master’s studies in 2013 stated that social-cohesion and relationships among people before reconciliation seminars were characterised by feelings of “fear to meet others, hatred and anger, loss of happiness, loneliness, divisions and ethnicity, refusal of forgiving, conflicts with others, fear of being killed, mistrust, guilt and trauma”.

The question that comes to the fore here is: “How and in what way will the effects of reconciliation will contribute to social change?” First, participants of training and seminars are strategically chosen based upon an analysis of groups identified as victims and perpetrators. The purpose is to develop relationships and an understanding of the “other”. This involves a transformation of one’s own attitude while encountering someone of another ethnic group, which leads to social cohesion. After the training and seminars, relationships were characterised by the fact that people: “Fellowship together, work together, support each other and engage in
sharing. There are no divisions or conflicts among the people, all are united. There is a sense of freedom and trust, and relationships are peaceful, loving and good. Feel free, trust each other, and have peace, love and good relationships”. After the reconciliation seminars were carried out at Remera parish, the level of trust improved to the point that an association had been formed between survivors and perpetrators. They visited each other in their homes and supported each other in their daily life and social problems (Nagaju, 2013:99).

Below follows the testimony of one of the respondents whose name is Nyirahabimana Esperance:

I had fear when I saw a person released from the prison and I did not trust the person. I felt that I cannot talk to him and that I have nothing to share with him. This because when I saw the person (my offender), I remembered what happened to me during the 1994 genocide and I felt that it was not easy to forgive and reconcile with people who killed our relatives. But through reconciliation seminars and trainings, the church helped us to reconcile and to build new relations with them. After reconciling to each other, my offender became my friend whom we share our daily activities and even God’ work. I trust him at the point he is the one who helps me to farm my cows (cited in Nagaju, 2013:87).

The ministry of reconciliation in the abovementioned parish helped both survivors and perpetrators of the genocide come together in search of sustainable peace. This helped the two parties to restore amicable relations between them. Ndatimana Emmanuel, in his testimony, stated the following:

Before the program of reconciliation, I saw all survivors as my enemies. But after participating in reconciliation seminars, our relationship has been transformed to the level I decided to marry a woman who is Tutsi survivor (cited in Nagaju, 2013:88).

It is clear according to the abovementioned statements that reconciliation in the EPR, as it was captured in Remera parish, led to positive changes and a transformation in the attitudes of people towards members of the ‘other’ group. However, statements such as “I marry a Tutsi woman,” shows that they still see each other in terms of ethnic categories. For this reason, this study suggests that despite the good work achieved by the EPR concerning the reconciliation process, the issue of ethnic
ideology must be given serious attention at the same time. In this regard, André Kamaraga during the general synod stated: “We had continuous teachings aimed at making people understand that the blood of Jesus Christ is beyond the blood of ethnic groups, that the human being has been created in the image of God, so that we are brothers and sisters; when we will be able to manifest that brotherhood within the church, we will be able to teach other Rwandans” (cited in Nsengimana, 2015:75). The EPR, therefore, should provide a clear theology of a shared identity, which will help its church members and other Rwandans to overcome any division related to ethnicity.

6.5.2 Truth-telling

Many people in Rwanda affirmed that after the 1994 genocide, fear and mistrust were key issues for both parties. They also argue that it was not possible for them to come together for any activity. This section therefore maintains that in the context of post-genocide Rwanda, where fear, anger and mistrust prevail among the people, truth-telling has been considered a viable response to these issues. Truth-telling is related to trauma healing programmes for the individual; the nation cannot deal with the crimes of the past and move forward to create a better future unless those crimes are named and identified. There can be no trust between warring parties unless the history between them is made known. However, truth-telling also has the possibility of creating cognitive dissonance, as people’s assumptions and perceptions about their enemies are revealed to be untrue, thereby provoking reassessments of the basis of their relationships. Truth-telling can happen between individuals in programmes based on the intergroup contact hypothesis (Bazuin, 2013:30). Truth-telling about what happened in 1994 is one approach used in the reconciliation process.

Impact and outcome of reconciliation

Reconciliation was based on the social reality of Rwanda, where groups are mixed and live together, and have to support each other. For example, a survivor may get ill and be helped to the hospital by close neighbours deemed as perpetrators, or may need support for other daily or social living problems (Mukabera, 2012:111). The study conducted in the Remera parish has shown that some cultural values were destroyed by the 1994 genocide. The reconciliation process helped both survivors and
perpetrators to reconstruct these cultural values. They live in peace and support each other during different ceremonies such as weddings, burials, etc. Respondents in Remera parish expressed and recognised the positive results of trust and relationship building among the people. They stated that people in villages now sit together and eat together. Inter-marriage is seen among our youth (Nagaju, 2013).

Chapter 3 reminded us that in pre-colonial Rwanda, the categories of ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ were not based on ethnic lines because they all shared the same language, religion and culture. It is helpful to note that in the reconciliation process, the reconstruction of these cultural values (i.e. sharing their painful past and telling the truth of what happened to them in 1994) is the response to which the Presbyterian Church helps the two groups (Hutu and Tutsi) address the ethnic ideology that divided them. It is in fact a means of de-mythologizing and undoing the ethnic myth constructed by both colonialists and missionaries.

6.5.3 Forgiveness
As mentioned earlier, reconciliation seminars and training are one of the most important strategies used by the EPR to implement the reconciliation initiatives proposed by the general synod. The pastors in charge of the congregations conduct seminars, teaching the Christian concepts of forgiveness that lead to reconciliation. In most cases, the church identifies the victims and perpetrators of the genocide along the ethnic divide of Hutu and Tutsi. The seminars invite individuals from both sides of these groups, as well as from the parish and surrounding communities. The seminars are designed to rebuild relationships and create a safe space where both survivors and released perpetrators learn about Christian reconciliation and forgiveness.

As I see it, the church emphasises reconciliation centered on forgiveness. Nevertheless, de Gruchy (2002:171) reminds us of the following,

 Forgiveness is a word that easily falls from our tongues, especially if we are not victims of oppression and injustice. It is easy for us who are not victims to tell them to forgive their enemies; it is also relatively easy for oppressors to ask for forgiveness. The problem is that forgiveness can be manipulated by the dominant in such a way that it strengthens their position and weakens that of the
victim. Forgiveness thus becomes a tool in the manipulation of power relations, making the oppressed even more a victim of injustice.

De Gruchy points out that genuine forgiveness does not mean brushing the past aside and regarding injustice lightly. Forgiveness arises out of a deep awareness of the evil that has been perpetrated, but knows how to deal with that evil in a way that leads to healing (de Gruchy, 2002:178).

As many Rwandans say, there is moral obligation to forgive and reconcile, since victims and perpetrators (the ex-prisoners) have to live together as neighbours again. However, according to Kubai (2007a:62), “The pain and human suffering as a result of the genocide are deep and this has certain implications for reconciliation. It is necessary to acknowledge that it is not humanly possible for a deeply pained and traumatised survivor of genocide to forgive and forget while he or she continues to suffer the pain and trauma of genocide”. In the case of churches in Rwanda, the challenging issue is that some people still think that reconciliation is about teaching survivors to forgive. However, in my view, forgiveness is not the issue of survivors only but it is a concern for both survivors in terms of forgiving and perpetrators in terms of repentance. This understanding is similar to that highlighted by Boers (1992:91):

Real forgiveness is in fact an act of empowerment and healing. But forgiveness may take time. It must come in its own time and cannot be forced. And real forgiveness is possible only through the work of the Spirit.

Despite the fact that forgiveness helps survivors to heal, it should be acknowledged that forgiveness is not an easy thing and it should not be imposed or forced on survivors. In my view, forgiveness can happen when perpetrators acknowledge their wrong and repent. Tutu (1999:278) also observes, “The most effective way would be for the perpetrators or their descendants to acknowledge the awfulness of what happened and the descendants of the victims to respond by granting forgiveness”.

The EPR during its general synod held at Kigali in the year 2005 created the commission of unity and reconciliation to fight against genocide and its ideology. One of the key leading questions of the commission was: “Can a Christian forgive without
forgetting what happened”? The members of the commission affirmed that forgiveness does not mean forgetting what happened during the tragedy of the 1994 genocide; a serious offense cannot, and perhaps should not, be completely forgotten. For them, it is important to remember the past in order to build a bright future.

In this regard, Desmond Tutu in his book No Future without Forgiveness clearly states:

True forgiveness deals with the past, to make the future possible. We cannot go on nursing grudges even vicariously for those who cannot speak for themselves any longer. We have to accept that what we do, we do for generations past, present and yet to come. That is what makes a community a community or a people a people (Tutu, 1999:279).

This implies that victims should not be forced to forgive; rather, forgiveness helps to acknowledge the past in order to build a future of hope based on God’s own forgiveness.

Beside seminars, preaching is effective for spreading the message of reconciliation, knowing that the church has the mission and the mandate to reconcile people with God and humans with humans. Preaching is very important because the minister speaks with a moral authority not found in secular reconciliation work. This can have a positive impact on the reconciliation process because of the large numbers of people who attend church regularly.

In addition to preaching, a book of liturgy is used in all congregations of the EPR. Among many prayers, confession of sin related to the genocide is found in the liturgy. As a Presbyterian theologian minister, Nsengimana indicated that the prayer is formulated as follows:

God our Lord, in the name of Jesus Christ our saviour, you gave a beautiful country to Rwandans. We are in your presence with sorrow because we did not consider the legacy of unity you provide us [....] we have promoted divisions among us instead of joining our force for the best of our country. We have fostered identity based discrimination, our common language as a symbol of that unity has been used for disputes, cursing each other, and other dishonoured actions instead of using it for mutual help hand by hand and sharing straggles. Our arms did not help those who were suffering, we did not use wisely what you
gave us, we have not been true witnesses of your Word, we have not observed your commandment [...] Oh, God, we are ashamed and regretting because of our sins, we could not be allowed to open our mouths in your presence, but because of the blood of Jesus Christ who has reconciled us to you, we dare to come to you, asking to heal injured hearts, full of sorrow, hate and revenge spirit, for we need to regain the unity as you and Christ Jesus you are united forever, Amen (Nsengimana, 2015:82-83).

It is clear that in this prayer, confession of sins is mentioned and underlines a public confession of the wrongs committed during the 1994 Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi. It calls for unity and reconciliation, continued resistance against the ideology of division and discrimination, assistance for vulnerable people, and the implementation of values provided by the Word of God.

For some people religious ritual takes on increased salience in post-genocide Rwanda. These rituals, particularly confession and asking forgiveness, are focused primarily on human relationships with God, but people report that they spill over into their relationships with each other. On the one hand, Catholic, Anglican and Lutheran churches in Rwanda have formalised confession and asking for forgiveness as part of their standard liturgies, they are fundamentally private: the member might privately confess to a priest or privately ask forgiveness from God. On the other hand, Evangelical Protestants do not have formal liturgies in the same way as Catholic and mainline denominations, but incorporate more informal opportunities for members to confess their sins and ask for forgiveness (Bazuin, 2013:154).

**Impact and outcome of reconciliation**

The respondents in Remera parish found that the reconciliation and forgiveness seminars taught them to: be patient, repent, forgive, love, instil hope and build self-esteem. It helped them to find fellowship with others and respect them. Seminars also helped them to reduce, solve and prevent conflict. It also helped them to support each other. It healed the wounds in the heart, provided peace of mind and allowed them to live joyful lives. Here is the testimony of Mukamudenge Ancile, one of the respondents in Remera:

Before reconciliation process, I spent sleepless nights because of people who killed my relatives, I had no peace, I felt miserable and I remained hurt by the
offender. Forgiveness released me, I feel free and I have peace in my heart (cited in Nagaju, 2013:86).

According to Rev. Jerome Bizimana, key themes included: forgiveness, repentance, acceptance and love for one another. He indicated that reconciliation programmes in his parish had a spiritual impact and helped to control negative feelings such as anger, grief, hopelessness, hatred and division by facilitating peace. In addition, participants of seminars at Remera parish witnessed the following:

We pray together, strengthen each other, share the Word of God without hypocrisy, love and fellowship is seen among us. Hutu and Tutsi feel that we are one people and brothers and sisters in Christ (cited in Nagaju, 2013:98).

Despite these successful stories of forgiveness, the EPR should go beyond the event of 1994, taking into account of the whole history of Rwanda. How does truth-telling, relationship building and forgiveness in the context of a hundred years of history help Rwandans to heal their past wounds?

6.5.4 Healing

Reconciliation is a profoundly difficult challenge, especially after such a great violence as genocide. However, healing from psychological wounds—the trauma resulting from victimization—is important because it prevents the defensive attitudes of survivors from turning into thoughts of revenge. Healing and reconciliation are essential both to improve the quality of life of wounded people and to make renewed violence less likely (Staub et al., 2003:288-9).

In Rwanda, according to Lala et al., (2014:451), memorial sites across the country present physical displays that serve as reminders of the genocide, while also drawing on traditional storytelling and narrative traditions. Major annual genocide commemorations in Rwanda encourage public remembrance and mourning. These activities and installations serve a valuable role in encouraging remembrance, ensuring that events and testimonies are preserved for historical records, and promoting the search for truth and justice. However, memorialisation and testimony also have the potential for harm if not balanced by measures that highlight positive characteristics of people and communities. This is because survivors can experience a
deep-seated psychological anguish that involves a loss of identity, beliefs and values, and that turn them into something resembling the “walking dead” (Lala et al., 2014:451).

In order for survivors to cope with overcome negative feelings during remembrance periods, an initiative called “Messages of Hope” commenced in partnership with *Ibuka* (the peak survivors’ organisation in Rwanda), the Kigali Genocide Memorial Centre (KGM), and an interdisciplinary team that includes social and clinical psychologists, and media and communications researchers from Murdoch University. The project aims to provide a practical framework through which Rwandans can tell their own personal stories of healing and hope for the future (Lala et al., 2014:452).

Messages of Hope focuses on the stories of ordinary Rwandan citizens who have recovered from their experiences of trauma and loss. The messages are comprised of testimonies in which the survivor tells the story of his/her personal journey since the genocide, and relays hopeful feelings for their own and the country’s future. The majority of messages are delivered by people who were present in Rwanda during the genocide. However, messages have also been created by Rwandans who were outside of the country or who were not yet born, but whose families were directly affected by the genocide (Lala et al., 2014:452).

Messengers are encouraged to tell their stories in their own words and to talk about aspects in their own life that inspired hope. For example, survivors frequently mention the importance of recovery as a means to honour those who were killed. The role of education in transforming lives is another common theme, as is the need for community support, reconciliation and healing. While acknowledging the reality of harmful experiences during the genocide, survivors’ messages of hope have focused on their own efforts to recover and rebuild, and includes advice and encouragement for other survivors that acknowledge suffering but celebrate resilience.

To that end, Schreiter proposes that the church as a community of memory is concerned with truthful memory and creates safe places where memories can be spoken out aloud in order to prevent anger that can poison any possibilities for the
future. Living in the memory of what Christ has gone through — suffering and death, yet not forgotten and indeed raised up by God — is the source of our hope (Schreiter, 2005:4-5).

**Impact and outcome of reconciliation**

The experience of the Remera parish shows the importance of bringing people from two conflicting parties into “reconciliation as encounter,” which helps them to express their painful feelings by telling their story, which is a path that leads to healing. During reconciliation meetings, both victims and perpetrators receive an opportunity to express anger, fear and pain. Talking about the pain of their past makes them feel better, not worse. Boers (1992:12) supports the viewpoint of equal opportunity for both victims and perpetrators. For him, both victims and offenders merit attention. This dual emphasis is clearly biblical. In the Bible’s first recorded crime, God empathises deeply with the victim, Abel. “Listen; your brother’s blood is crying out to me from the ground” (Genesis 4:10b). At the same time God protects Cain the offender from capital punishment (Genesis 4:15). God’s concern is for both the victim and offender, and we must do the same.

**6.6 The Church: an ‘effective’ instrument through which to address ethnic ideology and promote reconciliation**

The next crucial question to answer in this section is whether the EPR church is an ‘effective’ body and instrument through which to address ethnic ideology, respond to the effects of genocide, and promote reconciliation in Rwanda? To recap, the focal questions in the previous sections (6.4 and 6.5) were:

- Has the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda been engaged in addressing ethnic ideology and promoting reconciliation? And if so, how?
- Have these reconciliation programmes produced any significant impact and/or changes in the attitudes and behaviours of individuals and groups regarding reconciliation?
It was argued in this chapter that the EPR’s training had a significant impact on the actions of pastors. Most of the pastors understood that sensitising the guilty to admit their crimes and seek forgiveness is part of their duty. Prior to their training, many perceived genocide related issues as being the responsibility of the government, and not for the church.

Moreover, pastors who participated in the training understood that their uniting message of salvation was hardly received and understood when they were in front of a divided community. In this context, the involvement of the trained pastors in sensitising Christians towards reconciliation increased significantly after the training. Pastors who benefited from the EPR’s training promoted a positive attitude towards government policies related to reconciliation and participation in Gacaca courts.

These statements below indicate that reconciliation programmes produce positive results, and help to illustrate the impact of reconciliation on the lives of both victims and perpetrators:

> When I got out of prison, I felt that I was completely left out and did not fit in my community. Nobody trusted me; even my own family did not understand me. I had bitter talks with all people. I was always in a bad mood. My heart was heavy; I was interested in nothing. I was also always scared, and I was suspicious of everyone, especially the survivors. Indeed, they were pointing at me every time I met them in the street. I could never think a survivor could forgive a killer. I thought they always wanted revenge, even if they did not say it openly. I hated them, thinking I was only answering the hatred they had of me. I isolated myself and felt lonely. My life had no peace and expected no better future. The reconciliation seminars in my church helped me understand the root causes of genocide, its effects on Rwandans lives, and the necessity of reconciliation. I understood the source of my pain and the suffering of others around me especially survivors. The church helped us make a step towards reconciliation process\(^6\) (cited in Nagaju, 2013:98-100).

Again, a survivor/victim of the genocide gave the following testimony:

> The genocide took my entire family. Life after the genocide was unthinkable to me. I found no interest in anything. I lived my life in solitude. I had no trust in people around me. I isolated myself in fear and hatred. I had a lot of prejudices against ex-prisoners, and Hutus generally. I did not know that they, too, had

\(^6\)Testimony of an ex-prisoner who did not want to disclose his name: 27/03/2013.
suffered from the genocide. The training given by my church helped me accept myself and to meet other people again. During Reconciliation seminars, we were taught the topics related to the analysis of causes of the 1994 genocide. Surprisingly, we have discovered that the ethnic differences which have been so much magnified in the past are not the real differences affecting us. So I started to live in peace with all the people around me and I have new and good relationships because I decided to forgive the culprits of my family’s killing. I even accepted working with the killers of my family. Today, we have an association of survivors and perpetrators which is in Remera parish, we have activities which bring us money, and we trust each other and share the vision of building our future (cited in Nagaju, 2013:100).

As was indicated in chapter 5, Rwandans are now discovering that the 1994 genocide affected almost every citizen of the country in one way or another. Reversing these effects requires a change in attitude that cannot be achieved overnight. Therefore, this chapter shows that the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda has opted for a strategic approach that aims at: building relationships, forgiveness, truth-telling and healing in the communities. When the truth is told and relationships are restored, then healing and lasting reconciliation can be attained.

In conclusion, a significant impact and outcome of the EPR’s initiatives related to reconciliation is evident in the change of attitude and improved relationship between individuals and groups. Furthermore, the EPR also helped to identify the harm of division and ethnic ideology on the social cohesion of Christians and all citizens in general. Furthermore, the EPR also stressed the importance of seeking forgiveness among church members in order to live a meaningful Christian life.

However, it is important to be reminded that despite some of the church leaders’ noble intentions and activities, not all pastors have the same degree of dynamism and involvement in resolving conflict and promoting reconciliation. This is due to a number of factors, including the hypocrisy of some church leaders who display good intentions in public but privately discourage sincere reconciliation. Others did nothing to deter false testimonies in Gacaca or held ideological positions that compromised their impartiality to resolve conflicts. Other pastors had a limited awareness of the

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47 Testimony of a genocide survivor who wished to remain anonymous: 27/03/2013

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impact of social conflict on the Christian life, or they simply lacked technical competence to deal with conflicts, especially related to the genocide.48

There is no doubt that the EPR has strongly involved itself in responding to the effects and consequences of the genocide. The EPR also has undertaken various initiatives to promote reconciliation in the country. However, Elisée Musemakweli’s (2014:3) view reminds us that even if the ministry of reconciliation is part of the EPR’s mission, there are difficulties and challenges related to the process of reconciliation:

Not only were people physically wounded but they were traumatized and we were not well prepared to face this situation of reconciliation. But we have to do it. We have to help people to learn to live together again because they are together in the church; they are together in the villages; they are together, so we need to take some steps in the direction of harmony and reconciliation. That’s why we tried to focus on the Biblical passages of reconciliation — not only during worship but during our bible studies and by sitting with the people in their homes. Not only is it a tough path to walk; it is a long one.

Musemakweli’s hope is that future generations will move past the pain. He comments that he is confident the country is on the right path, and by means of the EPR with the help of many other Christian organisations, churches, and even the government itself, the people of Rwanda will someday be reconciled. Again, Musemakweli (2014:3) said: “We have some examples of people living together and living in harmony”. He adds: “This is really encouraging. That’s why we keep struggling — to make our people happy and live in security”.

Even though the EPR has done considerable work to reconcile Rwandans, the problem of ethnic ideology remains unsolved. As noted in section 5.2, a hateful ethnic ideology still persists in some parts of Rwanda, even after the genocide. This is why “those who either developed or implemented the 1994 genocide continues to disseminate ethnic ideology openly between individuals or among groups. This is highlighted by the proliferation of writings aimed at denying, delegitimizing or trivializing the genocide” (Mafeza, 2013:3). In response to ethnic ideology, the

government of Rwanda has initiated the “Ndí Umunyarwanda” (I am a Rwandan) programme as a good strategy employed by NURC to eradicate, undo and deconstruct ethnic ideology (cf. section 5.4.1.2). However, despite successful efforts and achievements done by the EPR, there is a gap due to the lack of programme such as “Ndí Umunyarwanda”. To put it differently, what is the EPR’s version of “Ndí Umunyarwanda” from a theological perspective? How and what must be done?

In his doctoral study entitled, ‘The test of faith: Christians and Muslims in the Rwandan genocide,’ Benda (2012) echoes the same viewpoint when he emphasises that it is time for Rwandan faith communities to come out with a systematic framework for reconciliation that combines theory and practice. Furthermore, he refers to a faith-based initiative of reconciliation that provides a clear ‘theology of ethnicity’ that deconstructs and demythologises Rwandan identity binaries. To him, the removal of ethnic criteria from identity cards is desirable. Unfortunately, it did not and could not lead to the erasure of an ethnic mentality that has been engraved in the psyche of Rwandans for almost a century (Benda, 2012:226-27). It has been stated in this study (4.6) that the most critical issue of the Rwandan church was the failure to address the problem of ethnic ideology. One factor, however, as Ferdinando (2009:56) pointed out, was the failure to grapple with theological perspectives of ethnicity. This being so, the EPR is therefore called to provide a theological guideline on how ethnic ideology can be addressed and deconstructed among the Rwandan people.
CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Introduction

This study aimed to investigate how the ministry of reconciliation in the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda has addressed the issue of ethnic ideology and responded to the challenges of a post-genocide Rwandan context. It also identified the contextual and identity factors that contributed to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the post-genocide effects thereof. Of particular interest was the role played by the Rwandan Church. In this respect, this study seeks to contribute to the existing literature on the Rwandan genocide by bringing together two areas of research that have previously been disengaged: The first area of research relates to the causes of the 1994 genocide. The second area of research concerns the strategies for reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda. This study has argued that reconciliation is only possible to the extent that we understand and address the root causes of the genocide. Thus, drawing particularly on scholars like Gatwa (2005) and Shyaka (2005), it was argued that ethnic ideology perpetuates the cycle of violence in Rwanda. What is unique to this research is the attempt to evaluate a particular church—the Presbyterian Church of Rwanda—as it attempts deconstruct and eradicate ethnic ideology as part of its effort to promote reconciliation. The intention of this evaluation is to establish suggestions for future reconciliation efforts, taking into account the issue of ethnic ideology that continues to persist in contemporary Rwanda.

This study sought to answer the following two questions:

1) What has the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda done with regards to reconciliation after the 1994 genocide?

2) What are the possible theological guidelines and strategies for the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda to promote reconciliation in the Rwandan society?

This final chapter comprises two main parts. The first part summarizes the arguments presented in this study; it also outlines the findings of the research and proposes
answers to the research questions. In the second part, some recommendations are made to the EPR to initiate effective actions and promote reconciliation.

### 7.2 Summary of arguments and research findings

This study intended to offer a realist evaluation of the Rwandan situation. The CMO (context-mechanisms-outcomes) configuration framework, as suggested by Pawson and Tilley (1997, 2004), was used in this regard. The CMO methodology was used as to identify and evaluate the “cause-effect” from the viewpoint of contexts, mechanisms and outcomes. It answered the questions of how and why the people of Rwanda and church leaders responded to ethnic ideology, as well as the how and why of the contextual phenomenon of reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda. The realist approach and its CMO method directed a deeper investigation of the Rwandan context in which mechanisms of reconciliation are implemented. This study moved beyond a mere evaluation of interventions by suggesting that the context of post-genocide Rwanda must be understood in light of the history of ethnic ideology. A fresh understanding of the Rwandan context thus demands new kinds of mechanisms: reconciliation efforts that will attempt to deconstruct ethnic ideology. The “Ndi Umunyarwanda” programme was highlighted as an example of this new kind of mechanism. However, the focus of this study shifted to the Presbyterian Church, seeking a theological and missiological basis for reconciliation to address the ethnic ideology. Once further mechanisms are put in place, they can be analysed according to their outcomes. In this sense, the CMO methodology served as a theoretical framework for this study, even if this dissertation did not conduct a CMO analysis for a particular programme.

The study was divided into seven chapters each with their own emphasis. Some conclusions also listed below:

*Chapter one* served as an introduction to the dissertation. In addition, it presented the aims of the study, the research problem and the research questions. It is an interdisciplinary research study informed by the social sciences, but still falls within the ambit of theology and missiology.
Chapter two provided a conceptual framework for reconciliation. It described the various dimensions of reconciliation, using social theories to inform biblical and theological reflections. Based on the views of scholars like Schreiter, Okure and de Gruchy, it was argued that the ministry of reconciliation is a divine work that is initiated by God Himself, with human beings as agents of that ministry. It was discovered that from a Christian theological perspective, reconciliation constitutes a paradigm for mission. This means that mission of reconciliation is based on the missio Dei, and reconciliation has become an essential part of the church’s mission. By understanding reconciliation as a new emerging paradigm for mission, reconciliation is considered both a process and a goal. In other words, the activity of reconciliation is a process, not a state to be achieved or a goal to be reached, but it is an on-going process aimed at building relationships between individuals, groups and societies. The chapter suggested that relationship building, truth-telling, forgiveness and healing are dimensions for the theological evaluation of reconciliation. All four of these dimensions relate to the operational definition of this study, which implies that from the contextual reality of Rwanda, the definition of reconciliation means that “victims and perpetrators do not see the past as defining the future, but rather come to see the humanity of one another, accept each other, and see the possibility of restoring a damaged relationship” (Staub, 2006:868).

Chapter three outlined the historical context of the Rwandan genocide. The chapter reviewed and examined the development of the Rwandan crisis before and after independence, and described the genesis of the social construction of ethnic ideology that led to genocide in 1994. The study found that before the introduction of colonialism, Rwanda had been a peaceful land, where values such as friendship, brotherhood, solidarity, love and patriotism were the basis of social education and moral responsibility. National unity was made easier by the fact that Rwandan people have always shared the same culture and one common language. The chapter showed that the issue of ethnic ideology, which led to the 1994 genocide, was artificially constructed by colonial authorities and later hardened by Rwandan elites in order to maintain their political power. However, other factors that contributed to the
Rwandan genocide include identity-based conflict, colonial ideology based on the Hamite theory, myth-making, political ideology, and economic ideology.

Chapter four explored Christian mission and ethnic ideology in the Rwandan church, taking into account the ties between the church and the state. The chapter revealed that Europeans had become obsessed with race, and this had a negative impact on the lives of the indigenous people in African countries such as South Africa and Rwanda. From the time of their arrival in Rwanda, missionaries played a vital role in sowing the seeds of an ethnic ideology by introducing a racist ideology derived from the Hamitic race theory. During the colonial period, missionaries contributed to the consolidation of Tutsi power and the replacement of the king. Post-independence, they played an important part in the consolidation of Hutu power. The church changed its dominant loyalty from Tutsi to Hutu, and overtly engaged in ethnic politics. The study indicated that the Rwandan Christian church has been accused of active complicity in violence through its close relationship with the government. Churches in Rwanda were also challenged for their failure to raise a prophetic voice against the discrimination, violence and killing of Tutsi committed by both the first and the second Republic of Rwanda.

Chapter five provided a description of Rwanda’s current position. It was indicated that the process of unity and reconciliation has already commenced since the genocide. It also requires the participation of Rwandans themselves. Furthermore, there have been many achievements made in terms of reconciliation by both the Rwandan government and NGOs, including the churches. In this sense, the role of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) has been crucial, as it has responded to the effects of genocide and sought to address the long-term effects of ethnic ideology that still persists among many. It has provided a new identity for all Rwandans, as is reflected in the “Ndi Umunyarwanda” (I am a Rwandan) programme. For the NURC, the concepts of ‘unity’ and ‘reconciliation’ must not only focus on the context of genocide, but on all the causes of Rwandan evil by considering the historical and ideological frameworks. In fact, it concerns the reconstruction of the national identity and reconciliation of the Rwandan with himself/herself and with
his/her nation. Furthermore, in order to reconcile Rwandans, they are to reconcile with their history (Shyaka, 2005:36).

Another mechanism for unity and reconciliation was the restorative *Gacaca* courts. On one hand, their objective was to reveal the truth of what happened during the genocide, and on the other hand, to punish the culprits and release and rehabilitate innocent prisoners. It was highlighted that only after fair justice is administered would reconciliation and unity become possible. Reconstructing post-genocide Rwanda has obliged various stakeholders to devise strategies that contribute to the restoration of relationships and trust.

*Chapter six* reflected on theological strategies, activities and programmes regarding the promotion of reconciliation achieved by the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda. Being a realist evaluation based on CMO configuration framework, this chapter also explored whether the programme led to any significant impact or outcome, taking into account the four dimensions of reconciliation, as proposed in chapter two. The study showed that different strategies were used by the Presbyterian Church to achieve reconciliation. Counselling and social services were provided to both victims and perpetrators during group meetings, while getting to know each other and work together. The study discovered that reconciliation in the Presbyterian Church is sometimes related to dialogue between survivors and perpetrators. The researcher also noticed that the meeting of survivors (Tutsi) and perpetrators is similar to what Boers (1992:90) calls the ‘face-to-face programme’. This helps the offenders to understand the consequences and impact of their deeds.

Overall, the study found that the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda has made significant achievements. They developed a permanent programme for dialogue sessions, which has inspired its members to express their views on unity, reconciliation and conflict resolution. Moreover, the study found the 1994 genocide to be overwhelmingly depressing because of the way it destroyed the sense of control people had over their lives. One of the main challenges to building constructive human relations in Rwanda is because of the long and difficult recovery process. In addition, the effect of the psychological damage runs very deep. For this reason, the church is helping its
members and the communities to heal these wounds that continue to inflict such tremendous pain. The church, through teaching, preaching and counselling, provides psychological therapies, which have helped foster compassion, acceptance and forgiveness.

In light of the above, a few brief recommendations follow. These are based on the literature as well as the researcher’s own observations.

7.3 Recommendations

Bosch (1991:393-401) emphasises that mission as mediating salvation implies that missions must be holistic, so that salvation is not only limited to the individual’s relationship with Christ. It must also see the hatred, injustice, oppression, violence and other forms of suffering in the world. Furthermore, Bosch maintains that mission as a quest for justice must deal with the relationship between the evangelistic and societal dimensions of Christian mission, which constitutes one of the thorniest areas in the theology and practice of mission. This implies that the church is viewed as an instrument for mission. To participate in mission is to participate in the movement of God’s love toward people. Thus, the primary purpose of the *missiones ecclesiae* cannot simply be the planting of churches or the saving of souls, but rather, it has to be service to the *missio Dei*.

Based on the fundamental theological and biblical mandate of being given “the ministry of reconciliation” and being entrusted with “the message of reconciliation” (2 Cor 5:18-19), the EPR must therefore take action regarding the issues of ethnic ideology and the effects of genocide, which continue to cause severe suffering to Rwandans. This reality places the issue of ethnic ideology and the consequences of genocide directly before the church’s leaders and members, demanding an appropriate response from them. These issues can only be responded to by applying clear biblical and theological reflections and guidelines.

The study also showed that the “*Ndi Umunyarwanda*” programme has been an efficient tool of reconciliation, which addresses and deconstructs genocide ideology
among Rwandans. However, theologically speaking, “Ndi Umunyarwanda” still excludes other people who are not Rwandans, which is problematic theologically and missiologically. This is why it is recommended that the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda, based on theological grounds, must provide Christian values, guideline and principles to eradicate and deconstruct ethnic ideology by promoting a common Christian identity which is inclusive and open to the “other”. In this respect, we may say that the EPR reconciliation initiatives posited reconciliation as a way to address the effects of genocide. However, it was unable to address ethnic ideology.

With regards to the Rwandan context, Barton (2012:238) understands that reconciliation as a Christian mission transcends ethnic categories. For him, mission envisions the redemption of relationships, the elimination of enmity and the establishment of a welcoming, embracing communion between former enemies. Furthermore, Barton uses Katongole’s (2009) idea when he calls for a revision of our understanding of mission and missions. What should Christian missions look like after the Rwandan genocide? For Katongole, the prophetic role of the church is mostly directed toward challenging the racialized ideas of ethnic identity and the opposition that enabled the 1994 genocide. The church, he rightly reasons, should oppose the rigid colonial structures of ethnic division and create a space for people to move past those oppositions and experience solidarity (cited by Barton, 2012:238). In light of all of this, I argue that in a contemporary society like Rwanda, where ethnic ideology and genocide effects are clearly visible, the Christian church is called to the ministry of reconciliation. In other words, reconciliation is therefore part of the church’s mission and the ministry of every Christian.

Building on the above theological recommendations, four areas are listed below where, on a practical level, the EPR may help to improve its engagement towards the ministry of reconciliation with regards to ethnic ideology and genocide:

**Continuing the work of reconciliation to address the effects and consequences of genocide.** Although the Presbyterian Church has successfully achieved many of its objectives in its ministry of reconciliation, it still faces the challenge of providing social services to genocide survivors due to financial constraints. Social services like
education, medical care, and diaconal services in the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda have been used as part of its mission work since the Church started. However, more effort must be done to address the social needs created by the genocide and its consequences, ensuring that social provision responds to these specific needs. Policies in terms of health, education, housing or economic development must continue to strengthen the mainstreaming of specific care for people affected by the genocide.

Healing the trauma of victims, or even achieving forgiveness, does not mean that things return to how they were before the conflict or the trauma arose. In terms of both healing and forgiveness, the victim and the wrongdoer find themselves in a new place—a place they could not have anticipated.

The church is also under the mandate to remind all people of the worth that offenders have in the eyes of God. It does so by ministering in whatever way it can to those who have violated the laws of the society and now find themselves removed from that society. It also does so by looking for better ways to prevent crime of all kinds, seeking more efficient ways to deal with offenders than our current system employs, and by showing concern for the victim as well as for the offender. The church should embody the Good News, that love has conquered hate in the person of Jesus Christ (Boers, 1992:101). In the Rwandan context, many ex-prisoners developed problems/issues related to the situation in which they lived while incarcerated. For instance, some came back with diseases, handicaps, and ailments such as stomachaches, tuberculosis, swollen legs, etc. When they returned to their homes, many discovered new and complicated problems, for example, their wives had remarried or given birth to children from other men. These problems compounded their sadness, grudges, fears, and shame, which traumatised them even more (Richters & Van Brakel, 2008:53). Therefore, it is recommended that the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda must continue its prison ministry. It must continue preaching the Gospel of repentance to perpetrators who are still in prison. It must create programmes for successful reintegration into society once released from prison.

Specific care should be also taken to address the trauma affecting specific groups. Psychological support should be mainstreamed. “Telling the story of suffering must
be one of several solutions to help Christians overcome the genocide trauma. To let people tell the story of their suffering is more important than preaching to them every day about reconciliation and forgiveness. Dedicating a space for telling stories of suffering, in ritual that is called *ubuhayma* in Kinyarwanda (testimony) could be considered” (Rutayisire, 2012:82). Thus, all parishes of the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda should create a safe space and allocate sufficient time for people to tell stories of their suffering because these personal stories instil hope in those who questioned whether God had abandoned their country during the genocide.

*Extension of reconciliation ministry within the existing programmes in all parishes.* The Rwandan context does not merely demand social and humanitarian services, but requires transforming the entire society to achieve genuine reconciliation throughout the country, moving beyond ethnic ideology, mistrust, hatred and enmity that may cause further violence in the future. The EPR is therefore called to shape and articulate its theology according to the context. In this respect, it is recommended that the contextual theology of reconciliation must serve as a guideline for future programmes. These programmes should not be limited to Presbyterian Church members only, but also extended to people of other denominations and other faiths, because reconciliation concerns all Rwandans.

*Creating awareness and empowerment of congregations.* It is recommended that the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda, particularly at the national level, should bring it to the attention of all congregations that the biblical mandate given to the church is to be agents of reconciliation. The Presbyterian Church in Rwanda should continue to support reconciliation efforts carried out in different parishes aimed at the rehabilitation of people affected by the genocide, their reintegration, as well as initiatives that are geared towards the long-term reconciliation and social cohesion of society. Lessons learned from different congregations should be shared and examples of successful approaches should be exchanged among congregations to improve reconciliation programmes.

*Christian education to younger generation as a source of societal change.* One of the most important tasks of the church is to interpret the Word of God to each new
generation, since God is a God-for-people. In this regard, the mission of the Presbyterian Church in Rwanda should be related to specific times and places, as well as to the particular needs of people. Thus, it is recommended that the younger generation must be helped so that they may discover the power of forgiveness and be freed from hatred and the spirit of revenge while growing up. Children and youth should be protected, cared for, educated, taught to resist ethnic ideology, spiritually nourished and given the opportunity to reach their full potential and grow up in an environment that is favourable to their moral, intellectual and physical development.

7.4 Suggestion for further research

In view of the perspectives of Yip (2013) and others who use critical realism and a realist approach in Missiology, it is hoped that this study will contribute substantially to the effort to reconcile the people of Rwanda. The proposed ‘post-postmodern anthropology’ and ‘post-postmodern missiology’ of Yip shows where some of the contributions of the dissertation are and possibilities for further research in missiology. He indicates that, “A number of questions need to be answered. In a context where there is an insider movement, what are the specific culture, structure, and history of that group? What is the situation of power (both hidden and manifested) in that group? ” (Yip 2013:11).

Yip explains the relevancy of critical realism as a philosophical foundation of religion and culture in anthropology and missiology and the development of a ‘post-postmodern anthropology’ and ‘post-postmodern missiology. The disciplines have challenged understandings and approaches to culture and religion on different levels since the 1960s: “A number of factors from the 1960s onward have led to a serious challenge to the traditional anthropology and hence the need of a new missiology. These include post-modern anthropology and globalization” (Yip, 2013:5-6). For example, post-modern or post-colonial scholarship in various disciplines and frameworks converge around the following themes: the need to move from mere description of language and symbols to issues of (mis)representation of ‘others’ and ‘other’ cultures and religions; consider the dynamics of ideology and power; construction of meaning and knowledge from different cultural and religious realities;
focus on the ‘preferential option of the poor’ and other marginal groups; develop knowledge which is largely based on the experiences and contexts of marginal groups.

However, according to Yip, a ‘positivist view’, a standard cause and effect logic (as used in old and new expressions of subjectivism or objectivism, idealism or instrumentalism) continues to inform and influence post-modern anthropology and post-modern/ecumenical missiology and mission practices. This logic is also part of and influence theological contextualization - ‘mission as contextualization’ in contexts of poverty and inequality - and mission practices, for example mission outreaches to the so-called ‘unreached peoples’ (Yip, 2013:6). Therefore, a critical realist approach in missiology or, according to Yip, ‘a post post-modern missiology’ is an attempt to address this problem by asking,

How do we contextualize in view of the large intra-cultural variations?...Rather than postulating a set of cultural qualities (or themes or symbols) as shared by a (unverified) ‘majority’ of a society and contextualizing on that basis, it is better to use progressive [a radical or revolutionary emergent] contextualization to study the social actions (including so-called exceptions) of a subgroup, the consequences, the inner states of the group members, all in the proper contexts, and making generalizations cautiously without making them general laws or norms. Missiological application then proceeds based on this generalization.... (Yip, 2013:11).

Yip builds on the original and basic realist perspective and parameters of missionary anthropologist Paul Hiebert and develops them with reference to the critical realism of Ortner in post-modern anthropology. He rephrases and applies the parameters of Hiebert to concepts and contexts of marginal groups - the poor and the so-called ‘unreached peoples’ as understood in two broad traditions of mission. Whether mission as evangelization of ‘un-reached people’ groups or mission as contextualization is used, understandings and identifications of the worlds and contexts of ‘others’ by middle or upper middle class people remain limited and problematic. The critical realist approach and proposed post-postmodern anthropology and post-post-modern missiology of Yip promote self-critical perspectives: how we read and acquire the knowledge from the worlds and contexts of marginal groups and ‘unreached peoples’ and for what purpose; how our processes and practices of (re-)discovering the worlds and contexts converge with and diverge
from the experiences, self-understandings and self-identifications of marginalized groups and ‘unreached peoples’ as insiders to their contexts (Yip, 2013; Hiebert 1991, cited in Yip).

How our approaches to individuals and groups from communities on the margins and ‘unreached peoples’ link agency, identity, identification and power in cultures and structures culture in theories and theologies which focus on the processes, practices and outcomes of reconciliation in and through the encounters.

It has been said repeatedly that reconciliation is a complex issue and a long-term process that requires united efforts to promote it. The EPR has a theological duty to perform and to eradicate ethnic ideology so that Rwandans may live in a peaceful and harmonious country.

In its attempt to re-consider the ministry of the EPR, this study has faced a few limitations. First of all, this study has taken the form of a literature study. Thus, the evaluation of the ministry of reconciliation in the EPR has primarily been based on a scrutiny of church documents. A closer empirical analysis of the work of the EPR at the congregational level might reveal more detailed information on the effects of reconciliation. Secondly, the literature analysis has revealed that reconciliation in the EPR is not generally conceived of in terms of ethnic ideology. Thus, there are no programmes in place that primarily focus on deconstructing ethnic ideology. It is therefore not possible to evaluate that which does not exist. Once further mechanisms are put in place to achieve reconciliation by addressing ethnic ideology, it will be possible to conduct a fuller evaluation of the EPR.

Future research should seek to fill these gaps. Further in-depth research on the role of the church in reconciliation should be undertaken to provide more information that will guide future interventions and inform policymakers on major trends and issues that can lead to policy changes in the area of peace and reconciliation. The researcher also suggests that there is a need for additional studies to be done on the theological response to ethnic ideology. The study may propose how and what must be done, and how to create a new national identity for Rwandans from a theological perspective.
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