

The Intertextual Relationship between
Augustine's Confessions
and
The Letter to the Romans

by

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Abstract

Interest in the exploration of classical texts through the use of modern theoretical frameworks is on the rise, but they are not yet mainstream. The complexity of a quotation rich text such as the *Confessions* has not yet been thoroughly explored through the lens of a theoretical framework developed specifically for this purpose. This dissertation investigates the concept of intertextuality and proposes a conceptual framework for the analysis of quotations in a classical text, employing the theories of intertextuality as expounded by Julia Kristeva and Roland Barthes. This conceptual framework forms the model for the analysis of the intertextual relationships between *Confessions* 1 to 8 (the autobiographical narration of Augustine's journey to conversion) and the *Letter to the Romans*. The dissertation is divided into two sections: the theoretical perspectives and methodology (section A), and the analyses of the intertextual relationships that play a role in *Confessions* 1-8 (section B).

The first chapter of the first section investigates the primary theoretical perspectives in the theories of intertextuality of Kristeva and Barthes, focusing on those aspects that may contribute to a conceptual framework for the analysis of a classical text. The second chapter establishes the methodology for the analysis of the text of the *Confessions* offered here, including definitions of the terms and concepts that constitute the conceptual framework for this dissertation.

The analyses of the intertextual relationships between *Romans* and *Confessions* 1-8 are found in the second section. In these chapters the passages in *Confessions* 1-8 that demonstrate significant similarity to passages in *Romans* are analysed using the conceptual framework established in the previous section. The analyses in these chapters demonstrate the two primary features which this conceptual framework is best suited to highlight: firstly, the possibility of multiple perspectives on a text, and secondly, the quality of polyvalence that is evident in a quotation rich text such as the *Confessions*.

Opsomming

Daar is 'n toename in belangstelling in die ondersoek van klassieke tekste aan die hand van moderne teoretiese raamwerke, maar sodanige benaderings is nog nie wydverspreid nie. Die kompleksiteit van 'n teks wat 'n rykdom van aanhalings bevat, soos die *Confessiones*, is tot dusver nog nie deeglik ontleed met behulp van 'n teoretiese raamwerk wat spesifiek daarvoor ontwikkel is nie. Hierdie proefskrif ondersoek die konsep van intertekstualiteit en bied 'n konseptuele raamwerk vir die analise van 'n klassieke teks. Die kontekstuele raamwerk is gegrond op die teorieë van intertekstualiteit ontwikkel deur Julia Kristeva en Roland Barthes. Hierdie raamwerk bied 'n model vir die analise van die intertekstuele verhoudings tussen *Confessiones* 1 tot 8 (die outobiografiese vertelling van Augustinus se reis na bekering) en die *Brief aan die Romeine*. Die proefskrif bestaan uit twee dele: teoretiese perspektiewe en metodologie (Afdeling A), en analyses van die intertekstuele verhoudings wat 'n rol speel in *Confessiones* 1-8 (Afdeling B).

Die eerste hoofstuk van die eerste deel ondersoek die belangrikste teoretiese perspektiewe van die teorieë van intertekstualiteit van Kristeva en Barthes. Klem word gelê op dié perspektiewe wat kan bydra tot 'n konseptuele raamwerk vir die analise van klassieke tekste. In die tweede hoofstuk word die metodologie vir die analise van die teks van die *Confessiones* wat hier aangebied word, uiteengesit en die terminologie en konsepte verduidelik wat die konseptuele raamwerk vir die proefskrif daarstel.

Die analyses van die intertekstuele verhoudings tussen *Romeine* en *Confessiones* 1-8 word in die tweede deel uiteengesit. In hierdie hoofstukke word die passasies in *Confessiones* 1-8 wat betekenisvolle ooreenkomste toon met passasies uit *Romeine* ontleed aan die hand van die konseptuele raamwerk wat in die vorige afdeling daargestel is. Die analyses illustreer die twee belangrikste aspekte wat so 'n konseptuele raamwerk uitnemend geskik is om aan te toon: die moontlikheid van

veelvoudige perspektiewe op 'n teks en multi-dimensionaliteit wat kenmerkend is van 'n teks soos die *Confessiones*.

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Chapter 1 Introduction

In *Conf.* 6.7.12, Augustine recalls an episode when he was a teacher in Milan; his friend, Alypius, who was a lover of the circuses, much to Augustine's chagrin, happened to be in attendance during one of Augustine's lectures. Augustine observes the following:

et forte lectio in manibus erat, quam dum exponerem opportune mihi adhibenda videretur similitudo circensium, quo illud quod insinuabam et iucundius et planius fieret cum inrisione mordaci eorum quos illa captivasset insania. scis tu, deus noster, quod tunc de Alypio ab illa peste sanando non cogitaverim. at ille in se rapuit meque illud non nisi propter se dixisse credidit et quod alius acciperet ad suscensendum mihi, accepit honestus adulescens ad suscensendum sibi et ad me ardentius diligendum. dixeras enim tu iam olim et innexueras litteris tuis, 'corripe sapientem, et amabit te.' at ego illum non corripueram... (Conf. 6.7.12).

I chanced to have a text in my hands, and while I was expounding it an apt comparison with the circuses occurred to me, which would drive home the point I was making more humorously and tellingly through caustic mockery of people enslaved by that craze. You know, our God that I did not think at the time about curing Alypius of this bane. Yet he took my illustration to himself, believed that I had used it solely on his account: and what another person might have regarded as a reason for being angry with me this honest young man regarded rather as a reason for being angry with himself and loving me more ardently. Long ago you had told us, weaving the advice into your scriptures, *Offer correction to a wise man, and he will love you for it*. Yet I had not corrected him myself¹.

¹ Boulding, 2008: 103-4.

Later on in the *Confessions*, Augustine describes his conversion story that culminates in a chance reading of *Rom. 13:13*. In a garden in Milan, upon hearing what seemed like children chanting “*tolle lege, tolle lege*”, he takes up the book he was reading and reads the first verse that he sees:

itaque concitus redii in eum locum ubi sedebat Alypius: ibi enim posueram codicem apostoli cum inde surrexeram. arripui, aperui, et legi in silentio capitulum quo primum coniecti sunt oculi mei: ‘non in comessationibus et ebrietatibus, non in cubilibus et impudiciis, non in contentione et aemulatione, sed induite dominum Iesum Christum et carnis providentiam ne feceritis in concupiscentiis.’ nec ultra volui legere nec opus erat. statim quippe cum fine huiusce sententiae quasi luce securitatis infusa cordi meo omnes dubitationis tenebrae diffugerunt. (Conf. 8.12.29).

Stung into action, I returned to the place where Alypius was sitting, for on leaving it I had put down there the book of the apostle’s letters. I snatched it up, opened it and read in silence the passage on which my eyes first lighted: *Not in dissipation and drunkenness, nor in debauchery and lewdness, nor in arguing and jealousy; but put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no provision for the flesh or the gratification of your desires.* I had no wish to read further, nor was there need. No sooner had I reached the end of the verse than the light of certainty flooded my heart and all dark shades of doubt fled away².

These two passages demonstrate how powerful language and literature can be: the wayward Alypius is prompted to amend his ways, interpreting Augustine’s jibe as being directed at him, though Augustine had no intention to do so; in this same context, he refers to God’s advice as “woven” into scripture. The young Augustine interprets the words in *Rom. 13:13* as a personal instruction to give up his desires and follow a life of celibacy. The words spoken by Augustine at that lecture in Milan

² Trans. Boulding, 2008: 156-7.

possessed far more power than even he, the author of those words, had considered; similarly, the book that he had been reading, and possibly had even read before, suddenly possessed the very thing he needed to commit himself completely to God.

Interpretation is a vast and complicated field. A particular complication arises when we discover a piece of another text in the text we are reading, or even a similarity to something we have read before. Such phenomena have been described by many different names: allusion, reference, echo, quotation, intertext, allegory, pastiche, parody, influence, to name but a fraction of the possibilities³. These terms have been the subject of thousands of studies, across the ages. There are many different ways of interpreting such phenomena. How does one go about interpreting the exchange between Alypius and Augustine? What is the role of *Rom.* 13:13 in the conversion scene in the garden in Milan?

The *Confessions* has been described as a work suffused with such phenomena. Verheijen remarks on the sheer quantity of references to the bible in the *Confessions*: “Dans les *Confessions* de saint Augustin, notamment dans livres I à IX, les références classiques ne manquent pas, mais les références bibliques y sont innombrables” (Verheijen, 1981: lxxix). However, this statement provokes a number of questions: What is a reference/quotation/citation/allusion? How does one go about interpreting the significance of a reference/quotation/citation/allusion? What is the relationship between the text being read, i.e. the *Confessions*, and the references/quotations/citations/allusions found in it?

These questions were prompted by my own investigations into the relationship between the *Letter to the Romans* and Augustine’s *Confessions* in my Masters thesis, completed in 2009, entitled “Augustine’s use of *Romans* in the conversion narratives of the *Confessions*”, where I explored the contexts of the quotations of *Romans* in the

³ To demonstrate such, Mary Orr lists more than 1000 possible terms that can be used to describe similar phenomena (2008: 238-246).

conversion narratives in the *Confessions* and the implications for the interpretation for these narratives. At the conclusion of this study, I was nonetheless dissatisfied with my use of the term “quotation”. In order to identify such “quotations” in this study, I followed the lead of text editions such as those of O’Donnell (1992a) and Verheijen (1981), and relied on their assignment of reference /quotation/citation/allusion. However, it was not clear what their precise criteria for identifying references/quotations/citations or allusions were. O’Donnell admits that there are always disagreements as to what constitutes a citation, and that “no collection of Augustine’s ‘citations’ is ever complete” (O’Donnell, 1992a: lxx).

In my investigation into the issue I was drawn to certain modern theoretical approaches, which contributed a more nuanced understanding to the issue of interpreting such relationships. In particular, the theory of Intertextuality described the kinds of relationships I had been trying to understand in a more methodical way. This investigation, however, highlighted several tensions between the methodology I had employed before and the methodologies employed in these modern theoretical approaches. When one is attempting to utilize a modern literary theory to describe and interpret a classical text, one encounters difficulties in establishing an equilibrium between the traditional methodology found in the Classics and the (often radical) methodology offered by more modern approaches. It forces one to reconsider the traditional methodologies of the Classics, how it differs from modern methodologies, and how modern methodologies may offer new answers to old questions.

The method of traditional classical philology, as established from the 19th century onward, is characterised by an attempt to provide literary and historical studies a kind of objectivity that was considered the strength of the physical sciences. The works of U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1848-1931) are characteristic of such attempts. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff’s method is paraphrased by Dan and Peta

Fowler in their article on literary theory and classical studies in the Oxford Classical Dictionary:

[According to Wilamowitz-Moellendorff,] [t]he purpose of textual study is to recover the intentions of the authors of the texts, and to this end all conceivable data from the ancient world may be relevant. The fragmentary traces that have come down to us are clues which enable us to reconstruct the thought processes of the ancients: but the conventions of ancient literature need to be established through painstaking examination of parallels before interpretation can take place. (Fowler and Fowler, 2003: 871).

The critic of this time was therefore considered a detective, searching for “clues” within texts, which then allow him or her to gain access to the ideas or experiences of the authors. While the traditional philology of the 19th century contributed greatly to our understanding of classical texts, the assumptions of this methodology came under scrutiny during the 20th century. The assumptions that came under attack were, firstly, the position that the critic is objective, in a scientific sense, something the traditional critics wished to emulate from the physical sciences; secondly, the attempt to psychologize the author through his/her texts; thirdly, the assumption that there exists a singular, coherent “master” interpretation or image; and finally, the notion that such interpretive tools are essentially timeless and not subject to scrutiny over time (Fowler and Fowler, 2003: 871).

In order to grant literary studies the required objectivity, traditional classical methodologies employed the author’s point of view as the determining factor for the interpretation of a text. 20th century literary theory is characterised by a shift from an author-centric method to a text- and/or reader-centric one. The origins and impetus of this shift stem from the influential work of Ferdinand de Saussure. In the *Cours de linguistique générale*, published in 1916, Saussure redefined language as essentially a single system of interrelated parts with no actual external reference. This, in turn,

inspired a collection of theoretical movements collectively called structuralism. Structuralism inspired a wide range of theoretical and literary pursuits and revitalised interest in the value of literary theory. Structuralism was succeeded by post-structuralism, a collection of theoretical movements in reaction to the theoretical positions of structuralism, born from the political turmoil of the events of the student uprisings in France in May 1968.

Despite the rapid increase of interest in literary theory since 1916, classical studies have been far less eager to embrace novel theoretical positions. As early as the 1960's, classicists have been accused of a resistance towards theory. The 1962 issue of *Arion* opens with an editorial which addresses this very issue:

Classical studies have become increasingly isolated from all other literary disciplines and interests. Our literary studies, for example, exist in a closed world of their own; we employ a "critical language" that bears no relation to any other critical language and our literary tokens are never brought into contact with any other critical currency.... The revolution in criticism and poetry, which has taken place in the last fifty years and whose founding fathers were deeply interested in classics, has gone on with minimal reference to the literatures of Greece and Rome. Alone among literatures, Greek and Latin are kept innocent of modern critical methods and discussion. Modern critics do not usually have the requisite knowledge of the languages, and professional students of classical authors frequently do not seem to know what criticism, or indeed literature, is, and petulant references to something called "The New Criticism" suggest that they do not care. (Arrowsmith et al., 1962: 3-4).

This was written a half-century ago, and yet Schmitz's introduction to *Modern Literary Theory and Ancient Texts*, first published in German in 2002, reflects a similar attitude: "Classics as a field has been rather slow to come to grips with modern

literary theory... We have to catch up with most other disciplines in the humanities" (Schmitz, 2007: 5-6). He does however note that "in the last few years, a number of classicists have become aware of the chances and opportunities that literary theory offers and have developed fascinating new vistas on our ancient texts" (Schmitz, 2007: 5-6). The Fowlers (2003: 871) are of the opinion that "20th century theorizing has a great deal to offer classical studies". In his introduction to *Texts, Ideas, and the Classics: Scholarship, Theory, and Classical Literature*, S. J. Harrison writes "that the new perspectives offered by literary theory can lead to new insights which can revolutionize (no less) the interpretation of a text" (2001: 7). Indeed, interest in literary theory in classical scholarship has provided a wealth of influential and novel avenues of study.

One of these avenues that relates to this study is that of allusion. Gian Biagio Conte's *The Rhetoric of Imitation*, published in 1986, combines traditional classical scholarship and modern literary theory in order to reassess the concept of allusion. Steven Hinds' influential work, *Allusion and Intertext: Dynamics of Appropriation in Roman Poetry*, published in 1998, deals with allusion, as well as the notion of intertext in the context of Roman poetry. Published shortly after this in 2001, *Intertextuality and the Reading of Roman Poetry* by Lowell Edmunds considers the concept of "intertextuality" from the theoretical perspectives of the last century. Such works as Schmitz's *Modern Literary Theory and Ancient Texts*, and the papers from the conference "Working Together: Scholarship and Theory in Classical Literature", held at Corpus Christi College, Oxford in April 1997, published in the collection *Texts, Ideas and the Classics: Scholarship, Theory, and Classical Literature*, edited by S. J. Harrison, demonstrate the increasing interest in modern literary theory in classical scholarship.

The focus of this study is the significance of traces of other texts in a particular text, specifically traces of *The Letter to the Romans* in Augustine's *Confessions*. The topic of "traces", "quotations", "allusions", "intertexts", and other such terms describing

similar phenomena has been a prominent focus point in theoretical studies in classical scholarship, as evidenced by the works mentioned earlier. The beginning of serious theoretical consideration of this topic can be attributed to Giorgio Pasquali and his influential article, *Arte Allusiva*, published in 1951. Since then, numerous studies on the topic have been made, many of which employ modern literary theories and methods.

One of the more popular terms to describe this area of inquiry is “intertextuality”. Unfortunately, it is an overused term in contemporary criticism. A brief survey of academic works with the words “intertextuality” or “intertext” in the title will yield an inordinate amount, particularly in the field of classical and biblical literature⁴. The term “intertextuality” has become in vogue in academic circles, often as a means to replace the terms source or influence study. Graham Allen warns against such casual use: “Intertextuality,” he says, “is not a transparent term and so, despite its confident utilization by many theorists and critics, cannot be evoked in an uncomplicated manner” (Allen, 2011: 2). Miller (2010: 285) notes that within Old Testament research (and indeed, this can be extrapolated to other fields as well), it is impossible to speak of an “intertextual method”, owing to the myriad ways in which scholars employ the term. Tull (2000: 62) identifies two broad groups of scholars employing the term, which he calls the “traditionalists” and the “radical intertextualists”, (2000: 62). Miller, in his interpretation of Tull’s description, describes the former as relying on “linear, historicist models of interpretation that seek to identify chronological relationships among texts”, and the latter as conforming more to “the kind of study that [Julia] Kristeva was advocating when she coined the term ‘intertextuality’” (Miller, 2010: 286). As such, Miller considers the so-called “radical” approach as a

⁴ I mention here a few titles published in the past 10 years: Weren, W. J. C. 2014. *Studies in Matthew’s gospel: literary design, intertextuality, and social setting*, Hays, R. B., Alkier, S. & Huizenga, L. A., 2009. *Reading the Bible Intertextually*, and Evans, C. A. and Zacharias, H. D. (eds). 2009. *Early Christian literature and intertextuality* (2 volumes). Even a cursory search of biblical scholarship will return a plethora of titles containing the word “Intertextuality”.

“more authentic application of intertextual study than the traditionalist approach” (2010: 286). Miller, however, reinterprets the “traditionalist” approach as “author-oriented”, and the “radical” approach as “reader-oriented”, in trying to convey who gives meaning to the intertextual relationships. He describes the reader-oriented approach as follows:

In the reader-oriented approach, it is the reader alone who creates that meaning. Even if one could determine which texts the author is alluding to, or could ascertain the author’s purpose in composing this text, such considerations are irrelevant. The author is merely ‘a reader, “digester” and re-arranger of texts and experiences’ and cannot endow a text with meaning. (Miller, 2010: 286).

The approach to intertextuality that is followed in this study aligns with Miller’s idea of a reader-oriented approach, and therefore Kristeva’s interpretation of intertextuality.

The term “intertextuality” appears for the first time in the essay “Le mot, le dialogue et le roman” by Julia Kristeva, published in 1967. Her topic is the literary theory of Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin, and her theory is largely a synthesis of his theory with Saussurian linguistics. Following her, many theorists have used the term “intertextuality” in a sense derived or developed from her original definition, and later completely different approaches appeared, using the same term to describe a variety of perspectives. The first prominent theorist to expand on Kristeva’s concept of “intertextuality” is Roland Barthes. Around the same time, Jacques Derrida, while not specifically utilizing the term “intertextuality”, developed a theory that shares many characteristics with Kristeva and Barthes’ development of the ideas of intertextuality. These theorists have often been grouped together under the umbrella term of “post-structuralist” thinkers (Allen, 2011: 92). Such post-structuralist approaches to the concept “intertextuality” were not the only ones to arise. Since the

1960's, certain approaches to intertextuality have also been undertaken by structuralist theorists, of which Gérard Genette and Michael Riffaterre are the most prominent (Allen, 2011: 92). Such approaches differ greatly from their post-structuralist equivalents and therefore it is necessary, before discussing the theories in detail, to first critically consider the structuralist and post-structuralist avenues of literary theory from a broader perspective.

The terms structuralism and post-structuralism are problematic in that they do not refer to specific theoretical positions or ideas, but to a series of broad approaches, the borders of which are often blurred or overlapping. Furthermore, especially in the work of the theorists of the 1960's, we see certain theorists, like Roland Barthes, starting off with primarily structuralist ideas and then moving towards and adopting post-structuralist positions. Post-structuralism is a reaction towards structuralism and such fluidity is to be expected.

Structuralism's origin lies in the work of Ferdinand de Saussure who was concerned with the limits of the philology of his time regarding the object of study. According to Saussure, "[philology] failed to seek out the nature of its object of study. Obviously, without this elementary step, no science can develop a method" (1959: 3). Saussure's insistence was that language could only be made the object of science if it could be limited to a discernible object (Young, 1981: 2). The core of Saussure's linguistics is his definition of the most basic component of language: a sign. In his definition, "the linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-image" (Saussure, 1959: 66). He then replaces the term "concept" with "signified" and "sound-image" with "signifier" (Saussure, 1959: 67). Furthermore, this union of signified and signifier is completely arbitrary. Young explains that it is a psychological entity and therefore has no direct reference to the real (Young, 1981: 2). From the basis of this linguistic model, Saussure developed a method which became known as structuralism. According to Young (1981: 3), "the structuralist method... assumes that meaning is made possible by the existence of underlying

systems of conventions which enable elements to function individually as signs. Structuralist analysis addresses itself to the system of rules and relations underlying each signifying practice: its activity more often than not consists in producing a model of this system”.

Young summarizes the four main avenues of criticism levelled against structuralism by post-structuralists: first, the problematic issue of using linguistics as a basis for literary criticism; secondly, the “unscientific” assumption that the work contains an intrinsic meaning which must be sought or dug up; thirdly, that the analysis is based on the discovery of the rational quality of the text, that is, the overall coherence of a text; finally, he argues that it presupposes “the traditional and metaphysical notion of harmony and unity: a work only exists so far as it realises a totality” (Young, 1981: 5). It is these criticisms that post-structuralism in turn addressed. It is far more challenging to describe a central post-structural thesis for this very reason: post-structuralism is reactionary and self-critical. As Young puts it, “[post-structuralism] consists of a perpetual detour towards a ‘truth’ that has lost any status or finality” (1981: 6). Young explains that criticism itself is a text and therefore subject to criticism; post-structural criticism therefore resists finality: it avoids becoming fixed (Young, 1981: 7). The post-structuralist’s position that there is no final “truth” that can be scientifically discerned does not spell the end of the critic: rather it requires that he/she approach the act of criticism from different avenues. Barthes’ *S/Z*, an analysis of Balzac’s *Sarrasine* through the lens of his post-structuralist theory, is an excellent example of the transformation of the critical faculty.

Despite the growing interest in theoretical studies in classics, the works of Augustine, in particular, the *Confessions*, have not been extensively analysed using such theories. The body of work on the *Confessions* produced in the last few decades is enormous, but the trends and foci discernible are limited. Knauer (1955: 2) identifies certain divisions in *Confessions* scholarship: the question regarding the historicity of the *Confessions*, that is, whether the *Confessions* is an accurate

representation of the events of Augustine's life; the question regarding the unity of the *Confessions*, that is, the apparent discrepancy between the first nine books and the last four; finally, a number of studies appeared regarding language, style and rhythm in the *Confessions*. O'Donnell (1992a) restates the prominence of the historicity question and argues that "new lines of inquiry and new questions have not been risked" in the last fifty to sixty years (1992a: xxii). According to O'Donnell, "[we] have still not appreciated the *Confessions* purely as a work of literature" (1992a: xxiii). Any overview of the body of work of the last twenty years in *Confessions* scholarship shows a continuation of the trends that Knauer and O'Donnell observed. A wide variety of scholarship can be found, including historical, theological and philosophical works, and works that focus on individual concepts within the *Confessions*, but it would seem that few new avenues have been taken.

Despite his conviction that recent Augustinian scholarship is difficult to briefly categorize⁵, Drecoll (2007: 13) does highlight certain areas which have come to the fore in recent years. The discovery of the *Codex Manichaicus Coloniensis*, or the Cologne Mani-codex, has renewed interest in the influence of Manichaeism in Augustine's works, especially the *Confessions* (Drecoll, 2007: 16). Following his overview of academic congresses of the last twenty years, Drecoll also notes the prominence of research concerning Augustine's conversion (2007: 15).

With regards to the attention that theoretical studies enjoy in Augustinian scholarship, only a few studies can be identified that deal specifically with theoretical and literary approaches to the interpretation of the *Confessions*. Other than the introduction of renewed interest in Manichaeism, which is also limited to a small number of studies, few new avenues have been risked: theological and philosophical studies dominate the landscape of *Confessions* scholarship. Such a

⁵ "[den] Stand der Augustinforschung etwa der letzten zehn oder zwanzig Jahre inhaltlich kurz zu umreißen, ist nicht möglich" (Drecoll, 2007: 13).

unique and multifaceted piece of literature should enjoy a wider range of attention in academia.

A study of the *Confessions*, rooted in a theoretical framework which has not yet been applied in *Confessions* scholarship, may reveal new insights into the text, as well as providing a unique perspective on the *Confessions*. To this end, this study aims to apply the theoretical framework of intertextuality to a critical reading of the *Confessions*. The goal is to demonstrate the multifaceted nature of a text like the *Confessions* and to demonstrate the value of a theoretical approach, such as the theory of intertextuality as understood by Kristeva and Barthes, in the interpretation of a classical text. Since this approach has not been applied in *Confessions* scholarship and is significantly different to the methodologies that have been applied in *Confessions* scholarship, it is often difficult to engage with other branches of Augustinian scholarship using the same kind of language⁶. The engagement with *Confessions* scholarship will therefore not be as extensive as is common in *Confessions* studies. My contribution to *Confessions* scholarship is not intended to be in the realms of the historical, philosophical and theological aspects of the *Confessions*, *Romans*, biblical literature or the authors of these works. Instead, I wish to contribute a new perspective on the *Confessions*, one that allows for a focus on the Text and the rich interpretations that can flow from the complex structure of this cognitive construct. My goal is not to put forward new interpretations, nor to discover a “neglected key to unlock all mysteries”, as O’Donnell puts it (1992a: xxiii), but rather to appreciate the plurality of the text and to demonstrate how the text may produce multiple interpretations.

⁶ As a casual example of one such difficulty, I offer the example of the common use of the author’s name in scholarship. It is not uncommon to see such phrases as “Augustine’s use” or “Augustine’s interpretation”. Setting aside the issue on whether or not a scholar intend this to refer to a historical Augustine or an abstract author, nevertheless, the theoretical framework of intertextuality denies agency to the author as the locus of interpretation. For a further discussion on the role of the author in the theory presented in this study, see chapter 3.2.2.2.

To achieve this goal, my study is divided into two parts: a description of the theoretical foundation (Section A), and the analyses of the intertextual relationships in the *Confessions* (Section B). In the first chapter of Section A, I conduct a thorough examination of the theoretical works of Kristeva and Barthes, chosen as the exemplars of the post-structuralist interpretation of intertextuality (Chapter 2: Theories of Intertextuality). My focus in this chapter are the areas relevant to the development of a conceptual framework which can be used to analyse the intertextual relationships between the *Confessions* and the *Letter to the Romans*. In this chapter, I also consider similar concepts in Classical scholarship, especially with a view to understanding the terminology which is used in Classical scholarship, in order to inform the terminology which will be used in my conceptual framework.

In the second chapter of Section A, I outline these theoretical concepts in a structured manner and describe them in terms of a conceptual framework for the analysis of the *Confessions* (Chapter 3: A Conceptual Framework of Intertextuality). The conceptual framework encompasses a detailed understanding of the role of the critic, which is important as the point of departure in the interpretation. In this chapter, I carefully define the primary terms employed in this dissertation, based on the theoretical concepts discussed in the previous chapter, and explain how I use these terms in my interpretation. I also consider the object of study in this chapter, so as to make clear what I am interpreting, in terms of the theoretical framework discussed in the previous chapter. Because of the importance given to the genre of *Romans* in scholarship, I also discuss this in this chapter, in order to situate my theoretical position relative to the scholarship on genre. I conclude this chapter with a brief discussion on the difficult issue of time, as it relates to textual interpretation.

Section B comprises the analyses of the intertextual relationships between the *Confessions* and the *Letter to the Romans* up to book 8 of the *Confessions*. The first analysis chapter concerns the title of the work and the analysis of *Conf.* 1.1.1 (Chapter 4: The Title and *Confessions* 1.1.1). The following chapter describes the

thematic elements found in *Conf.* 1.2.2 – *Conf.* 4 that serve as intertextual links with *Romans* throughout the *Confessions* (Chapter 5: *Confessions* 1.2.2 – *Confessions* 4). Subsequent chapters involve detailed analyses of very strong intertextual relationships with *Romans* in chapters associated with conversion narratives or have an impact on the conversion (Chapter 6: *Confessions* 5; Chapter 7: *Confessions* 7.9.13-15; Chapter 8: *Confessions* 7.20.26-7.21.27; Chapter 9: *Confessions* 8).

With this study I hope to demonstrate the value of embracing the polyvalence of a “multi-layered and subtle” text such as the *Confessions*, in O’Donnell’s words (1992a: xxiii), and the multiple perspectives that are possible through a theoretical lens such as that of intertextuality.

SECTION A: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

Chapter 2 Theories of Intertextuality

In this chapter I explore the concept of Intertextuality primarily from a theoretical point of view. I trace the concept of Intertextuality through its origins in Julia Kristeva to its further development in the works of Roland Barthes. My primary focus in this chapter is on the theory of Barthes. This focus is firstly motivated by the need to simplify an overwhelming, conflicting and contradicting tradition of theories related to, or called Intertextuality, and secondly, because Barthes successfully employs his theoretical framework in an analysis of a literary text, detailed in his seminal work, *S/Z*. His exposition is the one that I found the most useful to construct a conceptual framework with which to analyse the *Confessions*. The areas that I focus my attention on in the exploration of these theoretical approaches are: the text, or the object of literary study, the author, and the reader, and the manner in which meaning is produced through the interaction/agency of these three elements.

2.1. Definitions of Intertextuality

As a point of departure, I begin by considering some definitions of the term Intertextuality. I cite Harris (1992: 175), who defines Intertextuality as follows:

1. In its broadest usage, the mode of existence of all thought, language, and discourse.
2. More narrowly, the interaction of other utterances/texts (discourses) that produces a new utterance/text (discourse).
3. A synonym for allusion.
4. In one possible interpretation of Julia Kristeva, the process that produces the text from among the manifold possibilities of the mind's contents.

Harris' definition is based on a theoretical perspective. The term Intertextuality has been widely used outside of this definition. Graham Allen describes this use thus:

Intertextuality is one of the most commonly used and misused terms in contemporary critical vocabulary. 'An Intertextual Study of...' or 'Intertextuality and ...' are such commonplace constructions in the titles of critical works that one might be forgiven for assuming that intertextuality is a

term that is generally understood and provides a stable set of critical procedures for interpretation. Nothing, in fact, could be further from the truth. The term is defined so variously that it is, currently, akin to such terms as ‘The Imagination’, ‘history’, or ‘Postmodernism’: terms which are... underdetermined in meaning and overdetermined in figuration (Allen, 2011: 2).

Indeed, the terms intertextuality, intertextual and intertext are often employed in contexts where they are used to represent source study, as has become common in scholarship⁷. In order to avoid such confusion, I intend to explore the concept of intertextuality as set out in the writing of the originator of the word, Julia Kristeva, and its further development in the work of Roland Barthes. Once the relevant theoretical points have been identified, I proceed to explore the concepts related to Intertextuality, primarily from the perspective of Classical scholarship. The exploration of these concepts will highlight the manner in which a post-structuralist approach to Intertextuality differs from other similar methodologies often employed in Classical scholarship.

These explorations will serve as the backbone for the development of a conceptual framework that will guide the interpretation of the *Confessions* and the relationship it has with the *Letter to the Romans*.

2.2. Julia Kristeva

Kristeva’s own contribution to literary theory had its origin in another theory. The subject of Kristeva’s essay in which she introduces the term “intertextuality” is the literary theory of Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin⁸. In this essay she transforms and reinterprets his literary theory and formulates her own theory of Intertextuality. She does this by fusing Saussurian linguistics with Bakhtin’s literary theory. In order to

⁷ Julia Kristeva herself laments this situation in *Revolution in Poetic Language* (1984: 60).

⁸ “Le mot, le dialogue et le roman”, first published in 1967 in *Critique*.

understand what Kristeva contributed to literary theory, it is worth looking at the aspects of Bakhtin's theory that she uses or transforms in her own theory. Two aspects of Bakhtin's literary theory are relevant, namely, the notion of the "utterance" and his idea of "dialogism".

2.2.1. Dialogism and the utterance

The importance of Bakhtin's "utterance" to this study relates to Saussure's notion of the sign: in order to establish a theory of how texts convey meaning, the elements that make up texts and how they function need to be addressed. Differing significantly from the abstraction of the linguistic sign proposed by Saussure⁹, Bakhtin understands the "utterance" as central to the meaning of any text. The utterance differs from the sign in that it possesses a social context, a human element. Whereas the sign is an abstraction, the performance of the utterance, its social significance, is what defines its meaning. The abstraction of the sign robs it of one of the key aspects which provides it with meaning.

For the purposes of the conceptual framework used in this study, the most important aspect of Bakhtin's theory developed further by Kristeva is the concept of dialogism¹⁰. For Bakhtin, dialogism is not simply one aspect of language but a central element thereof. Bakhtin defines two kinds of texts or utterances: the monologic and the dialogic. The dialogic text is in continuous dialogue with other texts, and is informed by other texts, whereas the monologic text seeks to impose a singular logic and meaning. These terms refer to ideological perspectives. For Bakhtin, all language is dialogic, locked in the struggle between the opposing forces of the monologic and dialogic utterance. The monological text is that which imposes a singular perspective on the text, expresses a single voice; the dialogical text is a text possessing multiple voices, multiple perspectives.

⁹ Namely, the signifier/signified dyad.

¹⁰ Bakhtin introduced the notion of dialogism in *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, first published in 1929.

Bakhtin refers to the existence of more than one simultaneous voice as polyphony, a term he borrows from music. Bakhtin describes it thus:

The word is not a material thing but rather the eternally mobile, the eternally fickle medium of dialogic interaction. It never gravitates toward a single consciousness or a single voice. The life of the word is contained in its transfer from one mouth to another, from one context to another context, from one social collective to another, from one generation to another generation. In this process the word does not forget its own path and cannot completely free itself from the power of those concrete contexts into which it has entered (Bakhtin, 1984: 201).

The voice, for Bakhtin, is therefore a perspective, defined by social and literary contexts, of which there are many in any text.

What Bakhtin is defining in the discussion above is a theory of how meaning is produced by texts, a central and important issue to the interpretation of any text. The word does not possess a singular meaning, but is characterised by a number of contexts, across geographic, historical, literary and other spaces, potentially innumerable. These contexts thus inform the meaning of the word, but not in the sense of a mathematical function, whereby one would consider all these contexts (as inputs) and produce a single output, a single meaning. Rather, the word is in constant dialogue with these contexts, allowing for a multitude of meanings to emerge.

2.2.2. Intertextuality

In Kristeva's thought, the word "dialogism" is replaced with "intertextuality"¹¹. Whereas Bakhtin uses the word "utterance" to refer to the elements of the dialogic

¹¹ Harris describes "dialogism" as narrower than "intertextuality" in that it is only restricted to language use, whereas intertextuality extends to all discourse (1992: 176). There is some debate as to whether Bakhtin's "dialogism" and Kristeva's "intertextuality" are roughly synonymous, or whether

discourse, which emphasises the social and historical context, Kristeva uses the term “word”. The literary word, according to Kristeva’s understanding of Bakhtin’s theory, is “an intersection of textual surfaces rather than a point (a fixed meaning), as a dialogue among several writings: the writer, the addressee (or the character) and the contemporary or earlier cultural context” (Kristeva, 1986: 36).

Kristeva situates the word within a three-dimensional space within which the “various semic sets and poetic sequences function” (1986: 36). The three dimensions, “or coordinates of dialogue” of this textual space are the writing subject, the addressee and exterior texts (Kristeva, 1986: 36)¹². The status, or meaning, of the word is defined horizontally, that is, between the writing subject and the addressee, and vertically, between the addressee and exterior texts, or an “anterior or synchronic literary corpus” (Kristeva, 1986: 36-37). Therefore, Kristeva imagines the coincidence of the horizontal and vertical axes she has described:

Hence horizontal axis (subject-addressee) and vertical axis (text-context) coincide, bringing to light an important fact: each word (text) is an intersection of word (texts) where at least one other word (text) can be read... any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another. The notion of *intertextuality* replaces that of intersubjectivity, and poetic language¹³ is read as at least double. (Kristeva, 1980: 66).

the ideas Kristeva develops around “intertextuality” are significantly different to Bakhtin’s. For a discussion of this issue, see Lesic-Thomas, 2005.

¹² By exterior, here, Kristeva means other texts. At this point, Kristeva still limits her theory to literary texts.

¹³ The concept of “poetic language” as Kristeva understands it requires some clarification. “Poetic” here refers not specifically to poetry, nor even to literature or *belles lettres*, but rather as “the infinite possibilities of language” (Kristeva, 1984: 2). Poetic language is language unleashed, and literature the “exploration and discovery of the possibilities of language; as an activity that liberates the subject from a number of linguistic, psychic and social networks” (Kristeva, 1984: 2).

In distinction to Bakhtin, Kristeva considers the word not as an intersection of voices, but rather an intersection of texts. Kristeva, in “Le mot, le dialogue et le roman”, also criticises Saussure’s concept of the sign. The sign, according to Saussure, is, as Kristeva puts it, “a product of scientific abstraction”, “a vertically and hierarchically linear division”, while poetic language is double in the sense of “one and other” (Kristeva, 1980: 69). The term sign, as understood by Saussure, cannot be applied to poetic language. Poetic language is subject to “an infinity of pairings and combinations” (Kristeva, 1980: 69). In a similar vein, Allen (2011: 44-45) describes Intertextuality as a kind of language which resists a singular, absolute logic; meaning is not finite, it is subverted or resisted. To clarify here, poetic language, according to Kristeva, is always multivalent: there will always be traces of other texts (and, for example, other contexts, voices or narrators) in poetic language. For Kristeva, abstraction such as attempted by Saussurian linguistics, to reduce the text to a collection of signs, is not possible, because of the infinite possibilities that poetic language produces.

2.2.3. *Signifiance*

The discussion above describes the basic framework of Kristeva’s formulation of her theory of Intertextuality. Rather appropriately, the term “intertextuality” was quickly appropriated by other scholars, as remarked above, and was slowly transformed to refer to influence, allusion¹⁴ or simple source study, a fact she laments in *La révolution du langage poétique* (1984, 59-60). In response to this, Kristeva reformulated her theory in different terms. In *La révolution du langage poétique* she develops her theory beyond the earlier essays. At this stage, her theory is heavily influenced by the terminology of psychoanalysis, particularly that of Jacques

¹⁴ Allusion is included in Harris’ definition of Intertextuality. A discussion of the term allusion as a competing notion against Intertextuality occurs later in this chapter.

Lacan¹⁵. She is interested in refining the signifying process, which she calls *signifiance*. She defines this as “precisely this unlimited and unbounded generating process, this unceasing operation of the drives toward, in, and through language; toward, in, and through the exchange system and its protagonists – the subject and his institutions” (Kristeva, 1984: 17). She describes the process as the sum of two inseparable “modalities”, namely the semiotic and the symbolic (Kristeva, 1984: 24)¹⁶. For Kristeva, the symbolic represents the rational, the logical, the part which can be understood completely. It represents the point at which the subject enters into society and is subject to social structures, including linguistic structures (Kristeva, 1984: 29). The semiotic, on the other hand, is the irrational, the illogical, the desires and drives of the subject. She explains that every signifying system relies on a dialectic between the semiotic and the symbolic. From this dialectic, Kristeva develops a theory of how texts function. She identifies two aspects of the text which she labels the “genotext” and the “phenotext”. The genotext is pervaded by the semiotic, which she defines as “the only transfer of drive energies that organizes a space in which the subject is not *yet* a split unity that will become blurred, giving rise to the symbolic” (Kristeva, 1984: 86). The genotext is not linguistic, in the sense of being able to be reduced to grammatical or linguistic parts or structures, but rather what Kristeva considers a process, that is, continually working (Kristeva, 1984: 86). Out of the genotext, the phenotext emerges. The phenotext is the text that tries to communicate, which is seated in the symbolic, and therefore logical. Unlike the genotext, the phenotext can be reduced to its constituent parts and is structured. The phenotext represents what can be understood and the genotext that which resists comprehension, which undermines it. The genotext is the primary characteristic of

¹⁵ According to Allen, while Kristeva is indebted to Lacan for many of her ideas, she takes a critical and revisionary position to his ideas (2011: 47).

¹⁶ Kristeva derives these two modalities from Lacan’s distinction between the *Imaginary* and the *Symbolic*. The *Imaginary*, the child’s fragmented and symbolized sense of the body, is transformed into Kristeva’s *semiotic* (Allen, 2011: 47).

what Kristeva terms “poetic language”. In an attempt to explain how poetic language is understood, Kristeva revisits her earlier theory of Intertextuality. She identifies a process in the unconscious, the “passage from one sign system to another” (Kristeva, 1984: 59):

[This process] involves an altering of the thetic position – the destruction of the old position and the formation of a new one. The new signifying system may be produced with the same signifying material; in language, for example, the passage may be made from narrative to text. Or it may be borrowed from different signifying materials: the transposition from a carnival scene to the written text, for instance... The term *inter-textuality* denotes this transposition of one (or several) sign system(s) into another; but since this term has often been understood in the banal sense of ‘study of sources,’ we prefer the term *transposition* because it specifies that the passage from one signifying system to another demands a new articulation of the thetic – of enunciative and denotative positionality. If one grants that every signifying practice is a field of transpositions of various signifying systems (an inter-textuality), one then understands that its ‘place’ of enunciation and its denoted ‘object’ are never single, complete, and identical to themselves, but always plural, shattered, capable of being tabulated. In this way polysemy can also be seen as the result of a semiotic polyvalence (Kristeva, 1984: 59-60).

Several things can be gleaned from this challenging passage. Kristeva highlights the possibility that different kinds of signifying materials may operate in the same signifying system. Literature is not only characterised by linguistic material in the composition of its signifying system(s), but characterised by other materials too that are capable of signifying. A text is not merely a collection of (linguistic) texts, but a fabric of different signifying materials. Because the text is woven from these different, linguistic and non-linguistic “threads”, they pull against stable meaning and generate polysemy. The phenotext, that part which can be understood, is

undermined by the efforts of the genotext to unleash these different signifying materials.

2.2.4. The Addressee

Kristeva presents an articulation of what a text is and how the signification process functions, but the position of the author and reader is not concretely defined in her theory. She does describe the position of the “addressee” in her theory: “The addressee, however, is included within a book’s discursive universe only as discourse itself. He thus fuses with this other discourse, this other book, in relation to which the writer has written his own text” (Kristeva, 1980: 66). The author is transformed into the “writing subject”¹⁷. The writing subject refers also to the conscious and the unconscious of the writer, but both of these remain inaccessible. Leon S. Roudiez, in the introduction to the translation of *La révolution du langage poétique*, warns against trying to psychoanalyse the writer through his text, and through it somehow explain the text (Kristeva, 1984: 8). In Kristeva’s theory, the text is the primary point of departure.

2.2.5. Criticism of Kristeva’s theory

The description of Kristeva’s theory above does serve to highlight the complexity of Kristeva’s writing. Her love of mathematical language has made her work very difficult to interpret. This fact has also made her subject to significant criticism from scholars from the fields of Mathematics and Science. A chapter is devoted to her literary theory in Sokal and Bricmont’s work *Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science* (1998: 38-49). They note the errors in her use of mathematical language in the theory, particularly her understanding of set theory,

¹⁷ Allen describes the horizontal dimension, between the writing subject and the addressee as the communication between the author and the reader, which then overlaps with the dimension relating to anterior texts (2011: 38).

Boolean logic, and her own concept of “poetic logic”¹⁸. While Kristeva does insist that her use of notions of set theory and other mathematical language is metaphorical, Sokal and Bricmont do not see any justification for the use of such language, metaphorical or otherwise (1998: 42). The mathematical language, combined with the metaphorical use, makes it significantly challenging to understand the precise sense that Kristeva is trying to convey regarding the mechanics of her theory. It is therefore challenging to distil a unifying “system” from the theoretical texts discussed above. Accepting the criticism of Sokal and Bricmont, I attempt to restate the elements of Kristeva’s theory crucial for the formulation of a conceptual framework in a more systematic way here. These elements, taken together with the elements from Barthes’ theory, will form the backbone of the conceptual framework that will be employed for the analysis of the *Confessions*.

2.2.6. Summary of Kristeva’s theory

In order to contain the scope of the theory addressed in this dissertation, I highlight the primary aspects of Kristeva’s theory that I employ in my development of a conceptual framework for the analysis of the *Confessions*.

2.2.6.1. The nature of the word/text

Kristeva’s understanding of semiotics starts with the word, which, for her, is an intersection of texts. By intersection, she means that the word is understood in relation to other texts. Kristeva does not limit the meaning of “text” to literary texts, but to discourse in general, or signifying materials. “Text” for her includes translinguistic texts, that is, aspects of human culture and expression that cannot be reduced or represented (entirely) linguistically. The word is always an intersection

¹⁸ Whereas Boolean logic uses the set $\{0, 1\}$, Kristeva’s poetic logic encompasses a continuum across the interval 0-2 (Kristeva, 1986: 41). However, Sokal and Bricmont note that she seems to be confusing the Boolean set $\{0,1\}$, which denotes “false” and “true” respectively, with the interval $[0, 1]$ which contains all the real numbers between 0 and 1, which is an infinite set, and therefore a continuum (Sokal and Bricmont, 1998: 40). There would therefore be no difference, in terms of representing something across a continuum, between $[0, 1]$ and $[0, 2]$, for the purposes of Kristeva’s use thereof.

of multiple texts, and therefore is always subject to polyvalence. There will always be more than one meaning to any word. This aspect, expanded by Barthes, will form the cornerstone of the conceptual framework that is employed in this study. Kristeva's division of the text into the phenotext and the genotext may be described as follows for the purposes of this study: the phenotext represents the (traditional) logical text, that which can be represented linguistically, and the genotext represents the emotional, irrational, illogical text, which cannot be represented (directly) in a linguistic way. For me, the importance of Kristeva's challenging argument regarding poetic logic lies in her insight that the interpretation of poetic language is not subject to traditional logical divisions. By this I mean that it is possible that two (or more) interpretations can be made from the same word (text)¹⁹ which may seem contradictory. Assigning truth values to the "logic" of the interpretations is itself subject to interpretation, leading to an infinite regression. This assumption would, in part, be supported by Kristeva's notion of the genotext, the aspect of the text that resists logical subdivisions. For the purposes of this study, the most important part of this aspect of Kristeva's theory is the potential for contradictory interpretations that stem from the illogical aspect of the text and undermine the part of the text that attempts to define a logical structure.

2.2.6.2. Signification

Kristeva calls the process whereby something is read as *signifiance*, or *signification*. This process is always in motion and always in a state of becoming. The process is psychological, based on a dialectic between the rational and irrational parts of the psyche, which she terms the semiotic and the symbolic respectively. It is therefore not possible to establish a synchronic view of language in Kristeva's theory, as the process of signification is always at work. Identifying a point in the process and trying to analyse it is difficult to comprehend, but even more importantly, not of any

¹⁹ Using Kristeva's own formulation of the concept.

value, as the interpretation of texts is precisely defined by this ceaseless process. This process essentially defines the manner in which “reading” will be understood in this study: a ceaseless process that reads and rereads, interprets and reinterprets. As such, the reading will resist linearity and invite revision and reinterpretation.

2.2.6.3. Transposition

The recognition of another text in a text is described as by Kristeva as transposition²⁰: the old context of the other text is removed and replaced with a different context, thus altering its meaning. This transposition is an essential component of what is understood to be an intertextual relationship in this study.

Kristeva’s theory is focused on the mechanics of signification and does not offer a simple method with which to interpret a literary text. However, aspects of her theory do offer insight into the nature of the process of signification and the basic assumptions regarding the nature of the text, essential for a complete conceptual framework. In order to explore the development of the concept of Intertextuality beyond the process of signification and towards a methodology to analyse texts, I look to the French theoretician, Roland Barthes.

2.3. Roland Barthes

Roland Barthes was a contemporary of Kristeva and both influenced and was influenced by Kristeva’s work. Kristeva’s theory described a radical new approach to the understanding of the text. Barthes transformed her theory by describing similar ideas in far less technical language, and employing them in practical analyses of literary texts. Barthes’ theory is therefore not only more accessible and understandable, it also provides certain practical guidelines which are invaluable in a conceptual framework for the analysis of literary texts.

²⁰ Kristeva originally called this Intertextuality, and indeed, it is the mode in which all texts are read. All words/texts are essentially transposed. The reader recognizes the text and understands it in relation to the manner in which the text has been transposed into the new context.

2.3.1. The Work and the Text

Barthes develops his own articulation of the concept text in the essay “De l’oeuvre au texte”, first published in 1971. He approaches the Text in contradistinction to the Work²¹. The Work, according to Barthes, “is a fragment of substance, occupying a part of the space of books” (1977:156-157). It is a physical production, the ink on the pages, the part which can be read or consumed. A Work is consumed by reading (or in a more generalized, abstract sense, in its perception). For Barthes, all kinds of reading are equal in their consumption. The so-called “cultured” reading and casual reading are both the consumption of the Work (1977: 162). Finally, the Work, Barthes explains, is in a process of filiation: he lists three factors through which a work achieves this filiation, namely, “a *determination* of the work by the world (by race, then by History), a *consecution* of works amongst themselves, and a *conformity* of the work to the author” (Barthes, 1977: 160). The Work, therefore, exists in historical time, within a specific cultural milieu (to circumscribe Barthes’ use of the term “race”), in a literary history, ordered between past, contemporary and subsequent Works, and finally, is attached to the author of the Work, who acts as Creator of the Work. Barthes uses the term *conformity*, which suggests a complete identification of the Work with the author, to the point of their being inseparable. The author of the Work is the “father and owner of his work: literary science therefore teaches *respect* for the manuscript and the author’s declared intentions, while society asserts the legality of the relation of author to work” (Barthes, 1977: 160).

The Text²², according to Barthes, represents a different aspect of the literary object. While the Work is limited by its form (e.g. the words on the page, the notes of a score, the brushstrokes on a canvas), the Text cannot be computed: the “[Work] is

²¹ I reproduce Barthes’ capitalization for the terms Text and Work.

²² It should be noted here that Barthes’ distinction of Work and Text does not have any parallels with Kristeva’s division of the text into phenotext and genotext. The Text, as Barthes envisions it, would include both of Kristeva’s phenotext and genotext.

displayed, the [Text] is demonstrated" (Barthes, 1977: 157). The Text cannot be contained in a hierarchy, or be ordered into such categories as genre. It resists classification. Barthes describes the Work and Text in terms of Saussure's linguistic sign. He sees the Work as a signified: this signified is either obvious or literal, or it can be the goal of scientific pursuit, in the sense of hermeneutics or interpretation (Barthes, 1977: 158). The Text, in contrast, "practices the infinite deferment of the signified" (Barthes, 1977: 158) and is thought of as a signifier. While the Work may be moderately symbolic, that is, its symbolism has a limit, the Text is radically symbolic²³. In this way, the Text is similar to language, structured, but potentially infinitely complex. Much like Kristeva and Bakhtin, Barthes conceives of the Text as plural. He explains this plurality not as the co-existence of multiple meanings, but as "a passage, an overcrossing; thus it answers not to an interpretation, even a liberal one, but to an explosion, a dissemination" (Barthes, 1977: 159). The Text, as is suggested by the etymology of the word "text", is woven from different signifiers, woven with "citations, references, echoes, cultural languages, antecedent or contemporary, which cut across it through and through in a vast stereophony" (Barthes, 1977: 159-160). This intertextuality, Barthes argues, is untraceable and anonymous, and already read. By this he means that the intertextuality pre-exists the Text; the intertextuality must first be read to be understood.

In contradistinction to the "sanctity" of the Work, the Text can be broken. The Text can be read separately from the authority of the author. The author, Barthes argues, does not disappear but is absorbed into the Text. He becomes a character within the Text: "he is inscribed in the novel like one of his characters, figured in the carpet; no longer is privileged, paternal, aletheological, his inscription is ludic" (Barthes, 1977: 161). For Barthes, reading (in the sense of consuming the Work) is a passive activity, but when one engages with the Text, one is participating in a game, that is, one is

²³ The term "symbolic" here should be understood as symbols in the casual sense, not in the technical sense Kristeva uses it.

playing with the Text. Barthes plays with the various meanings of the word play; he holds that in this context the word “play” includes all its meanings: like a door or machine, the text has play; a reader plays with the Text like a game; and finally, like a musician plays a musical instrument. This has parallels in Bakhtin’s ideas of the utterance, the performance of language. Barthes’ final conclusion following his identification of the element of play in the Text is that there exists a unique kind of pleasure, “a pleasure without separation”, that is, without the kind of separation one would experience in the pleasure of simply reading a Work (Barthes, 1977:163-164).

2.3.2. The Author and Intertextuality

Barthes is not merely interested in the Text, but also in the other two elements of the trinity, namely the author and the reader. Barthes announces prophetically a fundamental change in the approach to the Text in an essay entitled “The Death of the Author”²⁴, which has now, ironically, become almost inseparable from the name of its author. In it he identifies a shift in the way the idea of the author is approached. According to Barthes, the author is a modern creation, that is, it is, historically speaking, a relatively new invention. In ages past, the Text was performed by shaman or rhapsode, whose name is not recorded, and whose “performance... may possibly be admired but never his ‘genius’” (Barthes, 1977: 142). Barthes argues that the author, even when writing in the first person, is defined by what is written, not the other way around: *I* refers to a subject, which is a linguistic construct and variable; it does not refer to a person (Barthes, 1977:145). The act of removing the author has consequences: any attempt to “decipher” a text, to find a singular, unambiguous meaning behind it, becomes impossible; there is no authority to determine it. According to Barthes, “to give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing”

²⁴ The essay was first published in English in the journal *Aspen* 5-6 in 1967, and in French in *Manteia* 5, in 1968. It was republished in the anthology *Image-Music-Text* in 1977.

(1977: 147). He understands that the act of removing the author has radical implications for the critic, who shares in the power the author wields over the text. Without the authority of an author, the critic is undermined. For Barthes, “in the multiplicity of writing, everything is to be *disentangled*, nothing *deciphered*” (1977: 147). The goal of the critic, of the philologist, must change: “the space of writing is to be ranged over, not pierced” (Barthes, 1977: 147). Barthes concludes his announcement by stating the implications of the author’s death:

We know now that a text is not a line of words releasing a single ‘theological’ meaning (the ‘message’ of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash. The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture (Barthes, 1977: 146).

[A] text consists of multiple writings, issuing from several cultures and entering into dialogue with each other, into parody, into contestation; but there is one place where this multiplicity is collected, united, and this place is not the author, as we have hitherto said it was, but the reader: the reader is the very space in which are inscribed, without any being lost, all the citations a writing consists of; the unity of a text is not in its origin, it is in its destination (Barthes, 1977: 148).

Here, Barthes introduces an important aspect to Intertextuality: the shift from the author as central authority of meaning to the reader, the “destination” of a text. The reader is not personal; he is merely “*someone* who holds together in a single field all the traces by which the written text is constituted” (Barthes, 1977: 148). Meaning, therefore, is produced through the reader, containing all the traces of the text, encountering the text itself, and the interaction between these two elements. Culler, writing on Kristeva and Barthes, describes Intertextuality’s approach to the reader thus:

The notion of intertextuality emphasizes that to read is to place a work in a discursive space, relating it to other texts and to the codes of that space, and writing itself is a similar activity: a taking up of a position in a discursive space. (Culler, 1976: 1382).

I have briefly described Kristeva and Barthes' ideas surrounding the concepts of "text" and how texts produce meaning. The critic, however, is interested primarily in how such a theoretical understanding of the literary object can be used to describe it. Barthes' work includes a rigorous exploration of a piece of literature from the perspective of his literary theory, which is explored in the following section.

2.3.3. Interpretation

The most successful employment of a theoretical model of intertextuality to describe and interpret a text is, to my mind, Barthes' *S/Z*, first published in French in 1970²⁵. It is a semantic analysis of the novella *Sarrasine* by Honoré de Balzac, embodying the essence of Barthes' own literary theory. Barthes begins this study by describing two kinds of texts: writerly and readerly texts. The nature of these texts embody the essence of Barthes' approach to interpretation and so it is worth investigating what he understands under these two categories. Readerly texts are the kinds of texts that are merely read. The reader is not an active participant in the text's production, but is left to either accept or reject the text (Barthes, 1990: 4). Barthes calls this kind of text a "classic text". By "classic" he is actually inferring criticism against the limitations imposed by academic traditions in the interpretation of texts. Bensmaia (2008: 484) explains that the idea of a readerly text was one which possessed the "classical" values such as a linear narrative, transparency of meaning and continuity of plot, as well as the insistence of the link between the meaning of the text and the intention of the author and the historical/cultural context in which it was produced.

²⁵ I employ the translation by Richard Miller published in 1990 in this dissertation.

More accurately, the readerly text is one that imposes these classical values on the reader, encouraging the reader towards a singular meaning or understanding.

In contradistinction to this there is the writerly text. According to Barthes (1990: 5), “the writerly text is *ourselves writing*, before the infinite play of the world (the world as function) is traversed, intersected, stopped, plasticized by some singular system”. In other words, the writerly text is the reader’s own participation in the act of producing a text. While the readerly text seeks to impose a singular, stable meaning, the writerly text encourages the production of additional meaning. According to Bensaïa, “the writerly text thus calls into question and deconstructs literary norms and conventions, unravelling the codes of literature to produce a *sui generis*, ‘ideal’ text” (2008: 484). It is this kind of reading towards which this study strives.

2.3.4. The Text in Interpretation

Having made this distinction, Barthes rearticulates his theory of what a text is once again, and how one would attempt to interpret it. Interpretation is, according to him, not giving a text meaning, but rather to “appreciate what plural constitutes it” (1990: 5). Barthes here imagines a perfectly plural text, with a multitude of networks that interact, each without dominating. This plural text is

a galaxy of signifiers, not a structure of signifieds; it has no beginning; it is reversible; we gain access to it by several entrances, none of which can be authoritatively declared to be the main one; the codes it mobilizes extend *as far as the eye can reach*, they are indeterminable...; the systems of meaning can take over this absolutely plural text, but their number is never closed, based as it is on the infinity of language (Barthes, 1990: 5-6) (original emphasis).

Into this web of networks the reader enters, but Barthes warns against taking such statements as “I read the text” at face value. This “I” is itself “a plurality of other texts, of codes which are infinite or, more precisely, lost (whose origin is lost)” (Barthes, 1975: 10). The act of reading is infinitely reiterative: when we read, we seek

out meanings, we “name” these meanings, as Barthes puts it; these “names” are then used to find names for other names: “names call to each other, reassemble, and their grouping calls for further naming: I name, I unname, I rename: so the text passes” (Barthes, 1990: 11). Forgetting a meaning, or “missing” something in the text, in Barthes’ opinion, is not a fault, because the act of reading does not constitute a stable or even closed system in which such meanings exists.

2.3.5. Analysis of the Text

Barthes is critical of the way that the text is often divided into large constituent parts or structures by classical rhetoric and school explications. A single text, for Barthes, is never on its own, separate from all others, but rather blurs to the point where literature itself becomes a single text. To seek structure or (logical) division in a single text is to deliberately ignore all other contingent texts in literature in the act of this division. As a result of this observation, in approaching the division of Balzac’s novella, Barthes does not look to logical structural points, but rather separates the text arbitrarily into units he coins *lexias*. These *lexias* may consist of a paragraph, a sentence, a few words or in some instances a single word; the only requirement Barthes imposes on these *lexias* is that there should be at most three or four meanings or interpretations which can be identified (Barthes, 1990: 14).

According to Rosenthal’s interpretation of *S/Z* and her understanding of what Barthes describes in it, reading “means laying out all the possibilities for interpretation that are in the work” (Rosenthal, 1975: 127). In order to do this “laying out”, Barthes employs what he calls linguistic “codes” in his interpretation of the novella. These are the Semantic Code (SEM), the Symbolic Code (SYM), the Cultural Code (REF), the Proairetic Code (ACT) and the Hermeneutic Code (HER)²⁶. The Semantic Code indicates a connotation. The first example given by Barthes is the title

²⁶ The capitalized abbreviations are used by Barthes in the course of his dissemination to indicate which code is operating in a specific *lexia*.

of the novella itself, *Sarrasine*. This name is not a usual French name, but would recall the (masculine) name Sarrazin. The addition of the “e” would, to a French person, indicate, or rather, connote femininity. Therefore the word/name Sarrasine is a signifier of femininity (Barthes, 1990: 17). The Symbolic Code, according to Rosenthal, corresponds to our notion of a theme that can be traced throughout the text (1975: 130). Rosenthal remarks that the final three codes do not have any comparable equivalents in American criticism, but allow us to describe certain qualities of literature where our own vocabulary is insufficient (1975: 130). The Cultural Code, or Reference Code, refers to cultural wisdom or knowledge, whether “physical, physiological, medical, psychological, literary, historical, etc....without going so far as to construct (or reconstruct) the culture [it] express[es]” (Barthes, 1990: 20)²⁷. The Proairetic Code refers to the action in a text. Together with the Hermeneutic Code, Rosenthal suggest they form what could be called the “plot” (1975: 132). The Hermeneutic Code is the code of mystery and puzzle, something that has to be solved/resolved. These codes represent the different voices that are woven into the text. As Barthes puts it,

we use *Code* here [in *S/Z*] not in the sense of a list, a paradigm that must be reconstituted. The code is a perspective of quotations, a mirage of structures... each code is one of the forces that can take over the text (of which the text is the network), one of the voices out of which the text is woven (Barthes, 1975: 20-21).

These codes offer a potential paradigm that can act as tools for analysis, and can be used to describe how texts pass through other texts. Barthes’ method allows for a range of texts to be analysed, particularly through the Cultural Codes. The division of “plot” into the Proairetic and Hermeneutic Codes makes it possible to analyse

²⁷ Examples of this can range from the mundane to the complex: Barthes gives, for example, daydreams as an example of shared human experience (1990: 18), and the artistic genre of the Dance of the Dead (1990: 24), both which he classifies under the Cultural Code described above.

texts where “plot” may seem an illogical or insufficient a term, such as the *Confessions*²⁸. As Allen insists, these codes are not tools for exhaustive analysis, but part of one reader’s analysis of a text (Allen, 2011: 83). But in order to be analysed, the text must be read. *S/Z* is therefore a reading of a text and the codes are some of the intertextual links or codes that permeate that reading. Such a reading is not and cannot ever be complete: that is exactly what constitutes the infinite nature of intertextuality.

Barthes’ description of a method for the analysis of the text presents a paradigm which will form the core of the methodology employed in the conceptual framework which will be used in the analysis of the *Confessions*. The method accounts for the infinite complexity of a text while embracing it, which is the purpose of this dissertation.

2.3.6. Criticism and the Critic

Another aspect of Barthes’s theory that influences the conceptual framework used in this study is his understanding of the role of criticism and the critic. On philology, Barthes (2007: 26) notes that “[it] does indeed have the task of fixing the literal meaning of an utterance, but it has no hold on second meanings”. Barthes argues that the complex nature of kinds of literature such as poetry, as well as literature that continues to provoke complex questions and a multitude of diverging interpretations prompts one to consider answers from without the realm of philology. It is not enough to understand the literal, semantic meaning of a text (if such a definitive meaning can be ascertained at all). The critic has a different task to the philologist, according to Barthes in *Criticism and Truth*, first published in 1966²⁹:

²⁸ It would be difficult to impose the concept of a plot onto the *Confessions*: while the *Confessions* contains episodes of linear narrative, it is embedded in a significantly non-linear prayer, including an analysis of the memory, time and the creation account in *Genesis*.

²⁹ I employ the translation, edited by Katrine Pilcher Keuneman and Charles J. Stivale, published in 2007.

Criticism is not science. Science deals with meanings, criticism produces them. It occupies, as has been said, an intermediate position between science and reading; ... The relationship of criticism to the work is that of a meaning to a form. The critic cannot claim to “translate” the work, and particularly not to make it clearer, for nothing is clearer than the work. What the critic can do is to “engender” a certain meaning by deriving it from the form which is the work (Barthes, 2007: 32).

Criticism and Truth is one of Barthes’ earlier works, predating *S/Z* and the other works discussed in this study, and contains strong structuralist influences. However, one can already see Barthes’ attempt to transform, redefine or even revolutionise the role of the critic in this passage. The critic is the midpoint between science and reading, philology and reader. The critic exists as reader and writer, but Barthes warns the critic about addressing the (external) reader:

[The] critic can in no wise substitute himself for the reader. In vain will he presume – or others will ask him – to lend a voice, however respectful, to the readings of others, to be himself but a reader to whom other readers have delegated the expression of their own feelings as a consequence of his knowledge or his judgement, in other words to exercise by proxy the rights of the community in relation to the work. Why? Because even if one defines the critic as a reader who writes, that means that this reader encounters on his path a redoubtable mediator: writing (Barthes, 2007: 38).

The critic is a reader, but the reader and the readings of others are not, in Barthes’ opinion, the focus of the critic. The notion of the reader must be approached, not as someone who produces a reading, but as the abstract locus of the process of signification.

2.3.7. Summary of Barthes' theory

Whereas Kristeva's theoretical exposition is notoriously convoluted and complex, Barthes' writing style is spontaneous and rich. This, however, also contributes to some difficulty in understanding precisely what his ideas are. Here, I attempt to summarize the aspects of his theory that I have discussed and the relevance to the conceptual framework for this study.

2.3.7.1. The Work

Barthes establishes a clear distinction between the Work and the Text, representing the two primary aspects of the object of literary study. The Work is a physical object. Because it is physical, it can be affiliated to a particular time, series and person. The Work can therefore be assigned an author and the content of the Work can be evaluated in respect to the author's intentions. The Work is not the focus of this study, though it is important to understand the difference between the Work and the Text for the conceptual framework.

2.3.7.2. The Text

The Text is a cognitive object. Because it is cognitive, it cannot be structured or divided in the same sense the Work can: it does not have a form to structure. The Text is made up of a variety of signifiers, echoes of other texts, cultural languages, and this is not limited to literary texts. These "threads" clash and blend, which allow for potentially infinite complexity. The Text is therefore plural, that is, a multitude of meanings are possible, potentially infinite. This point was already made by Kristeva and thus contributes a key aspect of the conceptual framework that will be employed in this study.

2.3.7.3. Signification

The meanings of a Text are determined by the interplay between the reader and the threads that make up the Text. Meaning is not determined by the author, as it is with

the Work, as the author is not recognized as an authority in the cognitive field of the Text. Instead the author becomes another one of the threads that make up the Text. The author therefore does not define which meanings are correct. When a text is written in the first person singular, the “I” becomes an empty subject or linguistic variable, to be filled by the reader. All meanings attributed to the Text are potentially “correct”³⁰. The reader is the cognitive space within which all these threads reside and the source of all the meanings that are produced. These two points form the primary basis of the perspective from which the interpretation of the text in the conceptual framework will take place.

Next, I summarize the key aspects of Barthes’ ideas regarding the critic and the analysis of literary texts as it pertains to the conceptual framework used in this study.

2.3.7.4. The Critic

Barthes is critical of the traditional philologist. Whereas philology, according to Barthes, attempts to understand the literal meaning of a text, criticism involves producing meanings. The critic creates meaning through an investigation of the various perturbations of the text. The critic is limited to him/herself in the process of criticism. A critic cannot substitute him/herself for another reader. The critic must accept that he/she is the locus from which all interpretations must stem. The interpretation of the critic is not merely giving a text meaning, but appreciating the possibility of a multitude of meanings. There are many ways to interpret a text, and no method is privileged above the other. Meanings are in themselves not stable. It is possible for a meaning to be forgotten in the process of an interpretation, and later “remembered”. The combination of textual elements responsible for an interpretation is not constant or enumerable because the system of the text is not

³⁰ Or rather, there is no sense in assigning “correct” or “incorrect” to an interpretation: meanings *are*. Correct or incorrect are ideological perspectives on the text, themselves subject to the process of signification.

stable or closed. Barthes accepts that there are two modes in which a text may be interpreted: the readerly and the writerly. For the critic, Barthes argues, the writerly text is the focus. The writerly text is the text that generates writing, i.e. generates a response from the reader/critic. It is under this paradigm that the reading of the *Confessions* is described here.

2.3.7.5. Analysis

Barthes analyses his texts through the application of codes, as discussed above. These codes represent one or more perspectives on the text and do not serve as an exhaustive tool for analysis. These codes are one critic's attempt to bring to light the complexity of a text in a rational, communicable way. The purpose of Barthes' literary analysis is not final answers, fixed meanings or authoritative claims, but rather a perspective whereby the complexity and plurality of the text may be appreciated. For the purposes of this study, Barthes' codes and the perspective they provide on the nature of interpretation are repurposed in the conceptual framework and tailored for the interpretation of the *Confessions*.

Barthes provides a good framework for using radically theoretical ideas in a critical context. It is still necessary to narrow down how this critical process will function, and establish a conceptual framework within which to interpret the text. But before a conceptual framework of Intertextuality can be established, it is necessary to address a number of other concepts within literary criticism, particularly in Classics, which may be related to Intertextuality.

2.4. Intertextuality and similar concepts in Classical scholarship

While the concept of Intertextuality (in the post-structuralist sense discussed above) is not absent in Classical scholarship, it is not mainstream. The concept that a (classical) text has a relationship with other texts is not novel in Classical scholarship either. In Classical scholarship, there are other notions that attempt to explain or interpret the relationship between a text and other texts, in different ways. For the

purposes of this study, I focus on two particularly prominent notions: genre, and allusion/quotation³¹. Genre can be broadly described as considering a text in relation to other texts that share certain stylistic or formal features. Similarly, allusion/quotation can be described as considering a part of a text in relation to a part of a different text. This particular aspect is often compared to the concept of Intertextuality and is of particular relevance to this study. I investigate these notions as they are usually employed in Classical scholarship and attempt to indicate how these notions relate to the theoretical understanding of Intertextuality as used in this dissertation. The purpose of this is also to establish a means to define more precisely the terminology employed in the conceptual framework used in this study, and it is therefore necessary to consider the terminology used within scholarship regarding Intertextuality and similar notions. Because of the casual use of terms like Intertextuality and others, it is necessary to disambiguate it from other uses where such terms are commonly used in scholarship.

2.4.1. Genre

It is very difficult to consider a Classical text without encountering the concept “genre”. Genre is a ubiquitous term in Classical scholarship and its ubiquity makes using it quite challenging, particularly within a theoretical framework such as intertextuality. The scope of intertextuality as understood by the theorists discussed means it effectively includes genre as well, or a reworking thereof. The difference between the more common understanding of genre and the implications that intertextuality has for the notion is outlined here. I explore the concept “genre” through the lens of theorists Alistair Fowler, Gian Biaggio Conte, Glenn Warren Most, and David Duff in order to establish the extent to which the concept of genre is compatible with the theory of Intertextuality.

³¹ More nuanced distinctions between allusion and quotation will be discussed in Chapter 2.4.2.

Alistair Fowler discusses the concept of genre in his study *Kinds of Literature: An Introduction to the Theory of Genres and Modes*, first published in 1982. He warns against reducing the term genre, as it often is, to the notion of classification. He argues that the value of genre lies in its use for “communication and interpretation” (Fowler, 1982: 37). Instead, he proffers, one should consider genre not as class, but as type (Fowler, 1982: 37). He describes the distinction between the two terms:

When we assign a work to a generic type, we do not suppose that all its characteristic traits need be shared by every other embodiment of the type. In this way a literary genre changes with time, so that its boundaries cannot be defined by any single set of characteristics such as would determine a class. (Fowler, 1982: 38).

Fowler suggests that genre be interpreted more flexibly, as a type, as opposed to a class. He further argues that the focus of genre theory is on interpretation, rather than mere classification:

When we try to decide the genre of a work, then, our aim is to discover its meaning... It follows that genre theory, too, is properly concerned, in the main, with interpretation. It deals with the principles of reconstruction and interpretation and (to some extent) evaluation of meaning (Fowler, 1982: 38).

The notion of meaning is central to Fowler’s idea of genre. Conte and Most offer a comparable definition in their article on genre in the *OCD*:

[Genre is] a grouping of texts related within the system of literature by their sharing recognizably functionalized features of form and content... [G]enres function within texts as a way of reducing complexity and thereby not only enriching, but even enabling literary communication: for by guiding *imitatio* and identifying as pertinent the strategic deployment of topoi and of conspicuous stylistic and thematic features, they select only certain contexts out of the potentially infinite horizon of possible ones. Hence genre is not only a descriptive grid described by philological research, but also a system of

literary projection inscribed within the texts, serving to communicate certain expectations to readers and to guide their understanding. (Conte and Most, 2003: 630-631).

Conte and Most's definition shares Fowler's emphasis on meaning, although this meaning is communicated in the form of an expectation. Fowler's formulation of the concept would suggest that genre is the doorway into the discovery of the meaning of a text, whereas Conte and Most see genre as a form of limitation on the meaning of the text, a way to select meanings, to narrow down possible meanings out of an infinity of possibilities.

Conte provides a more articulated account of genre in his book *Genre and Readers* (first published in Italian as *Generi e lettori* in 1991). He describes genre as a particular relationship between the reader and the text. Conte describes the state of theoretical approaches by situating them between the trinity of the model of understanding, namely the reader, the author and the text. Conte (1994: xix) insists that the author is "an impenetrable entity", and therefore criticism that focuses on the author serves merely as an appeal to psychology; textually centred criticism leads to a fetishized text, "an inert, overly static objectivity"; focus on the reader, he warns, "raises the spectre of unfettered proliferation of meaning". Conte does not expect texts to be read with univocal meaning and a fixed addressee, but he argues that that polysemy "arises from the poets' strength, not from the historically determined readers' limitations" (Conte, 1994: xix-xx). His approach is to see the reader not as a reader-interpreter, but as a reader-addressee. He describes it thus:

The reader-addressee is a form of the text; it is the figure of the recipient as anticipated by the text. To this prefiguration of the reader, all future, virtual readers must adapt themselves. (Conte, 1994: xx).

Therefore, according to Conte, the text determines the reader, not the other way around. The reader-addressee must conform himself to the expectations of the text. Genre is exactly these expectations, this prefiguration of reader.

The definition of Conte and Most (2003) would conform to many academics' understanding of genre. However, there are aspects of such a definition that are in conflict with the theoretical framework of intertextuality. The first conflict arises with the notion of complexity: whereas intertextuality, as Kristeva and especially Barthes understand it, is characterised by the explosion of textual meaning, the above mentioned definitions of genre seek to reduce such possibilities through it. Genre, in other words, is a way of keeping the text under control. This is not an illogical solution to the problem of communication within the theoretical environment, but it does have the problem of prioritizing certain interpretations based on genre. Furthermore, the notion of a "system of literary projection inscribed within the texts" (Conte and Most, 2003: 631) suggests a linguistic theory of the text, whereby information can be "inscribed" or embedded in a text. Such a theory has not been established convincingly, nor is it compatible with the conceptual framework used here: there is nothing inherent/embedded/inscribed in the text; meaning is produced, not found.

Conte's notion of genre described in *Genre and Readers* is also problematic. Conte's theory privileges certain meanings above others³². While it accepts the possibility of multiple meanings, these meanings are determined by a certain prefiguration

³² Conte conceives of "improper" and "proper" interpretations of a text: "[T]he text can acquire by transposition other meanings too (ones that we can now indicate provisionally as 'improper'), only and precisely because it is a device conceived by the author as a linguistic system intended to communicate a 'proper' signified" (Conte, 1994: xviii). Conte understands there to be a "proper" meaning embedded in the text, a text's intentionality: "[T]he text's form and intentionality determine the reader's form" (Conte, 1994: xix-xx). It is this form that Conte understands to be genre.

present in the text³³. Again, the idea of inherent information or meaning embedded within a text is not possible in the conceptual framework employed here. Such a prefiguration cannot exist within a text, or, at least, Conte has not effectively demonstrated how this could be. The primary problem with Conte's approach is the assumption that this prefiguration of reader-addressee is actually extractable from the text, and if so, that it is possible for the reader to adapt him/herself to this prefiguration. This is especially problematic in the field of Classical Literature, where texts are divorced from their modern readers through hundreds or thousands of years. The assumption that it is possible to accurately identify the prefiguration of reader-addressee, established approximately 2000 years ago, and accurately redeploy that information is a rather tall claim, and does not enjoy suitable explication by Conte.

The arguments of Fowler (1982), Conte and Most (2003) and Conte (1994) himself follow a similar assumption: the author encodes a meaning within a text which is capable of being transmitted through time by means of genre, which is transmitted historically through literature, as the mode of decoding. The reader adopts this mode and is capable of decoding the meaning.

While the above mentioned definitions seem to rely on different theoretical frameworks, all three are incompatible with intertextuality as it is understood in this study. Duff (2002: 55) notes that, despite superficial appearances, there exists a tension between the concepts intertext (in the sense of the understanding of the text by Kristeva and Barthes) and genre. Indeed, the reaction to genre comes as a consequence of the revolutionary spirit in which post-structuralism was born: genre, in the sense of "convention", "conformity", "standardization", was seen as overtly authoritative, even more so than the notion of the author, Duff argues (2002: 56).

³³ Conte conceives of text as a medium for transferring meaning: "[T]he text has been constructed in a certain way, and not in another, precisely so that the reader can receive and decode it" (1994: xviii). He insists that the text has a "programmed and concrete form" (Conte, 1994: xviii).

Intertextuality (as understood by Kristeva and Barthes) rejects any form of authority and was seen as liberating, in contrast to the limiting force of genre. Duff attempts to transform the concept of genre in order to reduce this authoritative nature:

Reconceived in terms of 'intertextuality', genre could shed its authoritarian connotations, remove the taint of prescriptiveness, and rid itself of its traditional role as arbiter or policeman of the writing and reading process. Within this new theoretical matrix, generic norms and conventions became just one of the threads that bind texts to one another, their coercive, restrictive force dispersed by the many other forms of intertextuality with which they coexist. (Duff, 2002: 57).

Therefore, according to Duff, intertextuality, in a certain sense, includes genre. The characteristics of a genre become textual elements that participate in the same manner as any other textual element. Therefore no element of the genre is privileged and the authoritarian nature of genre is undermined.

Conte's criticism of a reader-centric interpretation does, however, have merit: the enumeration of every possible meaning a reader might chance upon is pointless. Still, it is possible to reconcile the understanding of intertextuality presented here with aspects of Conte's notion of genre. Genre exists in the textual fabric as text itself, as something read into the text by the reader, both as individual elements of textual threads, as well as the totality of the specific genre itself³⁴. Genre is a text already read and understood (if recognised), that is reread in conjunction with another text, which guides the reading in a certain way. In this sense, when one is reading a text through the lens of a genre, the genre acts as a text that is recognised by the reader, whether by association with other similar texts, or attribution by some academic authority. This allows certain meanings to become stronger, without the

³⁴ If genre is conceived of as a collection of individual elements (texts), the collection of those elements itself becomes an element (text).

destruction of other meanings. Conte argues that genre is a “structure of constraints: strategies, conventions, codifications, expressive norms, selections of contents, all organized within a competence” (1994: xx). For him, the text constrains the reader: “This competence is the force that makes sure that a text’s score is correctly performed” (Conte, 1994: xx). Within the theory discussed, however, the text is not responsible for such constraint: all the texts, the elements of whatever genre(s) are read and other texts, are read and form part of the process of signification by the reader. In this way, it is the reader that becomes the constrainer: the reader is the force that limits the meaning, not the genre. The genre is an interpretive expectation that the reader produces, not the text. The reader may allow the genre to limit the meanings, but this is not a static, one-time action, but a continuous dialectic of the limited and limitless, whereby the reader wrestles with the myriad textual threads that perpetually tug in every direction. It can also be argued, then, that genre is but one interpretive expectation, and the reader is burdened with several expectations which he/she engages and wrestles with during a reading.

The term genre is therefore dangerous to use casually in an analysis. If it is assumed that there exists certain interpretive expectations that a reader will produce, these expectations need to be carefully explained before an analysis is done. The possibility of interpretations that fall outside of such expectations should also not be discounted. I refer not to just any potential meanings that might crop up in the reader’s mind, but specifically meanings that might occur in contradiction to the interpretive expectations as a consequence of that expectation, as resistance to it.

Beyond the concept genre, the words allusion and quotation are prolific concepts in Classical scholarship as a means to understand relationships between texts. Given the prominent use of these terms in scholarship to describe relationships between texts, it is worth investigating the manner in which these terms are employed in scholarship and to evaluate whether these terms are useful to describe intertextual relationships.

2.4.2. Allusion and quotation

The Oxford English Dictionary defines “allusion” as “[a]n implied, indirect, or passing reference to a person or thing; (in later use more widely) any reference to someone or something. Also: the action or process of making such a reference” (2012). This definition is not meant as a tool for literary analysis: it is a dictionary, not a theoretical encyclopaedia, but it does provide a good starting point for the aspects of the concept “allusion” that I wish to highlight. For example, the precise meaning of “indirect, or passing reference” is problematic, and the question arises as to what the requirements for a “direct” reference might be. The possibility of something being both “implied” and “indirect” is not considered here.

The OED’s definition of the verb “quote” is as follows: “To reproduce or repeat a passage from (a book, author, etc.); to repeat a statement by (a person); to give (a specified person, body, etc.) as the source of a statement”. This evokes further problems: would the meaning of “reproduction” in this context include, for example, a translation of a passage directly into another language? Would quotation, according to the aforementioned definition, no longer be a quotation if you change a single word from the passage, or employ different punctuation?

Elements of these definitions do find themselves in the definitions of scholars and theoreticians regarding the terms “quotation” and “allusion”. The aspects that the OED’s definition of “allusion” does highlight are the properties of “implied”, “indirect” and “passing”. These properties are the central points of discussion between scholars of allusion. Under “quotation”, the notion of reproduction or repetition is highlighted, as I try to demonstrate in the following discussion of the works of Conte, Hinds, Edmunds, Ben Porat, Lyne and Plett.

The topic of Gian Biaggio Conte’s well-known work “The Rhetoric of Imitation: Genre and Poetic Memory in Virgil and Other Latin Poets” is allusion. Conte describes an allusion as follows:

Allusion, I suggest, functions like the trope of classical rhetoric. A rhetorical trope is usually defined as the figure created by dislodging of a term from its old sense and its previous usage and by transferring to a new, improper, or 'strange' sense and usage. The gap between the letter and the sense in figuration is the same as the gap produced between the immediate, surface meaning of the word or phrase in the text and the thought evoked by the allusion. The effect could also be described as a tension between the literal and the figurative meaning, between the 'verbum proprium' and the 'improprium'. In both allusion and the trope, the poetic dimension is created by the simultaneous presence of two different realities whose competition with one another produces the simultaneous coexistence of both a denotative and a connotative semiotic (Conte, 1986: 23-24).

Conte's description seems to be very close to what Kristeva describes as "transposition"³⁵, and indeed, he acknowledges that what is understood by intertextuality, in particular by Kristeva and the Tel Quel group (which included Barthes) is widely accepted; he equates the term intertextuality to his notion of "poetic memory" (Conte, 1986: 29). Conte differentiates his own theoretical position from his predecessor, Giorgio Pasquali, whose famous essay "Arte allusiva", first published in *Stravaganze quarte e supreme* in 1951, introduced a number of theoretical notions to Classical scholarship. Pasquali's position, according to Conte, is more based on emulation than what he defines as allusion, that is, Pasquali is interested in how authors improve on existing literary traditions or works (Conte, 1986: 26). Conte's position is to reject intentionalism and to see allusion in terms of relationships between texts, or intertextuality, rather than imitation (1986: 27). Therefore he notes that

³⁵ "[Transposition] involves an altering of the thetic position – the destruction of the old position and the formation of a new one" (Kristeva, 1984: 59-60).

[t]he tendency to see intention and specific allusions everywhere is an old vice of the philologist and is perhaps intrinsic to the need to proceed by inference. When I emphasize, by contrast, the concept of a literary system and regard allusion as performing the same function as rhetorical figure, I am trying to purge any excess of intentionalism from the concept of “imitatio” (Conte, 1986: 28).

While Conte does divorce himself from the notion of authorial intention, the presence of the author is still felt in his theory. Conte argues that the author “establishes the competence of the Model Reader, that is, the author constructs the addressee and motivates the text in order to do so” (1986: 30).

For the most part, Conte’s ideas regarding allusion are compatible, if not congruent with the theory of Kristeva and Barthes. His rejection of the notion of intentionality and focus on the text is in line with the theoretical principles discussed in this chapter. Conte’s idea of the Model Reader and the author’s involvement in the construction of such a reader is, however, problematic. While such a Model Reader would not be incompatible with the theory of intertextuality (such a model could be interpreted as another text woven into the text), the involvement of the author in the construction of such a model is not compatible with the framework adopted here. This is, it would seem, more an ideological position than anything else: the then avant garde theories of Kristeva and Barthes sought to undermine authority in all its forms, whereas there exists a tradition of reverence for the authors of Classical works in scholarship. It is for this reason that the total abstraction of the author is rare in Classical scholarship³⁶. Conte’s theoretical approach, rejecting authorial intention

³⁶ Even a scholar such as Conte, who rejects authorial intentionality and bases his study on the text and the relationships therein, still refers to the author by name and involves the author in his analysis: “Virgil admires Catullus as a man of letters and wishes to show that he has grasped the intention of his allusion” (Conte, 1986: 37). Barthes, in *S/Z*, refers to Balzac only when referring to the actual work itself, or as an adjective, Balzacian. No action is ascribed to Balzac in *S/Z*, except that he wrote *Sarrasine*.

and focusing on the text, has contributed much to Classical scholarship and many scholars after him have followed similar approaches to understanding the relationships between texts.

Stephen Hinds is another influential Classical scholar who has contributed to the understanding of relationships between texts. Hinds' study on allusion entitled *Allusion and Intertext: dynamics of appropriation in Roman Poetry*, published in 1998, provides a well-defined framework for the use of the term allusion. However, his ideas are still problematic in a theoretical framework based on Intertextuality as understood by Kristeva and Barthes, particularly in terms of the role of authorial intention in the process of interpretation. Nevertheless, his work does demonstrate how the term "allusion" is employed and understood in Classical scholarship.

Hinds prefers the term "allusion" over "reference"; he differs from Richard Thomas, who has issue with the frivolous connotations that the term "allusion" possesses³⁷. Hinds argues against what he terms "philological fundamentalism": instead of defining a specific instance of allusion by attributing to it specific properties e.g. either covert or overt, secret or open, he prefers a view where more than one possibility can be considered in an interpretation. In his discussion of two possible interpretations for an allusion in Vergil, Hinds recommends the following:

The best answer... will be the one which refuses to treat the choice as a disjunctive one. The richest reading of the passage, the reading most fully responsive to the *Aeneid's* many-layered explorations of pastness, is surely one which can admit the possibility of proceeding in both these directions simultaneously (Hinds, 1998: 13).

Hinds also identifies what he terms "intertextualist fundamentalism". This he understands in the sense of the post-structuralist theories of intertextuality of Julia

³⁷ Compare the German term *Anspielung*, clearly demonstrating the etymology of the Latin *ludere*.

Kristeva and Roland Barthes. The issue Hinds addresses in his critique of intertextualist fundamentalism is the rejection of authorial intention. He describes the debate around authorial intention as “one of the most famous and broadly acknowledged impasses in twentieth century criticism” (Hinds, 1998: 47). While Hinds admits to the epistemological point of the unknowability of the poet’s intention, he argues that removing the poet/author entirely from the equation “impoverishes our vocabulary” in describing the various ways a text can allude (Hinds, 1994: 48). Hinds argues, in line with such theorists as Umberto Eco and Gian Biaggio Conte, that authorial intention does indeed feature in some form in the intertextualist model of interpretation: “meaning is constructed at the point of reception” and “one of the most persistent ways in which both Roman and modern readers construct the meaning of a poetic text is by attempting to construct from (and for) it an intention-bearing-authorial voice” (Hinds, 1998: 49). However, he considers the manner in which such authorial intention is treated in intertextualist circles to be inefficient and still prefers the rhetoric of allusivity. For Hinds “[the vocabularies of intertextuality] can never truly be hospitable to the possibilities of tendentiousness, quirkiness or sheer surprise which add spice to the allusive practices of real authors” (1998: 50).

For Hinds, the author is the locus of the allusive act. Authors allude. Readers recognize. The reader is given the freedom of “allusive inexactitude”, which allows for the possibility of multiple meanings, but ultimately flowing from the alluding author. For Hinds, the value of the term “allusion” lies in its rhetorical use.

Ziva Ben-Porat, on the other hand, demonstrates a different use of the term allusion than the common understanding of the term in her influential article entitled “The Poetics of Literary Allusion”, published in 1976. This description of allusion has much more in common with the theoretical positions of Kristeva and Barthes than Hinds’ understanding of the term allusion. She laments the lack of serious theoretical attention to the notion of allusion, despite its use in academic literature:

[T]he paucity of theoretical discussions of literary allusion stands in strikingly inverse proportion to the abundance of both actual allusions in literature and the focus on particular allusions in many critical writings (Ben-Porat, 1976: 105-106).

She defines a literary allusion as “a device for the simultaneous activation of two texts” (Ben-Porat, 1976: 107). The term “text”, according to Ben-Porat, is “the obvious term to describe the closed recorded (almost always verbal) system which is activated by a literary allusion” (1976: 107). This activation occurs through the manipulation of a certain signal: “a sign (simple or complex) in a given text characterized by an additional larger ‘referent’”, which is always another independent text (Ben-Porat, 1976: 108).

Ben-Porat elaborates on the process in which such activation occurs. She defines four stages in this process: the recognition of a marker³⁸ in a given sign, the identification of the evoked text, the modification of the initial local interpretation of the signal, and the activation of the evoked text as a whole, in an attempt to form maximum intertextual patterns (1976: 110-111). This allusion is dynamic: “the referents belonging to the reconstructed world of the evoked text are independent of, and may even be incompatible with, the reconstructed world of the alluding text” (Ben-Porat, 1976: 108).

Ben-Porat’s description of allusion comes closer to the understanding of intertextual relationships by Kristeva and Barthes than that of Hinds, but Ben-Porat’s understanding of the text is clearly structuralist in origin: for her, the text is a closed recorded, and primarily verbal, system. The post-structuralist theories of Kristeva and Barthes reject the closed nature of the text, and do not seek to limit or confine

³⁸ Marker here refers to the “built-in directional signal” which is often referred to as an allusion (Ben-Porat, 1976: 108). She uses marker to refer to the signal itself, whereas allusion is the entire process combined.

the text to its verbal components. However, Ben-Porat's use of the term allusion demonstrates that this term is not used in a homogenous fashion in scholarship, and the common understanding of allusion does not always align with theoretical understandings of the concept.

Not all Classical scholars are as accepting of the term "allusion". R.O.A.M Lyne's position on the term is critical: he criticises the use of the term allusion for its insistence on authorial involvement. He says,

The trouble with the term 'allusion' is that it encourages us to evade [theoretical] problems, for it smooths the path to a simple and sham solution. It encourages us to invoke the 'author's intention' to settle any unwelcome facts or difficulties (Lyne, 1994: 187).

He argues that the choice of the source of an "allusion", for example, in a case where one would say that Vergil alludes in this case, but not that one, because one cannot make sense of the second, is unacceptable: "We are making unjustifiable assumptions, we are forming preconceptions about an author's 'intentions' which we have no right or evidence to form" (Lyne, 1994: 187). Lyne offers as support a comparison between *Aen.* 1.94ff as an allusion to *Od.* 5.306ff³⁹, and *Aen.* 6.458-60 as an allusion to Catullus' *Coma Berenices*, *Carmen* 66.39-40⁴⁰. While scholars are eager to say that Vergil alludes to Homer in the first instance, as it is easy to see how Vergil would cast Aeneas as a new Odysseus, scholars struggle to explain the allusion to a frivolous piece of poetry in one of the more serious scenes in the *Aeneid* (Lyne, 1994: 188). As a result, most scholars, according to Lyne, prefer to say "Vergil is *not* alluding" (1994: 188). This, in Lyne's opinion, is an unjustifiable solution, as it

³⁹...*O terque quaterque beati, quis ante ora patrum Troiae sub moenibus altis contigit oppetere!* (*Aen.* 1.94-96). τρις μάκαρες Δαναοὶ καὶ τετρακίς, οἳ τότε ὄλοντο Τροίῃ ἐν εὐρείῃ χάριν Ἀτρεΐδῃσι φέροντες. (*Od.* 5.306-307)

⁴⁰ *Per sidera iuro, per superos, et si qua fides tellure sub ima est, invitus, regina, tuo de litore cessi.* (*Aen.* 6.458-60). *invita, o regina, tuo de vertice cessi, invita: adiuro teque tuumque caput.* (Catullus 66.39-40).

assumes it is possible to make decisions of the sort which necessarily appeal to the author's intention.

Instead, Lyne prefers to turn away from the unknowable author's intention and towards the knowable text. He therefore prefers the term "intertextuality" to describe such relationships between texts: he also uses the term "intertext", although he does hold some reservations about the terms. Lyne (1994: 189) argues that these terms allow the critic to formulate relatively objective things about something that exists, that is, the text, but he insists that intertextuality does not bring "total clarity to our theoretical vision", when compared to approaches employing the term allusion. He openly admits the difficulty of assigning an intertext, that is, of determining when an intertext is identifiable as an intertext (Lyne, 1994: 189). For that he relies on empiricism and judging each case on its own merits. In this manner he is able to state that Catullus 66.39-40 and *Aen.* 6.458-60 have an intertextual relationship. This formulation allows him to pursue other interpretative possibilities which the language of allusivity does not quite allow⁴¹. It should be noted, however, that Lyne's use of the term intertext differs slightly from the post-structuralist interpretation of Intertextuality as understood by Kristeva and Barthes⁴². While Lyne's approach is limited to similarity, his approach allows for richer interpretive possibilities than allowed by approaches such as Hinds'.

Another scholar in Classical literature with objections to the use of the term "allusion" is Lowell Edmunds. Edmunds' approach comes closer to being

⁴¹ Lyne outlines an extensive intertextual relationship between these two texts in his article "Vergil's *Aeneid*: Subversion by Intertextuality" (1994).

⁴² Lyne still treats the intertexts as a relationship between two specific (literary) texts, measurable by the similarities between the two texts. Intertextuality, as understood by Barthes and Kristeva, considers this only one kind of intertextual relationship: the text is suffused by many more intertextual relationships, not merely similarity to other literary texts. Similarity between texts, in Barthes and Kristeva's thought, is only one way in which intertextual relationships can be established. The text is woven from a multitude of textual materials, all contributing to the process of signification (see page 14).

compatible with the theoretical positions of Kristeva and Barthes. He disagrees with Hinds' position regarding the term allusion. According to Edmunds (2001: 164), "it is impossible to distinguish between an intertext and an allusion... What Hinds calls an allusion is the result of a persuasive, successful reading of the relation between [two texts]". His criticism of Hinds' position is also based on objections against authorial intention. Edmunds (2001: 166) does agree that no scholar is really interested in "a naïve hypostatization of a real authorial presence". However, he argues that Hinds' (re)constructed authorial presence is employed merely rhetorically, as a matter of convention or persuasion (Edmunds, 2001: 168). Edmunds's position is largely normative, that is, he maintains that an interpretive community is ultimately responsible for determining the validity of a certain reading. In this regard, convincing the interpretive community of one's position is necessary, and a rhetorical strategy is inevitable. Edmunds (2001: 168) argues that appeals to the authorial intention are no longer taken seriously and therefore Hinds' approach, as rhetorical as it is, is not convincing.

Throughout his book on the subject, *Intertextuality and the Reading of Roman Poetry*, Edmunds uses the word "quotation" to refer to intertextual phenomena:

Quotation is chosen here, in preference to the more common *reference*, *allusion*, *echo*, *reminiscence*, or *transformation*, as a general, inclusive way of describing the phenomenon. To quote means to repeat part of another text in such a way (which would sometimes entail sufficient quantity) that its status as a quotation and its source may be discernible. Quotation, of whatever length, may be either exact or inexact (Edmunds, 2001: 134).

Edmunds' definition of "quotation" therefore overlaps with the earlier definitions of "allusion". The only prerequisite for Edmunds is the identification of the quotation as such, which resides entirely in the capacity of the reader.

Edmunds' definition of quotation is not unique. Edmunds's formulation is inherited from the earlier work of Heinrich F. Plett, whose research on "quotation" deserves some attention. In his more recent work entitled *Literary Rhetoric: Concepts, Structures, Analyses*, Plett (2010: 282) defines quotation in rather technical terms. To paraphrase his formulation, he defines a quotation as a text segment, taken from a pre-text and inserted into a primary text. In order to recognise such a quotation, Plett lists markers like change of languages and language levels, or the use of graphemic signals and orthographical features such as quotation marks; however, in the absence of such clear markers Plett (2010: 282) says, "when quotation segments... are not specially designated by signals, their absence becomes a challenge to the intertextual competence, or to the general literary expertise, of the recipient – the only means for her or him to recognise an intertextual figure as such". Plett's formulation is open enough for it to be compatible with earlier descriptions of "allusion" and "quotation", but the recognition of quotation here resides in the competence of the reader. For Plett, quotation, when not explicitly marked, is therefore a kind of literary obfuscation, and in some terms, an "elitist or erudite" practice. Plett's formulation is very technical and may be considered too narrow to be compatible with the theoretical frameworks of Kristeva and Barthes. Plett places the burden of recognizing intertextual figures on the literary expertise of the reader, which implies that a reader without such expertise is missing something. In Barthes' theory in particular, there are no missed readings, there are only readings: the reader contains all the intertextual threads of the Text (see page 32). However, Plett's work does demonstrate the use of the term quotation outside of the more common use.

The different uses of the terms allusion and quotation discussed here demonstrate that these terms are not used consistently throughout scholarship, nor are they used in ways that conform to more common definitions. This makes using these terms without an explicit gloss very difficult. However, as a critic, it is necessary for me to employ some terminology in order to express my views. I summarize the positions

of the theoreticians discussed, which will guide my choice of terminology. My definitions are discussed in the following chapter.

Conte's use of the term allusion conforms almost precisely to what Kristeva and Barthes understand under intertextuality, and intertextuality is a theoretical position which Conte himself accepts. However, while Conte does deny authorial intention with regards to the interpretation of an allusion, he still uses the author in his analyses in an unabstracted way, which is not compatible with the theories of intertextuality discussed in this chapter.

The strength of Hinds' approach lies in the elegance of expression. This is not a position to be scorned for that reason: I am a philologist; I use words to describe words; I am subject to the whims of interpretation even as I try to interpret. However, to prioritise expression over accuracy presents problems, as the criticism of Hinds has demonstrated. Hinds wishes to express the value of the author as essentially involved in the text.

Ben-Porat's conception of the term allusion is closer to the understanding of intertextuality by Kristeva and Barthes. While Ben-Porat's ideas are still very much rooted in literary connections (as opposed to intertextuality, which defines text as going beyond the literary domain), the simplification of the process of allusion in the manner Ben-Porat has achieved can be seen as similar to the way Barthes and Kristeva envision the existence of other texts within an interpretation. However, Ben-Porat's formulation is rooted in a structuralist understanding of the text.

Lyne's position is text-centric: he sees the text as a stable basis for accurate statements. Lyne uses the term intertext to describe the relationship between texts. While not spelled out as such, Lyne's approach would appear to be compatible with Edmunds'; however, Edmunds prefers the term quotation. The terminology is different but the use and theoretical basis is similar. In Kristeva and Barthes' formulation of intertextuality, there is no difference between a text and an intertext:

all texts are intertexts, all intertexts are texts. The term “intertext” therefore loses its effectiveness. However, in describing all textual relationships to a singular term, the vocabulary for expressing the text with different kinds of possibilities that are found with Hinds is reduced. That is not to say that Kristeva and Barthes’ theory cannot describe these possibilities; rather, the description requires relatively complicated formulation or explication. Yet Kristeva and Barthes’ theory suffers from fewer theoretical difficulties than Hinds’, in particular in terms of the difficulty of maintaining the author’s intention as the determining factor for the evaluation of an intertextual relationship.

Therefore, given the general use of the term in classical scholarship, the term allusion is not compatible with a theoretical framework of Intertextuality. Because of the prevalence of scholars using the same terms in different ways, it will be necessary to establish precise definitions of terms for use in the literary analysis offered here. These definitions will serve as the backbone of a conceptual framework which will inform the analysis of the text(s).

Chapter 3 A Conceptual Framework of Intertextuality

In this chapter, I outline the conceptual framework of Intertextuality which I use in Chapter 4 - Chapter 9 to analyse the selected passages of *Confessions* 1-8. This conceptual framework is primarily derived from the theoretical work of Kristeva and Barthes, but also takes cognizance of the other notions regarding the relationship between texts discussed in the previous chapter. Given Barthes' clearer methodological explication, particularly in the seminal work, *S/Z*, I rely more on his theory for my methodology. Barthes and Kristeva share similarities with regards to certain theoretical concepts as detailed in the previous chapter. Given Kristeva's overly technical writing, I favour Barthes' explanations and formulations of these theoretical concepts.

In my presentation of this conceptual framework, I begin in section 3.1 with an explication of the role of the critic, which I fill in this dissertation. This is followed by definitions of specific terms that I employ in the course of my analysis of the text (3.2), in order to make clear (as far as possible) the meaning of the terms I use in this study, especially where they may have been used before in different contexts. I then turn to the object of the study (3.3), in order to limit the analysis so as avoid the difficulties presented by potentially infinite interpretive avenues. Finally, because of its importance in scholarship, I consider one of the other notions discussed in the previous chapter, namely genre, in order to clarify my understanding of the concept, and the implications of such a powerful interpretive paradigm for the conceptual framework described in this chapter (3.6).

3.1. The Role of the Critic

As author of this dissertation, I engage with my subject in a very specific role. Before any further elaboration of the methodologies and terminologies, the role of the critic needs to be examined and defined, so that the context within which this study takes place can be established.

Firstly, the critic is a reader. For Barthes, reading “is to find meanings, and to find meanings is to name them... it is a nomination in the course of becoming, a tireless approximation, a metonymic labor” (1990: 11). Reading is therefore not a single event or act or happening, but a continuous labour, and notably, an approximation: no complete reading is possible; no reading, however extensive, can encompass the entire text.

Through reading, the critic is also an interpreter, but still subject to the same mechanisms of reading as any other reader. The critic’s reading, the critic’s interpretation is not privileged in any way because he/she is a critic. A critic is distinguished from the casual reader by the degree of engagement with the text: a critic is a reader, but a writer also. A critic does not simply interpret, he/she also contributes to a body of scholarship by writing that interpretation. In the study of *Confessions* 1-8 presented here, the purpose of that interpretation is the principle described by Barthes: “To interpret a text is not to give it a (more or less justified, more or less free) meaning, but on the contrary to appreciate what *plural* constitutes it” (1990: 5). My interpretation embraces the plurality of the text, and therefore does not strive to impose one, or more, absolute meanings onto the text.

Simultaneously, I find it necessary to repeat here Barthes’ warning, that criticism is not science: “Science deals with meanings, criticism produces them... The critic cannot claim to ‘translate’ the work, and particularly not to make it clearer, for nothing is clearer than the work. What the critic can do is to ‘engender’ a certain meaning by deriving it from the form which is the work” (2007: 32). It is therefore not the role of the critic to be a sleuth, to hunt out meanings, but, as reader, to produce them. Furthermore, another important characteristic of being a critic emphasised by Barthes and that I aim to uphold in this dissertation is that the critic is not interested in *a* meaning or *an* interpretation, but many: the critic is concerned with ambiguities (Barthes, 2007: 28). No reading or interpretation is privileged above

the other. The textual elements involved in an interpretation are dynamic: the text is not closed off and the process of signification is never ceasing.

The critic is also limited as reader to him/herself as point of interpretation. A critic cannot substitute himself for another reader (Barthes, 2007: 38). The notion of an original audience, or any audience for that matter, becomes inverted: it is not the role of the critic to discover an audience or reader hidden in the pages; the situation is that those audiences, or preconception of such audiences, is already present in the critic. This reading is my reading because I cannot escape that position.

Therefore, the role I adopt in this dissertation is that of the Barthesian critic: I am the reader and interpreter of the text. My interest is primarily in appreciating the plurality of meanings of the selected passages from *Confessions* 1-8. I am less interested in enumerating or naming specific meanings, than to consider the way in which these meanings are produced, to read the elements which contribute to these meanings, which are meanings themselves.

3.2. Definitions

It is necessary, when establishing a theoretical framework, to carefully outline definitions of terms and concepts, especially where the use of some terms and concepts may diverge from more common, everyday use, as well as from other instances of specialised use in academic writing. Terminology is a challenging but unavoidable complication in the pursuit of literary criticism and theory. These fields are characterised by an over-abundance of terminology and jargon, often used interchangeably and inconsistently in the same fields of study. Where possible, I have chosen to employ terms as unambiguously as possible, but it is often not possible to avoid using terms that have been used by other scholars to denote different concepts. I therefore provide a list of the definitions of the primary terms used in the reading of the *Confessions* presented in this dissertation.

3.2.1. Basic Concepts

I describe here the definitions of the basic theoretical concepts used throughout this dissertation.

3.2.1.1. Work

The Work, rendered with the majuscule when referring to the abstract concept (as Barthes does in his essay, "From Work to Text"), but rendered with the miniscule when referring to specific works, is the physical product, the object, the ink on paper, to name but one possibility, of a particular literary work (Barthes, 1977: 156). A work has a particular physical form and is found or encountered in a particular context. A work can be divided into pages, chapters, paragraphs, sentences etc. The Work is the phenomenal surface which demonstrates the Text (Barthes, 1977: 157).

The primary work which I will be reading and interpreting is the critical text of the *Confessions* edited by James O'Donnell (1992a)⁴³. This work is a book, with a cover, a title, pages, paragraphs, etc., all of which establish a context within which I must read. This context contributes significantly to the primary assumptions which form part of the interpretations.

3.2.1.2. Text

What I will call the Text, always capitalised in this manner, is the cognitive, conceptual field which is demonstrated by the work (Barthes, 1977: 157). The Text is the sum total of all that can be demonstrated thus. It is an infinite, ever changing landscape, not subject to division or classification⁴⁴. The Text comprises of an infinite interconnected network of texts. The Text is not limited or constrained by the work: it cuts across works; it is not limited to literature, nor can it be contained by classifications or genres (Barthes, 1977: 157).

⁴³ See 3.3 for a complete discussion regarding the work used in this study.

⁴⁴ Both Barthes and Kristeva understand Text in this way.

3.2.1.3. text

A text, always rendered in the miniscule (in a similar way that Barthes distinguishes between the Text and the texts that are held in a vast intertextuality (Barthes, 1977: 160)), is an element of signification that can be conceived of in the vast infinite field of the Text. In both Barthes and Kristeva's theories, the text is not limited to linguistic or logical components, but extends to every possible element that contributes to the process of signification, e.g. symbolic, conceptual or psychic forces⁴⁵.

A text is not subject to a precise identification. It is, by its nature, unstable, not subject to any precise definitions or limits. However, in order to understand the manner in which the process of signification produces meanings, I, as critic, allow myself the freedom to "label" certain texts, to give them names, to interpret them. In the same way that Barthes employs his codes to interpret Balzac's *Sarrasine* (Barthes, 1990: 18-19), I employ specific labels here to try and understand certain kinds of texts. Such texts are labelled with a hyphen e.g. speaker-text or culture-text. These labels are not intended to represent a superior paradigm or key to unlock an interpretation, but rather a perspective on the text, part of what Barthes calls a "mirage of structures" (Barthes, 1990: 20). Another purpose of using the -text suffix is also to disambiguate when referring to those cognitive constructs that are texts that may have real world equivalents as well, such as the author, specific persons, or elements of cultures. When used without suffix, I refer to the author, person, cultural element itself, and when I use the -text suffix, I refer only to the cognitive construct that participates in the process of signification.

⁴⁵ Kristeva's division of the text into genotext and phenotext discussed earlier demonstrates that her conception of the text is not limited to literary texts, nor even logical structures, but also to psychic impulses, drives etc. (Kristeva, 1986: 120). Barthes' distinction between Work and Text as elaborated in his essay "From Work to Text" also confirms this idea: the text is not limited to logical or linguistic components (Barthes, 1977: 157).

What some theorists refer to as “intertext” is also a text. As emphasised before, all texts are intertexts and all intertexts are texts. For clarity’s sake, I shall avoid the use of the word “intertext”, preferring to use the word text where possible. I demonstrate the intertextual relationship between texts through the use of the word “quotation” as detailed below.

3.2.1.4. Quotation, to quote; citation, to cite

Because of the terminological inconsistencies surrounding terms like intertext, allusion or reference, as discussed in Chapter 2.4.2., I take the bold step in this dissertation to use the term quotation in what may be perceived as an unconventional manner. This is, however, consistent with the way that the term is employed by Kristeva, Barthes and, to a certain degree, Edmunds⁴⁶. I define “quotation” as anything that leads to the establishment of an intertextual relationship between two (or more) texts. It is important to reiterate that the term “quotation” is not used in this dissertation in the common, academic sense of attribution to an authority. The noun, “quotation”, is used to refer to an identification of an intertextual relationship and therefore the terms “quotation” and “intertextual relationship” are used interchangeably. When I use the verb, “to quote”, I refer to the ability of one text to recall another, as described above. Therefore, texts quote, not authors. When a text quotes another or more texts, it means that I am able to identify one or more intertextual relationships with that text. All texts have the potential to quote any or all texts. It is not the purpose in this dissertation to enumerate every text or outline every quotation that may be identified in the *Confessions*, as this would be impossible. As I have emphasised

⁴⁶ “...any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another” (Kristeva, 1986: 37). “The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture” (Barthes, 1977: 146). “The reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are inscribed without any of them being lost” (Barthes, 1977: 148). “Quotation is chosen here, in preference to the more common *reference, allusion, echo, reminiscence, or transformation*, as a general, inclusive way of describing the phenomenon” (Edmunds, 2001: 134).

repeatedly, the purpose of this dissertation is to appreciate the plurality of the text, not to describe all the possibilities of the process of signification.

The term “quotation”, or more often, “citation”, is frequently used in literary criticism to refer to similarities between literary works, i.e. excerpts of one literary work in another, often with the assumption that the author intended such excerpts to be recognised⁴⁷. This view of “quotation” or “citation” is incompatible with the conceptual framework which has been established in this dissertation. However, I do employ the term “citation” in this dissertation for a very specific use, divorced from the notion of “quotation” described above. In this dissertation, a “citation” is any text that is placed in the mouth or pen of another (explicit or implied) speaker. Citations can therefore often be identified by verbs of saying (e.g. *dicere*) or writing (e.g. *scribere*). However, this should not be interpreted as assigning any special or privileged status to this speaker: these words/text(s) do not belong to this speaker, they are merely spoken/written by him/her. The extent to which this conveys significance is dependent on the reader’s interpretation of the relationship between the speaker and the citation. This definition is therefore similar to the common use of the term; however, no form of intention or privilege is assigned to the voice citing or person cited.

3.2.1.5. Reinforce, amplify, weaken, attenuate

When I use the verbs “reinforce” or “amplify” with reference to a quotation or text, it refers to two or more texts which share an intertextual relationship with another, which has the effect of strengthening the signification potential of those texts. In this way, I argue that certain intertextual relationships may be interpreted as being stronger in the process of signification than others, i.e. that certain meanings, under

⁴⁷ This is the sense that O’Donnell and Verheijen use the term “citation”. Verheijen distinguishes between two possible “quotations” thus: the French word *référence* refers to parts of the *Confessions* that demonstrate a certain similarity to biblical texts, and *citation* refers to those parts where the biblical text is explicitly mentioned or introduced: “Malgré le nombre considerable des références bibliques dans les *Confessions*, les citations explicites y sont plutôt rares” (Verheijen, 1981: LXXIX).

certain circumstances, can become more prominent. A text or intertextual relationship can therefore be said to have a certain “strength”, “power”, or even “volume”, in the acoustic sense.

Similarly, where certain intertextual relationships may potentially have the effect of diminishing the strength of a text or interpretation, I use the antonyms “weaken” and “attenuate” to describe the effect.

3.2.2. Labelling the Text

In order to attempt to make sense of the infinite possibilities that the Text can provide, I name or label certain texts. This is not done in any rigid, methodical manner; rather, it represents my interpretation of a particular textual element, much in the same way that Barthes employs his codes to interpret Balzac’s *Sarrasine*. Below I list the definitions of the textual elements that I name in the course of my interpretation of the *Confessions*. These textual elements are marked by the “-text” suffix.

3.2.2.1. Person-text

I employ the term person-text for texts that represent an anthropomorphic textual element. These texts may include a human or even personified character in the narrative, the author (as character, in the way Barthes describes the author (1977: 161)) or God (where God is an active, intervening, speaking force), or the reader (in the way Kristeva describes the reader being incorporated into the discourse of the text as text itself (1980: 66)).

I also identify two specific kinds of person-text, namely, the author-text and the speaker-text, defined below.

3.2.2.2. Author-text

With regards to the author, because of the unique position the author has as both character and creator (in an attributive sense), as well as a host of other potential texts that I can connect to him/her, I identify this text as an author-text. The author-

text is therefore considered one of the person-texts identified in the process of the interpretation.

3.2.2.3. Speaker-text

Where a person-text can be said to be “speaking”, whether literally, or abstractly, especially in, but not limited to, rhetorical contexts, i.e. involving speeches, or where this interpreter would associate words directly with a specific person-text, I describe this person-text as a speaker-text. The speaker-text can therefore be said to be “heard” by the reader. The term speaker-text shares similarities with the term narrator. I have chosen speaker-text over narrator firstly to distance myself from the theoretical field of narratology and secondly to emphasise the inherent equality of the different texts in the process of signification.

Sometimes the assignment of speaker-text and author-text may (and often do) overlap, and I indicate such with a slash e.g. author/speaker-text. Such an indication points to a potential identification of the speaker-text with an author-text. This is not an absolute assignment and may change in the course of a reading or interpretation. Similarly named texts that overlap with other named texts are indicated in the same way.

The assignment of person-text, speaker-text and author-text may be fluid in an interpretation. Both speaker-text and author-text are person-texts, and an author-text may also be a speaker-text, but the texts may also be considered separately, that is, it is possible to consider a particular textual element through a specific lens of either author-text, speaker-text or person-text. A textual element may also be considered as only a person-text, stripped of the roles of author-text and speaker-text to see what kind of interpretations such an assignment would lead to.

When the text in question is being “spoken” by a speaker-text, I prefer to use the term “voice” to refer to the strength of a particular text or intertextual relationship. I do not employ the term “voice” in the sense that Bakhtin does (which is similar to the sense that Kristeva and I use the term “text”), but rather as a means to describe a

certain kind of textual relationship. Voices can therefore be loud or soft, depending on the reinforcement/amplification or weakening/attenuation of the texts involved.

3.2.2.4. Genre-text

The terms “genre”, “style”, “type” and “form” are used in literary criticism in very similar ways, that is, to either classify a certain work, or to compare it to a selection of characteristics that are often associated with one another in literary works. Genre (and the contiguous terms) is a very pervasive concept in literary criticism. It is a natural human faculty to try to classify, order or name. However, the theoretical framework adopted for this dissertation is not compatible with the concept of genre, as understood in mainstream literary criticism. Duff (2002: 55) notes that, despite the appearance of similarity, there exists a tension between the concepts of intertextuality (in the sense of Kristeva and Barthes) and genre⁴⁸. However, genre may be approached from an intertextual perspective: when genre is reduced to the role of text, it merely becomes another aspect of the vast intertextuality, an element of the signification. In this way, genre can be regarded as something that tries to limit the possibilities of interpretation, or an interpretive filter. The Text, with its infinite signification potential, resists such containment, but the genre-text nevertheless provides a certain interpretive force to the text. This is what the term genre-text denotes in the interpretation offered here.

3.2.2.5. Theme-text

What I call a theme-text corresponds to Barthes’ Semantic and Symbolic Codes, that is, something which establishes a semic (related to the seme or semantic meaning) or symbolic element which stretches through the Text and has the potential to be read

⁴⁸ “Though some theorists have sought to modify and moderate these claims [that intertextuality, as understood by Kristeva and Barthes, does not recognise the concept of genre], the basic tension between the two concepts [of genre and intertextuality] remains, and, despite superficial appearances, genre theory and the theory of intertextuality generally pull in opposite directions” (Duff, 2002: 55).

as a theme or leitmotif⁴⁹. This text label is meant to identify those thematic elements that recur through the Text. The expectation of any theme-text is therefore that it is to be repeated later in the course of the reading. The identification of a theme-text is therefore informed by a complete reading of the *Confessions* and is a retroactive assignment.

Because of the dynamic way theme-texts may be recognized in the course of a reading, they provide a complex way of linking texts through a reading. Certain theme-texts may come to be strongly linked or associated with other texts through repetition; thus the reading of a theme-text may evoke a connected text.

3.3. Object of Study

I, as critic, read the Text. I enter the Text through the text(s) demonstrated by the work, entitled the *Confessions*, as edited by James O'Donnell (1992a). This work is a critical text, incorporating much older works, earlier manuscripts, which are copies of another work, whose original author, according to O'Donnell, is Augustine (1992a: xvii). It is not the purpose of this author to question this claim, nor to consider the integrity of this critical text, nor to engage in any discussion regarding authenticity or historicity. However, I, the critic, have received this work in a specific context, and my reading is in no small way influenced by this very context. So I accept this work, not as true or right or pure, but merely as work, as one port of access to the Text.

Thus, my object of study is the Text. However, such an object is too vast and too unstable to allow for any kind of comprehensive study or investigation within the scope of this dissertation. Therefore, I shall limit my interpretation by imposing upon this Text what Barthes calls "codes": perspectives on the Text (Barthes, 1990:

⁴⁹ The recognition or assignment of a particular semic or symbolic element to a leitmotif is a dynamic process and never complete. The reader creates a leitmotif in the process of reading through the experience of the semic and symbolic elements, woven together to form a theme.

20). I shall limit my interpretation to those texts that I interpret as demonstrating an intertextual relationship with the *Letter to the Romans*.

Within the adopted conceptual framework, this statement needs clarification: the *Letter to the Romans* seems here to represent another work, a work like the *Confessions*. However, I am not reading the aforementioned works simultaneously (this is impossible) but in interpreting the text demonstrated by the *Confessions*, I single out instances where I, the critic, think that the *Confessions* demonstrates texts which evoke intertextual relationship(s) with texts which are demonstrated by a specific work I am familiar with, namely the *Letter to the Romans*. That is not to say that I do not, in the course of this investigation, pause to read from the *Letter to the Romans*.

This constraint, however deceptively narrow it may seem, can still potentially fill pages upon pages of interpretations, for it would be possible to establish intertextual connections between the *Confessions* and the *Letter to the Romans* from every word in the *Confessions*. Such an endeavour would not contribute much to the appreciation of the *Confessions*. Instead, the method I follow in this dissertation is to permit myself the same freedom as Barthes allowed himself in *S/Z*, that is, to arbitrarily divide the work into smaller divisions for interpretation (Barthes, 1990: 14). I say arbitrarily, because I base my divisions not on empirical or scientific observations on the work (for such an empirical or scientific investigation cannot give access to the Text), but on my reading of the text. I select those passages where I perceive the strength of the intertextual relationship between *Confessions* and the *Letter to the Romans* to be particularly strong, especially in places where, in my judgement, these intertextual relationships contribute to the stronger texts in the *Confessions*.

In order to demonstrate the verbal similarities between the *Confessions* and the *Letter to the Romans*, I employ, where possible, the reconstructions of the Latin text of the

Letter to the Romans by O'Donnell⁵⁰. Where no such reconstruction is available, I rely on the Vulgate edition by Weber (1975). Where I discuss the *Letter to the Romans*, outside of a comparison with the Latin of the *Confessions*, I prefer to use the Greek text of *Romans* (NA28), as is common practice in scholarship of *Romans*.

3.3.1. The works of Augustine on *Romans* and other biblical texts.

The historical figure that is associated with the *Confessions* as author, namely Augustine, is also attributed as author to a number of other works. Many of these works concern the exegesis of biblical texts, not the least of which includes two works on the *Letter to the Romans*: the *Propositions from the Epistle to the Romans* (*expositio quarumdam propositionum ex epistola ad Romanos*) and the *Unfinished Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* (*epistolae ad Romanos inchoata expositio*)⁵¹. Frederiksen Landes considers both works incomplete (Frederiksen Landes, 1982: ix). The *Propositions* is a reworking of a discussion with fellow clergymen regarding Paul and the *Unfinished Commentary* is limited to the opening lines of the *Letter to the Romans* (Frederiksen Landes, 1982: ix).

The *Propositions* deals with the tension between the state of man *sub lege* and man *sub gratia*. This work includes extensive discussions of *Rom.* 1:18-32, *Rom.* 7 and *Rom.* 8, all of which are also discussed in this dissertation. The *Unfinished Commentary* is limited to *Rom.* 1:1-6, but the commentary touches on certain theme-texts that may affect the interpretation in this study. Similarly, the historical Augustine is associated

⁵⁰ O'Donnell's methodology in his commentary is to attempt to reconstruct the version of the work that Augustine would have used himself, a translation in Latin which would have antedated Jerome's Vulgate, from various sources (1992a: lxix). While his methodology is not compatible with the conceptual framework adopted here, his methodology does provide material that is able to demonstrate a convincing similarity between the *Confessions* and the *Letter to the Romans*. It is to this end that I use his reconstructions as far as possible. This verbal similarity makes it easier to demonstrate the manner in which intertextual relationships are recognised: it is not necessary *per se* for the recognition of an intertextual relationship. As detailed in 3.2.1.4, intertextual relationships can be established by any text; verbal similarity is not a prerequisite.

⁵¹ Paula Fredriksen Landes has published a text and translation of these works, entitled *Augustine on Romans* published in 1982.

with many other commentaries and discussions of biblical texts that are also discussed in this dissertation⁵². However, a conscious decision has been made to exclude these works from the scope of the interpretation presented in this dissertation. The motivation for this decision stems from one of the primary assumptions present in the conceptual framework adopted in this dissertation: the author is separated from the Text, in as far as determining the meaning of the Text. I intentionally wanted to avoid appealing to Augustine's commentaries, lest I fall into the trap of seeking this Augustine's opinion on his own work. To reiterate Miller's explication of the role of the author in the reader-oriented approach:

[I]t is the reader alone who creates that meaning. Even if one could determine which texts the author is alluding to, or could ascertain the author's purpose in composing this text, such considerations are irrelevant. The author is merely 'a reader, "digester" and re-arranger of texts and experiences' and cannot endow a text with meaning. (Miller, 2010: 286).

That is not to say that these works would not produce remarkable interpretative avenues, within the framework presented in this study. On the contrary, it would be possible to explore the unique intertextual relationships between these texts, through the links provided by the shared author-text, generated by the reader/critic's knowledge of the author Augustine. The possibilities that such avenues would provide are numerous, but are not within the scope of this study.

3.4. Translation

In order to facilitate easier reading of this study, particularly by those unfamiliar with Latin and Greek, I offer translations of the two primary sources employed here. A few notes regarding this translation, however, should be made. Firstly, all

⁵² Most notable are the numerous commentaries on *Genesis*, *de Genesi contra manichaeos*, *de Genesi ad littera* and *de Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber*, as well as the commentary of the *Psalms*, *enarrationes in Psalmos*.

translation is interpretation. My analyses of the intertextual relationships between the *Confessions* and *Romans* are interpretations based primarily on the Latin and Greek versions of the texts respectively. I am therefore providing the reader of this study two different interpretations (my analyses and the translation) and by extension, two different perspectives on the text.

Secondly, choosing the best translation of the *Confessions* and *Romans* to this end is a difficult task. Its difficulty is derived from the vast amount of translation theories available. My theoretical framework contains within it a fundamental assumption: the critic/reader establishes intertextual relationships through the course of a reading through his/her own experience of the Text. There is nothing inherent in the work being read that creates such an intertextual relationship.

It is therefore necessary to stress that the translations offered are an attempt at an interpretive aid. Where possible, great care has been taken to ensure that the translation and the argument provided in the dissertation are congruent, as far as possible. Where there exists the possibility of easy misunderstanding, I have provided my own translation (which is clearly marked as such). The choice of translations, barring the aforementioned exceptions, is based on the accessibility to the reader. To this end, I have chosen Maria Boulding's translation of the *Confessions*, published in 2008, for its comfortable reading. Similarly, I have opted to use the New Revised Standard Version of the Bible as the source for the translation of the *Letter to the Romans*.

In the course of my dissertation, I have opted not to translate individual Latin or Greek words and phrases, as I do not think the translation will not significantly benefit the argument to someone unfamiliar with Latin or Greek. The translations are therefore limited to the texts being quoted.

3.5. Abbreviations

Biblical Works

<i>Gen.</i>	<i>Genesis</i>	<i>Gen.</i>	<i>Genesis</i>
<i>Ex.</i>	<i>Exodus</i>	<i>Ex.</i>	<i>Exodus</i>
<i>Lev.</i>	<i>Leviticus</i>	<i>Mark</i>	<i>Mark</i>
<i>Deut.</i>	<i>Deuteronomy</i>	<i>Luke</i>	<i>Luke</i>
<i>1 Kings</i>	<i>1 Kings</i>	<i>John</i>	<i>John</i>
<i>Ps.</i>	<i>Psalms</i>	<i>Rom.</i>	<i>Romans</i>
<i>Prov.</i>	<i>Proverbs</i>	<i>1 Cor.</i>	<i>1 Corinthians</i>
<i>Isaiah</i>	<i>Isaiah</i>	<i>Phil.</i>	<i>Philippians</i>
<i>Dan.</i>	<i>Daniel</i>	<i>Col.</i>	<i>Colossians</i>
<i>Joel</i>	<i>Joel</i>	<i>Heb.</i>	<i>Hebrews</i>
<i>Nahum</i>	<i>Nahum</i>	<i>Jas.</i>	<i>James</i>
<i>Matt.</i>	<i>Matthew</i>	<i>1 Pet.</i>	<i>1 Peter</i>

Augustine's Works

<i>Conf.</i>	<i>Confessiones</i>
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3.6. The genre of *Romans*

In this study, a genre-text is understood as the relationship of the collected and individual characteristics that bind certain texts together. This understanding of the notion of genre may be at odds with other methodologies that employ the concept. Nevertheless, scholarship on the genre of *Romans* is vast, and an investigation into the issue of the genre of *Romans* may reveal aspects that are compatible with the

conceptual framework adopted in this dissertation and may contribute to an understanding of the intertextual relationships between the *Confessions* and *Romans*.

There is relatively little consensus regarding the genre of *Romans*, but many scholars identify *Romans* as displaying characteristics of what is termed a “diatribe”⁵³. However, what the term “diatribe” means and what the implications are for the interpretation of *Romans* differs significantly from scholar to scholar. According to Moles (2003: 464), using the term “diatribe” to describe a corpus, genre or tradition has been problematic. The term διατριβή itself can have a wide range of meanings, from “spending time” to “recreation”, “study”, “conversation”, “speech” or “philosophy school” (Moles, 2003: 464). Scholars argue that the diatribe had its origins in the wandering philosophers of the Classical period. These philosophers were concerned with moral exhortation, which Moles considers the pagan equivalent of the Christian sermon (2003: 463). Stowers (1981:48) identifies as examples of diatribe the works of Teles (writing about Bion), Arrian (writing about Epictetus) and Lucius (writing about Musonius Rufus). The primary criterion for the classification of such texts, according to Stowers, is a common adherence to a specific philosophical tradition as well as the use of a dialogical style, which is paired with certain stylistic and rhetorical features (Stowers, 1981: 48). To these two criteria, Stowers adds a third: a scholastic social setting, that is, a classroom environment (1981: 49). Stowers does not consider the diatribe to be a literary genre in the sense that the term comprises a certain “family of writings which consciously reflect back on and follow a literary tradition with common literary form” (1981: 49). He, in fact, emphasises the difficulty of assigning a genre to a particular text: “Every linguistic utterance is both conventional and unique. It must be conventional or of a type in order to be communicable. So also every literary or rhetorical work must be of a genre or type in order to have meaning and be understood” (Stowers, 1981: 49).

⁵³ Scholars who have made the connection between *Romans* and the features of the diatribe include Bultmann (1910), Malherbe (1980), Stowers (1981).

Scholars argue that features of what is called “diatribe” can be traced through Classical to early Christian literature, where it appears in works like Christian sermons or letters such as the *Letter to the Romans*. Many features of the diatribe demonstrate properties which are similar to the kinds of textual interrelationships that are outlined in the conceptual framework. It is therefore worth considering the properties of the diatribe in *Romans* that may be compatible with the conceptual framework. I therefore move to a discussion of diatribe in *Romans* and the characteristics thereof.

Consensus on whether *Romans* is, in fact, a diatribe or contains elements of the diatribe has not been achieved. The dissertation of Rudolf Bultmann, *Der Stil der Paulinischen Predigt und die kynische-stoische Diatribe* (1910) is responsible for the thesis that the *Letter to the Romans* employed the style of the diatribe. After Bultmann’s dissertation, Stanley Stowers’s own dissertation, *The Diatribe and Paul’s Letter to the Romans* (1981) is considered by many scholars to be a fresh perspective on the issue (Song, 2004: 3). Whereas Bultmann considered the diatribe as an unconscious style employed by Paul in imitation of the wandering Cynic-Stoic preachers, Stowers argues that Paul’s use of the diatribe style is conscious and intentional (1981: 178). Song (2004: 5) however does note that a precise definition of the diatribe, whether considered a genre, style, or type, has not been achieved, and that scholars are often vague with regards to the extent of the diatribal elements in *Romans*. I do not intend to enter into this debate here. I focus on the aspects that scholars identify as diatribal and consider these aspects through the lens of the conceptual framework of this dissertation.

Bultmann places the diatribe between a dialogue and a speech (Bultmann, 1910: 10). The difference, Bultmann points out, is that the diatribe lacks the flow of a speech, but is characterised by speech and reply (Bultmann, 1910: 10). The replies are spoken by a *Zwischenredner*, or interlocutor, often introduced by ἀλλά (referring to classical diatribes, originally written in Greek). According to Bultmann, this interlocutor is

rarely identified, and is usually figured as an ἰδιῶτης or representative of the *communis opinio* (Bultmann, 1910: 11). Stowers agrees with Bultmann regarding the dialogical character of the diatribe (1981: 78). Stowers' argument against Bultmann, after reassessing the works commonly considered to be diatribes, is that the dialogical nature of the diatribe stems from "the discourses and discussion in the school where the teacher employed the 'Socratic' method of censure and protreptic", as opposed to the kind of style employed by the wandering Cynic-Stoic philosophers (1981: 76).

The dialogical characteristic of the diatribe harmonises well with the conceptual framework adopted here: the Text, as described in this framework is, by its nature, dialogical; there are already competing voices or texts present. The fact that a text is regarded as a dialogue between these competing voices affirms the notions of intertextuality discussed in 3.2.1.2. The nature of the interlocutor, however, as seen from the generic perspective of the diatribe, contributes a certain nuance to the nature of this dialogue. The interlocutor is spoken/written in the mouth/hand of the author-text, but can represent a rival/resistant speaker-text. In classical diatribes, the interlocutor's speech is often introduced through φησί or other such formulae, but this is rare in Paul; rather, there is often no introduction or marker of the interlocutor's speech (Malherbe, 1980: 233). In such a case, the ambiguity of the speech is significantly enhanced: the criteria for determining which speech is spoken by an interlocutor is no longer formal, but relies on interpretation. In instances like these, there exists no formula or rule that one can apply to determine whether or not a certain speaker-text is an interlocutor. The association of a speaker-text to the role of interlocutor is an interpretive decision. Consequently, the role of interlocutor is not final or absolute. The role of interlocutor is therefore best considered in the light of other texts that may influence such a perspective on the speaker-text.

In scholarship on *Romans*, the interlocutor is identified in different ways. Sometimes, the interlocutor is identified when the author-text turns to address the interlocutor.

In *Romans*, this apostrophe is achieved, amongst others, through the use of the second person singular, or vocatives such as “ὦ ἄνθρωπε” (Song, 2004: 7). These forms of address stand in opposition to the explicit plural addressee(s) of the *Letter to the Romans*, namely *πᾱσιν τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν Ῥώμῃ ἀγαπητοῖς θεοῦ, κλητοῖς ἁγίοις* (*Rom.* 1: 7)⁵⁴. The primary manner in which the interlocutor “speaks” in a diatribe, according to Stowers, is with objections and false conclusions (1981, 119). The contradiction of the interlocutor’s line of argument with the author-text is evident: it is an objection to the author-text’s position (Stowers, 1981: 119). Between the apostrophe of the author-text to the interlocutor and the interlocutor’s objections and false conclusions, a dialogue is formed.

The exact assignment of the actors in such a dialogue is, as I have said, a complicated matter. There is disagreement amongst scholars whether specific parts of *Romans* are spoken by the author, Paul, or whether it is meant to represent the opinion or position of an interlocutor. Such a precise assignment is not necessary within the conceptual framework I adopt; rather, a multitude of speaker-texts may be read, enhanced and strengthened by the conflicting texts within these “diatribal” sections. I therefore treat the interlocutor as a speaker-text. The nature of the diatribe and the possibility of the existence of an interlocutor in texts identified as diatribe provides a remarkable instability to the nature of the speaker-text in *Romans*, which also has the potential to spill into other texts that quote *Romans*. In my analysis of the speaker-text in *Romans* I therefore consider the interlocutor dynamically, not as a static actor in a dialogue.

⁵⁴ Song (2004: 29) notes that unless the existence of the interlocutor in the diatribe is acknowledged, such features of *Romans* as the singular “you” would be difficult to explain. He also notes that “no particular person representing the singular ‘you’ is standing before Paul; also, Paul does not refer to any certain individual in Rome using the second-person singular. The persons addressed in the singular ‘you’ in *Romans* are purely rhetorical, not identical” (Song, 2004: 29).

3.7. Time

The *Confessions* is a text with, arguably, a strong temporality: it is comprised of an ostensibly linear autobiographical narrative that stretches through books 1-9. However, the concept of time is very complex, both in the theoretical sense and within the sense of human experience. It is therefore no surprise that overlooking temporal complexities is common. It is possible, especially within the conceptual framework adopted in this study, to describe a text using many different notions of time.

The most basic notion of time that can be applied to a work is the linear reading: a work can be described as a linear sequence of pages, those pages consisting of a linear sequence of paragraphs, those paragraphs consisting of a linear sequence of words. Thus it is possible to say that one part of the work “happens” before another, in relation to this linear sequence. However, as a critic, it would be possible to assume that the work is already read and compress this linear sequence into a single point, able to be read anywhere throughout the reading.

Another notion that should also be considered is grammatical time. Within the shared text of language, the rules of grammar provide a framework to order utterances in grammatical time through verb tense, adverbs and other grammatical constructions.

The final notion that deserves mention is that of narrative time. Narrative time is the perceived sequence of events in a narrative. Unlike the linear sequence of the work, which is fixed (as much as the pages of a book are fixed), the sequence in a narrative is constructed by the reader, and is dependent on the reader’s understanding of the narrative and its relative events. In this way, time is a text that the reader constructs to interpret the events, themselves texts, in a text. Because time is a text, it is subject to the same uncertainties and complexities as other texts. The temporality of a certain passage may be attenuated by different texts being injected into the

interpretation, disrupting it. A different temporality may become amplified in the course of an interpretation. Temporality may become ambiguous to the point of almost disappearing. Because of this textual nature of time, it would also be possible to consider multiple temporalities in a specific interpretation.

In the case of the *Confessions*, applying a simple linear temporal progression is challenging, as the text constantly undermines a linear interpretation. The *Confessions* opens with a prayer of one confessing a story to God; the confession itself and the events being confessed could be plotted in time relative to one another. However, the more the text is considered, the more complex the temporal space becomes: the interweaving of narrative and commentary, as is characteristic of the *Confessions*, challenges any attempt to reconstruct a linear temporal sequence of events⁵⁵. Within the conceptual framework presented here, time becomes a text, an element of the process of signification that must be resolved, or ignored. Because it is such an elusive and dynamic text, it could be easiest to simply ignore it and interpret the *Confessions* without referring to time. This is, however, very challenging to do, given that events are typically ordered with some sense of time. The autobiographical narrative in the *Confessions* presents person-texts within a certain temporal progression. Therefore it would be possible to characterise a certain person-text, for example, the author-text in the autobiographical narrative, Aurelius Augustinus, within and without the temporal progression of the narrative. This person-text can be considered either at a specific time during the narrative, or outside the narrative completely.

The elements discussed above form the conceptual framework that is employed in this dissertation. This conceptual framework provides the framework of terminology and theoretical methodology for an analysis of the *Confessions* and its relationship to the *Letter to the Romans* through the lens of Intertextuality, offered here.

⁵⁵ This point will become clearer in the course of my interpretation.

SECTION B: ANALYSES OF *CONFESSIONS 1-8*

Chapter 4 The Title and *Confessions* 1.1.1

4.1. Introduction

The conceptual framework adopted in this dissertation contains within it certain primary assumptions that guide the critic in the reading and interpretation of the *Confessions*. Beyond these, there are many other aspects of the Text that contribute further assumptions to the interpretation. Before dealing with the passages that demonstrate intertextual relationships between the *Confessions* and the *Letter to the Romans*, I wish to address the issue of these basic, but fundamental assumptions that I, as critic, possess when encountering a work for the first time, and how the initial reading of the work shapes a certain framework within which an interpretation takes place. I therefore first discuss the first two major parts of the work that I encounter in the course of reading the *Confessions*, namely the title and the opening passage.

4.2. The Title

I begin my interpretation with the title of the work in Latin. The provenance of the title and the issues regarding its authenticity are not the subject of this dissertation, but it is difficult not to allow these issues to spill into the interpretation of this title. The title provides many initial assumptions when encountering the *Confessions* for the first time:

*Aureli Augustini confessionum libri tredecim*⁵⁶

At first glance, the title seems to communicate that these are thirteen books of confessions of a certain Aurelius Augustinus. As a critic, my assumption is that this Aurelius Augustinus refers to the Augustine that scholars like O'Donnell claim is the author of the original work (1992a: xvii). As critic, I am familiar with the name Augustine, and attach to this name certain other “identities” from historical works that I have read. I shall not elaborate on the exact nature of this Augustine and the

⁵⁶ The thirteen books of Aurelius Augustinus' confessions (Own translation).

myriad other texts that could be linked to this person-text; rather I accept here that the Aurelius Augustinus and the historical person-text, Augustine of Hippo, may be linked. The one whom scholars (and many others) refer to as Saint Augustine is a character of religious significance, whose significance and meaning overlap with the historical Augustine of Hippo; nevertheless, this character remains distinct and separate from these other characterisations.

The title has therefore, in the course of my first interpretation of the work, demonstrated an author-text and connected a variety of person-texts to this author-text⁵⁷. Attached to the person-text of Saint Augustine is also other texts associated with the respective religious groups that recognise him. Finally, this author is given a name in Latin: Aurelius Augustinus⁵⁸.

4.3. *Conf.* 1.1.1

In addition to the title of the work, the initial chapter of the *Confessions* provides a number of assumptions to the reading. These assumptions provide a fabric which is then disrupted by the introduction of other texts into the interpretation. The more the text is read (and reread), the more texts are introduced, the more texts are recognised, the more powerful the signification. This nature of signification is anticipated by the conceptual framework of intertextuality. In this chapter, I explore the assumptions that may result from reading the opening of the *Confessions*, and the manner in which the Text serves to disrupt them, and the varied potential interpretations that may result.

⁵⁷ These person-texts are by no means an exhaustive list, merely a demonstration of some of the possibilities.

⁵⁸ It should be noted here that the authenticity of the praenomen Aurelius is not well attested (O'Donnell, 1992b: 3). The names *Aurelius* and *Augustinus* are never mentioned again in the *Confessions*. Regardless, no other name is provided and therefore I adopt Aurelius Augustinus as the name of the author-text. For a more in-depth discussion of the names Aurelius and Augustinus, see La Bonnardière, 1981.

After the title, the *Confessions* begins with a sentence in the second person singular, talking to a certain *dominus* in the vocative, attributing greatness and praiseworthiness to him:

magnus es, domine, et laudabilis valde. magna virtus tua et sapientiae tuae non est numerus. (*Conf.* 1.1.1)⁵⁹.

As critic, my interpretation of this opening is influenced by a variety of intertextual relationships that enter into the text. The first is the author-text that has been identified through the title. The words “*magnus es, domine*” are spoken by someone⁶⁰, and my understanding of the subject matter of the work and its author encourages me to assign the author-text to this speaker. Therefore, I may conclude, the speaker-text of this opening is connected to the author-text. The assumption of the critic is that the Augustinus of the title is speaking these words.

However, this Augustinus is not the only author/speaker-text in this opening passage. O’Donnell (1992b: 9) identifies similarities between this opening passage and four biblical works⁶¹, namely *Psalms* 95:4⁶², *Psalms* 144:3, *Psalms* 47.2 and *Tobit* 13.1. I demonstrate the similarities between these below:

Conf. 1.1.1 *magnus es, domine, et laudabilis valde. magna virtus tua et sapientiae tuae non est numerus.*

Ps. 95:4 *quoniam magnus dominus et laudabilis valde*

Ps. 144:3 *magnus dominus et laudabilis valde, et magnitudinis eius non est*

⁵⁹ *Conf.* 1.1.1: “Great are you, O Lord, and exceedingly worthy of praise; your power is immense and your wisdom beyond reckoning”.

⁶⁰ The second person *es* draws me to assume a second person being addressed, and therefore begs an addressor.

⁶¹ The term “work” as understood by Barthes and as adopted in the study refers to the physical production which demonstrates the text. The similarity between these passages exists primarily at a formal level, that is, how similar they look, which refers to the arrangement of words on the paper.

⁶² The Greek numbering of the *Psalms* is followed in this study.

finis

Ps. 47:2 *magnus dominus et laudabilis valde, in civitate dei nostri, in monte sancto eius*

Tob. 13:1 *magnus es domine in aeternum*

Within the conceptual framework adopted here, it is not possible to consider which of the passages above the intended one is. The intention of the author does not exist in any form to allow such a determination. All of these passages demonstrate a strong similarity to the words in *Conf.* 1.1.1. While the passage from *Tobit* arguably demonstrates the least similarity, unlike the passages from *Psalms*, it is also presented in the second person singular, and so demonstrates grammatical similarity as well. Therefore I shall assume that all of these texts may potentially affect the signification.

I do not wish to elaborate on all the potential interpretive possibilities this may have on the text, but I do wish to consider one aspect of the interpretation that this may contribute to, namely, that of the speaker-text(s) and author-text(s). If an intertextual relationship is established between the opening lines of *Conf.* 1.1.1 and these texts, the strength of the author-/speaker-text that was initially assigned to the opening words, that is, Aurelius Augustinus, is called into question; that is, there are more author-texts competing, as it were, for the role of speaker-text. This competition occurs entirely in the cognitive realm of the reader and it is the reader who must resolve this role. With the recognition of the intertextual relationships noted above, the author(s) and speaker(s) of *Psalms* and *Tobit* (and potentially others) invade. The voice of the author-text, Aurelius Augustinus becomes less prominent and the voices of the authors of the *Psalms*⁶³ and Tobias (as speaker of the words in *Tob.* 13) begin to become louder. This is not to say that Aurelius Augustinus the author-/speaker-text

⁶³ Of the quoted *Psalms*, 144 and 95 are directly attributed to David in the text. *Psalm* 47 is attributed to the sons of Korah.

disappears from the Text; rather, in the process of the reading, new texts are drawn into the process of signification, the reader is confronted with conflicting interpretations, conflicting author- and speaker-texts. The reader therefore hears more than one voice, and the reader's own experience and interpretation determines the respective volume of these voices.

Beyond these speaker-texts, there is another voice that can be discerned, that of the divine person-text, God, already introduced via the acknowledgement of the word *domine*. While God is not yet called by the name *deus* (this only occurs in *Conf.* 1.2.2), a link with the name *dominus* and the divine person-text, God, can be established, through the texts related to history and culture attached to the author-text and the connected person-texts of Augustine of Hippo and Saint Augustine. Similarly, the author-text of God can be attached to the texts of *Psalms* and *Tobit* as well, under the shared culture-text of the divine inspiration of these texts which some religious groups hold. Whether God is considered to be speaker-text, author-text or merely divine person-text, the presence of the voice of God as speaker-text is very hard for this critic to deny, given the collection of strong texts to reinforce this text.

The reader exists in the text as well, as person-text and as speaker-text. The second person singular verb in the opening sentence of the *Confessions* seeks a voice to speak it. The author-text, Augustinus, has already been suggested, but the reader him/herself speaks these words too, if silently and only ever in thought. The opening can be interpreted as being presented in the form of a prayer to God. As critic, I might establish a *mise-en-scène*, a setting for this opening: O'Donnell (1992b: 8) remarks that this "opening can give rise to the disconcerting feeling of coming into a room and chancing upon a man speaking to someone who isn't there". So, I could imagine an empty room, with a man standing in it, talking to someone who is not there, and I, the reader, watching this strange scene. The man, as I originally identified, is one Aurelius Augustinus; however, as reader of the work, whether silent or aloud, the words on the page become my words as well; the prayer spoken

by this odd man becomes my prayer as well. Returning to the *mise-en-scène*, the man standing in the dark room is both this Augustinus and myself, as reader and critic.

The extent to which the reader perceives him/herself in this role of speaker-text is by no means absolute or constant. The reader is constantly reminded, through the alienation of the work⁶⁴ and the presence of strong author-text(s), that these are not his/her words; yet the reader speaks them, in silence or aloud, nonetheless. The reader, in a sense, allows him/herself to become a speaker-text, whether consciously or not, throughout the reading. The resistance to this role would depend on the reader's own convictions and experiences (an atheist reader would hardly consider attributing any magnitude to God, since he/she would not acknowledge his existence, while a devoted church goer would easily join in the prayer, recognising familiar prayer tropes), but as critic, I allow myself the freedom to consider this position more dynamically: I will interpret the reader's presence as person- and speaker-text outside of my own experiences and convictions, as far as possible.

In the following passage, certain thematic elements are encountered:

et laudare te vult homo, aliqua portio creaturae tuae, et homo circumferens mortalitatem suam, circumferens testimonium peccati sui et testimonium quia superbis resistis; et tamen laudare te vult homo, aliqua portio creaturae tuae. tu excitas ut laudare te delectet, quia fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te. (Conf. 1.1.1)⁶⁵.

⁶⁴ The reader is essentially separated physically from the work: the reader and the work are not the same.

⁶⁵ "And so we humans, who are a due part of your creation, long to praise you – we who carry out mortality about with us, carry the evidence of our sin and with it the proof that you thwart the proud. Yet these humans, due part of your creation as they are, still do long to praise you. You stir us so that praising you may bring us joy, because you have made us and drawn us to yourself, and our heart in inquiet until it rests in you".

The first thematic element is creation; this theme-text is evoked by the words *aliqua portio creaturae tuae*, which is repeated, and the verb *fecisti*. The emphasis of these semantically similar words creates the beginning of a theme-text. This theme is particularly strong in the last three books of the *Confessions*, where an exegesis of the creation account in *Genesis* is found. The second theme-text is that of the sinful nature of man; this is confirmed by *circumferens testimonium peccati*, which is reinforced by the parallel *circumferens mortalitatem suam*. This theme-text also attaches itself to the word *homo* which is prominent in this passage, occurring three times in the first sentence of this passage. The theme of sin is quoted by the title of the work as well: the word *confessionum* may refer to confessions of praise, but also confessions of sins, which occupy the first books of the *Confessions*. The word *homo* is particularly unstable: the singular can express both an individual and the entirety of mankind. The text prompts the critic to consider the identity of the *homo*: the author-text, the speaker-text, humanity in general, or perhaps even the reader, in the role as speaker-text and/or person-text. The word *homo* has the potential to quote every possible person-text through its open connotative power.

Pervading this entire passage is also the very strong theme-text of praise; this is evoked by the use of *laudare* in four instances. This opening has been described as a complete confession of praise by O'Donnell (1992b: 9). He remarks that this opening "renders the remaining 78,000 or so words of the text superfluous. This exclamation is self-sufficient; nothing more need be said, ever" (O'Donnell, 1992b: 9). This theme-text also overlaps with the actual act of praise: through the performance of these words, whether aloud or silently, the act of praising becomes real, beyond the sphere of the cognitive act of reading. The *Confessions* could be interpreted as a performance of praise as much as a description thereof.

Another theme-text which can be demonstrated through the course of the reading of the *Confessions* is that of pride, which also shares an intertextual relationship with three other texts, as demonstrated below:

Conf. 1.1.1

*Prov. 3:34, 1 Pet. 5:5, Jas. 4:6*⁶⁶

et homo circumferens mortalitatem suam, deus superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat circumferens testimonium peccati sui et gratiam. testimonium quia superbis resistis.

La Bonnardière notes that many instances of criticism of pride can be found in the author's works, and of the biblical quotations found in these passages, *Prov. 3:34* is featured prominently (1975: 123). She considers the presence of *Prov. 3:34* at the introductory passage of the *Confessions* significant, noting the use of *Prov. 3:34* in the introductory passages of other of the author's works⁶⁷ (La Bonnardière, 1975: 125). La Bonnardière highlights five more significant instances of *Prov. 3:34* in the *Confessions*, which she considers signifying moments of grace and instances where God resists the proud: *Conf. 3.5.9*⁶⁸, *Conf. 4.3.5*, *Conf. 4.15.26*, *Conf. 7.9.13*⁶⁹ and *Conf. 10.36.59*. She argues that the quotation of *Prov. 3:34* in *Conf. 1.1.1* functions differently to the later instances mentioned before (La Bonnardière, 1975: 127). While the individual contexts of these quotations will definitely convey unique interpretive possibilities in each case, it would be difficult, as critic, to ignore the significance of these intertextual relationships, particularly in the course of powerful passages such *Conf. 3.5.9* (the reading of the *Hortensius* and subsequent encounter with scripture) and *Conf. 7.9.13* (the intellectual conversion narrative). These intertextual relationships will allow the context of *Conf. 1.1.1* to intrude into the text of the aforementioned passages, introducing some instability into the interpretation, and offering other interpretive possibilities.

⁶⁶ The works in question, *Prov. 3:34*, *1 Pet. 5:5* and *Jas. 4:6*, all use the same form.

⁶⁷ La Bonnardière notes the presence of *Prov. 3:34* in *De civitate Dei*, prologue, I, *Sermo 351*, 1, *Sermo 144*, 1, and *Tractatus in Io. Ev. 54*, 1. She also notes the presence of the same verse at the conclusion of certain works, namely *De spiritu et littera 36*, 66, *Sermo 23 A*, 4, *Sermo Guelferbytanus 3*, 4, and *Sermo 150*, 10 (La Bonnardière, 1975: 125-126).

⁶⁸ See the discussion of this quotation in chapter 5.2.

⁶⁹ See the discussion of this quotation in chapter 7.2.

The aforementioned theme-texts are thematic elements that evolve throughout the reading and become prominent throughout the *Confessions*. I refer to these theme-texts throughout my analysis of *Confessions* 1-8 to highlight how these themes run through the text, as well as highlighting the manner in which these theme-texts attach themselves to the context in which they occur, which allows these theme-texts to acquire the ability to quote these contexts and their respective texts, drawing in a vast intertextuality through the development of the theme-texts as they evolve. These thematic elements function like threads through a vast tapestry, capable of leading one to recall the use of a specific thread in a different part of the text.

Another aspect that influences the interpretation of this passage is the first person plural subject and the words attached to it, particularly *homo*. The words *nos* and *nostrum*, together with the signification potential of *homo*, can have the effect of drawing in the reader as person-text as part of the *nos* that the author-/speaker-text is referring to, as well as strengthening the possibility of having the reader identifying with the speaker-text in the prayer. Furthermore, what can be demonstrated here is a blurring of the speaker-texts: the vast signifying potential of *homo* makes the *nos* potentially represent every human being. The *nos* also represents the first mention of a first person subject, which in this context might be interpreted as either a singular or plural referent. *Nos* is both plural and empty⁷⁰, and as such, its subject can also potentially be vast.

The first and most jarring change from the previous passage is the switch from a first person plural speaker-text (evoked by *nos* and *nostrum*) to an explicitly singular speaker-text in the next sentence:

⁷⁰ The first person singular *ego* represents an empty subject, a linguistic variable that can be filled by any subject, including the reader (see discussion of the empty subject in Chapter 2.3.2.). In the plural, the emptiness does not vanish, but its borders are extended and become vague. The first person plural pronoun can be considered both potentially singular (and therefore the equivalent of *ego*) or plural.

*da mihi, domine, scire et intellegere utrum sit prius invocare te an laudare te, et scire te prius sit an invocare te. (Conf. 1.1.1)*⁷¹.

The singular *mihi* has the effect of disrupting the strong plural sense that the combination of *homo* and *nos* evoked, and has the potential to transform the speaker-text(s) from a plural to a singular⁷² speaker-text. The question regarding the identity of this singular speaker-text is raised.

In *Conf. 1.1.1*, the speaker-text requests knowledge and understanding from the *dominus*, or God. Knowledge, understanding and, by extension and association, wisdom, are thematic elements in this opening passage that become a significant theme-text in the course of the reading. The speaker-texts already identified may offer suitable candidates for this other, singular speaker-text. The reader is already implicated as speaker-text through his/her role as reader, reading, and therefore implicitly “speaking” the words. However, the reader must ultimately resolve the role him-/herself: if the reader does not agree with the sentiments voiced in this role, there will always be a tension between the reader and the role of the speaker-text in the cases where the first person speaker is present. Another speaker-text that can most easily qualify for this role is Aurelius Augustinus, identified as the author-text. However, such a casual assignment may ignore some of the nuances which may enhance the meaning of this passage. If Aurelius Augustinus is assigned to the role of speaker-text, the question of the temporal space associated with this passage can be raised.

If the speaker-text in *Conf. 1.1.1* is considered outside of the narrative time, the voice of the author-text joins with the voice of the reader. It is the cry of the ignorant seeking knowledge, the cry of one seeking to approach God. When considering this

⁷¹ *Conf. 1.1.1*: “Grant me to know and understand, Lord, which comes first: to call upon you or to praise you? To know you or to call upon you?”

⁷² Singular here in the grammatical sense: more than one speaker-text can be identified to represent the singular *mihi*.

passage in the light of the temporal progression of the narrative, more nuanced interpretations are possible. While all possible temporal variants of Aurelius Augustinus can be considered here, certain variants are more logical and therefore more likely to be considered in the process of signification. The Augustinus at the time of the writing of the *Confessions*, that is, the Augustinus that has already undergone the events of the *Confessions* is possibly the most likely candidate for this role, but there may exist some resistance to this notion. The author-text Aurelius Augustinus, the person-text Augustinus at the time of writing the *Confessions* and the historical person-text Augustine are very strongly connected and therefore the collective person-texts that make up this Augustinus may be interpreted as a figure of knowledge and wisdom himself. The fact that this Augustinus is asking for knowledge and wisdom may potentially be considered strange. However, it is also possible to interpret this appeal as the approach of a humble man, which is an equally strong characteristic to associate with the aforementioned person-texts. Another possibility to consider is the Augustinus before his conversion. It is not possible for me as critic to pinpoint the exact temporal situation of this pre-conversion Augustinus within the narrative progression, nor is it necessary. Instead, I may allow this person-text a dynamic temporal assignment, and thus I may consider the voice of this person-text as present throughout the narrative.

The voice of the pre-conversion Augustinus may potentially be stronger in the following passage:

sed quis te invocat nesciens te? aliud enim pro alio potest invocare nesciens. an potius invocaris ut sciaris? quomodo autem invocabunt, in quem non crediderunt? aut quomodo credent sine praedicante? (Conf. 1.1.1)⁷³.

⁷³ Conf. 1.1.1: "Must we know you before we can call upon you? Anyone who invokes what is still unknown may be making a mistake. Or should you be invoked first, so that we may then come to know you? But how can people call upon someone in whom they do not yet believe? And how can they believe without a preacher?"

In this passage, the theme-text of ignorance is demonstrated through the use of the word *nesciens*. The theme-text can be considered a semic inversion of the theme-text of knowledge which has already been demonstrated. This inversion implies a relationship, that is, it is possible for the theme-text of knowledge to evoke the theme-text of ignorance. In this passage both theme-texts blend and clash. The first strong intertextual relationship with the *Letter to the Romans*, namely with *Rom.* 10:14-15 can be established, as demonstrated below:

Conf. 1.1.1

Rom. 10:14-15

quomodo autem invocabunt, in quem non crediderunt? aut quomodo credent sine praedicante?

quomodo autem invocabunt, in quem non crediderunt? aut quomodo credent, quem non audierunt? quomodo autem audient, sine praedicante? aut quomodo praedicabunt, si non mittantur.

The words in *Conf.* 1.1.1 shown above are identical to the words in *Rom.* 10:14-15, demonstrating a particularly strong intertextual relationship between these two texts. However, the intertextual relationship is disrupted: the words “*quem non audierunt? quomodo autem audient*” are found in *Rom.* 10:14-15 but not in *Conf.* 1.1.1. Yet the text in *Conf.* 1.1.1 quotes the text which I associate with *Rom.* 10:14-15, and therefore draws in the words that are not present as well. Given the parallel construction found in *Rom.* 10:14, the words “*aut quomodo praedicabunt, si non mittantur*” may also be considered present, though the intertextual relationship established in this passage. The words not found in *Conf.* 1.1.1 are concerned with hearing, quoted by two examples of the verb *audire*, and sending, through the verb *mittere*. The parts of *Rom.* 10:14-15 not found in *Conf.* 1.1.1 nevertheless intrude upon the reading through the intertextual relationship with the text of *Romans*. Through the strong intertextual relationship between *Conf.* 1.1.1 and *Rom.* 10:14-15, it is

possible for this text to evoke more than the lexical similarity and draw this into the sphere of interpretation.

Consider the passage in *Romans* which has been so strongly evoked by *Conf.* 1.1.1, and what can be drawn into the reading: if the words in *Conf.* 1.1.1 can quote the words in *Rom.* 10:14-15, these words can also potentially quote the context, as well as any other texts connected to that passage. Given the strong genre-text of the diatribe in *Romans* and the elements ascribed to it, as has been discussed in the conceptual framework, it may be possible to consider which speaker-texts could influence the interpretation⁷⁴. The following section provides a detailed description of the nature of the different potential speaker-texts in *Rom.* 10:14-15 and its context in order to demonstrate the complexities that the conceptual framework of intertextuality serves to expose and that this dissertation explores.

Before commencing with a reading of *Rom.* 10, the book itself may be considered, and, in a similar way to how I have read the *Confessions*, the initial assumptions that are made upon reading it. The opening of the letter is as follows⁷⁵:

Παῦλος δοῦλος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ, κλητὸς ἀπόστολος ἀφωρισμένος εἰς εὐαγγέλιον θεοῦ... πᾶσιν τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν Ῥώμῃ ἀγαπητοῖς θεοῦ, κλητοῖς

⁷⁴ It should be noted that not all scholars interpret the exchange in *Rom.* 10:14-15 as a dialogue between an interlocutor and the teacher. Witherington casts the words of *Rom.* 10:14-15 directly in Paul's mouth (2004: 264). Dunn recognizes the diatribe style in the book of *Romans* (Dunn, 1988: lxii), but does not comment on any interlocutor in his discussion of *Rom.* 10:14-15 (Dunn, 1988: 628). Jewett also recognizes the diatribe style in *Romans*, and interprets the section *Rom.* 9:30 – *Rom.* 10:4 as demonstrating this style (2007: 26). However, in Jewett's discussion of *Rom.* 10:14-15, he makes no reference to the diatribe or interlocutor (Jewett, 2007: 637-640). A strong proponent of the presence of the interlocutor is Song (2004), whose interpretation will be discussed below.

⁷⁵ In instances where no comparison with the Latin of the *Confessions* is being made, I quote the Greek text of the *Letter to the Romans*, as explained in Chapter 3.3.

ἀγίοις, χάρις ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη ἀπὸ θεοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν καὶ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. (*Rom.* 1:1-7)⁷⁶.

The first word of the letter is Παῦλος, and the format, as presented rather strongly in the opening verse, would seem to be that of a letter (an assumption supported by the modern appellation of the work). Given the case of the name as well as the conventions of letter writing of the time (all of which are texts influencing my interpretation), I come to the conclusion that this letter was written by Παῦλος, who can therefore be cast as an author-text⁷⁷. The words in the opening, together with the assumptions noted above, allow me to cast the words in the opening in the voice of Παῦλος. Whether an historical Παῦλος dictated these words to a scribe or wrote them himself is irrelevant; it is possible to imagine Παῦλος speaking these words. This letter is addressed, according to the convention of letter writing of the time, to πᾶσιν τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν Ῥώμῃ ἀγαπητοῖς θεοῦ. However, who actually “hears” these words is a different matter: the reader, whether or not he/she fits the description of the ostensible addressee of the letter, receives the words of the letter. Regardless of the addressee of the letter, I can anticipate that the person-text of Παῦλος will be a strong speaker-text throughout the letter.

Given the strong genre-text of the diatribe which characterises *Romans*, it is possible to anticipate that the speaker-text of *Romans* will be significantly dynamic; that is, although Παῦλος is indeed a strong speaker-text throughout the letter, his role as speaker may be undermined. Such an undermining can potentially be read in *Rom.* 10.

⁷⁶ Paul, a servant of Jesus Christ, called to be an apostle, set apart for the gospel of God... to all God's beloved in Rome, who are called to be saints: Grace to you and peace from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ.

⁷⁷ I shall not proceed with a discussion of the historical Παῦλος or the authorship of *Romans*, but accept, as is my prerogative as critic, the person-text of Παῦλος, as I understand him to be, as the author of *Romans*. Whether interpreted as a variable (i.e. whosoever wrote the *Letter to the Romans*, I call Παῦλος) or as ideology (i.e. I believe that Παῦλος wrote the *Letter to the Romans*), the effect remains similar: my understanding of the character Παῦλος fills the notion of the author of *Romans*.

In *Rom.* 10, the speaker-text puts forward an argument for the salvation of the Israelites. The passage starts with an argument regarding the Israelites (*Rom.* 10: 1-2). The author of *Romans* recognizes the Israelites as zealous, but their zeal is not based on knowledge (ἐπίγνωσις). The author-/speaker-text then contrasts the righteousness achieved through the law of Moses with the righteousness achieved through faith by appealing to scriptural authority to support his argument⁷⁸:

Μωϋσῆς γὰρ γράφει τὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐκ [τοῦ] νόμου ὅτι ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὰ ἄνθρωπος ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς. (*Rom.* 10: 5)⁷⁹.

ἢ δὲ ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοσύνη οὕτως λέγει· μὴ εἴπῃς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου· τίς ἀναβήσεται εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν; (*Rom.* 10: 6)⁸⁰.

In both instances, scriptural texts intrude into the reading. In the first instance, the author-/speaker-text recognizes the source as Moses, who enters into the text as author-text as well, lending authority to this and the second appeal to scripture (given the similarity of *Rom.* 10:6 to *Deuteronomy*, another text ascribed to Moses). An

⁷⁸ I quote the scriptural authority that may be identified in the footnotes following the translation of the passage, basing such an identification on the similarity of the scriptural text with the passage in *Romans*. The similar parts are underlined.

⁷⁹ *Rom.* 10:5: “Moses writes concerning the righteousness that comes from the law, that ‘the person who does these things will live by them’”.

Lev. 18: 5: καὶ φυλάξεσθε πάντα τὰ προστάγματά μου καὶ πάντα τὰ κρίματά μου καὶ ποιήσετε αὐτά, ἃ ποιήσας ἄνθρωπος ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς· ἐγὼ κύριος ὁ θεὸς ὑμῶν. “You shall keep my statutes and my ordinances; by doing so one shall live: I am the Lord”.

⁸⁰ *Rom.* 10:6: “But the righteousness that is by faith says: ‘Do not say in your heart, ‘Who will ascend into heaven?’”

Deut. 9: 4: μὴ εἴπῃς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου ἐν τῷ ἔξαναλῶσαι κύριον τὸν θεόν σου τὰ ἔθνη ταῦτα ἀπὸ προσώπου σου λέγων Διὰ τὰς δικαιοσύνας μου εἰσῆγαγέν με κύριος κληρονομήσαι τὴν γῆν τὴν ἀγαθὴν ταύτην· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀσέβειαν τῶν ἐθνῶν τούτων κύριος ἐξολεθρεύσει αὐτοὺς πρὸ προσώπου σου. “After the Lord your God has driven them out before you, do not say to yourself, ‘The Lord has brought me here to take possession of this land because of my righteousness.’ No, it is on account of the wickedness of these nations that the Lord is going to drive them out before you.”

Deut. 30: 12: οὐκ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ἄνω ἐστὶν λέγων Τίς ἀναβήσεται ἡμῖν εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν καὶ λήμψεται αὐτὴν ἡμῖν; καὶ ἀκούσαντες αὐτὴν ποιήσομεν. “It is not up in heaven, so that you have to ask, ‘Who will ascend into heaven to get it and proclaim it to us so we may obey it?’”

antithesis between ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἡ ἐκ πίστεως and ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἡ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου is formed.

Until *Rom.* 10:14, there is little reason to suspect a speaker-text that could be cast as interlocutor, that is, a speaker-text with a counter argument to the primary speaker-text: there are other speaker-texts in *Rom.* 10:1-13, such as Moses and the authors of the texts identified as potential quotations, but none seems to resist the author-/speaker-text's argument as one would anticipate for an interlocutor. However, in *Rom.* 10:14, the speaker-text begins to issue a series of questions which would try to undermine the preceding argument. The reader is confronted with a paradox: why would Παῦλος deliberately try to undermine his own argument so? This resistance allows the speaker-text to be considered here dynamically: the possibility of *prosopopoeia*, of an interlocutor, can be considered here, given the series of questions introduced⁸¹:

Πῶς οὖν ἐπικαλέσονται εἰς ὃν οὐκ ἐπίστευσαν; πῶς δὲ πιστεύσωσιν οὐ οὐκ ἤκουσαν; πῶς δὲ ἀκούσωσιν χωρὶς κηρύσσοντος; πῶς δὲ κηρύξωσιν ἐὰν μὴ ἀποσταλῶσιν; καθὼς γέγραπται· ὡς ὠραῖοι οἱ πόδες τῶν εὐαγγελιζομένων [τὰ] ἀγαθὰ (*Rom.* 10:14-15)⁸².

Given the unstable nature of the speaker-text in *Romans* due to its association with the genre-text of the diatribe, as well as the dialogic nature of the diatribe genre-text, it is possible to assign to the questions the voice of the interlocutor speaker-text. Similarly, the voice of the teacher (to use Song's preferred term), or simply Παῦλος, the author-text, can be assigned to the response (Song, 2004: 103).

⁸¹ This interpretation is also followed by Song; he casts the questions in *Rom.* 10:1-21 in the mouth of an interlocutor and the responses, supported by scriptural authority, in the mouth of what Song calls the teacher i.e. Paul (2004: 103).

⁸² *Rom.* 10:14-15: "How, then, can they call on the one they have not believed in? And how can they believe in the one of whom they have not heard? And how can they hear without someone preaching to them? And how can anyone preach unless they are sent? As it is written: 'How beautiful are the feet of those who bring good news!'"

The potential identity of this interlocutor is not easily ascertained. The unstable nature of the interlocutor makes it hard for a specific voice to be assigned to it. The interlocutor, according to most scholars' understanding of the diatribal interlocutor, represents an opposing philosophy or opinion. Therefore the assignment of the speaker-text of these questions can be very dynamic. There are many potential philosophies and opinions that may oppose the author-/speaker-text's position. This does not mean that the interlocutor speaker-text is without identity or empty (although, this too is a possibility); rather, the interlocutor is capable of being associated with a number of speaker/person-texts depending on the reader's interpretation. Regardless of the actual identity of the interlocutor, it may be possible to represent *Rom.* 10:12-14 as a dialogue between Παῦλος and the interlocutor.

One possible assignment of speakers in *Rom.* 10:12-14 is as follows⁸³:

Author οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν διαστολή Ἰουδαίου τε καὶ Ἑλλήνου, ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς κύριος πάντων, πλουτῶν εἰς πάντα τοὺς ἐπικαλουμένους αὐτόν·

Citation by Author⁸⁴ πᾶς γὰρ ὃς ἂν ἐπικαλέσῃται τὸ ὄνομα κυρίου σωθήσεται.

Interlocutor Πῶς οὖν ἐπικαλέσονται εἰς ὃν οὐκ ἐπίστευσαν; πῶς δὲ πιστεύσωσιν οὗ οὐκ ἤκουσαν; πῶς δὲ ἀκούσωσιν χωρὶς κηρύσσοντος; πῶς δὲ κηρύξωσιν ἐὰν μὴ ἀποσταλῶσιν;

⁸³ This analysis is supported by Song's observations regarding the dialogue between author and interlocutor (rendered Teacher and Interlocutor in Song's analysis). According to Song, the Teacher's responses "are performed, as a rule, by adopting a typical diatribe device, that is, resorting to an authority, Scripture" (Song, 2004: 103).

⁸⁴ *Joel* 3:5: καὶ ἔσται πᾶς, ὃς ἂν ἐπικαλέσῃται τὸ ὄνομα κυρίου, σωθήσεται· ὅτι ἐν τῷ ὄρει Σιών καὶ ἐν Ἱερουσαλὴμ ἔσται ἀνασωζόμενος, καθότι εἶπεν κύριος, καὶ εὐαγγελιζόμενοι, οὓς κύριος προσκέκληται. "Then everyone who calls on the name of the Lord shall be saved; for in Mount Zion and in Jerusalem there shall be those who escape, as the Lord has said, and among the survivors shall be those whom the Lord calls" (*Joel* 2:32 in NRSV).

Citation by Author⁸⁵ καθὼς γέγραπται ὡς ὠραῖοι οἱ πόδες τῶν εὐαγγελιζομένων [τὰ] ἀγαθὰ⁸⁶.

In this interpretation, the interlocutor interrupts the author's argument with a series of questions concerning the possibility of calling on someone without believing in him/her. Belief, according to the interlocutor, must be predicated by listening and listening must be predicated by preaching. Preaching the gospel must be predicated by a mission, which the negative subjunctive construction ἐὰν μὴ ἀποσταλῶσιν may suggest has not happened.

The argument that the interlocutor poses has four logical steps, all of which are addressed in turn by the author. The steps are as follows: mission, followed by preaching, followed by hearing, followed by believing. The author has already dealt with the first step in *Rom.* 10:15; there has been a mission and preaching: ὡς ὠραῖοι οἱ πόδες τῶν εὐαγγελιζομένων [τὰ] ἀγαθὰ (*Rom.* 10:15). The word εὐαγγελιζομένων refers to both the acts of sending and preaching (Tobin, 2004: 350). In *Rom.* 10: 16-18, the interlocutor responds by addressing the issue of hearing⁸⁷:

Interlocutor Ἄλλ' οὐ πάντες ὑπήκουσαν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ.

⁸⁵ *Isaiah* 52: 7: ὡς ὠραῖοι ἐπὶ τῶν ὄρεων, ὡς πόδες εὐαγγελιζομένου ἀκοὴν εἰρήνης, ὡς εὐαγγελιζόμενος ἀγαθὰ, ὅτι ἀκουστήν ποιήσω τὴν σωτηρίαν σου λέγων Σιών Βασιλεύσει σου ὁ θεός: "How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of the messenger who announces peace, who brings good news, who announces salvation, who says to Zion, 'Your God reigns.'"

Nahum 2: 1: Ἴδου ἐπὶ τὰ ὄρη οἱ πόδες εὐαγγελιζομένου καὶ ἀπαγγέλλοντος εἰρήνην· ἐόρταζε, Ἰουδα, τὰς ἐορτάς σου, ἀπόδος τὰς εὐχάς σου, διότι οὐ μὴ προσθήσωσιν ἔτι τοῦ διελθεῖν διὰ σοῦ εἰς παλαίωσιν Συντετέλεσται, ἐξήρηται. "Look! On the mountains the feet of one who brings good tidings, who proclaims peace! Celebrate your festivals, O Judah, fulfill your vows, for never again shall the wicked invade you; they are utterly cut off." (*Nahum* 1:15 in NRSV).

⁸⁶ *Rom.* 10:12-14: "For there is no distinction between Jew and Greek; the same Lord is Lord of all and is generous to all who call on him. For, 'Everyone who calls on the name of the Lord shall be saved.' But how are they to call on one in whom they have not believed? And how are they to believe in one of whom they have never heard? And how are they to hear without someone to proclaim him?"

⁸⁷ Reconstructed from Song's analysis with slight amendments (Song, 2004: 103).

Citation by Interlocutor ^{88 89}	Ἡσαΐας γὰρ λέγει· κύριε, τίς ἐπίστευσεν τῇ ἀκοῇ ἡμῶν;
Author	ἄρα ἡ πίστις ἐξ ἀκοῆς, ἡ δὲ ἀκοὴ διὰ ῥήματος Χριστοῦ.
Interlocutor	ἀλλὰ λέγω, μὴ οὐκ ἤκουσαν;
Author	μενοῦνγε·
Citation by Author ⁹⁰	εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἐξῆλθεν ὁ φθόγγος αὐτῶν καὶ εἰς τὰ πέρατα τῆς οἰκουμένης τὰ ῥήματα αὐτῶν. ⁹¹

In *Rom.* 10:19, the interlocutor changes the angle of his/her argument: it is not enough to hear something, there must also be comprehension. If there is no comprehension, the act of hearing is fruitless. The author counters this argument with several biblical citations:

Interlocutor	ἀλλὰ λέγω, μὴ Ἰσραὴλ οὐκ ἔγνω;
Citation by Author ⁹²	πρῶτος Μωϋσῆς λέγει· ἐγὼ παραζηλώσω ὑμᾶς ἐπ' οὐκ

⁸⁸ Song is unclear about the assignment of the interlocutor and author/teacher in *Rom.* 10:15-16. Song (2004: 103) seems to argue that all the biblical citations are placed in the voice of the teacher. However, the quotation of *Isaiah* 53:1 seems to resist such an assignment. I argue that the interlocutor is a stronger candidate for the role of speaker-text here.

⁸⁹ *Isaiah* 53: 1: κύριε, τίς ἐπίστευσεν τῇ ἀκοῇ ἡμῶν; καὶ ὁ βραχίον κυρίου τίτι ἀπεκαλύφθη; "Who has believed what we have heard? And to whom has the arm of the Lord been revealed?"

⁹⁰ *Ps.* 18: 5: εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἐξῆλθεν ὁ φθόγγος αὐτῶν καὶ εἰς τὰ πέρατα τῆς οἰκουμένης τὰ ῥήματα αὐτῶν. "Yet their voice goes out through all the earth, and their words to the end of the world."

⁹¹ *Rom.* 10:16-18: "But not all have obeyed the good news; for Isaiah says, 'Lord, who has believed our message?' So faith comes from what is heard, and what is heard comes through the word of Christ. But I ask, have they not heard? Indeed they have; for 'Their voice has gone out to all the earth, and their words to the ends of the world.'"

⁹² *Deut.* 32: 21: αὐτοὶ παρεζήλωσάν με ἐπ' οὐ θεῶν, παρώργισάν με ἐν τοῖς εἰδώλοις αὐτῶν· καὶ ἐγὼ παραζηλώσω αὐτοὺς ἐπ' οὐκ ἔθνει, ἐπ' ἔθνει ἀσυνέτω παροργιῶ αὐτούς. "They made me jealous with what is no god, provoked me with their idols. So I will make them jealous with what is no people, provoke them with a foolish nation."

ἔθνει, ἐπ’ ἔθνει ἀσυνέτω παροργιῶ ὑμᾶς.

Citation by Author⁹³ Ἡσαΐας δὲ ἀποτολμᾷ καὶ λέγει· εὐρέθην [ἐν] τοῖς ἐμὲ μὴ ζητοῦσιν, ἐμφανῆς ἐγενόμην τοῖς ἐμὲ μὴ ἐπερωτῶσιν.

Citation by Author⁹⁴ πρὸς δὲ τὸν Ἰσραὴλ λέγει· ὅλην τὴν ἡμέραν ἐξεπέτασα τὰς χεῖράς μου πρὸς λαὸν ἀπειθοῦντα καὶ ἀντιλέγοντα.⁹⁵

In the response to the interlocutor’s objections in *Rom.* 10:19-21, the author employs three scriptural citations, the sources, or rather authors of which are all named (Song, 2004: 103). The author’s point is twofold: firstly, through scripture, it is foretold that the Gentiles would come to know God and secondly, that Israel would be made jealous for this reason (Tobin, 2004: 351). Tobin (2004: 351) summarizes the author’s argument: “Israel has no excuse for not knowing this. Once again, it is not that God’s word has failed. Rather, Israel has failed by not understanding what is found in that word”.

The reconstruction of the fictional dialogue above is one interpretive possibility, based on the intertextual relationship that the *Letter to the Romans* has with the genre-text of the diatribe and other diatribal texts. It is also possible, and by no means unreasonable, to place the words in *Rom.* 10 entirely in the mouth of the presumed

⁹³ *Isaiah* 65: 1: Ἐμφανῆς ἐγενόμην τοῖς ἐμὲ μὴ ζητοῦσιν, εὐρέθην τοῖς ἐμὲ μὴ ἐπερωτῶσιν· εἶπα Ἰδοὺ εἰμι, τῷ ἔθνει οἱ οὐκ ἐκάλεσάν μου τὸ ὄνομα. “I was ready to be sought out by those who did not ask, to be found by those who did not seek me. I said, ‘Here I am, here I am,’ to a nation that did not call on my name.”

⁹⁴ *Isaiah* 65: 2: ἐξεπέτασα τὰς χεῖράς μου ὅλην τὴν ἡμέραν πρὸς λαὸν ἀπειθοῦντα καὶ ἀντιλέγοντα, οἱ οὐκ ἐπορεύθησαν ὁδῷ ἀληθινῇ, ἀλλ’ ὀπίσω τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν αὐτῶν. “I held out my hands all day long to a rebellious people, who walk in a way that is not good, following their own devices;”

⁹⁵ *Rom.* 10:19-21: “Again I ask, did Israel not understand? First Moses says, ‘I will make you jealous of those who are not a nation; with a foolish nation I will make you angry.’ Then Isaiah is so bold as to say, ‘I have been found by those who did not seek me; I have shown myself to those who did not ask for me.’ But of Israel he says, ‘All day long I have held out my hands to a disobedient and contrary people.’”

speaker-text Παῦλος. Nevertheless, the ironic ⁹⁶ quality of the words, the undermining of the argument, whether rhetorical or not, as well as the intertextual relationships with many other biblical texts, serves to disrupt the speaker-text Παῦλος' presence and allows for other potential speaker-texts to be introduced into the interpretation.

Because of the strong intertextual relationship between *Conf.* 1.1.1 and *Rom.* 10:14-15, the observations regarding the dynamic interlocutor above may spill into the interpretation of *Conf.* 1.1.1. If the voice of the speaker-text of *Rom.* 10:13 is drawn into the space of signification of *Conf.* 1.1.1, the interpretive possibilities that could be generated are multiplied. The identity of the speaker-text of the questions posed in *Conf.* 1.1.1 becomes unstable: the speaker-text of Aurelius Augustinus, who was assigned as strongest speaker-text at the opening of the *Confessions*, offers some resistance, in a similar manner in which Παῦλος resisted the role of speaker-text in *Rom.* 10:13. While it is not impossible for a post-conversion, bishop Augustinus to ask these questions in a humble, rhetorical fashion, the simplicity of the questions, as well as the profound spiritual and intellectual journey that the author-/speaker-text of *Conf.* 1.1.1 undergoes in the *Confessions*, resists this interpretation.

The pre-conversion Augustinus is certainly also a potential candidate. The association of ignorance and the younger Augustinus can spill over to the fictional dialogue and the younger Augustinus may merge with the role of the interlocutor. The interlocutor may also embody an opposing opinion to that of the author-text Augustinus, which may include any number of specific person-texts, or specific philosophies.

⁹⁶ The word "irony" is employed in this study in the sense understood by Erler: "Expression of something by the opposite" (1998: 1106-1107). Within the conceptual framework adopted in this dissertation, for every interpretation, there is a possible ironic interpretation. There is no inherent, unambiguous or systemic marker that can identify irony: irony is determined by interpretation.

Besides Augustinus, the ever present reader as speaker-text is as viable a candidate for the role of interlocutor as any other. The reader's own ignorance, own philosophical or religious persuasions, as well as the role as reader/supplicant may draw him/her into the voice of the interlocutor. The reader is always in the position to accept or reject the words he/she is reading/speaking/praying, however the act of reading, the polyvalence of meaning and the reader's own insertion into the role of reader always resists absolute rejection. The reader must concede that while reading, even while rejecting the words read, the words are spoken, if only in silence, psychically. The reader can reject the Text, but he/she cannot destroy it; the reader can resist the Text, but he/she cannot diffuse the explosion contained in it⁹⁷.

The potential merger of the speaker-text of the interlocutor with the text of *Conf.* 1.1.1, as well as the fictional dialogue in *Rom.* 10:12-15 may impact significantly on how *Conf.* 1.1.1 is interpreted. The fictional dialogue in *Rom.* 10:12-15 may be transformed and transposed to *Conf.* 1.1.1.

The passage in *Conf.* 1.1.1 which has triggered this interpretive explosion and intertextual relationship is characterised by questions, and it is through these questions that the potential dialogue may be represented. Mathewes (2002: 541) has noted the "innumerable questions" present in the *Confessions*. According to him, the narrative presented in books 1-9 of the *Confessions* details the author's "struggles to learn to ask questions" (2002: 543). Mathewes (2002: 543) warns against simply reducing the author's questions to mere rhetoric:

In ignoring Augustine's many questions as 'mere rhetoric,' or by dismissing them (and perhaps him) as signs of a deep 'anxiety,' we miss something important. We miss the way that Augustine is telling a story about learning to ask questions – learning, beyond the explicit intellectual form of 'the

⁹⁷ See Chapter 2.3.1 for a discussion on the nature of this explosion as understood by Barthes.

question,' to inhabit the form of life from which our questions derive. We miss, that is, the openness of Augustinian questioning as pointing beyond itself to a whole mode of life that we are meant to inhabit. We mistake heaven for hell; fearful as we are of questions, we cannot see that the energy they most fundamentally express is a foretaste of the final communion with God - a communion that is anything but static.

Mathewes' investigation into the act of questioning into the *Confessions* highlights an important point: questions, answered or otherwise, cannot be reduced to a mere rhetorical device. The act of questioning is a powerful text that pervades the *Confessions*. The questions in *Conf.* 1.1.1 should be considered beyond the scope of mere rhetoric. It is possible to consider the fictional dialogue as another interpretive possibility.

Consider, then, the questions and the response that follows them in *Conf.* 1.1.1. Following the series of questions, the speaker-text responds with a rather unexpected statement:

*et laudabunt dominum qui requirunt eum: quaerentes enim inveniunt eum et invenientes laudabunt eum.*⁹⁸

The reader encounters a strange disjunction between the questions asked and the response given. The questions posed by the speaker-text in *Conf.* 1.1.1 can be simplified as follows:

Who (can) call you without knowing *sed quis te invocat nesciens te?*
you?

(Support) It is possible to unknowingly *aliud enim pro alio potest invocare nesciens.*

⁹⁸ "[T]hose who seek the Lord will praise him, for as they seek they find him, and on finding him, they will praise him".

call upon someone else in place of another.

Or should you rather be called in order *an potius invocaris ut sciaris?* to be known?

But how can they call upon someone in *quomodo autem invocabunt, in quem non* whom they do not believe? *crediderunt?*

Or how can they believe without a *aut quomodo credent sine praedicante?* preacher?

The first question deals with the issue of ignorance: how can someone call upon someone he/she does not know? The validity of the question is demonstrated by the statement that it would be possible to call upon someone as something else in ignorance. The second question asks whether it is better for God to be called in order to be known. The third question asks how it is possible to call upon someone you do not believe in. The final question considers how it is possible to believe in someone if there has not been a preacher.

If the genre-text of the diatribe is employed in the reading of *Conf.* 1.1.1, the characteristics, such as appeal to authorities like scripture and the presence of the interlocutor, may be quoted by the intertextual relationship with *Rom.* 10:14-15 and spill into the reading of the passage. Therefore, in attempting to resolve the tension created by the series of questions in *Conf.* 1.1.1 and the seemingly disjunctive response, I consider the appeal to scriptural authority as a possible resolution to interpreting this passage.

In the response to the questions in *Conf.* 1.1.1, the theme-text of praise is picked up again, as well as two new theme-texts that will become particularly strong throughout the *Confessions*: the theme-texts of seeking and finding respectively. The verbs *quaerere* and *invenire* are often found together in the *Confessions* and these two

words, combined with the intertextual relationships with other texts, provide powerful signification potential.

Many scholars see the *quaerere* and *invenire* pair as a citation or allusion to *Matt. 7:7*⁹⁹. The intertextual relationship between *Matt. 7:7* and these two words, although only two, is still very demonstrable¹⁰⁰:

*petite et dabitur vobis; quaerite et invenietis; pulsate et aperietur vobis. (Matt. 7:7)*¹⁰¹.

Furthermore, the closing words of the *Confessions*, *a te petatur, in te quaeratur, ad te pulsetur: sic, sic accipietur, sic invenietur, sic aperietur*, demonstrate a very strong intertextual relationship with *Matt. 7:7*, as well as other instances which could be identified¹⁰². Nevertheless, to limit the signification potential to one text, on the basis of the aforementioned similarity, without any specific mention of the author or work, would be premature. The combination of *quaerere* and *invenire* is not unique to *Matt. 7:7*. Intertextual relationships between *Conf. 1.1.1*, *Luke 11:10*, *Isaiah 65:1*, *Rom. 10:20* and *Wis. 13:6* can also be drawn, as indicated below:

Conf. 1.1.1 *quaerentes enim inveniant eum et invenientes laudabunt eum*¹⁰³

Matt. 7:7 *petite et dabitur vobis; quaerite et invenietis; pulsate et aperietur vobis*¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹ Both O'Donnell and Verheijen note this as a citation of *Matt. 7:7* in their text editions of the *Confessions*.

¹⁰⁰ The Latin of *Matt. 7:7* as reconstructed by O'Donnell is quoted here to demonstrate the similarity between the *Conf. 1.1.1* and *Matt. 7:7*.

¹⁰¹ *Matt. 7:7*: "Ask, and it will be given you; search, and you will find; knock, and the door will be opened for you."

¹⁰² Verheijen identifies ten possible citations/allusions of *Matt. 7:7* in the *Confessions* (1981: 285). O'Donnell identifies a possible eleven citations/allusions (1992b: 15).

¹⁰³ See footnote 98.

¹⁰⁴ See footnote 101.

*Luke 11:9-10*¹⁰⁵ *et ego vobis dico petite et dabitur vobis quaerite et invenietis pulsate et aperietur vobis. omnis enim qui petit accipit et qui quaerit invenit et pulsanti aperietur*¹⁰⁶

Isaiah 65:1 *quaesierunt me qui ante non interrogabant, invenerunt qui non quaesierunt me. dixi: "ecce ego, ecce ego."*¹⁰⁷

Rom. 10:20 *Esaias autem audet, et dicit. "inventus sum a non quaerentibus me"*¹⁰⁸

*Wis. 13:6*¹⁰⁹ *sed tamen adhuc in his minor est querella et hii enim fortassis errant Deum quaerentes et volentes invenire*¹¹⁰

Each of these texts can contribute to the reading of the passage in *Conf.* 1.1.1 in unique ways, through the intertextual relationships that can be evoked. *Matt.* 7:7 shares many similarities to *Luke* 11:10, with the same three pairs of verbs. What is sought and what is found, how the seeking must occur and when the finding shall happen, are all enigmatically left up to the reader. No further details are provided, making the nature of the seeking and finding, and the signification potential significantly unstable and open to various interpretations. *Isaiah* 65:1, and by extension *Rom.* 10:20¹¹¹, however, introduces a slightly different element to the reading: the speaker-text, which can most easily be associated with God, says that those who *did not* seek him, found him; to the nations who do not call him, God says "*ecce ego ecce ego*". The manner in which the seeking happens does not seem to

¹⁰⁵ Latin text from the Vulgate.

¹⁰⁶ *Luke* 11:9-10: "So I say to you, Ask, and it will be given you; search, and you will find; knock, and the door will be opened for you. For everyone who asks receives, and everyone who searches finds, and for everyone who knocks, the door will be opened."

¹⁰⁷ See footnote 93.

¹⁰⁸ *Rom.* 10:20: "Then Isaiah is so bold as to say, 'I have been found by those who did not seek me; I have shown myself to those who did not ask for me.'"

¹⁰⁹ Latin text from the Vulgate.

¹¹⁰ *Wis.* 13:6: "Yet these people are little to be blamed, for perhaps they go astray while seeking God and desiring to find him."

¹¹¹ Given the strong intertextual relationship between them, amplified by the direct appeal to Isaiah in *Rom.* 10:20.

matter in *Isaiah* 65:1: even though they were not asking for God, they found him nonetheless; even though they did not call to him, he revealed himself to them nonetheless.

There are certain similarities between *Isaiah* 65:1 and *Conf.* 1.1.1 that are noteworthy: similar texts pervade both, seeking to draw the other in. The presence of *Isaiah* 65:1 in *Rom.* 10:20, especially as part of the author-text's response to the interlocutor speaker-text, as discussed above in the analysis of *Rom.* 10, draws in the authority of the speaker-text of *Isaiah* as teacher into this passage. The reinforcement of the text of *Isaiah* 65:1 in both *Rom.* 10:20 and *Conf.* 1.1.1 increases the volume of this text in the reading, potentially making it louder than *Matt.* 7:7 in this instance. The act of calling (*vocare* in *Isaiah* 65:1) is present throughout *Conf.* 1.1.1 (it is, after all, a calling out from the outset), strengthened by the use of verbs like *invocare* in *Conf.* 1.1.1 and further throughout the *Confessions*. The use of the verb *interrogare* in *Isaiah* 65:1 recalls the act of questioning that pervades the *Confessions*, particularly *Conf.* 1.1.1. The repetitive sequence "*ecce ego ecce ego*" curiously parallels the words "*tolle lege tolle lege*" (*Conf.* 8.12.29), the words of a child that Augustinus heard in the garden at Milan, at the moment of his conversion to Catholic Christianity. The rhythm of both are the same and the notion of God making himself known, the idea of revelation, is strong in both instances. The disjunction between the act of seeking and the act of finding as present in *Isaiah* 65:1 also mirrors the disjunction between the series of questions in *Conf.* 1.1.1 and the response. Furthermore, when the *Confessions* is viewed in a broader perspective, the disjunction between seeking and finding in *Isaiah* can be seen as a parallel to the disjunction between Augustinus' own quest in the narrative of the *Confessions* and the manner in which he came to convert to Christianity in the garden scene in Milan.

Wis. 13:6 also contributes to the reading of *Conf.* 1.1.1 in unique ways. Not only is it possible to identify intertextual relationships between *Wis.* 13:6 and *Conf.* 1.1.1, but also between *Wis.* 13:6 and *Rom.* 10:14-15. The title of the work, *Wisdom of Solomon*,

Sapientia Salomonis or Σοφία Σαλομώντος, together with its purported author, Solomon, evokes the theme-text of knowledge, understanding and wisdom immediately, which is shared with both *Conf.* 1.1.1 and *Rom.* 10:14-15. Winston (1979: 18) states that the genre of *Wisdom* is a *logos protreptikos*. He further remarks that “protreptic discourse readily lent itself to the incorporation of diatribe” and some of the features he highlights of such a diatribe, which are present in *Wisdom*, are speeches and objections of imaginary adversaries, which I call the interlocutor (Winston, 1979: 20). Winston specifically mentions *Wis.* 13:6-9 as an example of a passage with such features (1979: 20). Reese confirms Winston’s observation, and describes *Wis.* 11:18 – 15:19 as a diatribe (1970: 120). It may be said, therefore, that *Wisdom* and *Romans* share an intertextual relationship with regard to the genre-texts. Furthermore, *Wis.* 13 and *Rom.* 1:18-32 demonstrate a very strong intertextual relationship, which will be elaborated on in Chapter 6 on *Confessions* 5. The intertextual relationship between *Wis.* 13 and *Romans* is characterised by a strong resistance: there is a tension between the author’s ideas and beliefs demonstrated by *Romans* and those demonstrated by *Wisdom*. Despite the strong relationship between these texts, the resistance is also very strong. This proposition is also discussed in the course of this study (especially in Chapter 6).

After the response given to the questions posed by the speaker-text in *Conf.* 1.1.1, the first examples of verbs in the first person singular is found:

*quaeram te, domine, invocans te et invocem te credens in te: praedicatus enim es nobis. invocat te, domine, fides mea, quam dedisti mihi, quam inspirasti mihi per humanitatem filii tui, per ministerium praedicatoris tui.*¹¹²

The speaker-text of *quaeram* and *invocem* is therefore worth considering. I have already identified a number of potential speaker-texts in this first chapter of the

¹¹² *Conf.* 1.1.1: “Let me seek you, then, Lord, even while I am calling upon you, and call upon you, even as I believe in you; for to us you have indeed been preached. My faith calls upon you, Lord, this faith which is your gift to me, which you have breathed into me through the humanity of your Son and the ministry of your preacher.”

Confessions: the reader, the author-text, Aurelius Augustinus, God, David, Paulus, and more. Under Aurelius Augustinus, I can define more specifically the Augustinus at the time of writing the *Confessions*, and Augustinus before writing the *Confessions*¹¹³. The speaker-text's words here share strong similarities with the questions and responses given in the previous passages. The speaker-text declares his/her desire to seek (further evoking the theme-text of seeking and finding, as well as continuing the force of the scriptural texts identified), while calling. In this way, the theme-text of seeking and finding has also started to become an action, through the active participation of the speaker-text. Furthermore, the speaker-text declares a desire to call while believing, introducing the theme-text of faith and belief. The speaker-text then makes the statement *praedicatus enim es nobis*. This statement again evokes the intertextual relationship between *Conf.* 1.1.1 and *Rom.* 10:14-15. The final question asked by both the speaker-text of *Conf.* 1.1.1 and the speaker-text of *Rom.* 10:14-15 concerns preaching. The *enim* in *Conf.* 1.1.1 suggests that the speaker-text follows the same logic as the progression presented in *Rom.* 10: God has already been preached, and therefore Augustinus has already heard: this is implied by the relationship with *Rom.* 10:14-15. Therefore Augustinus can believe, and because he believes, he can call upon God. The statement *praedicatus enim est nobis* is therefore another complete confession, a confession of the existence of God, drawing in the texts of *Romans* to complete it.

Further, this confession is not limited to the speaker-text Augustinus. The speaker-text in *Conf.* 1.1.1 makes the claim that God has been preached to an audience indicated by the first person plural *nobis*. The plural disrupts the strength of the singular verbs *quaeram* and *invocem*, and seeks to populate the speaker-text with a plurality. The reader as speaker-text is drawn into the *nobis*. The question of the

¹¹³ More specific subdivisions of this complex speaker-text can further be elaborated on, such as Augustinus at specific times in his life, but for the moment I shall only discuss the text in terms of these broad speaker-texts.

validity of such a claim may be raised, but is disrupted by the strength of the opening: *Magnus es, domine, et laudabilis valde*. The unstable nature of this opening, the intertextual relationships with many scriptural texts, the connections with scriptural authority and the authority of the individual author-texts, together with that of God, as divine author-text, may be interpreted as affirming the speaker-text's claim of *praedicatus enim es nobis*. The reader has heard these words already; the reader has spoken these words, if only in silence. Regardless of the reader's own convictions, the signification potential of these texts flow in, resisting what convictions and preconceptions the reader may have.

4.4. Conclusion

The opening of the *Confessions* contributes much to the reading of the work as a whole. Not only does it begin to create certain basic assumptions, such as the identity of the speaker-text(s), it also challenges those assumptions through the introduction of several powerful texts that serve to disrupt a monological¹¹⁴ reading. The presence of quotations of other texts not only provides a certain instability in the identity of the speaker-text, but floods the reading with a number of contiguous texts. In the case of *Rom. 10:14-15*, the genre-text of the diatribe and the interlocutor as potential speaker-text in *Romans* also enter into *Conf. 1.1.1*, disrupting the (mono)logic of the reading and the way in which the critic interprets the speaker-text(s). The speaker-text becomes a variable, flexible and dynamic construct, through the interaction with the other texts. In the interaction of *Conf. 1.1.1* with *Matt. 7:7*, *Isaiah 65:1* and *Rom. 10:14-15*, the theme-text of seeking and finding is introduced and further amplified in the rest of the *Confessions*. Not only is this a text which is introduced and becomes a thread throughout the *Confessions*, notably through its presence in the final words of the *Confessions*, but it may also become a leitmotif to

¹¹⁴ In the sense used by Barthes, to refer to an interpretation with a singular, fixed meaning. See Barthes' discussion on the plurality of the Text (Barthes, 1977: 159).

the entire *Confessions*: the nuanced nature of seeking and finding, as found in *Isaiah* 65:1, combined with the acts of questioning and calling that pervade the *Confessions*, may allow for new readings of the entire *Confessions*.

While the analysis of *Conf.* 1.1.1 set out above serves to demonstrate the nature and interpretive potential of intertextual relationships in general, the main focus of this dissertation is the intertextual relationships between the *Confessions* and the *Letter to the Romans*. In the following chapter, I briefly give an overview of the potential intertextual relationships with *Romans* that may be found in *Conf.* 1.2.2 – *Conf.* 4. There are not many strong, formal similarities with *Romans* in *Conf.* 1.2.2 – *Conf.* 4, as was the case with *Conf.* 1.1.1 and *Rom.* 10:14-15. However several of the shared thematic elements that have been discussed in this chapter and that become prominent in the course of the reading of the *Confessions* as a whole can be found in *Conf.* 1.2.2 – *Conf.* 4.

Chapter 5 *Confessions* 1.2.2 – *Confessions* 4

5.1. Introduction

The verbal similarities between the *Letter to the Romans* and the section between *Conf.* 1.2.2 and *Conf.* 4 are less pronounced than in other parts of the *Confessions*. In this chapter, I therefore only discuss the parts of *Conf.* 1.2.2 – *Conf.* 4 that demonstrate a significant intertextual relationship with the *Letter to the Romans* and I focus on the thematic elements already discussed in Chapter 4 that may contribute to a general understanding of the intertextual relationship between the *Confessions* and the *Letter to the Romans*. The three thematic elements I focus on in this chapter are that of pride, and seeking and finding.

5.2. Pride

The first clearly identifiable instance of the theme-text of pride that can easily be identified after *Conf.* 1.1.1 occurs soon afterwards, in *Conf.* 1.4.4. This occurs as a response to a series of questions (starting from *Conf.* 1.2.2), which continues further until 1.5.6, only occasionally punctuated by responses, such as *Conf.* 1.4.4. The act of questioning pervades this section: given the relationship of the act of questioning in *Conf.* 1.1.1 with the speaker-texts identified earlier, namely the pre-conversion Augustinus, the post-conversion Augustinus or the reader, these voices may enter into this passage, bringing with them the context(s) in *Conf.* 1.1.1. The first major break from questioning and into a more formal response occurs, as I have said, in *Conf.* 1.4.4, in response to the speaker-text's questions¹¹⁵ regarding the nature of God:

summe, optime, potentissime, omnipotentissime, misericordissime et iustissime, secretissime et praesentissime, pulcherrime et fortissime, stabilis et

¹¹⁵ *quid es ergo, deus meus? quid, rogo, nisi dominus deus? quis enim dominus praeter dominum? aut quis deus praeter deum nostrum?* (*Conf.* 1.4.4).

*incomprehensibilis, immutabilis mutans omnia, numquam novus numquam vetus, innovans omnia et in vetustatem perducens superbos et nesciunt (Conf. 1.4.4).*¹¹⁶

This sudden break from the questions represents another confession, that is, a confession of the nature of God. The voice of Augustinus at the time of writing the *Confessions* can certainly be considered a potential speaker-text here, but the hyperbolic expressions may also evoke the character of Augustinus during his conversion, in the throes of conversion ecstasy. This may have the effect of foreshadowing the final conversion narrative in Book 8.

The theme-text of pride is evoked by the word *superbos* in quoted passage; this recalls *Conf. 1.1.1* and the intertextual relationship with *Prov. 3:34*, *1 Pet. 5:5* and *Jas. 4:6*. Furthermore, the word *nesciunt* here quotes the theme-text of ignorance, which I have identified as the semic inversion of theme-text of knowledge, understanding and wisdom. The pairing of these two theme-texts, ignorance and pride, together with the evocation of the intertextual relationships with the aforementioned texts creates an association which in itself becomes an intertextual relationship. It would therefore be possible to associate pride and ignorance with the aforementioned texts through the intertextual relationship established through their proximity. Thus it may also be possible to anticipate further intertextual relationships that may arise in a similar manner, where another text is associated with a strong theme- or person-text.

In book 3, the theme-text of pride becomes more prominent. In *Conf. 1.1.1*, the speaker-text says “*et laudare te vult homo, aliqua portio creaturae tuae, et homo circumferens mortalitatem suam, circumferens testimonium peccati sui et testimonium quia superbis resistis*”. Thus, according to the speaker-text, man carries with him/her the

¹¹⁶ *Conf. 1.4.4*: “You are most high, excellent, most powerful, omnipotent, supremely merciful and supremely just, most hidden yet intimately present, infinitely beautiful and infinitely strong, steadfast yet elusive, unchanging yourself though you control the change in all things, never new, never old, renewing all things yet wearing down the proud though they know it not;”

testimony that God resists the proud. The interpretive leap is possible, then, that such *superbia* is something inherent, like *mortalitas* and *peccatum*, within man. Through the unstable person-text of *homo*, as argued in chapter 4.3, it is possible to assign the quality of *superbia* to a variety of person-texts, in *Conf.* 1.1.1: the author-/speaker-text, humanity in general, or the reader. However, in book 3, the theme-text of pride becomes associated with more specific person-texts, drawing the critic away from the unstable, open interpretation in *Conf.* 1.1.1, and leading to it being assigned to more specific person-texts.

The first example of *superbia* in book 3 occurs in *Conf.* 3.3.6. Here, the speaker-text describes his course of study and his proficiency therein:

habebant et illa studia quae honesta vocabantur ductum suum intuentem fora litigiosa, ut excellerem in eis, hoc laudabilior, quo fraudulentior. tanta est caecitas hominum de caecitate etiam gloriantium. et maior etiam eram in schola rhetoris, et gaudebam superbe et tumebam typho¹¹⁷

The words *superbe*, *tumebam* and *typho*, all connoting pride, are used to describe the speaker-text during the course of his studies. The theme-text of pride occurs again, in *Conf.* 3.5.9, now where the speaker-text describes his first serious encounter with scripture:

itaque institui animum intendere in scripturas sanctas et videre quales essent. et ecce video rem non compertam superbis neque nudatam pueris, sed incessu humilem, successu excelsam et velatam mysteriis. et non eram ego talis ut intrare in eam possem aut inclinare cervicem ad eius gressus. non enim sicut modo loquor, ita sensi, cum attendi ad illam scripturam, sed visa est mihi indigna quam tullianae dignitati

¹¹⁷ *Conf.* 3.3.6: “The prestigious course of studies I was following looked as its goal to the law-courts, in which I was destined to excel and where I would earn a reputation all the higher in the measure that my performance was the more unscrupulous. So blind can people be that they glory even in their blindness! Already I was the ablest student in the school of rhetoric. At this I was elated and vain and swollen with pride;”

*compararem. tumor enim meus refugiebat modum eius et acies mea non penetrabat interiora eius. verum autem illa erat quae cresceret cum parvulis, sed ego dedignabar esse parvulus et turgidus fastu mihi grandis videbar.*¹¹⁸

Here, the critic's identification of the speaker-text with the younger Augustinus is resisted: the words of the second sentence are spoken in present tense, with a deep reverence and admiration for the scriptures which the younger self described in this passage, according to the speaker-text's own testimony, did not possess. The speaker-text refers in this sentence to *superbis* in a general way, drawing the broader possibilities of the first mention in *Conf.* 1.1.1 into the interpretation. However, the speaker-text then describes the younger Augustinus with words of pride: *tumor* and *turgidus* (as cognates of *tumeo*).

In *Conf.* 3.6.10, the quality of *superbia* is directly assigned to a specific group of people:

*itaque incidi in homines superbe delirantes, carnales nimis et loquaces, in quorum ore laquei diaboli et viscum confectum commixtione syllabarum nominis tui et domini Iesu Christi et paracleti consolatoris nostri spiritus sancti.*¹¹⁹

This group is not explicitly identified until *Conf.* 3.10.18, and only in passing:

¹¹⁸ *Conf.* 3.5.9: "Accordingly I turned my attention to the holy scriptures to find out what they were like. What I see in them today is something not accessible to the scrutiny of the proud nor exposed to the gaze of the immature, something lowly as one enters, but lofty as one advances further, something veiled in mystery. At that time, though, I was in no state to enter, nor prepared to bow my head and accommodate myself to its ways. My approach then was quite different to the one I am suggesting now: when I studied the Bible and compared it to Cicero's dignified prose, it seemed to me unworthy. My swollen pride recoiled from its style and my intelligence failed to penetrate to its inner meaning. Scripture is a reality that grows along with little children, but I disdained to be a little child and in my high and mighty arrogance regarded myself as grown up."

¹¹⁹ *Conf.* 3.6.10: "In reaction to this disappointment I fell among a set of proud madmen, exceedingly carnal and talkative people in whose mouths were diabolical snares and a sticky mess compounded by mixing the syllables of your name, and the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit, who is out Paraclete and Consoler."

*si quis enim esuriens peteret qui manichaeus non esset, quasi capitali supplicio damnanda buccella videretur si ei daretur.*¹²⁰

It would however be quite difficult to postulate the *homines superbe delirantes* mentioned at the opening of *Conf.* 3.6.10 as anyone other than the Manichaeans. Though the text in *Conf.* 3.6.10 is not explicit in its identification, it is generally accepted that this passage refers to the Manichaeans¹²¹. The quality of *superbia* can be assigned to the Manichaeans through the context of this passage, as well as through associating the phrase *laqueus diaboli* with them. Both the phrase *laqueus diaboli* and *superbia* resurface in book 5.

This new association of the theme-text of pride with a specific person-text, namely the Manichaeans, has implications for the interpretations made thus far. The instances of the theme-text of pride already mentioned may now retroactively be assigned to the Manichaeans as well. While the mention of the theme-text of pride in *Conf.* 1.1.1 has already been extended to all of humanity through the unstable person-text contained in *homo*, the more specific person-text of the Manichaeans can also be considered as a potential person-text in *Conf.* 1.1.1. This is further reinforced by the identification of the author-text Augustinus as Manichaean in book 3. Having fallen in with them, as recounted in *Conf.* 3.6.10, the author-text Augustinus “becomes” a Manichaean, and therefore all the texts associated with the Manichaeans also become associated with Augustinus. The theme-text of pride thus becomes strongly associated with the author-text especially during his time as a Manichaean through the intertextual relationships between the theme-text of pride and the person-text of the Manichaeans.

¹²⁰ *Conf.* 3.10.18: “[F]or if some hungry person who was not a Manichee asked for one, it was believed that to give it to him entailed passing a death-sentence on that morsel.”

¹²¹ O’Donnell identifies the section of *Conf.* 3.6.10 – 3.10.18 as “Among the Manichees” (1992b: 145) and remarks that the extensive food metaphor in *Conf.* 3.6.10 mirrors the Manichaean eating rituals (1992b: 173).

5.3. Seeking and Finding

The observation that the theme-texts of seeking and finding pervades the *Confessions* has been made by other scholars, particularly through the quotation of *Matt. 7:7*¹²². Given the intertextual relationship also between these theme-texts and the *Letter to the Romans* already established in *Conf. 1.1.1*, further exploration of the relationship between these theme-texts may offer interesting perspectives on the interpretation of the intertextual relationship between the *Confessions* and the *Letter to the Romans* in general.

In *Conf. 1.6.10*, the word *invenire* is found in a discussion of the speaker-text's infancy:

quid ad me, si quis non intellegat? gaudeat et ipse dicens, 'quid est hoc?' gaudeat etiam sic, et amet non inveniendo invenire potius quam inveniendo non invenire te.

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The notion contained in the final sentence of this passage evokes the intertextual relationship between *invenire* and *Isaiah 65:1*, already established in *Conf. 1.1.1*: that one should rather find (by implication, God) on a wrong path of inquiry that results in failure to find the object sought (*non inveniendo*), than not to find God at all, through an attempt to find him specifically. The disjunction between seeking and finding, as presented in the intertextual relationship with *Isaiah 65:1*, is mirrored in this notion.

In *Conf. 1.9.14*, the word *invenimus*, voiced in the first person plural, also recalls the theme-texts of seeking and finding which was characteristic of *Conf. 1.1.1*:

¹²² See Knauer, 1957: 240, Kotzé, 2007: 89.

¹²³ *Conf. 1.6.10*: "What does it matter to me, if someone does not understand this? Let such a person rejoice even to ask the question, 'What does this mean?' Yes, let him rejoice in that, and choose to find by not finding rather than by finding fail to find you."

invenimus autem, domine, homines rogantes te et didicimus ab eis, sentientes te, ut poteramus, esse magnum aliquem qui posses etiam non apparens sensibus nostris exaudire nos et subvenire nobis. nam puer coepi rogare te, auxilium et refugium meum, et in tuam invocationem rumpebam nodos linguae meae et rogabam te parvus non parvo affectu, ne in schola vapularem. et cum me non exaudiebas, quod non erat ad insipientiam mihi, ridebantur a maioribus hominibus usque ab ipsis parentibus, qui mihi accidere mali nihil volebant, plagae meae, magnum tunc et grave malum meum (Conf. 1.9.14).¹²⁴

Here the character that can be identified with the author-text, i.e. Augustine, relates how, as a child, he found men praying to God. The verb, *rogare*, echoes the verb *interrogare* in *Isaiah* 65:1: *quaesierunt me qui ante non interrogabant invenerunt qui non quaesierunt me dixi ecce ego ecce ego ad gentem quae non vocabat nomen meum*. Through the intertextual relationship with *Isaiah* 65:1, made stronger by the use of *invenimus* in close proximity to forms of *rogare*, an interpretation that this praying may not necessarily lead to finding God is possible. This scene in *Conf.* 1.9.14 shows the first instance where Augustine encounters some kind of understanding of God for the first time (presumably as a young boy). The frequent presence of the word *rogare*, the emotive language, even the confession hidden in *esse magnum aliquem*¹²⁵ all make for a description of an earnest attempt at seeking God, but without any finding. This particular scene is therefore the first attempt of the young Augustine to consciously seek God through prayer, one which failed.

¹²⁴ *Conf.* 1.9.14: "We did, however, meet at school some people who prayed to you, Lord, and we learned from them, imagining you as best we could in the guise of some great personage who, while not evident to our senses, was yet able to hear and help us. So it came about that even then in boyhood I began to pray to you, my aid and refuge. By calling upon you I untied the knots of my tongue and begged you, in my little-boy way but with no little earnestness, not to let me be beaten at school. You did not hear my prayer, lest by hearing it you might have consigned me to a fool's fate; so my stripes were laughed at by my elders and even my parents, who would not have wished anything bad to happen to me. But bad it was, and very dreadful for me."

¹²⁵ As well as the potential intertextual relationship with *Conf.* 1.1.1: *Magnus es, domine*.

5.4. Conclusion

While the strong verbal similarities with *Romans* in books 2 – 4 of the *Confessions* are less pronounced (i.e. as was the case in *Conf.* 1.1.1), nevertheless, the intertextual threads that run through the *Confessions* are still evoked through prominent texts such as quotations of other works, theme-texts and the multivalent assignment of speaker-texts. These theme-texts assist in strengthening the force of quotations of *Romans* in later chapters by drawing even more reinforcing texts into the signifying process: where same or similar theme-texts are recognised in both the *Confessions* and *Romans*, there is a strengthening of the intertextual relationship. These texts become particularly strong in book 5, together with the establishment of an intertextual relationship with *Rom.* 1:20-25 in this book.

Chapter 6 *Confessions* 5.1.1 – *Confessions* 5.4.7

6.1. Introduction

Book 5 of the *Confessions* is characterised by a very strong intertextual relationship with *Romans*. In this chapter, I explore the extent of this relationship and the possibilities it may present for the interpretation of this book. I focus in particular on the development of the theme-texts already discussed (namely the theme-texts of pride, seeking, finding and creation), as well as the manner in which the speaker-text(s) and contexts may affect the interpretation.

6.2. *Conf.* 5.1.1

Conf. 5.1.1 begins with a confession: *accipe sacrificium confessionum mearum de manu linguae meae*. The word *confessionum* establishes a link back to the title of the work and back to the opening in *Conf.* 1.1.1. O'Donnell remarks that the “renewed emphasis on *confession* is one sign among several that a hinge in the work’s structure has been reached” (1992b: 281). While the nature of this hinge is not made clear by O'Donnell, it is certain that the use of the word *confessionum* has the potential to draw the reader back to the opening. The possibility exists therefore that the texts identified in the opening are also drawn into this passage in the same manner. The verb *confiteor* appears three times in *Conf.* 5.1.1 and the verb *laudare* appears three times as well, repeating the theme-texts of confession and praise respectively, both significantly present in the opening as demonstrated earlier. The theme-text of creation¹²⁶ is also evoked in *Conf.* 5.1.1 by verbs such as *fecisti* (appearing twice) and *creatura*.

According to O'Donnell, the use of the verb *facere* is characteristic of the version of the text of *Genesis* that he postulates Augustine would have used (1992b: 18): *in*

¹²⁶ Discussed in Chapter 4.3.

principio fecit deus caelum et terram. (Gen. 1:1)¹²⁷. The Vulgate uses *creare: in principio creavit deus caelum et terram*. Speculation as to the text that the historical Augustine would have used is not the purview of this dissertation, but if such a connection is created by the reader, this would significantly strengthen the intertextual relationship between *Conf.* 5.1.1 and *Genesis*. The theme-texts of praise, confession and creation all reinforce the connection with *Conf.* 1.1.1.

6.3. *Conf.* 5.2.2

Conf. 5.2.2 continues to evoke the opening of the *Confessions* through the word *inquieti*, which recalls the phrase *inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te* (*Conf.* 1.1.1). The verbs *quaerere* and *invenire* both appear twice in this paragraph, recalling the verbs found in *Conf.* 1.1.1 as well. Another theme-text that emerges, strengthened by the connotation of *quaerere*, is that of flight:

eant et fugiant a te inquieti iniqui. et tu vides eos et distinguis umbras, et ecce pulchra sunt cum eis omnia et ipsi turpes sunt. et quid nocuerunt tibi? aut in quo imperium tuum dehonestaverunt, a caelis usque in novissima iustum et integrum? quo enim fugerunt, cum fugerent a facie tua? aut ubi tu non invenis eos? sed fugerunt ut non viderent te videntem se atque excaecati in te offenderent (*Conf.* 5.2.2).¹²⁸

Fugere, which appears here four times, may be considered the semic inversion of *quaerere*. *Quaerere* indicates a deliberate attempt to seek or to near a certain entity or thing, while *fugere* implies a deliberate separation or distancing from a certain entity

¹²⁷ Reconstruction by O'Donnell (1992b: 18).

¹²⁸ *Conf.* 5.2.2: "Wicked, restless folk may go their way and flee from you as they will. You see them, for your eyes pierce their darkness, and how lovely is the whole of which they are part, lovely though they are foul! And how have they harmed you? Have they in any point brought your rule into disrepute, that rule which is just and perfect from highest heaven to the lowest of creatures? Where have they fled, in fleeing from your face? Is there any place where you cannot find them? They have fled all the same, to avoid seeing you who see them, and so in their blindness they have stumbled over you."

or thing. *Fugere*, as the inverse of *quaerere*, therefore also has the potential to evoke the theme-text of seeking, as *quaerere* does, and by extension, the theme-text of finding.

The connection with the opening of the *Conf.* 1.1.1 is therefore strong in *Conf.* 5.1.1-5.2.2. The question arises as to the significance of this connection and how it impacts the interpretation. The confession uttered in 5.1.1 is potentially most easily read in the voice of Aurelius Augustinus, the same speaker-text that uttered the opening words of the *Confessions*. The context of the passage suggests the present Augustinus, that is, the Augustinus at the time of writing the *Confessions*. The reader as speaker-text is also always present, speaking the words in his/her mind in the silent activity of reading. This is compounded by the emphasis on the entirety of creation in *Conf.* 5.1.1: *non cessat nec tacet laudes tuas universa creatura tua*, which makes the reader, as well as the entirety of creation, potential speaker-texts of the confession in *Conf.* 5.1.1.

Conf. 5.2.2 changes the tone by shifting the emphasis from the positive aspect of creation praising God, to the negative aspects of the wickedness of humanity. This paragraph introduces a new person-text, the *inquieta iniqui*, which begs the question regarding the identity of these people. The word *inquieta*, as mentioned earlier, evokes the opening of the *Confessions* as well as possibly Augustinus as speaker-text. It could be posited that the Augustinus best suited to share in the qualities of the *inquieta iniqui* would be the Augustinus before writing the *Confessions*, before undergoing his final conversion: the younger Augustine is characterised by *inquietudo* several times throughout the first four books¹²⁹. However, the speaker-text never says *fugiebam*, always *quaerebam*. The strong presence of the third person plural that dominates this paragraph assists to distance the speaker-text from the third person person-texts to whom the action of fleeing is ascribed. Whether or not

¹²⁹ Including *Conf.* 1.17.27 (*inquietum*), 1.19.30 (*inquietudine*), 2.2.2 (*inquieta*) and 2.3.6 (*inquieta*).

the speaker-text would associate himself with the *iniqui* is not clear, despite previous texts that strengthen the possibility of an association of the younger Augustinus with the *iniqui*. The identity of the third person person-texts here may be further explored through an investigation of other intertextual relationships evoked by *Conf.* 5.2.2.

The power of *Romans* pervades this passage¹³⁰: the relationship between this passage and *Rom.* 11 is clearly demonstrable:

*sed fugerunt ut non viderent te videntem se ceteri vero excaecati sunt, sicut scriptum
atque excaecati in te offenderent, quia non est; dedit illis deus spiritum compunctionis,
deseris aliquid eorum quae fecisti; in te oculos ut non videant, aures ut non
offenderent iniusti et iuste vexarentur, audiant, usque in hodiernum diem... dico
subtrahentes se lenitati tuae et offendentes ergo, numquid sic offenderunt ut caderent?
in rectitudinem tuam et cadentes in absit, sed illorum delicto salus gentibus ut
asperitatem tuam. (Conf. 5.2.2)¹³¹ illos aemulentur. (Rom. 11:7-11).¹³²*

The *quaerebat* in *Rom.* 11:7, quoted by *Conf.* 5.2.2 through extended context, once again draws in and strengthens the force of the seeking theme-text which has become stronger and stronger; thus again the texts of *Matt.* 7:7 and *Isaiah* 65:1 are potentially drawn in, as well as the other texts identified earlier. Other words from *Rom.* 11 can be found after *Conf.* 5.2.2, contributing to the retroactive strengthening of the presence of these texts. The word *laqueum* (*Rom.* 11:9) is found in *Conf.* 5.3.3, and *obscrentur* (*Rom.* 11:10) is found in *Conf.* 5.3.5, where a strong intertextual

¹³⁰ Both Verheijen (1981: 288) and O'Donnell (1992b: 284) identify similarities between *Rom.* 11 and *Conf.* 5.2.2.

¹³¹ *Conf.* 5.2.2: "They have fled all the same, to avoid seeing you who see them, and so in their blindness they have stumbled over you – for you abandon nothing you have made; yes, stumbled over you, these unjust folk, and justly hurt themselves; for they distanced themselves from your gentleness only to trip over your probity and fall upon the rough edges of your anger."

¹³² *Rom.* 11:7-11: "[B]ut the rest were hardened, as it is written, 'God gave them a sluggish spirit, eyes that would not see and ears that would not hear, down to this very day.'... So I ask, have they stumbled so as to fall? By no means! But through their stumbling salvation has come to the Gentiles, so as to make Israel jealous."

relationship also with *Rom.* 1:21-25 can be established. A strong interweaving could therefore be read here: however, the implications of this interweaving for interpretation is relatively complex. The texts involved are numerous, and conflicting interpretations are possible from the dynamic interaction between these texts. In the following paragraphs I explore the manner in which these texts clash and weave¹³³, and the elements that allow for such complex interaction.

6.4. *Conf.* 5.3.3 - 5.3.5

Firstly, I consider the context within the *Confessions*: In *Conf.* 5.3.3, the story is recounted of how Augustinus hears of the arrival of a certain Manichaean called Faustus. This man is reputed to be very learned, but the speaker nevertheless considers the observations of the philosophers he had read to be more convincing than the arguments made by Faustus (*Conf.* 5.3.3). The identity or nature of these philosophers is not elaborated on here, other than the observation that these philosophers were able to make certain predictions regarding natural events, elaborated on in *Conf.* 5.3.4. The speaker's observation that the philosophers had not found God may be an indication that these were pagan philosophers, rather than Christian¹³⁴. Despite the speaker-text's insistence that he considered the conclusions of these philosophers more convincing than the claims that the Manichaeans had made, he nonetheless begins a tirade against these philosophers, not the Manichaeans:

et quoniam multa philosophorum legeram memoriaeque mandata retinebam, ex eis quaedam comparabam illis manichaeorum longis fabulis, et mihi probabiliora ista videbantur quae dixerunt illi qui tantum potuerunt valere ut possent aestimare saeculum, quamquam eius dominum minime invenerint. quoniam magnus es,

¹³³ See chapter 2.3.2 for a discussion of the use of terms like "clash" and "weave" to describe intertextual relationships.

¹³⁴ ...*et mihi probabiliora ista videbantur quae dixerunt illi qui tantum potuerunt valere ut possent aestimare saeculum, quamquam eius dominum minime invenerint* (*Conf.* 5.3.3).

domine, et humilia respicis, excelsa autem a longe cognoscis, nec propinquas nisi obtritis corde nec inveniris a superbis, nec si illi curiosa peritia numerent stellas et harenam et dimetiantur sidereas plagas et vestigent vias astrorum. (Conf. 5.3.3)¹³⁵

The verb *invenire* occurs twice in this passage, and in two distinct forms. The first is a concessive subjunctive in the active (*invenerint*) and the second is indicative in the passive (*inveniris*). The first verb is third person plural, ostensibly with the philosophers as subject, but the second is second person singular, and its subject can be most logically attributed to the addressee. The agent of the second verb is explicitly given: *a superbis*. Since the first verb's subject was (at first glance) the philosophers, it is easiest to assign the identity of the *superbi* here to the philosophers. However, the context and the powerful signification potential contained in the words allow for more dynamic interpretations. Once again the text establishes a strong intertextual relationship with *Conf.* 1.1.1: again *magnus es, domine* is repeated; the word *superbis*, and the theme-text of pride, as well as the words *humilia* recall the quotation of *Prov.* 3:34, *1 Pet.* 5:5 and *Jas.* 4:6¹³⁶, also quoted at *Conf.* 1.1.1. The connection with *Conf.* 1.1.1 evoked by the passage from *Conf.* 5.3.3 is further strengthened by the presence of intertextual relationships with *Conf.* 1.1.1 in *Conf.* 5.1.1 and 5.2.2, as well as the relationship with the theme-text of pride that pervades book 3. The identity of the *superbi* becomes far more open to other possibilities through these relationships.

¹³⁵ *Conf.* 5.3.3: "Now, I had read widely in the works of philosophers, committed a good deal to memory and still retained it, and I began to compare certain elements from my reading with the long-winded myths of the Manichees. The philosophers' conclusions seemed to me more probably, since these men had been clever enough to make calculations about the world, even though they were quite unsuccessful in discovering its Lord. For you are great, Lord, and you look kindly on what is humble, but the lofty-minded you regard from afar. Only to those whose hearts are crushed do you draw close. You will not let yourself be found by the proud, nor even by those who in their inquisitive skill count stars or grains of sand, or measure the expanses of heave, or trace the paths of planets."

¹³⁶ *deus superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat gratiam*. All three texts share the same form (O'Donnell, 1992b: 11)

Given the subject matter of *Conf.* 5.3.3, the meeting with Faustus the Manichaean, described as a *magnus laqueus diaboli* in *Conf.* 5.3.3, a connection between *Conf.* 5.3.3 and book 3 can potentially be established through the Manichaean person-text, the use of *laqueus diaboli* (used to describe the Manichaeans in *Conf.* 3.6.10), as well as the quotation of *Prov.* 3:34, *1 Pet.* 5:5 and *Jas.* 4:6 and the theme-text of pride. The *superbi* are therefore potentially strongly associated with the Manichaeans. However, as was demonstrated earlier, the potential for alternative association still remains and other interpretations are still possible: the former Manichaean Augustinus is equally a candidate, both as (former) Manichaean and as already associated with the notion of pride particularly in book 3; in *Conf.* 1.1.1, the *superbi* were unstable, potentially referring to all of humanity, and by extension, the reader. This particular interpretation is strengthened by the strong similarities between *Conf.* 5.1.1 and *Conf.* 1.1.1, and a sense of recapitulation in this passage.

The verbs *invenerint* and *inveniris* in *Conf.* 5.3.3 also deserve some further attention. The verb naturally recalls the theme-text of finding, and with it, seeking. This theme-text evokes the quotations listed earlier: *Matt.* 7:7, as always, but also *Rom.* 10:20 and *Isaiah* 65:1¹³⁷. As I have pointed out, whereas *Matt.* 7:7 describes a generic, non-specific seeking and finding, *Isaiah* 65:1 adds a particular nuance to these theme-texts. This nuance, namely that God is found by those who do not seek him, i.e. that seeking does not necessarily lead to finding what has been sought, is implied by the passive in *inveneris*: God does not allow himself to be found by the proud, and he reveals himself to the humble. Furthermore, the speaker-text continues to elaborate on this in the rest of the sentence: *nec inveniris a superbis, nec si illi curiosa peritia numerent stellas et harenam et dimetiantur sidereas plagas et vestigent vias astrorum* (*Conf.* 5.3.3). Even through the observation and calculations of the stars and their movement, God does not reveal himself to these people.

¹³⁷ Which is quoted by *Rom.* 10:20.

Another intertextual relationship can be established here, that with *Wis.* 13:9:

qui tantum potuerunt valere ut possent si enim tantum potuerunt valere ut possent aestimare saeculum, quamquam eius aestimare saeculum, quomodo eius dominum minime invenerint. (Conf. dominum non facilius invenerunt? (Wis. 5.3.3)¹³⁸. 13:9).¹³⁹

The presence of *Wis.* 13 in this passage, together with its interaction with *Romans* will be explored further in the following section.

The speaker-text continues to elaborate on the discussion in the passage that follows:

mente sua enim quaerunt ista et ingenio quod tu dedisti eis et multa invenerunt et praenuntiaverunt ante multos annos defectus luminarium solis et lunae, quo die, qua hora, quanta ex parte futuri essent, et non eos fefellit numerus. (Conf. 5.3.4).¹⁴⁰

The verbs *quaerere* and *invenire* provoke some interesting considerations: it is no longer God being sought, but things about the universe and the natural world. The subject of *quaerunt* and *invenerunt* is not explicitly given in this particular passage, permitting a certain amount of speculation and uncertainty. The context allows most easily for the philosophers to be assigned as the subject, but the Manichaeans as person-text are also a potential candidate, given the Manichaeans' attempts to describe the world and its mysteries, especially through astrology (Lieu, 1985: 177).

¹³⁸ See footnote 135.

¹³⁹ *Wis.* 13:9: "[F]or if they had the power to know so much that they could investigate the world, how did they fail to find sooner the Lord of these things?"

¹⁴⁰ *Conf.* 5.3.4: "With their intellect and the intelligence you have given them they investigate these things, and so they have discovered much, and predicted eclipses of the sun's light, or the moon's, many years in advance, indicating precisely the day, the hour, and the extent of the eclipse. And their calculations have been accurate."

This was, after all, the reason for the young Aurelius Augustinus' seeking out of Faustus¹⁴¹.

Another interesting observation is the use of the word *numerus* here. An intertextual relationship with *Conf.* 1.1.1 may be established: *magna virtus tua et sapientiae tuae non est numerus* (*Conf.* 1.1.1). In the aforementioned instance, God's wisdom is not calculable. In the latter instance, in *Conf.* 5.3.4, the speaker-text admits that the attempts of these people to make predictions regarding the movements of the stars and planets were successful: the calculations they wanted to make could be made accurately.

The speaker-text continues to describe the *philosophi*, still in *Conf.* 5.3.4:

*et mirantur haec homines et stupent qui nesciunt ea, et exultant atque extolluntur qui sciunt, et per impiam superbiam recedentes et deficientes a lumine tuo tanto ante solis defectum futurum praevident, et in praesentia suum non vident (non enim religiose quaerunt unde habeant ingenium quo ista quaerunt), et invenientes quia tu fecisti eos, non ipsi se dant tibi, se ut serves quod fecisti, et quales se ipsi fecerant occidunt se tibi, et trucidant exaltationes suas sicut volatilia, et curiositates suas sicut pisces maris quibus perambulant secretas semitas abyssi, et luxurias suas sicut pecora campi, ut tu, deus, ignis edax consumas mortuas curas eorum, recreans eos immortaliter. (*Conf.* 5.3.4).¹⁴²*

¹⁴¹ *quam ego iam tametsi laudabam, discernebam tamen a veritate rerum quarum discendarum avidus eram, nec quali vasculo sermonis, sed quid mihi scientiae comedendum apponeret nominatus apud eos ille Faustus intuebar. fama enim de illo praelocuta mihi erat quod esset honestarum omnium doctrinarum peritissimus et apprime disciplinis liberalibus eruditus (*Conf.* 5.3.3). "... I too was ready to admire [his eloquence], but I was beginning to distinguish it from the truth I hungered to learn. What interested me was not the dainty verbal dish on which he served his offerings, this Faustus of such high renown, but how much knowledge he could provide for me to eat; for I have been told earlier how extremely well informed he was in all branches of reputable scholarship, and how particularly learned in the liberal arts.*

¹⁴² *Conf.* 5.3.4: "People think this wonderful: those who are ignorant of such matters are dumbfounded, while the experts strut and make merry. In their impious pride they draw away from you and lose your light, because these scholars who foresee a future eclipse of the sun fail to see their own in the present, for want of inquiring in a religious spirit from whom they have received the very

The theme-text of ignorance is present here (*stupent, nesciunt*), as well as knowledge (*sciunt, ingenium*), but much stronger is the theme-text of pride (*exultant, impiam superbiam, exaltationes*), as well as the ever present theme-text(s) of seeking and finding (*non religiose quaerunt, quaerunt, invenientes*). The addition of the adverb *religiose* adds a nuance to the act of seeking: this not only strengthens *impiam superbiam* (which also has the effect of enhancing the theme-text of pride), it also quotes a particular use of *quaerere* in *Conf. 5.3.5* which will be discussed next. This is not the only foretaste of *Conf. 5.3.5*: the words *volatilia, pisces* and *pecora* are echoed in the following paragraph as well.

Conf. 5.3.5 starts off with a strong quotation of the theme-texts of ignorance and knowledge:

*sed non noverunt viam, verbum tuum, per quod fecisti ea quae numerant et ipsos qui numerant, et sensum quo cernunt quae numerant et mentem de qua numerant: et sapientiae tuae non est numerus.*¹⁴³

The words *numerare* and *numerus* occur five times in this single sentence, creating a very strong connection with the use of *numerus* in the previous paragraph, as well as creating a strong connection with *Conf. 1.1.1*, through both the use of the words *numerare* and *numerus*, and the phrase *sapientiae tuae non est numerus*. The verb *fecisti*, and its relationship with the theme-text of creation, amplifies this connection.

intelligence which enables them to inquire into these phenomena. If they discover that you have made them, they do not give themselves to you so that you may preserve what you have made, nor do they slay in your honor those selves of their own making, nor immolate their high-flown pride as though it were a sacrifice of birds, nor make into an offering of fish that curiosity whereby they walk the secret pathways of the deep, nor sacrifice their self-indulgent habits like beasts of the field, so that you, O God, who are a devouring fire, may consume their dead ambitions and re-create the seeks for eternal life.”

¹⁴³ *Conf. 5.3.5*: “They do not know him who is the Way, your Word through whom you made those very things they are reckoning, together with themselves who do the reckoning, and the senses with which they perceive the things they reckon, and the mind with which they reckon; yet your wisdom is beyond reckoning.”

The phrase *non noverunt hanc viam* is repeated three times in *Conf.* 5.3.5. The theme-text of ignorance, made very prominent by this repetition, is expanded and a very strong intertextual relationship with *Romans* is created:

sed non noverunt viam, verbum tuum, per quod fecisti ea quae numerant et ipsos qui numerant, et sensum quo cernunt quae numerant et mentem de qua numerant: et sapientiae tuae non est numerus. ipse autem unigenitus factus est nobis sapientia et iustitia et sanctificatio, et numeratus est inter nos, et solvit tributum Caesari.

non noverunt hanc viam qua descendant ad illum a se et per eum ascendant ad eum.

*non noverunt hanc viam, et putant se excelsos esse cum sideribus et lucidos, et ecce ruerunt in terram, et obscuratum est insipiens cor eorum. et multa vera de creatura dicunt et veritatem, creaturae artificem, non pie quaerunt, et ideo non inveniunt, aut si inveniunt, cognoscentes deum non sicut deum honorant aut gratias agunt, et evanescent in cogitationibus suis, et dicunt se esse sapientes sibi tribuendo quae tua sunt, ac per hoc student peruersissima caecitate etiam tibi tribuere quae sua sunt, mendacia scilicet in te conferentes, qui veritas es, et immutantes gloriam incorrupti dei in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis et volucrum et quadrupedum et serpentium, et convertunt veritatem tuam in mendacium, et colunt et serviunt creaturae potius quam creatori. (*Conf.* 5.3.5).¹⁴⁴*

¹⁴⁴ *Conf.* 5.3.5: "They do not know him who is the Way, your Word through whom you made those very things they are reckoning, together with themselves who do the reckoning, and the senses with which they perceive the things they reckon, and the mind with which they reckon; yet your wisdom is beyond reckoning. Your only-begotten Son has become our wisdom, our righteousness and our sanctification, yet he was reckoned as one of us and paid tribute to Caesar. They do not know him as the Way whereby they can climb down from their lofty selves to him, and thus by him ascend to him. Of this way they know nothing; they think themselves exalted to the stars and brilliant. But they have crashed down to earth and their foolish hearts are darkened. Many true statements do they make about creation, but they do not find the Truth who is artificer of creation because they do not seek him with reverence. Or, if they do find him and recognize God, they do not honor him as God or give him thanks; their reasoning grows unsound as they claim to be wise and arrogate themselves what is yours. This in turn leads them into an extreme of blind perversity, where they will even ascribe to you

The strong resemblance to *Rom.* 1:21-25 is evident:

invisibilia enim dei a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur, et sempiterna eius virtus et divinitas, ut sint inexcusabiles, quia cognoscentes deum, non ut deum glorificaverunt aut gratias egerunt; sed evanuerunt in cogitationibus suis et obscuratum est insipiens cor eorum, dicentes enim se esse sapientes stulti facti sunt. et immutaverunt gloriam incorruptibilis dei in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis, et volucrum et quadrupedum et serpentium. propter hoc tradidit illos deus in concupiscentias cordis eorum, in immunditiam. qui transmutaverunt veritatem dei in mendacium, et coluerunt et servierunt creaturae, potius quam creatori, qui est benedictus in saecula. (Rom. 1:21-25).¹⁴⁵

Overlapping this intertextual relationship is another intertextual relationship, which has threads in both *Rom.* 1:21-25 and *Conf.* 5.3.5: also *Wisdom of Solomon*, is woven into the fabric of the text here, allowing for particularly complex interactions between these three texts. The interaction between *Wisdom of Solomon* and *Romans* is particularly strong: similar language is used and similar themes are treated¹⁴⁶. In order to demonstrate the complex potential interaction between these three texts, I first investigate the intertextual relationship between *Rom.* 1:18-32 and *Wisdom* 13 in the following paragraphs before I return to *Conf.* 5.3.5.

what is theirs, blaming you, who are Truth, for their own lies, and changing the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of corruptible humans, or birds or four-footed beasts or crawling things. They distort truth into a lie, and they worship and serve the creature instead of the creator."

¹⁴⁵ *Rom.* 1:21-25: "[F]or though they knew God, they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking, and their senseless minds were darkened. Claiming to be wise, they became fools; and they exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling a mortal human being or birds or four-footed animals or reptiles. Therefore God gave them up in the lusts of their hearts to impurity, to the degrading of their bodies among themselves, because they exchanged the truth about God for a lie and worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed forever!"

¹⁴⁶ Linebaugh discusses this issue at length in his article "Announcing the Human: Rethinking the Relationship Between *Wisdom of Solomon* 13–15 and *Romans* 1.18–2.11" (2011). In it he traces the scholars who have identified similarities between these two texts and concludes that these scholars all roughly agree that "*Rom* 1.18-2.11 stands as a compressed but theologically faithful re-presentation of *Wisdom of Solomon* 13-15" (2011: 215).

Rom. 1:18-32 is often considered one section by scholars, often called the “indictment¹⁴⁷”. The speaker-text begins with an attack on the vices of those who were not able to fully comprehend God and worship him as God. The first part deals with the inability of these men to perceive God¹⁴⁸:

Ἀποκαλύπτεται γὰρ ὀργὴ θεοῦ ἀπ’ οὐρανοῦ ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἀσέβειαν καὶ ἀδικίαν ἀνθρώπων τῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατεχόντων, διότι τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ φανερόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς· ὁ θεὸς γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐφανερώσεν. τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου τοῖς ποιήμασιν νοούμενα καθορᾶται, ἢ τε αἴδιος αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ θεϊότης, εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἀναπολογήτους (*Rom.* 1:18-20).¹⁴⁹

This passage shares similarities with another “indictment” passage in *Wisdom of Solomon* 13:1-9:

Μάταιοι μὲν γὰρ πάντες ἄνθρωποι φύσει, οἷς παρῆν θεοῦ ἀγνωσία καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὀρωμένων ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἴσχυσαν εἰδέναί τὸν ὄντα οὔτε τοῖς ἔργοις προσέχοντες ἐπέγνωσαν τὸν τεχνίτην, ἀλλ’ ἢ πῦρ ἢ πνεῦμα ἢ ταχινὸν ἀέρα ἢ κύκλον ἀστρῶν ἢ βίαιον ὕδωρ ἢ φωστῆρας οὐρανοῦ πρυτάνεις κόσμου θεοὺς ἐνόμισαν. ὧν εἰ μὲν τῇ καλλονῇ τερπόμενοι ταῦτα θεοὺς ὑπελάμβανον, γνώτωσαν πόσω τούτων ὁ δεσπότης ἐστὶ βελτίων, ὁ γὰρ τοῦ κάλλους γενεσιάρχης ἔκτισεν αὐτά· εἰ δὲ δύναμιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν ἐκπλαγέντες, νοησάτωσαν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν πόσω ὁ κατασκευάσας αὐτὰ δυνατώτερός ἐστιν· ἐκ γὰρ μεγέθους καὶ καλλονῆς κτισμάτων ἀναλόγως

¹⁴⁷ So called by Song (2004: 92) and Stowers (1981: 79). Campbell (1999: 234) uses the term “indictment” to refer to the traditional reading of *Rom.* 1:18-3:20.

¹⁴⁸ The Greek is quoted here as in earlier instances where the primary focus is the interpretation of a passage from *Romans*, as well as to demonstrate the similarity with *Wisdom*.

¹⁴⁹ *Rom.* 1:18-21: “For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and wickedness of those who by their wickedness suppress the truth. For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. Ever since the creation of the world his eternal power and divine nature, invisible though they are, have been understood and seen through the things he has made. So they are without excuse.”

ὁ γενεσιουργὸς αὐτῶν θεωρεῖται. ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπὶ τούτοις μέμψις ἐστὶν ὀλίγη, καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ τάχα πλανῶνται θεὸν ζητοῦντες καὶ θέλοντες εὐρεῖν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῦ ἀναστρεφόμενοι διερευνῶσιν καὶ πείθονται τῇ ὄψει, ὅτι καλὰ τὰ βλεπόμενα. πάλιν δ' οὐδ' αὐτοὶ συγγνωστοί· εἰ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ἴσχυσαν εἰδέναι ἵνα δύνωνται στοχάσασθαι τὸν αἰῶνα, τὸν τούτων δεσπότην πῶς τάχιον οὐχ εὔρον; (*Wis.* 13:1-9).¹⁵⁰

Several scholars have noted a relationship between *Rom.* 1:18-32 and *Wis.* 13 but scholars differ considerably regarding the nature of this relationship. The relationship was first documented by Eduard Grafe in *Das Verhältnis der paulinischen Schriften zur Sapientia Salamonis* published in 1892. According to Norden (1913: 128), the author of *Romans* had this very passage (*Wis.* 12:27 ff., including *Wis.* 13:1-9) in mind when writing *Rom.* 1:18-32. According to Linebaugh (2011: 215), the position that most modern commentaries follow is that *Rom.* 1:18-32 “reactivates” the polemic against Gentile idolatry present in *Wis.* 13.

There are several textual threads that can be traced in *Wis.* 13:1-9 and *Rom.* 1:18-32 which also may impact on the interpretation of the *Confessions*. The first is the theme-text of foolishness, evoked by words such as μάταιοι (*Wis.* 13:1), ἐματαιώθησαν (*Rom.* 1:21), ἐσκοτίσθη (*Rom.* 1:21) and ἐμωράνθησαν (*Rom.* 1:22). The second is the theme-text of knowledge, which can be quoted by words such as ἐπέγνωσαν,

¹⁵⁰ *Wis.* 13:1-9: “For all people who were ignorant of God were foolish by nature; and they were unable from the good things that are seen to know the one who exists, nor did they recognize the artisan while paying heed to his works; but they supposed that either fire or wind or swift air, or the circle of the stars, or turbulent water, or the luminaries of heaven were the gods that rule the world. If through delight in the beauty of these things people assumed them to be gods, let them know how much better than these is their Lord, for the author of beauty created them. And if people were amazed at their power and working, let them perceive from them how much more powerful is the one who formed them. For from the greatness and beauty of created things comes a corresponding perception of their Creator. Yet these people are little to be blamed, for perhaps they go astray while seeking God and desiring to find him. For while they live among his works, they keep searching, and they trust in what they see, because the things that are seen are beautiful. Yet again, not even they are to be excused; for if they had the power to know so much that they could investigate the world, how did they fail to find sooner the Lord of these things?”

γνώτωσαν, νοησάτωσαν (*Wisdom*), τὸ γνωστόν, νοούμενα, γνόντες (*Romans*). Another text connected to this is the theme-text of perception: ὀρωμένων, εἰδέναι, θεωρεῖται, τὰ βλεπόμενα (*Wisdom*), φανερόν, ἐφανερώσεν, καθορᾶται (*Romans*). The theme-text of perception is slightly less prominent in *Romans* than in *Wisdom*¹⁵¹. Furthermore, the nature of perception in *Romans* is essentially passive: the verbs are either verbs of revelation (in the case of φανερόν and ἐφανερώσεν), in what may be called a forced perception, or grammatically passive (in the case of καθορᾶται). In *Wisdom*, verbs of perception are both in the passive (ὁ γενεσιουργὸς αὐτῶν θεωρεῖται) and in the active (πάντες ἄνθρωποι... οὐκ ἴχυσαν εἰδέναι τὸν ὄντα). While the theme-text of seeking and finding seems absent in *Rom. 1:18-32*, this theme-text can be traced in *Wisdom 13*: ζητοῦντες καὶ θέλοντες εὐρεῖν, διερευνῶσιν, οὐχ εὔρον. However, this theme-text seems absent in *Rom. 1:18-32*. Added to this is another theme-text, that of natural theology. This text is evoked strongly by particular passages:

Μάταιοι μὲν γὰρ πάντες ἄνθρωποι φύσει, οἷς παρῆν θεοῦ ἀγνωσία καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὀρωμένων ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἴχυσαν εἰδέναι τὸν ὄντα οὔτε τοῖς ἔργοις προσέχοντες ἐπέγνωσαν τὸν τεχνίτην (*Wis. 13:1*).¹⁵²

διότι τὸ γνωστόν τοῦ θεοῦ φανερόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς· ὁ θεὸς γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐφανερώσεν. τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου τοῖς ποιήμασιν νοούμενα καθορᾶται, ἢ τε ἀίδιος αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ θειότης (*Rom. 1:19-20*).¹⁵³

Natural theology, or natural revelation, is the argument that knowledge of God is obtainable through the observation of his works, i.e. creation, or, as Collins puts it, “the attempt to arrive at the knowledge of God by reflection on the natural order”

¹⁵¹ There are four verbs of perception in *Wisdom*, compared to the three in *Romans*.

¹⁵² See footnote 150.

¹⁵³ See footnote 149.

(1998: 3). An investigation of nature should therefore lead to the conclusion that God exists. According to Collins, the author of *Wisdom* subscribed to such a natural theology and he cites *Wis.* 13:1-9 as the prime example of this thesis (1998: 6). In *Romans*, the author/speaker-text uses the words of revealing, φανερόν, ἐφανερώσεν, to express this notion. It is therefore quite logical to assume that the author/speaker-text of *Romans* also subscribes to such a natural theology. However, this theme-text is resisted by a number of other texts present in *Rom.* 1:18-32.

The ever present interlocutor must be seriously considered here as a potential speaker-text. Because of the unstable nature of the speaker-text in *Romans* due to its relationship with the diatribe and the characteristics of the interlocutor, the assumption that *Rom.* 1:18-32 is spoken in the voice of the author-text, i.e. Παῦλος, may be resisted. If *Rom.* 1:18-32 is considered to be spoken in the voice of an imaginary interlocutor, the critic may choose not to associate the texts read in it (including the intertextual relationship with *Wisdom of Solomon*) with the author-text, or interpret it as an inversion of the author-text's position (as a directly opposing philosophy). However, the strength of the voice of the interlocutor should be evaluated before such an interpretation can be made.

The notion that *Rom.* 1:18-32 is not "spoken" by the author of *Romans* is not novel. Campbell argues that this passage is, in fact, a cameo of a Jewish Christian elenchus or censure (1999: 248). Campbell casts the speech here in the voice of a Jewish Christian who judges an unrighteous pagan. Campbell bases this observation on, amongst other things, the rhetorical turn which occurs in *Rom.* 2:1-5¹⁵⁴:

¹⁵⁴ Jewett also recognizes a "vivid rhetorical shift into diatribal style" here (2007: 193). Jewett, however, casts *Rom.* 1:18-32 in the voice of Paul, not an interlocutor.

Διὸ ἀναπολόγητος εἶ, ὃ ἄνθρωπε πᾶς ὁ κρίνων· ἐν ᾧ γὰρ κρίνεις τὸν ἕτερον, σεαυτὸν κατακρίνεις, τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ πράσσεις ὁ κρίνων (*Rom.* 2:1).¹⁵⁵

This apostrophe Campbell considers to be cast in the voice of the author (i.e. Παῦλος) (1999: 248). The sudden apostrophe does introduce a significant disruption to the text. The use of the word ἀναπολόγητος in *Rom.* 2:1 mirrors its use in *Rom.* 1:20, as well as the phrase οὐδ' αὐτοὶ συγγνωστοί in *Wis.* 13:8. This, combined with the censorious tone, would suggest that no change of speaker-text has occurred in *Rom.* 2:1. However, there are several aspects which resist this. The identity of the ἄνθρωπος addressed in *Rom.* 2:1 is unclear. The sudden change from a plural subject in *Rom.* 1:32 (οἵτινες... ἐπιγνόντες) to a singular (ἀναπολόγητος εἶ, ὃ ἄνθρωπε) is jarring. Furthermore, the topic of *Rom.* 2:1 is a criticism of those who judge, whereas *Rom.* 1:18-32 was an indictment, or judging. If the speaker-text of these two passages is the same, he/she is not very consistent; at the very least, he/she is hypocritical, being guilty of the judgement he/she condemns in *Rom.* 2:1.

Another aspect which can be interpreted as ironic in this passage is the use of negative theology to describe God, specifically the words τα ἀόρατα which refer to the invisible qualities of God¹⁵⁶. τα ἀόρατα is the subject of the verb καθορᾶται in *Rom.* 1:20, and the juxtaposition of these words with a shared stem, from ὁράω, to see, causes some tension in the passage. Given the possibility of two interpretations, casting this verse in the voice of the serious teacher means that this could be regarded as a theological, if poetic statement: it is possible to see the invisible creator, or the invisible aspects of him, through the visible things which he created. However, if the paradox (being able to see the invisible) is considered in the light of the voice of the interlocutor, the author-text may be deliberately juxtaposing these

¹⁵⁵ *Rom.* 2:1: "Therefore you have no excuse, whoever you are, when you judge others; for in passing judgment on another you condemn yourself, because you, the judge, are doing the very same things."

¹⁵⁶ According to Palmer, negative theology was a feature of Middle Platonist thought, as well as certain later Platonists, including Plotinus (1983: 235-236). See Palmer (1983) for a discussion of Middle Platonist negative theology and its influence on Greek apologists of the second century.

two concepts (visible and invisible) in order to demonstrate the fault in the interlocutor's argument, that is, it is not possible for an invisible God to be known through mere observation of the things he has created¹⁵⁷. The interpretation of either possibility is dependent on how the potential presence of the interlocutor or an alternative speaker-text other than the author-text in this passage is considered.

If the words of *Rom.* 1:18-32 and *Rom.* 2:1 are cast in two different voices, the question as to the identities/natures of these two voices is raised. The author-text, the interlocutor, the reader, or other possible speaker-texts are all potential candidates. If Campbell's suggestion is followed and *Rom.* 1:18-32 is cast in the voice of an opposing interlocutor (Campbell's Jewish Christian teacher) and *Rom.* 2:1 in the voice of the author/speaker-text, certain interesting interpretive conclusions are possible. Firstly, the theme-text of natural theology in *Rom.* 1:18-32 is either unimportant to the author-text or the author-text is explicitly against such a notion. The strong relationship between *Rom.* 1:18-32 and *Wis.* 13:1-9 would also potentially evoke a resistance between the author/speaker-text of *Rom.* 2:1 and *Wisdom of Solomon*, and the philosophy embodied in *Wisdom*, particularly the strong theme-text of natural theology. It would be possible to argue (as Campbell does) that the author-text in *Romans* does not subscribe to a natural theology.

To limit the interpretation of *Rom.* 1:18-32 and *Rom.* 2:1 to one possibility would be to undermine the complexity of the Text. I therefore consider both possibilities as possible interpretations: that *Rom.* 1:18-32 is spoken in the voice of an interlocutor and in the voice of the author-text. I allow that the relationship between *Rom.* 1:18-32 and *Wis.* 13:1-9 is dynamic, i.e. that *Wisdom* in *Rom.* 1:18-32 could be interpreted as both affirming and contrasting. The author-text of *Romans* therefore both subscribes

¹⁵⁷ Wolter offers another interpretation: he recognizes the paradox in this passage, but argues that invisible characteristics of God can be seen, not through physical eyes, but through the mind (Wolter, 2014: 138-139).

to the notion of a natural theology, and does not, and where he does not, he either does not consider it important, or actively opposes such a notion.

It is important to consider the possibility that this complexity is, in turn, quoted by *Conf.* 5.3.5, through the intertextual relationship between these texts; the possibilities of this relationship, however, require careful exploration. The multifaceted nature of the interpretation of *Rom.* 1:18-32 will result in a polyvalent interpretation of the relationship between *Conf.* 5.3.5 and *Rom.* 1:18-32. Furthermore, the relationship between *Wis.* 13:1-9 and *Conf.* 5.3.5 will add further polyvalence to the interpretation.

The theme-texts that were identified earlier may provide a perspective on the nature of the relationship between *Conf.* 5.3.5 and the other two works in discussion. The theme-text of foolishness, as identified in *Wisdom* 13, can be evoked by the words *insipiens* and *evanescent* (*Conf.* 5.3.5). In the latter example, a relationship with *Wis.* 13:1-9 is strong: the word used for μάταιοι in the Vulgate is *vani*. The word *obscuratum* is a translation of the word ἐσκοτίσθη and also has the force of foolishness here. The theme-text of knowledge (and its inversion, ignorance) is thus strong here. The theme-text of perception, however, is less prominent in *Conf.* 5.3.5. Only the word *caecitate* seems to hint towards this theme-text, and if so, negatively. The theme-text of seeking and finding is present here too: *non pie quaerunt, et ideo non inveniunt, aut si inveniunt, cognoscentes deum non sicut deum honorant aut gratias agunt* (*Conf.* 5.3.5). However, the verb *quaerunt* now has an ethical nuance, through the adverb *pie*. As demonstrated, the theme-text of seeking and finding is not strongly present in *Rom.* 1:18-32, but rather in *Wis.* 13:1-9, establishing an even stronger relationship between *Conf.* 5.3.5 and *Wisdom*. This relationship is further amplified by the strong quotation of *Wis.* 13:9 in *Conf.* 5.3.3 described in Chapter 6.4. The theme-text of natural theology is present through the intertextual relationships with *Rom.* 1:18-32 and *Wis.* 13:1. However, other than this relationship, *Conf.* 5.3.5 does not demonstrate much further strengthening of this theme-text.

Given the strong, complex relationships between *Conf.* 5.3.5, *Rom.* 1:18-32 and *Wis.* 13:1-9, the interpretations that may be generated are equally complex and dynamic. The speaker-text is an aspect that is particularly disrupted by the intertextual relationships here, not only through the potential presence of the interlocutor, but also through the competing voices of authority represented by the author-texts of *Romans* and *Wisdom*. The author/speaker-text of *Wisdom*, whether he is assigned the name Solomon, Pseudo-Solomon or any other such term, is strongly associated with the textual history of the character Solomon. Thus, it is possible to ascribe to this author-text the qualities of wisdom and knowledge attributed to the literary character of Solomon. However, the assignment of Pseudo-Solomon¹⁵⁸ also has the potential to undermine or resist such attribution. The theme-text of wisdom, knowledge and understanding can nevertheless be strongly associated with the author/speaker-text of *Wisdom*, whether such qualities could be attributed to the author/speaker-text directly or not. The relationship between the author/speaker-text of *Wisdom* and that of *Romans* is also complex. The mythology surrounding the character of Solomon, expressed in literature, particularly biblical literature, ascribes a certain authority to him, and by extension, to the author/speaker-text of *Wisdom*. The author-text of *Romans* can be attributed to Παῦλος, who is equally considered authoritative within certain religious and cultural circles. These equally authoritative juggernauts provide a certain power struggle in *Conf.* 5.3.5: to whose authority does the reader defer? As critic, I have the privilege of investigating both possibilities.

If the authority of *Wisdom* is considered to be the stronger force here, the theme-texts more strongly associated with *Wisdom* may be regarded as dominant. The theme-text of a natural theology therefore becomes more dominant and the indictment against the pagan even stronger. The initial context in *Conf.* 5.3.5 does not seem to resist such an interpretation: the author/speaker-text is directing an invective against the

¹⁵⁸ As done by Winston in his commentary (1981).

philosophers regarding their inability to recognize God, despite their ability to accurately predict astronomical phenomena. However, several aspects of the text pull against such a quick association.

Firstly, the indictment of animal worship, present strongly in both *Rom.* 1:18-32 and *Wis.* 13:1-9, seems out of place in *Conf.* 5.3.5: no mention has been made hitherto about animal worship regarding the philosophers or any other potential subject. The logic behind this sudden indictment is puzzling. At first glance, it seems to serve little purpose other than to strengthen the intertextual relationship between *Conf.* 5.3.5 and *Rom.* 1:18-32, and by extension, *Wis.* 13:1-9. A potential connection can be made with *Conf.* 5.3.4: *et (non) trucidant exaltationes suas sicut volatilia, et curiositates suas sicut pisces maris quibus perambulant secretas semitas abyssi, et luxurias suas sicut pecora campi*. However, the sacrifice of animals described here and the worship of animals, as is found in *Rom.* 1:23 and *Wis.* 13:10-14, are not the same. Furthermore, the sacrifice of these animals is treated as a metaphor of a sacrifice of pride (*exaltationes*), curiosity (*curiositates*) and indulgence (*luxurias*) to God. A possible theme of *mundus inversus* could be extrapolated in *Conf.* 5.3.5: perhaps the point is to demonstrate the consequences of the pursuits of the philosophers and their kind, i.e. that it leads to such nonsense as the worship of creatures that were once, or rather should be, sacrificed. This would be in line with the indictment in *Wis.* 13:1-9. However, the primary focus of *Wis.* 13 is not only the practice of animal worship, but rather idolatry, particularly in the form of animal idols (*Wis.* 13:10-14).

The theme-text of natural theology, as developed by *Wis.* 13, is also resisted in various ways by *Conf.* 5.3.5. The weak presence of the theme-text of perception, a rather important aspect of natural theology, reduces the strength of the theme-text of natural theology strongly associated with the notion of perception here. The strength of the theme-text of natural theology may be strengthened by the theme-text of seeking and finding in *Conf.* 5.3.5, which it shares with *Rom.* 1:21: *non pie quaerunt, et*

ideo non inveniunt, aut si inveniunt, cognoscentes deum non sicut deum honorant aut gratias agunt (*Conf.* 5.3.5).

While *Rom.* 1:21 may share an intertextual relationship with this theme-text, it does not necessarily imply the notion of natural theology. Furthermore, the theme-texts of seeking and finding are already associated with a text which would resist the theme-text of natural theology: *Isaiah* 65:1. The disjunction between the act of seeking and finding, as well as the fact that the acquisition of the knowledge of God is placed directly within the domain of the personal revelation of God, all resist the theme-text of natural revelation, which would lead to the interpretation that the author-text of *Romans* does not subscribe to it. *Isaiah* 65:1 is only one possible text associated with the theme-texts of seeking and finding. The association of *Isaiah* 65:1 with *Rom.* 10:20 also introduces a certain tension for the interpretation of *Conf.* 5.3.5: the author/speaker-text of *Rom.* 10:20 cites *Isaiah* explicitly, suggesting that the author/speaker-text of *Romans* subscribes to *Isaiah's* statements. This would lend further credence to the notion that the author-text is not speaking in *Rom.* 1:18-32, since considerable resistance to the notion of the author-text endorsing natural theology accompanies the quotation of *Isaiah* 65:1.

Furthermore, the relationship between *Conf.* 5.3.5 and *Wis.* 13:1-9, specifically regarding natural theology, is not particularly clear or simple. No specific text dominates here. If *Romans* is considered to be the dominant authority in *Conf.* 5.3.5, the possible relationships that may stem from the unstable speaker-text of *Rom.* 1:18-32 should also be considered.

Consider the speaker-text of *Conf.* 5.3.5. In *Conf.* 5.3.3, the speaker-text begins by describing a particular episode, namely the speaker-text meeting with Faustus. Here the association of the speaker-text with the author-text is particularly strong. The Augustinus at the time of writing the *Confessions* would be a strong candidate for the role of speaker-text. However, as the speaker-text begins to describe the

philosophers, he initiates an invective against them, beginning in *Conf.* 5.3.4. A different voice can be heard here, a different person-text: Augustinus, perhaps, but characterised differently. The censorious tone, amplified by the intertextual relationships with *Wis.* 13:1-9 and *Rom.* 1:18-32, contrasts with the narrative tone of *Conf.* 5.3.3. It is the force of *Rom.* 1:18-32 that begins to grow louder in *Conf.* 5.3.5. The censorious speaker-text can be strongly identified with the speaker-texts of *Wis.* 13:1-9 and *Rom.* 1:18:32. The voices of *Rom.* 1:18-32 then begin to dominate from *obscuratum est insipiens cor eorum*: this effect crescendos from *cognoscentes deum* until *creatori*. The voices of Augustinus and the author-text become less dominating, yet are still heard.

If the voices of *Rom.* 1:18-32 are strong here, the critic may consider what they have to say. If the possibility that *Rom.* 1:18-32 is written unironically is considered, i.e. that it is not the interlocutor's voice, but rather the author-text's voice speaking here, then this can be aligned with the opinions of the speaker-text of *Conf.* 5.3.5. The force of the invective here is therefore enhanced: the speaker-text is conducting a serious criticism of the faults of the philosophers regarding their failure to find God.

However, if another possibility is considered, that *Rom.* 1:18-32 was written ironically, as *prosopopoeia*, in the voice of an interlocutor, the aforementioned interpretation is resisted. The irony bleeds into the interpretation of *Conf.* 5.3.5 and inverts the previous interpretation: the speaker-text in *Conf.* 5.3.5 becomes shattered, speaking in two distinct, conflicting modes, critical and ironic. This irony is amplified by several other features of the text. The quotation of *Isaiah* 65:1 in *Rom.* 10:20, as described earlier causes a disruption of the author/speaker-text of *Romans*, which spills into *Conf.* 5.3.5. The instability of the speaker-text(s) of *Rom.* 1:18-32 and *Rom.* 10:20 contributes to the instability of the speaker-text in *Conf.* 5.3.5. The lack of strong support for a belief in natural theology in *Conf.* 5.3.3-5, particularly the weakness of the theme-text of perception, is further support for this instability. The censure of animal worship at the end of *Conf.* 5.3.5, without a suitable object, only

serves to amplify this disruption of the speaker-text. Unlike *Rom.* 1:18-32, *Conf.* 5.3.5 is not followed by an apostrophe, at least not an obvious one¹⁵⁹. The potential dialogue continues in *Conf.* 5.4.7.

6.5. *Conf.* 5.4.7

In *Conf.* 5.4.7, God is addressed and asked a question, but his answer is already assumed by the speaker-text, through the interrogative particle *numquid*:

*numquid, domine deus veritatis, quisquis novit ista, iam placet tibi? (Conf. 5.4.7).*¹⁶⁰

In *Conf.* 5.4.7, the speaker-text also insists that knowledge of the cosmos is less important than knowledge of God:

*infelix enim homo qui scit illa omnia, te autem nescit; beatus autem qui te scit, etiamsi illa nesciat. (Conf. 5.4.7).*¹⁶¹

This passage does not rule out a belief in natural theology, but it offers no support for it either. Instead, the speaker-text argues that observation of the cosmos is irrelevant or even unnecessary for acquiring a knowledge of God. This would align itself with the ironic interpretation of *Rom.* 1:18-32 where the speaker-text of *Rom.* 1:18-32 does not consider the position of the author-text of *Wis.* 13:1-9 to be important (or possibly deems it wrong). The connection with *Rom.* 1:18-32 (*Rom.* 1:21 in particular) is strengthened again in the next sentence of *Conf.* 5.4.7:

*qui vero et te et illa novit, non propter illa beatior, sed propter te solum beatus est, si cognoscens te sicut te glorificet et gratias agat, et non evanescat in cogitationibus suis. (Conf. 5.4.7).*¹⁶²

¹⁵⁹ *Conf.* 5.3.6 describes the author/speaker-text comparing the assertions of Mani he had read and the inconsistencies he picked up. There is no apostrophe to another figure/person-text.

¹⁶⁰ *Conf.* 5.4.7: "Lord God of truth, it surely cannot be that simply knowing these things renders a person pleasing to you?"

¹⁶¹ *Conf.* 5.4.7: "Unhappy is anyone who knows it all but does not know you, whereas one who knows you is blessed, even if ignorant of all these".

Given the disruption caused by the interaction of *Conf.* 5.3.5 with *Rom.* 1:18-32 and *Wis.* 13:1-9, this passage in *Conf.* 5.4.7 resists the old contexts and instead adopts a new context: knowledge of the universe does not lead to knowledge of God, nor is it better to know both¹⁶³. The criticism is here less of the lack of knowing God through observation of the universe than of unsound reasoning, that is, ignorance is better than incorrect conclusions. It is in the latter that the subject of the criticism becomes more complex: the philosophers, after all, were accurate in their calculations. However, it is the Manichaeans who are more likely to be criticised for unsound reasoning in the *Confessions*, which is the topic of the following section *Conf.* 5.5.8 – *Conf.* 5.7.13.

6.6. Conclusion

The implications of the observations made above are difficult to summarize. The texts woven into in *Conf.* 5.3.5 clash and resist each other, neither one seeming to dominate, neither one providing a monological voice of authority. The ambiguity here should therefore be allowed to remain: the relationship between the author-text and the speaker-text of *Conf.* 5.3.3-5.3.5 is complex and dynamic: there are multiple layers and each layer contributes to a different nuance in the process of interpretation. Instead of seeking a final, monological answer to this passage, I permit myself to allow the polyvalence and allow the text its shattered nature. This polyvalence is further expanded through the intertextual relationships that suffuse subsequent passages of the *Confessions* where *Romans* is quoted, particularly in *Conf.* 7.

¹⁶² *Conf.* 5.4.7: “Nor is anyone who knows both you and them more blessed for knowing them, but blessed on your account alone, provided that such a person recognizes you as you are, and glorifies you and give you thanks, and does not drift off into unsound reasoning.”

¹⁶³ Kristeva describes such destruction of the “old” context and the creation of the “new” context as transposition. See chapter 2.2.6.3.

The rest of book 5 lacks further strong formal similarities with *Romans*. Book 6 of the *Confessions* is curiously also lacking strong intertextual relationships with *Romans*, in comparison with other books of the *Confessions*. Verheijen identifies a mere three quotations of *Romans* in book 6, all of which are short, no more than four words¹⁶⁴ (1981: 288). While these texts have the potential to draw the force of *Romans* into the text, the volume of the texts is not loud, given the small quantity of text that would have to create the intertextual relationship and the use of texts from *Romans* that appear as isolated instances. A significant change occurs in Book 7 and 8, where an abundance of similarities to *Romans* can be identified.

¹⁶⁴ *Conf.* 6.2.2 *fervens spiritu* (*Rom.* 12:11); *Conf.* 6.5.8 *cum essemus infirmi* (*Rom.* 5:6); *Conf.* 6.6.9 *qui es super omnia* (*Rom.* 9:5).

Chapter 7 *Confessions* 7.9.13-15

7.1. Introduction

Book 7 of the *Confessions* demonstrates very strong intertextual relationships with the *Letter to the Romans*. The book starts with the author-text's description of his break from materialistic notions of God (as held by the Manichaeans), his search for the cause of evil, and his rejection of astrology. The narrative continues with a significant episode which scholars often call the intellectual conversion¹⁶⁵. This episode presents arguably one of the strongest examples of an intertextual relationship with the *Letter to the Romans*, as well as significant relationships with other biblical texts. In *Conf.* 7.9.13-15, the author/speaker-text narrates an account of his reading of some books by certain Platonists. Subsequently he discusses the effect these books had on him and what he took from these books.

7.2. *Conf.* 7.9.13-14

Conf. 7.9.13 begins with a sentence in which God is addressed via a verb in the second person singular; the agency of the addressee, God, can be perceived as a very strong force in this passage:

et primo volens ostendere mihi quam resistas superbis, humilibus autem dat gratiam, et quanta misericordia tua demonstrata sit hominibus via humilitatis, quod verbum tuum caro factum est et habitavit inter homines, procurasti mihi per quendam hominem immanissimo typho turgidum quosdam platoniorum libros ex graeca lingua in latinam versos... (*Conf.* 7.9.13)¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁵ Brian Dobell uses the term in his book on the same topic, *Augustine's Intellectual Conversion: The Journey from Platonism to Christianity* (2012). O'Meara describes the conversion in book 7 (including the reading of Paul in *Conf.* 7.20.26-7.21.27) as the *intellectual* conversion, which he distinguishes from the *moral* conversion in book 8 (1980: 131).

¹⁶⁶ *Conf.* 7.9.13: "You wanted to show me first and foremost how you thwart the proud but give grace to the humble, and with what immense mercy on your part the way of humility was demonstrated to use when you Word was made flesh and dwelt among men and women; and so through a certain

The theme-text of pride evoked by *resistas superbis*, and the intertextual relationships with *Prov.* 3:34, *1 Pet.* 5:5 and *Jas.* 4:6, is clearly present in the passage. This also evokes strong links with all the texts previously connected with this theme-text, in particular, *Conf.* 1.1.1, *Conf.* 3 and *Conf.* 5.3.3-5¹⁶⁷. The theme-text is further amplified by the words *typho turgidum*, and the semic inversion, humility, evoked by *humilibus* and *humilitatis*. The addressee, God, “procured” for the speaker-text books through a certain person. Much is left to the imagination in this passage. The identity of the man is left unknown; the only information provided is that he was “grossly swollen with pride”. The books themselves are also unidentified, the reader is only informed that their subject matter is ‘Platonist’ or that their author(s) are Platonists. What follows in *Conf.* 7.9.13 is, in a sense, a description of the speaker-text’s reading:

et ibi legi, non quidem his verbis sed hoc idem omnino multis et multiplicibus suaderi rationibus, quod in principio erat verbum...¹⁶⁸

The speaker-text is careful to explain that he is not reproducing the exact words in the text, but the ideas contained there. The speaker-text also contrasts what he found in the books to what he did not find. The ideas that the speaker-text puts down to describe what he found and what he did not find in these books have an immensely strong intertextual relationship with *John* 1:1-14, as well as other texts. The comparison between *Conf.* 7.9.13-14 and the texts with which it demonstrates a strong intertextual relationship is shown below:

Conf. 7.9.13-14

Intertextual Relationship

et ibi legi, non quidem his verbis sed hoc John 1:1-10: in principio erat verbum, et

man grossly swollen with pride you provided me with some books by the Platonists, translated from the Greek into Latin.”

¹⁶⁷ These connections have been discussed in Chapters 4.3 and 6.4.

¹⁶⁸ *Conf.* 7.9.13: “In them I read (not that the same words were used, but precisely the same doctrine was taught, buttressed by many and various arguments) that *in the beginning was the Word...*”

idem omnino multis et multiplicibus suaderi rationibus, quod in principio erat verbum et verbum erat apud deum et deus erat verbum. hoc erat in principio apud deum. omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil. quod factum est in eo vita est, et vita erat lux hominum; et lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt. et quia hominis anima, quamvis testimonium perhibeat de lumine, non est tamen ipsa lumen, sed verbum deus est lumen verum, quod inluminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum. et quia in hoc mundo erat, et mundus per eum factus est, et mundus eum non cognovit.

*quia vero in sua propria venit et sui eum non receperunt, quotquot autem receperunt eum, dedit eis potestatem filios dei fieri credentibus in nomine eius, non ibi legi.*¹⁷⁰

*verbum erat apud deum, et deus erat verbum. hoc erat in principio apud deum. omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil. quod factum est in illo vita est, et vita erat lux hominum, et lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt. fuit homo missus a deo, cui nomen erat Iohannes; hic venit in testimonium, ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine, ut omnes crederent per illum. non erat ille lumen, sed ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine. erat lux vera quae inluminat omnem hominem venientem in mundum. in mundo erat, et mundus per eum factus est, et mundus eum non cognovit.*¹⁶⁹

*John 1:11-12: in sua propria venit, et sui eum non receperunt, quotquot autem receperunt eum, dedit eis potestatem filios dei fieri, his qui credunt in nomine eius*¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁹ *John 1:1-10: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things came into being through him, and without him not one thing came into being. What has come into being in him was life, and the life was the light of all people. The light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not overcome it. There was a man sent from God, whose name was John. He came as a witness to testify to the light, so that all might believe through him. He himself was not the light, but he came to testify to the light. The true light, which enlightens everyone, was coming into the world. He was in the world, and the world came into being through him; yet the world did not know him."*

¹⁷⁰ *Conf. 7.9.3: "In them I read (not that the same words were used, but precisely the same doctrine was taught, buttressed by many and various arguments) that in the beginning was the Word, and the*

item legi ibi quia verbum, deus, non ex carne, non ex sanguine non ex voluntate viri neque ex voluntate carnis, sed ex deo natus est; John 1:13: *qui non ex sanguinibus neque ex voluntate carnis neque ex voluntati viri sed ex deo nati sunt.*¹⁷²

sed quia verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis, non ibi legi. John 1:14: *et verbum caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis, et vidimus gloriam eius, gloriam quasi unigeniti a patre, plenum gratia et veritate.*¹⁷³

indagavi quippe in illis litteris varie dictum et multis modis quod sit filius in forma patris, non rapinam arbitratus esse aequalis deo, quia naturaliter idipsum est, sed quia semet ipsum exinanivit formam servi accipiens, in similitudinem hominum factus et habitu inventus ut homo, humilavit se factus oboediens usque ad Phil. 2:6-8: *cum in forma dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse aequalis deo, semet ipsum exinanivit formam servi accipiens, in similitudine hominum factus et habitu inventus ut homo. humilavit se, factus oboediens usque ad mortem crucis.*¹⁷⁴

Word was with God; he was God. He was with God in the beginning. Everything was made through him; nothing came to be without him. What was made is alive with his life, and that life was the light of humankind. The Light shines in the darkness, and the darkness has never been able to master it; and that the human soul, even though it bears testimony about the Light, is not itself the Light, but that God, the Word, is the true Light, which illumines every human person who comes into this world; and that he was in this world, a world made by him, but the world did not know him. But that he came to his own home, and his own people did not receive him; but to those who did receive him he gave power to become children of God: to those, that is, who believe in his name – none of this did I read there.”

¹⁷¹ John 1:11-12: “He came to what was his own, and his own people did not accept him. But to all who received him, who believed in his name, he gave power to become children of God,”

¹⁷² John 1:13: “who were born, not of blood or of the will of the flesh or of the will of man, but of God.”

¹⁷³ John 1:14: “And the Word became flesh and lived among us, and we have seen his glory, the glory as of a father’s only son, full of grace and truth.”

¹⁷⁴ Phil. 2:6-8: “who, though he was in the form of God, did not regard equality with God as something to be exploited, but emptied himself, taking the form of a slave, being born in human likeness. And being found in human form, he humbled himself and became obedient to the point of death—even death on a cross.”

mortem, mortem autem crucis:

*propter quod deus eum exaltavit a mortuis et donavit ei nomen quod est super omne nomen, ut in nomine Iesu omne genu flectatur caelestium terrestrium et infernorum, et omnis lingua confiteatur quia dominus Iesus in gloria est dei patris, non habent illi libri.*¹⁷⁵

*Phil. 2:9-11: propter quod et deus eum exaltavit et donavit ei nomen quod est super omne nomen, ut in nomine Iesu omne genu flectatur caelestium, terrestrium, et infernorum, et omnis lingua confiteatur quia dominus Iesus Christus in gloria est dei patris.*¹⁷⁶

quod enim ante omnia tempora et supra omnia tempora incommutabiliter manet unigenitus filius tuus coaeternus tibi, et quia de plenitudine eius accipiunt animae ut beatae sint, et quia participatione manentis in se sapientiae renovantur ut sapientes sint, est ibi;

*John 1:16: et de plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus, et gratiam pro gratia.*¹⁷⁷

*Wis. 7:27: et cum sit una, omnia potest; et in se permanens omnia innovat: et per nationes in animas sanctas se transfert; amicos Dei et prophetas constituit.*¹⁷⁸

quod autem secundum tempus pro impiis mortuus est, et filio tuo unico non infirmi essemus secundum tempus pro impiis

Rom. 5:6: ut quid enim Christus cum adhuc infirmi essemus secundum tempus pro impiis

¹⁷⁵ Conf. 7.9.14: "I also read in them that God, the Word, was born not of blood nor man's desire nor lust of the flesh, but of God; but that *the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us*, I did not read there. I certainly observed that in these writings it often stated, in a variety of ways, that the Son, being *in the form of God* the father, *deemed it no robbery to be equal to God*, because he is identical with him in nature. But that *he emptied himself and took on the form of a slave, and being made in the likeness of men was found in human form, that he humbled himself and was made obedient to the point of death, even death on a cross, which is why God raised him from the death and gave him a name above every other name, so that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, in heaven, on earth, or in the underworld, and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, in the glory of God the Father*, of this no mention was made in these books."

¹⁷⁶ Phil. 2:9-11: "Therefore God also highly exalted him and gave him the name that is above every name, so that at the name of Jesus every knee should bend, in heaven and on earth and under the earth, and every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father."

¹⁷⁷ John 1:16: "From his fullness we have all received, grace upon grace."

¹⁷⁸ Wis. 7:27: "Although she is but one, she can do all things, and while remaining in herself, she renews all things; in every generation she passes into holy souls and makes them friends of God, and prophets;"

*pepercisti, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidisti mortuus est?*¹⁸⁰

*eum, non est ibi.*¹⁷⁹

*Rom. 8:32: qui etiam filio suo non pepercit
sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum.*¹⁸¹

The simplest interpretation for the vast quantity of quotation here is that the speaker is comparing the content of one set of texts (the books of the Platonists) with others (primarily the gospel of John); the reader becomes aware of this only if the intertextual relationships are recognized by him/her. However, the gospel of John is not explicitly mentioned, and although the intertextual relationship between *Conf.* 7.9.13-14 and *John* 1:1-14 is extremely strong, arguably one of the strongest in the *Confessions*, the lack of an explicit mention allows a modicum of instability to creep into the interpretation. A further element that contributes to this disruption is the nature of the speaker-text here: if the person-text of Augustine is assumed to be the speaker-text here, the time at which this Augustine is encountered should be considered. If the “*ibi legi*” is taken literally, one possibility to be considered would be that the Augustine at the time of the events being described in *Conf.* 7.9.13-15 had come to this comparison at this time; the other possibility is that the Augustine at the time of writing the *Confessions* has made the connection in a retrospective comparison. A question is provoked by this potential duality: did the Augustine at the time of the events of *Conf.* 7.9.13-15 establish the comparison between the books of the Platonists and *John* at the time of reading these books, or did he only come to this conclusion later, perhaps after his conversion, or even much later, after he had had time to study the scriptures in more depth?

¹⁷⁹ *Conf.* 7.9.14: “I did read in them that your only-begotten Son, coeternal with you, abides before all ages and above all ages, and that of his fullness our souls receive, to become blessed thereby, and that by participation in that Wisdom which abides in itself they are made new in order to become wise; but that at the time of our weakness he died for the wicked, and that you did not spare even your only Son but delivered him up for us all, these things are not to be found there.”

¹⁸⁰ *Rom.* 5:6: “For while we were still weak, at the right time Christ died for the ungodly.”

¹⁸¹ *Rom.* 8:32: “He who did not withhold his own Son, but gave him up for all of us, will he not with him also give us everything else?”

There is no final answer to such an interpretive conundrum: no linear temporality can be applied to the text in order to describe a succession of events that could provide an answer to this question¹⁸². The pre-conversion Augustinus (described at the time of the events of *Conf.* 7.9.13-15) and the Augustinus at the time of writing exist together at the time of interpretation. Therefore, the text can be considered as both linear and simultaneous, within and without time. Both voices speak simultaneously, and thus the interpretations blur, overlap, clash. A further disruption to this dual reading is the reader him/herself: the reader is reading something of the text that the author/speaker-text is trying to describe, and so joins the author/speaker-text in his experience. The reader familiar with *John* 1 will come to recognise the strong relationship between *John* 1:1-14 and this passage, but the ignorant reader is not lost in the experience: the contents of the text that was read is delivered to the reader, simply in a different form. In either case, the reader must also experience a certain level of discomfort: the reader is divorced from the original works referred to in *Conf.* 7.9.13, as they are not explicitly identified. The paraphrased content, imported, ostensibly, from another source, is the only way to gauge what these books might have been about. This is all dependent, however, on how the reader experiences the intertextual relationships present in *Conf.* 7.9.13-15.

If this intertextual relationship is viewed from another perspective, that of considering the author(s) of the procured books, the following can be observed. The author-text(s) of the books is mentioned (i.e. *quidam platonici*), but because the identity of the Platonists is not explicit, a certain void is created as far as the element of the author-text(s) is concerned. A generic "Platonist" author-text could be assigned to this role, but the specificity of the text that is read resists this open

¹⁸² See the discussion on Time in chapter 3.7.

interpretation¹⁸³. It is therefore not surprising that many scholars have spent much time in trying to identify the potential candidates for the author(s) of these books, and the books themselves¹⁸⁴. It is not the purpose of this dissertation to identify or contribute to the discussion regarding the identification of the Platonists referred to in *Conf.* 7.9.13-15; however, it is important to note that these names may be drawn into the interpretation as well.

As a result of the potential presence of these different voices in *Conf.* 7.9.13-15, the effect is created of the author/speaker-text of the *Confessions* and the author/speaker-text(s) of the Platonists speaking simultaneously. However, because of the strong intertextual relationship between *Conf.* 7.9.13-14 and *John* 1:1-14, as well as the comparison, both positive and negative in this passage, there occurs a resistance to associate the words read in *Conf.* 7.9.13-15 with the voice of (any of) these Platonists, as it is unlikely that any of them would have used a formulation so close to that of a Christian text, as the candidates for the author of these books mentioned earlier were all non-Christian. The ambiguity of the authorship of these works, the intertextual relationship with a Christian text, as well as the admission by the author/speaker-text that the words being reported are, in fact, not the word he had read, introduce instability into the interpretation and serves to attenuate the voices of the other texts.

¹⁸³ *Conf.* 7.9.13-15 refers not to general Platonic precepts but cites a specific text, as if reading from it, and yet not. The mystery of the identity of these book also becomes a strong force here and a generic solution is not sufficient.

¹⁸⁴ Rachet (1963: 338) names four principle contenders for the author(s) of these book: Plotinus, Iamblichus, Porphyry and Apuleius. Beatrice (1989) provides a good summary of the history of the debate. O'Connell sees the strong influence of Plotinus on Augustine's thought and sees similarities between parts of the *Confessions* and Plotinus' *Enneads* (1969: 12). He admits that the issue is under discussion, offering Porphyry and Plotinus as likely candidates, but makes significantly more references to Plotinus in his discussion of the *libri platoniorum* (1969: 75-80). Brown hesitantly offers Plotinus and maybe Porphyry as the authors, though he openly admits the difficulty in reconstructing the books and their authors (1967: 94). Stock offers evidence that the historical Augustine had definitely read Plotinus at the time of writing the *Confessions*, but does not commit to naming a source (1996: 69). Instead, he remarks that the omission of identification of the *platonici* places the emphasis on Augustine's interpretation in *Conf.* 7.9.13-15 (Stock, 1996: 71). Scott considers Plotinus the primary candidate, referring to his chapter on the passage as "The Plotinian Myth" (1995: 95).

Therefore, the volume of the author/speaker-text's voice, the Augustinus at the time of writing the *Confessions*, is still audible. This effect, these competing, clashing voices, transforms this "reading" into something else: a re-reading, an interpolation, a palimpsest¹⁸⁵. The hypothetical lower layers of text have faded and the oldest text is barely visible. Below I use the metaphor of the palimpsest to consider what the original text may have looked like, or at least, as much as can be reconstructed given the material that is provided. The author-text has, however, provided marginalia, in the form of commentary regarding what was missing from this text. I mark these marginalia with shading below. The reconstructed text that the author/speaker-text encountered is therefore all the unshaded parts:

Conf. 7.9.13-15¹⁸⁶

Intertextual Relationship

*et ibi legi, non quidem his verbis sed hoc idem omnino multis et multiplicibus suaderi rationibus, quod in principio erat verbum... et mundus eum non cognovit.*¹⁸⁷

*quia vero in sua propria venit... in nomine eius, non ibi legi. John 1:11-12: in sua propria venit... in nomine eius*¹⁸⁸

*item legi ibi quia verbum, deus, non ex carne, ... sed ex deo natus est; John 1:13: qui non ex sanguinibus... sed ex deo nati sunt.*¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁵ My use of the word palimpsest should not be confused with the use of the word in Gérard Genette's *Palimpsestes: La Littérature au second degré* (1982), although similarities could possibly be identified. I use the term palimpsest here to represent the various textual surfaces that can be identified: the words of *Conf.* 7.9.13-15 as the uppermost surface, the words of *John 1* and the other intertextual relationships that can be identified as the surface below that, and the original (unknown) words of the books of the Platonists which the author/speaker-text read as the third and final surface, the *scriptio inferior*. The latter is missing and can never be reconstructed to any degree of certainty, but the effect of writing over the unknown text remains.

¹⁸⁶ For translations, see footnotes 170, 175, and 179.

¹⁸⁷ See footnote 169.

¹⁸⁸ See footnote 171.

sed quia verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis, non ibi legi. John 1:14: *et verbum caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis...*¹⁹⁰

indagavi quippe in illis litteris varie dictum et multis modis quod sit filius in forma patris... mortem autem crucis: Phil. 2:6-8: *cum in forma dei... ad mortem crucis.*¹⁹¹

propter quod deus eum exaltavit... in gloria est dei patris, non habent illi libri. Phil. 2:9-11: *propter quod et deus eum... in gloria est dei patris.*¹⁹²

quod enim ante omnia tempora et supra omnia tempora... ut sapientes sint, est ibi; John 1:16: *et de plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus, et gratiam pro gratia.*¹⁹³

Wis. 7:27: *et cum sit una... et prophetas constituit.*¹⁹⁴

quod autem secundum tempus... pro nobis omnibus tradidisti eum, non est ibi. Rom. 5:6: *ut quid enim Christus cum adhuc infirmi essemus secundum tempus pro impiis mortuus est?*¹⁹⁵

Rom. 8:32: *qui etiam filio suo non pepercit sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum.*¹⁹⁶

The reader is confronted with a barrage of texts, all written over the older, faded text which is the books of the Platonists. The reader who is confronted with the mystery of the content of the books can only reconstruct them from the material that the

¹⁸⁹ See footnote 172.

¹⁹⁰ See footnote 173.

¹⁹¹ See footnote 174.

¹⁹² See footnote 176.

¹⁹³ See footnote 177.

¹⁹⁴ See footnote 178.

¹⁹⁵ See footnote 180.

¹⁹⁶ See footnote 181.

author-text of *Conf.* 7.9.13-15 provides¹⁹⁷. If the reader does attempt a reconstruction, he/she has to trust that the author-text has accurately conveyed the sense of these books through his palimpsest. However, the lower layers of the texts cannot be deciphered, unravelled or reassembled to make the original. I, as the critic and reader, am infinitely and forever removed from those books. They exist only as text in the *Confessions* and therefore must be treated as such. What remains is the palimpsest, consisting of many layers from many different textual sources. As demonstrated above, strong intertextual relationships with several different texts in different strengths can be identified. These multiple texts only compound the polyvalence here, disrupting any attempts to narrow down a singular text and singular meaning.

When the author/speaker-text continues in the following section, he does not continue the report on what he has read in the Platonic books but addresses God directly. Now, a strong intertextual relationship with *Matt.* 11:25 and 11:28-29 is established:

Conf. 7.9.14

Matt. 11:25

abscondisti enim haec a sapientibus et revelasti ea parvulis, ut venirent ad eum laborantes et onerati et reficeret eos, *confiteor tibi, pater, domine caeli et terrae, quia abscondisti haec a sapientibus et prudentibus, et revelasti ea parvulis.*¹⁹⁹

quoniam mitis est et humilis corde, et diriget mites in iudicio et docet mansuetos

Matt. 11: 28-29

vias suas, videns humilitatem nostram et laborem nostrum et dimittens omnia peccata

venite ad me, omnes qui laboratis, et ego vos reficiam. tollite iugum meum super vos et

¹⁹⁷ A final, absolute reconstruction is impossible: no other information regarding the identity and content of the work is given. However, the mystery compels the reader to reconstruct the text, however inaccurately.

¹⁹⁹ *Matt.* 11:25: "I thank you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because you have hidden these things from the wise and the intelligent and have revealed them to infants;"

*nostra. qui autem cothurno tamquam discite a me quoniam mitis sum et humilis doctrinae sublimioris elati non audiunt corde, et inuenietis requiem animabus dicentem, discite a me quoniam mitis sum vestris.²⁰⁰
et humilis corde, et inuenietis requiem animabus vestris,¹⁹⁸*

As in previous instances, I argue here that the quotation from *Matthew* draws in not only the words quoted explicitly, but also the wider context of the passage where they occur. *Matt.* 11:25 begins with *confiteor*, through which an intertextual relationship with the title of the *Confessions* may be established by the critic. The speaker-text of *Matt.* 11:25-29 is Jesus, and therefore a significantly powerful authority can be ascribed to this particular text through the intertextual relationship between this speaker-text and the cultural constructs surrounding him. This small but powerful citation²⁰¹ has powerful implications for the interpretation. The theme-texts of finding, and, in particular, humility, are both present in *Matt.* 11:25-29 and in *Conf.* 7.9.14, making these theme-texts that are equally prominent in *Conf.* 1.1.1, also very prominent here, and strengthening the relationship between these two passages (*Conf.* 1.1.1 and *Conf.* 7.9.14) significantly. Furthermore, another strong intertextual relationship can be identified in the last lines of *Conf.* 7.9.14, namely that with *Rom.* 1:18-32. The interaction between these intertextual relationships may have interesting consequences for the interpretation of the passage. The similarities

¹⁹⁸ *Conf.* 7.9.14: "For you have *hidden these matters from the sagacious and shrewd, and revealed them to little ones*, so that those who toil under heavy burdens may come to him and he may give them relief, because he is gentle and humble of heart. He will guide the gentle aright and teach the unassuming his ways, for he sees our lowly estate and our labor, and forgives all our sins. As for those who are raised on the stilts of their loftier doctrine, too high to hear him calling, *Learn of me, for I am gentle and humble of heart, and you shall find rest for your souls*"

²⁰⁰ *Matt.* 11:28-29: "Come to me, all you that are weary and are carrying heavy burdens, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you, and learn from me; for I am gentle and humble in heart, and you will find rest for your souls."

²⁰¹ While the original source or author of the citation is not explicitly mentioned, the introduction of the text with *dicentem* (in the case of *Matt.* 11:28-29) has the force of identifying the whole of the quoted text as some kind of citation.

between *Rom.* 1:21-22 can be clearly demonstrated, but the comparison between this quotation and the one found in *Conf.* 5.3.5, discussed in Chapter 6, should also be considered. I quote the three texts in parallel columns:

<i>Conf.</i> 7.9.14	<i>Conf.</i> 5.3.5	<i>Rom.</i> 1:21-22
<u><i>etsi cognoscunt deum, non sicut deum glorificant aut gratias agunt, sed evanescent in cogitationibus suis et obscuratur insipiens cor eorum; dicentes se esse sapientes stulti facti sunt.</i></u> ²⁰²	<i>non noverunt hanc viam... et obscuratum est insipiens cor eorum.</i> <i>et multa vera de creatura dicunt... cognoscentes deum non sicut deum honorant aut gratias agunt, et evanescent in cogitationibus suis, et dicunt se esse sapientes...</i> ²⁰³	<i>quia cognoscentes deum, non ut deum glorificaverunt aut gratias egerunt; sed evanuerunt in cogitationibus suis et obscuratum est insipiens cor eorum, dicentes enim se esse sapientes stulti facti sunt.</i> ²⁰⁴

The intertextual relationship between *Conf.* 7.9.14 and *Rom.* 1:21-22 is stronger on a formal level than that between *Conf.* 5.3.5 and *Rom.* 1:21-22, given the almost exact similarity between the former two. While most of the quotation is found in *Conf.* 5.3.5, the order is different, and *Conf.* 5.3.5 does not contain the words *stulti facti sunt*. This intertextual relationship nevertheless draws in *Conf.* 5.3.5 into *Conf.* 7.9.14 as well, given the clear similarities. The texts discussed in the previous discussion of *Conf.* 5.3.5 also invade, allowing for complex and dynamic interactions between the various texts.

²⁰² *Conf.* 7.9.14: “[E]ven if they know God, they do not honour him as God or give him thanks; their thinking has been frittered away into futility and their foolish hearts are benighted, for in claiming to be wise they have become stupid.”

²⁰³ See footnote 144.

²⁰⁴ See footnote 145.

One of the texts that is prominent in *Conf.* 5.3.3-5 is that of natural theology, evoked primarily through the interaction of *Rom.* 1:18-32 and *Wis.* 13:1-9. This text is, in turn, also quoted by *Conf.* 7.9.14, through *Rom.* 1:20-21. However, the notion of natural theology resists the ideas quoted by *Matt.* 11:25: in this verse, God actively conceals himself from those who claim to be wise but reveals himself to little children. The possibility for God to be discovered through observation of the natural world is in direct contrast to the latter. The notion of personal, rather than natural, revelation is therefore present in *Matt.* 11:25. This also echoes the potential quotation of *Isaiah* 65:1 through the use of the theme-texts of seeking and finding, and its similar notion of personal revelation. Another potential intertextual relationship can be identified between this passage and the ideas found in Stoicism. This has been recognised by many scholars of *Rom.* 1:18-32: Dunn considers the use of terms describing negative aspects such as *τα ἀόρατα* as more familiar in Stoic thought than early Christian (1988: 57). He finds a parallel with Pseudo-Aristotle's *De Mundo* 399b.14 and Plutarch's *Moralia* 389A, and argues that it was through Stoic influence that these terms entered Jewish literature of the time (Dunn, 1988: 57)²⁰⁵.

The subject of the verb *cognoscunt* and *non glorificant aut gratias agunt*, (i.e. the quotation of *Rom.* 1:21-22) in *Conf.* 7.9.14 are the *cothurno doctrinae sublimioris elati* who cannot hear the words in *Matt.* 11:28-29. Who these *elati* are is not explicitly given. The author/speaker-text does not explicitly bind these *elati* to the *platonici*. The context of the discussion in *Conf.* 7.9.14 may connect these two person-texts. The intertextual relationship established with *Rom.* 1:18-32 in *Conf.* 5.3.3-5 may also allow the philosophers²⁰⁶ of *Conf.* 5.3.3-5 to be considered potential candidates. If the

²⁰⁵ See also Jewett, 2007: 155, Käsemann, 1980: 39.

²⁰⁶ The philosophers mentioned in *Conf.* 5.3.3-5 are not identified in terms of school or philosophy. It is quite possible that the author-text may have encountered a *platonicus* before his encounter with the *libri platoniorum*. For the sake of the argument, I treat the philosophers in *Conf.* 5.3.3-5 as a generic person-text, and the *platonici* in *Conf.* 7.9.13-15 as a separate person-text, while accepting the possibility of some overlap.

context of *Conf.* 5.3.3-5 is taken into account this may also allow the Manichaeans to be included as a potential candidate for the *elati*. The word *humilitas* in *Conf.* 7.9.14 evokes its semantic inverse, *superbia*, which can be applied to the Manichaeans as well, as has been demonstrated. However, the vague reference permits the referent of the *elati* to be completely destabilised and introduce a wider range of possibilities: humanity in general, which was also assigned to the theme-text of *superbi* in *Conf.* 1.1.1, and the ever-present reader. The reader is free to resist this interpretation, but cannot deny the possibility of it. However, the text of *Rom.* 1:21-22 seems to spill over to *Conf.* 7.9.15, dragging with it the multitude of texts which have been associated with it.

7.3. *Conf.* 7.9.15

In *Conf.* 7.9.15, the author/speaker-text continues to describe the books of the Platonists, now formulating a text that demonstrates a strong intertextual relationship with *Rom.* 1:23:

Conf. 7.9.15

Rom. 1:23

*et ideo legebam ibi etiam immutatam et immutaverunt gloriam incorruptibilis dei gloriam incorruptionis tuae in idola et varia simulacra, in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis, et volucrum et quadrupedum et corruptibilis hominis et volucrum et serpentium.*²⁰⁸
*quadrupedum et serpentium...*²⁰⁷

The presence of *Rom.* 1:23 here is quite jarring. In the last sentence of *Conf.* 7.9.14, the author/speaker-text quotes from *Rom.* 1:21-22; in this latter instance he is not giving an account of his reading from the books of the Platonists as he had done before, but

²⁰⁷ *Conf.* 7.9.15: "In consequence what I also read there was the story of the exchanging your glorious, imperishable nature for idols and variety of man-made things, for the effigy of a perishable human or of birds or animals or crawling creatures;"

²⁰⁸ *Rom.* 1:23: "[A]nd they exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling a mortal human being or birds or four-footed animals or reptiles."

a description of certain *elati* who cannot hear God speaking to them. While the *elati* may potentially be the Platonists, I have argued that the identity of the *elati* is too unstable to permit an unequivocal assignment.

However, in *Conf.* 7.9.15, the author/speaker-text resumes his description of his reading of the books of the Platonists in what seems to be the same manner as in *Conf.* 7.9.13. The words used in this description demonstrate a significantly strong intertextual relationship with *Rom.* 1:23. The recognition of *Rom.* 1:23, following on the recognition of *Rom.* 1:21-22 in the previous paragraph, creates a certain unease: the same thematic section in the *Letter to the Romans* (*Rom.* 1.21-23) is disrupted here because the two parts are used in two different contexts: *Rom.* 1:21-22 in *Conf.* 7.9.14 as criticism of the *elati*, *Rom.* 1:23 as a description of the books of the Platonists.

In spite of this disjunction, a link is created between these texts in the mind of the reader in order to make sense of it. The quotation of *Rom.* 1:23 in *Conf.* 7.9.15 is presented in a different manner from the previous quotations in *Conf.* 7.9.13-14: instead of the quoted text being transposed with little change, i.e. the text in the books of the Platonists is rendered by the texts in the quoted works (as described earlier), the quoted text of *Rom.* 1:23 is transformed so that it describes not an approximation of the actual words of the text that was read by the author/speaker-text, but the contents of the text: *immutatam gloriam incorruptionis tuae* instead of *immutaverunt gloriam incorruptibilis dei*. The text that the author/speaker-text encountered is described as containing *immutata gloria*, i.e. this phrase was never actually read in the books of the Platonists.

The glory of God's incorruptibility referred to in *Conf.* 7.9.15 had been changed into idolatry and animal worship: *idola et varia simulacra, in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis et volucrum et quadrupedum et serpentium* (*Conf.* 7.9.15). This recalls earlier references to idolatry and animal worship in *Conf.* 5.3.5, where the same quotation of *Rom.* 1.23 was identified. However, little more is said about idolatry and

animal worship in both cases. Despite the strong element of censure, the sin itself is not elaborated on in either case. The presence of *Rom.* 1:23 in these two cases has the potential to disrupt the interpretation. Whether the author/speaker-text is employing the words of *Rom.* 1:23 rhetorically, as a form of hyperbole or metaphor, or earnestly, is not easy to answer. The lack of any further elaboration on idolatry and animal worship resists a literal interpretation of this passage.

Contributing to the instability of this passage is another collection of texts which serves to produce a variety of meanings through the interaction with the texts identified. The speaker-text of *Conf.* 7.9.15 directly compares the *imagines corruptibilis hominis et volucrum et quadrupedum et serpentium* to *Aegyptium cibum*. This is the first mention of Egypt in the *Confessions* and the sudden reference injects more instability into the interpretation. Egypt may be regarded within the conceptual framework employed here as a text with a plethora of texts attached to it.

The most obvious text to associate with the passage in *Conf.* 7.9.15 is the cultural practice of animal worship famously associated with Ancient Egypt, and the worship of idols in the form of humans, birds, beasts and serpents. However, the speaker-text refers to the *Aegyptium cibum* as the food which Esau sold his birthright for²⁰⁹. The speaker-text compares the situation described in the Platonic texts to the manner in which the Israelites rejected God, turning their hearts back to Egypt and worshipping an idol of a golden calf (*Exodus* 32:1-6). The concept of Egypt thus becomes associated with the admonition of *Rom.* 1:21-22: *cognoscentes deum, non ut deum glorificaverunt aut gratias egerunt*. Although the Israelites were shown the wonders of God, they nevertheless rejected him and returned to the worship of an Egyptian deity in their time of crisis. This food, the speaker-text insists, he did not eat: *inveni haec et non manducavi*. The theme-text of finding appears again, but what was found is rejected.

²⁰⁹ Recounted in *Gen.* 25:33-34.

The speaker-text establishes a certain logical precedent through the metaphor of the *Aegyptium cibum*: just as the older had to make way for the younger, through Esau selling his birthright to the younger Jacob for a bowl of lentil stew, the *populus primogenitus*, ostensibly the Israelites, gave up their birthright to the Gentiles (*vocasti gentes in hereditatem tuam*). It is not surprising therefore that the speaker-text identifies himself as a Gentile: *et ego ad te veneram ex gentibus* (*Conf.* 7.9.15). O'Donnell (1992b: 432) argues that, by being a Gentile, the author/speaker-text "was paradoxically less vulnerable to the seductions of idolatry than the Jews had been". This notion itself is paradoxical; the strong presence of *Rom.* 1:18-32 and its anti-Gentile diatribe does not seem to be in harmony with the speaker-text's observation.

The paradox can be explored further. It flows from a clash of two textual perspectives, complicated further by the potential irony in the form of the interlocutor in *Rom.* 1:18-32. I have identified on this basis two interpretive possibilities in *Romans*: either the author-text was critical of Gentile traditions, if the voice of *Rom.* 1:18-32 is considered to be that of the author-text himself, or the author-text is allowing another speaker-text to speak, namely an unidentified interlocutor, whose position the author-text wishes to criticise. It is therefore possible, in the second case, for the author-text of *Romans* to be sympathetic to Gentiles. These possibilities are transposed from *Romans* into *Conf.* 7.9.14-15. Of these two possibilities, the interpretation that casts the author-text as sympathetic to Gentiles is the one that creates the least resistance when the interpretation of the previous sections of *Conf.* 7.9.15 (discussed earlier) is taken into account. The presence of *Rom.* 1:18-32 here may therefore be considered ironic; however, if this is considered a possibility, the extent to which this intertextual relationship is treated ironically should be explored. If the same force of irony were to be transposed from *Rom.* 1:18-32, then the voice of an interlocutor could be assumed here. However, the text of *Conf.* 7.9.13-15 resists such an interpretation: there is no clear apostrophe to the interlocutor, nor any sense of a noticeable opposition between these words and

the author/speaker-text's own position. The notion of natural theology, so firmly embedded in *Rom.* 1:18-32, is challenged through the concomitant quotation of *Matt.* 11:25 in the same context (*Conf.* 7.9.14), and so the possibility that this may express a position against natural theology can be considered here. However, such an interpretation is not particularly strong, and there are few amplifying texts to support such an interpretation. The transposition of *Rom.* 1:18-32 to *Conf.* 7.9.13-15 has effectively subverted the connotations of the original context almost in its entirety and transformed the textual material into something else. If some form of irony must be applied to this passage, it can most easily be applied to the notion of *idola et varia simulacra* and the *Aegyptium aurum* referred to in *Conf.* 7.9.15. Hitherto little has been said about idolatry and animal worship. Instead, the language may be considered ironic, hyperbolic, critical or metaphorical.

The *Aegyptium aurum* which the speaker-text of *Conf.* 7.9.15 refers to is that which was taken from Egypt by God's people on the volition of God: *quod ab Aegypto voluisti ut auferret populus tuus*. The metaphorical language of this passage is hard to escape: in the phrase *intendi in aurum*, the author/speaker-text does not seem to be referring to literal gold, but metaphorical gold, which O'Donnell argues (1992b: 432) points to Platonism²¹⁰. This metaphor can be represented differently: just as the Israelites transformed the Egyptian gold into idols, the philosophers (referred to in *Conf.* 7.9.13-15, but also potentially *Conf.* 5.3.3-5) took the truth of the nature of God and transformed it into an idol, misrepresenting it in some way, though still basing it on some kind of understanding of the nature of God. Thus the philosophy which the author/speaker-text encountered was to him a perfect an example of such *Aegyptium aurum*, though fashioned into an idol, missing the elements which the

²¹⁰ Herzman agrees that the gold here refers to Platonism (1997: 54). He asserts on the basis of this passage that Augustine, together with Origen and against Tertullian, argued that there were similarities between pagan and Christian culture (1997: 54).

author/speaker-text noted in *Conf.* 7.9.13-14. Thus the author/speaker-text claims that he “set [his] heart upon the gold”, but “disregarded the idols of the Egyptians”.

The Egyptian metaphor is further expanded through an intertextual relationship with *Rom.* 9:12, also evoked by this passage, as well as an intertextual relationship with *Gen.* 25:23:

Conf. 7.9.15

Rom. 9:12

Gen. 25:23

*placuit enim tibi, domine, non ex operibus sed ex
 auferre opprobrium vocante dictum est ei quia gentes in utero tuo sunt
 diminutionis ab Iacob, ut “maior serviet minori”.²¹² et duo populi ex ventre
maior serviret minori, et tuo dividuntur
vocasti gentes in hereditatem populusque populum
 tuam.²¹¹ superabit et maior minori*

serviet.²¹³

It is necessary at this point to once again emphasise the nature of intertextual relationships as understood through the conceptual framework adopted in this dissertation. If relationships like these are considered within a linear temporality, claims such as *Rom.* 9:12 quotes *Gen.* 25:23, and *Conf.* 7.9.15 quotes either *Rom.* 9:12 or *Gen.* 25:23 are possible, however such an interpretation would largely be based on a firmly embedded assumption: that quotation operates at the level of the author, i.e. the author of *Romans* would only have had access to *Genesis*, and not to the *Confessions*. Intertextual relationships do not exist within a linear temporality; they are atemporal. Temporality can be constructed through means of textual

²¹¹ *Conf.* 7.9.15: “[F]or it was pleasing in your sight, Lord, to take away from Jacob the shame of his subordination and cause the elder to serve the younger., so you called the Gentiles into your inheritance.”

²¹² *Rom.* 9:12: “(not by works but by his call) she was told, ‘The elder shall serve the younger’”

²¹³ *Gen.* 25:23: “And the Lord said to her, ‘Two nations are in your womb, and two peoples born of you shall be divided; the one shall be stronger than the other, the elder shall serve the younger.’”

interpretation, but like the authority of the author, this is something that enters into the textual space as text, that participates in the process of signification in the same manner.

It is therefore not a question whether or not the author had either *Rom.* 9:12 or *Gen.* 25:23 in mind when writing the work, nor even both. The text of *Conf.* 7.9.15 has the potential to evoke either or both, regardless of the author's presence. Similarly, *Gen.* 25:23 has the same ability to recall *Conf.* 7.9.15 or *Rom.* 9:12. The significance of this relationship is non-linear, that is, the relationship does not produce its meaning solely in one direction.

The intertextual relationship between *Conf.* 7.9.15 and *Rom.* 9:12 and/or *Gen.* 25:23 is amplified by a shared person-text: Jacob, and by extension, his brother Esau: the story of Jacob and Esau is told in *Gen.* 25:19-34. Esau, the elder, sells his birthright to Jacob, the younger brother. In *Rom.* 9:12, the example is given as a response arguments that God has failed his promises (Tobin, 2004: 326). Tobin (2004: 320) characterises *Rom.* 8:31-11:36 as "the longest, most complex, and most sustained argument not only in *Romans* but in all of his letters" and "one of the most difficult passages and controversial passages to interpret". He also identifies a number of rhetorical figures that dominate this passage, including rhetorical questions, apostrophe, dialogue with imaginary interlocutors, personification and speech-in-character (Tobin, 2004: 320). It is therefore no surprise that this passage would be particularly challenging: apostrophe, imaginary interlocutors, personification and speech-in-character (or *prosopopoeia*) are all literary forms that introduce instability to the text through the transformation of the speaker-text: new speaker-texts overlap and clash, generating significant polysemy. The conceptual framework I have adopted may assist in embracing this complexity and understanding how this complexity contributes to the interpretation of the *Confessions*. An investigation into the texts present in *Rom.* 9:6-26 may further contribute to understanding this complexity and its impact on the interpretation of *Conf.* 7.9.15.

In *Rom.* 9:6-26, the author-text makes claims regarding the covenant, arguing that not all Israelites belong to Israel²¹⁴. The author/speaker-text makes the following claim regarding the justification of his argument:

μήπω γὰρ γεννηθέντων μηδὲ πραξάντων τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ φαῦλον, ἵνα ἢ κατ' ἐκλογὴν πρόθεσις τοῦ θεοῦ μένη, οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦντος, ἐρρέθη αὐτῇ ὅτι ὁ μείζων δουλεύσει τῷ ἐλάσσονι, καθὼς γέγραπται· τὸν Ἰακώβ ἠγάπησα, τὸν δὲ Ἡσαῦ ἐμίσησα. (*Rom.* 9:11-13).²¹⁵

Thus, the author/speaker-text argues that it is not by any deeds, whether good or evil, but only by the election and calling of God that Israel was so divided. He continues this thought in *Rom.* 9:18: ἄρα οὖν ὃν θέλει ἐλεεῖ, ὃν δὲ θέλει σκληρύνει (*Rom.* 9: 18).

The inclusion of this text in the interpretation of *Conf.* 7.9.15 is not without difficulties. The God who hardens hearts seems misplaced in the *Confessions*, where God is primarily depicted as a merciful father²¹⁶. However, it should also be noted that the statements made by the author/speaker-text in *Rom.* 9: 6-26 are regarding Israel. *Romans* 9 is far kinder to the Gentiles than it is to the Israelites, as for example in *Rom.* 9:30-31:

²¹⁴ Οὐχ οἷον δὲ ὅτι ἐκπέπτωκεν ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ. οὐ γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἐξ Ἰσραὴλ οὗτοι Ἰσραήλ (*Rom.* 9:6). "It is not as though the word of God had failed. For not all Israelites truly belong to Israel".

²¹⁵ *Rom.* 9:11-13: "Even before they had been born or had done anything good or bad (so that God's purpose of election might continue, not by works but by his call) she was told, 'The elder shall serve the younger.' As it is written, 'I have loved Jacob, but I have hated Esau.'"

²¹⁶ Wilson (1979) provides a discussion regarding the theological difficulties presented by the hardening of Pharaoh's heart referred to in this passage. Babcock (1985) also offers a look at Augustine's own interpretation of *Rom.* 9 in his commentaries on *Romans* and *Ad Simplicianum*.

Τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν; ὅτι ἔθνη τὰ μὴ διώκοντα δικαιοσύνην κατέλαβεν δικαιοσύνην, δικαιοσύνην δὲ τὴν ἐκ πίστεως, Ἰσραὴλ δὲ διώκων νόμον δικαιοσύνης εἰς νόμον οὐκ ἔφθασεν. (*Rom.* 9:30-31).²¹⁷

The author/speaker-text in *Conf.* 7.9.15 explicitly also aligns himself with the Gentiles. In addition to this, it can be argued, on the basis of the analogue established by the author/speaker-text of *Rom.* 9:6-26, that the author/speaker-text of *Conf.* 7.9.15 also aligns himself with Jacob versus Esau.

7.4. Conclusion

It is not always possible to resolve all these connections in a satisfying way. The text, as is its nature, resists finality and invites conflicting interpretations. The reader, confronted by these myriad interpretations, attempts to reconcile them and make sense out of them. However, to make sense of something does not necessarily imply to order it, to produce a coherent, logical whole. As demonstrated above, the texts quoted by the *Confessions* often introduce conflicting texts, and an attempt to reduce passages such as these to a logical, linear, coherent whole fails to account for the rich tapestry of texts that such an important passage is comprised of.

²¹⁷ *Rom.* 9:30-31: "What then are we to say? Gentiles, who did not strive for righteousness, have attained it, that is, righteousness through faith; but Israel, who did strive for the righteousness that is based on the law, did not succeed in fulfilling that law."

Chapter 8 Confessions 7.20.26-7.21.27

8.1. Introduction

Conf. 7.9.13-15 is not the only significant example of a strong intertextual relationship with the *Letter to the Romans* in book 7. Another important stage in the narrative occurs in *Conf.* 7.20.26-7.21.27, which is also characterised by a strong intertextual relationship with *Romans*. The “intellectual conversion” narrative in *Conf.* 7.9.13-15 can be considered as a foreshadowing of the events of *Conf.* 7.20.26-7.21.27: the author/speaker-text’s encounter with the books of the Platonists is followed by a pursuit of biblical literature.

8.2. *Conf.* 7.20.26

The theme-text of seeking and finding is present throughout book 7: there are 16 instances of forms of *quaerere* in book 7, and 15 of *invenire*. Of the 16 forms of *quaerere*, 10 are in the imperfect, which creates the feeling of an incomplete, unsuccessful quest for God. Dissatisfied with the situation reached at the conclusion of *Conf.* 7.9.13-15, i.e. the reading of the books of the Platonists, the author/speaker-text is prompted to an earnest quest for God, recounted in *Conf.* 7.20.26:

*sed tunc, lectis platonicorum illis libris, posteaquam inde admonitus quaerere incorpoream veritatem, invisibilia tua per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspexi et repulsus sensi quid per tenebras animae meae contemplari non sinerer, certus esse te et infinitum esse nec tamen per locos finitos infinitosve diffundi et vere te esse, qui semper idem ipse esses, ex nulla parte nulloque motu alter aut aliter, cetera vero ex te esse omnia, hoc solo firmissimo documento quia sunt, certus quidem in istis eram, nimis tamen infirmus ad fruendum te (*Conf.* 7.20.26).²¹⁸*

²¹⁸ *Conf.* 7.20.26: “But in those days, after reading the books of the Platonists and following their advice to seek for truth beyond corporeal forms, I turned my gaze toward your invisible reality, trying to understand it through created things, and though I was rebuffed I did perceive what that reality was which the darkness of my soul would not permit me to contemplate. I was certain that

An intertextual relationship with *Rom.* 1:20 can be established:

invisibilia enim dei a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur, et sempiterna eius virtus et divinitas, ut sint inexcusabiles (Rom. 1:20).²¹⁹

Passages from *Rom.* 1:18-32 is quoted in sections already discussed, namely *Conf.* 5.3.5 and *Conf.* 7.9.13-15, but the part of *Rom.* 1:20 that is recognised in *Conf.* 7.20.26 is not present in the other sections discussed. *Rom.* 1:20 and its context evokes the theme-text of natural theology, as discussed in earlier chapters, and it is this verse that convinces O'Donnell (1991: 9) that Augustine believed that a purely natural theology approach is possible. The presence of the notion of natural theology here is undeniable, but the intertextual relationship between *Conf.* 7.20.26 and *Rom.* 1:18-32, particularly the instability of the speaker-text through association with a potential interlocutor, resists absolute assignment of this notion to the author/speaker-text. The author/speaker-text reports that his attempt to understand the invisible qualities of God through that which he created is rebuffed (*repulsus*), and yet the author/speaker-text insists he saw something, though it might imply an exercise in introspection (*sensi quid per tenebras animae meae contemplari non sinerer*).

The author/speaker-text confirms the nature of God through notions of *negative* theology: *invisibilia, infinitum, ex nulla parte nulloque motu alter aut aliter*. If the possibility of an ironic juxtaposition of negative theology with natural theology is considered, the strong presence of negative theology in *Conf.* 7.20.26 may be considered to be a similar ironic refutation of the position of natural theology that was identified as a possibility in Chapter 7.3. This is, however, the first time that a strong intertextual relationship with *Rom.* 1:20 can be established, especially through

you exist, that you are infinite but not spread out through space either finite or infinite, and that you exist in the fullest sense because you have always been the same, unvarying in every respect and in no wise subject to change. All other things I saw to have their being from you, and for this I needed by one unassailable proof – the fact that they exist. On these points I was quite certain, but I was far too weak to enjoy you.”

²¹⁹ See footnote 149.

the word *invisibilia*. Furthermore, the words spoken in *Conf.* 7.20.26 are more narrative in nature than was the case previously: the censorious tone which was characteristic of *Conf.* 5.3.5 and *Conf.* 7.9.13-15 is not present here, save through the intertextual relationship with *Rom.* 1:18-32. The author/speaker-text is criticising no one, except, perhaps, his own failed attempts at discerning God, based on the philosophy present in the books of the Platonists. Before discussing his reading of scripture, the author/speaker-text makes a curious observation:

nam si primo sanctis tuis litteris informatus essem et in earum familiaritate obdulcuisses mihi, et post in illa volumina incidissem, fortasse aut abripuissent me a solidamento pietatis, aut si in affectu quem salubrem inbiberam perstitissem, putarem etiam ex illis libris eum posse concipi, si eos solos quisque didicisset. (Conf. 7.20.26).²²⁰

The author/speaker-text speculates that the order in which he received the respective works may have contributed to his ultimate conversion, that is, if he had chanced upon scripture first, he would have been seduced by the content of the books of the Platonists more strongly, whereas, having read the books of the Platonists, the similarities between scripture and these books became more attractive (*Conf.* 7.20.26). This is, however, all speculative. The author/speaker-text had already attempted the study of scripture before, but was unimpressed by it (*Conf.* 3.5.9). An interesting parallel with *Conf.* 7.9.15 could be drawn here: the author/speaker-text considers the strong possibility that he may have broken away from the scriptures and taken up the pagan philosophies; this position seems to mirror the Israelites abandoning God for the Egyptian idols, if pagan philosophy is considered as the parallel for these

²²⁰ *Conf.* 7.20.26: "If I had first become well informed about your holy writings and you had grown sweet to me through my familiarity with them, and then I had afterward chanced upon those other volumes, they might perhaps have torn me loose from the strong root of piety, or else, if I had held firm in the salutary devotion I had absorbed, I might have supposed that it could be acquired equally well from those books, if everyone studies them and nothing else."

“*idola*” in the metaphor in *Conf.* 7.9.15. The verb *incidissem* also establishes a tenuous, but nevertheless noteworthy intertextual relationship with *Conf.* 3.6.10:

*itaque incidi in homines superbe delirantes, carnales nimis et loquaces, in quorum ore laquei diaboli et viscum confectum commixtione syllabarum nominis tui et domini Iesu Christi et paracliti consolatoris nostri spiritus sancti (Conf. 3.6.10).*²²¹

The significance of this intertextual relationship could potentially be overstated, but it is interesting to note that the same verb is used and potentially the same sense may enter. The two scenes do share a noteworthy similarity: an encounter that occurs as a result of the dissatisfaction of an intellectual reading (Cicero, *Conf.* 3.4.7-8, in the case of *Conf.* 3.6.10, the Platonists, *Conf.* 7.9.13-15, in the case of *Conf.* 7.20.26). However, in *Conf.* 7.20.26, an *irrealis* is found, and the “fall” did not actually occur. The similarities between the events of *Conf.* 3.4.7-3.5.9 and *Conf.* 7.9.13-7.21.27 on a broader scale are also striking.

In *Conf.* 3.4.7-8 and 3.5.9 respectively, the author-text undergoes a similar process whereby he encounters a work of philosophy which inspires him and then turns to scripture. In *Conf.* 3.4.7-8, however, the work that was read and the author are both identified, namely the *Hortensius* by Cicero. The possibility of divine agency in this narrative is difficult to ascertain. The author/speaker-text uses the word *perveneram* to describe his discovery of the *Hortensius*, but no further elaboration other than that. Yet, the author/speaker-text also confesses *nesciebam quid ageres mecum*, indicating that the agency of God in all aspects of the author/speaker-text’s narrative is still a possibility.

In describing the contents of the *Hortensius*, the author/speaker-text uses a similar method as *Conf.* 7.9.13-15, creating a palimpsest effect, through establishing a strong intertextual relationship with *Col.* 2:8-9:

²²¹ See footnote 119.

Conf. 3.4.8

sunt qui seducant per philosophiam magno et blando et honesto nomine colorantes et fucantes errores suos, et prope omnes qui ex illis et supra temporibus tales erant notantur in eo libro et demonstrantur, et manifestatur ibi salutifera illa admonitio spiritus tui per seruum tuum bonum et pium: videte, ne quis vos decipiat per philosophiam et inanem seductionem secundum traditionem hominum, secundum elementa huius mundi et non secundum Christum, quia in ipso inhabitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter.'²²²

Col. 2.8-9

*videte ne quis vos decipiat per philosophiam et inanem seductionem, secundum traditionem hominum, secundum elementa mundi, et non secundum Christum, quia in ipso inhabitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter*²²³

This manner of presenting the content of one text through the quotation of another text to create the effect of a palimpsest where the *scriptio inferior* is only barely visible produces intriguing interpretive possibilities. Unfortunately due to the absence of the original text of the *Hortensius* save in small fragments, not much can be said about the intertextual relationship between this passage and the *Hortensius* itself, a similar problem as found in the case of the books of the Platonists. However, the author/speaker-text has created a palimpsest, which the critic can attempt to

²²² Conf. 3.4.8: "There are people who lead others astray under the pretense of philosophy, coloring and masking their errors under that great, fair, honourable name. Nearly all who did so in Cicero's own day are mentioned and shown up in his book; and there too one can almost find an exposition of the salutary warning given by your Spirit through your good devour servant: 'Take care that no one deceives you with philosophy and empty, misleading ideas derived from man-made traditions, centered on the elemental spirits of this world and not on Christ; for in him all the fullness of the Godhead dwells in bodily wise.'"

²²³ Col. 2:8-9: "See to it that no one takes you captive through philosophy and empty deceit, according to human tradition, according to the elemental spirits of the universe, and not according to Christ. For in him the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily,"

decipher. The author/speaker-text casts the words which resemble *Col.* 2:8-9 in the mouth of a certain *servus bonus et pius*. It may be rather easy to assign to this *servus* the identity of the author-text of *Colossians*, Παῦλος. However, the lack of explicit names and the lack of direct citation, as well as the fact that this particular quotation is being used to describe another text, i.e. the *Hortensius*, permits the identity of this *servus* to be considered unstable. Since an author-text has already been explicitly mentioned in *Conf.* 3.4.7, it is possible to assign Cicero as the *servus* in *Conf.* 3.4.8. This interpretation is not without significant resistance: Cicero is a pagan philosopher. However, the author/speaker-text does potentially establish the possibility that pagans may achieve some knowledge of God. The intertextual relationship with *Rom.* 1:18-32, particularly *Rom.* 1:21, supports such an interpretation: *quia cognoscentes deum, non ut deum glorificaverunt aut gratias egerunt*. It is therefore possible that *Conf.* 3.4.8 can be interpreted to mean that the author/speaker-text considers the content of the *Hortensius* to be in accordance with scripture. The author/speaker-text, much in the same way as in *Conf.* 7.9.13-15, is quick to point out what is not in accordance with scripture:

et hoc solum me in tanta flagrantia refrangebat, quod nomen Christi non erat ibi, quoniam hoc nomen secundum misericordiam tuam, domine, hoc nomen salvatoris mei, filii tui, in ipso adhuc lacte matris tenerum cor meum pie biberat et alte retinebat, et quidquid sine hoc nomine fuisset, quamvis litteratum et expolitum et veridicum, non me totum rapiebat. (Conf. 3.4.8).²²⁴

The author/speaker-text's final comment deserves some exploration. The *Hortensius* could not contain the name of Christ, since the work would have predated the historical Christ. In comparison, all the parts that the author/speaker-text marks as

²²⁴ *Conf.* 3.4.8: "Only one consideration checked me in my ardent enthusiasm: that the name of Christ did not occur there. Through your mercy, Lord, my tender little heart had drunk in that name, the name of my Savior and your Son, with my mother's milk, and in my deepest heart I still held on to it. No writing from which that name was missing, even if learned, of literary elegance and truthful, could ever captivate me completely."

absent from the books of the Platonists in *Conf.* 7.9.13-15 also concern Christ in some way or another. References to Christ are underlined in the text:

Conf. 7.9.13-15²²⁵

Intertextual Relationship

quia vero in sua propria venit et sui eum non receperunt, quotquot autem receperunt eum, dedit eis potestatem filios dei fieri credentibus in nomine eius, non ibi legi.

*John 1:11-12: in sua propria venit... in nomine eius*²²⁶

sed quia verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis, non ibi legi.

*John 1:14: et verbum caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis...*²²⁷

propter quod deus eum exaltavit a mortuis et donavit ei nomen quod est super omne nomen, ut in nomine Iesu omne genu flectatur caelestium terrestrium et infernorum, et omnis lingua confiteatur quia dominus Iesus in gloria est dei patris, non habent illi libri.

*Phil. 2:9-11: propter quod et deus eum... in gloria est dei patris.*²²⁸

quod autem secundum tempus pro impiis mortuus est, et filio tuo unico non pepercisti, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidisti eum, non est ibi.

*Rom. 5:6: ut quid enim Christus cum adhuc infirmi essemus secundum tempus pro impiis mortuus est?*²²⁹

²²⁵ See footnotes 168, 175 and 179.

²²⁶ See footnote 171.

²²⁷ See footnote 173.

²²⁸ See footnote 176.

²²⁹ See footnote 180.

Conf. 7.9.13-15²²⁵

Intertextual Relationship

Rom. 8:32: *qui etiam filio suo non pepercit sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum.*²³⁰

The two discoveries of philosophy recounted in *Conf.* 3.4.7-8 and *Conf.* 7.9.13-15 respectively therefore share many similarities. Both of these discoveries also lead directly to an exploration of the biblical texts.

8.3. *Conf.* 7.21.27

In *Conf.* 7.21.27, the author/speaker-text seizes upon certain books from the Bible, in particular, those of the author the speaker-text identifies as Paulus²³¹. This passage presents many similarities to the intellectual conversion presented in *Conf.* 7.9.13-15. The author/speaker-text is once again engaging with literature which has a profound effect upon his thinking. The presence of other intertextual relationships also bind these two passages together, most significantly, relationships with *Matt.* 11:25, 28-29, which will be discussed later. The books which the author/speaker-text read in *Conf.* 7.21.27 are not identified either, although one of the authors, namely Paulus, is identified.

However, despite the strong intertextual relationship between *Conf.* 7.9.13-15 and *Conf.* 7.20.26-7.21.27, there are also significant differences. Firstly, the books are not “procured” for the author/speaker-text through divine agency as the books of the Platonists were. This can be interpreted as odd, perhaps even inconsistent; the agency of God would be expected in such an important episode. However, God is an omnipresent person-text, hidden behind every quotation of a biblical text and behind the *Confessions* itself. Secondly, in *Conf.* 7.21.27, the “palimpsest” effect that

²³⁰ See footnote 181.

²³¹ Through the intertextual relationship present in the name, it is naturally possible to equate this Paulus to the Παῦλος of the texts already discussed.

had been established in *Conf.* 7.9.13-15 is not so strongly present. This need not be significant at all; the author-text was replacing pagan words with Christian words in the case of *Conf.* 7.9.13-15, but has no need to replace anything here. However, there is less of the sense of reading in *Conf.* 7.21.27 that was so prominent in the narrative of the intellectual conversion. Yet this absence does parallel the first encounter the author-text has with scripture in *Conf.* 3.5.9. No author or text is identified in *Conf.* 3.5.9, though this in itself should not seem remarkable either: the Augustinus at the time of the events *Conf.* 3.5.9 may have considered these texts inferior; “forgetting” to mention the names may as well be a consequence of his disdain. Furthermore, no actual reading is reported in *Conf.* 3.5.9, to the extent demonstrated in *Conf.* 7.9.13-15.

The narrative of *Conf.* 3.4.7-3.5.9 is referred to as an “abortive conversion” by O’Meara (1980: 59). It ends bluntly and only leads to the author-text falling in with the Manichaeans. However, in *Conf.* 7.21.27 this is not the case. The effect of the intellectual conversion has changed the author/speaker-text, in a different manner than the *Hortensius* of Cicero had. This passage is, however, challenging: the reader is in a similar predicament as he/she was at *Conf.* 7.9.13-15: only an author, who can be identified as Paulus/Παῦλος, is presented as the source for the scripture the author/speaker-text reports he has read. This fact allows all of the works associated with Paulus/Παῦλος to be considered as a potential quotation here, in order to resolve this hermeneutic issue. However, in describing this experience in *Conf.* 7.21.27, the speaker-text employs texts that present many possible intertextual relationships with scriptural texts, not limited to Pauline authorship.

Conf. 7.21.27

Intertextual Relationship

*et coepi et inveni, quidquid illac verum legeram, hac cum commendatione gratiae tuae dici, ut qui videt non sic gloriatur, quasi non acceperit non solum id quod videt, sed etiam ut videat (quid enim habet quod non accepit?) et ut te, qui es semper idem, non solum admoneatur ut videat, sed etiam sanetur ut teneat, et qui de longinquo videre non potest, viam tamen ambulet qua veniat et videat et teneat,*²³²

1 Cor. 4.7: quid autem habes quod non accepisti? si autem accepisti, quid gloriaris quasi non acceperis?²³³

Ps. 101:28, Heb. 1:12²³⁴: tu autem idem ipse es, et anni tui non deficient.²³⁵

*quia, etsi condelectetur homo legi dei secundum interiorem hominem, quid faciet de alia lege in membris suis repugnante legi mentis suae et se captivum ducente in lege peccati, quae est in membris eius?*²³⁶

Rom. 7:22-23: condelector enim legi dei secundum interiorem hominem; video autem legem aliam in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae et captivantem me sub lege peccati quae est in membris meis.²³⁷

²³² Conf. 7.21.27: "So I began to read, and discovered that every truth I had read in those other books was taught here also, but now inseparably from your gift of grace, so that no one who sees can boast as though what he sees and the very power to see it were not from you – for who has anything that he has not received? So totally is it a matter of grace that the searcher is not only invited to see you, who are ever the same, but healed as well, so that he can possess you. Whoever is too far off to see may yet walk in the way that will bring him to the place of seeing and possession;"

²³³ 1 Cor 4:7: "What do you have that you did not receive? And if you received it, why do you boast as if it were not a gift?"

²³⁴ Presented in the exact same form at Heb. 1:12.

²³⁵ Heb. 1:12: "But you are the same, and your years will never end."

²³⁶ Conf. 7.21.27: "...for even though a person may be delighted with God's law as far as his inmost self is concerned, how is he to deal with that other law in his bodily members which strives against the law approved by his mind, delivering him as prisoner to the law of sin dominant in his body?"

²³⁷ Rom. 7:22-23: "For I delight in the law of God in my inmost self, but I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind, making me captive to the law of sin that dwells in my members."

quoniam iustus es, domine, nos autem peccavimus, inique fecimus, impie gessimus, et gravata est super nos manus tua, et iuste traditi sumus antiquo peccatori, praeposito mortis, quia persuasit voluntati nostrae similitudinem voluntatis suae, qua in veritate tua non stetit. ²³⁸

*Dan. 3:27: quia iustus es in omnibus quae fecisti nobis, et universa opera tua vera, et viae tuae rectae.*²³⁹

*Tob. 3:2: dicens iustus es Domine et omnia iudicia tua iusta sunt et omnes viae tuae misericordia et veritas et iudicium.*²⁴⁰

*Dan. 3:29: peccavimus enim, et inique egimus recedentes a te et deliquimus in omnibus.*²⁴¹

1 Kings 8:47: et conversi deprecati te fuerint in captivitate tua, dicentes, "peccavimus, inique egimus, impie gessimus." ²⁴²

*Ps. 31:4: die ac nocte gravata est super me manus tua*²⁴³

*John 8:44: ille homicida erat ex initio et in veritate non stetit, quia non est veritas in eo.*²⁴⁴

²³⁸ *Conf. 7.21.27: "You are just, O Lord; but we have sinned, and done wrong, and acted impiously, and your hand has lain heavy upon us. With good reason were we assigned to that ancient sinner who presides over death, for he had seduced our will into imitating that perverse will of his by which he refused to stand fast in your truth."*

²³⁹ *Dan. 3:27: "For you are just in all you have done; all your works are true and your ways right, and all your judgments are true." (Prayer of Azariah 1:4 in NRSV).*

²⁴⁰ *Tob. 3:2: "You are righteous, O Lord, and all your deeds are just; all your ways are mercy and truth; you judge the world."*

²⁴¹ *Dan. 3:29: "For we have sinned and broken your law in turning away from you; in all matters we have sinned grievously." (Prayer of Azariah 1:6 in NRSV).*

²⁴² *1 Kings 8:47: "[Y]et if they come to their senses in the land to which they have been taken captive, and repent... saying, 'We have sinned, and have done wrong; we have acted wickedly.'"*

²⁴³ *Ps. 31:4: "For day and night your hand was heavy upon me" (Ps. 32:4 in NRSV).*

*quid faciet miser homo? quis eum liberabit de corpore mortis huius, nisi gratia tua per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum, quem genuisti coaeternum et creasti in principio viarum tuarum, in quo princeps huius mundi non invenit quicquam morte dignum, et occidit eum? et evacuatum est chirographum quod erat contrarium nobis.*²⁴⁵

*Rom. 7:24-25: miser ego homo: quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? gratia dei per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum.*²⁴⁶

*Prov. 8:22: dominus creavit me in principio viarum suarum.*²⁴⁷

*John 14:30: venit enim princeps mundi huius, et in me non habet quidquam.*²⁴⁸

*Col. 2:14: delens quod adversus nos erat chirographum decreti quod erat contrarium nobis et ipsum tulit de medio affigens illud cruci.*²⁴⁹

These are the intertextual relationships that O'Donnell (1992b: 478-480) and Verheijen (1981: 110-111) both identify. The similarity between the various texts is sufficient that ignoring it would be difficult. The sheer variety of texts is enough to substantiate the claim that this particular passage is suffused with instability. The text is immersed in otherness, other texts that enter the interpretation. However, amidst this cacophony there emerges one text louder than the others: the intertextual relationship with *Rom. 7:22-25* is significantly more prominent in this passage than

²⁴⁴ *John 8:44*: "He was a murderer from the beginning and does not stand in the truth, because there is no truth in him."

²⁴⁵ *Conf. 7.21.27*: "What is a human wretch to do? Who will free him from this death-laden body, if not your grace, given through Jesus Christ our Lord, whom you have begotten coeternal with yourself and created at the beginning of all your works? In him the ruler of this world found nothing that deserved death, yet slew him all the same; and so the record of debt that stood against us was annulled."

²⁴⁶ *Rom. 7:24-25*: "Wretched man that I am! Who will rescue me from this body of death? Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord!"

²⁴⁷ *Prov. 8:22*: "The Lord created me at the beginning of his work, the first of his acts of long ago."

²⁴⁸ *John 14:30*: "[F]or the ruler of this world is coming. He has no power over me."

²⁴⁹ *Col. 2:14-15*: "...erasing the record that stood against us with its legal demands. He set this aside, nailing it to the cross."

the other intertextual relationships. Still, it would be wrong to overemphasise this prominence. While *Rom.* 7:22-25 is a strong presence in *Conf.* 7.21.27, it is still interwoven with other texts. The scriptural texts are also not the only texts at work to destabilize the meaning here. The complicated roles of the author-text(s) and speaker-text(s) also contribute to the polyvalence. Each scriptural text introduces as interpretation possibilities both its own author-text and speaker-text(s). The critic's attention is drawn wherever Paulus/Παῦλος is introduced as author/speaker-text, since the author/speaker-text mentioned that Paulus/Παῦλος is the author of the texts being read in this episode. The intertextual relationship between the person-text of Paulus/Παῦλος introduced by the speaker-text in *Conf.* 7.20.26-7.21.27 and the author-text of *Romans* and other texts attributed to Παῦλος all contribute to producing significance.

The first Pauline text that is encountered after the author/speaker-text starts reporting the reading is *1 Cor.* 4:7. However, the speaker-text of *Conf.* 7.21.27 remains a strong presence here²⁵⁰, and while the voice of Paulus/Παῦλος as author/speaker-text of *1 Cor.* 4:7 does indeed enter into the interpretation and is amplified by the intertextual relationship with the person-text Paulus/Παῦλος mentioned by the author/speaker-text of *Conf.* 7.21.27, it is not strong enough to lead to a confident interpretation that the author/speaker-text of *Conf.* 7.21.27 is replaced with the author/speaker-text of *1 Cor.* 4:7 entirely.

However, there is a strong similarity between *Conf.* 7.21.27 and *Rom.* 7:22-25 (as discussed above). The words that can be associated with *Rom.* 7:22-25 are incorporated within the extended speech of the speaker-text of *Conf.* 7.21.27, all part of the same sentence that starts with *coepi et inveni*. This blending of the various texts in one single sentence allows for the paradoxical possibility of one sentence being

²⁵⁰ There has been little reason to suspend the author/speaker-text of the *Confessions* at the point of the quotation of *1 Cor.* 4:7.

spoken by numerous speaker-texts, changing voice at various points in the sentence. This gives rise to the possibility of a reader realising that the speaker-text, in this case, Paulus/Παῦλος, has been present in the course of the reading all along. This interpretation is amplified by the explicit mention of the person-text Παῦλος by the author/speaker-text earlier. This does have the effect of significantly blurring the boundaries between the two primary speaker-texts, namely Augustinus and Paulus/Παῦλος.

To limit the speaker-text(s) to these two person-texts, however, is not easy. While these two speaker-texts are undoubtedly the strongest in the interpretation, they are constantly undercut, or undermined by other, weaker speaker-texts, which, when taken together, create a strong destabilization of this passage. The presence of the other “lesser” texts in this passage (demonstrated above) serve to undermine the position taken above, that there are two strong speaker-texts in this passage. In short, this is a particularly polyphonic passage, in the sense that many voices can be discerned, all speaking simultaneously. It may serve to look past these voices for a moment (as impossible as the task may seem) and focus on the text without these speaker-texts informing the interpretation.

The first, long sentence describing the speaker-text’s reading of the work(s) of Paulus/Παῦλος begins with two verbs in the first person singular: *et coepi et inveni*. The intertextual relationship with *Matt. 7:7*, *Luke 11:10*, *Isaiah 65:1*, *Rom. 10:20* and *Wis. 13:6* and the theme-text of finding can be identified here. Further support for recognizing the presence of *Isaiah 65:1* and the notion of finding something without searching for it is present here: *et qui de longinquo videre non potest, viam tamen ambulet qua veniat et videat et teneat* (*Conf. 7.21.27*).

In the next sentence, the topic unexpectedly changes to the “law of God”:

etsi condelectetur homo legi dei secundum interiorem hominem, quid faciet de alia lege in membris suis repugnante legi mentis suae et se captivum ducente in lege peccati, quae est in membris eius? (Conf. 7.21.27).²⁵¹

The speaker-text seems to be pondering a question regarding the conflict between two laws within a person. This passage is the first part of *Conf. 7.21.27* that demonstrates a significant similarity to *Romans*, specifically *Rom. 7:22-25*²⁵². Interpreting the intertextual relationship between *Conf. 7.21.27* and *Rom. 7:22-25* by considering the context of *Rom. 7:22-25* may help in understanding this sudden insertion.

The argument of *Rom. 7:7-25* is an explanation of the nature of will and sin. The author/speaker-text of *Rom. 7:7-25* explains that the law (understood here as the law of Moses) is spiritual. A clear distinction between the spiritual and the fleshly is made:

Οἶδαμεν γὰρ ὅτι ὁ νόμος πνευματικός ἐστίν, ἐγὼ δὲ σαρκινός εἰμι πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν (*Rom. 7:14*).²⁵³

The speaker-text describes a conflict between the will to do something and the sinful nature of man:

ὁ γὰρ κατεργάζομαι οὐ γινώσκω· οὐ γὰρ ὁ θέλω τοῦτο πράσσω, ἀλλ’ ὁ μισῶ τοῦτο ποιῶ. εἰ δὲ ὁ οὐ θέλω τοῦτο ποιῶ, σύμφημι τῷ νόμῳ ὅτι καλός.

²⁵¹ See footnote 236.

²⁵² Thomas Martin (2001) gives an excellent exploration of Augustine’s own attempts to interpret *Rom. 7:24-25a*, including a discussion on the passage in question in the *Confessions*. However, as explained in chapter 3.3.1, I will not be considering the author’s own interpretations of *Romans* in my interpretation of the text.

²⁵³ *Rom. 7:14*: “For we know that the law is spiritual; but I am of the flesh, sold into slavery under sin.”

νυνὶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγὼ κατεργάζομαι αὐτὸ ἀλλ' ἢ οἰκοῦσα ἐν ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτία
(*Rom. 7:15-17*).²⁵⁴

The author-text envisions two laws struggling against each other:

συνήδομαι γὰρ τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον, βλέπω δὲ
ἕτερον νόμον ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν μου ἀντιστρατευόμενον τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ νοός
μου καὶ αἰχμαλωτίζοντά με ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς
μέλεσίν μου (*Rom. 7:22-23*).²⁵⁵

The discussion on the nature of these conflicting wills culminates in the dramatic cry:

Ταλαίπωρος ἐγὼ ἄνθρωπος· τίς με ῥύσεται ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου
τούτου; (*Rom. 7:24*).²⁵⁶

The section discussed above, *Rom. 7:7-25*, is known to be a source of numerous conflicting interpretations (Tobin, 2004: 225)²⁵⁷. This passage is characterised by the extensive use of the first person singular. It is this fact that prompts Tobin (2004: 225) and others to question the identity of the "I" in *Rom. 7:7-25*, beyond assigning it to the author-text, Παῦλος²⁵⁸. The ever-present genre-text of the diatribe contributes the

²⁵⁴ *Rom. 7:15-17*: "I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate. Now if I do what I do not want, I agree that the law is good. But in fact it is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwells within me."

²⁵⁵ *Rom. 7:22-23*: "For I delight in the law of God in my inmost self, but I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind, making me captive to the law of sin that dwells in my members."

²⁵⁶ *Rom. 7:24*: "Wretched man that I am! Who will rescue me from this body of death?"

²⁵⁷ Hultgren devotes an entire appendix to the issue and includes an extensive bibliography on the issue (Hultgren, 2011: 681-691).

²⁵⁸ See Cranfield (1975), Lambrecht (1992) and Fitzmyer (1993) for discussion regarding the possibilities for the identity of the "I" in *Rom. 7:7-25*. Fitzmyer discusses five possible interpretations of the *Ego* (Fitzmyer's own words) in *Rom. 7:7-25*: the first possible interpretation is an autobiographical one, i.e. that the first person singular refers to a younger Παῦλος, before his conversion, though Fitzmyer is not convinced by this interpretation (1993: 464-465); the second interpretation that Fitzmyer identifies is a psychological one, from the perspective of a young Jewish boy, before his passing under Mosaic law; the third is from the perspective of Adam, the father of the

possibility of an interlocutor's presence; however, when and how the interlocutor speaks should be considered in more depth. Another possibility is that of *prosopopoeia*, or speech-in-character, suggested by Stowers²⁵⁹. The possibility of an autobiographical representation can also be considered.

According to Song, *Rom. 7:7-25* demonstrates formulae which are characteristic of the diatribe and as such, act as markers for a fictional dialogue with an imaginary interlocutor (2004: 100). One such formula is the *μη γένοιτο* formula, which is found throughout *Romans*. Song argues that this formula introduces the teacher's response to the interlocutor's objection. He describes the dialogue between the interlocutor and the teacher as follows (Song, 2004: 100-101):

<i>Rom. 7.7a</i>	Interlocutor	Τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν; ὁ νόμος ἁμαρτία;
	Teacher	μη γένοιτο·
<i>Rom. 7:7b-12</i>		ἀλλὰ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν οὐκ ἔγνων εἰ μή διὰ νόμου· τὴν τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμίαν οὐκ ἤδειν εἰ μή ὁ νόμος ἔλεγεν· ...
<i>Rom. 7:13a</i>	Interlocutor	Τὸ οὖν ἀγαθὸν ἐμοὶ ἐγένετο θάνατος;
	Teacher	μη γένοιτο·
<i>Rom. 7:13b-25</i>		ἀλλ' ἡ ἁμαρτία, ἵνα φανῇ ἁμαρτία, διὰ τοῦ

human race, though Fitzmyer considers such an interpretation largely eisegetical (Fitzmyer, 1993: 464); the fourth interpretation, which Fitzmyer argues is followed by Augustine himself, is as a Christian, and the author's own experience as a new convert, though he queries the presence of Mosaic law, being far more relevant to a Jewish context (Fitzmyer, 1993: 464); finally, Fitzmyer considers a cosmic-historical dimension, a dramatized account of the experience of all human beings who are unsaved (Fitzmyer, 1993: 464).

²⁵⁹ This proposition was discussed in his essay "*Romans 7.7-25 as a Speech-in-Character (προσωποποιία)*" (1995).

ἀγαθοῦ μοι κατεργαζομένη θάνατον, ἵνα γένηται
καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἁμαρτωλὸς ἢ ἁμαρτία διὰ τῆς
ἐντολῆς.

...²⁶⁰

The first person singular verbs and pronouns in this passage are thus, according to Song, representative of two different person-texts, i.e. the interlocutor and the teacher²⁶¹.

This observation does beg the question: is the “I” of the teacher equal to the “I” of the author-text, Παῦλος? Song recognizes the complexity of such pronominal expressions in *Romans* and makes a comparison with Epictetus’ *Discourses* I.1.21-25 and III.12.7 (Song, 2004: 108). According to Song, the use of the “I” in these passages is a generalizing pronoun, which he interprets as meaning “men” or “man/you” (Song, 2004: 109). Similarly, Wolter insists that the “I” in this passage does not refer to the author-text:

“Weil Paulus die Klage aber nicht selbst erhebt, sondern als fiktiven Ausruf dem Ich in den Mund legt, handelt es sich bei ihr eigentlich um eine für die Leser bestimmte Mitteilung” (Wolter, 2014: 461).

Song argues against assigning the “I” in *Rom.* 7:7-25 to Παῦλος:

This “I” section is performed in very diatribal rhetoric. Therefore, what is presented here is not Paul’s confession, but pedagogical argumentation...
Therefore, by fully appreciating the diatribe techniques in *Romans* 7, the

²⁶⁰ *Rom.* 7:7-13: “What then should we say? That the law is sin? By no means! Yet, if it had not been for the law, I would not have known sin. I would not have known what it is to covet if the law had not said ... Did what is good, then, bring death to me? By no means! It was sin, working death in me through what is good, in order that sin might be shown to be sin, and through the commandment might become sinful beyond measure.”

²⁶¹ For example, ἐμοὶ for the interlocutor in *Rom.* 7:13, ἔγνω for the teacher in *Rom.* 7:7.

empathic “I” in the chapter cannot be read as merely referring to Paul himself. Paul employs the representative “I” for the most intensive style of argument in order to disclose humanity’s “wretched” (*talaipōros*) status. Paul’s rhetorical strategy here is more likely to be *pathos* (emotion), rather than *ethos* (character) (Song, 2004: 111).

Song’s interpretation highlights a few aspects of this text that can be explored further. The possibility that the “I” (ascribed to the teacher) in *Rom. 7:7-25* is not Παῦλος leaves an empty variable in the interpretation that seeks to be filled. Song’s interpretation of this linguistic variable is to fill it with a generalized subject, “man” or “humanity”. It would be possible to direct this generalized subject to the reader as well. Thus the reader him/herself speaks the words of *Rom. 7:7-25*, potentially filling both roles of teacher and interlocutor. There are significant problems with such broad interpretations, however. Song’s interpretation fails to convincingly explain the sudden emotional outburst that occurs in *Rom. 7:24* and the response and resolution that follows in *Rom. 7:25*. In Song’s interpretation, *Rom. 7:24* is spoken by the teacher. However, a strong argument could be made for the interlocutor, or, if the possibility is considered, another person-text outside of the diatribe dialogue paradigm. Alternatively, if these words are indeed spoken by the teacher, his/her arguments seem to lead him/her to a conclusion of despair. This interpretation is resisted by the genre-text of the diatribe, as the teacher is expected to occupy a position of authority. A teacher that displays such significant doubt does not convey confidence and authority.

Song’s position that the passage is written to evoke *pathos* is perhaps more convincing. However, the manner in which this *pathos* is characterised can be investigated in more depth. The *pathos* evoked by the cry in *Rom. 7:24* is a product of the discussion that precedes it: the reader follows the argumentation offered by the speaker-text, only to realise its inevitable conclusion. The response to this cry is offered immediately:

χάρις δὲ τῷ θεῷ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν. Ἄρα οὖν αὐτὸς ἐγὼ τῷ μὲν νοῖ δουλεύω νόμῳ θεοῦ τῇ δὲ σαρκὶ νόμῳ ἁμαρτίας. (*Rom.* 7:25).²⁶²

The pronominal expression shifts from the first person singular to the first person plural in ἡμῶν, only to shift back to the singular with ἐγὼ and δουλεύω. Furthermore, the first person singular is strengthened: αὐτὸς ἐγὼ. To assign a generic subject to this αὐτὸς ἐγὼ is resisted: the αὐτὸς strengthens the force of the speaker-text's presence and resists the association of more generic person-texts such as humanity. Instead, the voice of the author-text, Παῦλος, becomes stronger again. Thus the cry of *Rom.* 7:24 may also be the cry of Παῦλος, perhaps a younger Παῦλος. The older Παῦλος (or perhaps Παῦλος at the point of his conversion) responds in *Rom.* 7:25 to his younger self with the knowledge he has gained thus far. Alternatively, this could be the cry of Παῦλος at the time of writing *Romans*, torn by the perpetual struggle that continues within him. In this way, the *pathos* evoked stems from the personal confession rather than generalized rhetoric.

While some aspects of the diatribe can be used to explain the dialogue-like nature of *Rom.* 7:7-25, it does not serve to describe all the interpretive nuances of this particularly challenging passage. Stowers (1995: 180) considers the characterisation of the "I" in *Rom.* 7:7-25 as an example of *prosopopoeia*²⁶³. This figure of speech has much in common with the notion of the interlocutor in the diatribe: both figures represent someone other than the author speaking. Jewett observes that the debate over the possibility of *prosopopoeia* and the identity of the "I" remains unsolved (2007: 444). *Prosopopoeia* demonstrates the same interpretive difficulties as the figure

²⁶² *Rom.* 7:25: "Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord! So then, with my mind I am a slave to the law of God, but with my flesh I am a slave to the law of sin."

²⁶³ Stowers defines *prosopopoeia*, or speech-in-character as "a rhetorical and literary technique in which the speaker or writer produces speech that represents not himself or herself but another person or type of character" (Stowers, 1995: 180). I do not intend to discuss the validity of Stowers' claim or the historical or generic aspects of *prosopopoeia*. Rather, I consider the effect such a perspective would have on the interpretation, particularly in the interpretation of the speaker-text.

of the interlocutor: although the words are written by the author-text, they are (seemingly) not spoken by the author-text. This is dependent on the reader's perspective.

To support his claim, Stowers describes the change of voice that occurs in *Rom. 7:7*:

The section begins in v. 7 with an abrupt change in voice following a rhetorical question that serves as a transition from Paul's authorial voice that has previously addressed the readers explicitly described by the letter in 6.1-7.6 (Stowers, 1995: 191).

This change of voice, according to Stowers, is characterized by *διαφωνία*, or difference in characterization from the authorial voice²⁶⁴. How this *διαφωνία* is evoked is not discussed in much detail: Stowers only notes that the information presented in *Rom. 7:7-25* is not consistent with the biographical information known about the author of *Romans* (Stowers, 1995: 192). Thus Stowers interprets this passage as an imaginary dialogue: the majority of *Rom. 7:7-25* is spoken by this imaginary speaker, whilst the concluding words of the chapter are spoken by the author (Stowers, 1995: 193).

Many of the aforementioned interpretations resist assigning the author-text, Παῦλος, to the role of speaker-text in this passage. The other texts connected with the author-text Παῦλος are thus resisted here as well. The voice of Παῦλος and the authority that it bears is attenuated by the seeming alien presence of another voice, another speaker-text.

The identity of this speaker-text is very difficult to ascertain, if not impossible: certainly many different possibilities could be suggested, but the nature of the text resists any final interpretations: thus the speaker-text in *Rom. 7:7-25* becomes fluid

²⁶⁴ Stowers classifies this change of voice as *ἐναλλαγή* or *μεταβολή* (1995: 191).

and dynamic. Such a dynamic speaker-text can easily transform into another speaker-text: the person-texts in *Romans*, the Jew, the Gentile, the Roman, the sinner, even the reader may be considered a potential candidate for this variable person-text. The wretched man, the *ταλαίπωρος ἄνθρωπος* allows one to associate all of humanity with this speaker-text; it draws the reader *ἐγώ* in as well.

There is a very significant effect of this unstable speaker-text, particularly the distancing of this speaker-text from the author-text, Παῦλος: if the author-text is interpreted as not speaking in most of *Rom. 7:7-25*, to what extent should the statements made be considered the opinion of the author-text? I consider here the statements made by the speaker-text regarding the nature of the two laws and the struggle that man faces between these two forces:

νυνὶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγὼ κατεργάζομαι αὐτὸ ἀλλ' ἡ οἰκοῦσα ἐν ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτία.
(*Rom. 7:17*).²⁶⁵

The possibility exists that this speaker-text, who does not bear the authority of the author-text Παῦλος, if this passage is not interpreted as spoken in his voice, does not represent what the author-text is conveying, but an erroneous conclusion. If this is the case, the author-text's position on the nature of these two laws and the struggle as set out in *Rom. 7:7-25* is called into question. The statements made in *Rom. 7:7-25* can therefore be seen as the words of someone completely different to the author-text, and therefore completely divorced from the author-text.

However, the possibility also exists that these words do indeed represent the author-text's thoughts, formulated in a different manner: the author-text represents the ideas presented in *Rom. 7:7-25* in the voice of one who is struggling with his innate nature. However, the result of this prosopoetic representation is instability: the technique disrupts the text and generates a multitude of potential meanings.

²⁶⁵ *Rom. 7:17*: "But in fact it is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwells within me."

While *Rom.* 7:7-25 does demonstrate significant instability, as has been shown, this context and the instability may shed some light on the interpretive possibilities of *Conf.* 7.21.27, through the strong intertextual relationship between these passages. Consider the two parts of *Conf.* 7.21.27 that demonstrate the strongest similarity with *Rom.* 7:22-25:

Conf. 7.21.27

Rom. 7

*quia, etsi condelectetur homo legi dei secundum interiorem hominem, quid faciet de alia lege in membris suis repugnante legi mentis suae et se captivum ducente in lege peccati, quae est in membris eius?*²⁶⁶

*Rom. 7:22-23: condelector enim legi dei secundum interiorem hominem; video autem legem aliam in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae et captivantem me sub lege peccati quae est in membris meis.*²⁶⁷

*quoniam iustus es, domine, nos autem peccavimus, inique fecimus, impie gessimus, et gravata est super nos manus tua, et iuste traditi sumus antiquo peccatori, praeposito mortis, quia persuasit voluntati nostrae similitudinem voluntatis suae, qua in veritate tua non stetit.*²⁶⁸

quid faciet miser homo? quis eum liberabit de corpore mortis huius, nisi gratia tua per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum, quem genuisti coaeternum et creasti in principio viarum tuarum, in quo princeps huius

*Rom. 7:24-25: miser ego homo: quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? gratia dei per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum.*²⁷⁰

²⁶⁶ See footnote 236.

²⁶⁷ See footnote 237.

²⁶⁸ See footnote 238.

*mundi non invenit quicquam morte
dignum, et occidit eum?*²⁶⁹

The two passages that demonstrate significant similarity with *Rom.* 7:22-25 are divided by a short passage (included above). The most marked difference between the passages from *Conf.* 7.21.27 and *Rom.* 7:22-25 is the person of the verbs: while in *Rom.* 7:7-25 the first person singular is most prominently used, in *Conf.* 7.21.27, the verbs are cast in the third person singular. The subject of *Rom.* 7:22-25 is a strong “ἐγώ”, while *Conf.* 7.21.27 it is “*homo*”. In the short passage that separates the two passages in *Conf.* 7.21.27 demonstrating the similarity with *Rom.* 7:22-25, the first person plural verbs, pronouns and adjectives are used, not the singular forms (*nos* (twice), *peccavimus*, *fecimus*, *gessimus*, *sumus*, *nostrae*).

This difference between the passages in *Conf.* 7.21.27 and *Rom.* 7:22-25 may be interpreted as strange: the *Confessions* is written largely from a first person singular perspective. This “alteration” from first person singular to third person singular could be interpreted as out of place, although such an interpretation would be based on an author-centric view of the text. Nevertheless, there exists a feeling of alienation between *Conf.* 7.21.27 and *Rom.* 7:22-25 as a result of this change: the speaker-text of *Rom.* 7:22-25 becomes attenuated by this transformation. The various potential speaker-texts already identified, Παῦλος, the interlocutor, the younger Παῦλος, Adam, the reader, and others, all of these that have been associated with the linguistic variable “I” are now accrued in the *homo* in *Conf.* 7.21.27, through the strong intertextual relationship between *Conf.* 7.21.27 and *Rom.* 7:22-25. Humanity is interpreted as a potential speaker-text in *Rom.* 7:22-25, and because of this intertextual relationship, this particular interpretation is amplified. The autobiographical element in *Rom.* 7:7-25 may potentially be amplified as well, given

²⁷⁰ See footnote 246.

²⁶⁹ See footnote 245.

the strong autobiographical thematic elements of the *Confessions*, and therefore it may be possible for *Rom.* 7:7-25 to be interpreted as a more personal confession through this intertextual relationship. A question similar to the one that occurs in the interpretation of *Romans* now also arises in the interpretation of *Conf.* 7.21.27: to what extent might it be possible to interpret the words ascribed to the *homo* in *Conf.* 7.21.27 as the personal (though indirect) confession of the author-text?

Identification of the speaker-text of *Rom.* 7:7-25, i.e. the “I”, with the author-text Παῦλος as I have indicated, is strongly resisted (although it remains a possibility) and such resistance may be transferred to *Conf.* 7.21.27. Thus it may be possible to say that the identification of the author/speaker-text with the *homo* in *Conf.* 7.21.27 is resisted, through the intertextual relationship with *Rom.* 7:7-25²⁷¹. However, if the *homo* in *Conf.* 7.21.27 is not equated to the author-text, the identity of the *miser homo* comes into question.

The candidates for the role of *homo* already identified throughout this study can be considered. Humanity in general is the more obvious interpretation. The reader, as part of humanity, may identify strongly with this *homo*. Whether the reader would agree with the plight of this *miser homo* would depend on the reader’s circumstances and interpretation, yet the cry might nevertheless be silently uttered in the reader’s mind. This association may be amplified further if the intertextual relationship with *Rom.* 7:22-25 is established by the reader.

The younger Augustinus might also be considered as a potential candidate for the role of this *miser homo*, much like the younger Παῦλος was considered as a potential candidate for the ταλαίπωρος ἄνθρωπος. The emotional words and sorry plight of this *miser homo* share many similarities with the emotional language used to describe the feelings of the pre-conversion Augustinus, expressed in book 8, which will be

²⁷¹ If it were possible to equate the “I” of *Rom.* 7:7-25 with the *homo* of *Conf.* 7.21.27, as suggested earlier.

discussed in the following chapter. The confession implicit in the cry of the *miser homo*, can potentially be thought of as spoken in the voice of the pre-conversion Augustinus: the ἐγώ in *Rom.* 7:22-25 can be implied through the intertextual relationship between *Conf.* 7.21.27 and *Rom.* 7:22-25, and it would be possible to associate the cry of the ἐγώ with the pre-conversion Augustinus. The post-conversion Augustinus is also a possibility, reflecting the internal struggle that yet persists. Similarly, it might be possible to interpret the perspective of the speaker-text of *Conf.* 7.21.27 outside of time (i.e. not bound to the author-text in time), observing the younger Augustinus. This speaker-text has much in common with the reader, existing, as it were, outside of the events of the *Confessions*, only capable of observing them. The pathos evoked by the words *miser homo* may be seen as an echo of the pathos the reader might experience, while observing the events described by the author/speaker-text.

However, the two passages quoted are divided by a powerful disruption: *quoniam iustus es, domine, nos autem peccavimus, inique fecimus, impie gessimus, et gravata est super nos manus tua, et iuste traditi sumus antiquo peccatori, praeposito mortis, quia persuasit voluntati nostrae similitudinem voluntatis suae, qua in veritate tua non stetit.* (*Conf.* 7.21.27). This passage disrupts the context that has been imported into the reading, namely that of *Rom.* 7:22-25. The first person plural forms (*nos, peccavimus, fecimus, gessimus, sumus, nostrae*) disrupt both the first person singular sense that dominated in the quoted text and the third person singular imprinted on it in *Conf.* 7.21.27. In this way it may be possible to consider this passage as an interpolation, something alien between the two quoted passages. Nevertheless, the context of the quoted texts may spill over into this interpolation through the first person perspective shared between it and *Rom.* 7:22-25. The voice of the speaker-text has altered slightly: the first indication is the sudden introduction of the first person plural, but other indications include the sudden direct address of God (*iustus es, domine*) and the renewed confessional language. The voice of Augustinus is strong:

the similarities with the opening of the *Confessions* allow for an intertextual relationship to be established with *Conf.* 1.1.1. The speaker-text(s) of *Conf.* 1.1.1 can be included as potential speaker-texts in *Conf.* 7.21.27. However, the context of *Rom.* 7:22-25 also allows for the possible interpretations discussed earlier: the speaker-text of this passage in *Conf.* 7.21.27 may also be an example of an imaginary interlocutor, or an example of *prosopopoeia*. If such interpretations are considered, it may have implications for the whole of the *Confessions*: if this voice is interpreted as *prosopopoeia*, it would be possible, through the intertextual relationships that suffuse the *Confessions*, to consider the speaker-text introduced in *Conf.* 1.1.1, as well as subsequent speaker-texts that can be linked or equated to this speaker-text, as an example of *prosopopoeia*, essentially alienating the author-text, Augustinus, from this voice. In other words, if it is possible to consider one instance of *ego*²⁷² as ironic/prosopoetic, it is possible to consider all instances of the *ego* as prosopoetic. The speaker-text of the words in *Conf.* 1.1.1 is no longer Augustinus. Appeals to the author's intention and the autobiographical implications present in the *Confessions* become irrelevant. Interpreted in this way, empowered by the intertextual relationships with *Romans* that allow for such interaction, the author-text Augustinus no longer speaks. This is only one interpretive possibility in the *Confessions*, one potential way in which the *Confessions* could be read: nevertheless, this interpretation does demonstrate the ability of one or more texts to completely disrupt, even retroactively, the interpretation of another text.

8.4. Conclusion

Much like the unstable speaker-text in *Rom.* 7:7-25, there is no small amount of instability in *Conf.* 7.21.27: the dynamic power of the ἐγώ in *Rom.* 7:7-25 carries its force into *Conf.* 7.21.27, despite being transformed into the *miser homo*. A multitude

²⁷² By *ego* here I mean the first person (whether singular or plural) speaker-text, or speaker-texts that might be linked with a first person speaker-text.

of possible facets are introduced through this intertextual relationship: the voices of the author-texts are suddenly resisted; contexts blur and clash. The pathos carried over from *Rom.* 7:7-25 is amplified by this blurring and the depiction of an emotional struggle of *Conf.* 7.21.27, a foreshadowing of the events to come in book 8, is brought into focus.

The power and pathos of *Rom.* 7:7-25 is not limited to *Conf.* 7.21.27. Not only does the emotional and spiritual significance of this episode echo through the rest of the narrative, the intertextual relationship between the *Confessions* and *Rom.* 7:7-25 becomes stronger through more instances of similarity to this passage in book 8 of the *Confessions*.

Chapter 9 *Confessions* 8

9.1. Introduction

Book 8 of the *Confessions* has been described as the climax of the narrative section of the work (Stock, 1996: 75). It contains famous scene of the garden in Milan, the final conversion of Augustinus. The whole of book 8 is replete with conversion narratives, culminating in the conversion narrative of Augustinus himself (O'Donnell, 1992c: 3). The conversion of Augustinus happens as a result of his reading of *Rom.* 13:13, an event which instantly dissolves all of the torment of uncertainty described in books 7 and 8. It is therefore not surprising that so much has been written on the conversion narrative in book 8 of the *Confessions*²⁷³. The relationship between book 8 and *Romans* is not limited to *Rom.* 13:13. Scholars have identified a number of parallels between *Romans* and book 8. Quotations of *Rom.* 7:7-25 in book 7 and 8 have been noted by other scholars, and have been the subject of research regarding the influence of *Romans* 7:7-25 on the author of the *Confessions*, particularly concerning his understanding of the concept of the will²⁷⁴.

The historicity of the conversion scene in *Conf.* 8.12.29-30 and the relative importance of *Rom.* 13:13 for the author of the *Confessions* has also been the subject of much investigation²⁷⁵. Paula Frederiksen (1986: 3) and Thomas Martin (1993: 243) have noted similarities between Augustine's conversion and the conversion of Paul. Martin suggests that Augustine may have self-identified with the apostle (1993: 243). There is a complex relationship between the whole of book 8, leading up to the dramatic conversion narrative, and the *Letter to the Romans*, and this complexity is worth exploring through the lens of intertextuality as established in the conceptual framework in this dissertation.

²⁷³ See O'Meara (1980), Brown (1967), Ferrari (1980, 2003), Frederiksen (1986) and Vaught (2004).

²⁷⁴ See Babcock (1979), Stark (1989), Martin (1993) and BeDuhn (2013).

²⁷⁵ The greatest proponent of the thesis that *Rom.* 13:13 was not that important in the conversion of Augustine is Leo Ferrari (1980, 2003). See also Frederiksen (1986) for a discussion of this matter.

O'Donnell (1992c: 3) has noted seven identifiable citations of *Romans* in book 8: *Rom.* 1.21-22 at *Conf.* 8.1.2, *Rom.* 4.17 at *Conf.* 8.4.9, *Rom.* 7.16-17 at *Conf.* 8.5.11, *Rom.* 7.22-25 at *Conf.* 8.5.12, *Rom.* 7.17 and 20 at *Conf.* 8.10.22, *Rom.* 13.13 at *Conf.* 8.12.29 (Augustinus' conversion), and *Rom.* 14.1 at *Conf.* 8.12.30. Furthermore, he argues that the linear progression of the citations forms a pattern and is an indication that "the whole of [book] 8 is a record of reading Paul, particularly *Romans*" (1992c: 3). O'Donnell sees significance in this progression, and it is not without reason: the linear progression of these quotations is compelling, and it would be difficult not to see some significance in such a profoundly strong linear progression. Verheijen's identification of the quotations nearly matches O'Donnell's, except for a few variations, as indicated below:

<i>Verheijen</i>		<i>O'Donnell</i>	
<i>Romans</i>	<i>Confessions</i>	<i>Romans</i>	<i>Confessions</i>
1:21	8.1.2	1:21	8.1.2
1:22	8.1.2	1:22	8.1.2
4:17	8.4.9	4:17	8.4.9
7:14	8.5.10		
7:16	8.5.10		
7:17	8.5.10		
7:16	8.5.11	7:16	8.5.11
7:17	8.5.11	7:17	8.5.11
7:22	8.5.12	7:22	8.5.12
7:23	8.5.12	7:23	8.5.12

7:24	8.5.12	7:24	8.5.12
7:25	8.5.12	7:25	8.5.12
7:17	8.10.22	7:17	8.10.22
7:20	8.10.22	7:20	8.10.22
3:4	8.10.24		
13:13	8.12.29	13:13	8.12.29
13:14	8.12.29		
14:1	8.12.30	14:1	8.12.30

The biggest difference between the two scholars' indications is the lack of the quotation of *Rom.* 7:14-17 in *Conf.* 8.5.10 in O'Donnell's assignment²⁷⁶, as well as the identification of *Rom.* 3:4 in *Conf.* 8.10.24 by Verheijen. Verheijen's identification is less linear than O'Donnell's as a result. Nevertheless, there is still a significantly strong linear progression in Verheijen's list as well. However, this linear progression needs to be evaluated and its significance explored. The significance of such a linear progression can be investigated through an analysis of the intertextual relationships between *Romans* and the *Confessions* in each instance, as well as the relationships these texts may produce within the *Confessions* itself, with previous chapters. The significance of the linear reading, and the implications thereof, should be critically evaluated.

²⁷⁶ O'Donnell does note the possible reference to *Rom.* 7:14-17 at *Conf.* 8.5.10 in his commentary of that passage (1992c: 33), but does not list it in his discussion of the list of *Romans* quotations in book 8 (1992c: 3). It could be that O'Donnell's methodology requires a stronger level of similarity than Verheijen's.

9.2. *Conf.* 8.1.1-8.1.2

The first quotation identified by both Verheijen and O'Donnell is *Rom.* 1:21 and 1:22 found in *Conf.* 8.1.2. O'Donnell also identifies a link between *Conf.* 8.1.1 and *Rom.* 1:21, although this is not strong enough for him to consider it a citation according to his criteria (1992c: 4):

Conf. 8.1.1*Rom.* 1:21

*deus meus, recorder in gratiarum actione quia cognoscentes deum, non ut deum tibi et confitear misericordias tuas super glorificaverunt aut gratias egerunt;*²⁷⁸
*me.*²⁷⁷

The intertextual relationship between these passages is at first glance not particularly strong, but this is not the first time an intertextual relationship with *Rom.* 1:21 has been identified here. Quotations of *Rom.* 1:20-24 have been identified in *Conf.* 5.3.5, 5.4.7, 7.9.14-15 and 7.20.26, where they have significant strength. This previous repetition and amplification allows this small quotation to become stronger and more significant. It may therefore be important to explore the significance of the intertextual relationship between *Conf.* 8.1.1 and *Rom.* 1:21, and the other intertextual relationships with *Rom.* 1:18-32 already identified.

The other contexts in which quotations of *Rom.* 1:18-32 have appeared were largely characterised by a certain censorious tone (whether interpreted ironically, in the sense of being spoken by an interlocutor, or not), especially in *Conf.* 5.3.5 and *Conf.* 7.9.15. The context is inverted here: the speaker-text, Augustinus, exhorts himself to recall God's mercies, *in giving thanks* to him. Whereas the speaker-text in the other chapters where *Rom.* 1:20-24 was quoted was accusing the potential target of not giving thanks, in *Conf.* 8.1.1, the speaker-text affirms that he is giving thanks to God.

²⁷⁷ *Conf.* 8.1.1 "In a spirit of thankfulness let me recall the mercies you lavished on me, O my God; to you let me confess them."

²⁷⁸ See footnote 149.

This generates a clear distance between the speaker-text of *Conf.* 8.1.1 and the potential target of the previous censure, possibly even putting some doubt on the potential irony present in the passages where *Rom.* 1:20-24 is quoted. If the speaker-text of *Conf.* 8.1.1 and *Conf.* 5.3.5, 5.4.7, 7.9.14-15 and 7.20.26 are considered the same, the force of the irony in the form of the interlocutor is attenuated. Alternatively, if the irony is permitted its power, other interpretations may be possible: the speaker-text can be interpreted within a certain temporal progression, undergoing certain changes and conversions as the narrative progresses. Having undergone the events of book 7, the speaker-text, possibly the Augustinus at the time of the events at the beginning of book 8, has come to an understanding of God through the events of book 7 (*cognoscentes deum*) and therefore is able to now properly give thanks (*gratias egerunt*). This interpretation allows the critic to assign the speaker-text to an Augustinus at a specific time in the narrative described in the *Confessions*, as opposed to the Augustinus at the time of writing the *Confessions* introduced at the beginning of the work, as discussed in Chapter 4.3. The voice of the Augustinus who has experienced the intellectual conversion described in book 7 is clearly audible, amplified by the intertextual relationship between *Rom.* 1:18-32 and *Conf.* 7.9.13-15.

However, the voice of the post-conversion Augustinus²⁷⁹ potentially heard in book 1 of the *Confessions* is not absent in *Conf.* 8.1.1. Intertextual connections with *Conf.* 1.1.1 can be identified in this passage as well. The verb *confitear* evokes the title and what follows. The thematic element of praise, which is strongly evoked by *Conf.* 1.1.1, is also present: *sacrificem tibi sacrificium laudis* (*Conf.* 8.1.1). The relationship with *Conf.* 1.1.1 is even further strengthened through a quotation of *Ps.* 75:2: *magnum et mirabile nomen eius* (*Conf.* 8.1.1)²⁸⁰. The word *magnum* and the book of *Psalms*²⁸¹ share an

²⁷⁹ In other words, the Augustinus at the time of writing the *Confessions*.

²⁸⁰ *Ps.* 75:2: *notus in Iudaea deus, in Israhel: magnum nomen eius.*

²⁸¹ While the specific *Psalms* recognized in *Conf.* 8.1.1 is not recognized in *Conf.* 1.1.1, the book of *Psalms* is, and the intertextual relationship is established on these grounds. The *Psalms* are the most quoted book of the Bible, according to Verheijen's reckoning, and so it is difficult to ignore their presence

intertextual relationship with the opening words of the *Confessions*: *magnus es, domine, et laudabilis valde* (*Conf.* 1.1.1). These intertextual relationships increase the volume of the voice heard in the opening lines of the *Confessions* here at the opening of book 8.

In *Conf.* 8.1.2, it is possible to identify a quotation of *Rom.* 1:21-22 again, further strengthening the intertextual relationship in *Conf.* 8.1.1²⁸²:

Conf. 8.1.2

Rom. 1:21-22

et est aliud genus impiorum, qui quia cognoscentes deum, non ut deum cognoscentes deum non sicut deum glorificaverunt aut gratias egerunt; sed glorificaverunt aut gratias egerunt. in hoc evanuerunt in cogitationibus suis et quoque incideram, et dextera tua suscepit obscuratum est insipiens cor eorum, me et inde ablatum posuisti ubi dicentes enim se esse sapientes stulti facti convalerem, quia dixisti homini, 'ecce sunt.²⁸⁴ pietas est sapientia,' et, 'noli velle videri sapiens, quoniam dicentes se esse sapientes stulti facti sunt.'²⁸³

throughout the *Confessions*. For an excellent, though dated, exploration of the *Psalms* quotations in the *Confessions*, see Knauer's *Psalmenzitate in Augustins Konfessionen* (1955).

²⁸² I discuss this passage, which occurs at the end of *Conf.* 8.1.2, first, because of its thematic links through the quotation from *Rom.* 1:21-22. A discussion of the passage preceding this one occurs at the end of this section. *Conf.* 8.1.2 opens with a passage on the author/speaker-text's struggle with celibacy that I do not discuss here as a result of the focus on the intertextual relationships.

²⁸³ *Conf.* 8.1.2: "But there are impious people of another type, who do recognize God yet have not glorified him as God, nor given him thanks. Into that error too I had formerly blundered, but your right hand grasped me, plucked me out of it and put me in a place where I could be healed, for you have told us that *reverence for God—that is wisdom*, and warned us, *Do not give yourself airs for wisdom*, because *those who believed themselves wise have sunk into folly.*"

²⁸⁴ See footnote 149.

The verb *incideram* has the ability to quote the context of *Conf.* 3.6.10²⁸⁵, discussed in chapter 5.2. This has the effect of quoting the passages connected to the Manichaeans and the intertextual relationships connected to them, including *Rom.* 1.20-24 and *Conf.* 5.3.3-5 (discussed in Chapter 6), and may further strengthen other intertextual relationships where *Rom.* 1:20-24 is identified, particularly where *Rom.* 1:20-24 is interpreted as targeting potential Manichaean person/speaker-texts or interlocutors.

The theme of pride, quoted by the intertextual relationship between *Conf.* 8.1.2 and *Conf.* 3.6.10, and the statement *dicentes enim se esse sapientes stulti facti sunt*, is thus also potentially present in *Conf.* 8.1.2. Furthermore, the speaker-text identifies himself as one who had been of the kind who did not know God or give him thanks. Given the potential intertextual relationship with *Conf.* 3.6.10, it would be possible to interpret the *hoc* in *in hoc quoque incideram* (*Conf.* 8.1.2) as referring to Augustinus' time as a Manichaean. The theme of pride serves to amplify such an interpretation, as well as the context of *Conf.* 5.3.3-5, potentially quoted through the intertextual relationship with *Rom.* 1:20-24²⁸⁶.

As in previous instances discussed in Chapter 6.4 and Chapter 7.3, the original context of *Rom.* 1:21-22 also injects a significant amount of instability into the interpretation of *Conf.* 8.1.2 through the potential presence of the interlocutor. The force of the original context, i.e. the censorious diatribe, if not interpreted ironically, allows this passage to be interpreted as both critical (as the speaker-text is criticising a group, the *genus impiorum*, *qui cognoscentes deum non sicut deum glorificaverunt aut gratias egerunt*), and self-critical (since the speaker-text includes himself amongst this *genus impiorum*). The voice of the potential interlocutor is less easy to hear, due to the presence of the self-critical speaker-text. In the genre-text of diatribe, the

²⁸⁵ itaque *incidi* in homines superbe delirantes, carnales nimis et loquaces, in quorum ore laquei diaboli et viscum confectum commixtione syllabarum nominis tui et domini Iesu Christi et paraleti consolatoris nostri spiritus sancti. (*Conf.* 3.6.10). See footnote 119.

²⁸⁶ Manichaean emphasis on knowledge over faith also contributes to reading the reference to *dicentes enim se esse sapientes stulti facti sunt* as well applicable to this group (Coyle, 1999: 522).

interlocutor's opinions are typically represented as erroneous and false, and the conclusions the interlocutor draws are demonstrated to be wrong²⁸⁷. Because the speaker-text in *Conf.* 8.1.2 includes himself amongst the *genus impiorum*, the validity of the statement is hard to question. The statement made by the speaker-text in *Conf.* 8.1.2 regarding falling into this *genus impiorum* is quite factual, especially if the fact that this passage may refer to Augustinus' time as a Manichaean, through the intertextual relationship discussed in *Conf.* 8.1.1 and the other texts discussed in *Conf.* 8.1.2. Therefore there is little reason to lay suspicion on the validity of the statement in *Conf.* 8.1.2, and the possibility of interpreting the speaker-text in *Conf.* 8.1.2 as an interlocutor is resisted. There are many interpretive possibilities that stem from this conclusion. Without the interlocutor's voice, there is little to resist the conclusions made earlier regarding the opinions voiced in *Rom.* 1:18-32²⁸⁸.

The theme of natural theology may also potentially be quoted by *Rom.* 1:18-32. Because of the impact such a powerful theme-text may have on the interpretation, it is worth evaluating in this context. This theme is once again strengthened by a quotation from *Wisdom* 13:

Conf. 8.1.2

Wis. 13:1

*vani sunt certe omnes homines quibus non inest dei scientia, nec de his quae videntur bona potuerunt invenire eum qui est. at ego iam non eram in illa vanitate.*²⁸⁹

*vani sunt certe omnes homines quibus non inest dei scientia, nec de his quae videntur bona, non potuerunt scire eum qui est, neque operibus attendentes agnoverunt artificem.*²⁹⁰

²⁸⁷ See chapter 3.6.

²⁸⁸ The passage in *Romans* identified as the indictment.

²⁸⁹ *Conf.* 8.1.2: "How foolish are they who know not God! So many good things before their eyes, yet *Him Who Is* they fail to see. I was trapped in that foolishness no longer."

²⁹⁰ See footnote 150.

The intertextual relationship between the passages from *Conf.* 8.1.2 and *Wis.* 13:1 is very strong. One small but significant difference can be noted: *Conf.* 8.1.2 has *invenire* while *Wis.* 13:1 has *scire*. The theme-texts of seeking and finding are introduced into the context. This has the effect of also evoking links to other texts associated with this theme, such as *Matt.* 7:7 and *Isaiah* 65:1, as demonstrated earlier.

Combined with the intertextual relationship with *Rom.* 1:18-32, the shared thematic element of natural theology becomes even stronger in *Conf.* 8.1.2. However, the reader's memory of the implications of *Isaiah* 65:1 may cause him/her to resist this theme (as discussed in Chapter 6); it injects further instability into the interpretation.

The statements made by the speaker-text of *Conf.* 8.1.2 regarding the knowledge of God should be evaluated against the backdrop of a large number of competing textual elements: the speaker-text in *Conf.* 8.1.2 seems to be quite convinced that it is possible to know God through observation of creation:

nec de his quae videntur bona potuerunt invenire eum qui est. at ego iam non eram in illa vanitate. transcederam eam et contestante universa creatura inveneram te creatorem nostrum et verbum tuum apud te deum tecumque unum deum, per quod creasti omnia. (Conf. 8.1.2).²⁹¹

The verbs of perception *videntur* and *contestante*, as well as the quotation of *Wis.* 13:1 makes for a strong case for natural theology in this statement. The speaker-text makes a bold statement here: *inveneram te*. This statement is not qualified or elaborated on, yet this moment has been predicted by numerous instances of *quaerere* throughout the *Confessions*. The speaker of these words is ambiguous: Augustinus, the author-text, is the most obvious candidate; however, the precise temporal

²⁹¹ *Conf.* 8.1.2: "So many good things before their eyes, yet *Him Who Is* they fail to see. I was trapped in that foolishness no longer, for I had left it behind by hearkening to the concerted witness of your whole creation, and had discovered you, our creator, and your Word, who dwells with you and is with you the one sole God, through whom you have created all things."

assignment of this speaker-text is less obvious. The voice of Augustinus at the time of writing the *Confessions* will always have a strong presence, however, the Augustinus at the time of the events at the beginning of *Conf.* 8 may also be considered. If this Augustinus is considered as a potential speaker-text here, then this Augustinus has already found God at this particular time. The intellectual conversion and the reading of Paul that followed, described in book 7 of the *Confessions*, would be the best time to associate with this finding of God. However, despite the strong presence of the theme of natural theology in *Conf.* 8.1.2, Augustinus' discovery of God did not come through the contemplation of nature or the universe, but through scriptural revelation predicated by an intellectual epiphany. Furthermore, it is God who, so the speaker-text asserts, actively delivered him: *et dextera tua suscepit me et inde ablatum posuisti ubi convalerem*. Without both the intellectual conversion (initiated by God, according to the speaker-text in *Conf.* 7.9.13) and the scriptural revelation, Augustinus would not have discovered God, at least, not in the form of Christ, who was markedly absent in the books of the Platonists. The ambiguity created by the possibility of a belief in natural theology in the author/speaker-text through the intertextual relationship with *Rom.* 1:18-32 and *Wis.* 13:1-9 and the lack of natural revelation in the actual narrative in *Conf.* 7 generates no small amount of uncertainty to this scene. That the Augustinus here would consider his younger self and the people he used to associate with as this *genus impiorum* is relatively clear, but the speaker-text's insistence that he found God through the witness of creation, i.e. a belief in natural theology, does not seem to agree with the record of the events provided in the preceding paragraphs of the *Confessions*. The nature of God's revelation to Augustinus is not made clear, only Augustinus' potential criticism of those who do not know God, if the statement is not taken ironically.

The role of *Romans* in *Conf.* 8.1.1-2 is quite complex and difficult to ascertain. *Rom.* 1:18-32 is a powerful text, made even more powerful through being quoted on

multiple occasions throughout the *Confessions*. These quotations collect contexts, linking them together, strengthening the quotations, and allowing for significant disruption to the interpretation. The interweaving of *Rom.* 1:18-32 and *Wis.* 13 within the text of the *Confessions* is an excellent example of how two texts, quoted in proximity, serve to enhance the interpretive possibilities and generate an explosion of meaning.

9.3. *Conf.* 8.4.9

Following the confession in *Conf.* 8.1.2, the speaker-text describes how he went to Simplicianus with his uncertainties (*Conf.* 8.2.3). Augustinus told Simplicianus about his discovery of the books of the Platonists, translated by Victorinus (*Conf.* 8.2.3). Simplicianus told Augustinus the tale of Victorinus' conversion (*Conf.* 8.2.3 – 5). The speaker-text then interprets the narrative with an exploration on the nature of salvation and conversions such as Victorinus' (*Conf.* 8.3.6 - 8.4.9).

The quotation of *Romans* identified by both Verheijen and O'Donnell near the end of *Conf.* 8.4.9 is challenging to interpret. The particular significance of the quotation, the implications of blending the context of *Romans* with that of the *Confessions*, is difficult to ascertain. The wider context within which this section of *Conf.* 8.4.9 occurs is a discussion on the relative value of things, especially conversions, determined by the difference between the initial and final states: *plus enim hostis vincitur in eo quem plus tenet et de quo plures tenet. plus autem superbos tenet nomine nobilitatis et de his plures nomine auctoritatis* (*Conf.* 8.4.9). The author/speaker-text's argument is that someone like Victorinus, who, in the author/speaker-text's opinion, had fallen very far and held many others in wickedness, is far more valuable a convert than someone who is already righteous. The quotation itself is preceded by a precaton that the weak never be considered less than the strong in God's eyes:

absit enim ut in tabernaculo tuo prae pauperibus accipiantur personae divitum aut prae ignobilibus nobiles, quando potius infirma mundi elegisti ut confunderes fortia,

et ignobilia huius mundi elegisti et contemptibilia, et ea quae non sunt tamquam sint, ut ea quae sunt evacuares. (Conf. 8.4.9).²⁹²

This passage demonstrates a fleeting similarity to *Rom. 4:17*:

[deus] qui vivificat mortuos et vocat ea quae non sunt, quasi sint. (Rom. 4:17).²⁹³

The similarity between *Conf. 8.4.9* and *Rom. 4:17* is not particularly strong: the length of the quotation is not significant and the nature of the quotation, i.e. the word use, does not result in a strong identification of this quotation. There is nothing particularly specific in the actual words used in this quotation: pronouns, relative pronouns and equitive verbs. There is little in the way of thematic elements that can be identified by this collection of words. However, the similarity between *Conf. 8.4.9* and *Rom. 4:17* allows for the possibility to look past lexical similarity and permit the context to be quoted through the intertextual relationship. A consideration of the contexts of these two passages may yield possible interpretations beyond mere similarity.

The context of *Rom. 4:17* is a discussion of the law and an argument by the author-text regarding the status of Abraham before and after his circumcision. The author-text makes the argument that Abraham was justified before his circumcision, not after or because of it:

καὶ σημεῖον ἔλαβεν περιτομῆς σφραγίδα τῆς δικαιοσύνης τῆς πίστεως τῆς ἐν τῇ ἀκροβυστίᾳ (*Rom. 4:11*).²⁹⁴

²⁹² *Conf. 8.4.9*: “Forbid it, Lord, that rich personages should ever be more welcome in your tabernacle than the poor, or the nobility than lowly folk, when your own preferential choice fell upon the weak things of this world in order to shame the strong, upon lowly things, contemptible things and nonentities, as though they really were, to set at nought the things that are.”

²⁹³ *Rom. 4:17*: “...who gives life to the dead and calls into existence the things that do not exist.”

²⁹⁴ *Rom. 4:11*: “He received the sign of circumcision as a seal of the righteousness that he had by faith while he was still uncircumcised.”

According to Fitzmyer, the position of the author is even stronger: “Abraham’s status of justification before God not only did not depend on his adoption of circumcision, but did not depend even on his observance of the law” (Fitzmyer, 1993: 383). Thus neither law nor circumcision have anything to do with justification before God: the circumcision Abraham received existed merely as a sign of this justification (according to the author of *Rom.* 4:11) and the law only brings punishment (*Rom.* 4:15). Fitzmyer conjectures that *Rom.* 4:17 may possibly be an indirect quotation of a Jewish liturgical formula²⁹⁵ and considers it more likely that this is a reference to the dead womb of Sarah who would conceive Isaac (1993: 386).

There is little in the context of *Rom.* 4:11-17 that would contribute significantly to the signification potential of *Conf.* 8.4.9: there are few points of contact between the two passages. The brevity of the quotation and the lack of contact points between the context of *Rom.* 4.11-16 and *Conf.* 8.4.9 attenuates the strength of this quotation, and as such, undermines O’Donnell’s assertion that book 8 of the *Confessions* is a reading of *Romans*, an interpretation he bases on the linear progression of the quotations he identifies (1992c: 3). However, there are considerably more powerful quotations in *Conf.* 8.5.10-12 and the following sections that may make his position more convincing, as well as contribute to the vast signifying potential of the text.

9.4. *Conf.* 8.5.10-12

Conf. 8.5.10-8.5.12 demonstrates significant similarities with *Rom.* 7:14-25, both formally and thematically. Although *Rom.* 7:22-25 is also quoted in *Conf.* 7.21.27, there is a significant difference between the passages in *Conf.* 7 and that in *Conf.* 8, and the intertextual relationships evoked by *Rom.* 7:22-25 in each case. *Conf.* 8.5.10 begins with the speaker-text’s expression of his emotional reaction to Simplicianus’ story:

²⁹⁵ Fitzmyer cites *Shemoneh Esreh* 2: “You, O Lord, are mighty forever, you who make the dead live” (1993: 386).

sed ubi mihi homo tuus Simplicianus de Victorino ista narravit, exarsi ad imitandum: ad hoc enim et ille narraverat (Conf. 8.5.10).²⁹⁶

A few lines further on, the speaker-text describes his subsequent experience of an internal battle within himself, despite his desire to imitate the conversion:

velle meum tenebat inimicus et inde mihi catenam fecerat et constrinxerat me... voluntas autem nova quae mihi esse coeperat, ut te gratis colerem fruique te vellem, deus, sola certa iucunditas, nondum erat idonea ad superandam priorem vetustate roboratam. ita duae voluntates meae, una vetus, alia nova, illa carnalis, illa spiritalis, confligebant inter se atque discordando dissipabant animam meam. (Conf. 8.5.10).²⁹⁷

This passage demonstrates a small, but significant similarity to *Rom.* 7:14:

scimus enim quod lex spiritalis est; ego autem carnalis sum, venumdatum sub peccato. (Rom. 7:14).²⁹⁸

The subject of *Conf.* 8.5.10 is *voluntas*: forms of *velle* occur twice; *voluntas* occurs four times. Both Verheijen (1981: 288) and O'Donnell (1992c: 33) see thematic parallels with *Rom.* 7:16-17 as well:

si autem, quod nolo, illud facio, consentio legi quoniam bona. nunc autem iam non ego operor illud, sed, quod habitat in me peccatum. (Rom. 7:16-17).²⁹⁹

²⁹⁶ *Conf.* 8.5.10: "On hearing this story I was fired to imitate Victorinus; indeed it was to this end that your servant Simplicianus had related it."

²⁹⁷ *Conf.* 8.5.10: "The enemy had my power of willing in his clutches, and from it had forged a chain to bind me... A new will had begun to emerge in me, the will to worship you disinterestedly and enjoy you, O God, our only sure felicity; but it was not yet capable of surmounting that earlier will strengthened by inveterate custom. And so the two wills fought it out—the old and the new, the one carnal, the other spiritual—and in their struggle tore my soul apart."

²⁹⁸ *Rom.* 7:14: "For we know that the law is spiritual; but I am of the flesh, sold into slavery under sin."

²⁹⁹ *Rom.* 7:16-17: "Now if I do what I do not want, I agree that the law is good. But in fact it is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwells within me."

Further similarities with *Rom.* 7:16-17 can be identified in the opening lines of *Conf.* 8.5.11, conveying the same idea:

*sic intellegebam me ipso experimento id quod legeram, quomodo caro concupisceret adversus spiritum et spiritus adversus carnem, ego quidem in utroque, sed magis ego in eo quod in me approbabam quam in eo quod in me improbabam. ibi enim magis iam non ego, quia ex magna parte id patiebar invitus quam faciebam volens, sed tamen consuetudo adversus me pugnacior ex me facta erat, quoniam volens quo nollem perveneram. (*Conf.* 8.5.11).³⁰⁰*

The strongest similarity with *Rom.* 7:7-25 in this section (*Conf.* 8.5.10-12) occurs in *Conf.* 8.5.12:

Conf. 8.5.12

Rom. 7:22-25

frustra condelectabar legi tuae secundum interiorem hominem, cum alia lex in membris meis repugnaret legi mentis meae et captivum me duceret in lege peccati quae in membris meis erat. lex enim peccati est violentia consuetudinis, qua trahitur et tenetur etiam invitus animus eo merito quo in eam volens inlabitur. miserum ergo me quis liberaret de corpore mortis huius nisi gratia tua per Iesum Christum, dominum *condelector enim legi dei secundum interiorem hominem; video autem legem aliam in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae et captivantem me sub lege peccati quae est in membris meis. miser ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? gratia dei per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum. (*Rom.* 7:22-25).³⁰²*

³⁰⁰ *Conf.* 8.5.11: "I thus came to understand from my own experience what I had read, how the flesh lusts against the spirit and the spirit strives against the flesh. I was aligned with both, but more with the desires I approved in myself than with those I frowned upon, for in these latter I was not really the agent, since for the most part I was enduring them against my will rather than acting freely. All the same, the force of habit that fought against me had grown fiercer by my own doing, because I had come willingly to this point where I now wished not to be."

nostrum? (*Conf.* 8.5.12).³⁰¹

Rom. 7:7-25 and *Conf.* 8.5.10-12, as well as *Conf.* 8.10.22, share many potent thematic elements, as well as the significant lexical similarities as noted by Verheijen and O'Donnell. The notion of a struggle between two forces is the most significant parallel between these passages. However, there is a significant difference between these two struggles. In *Rom.* 7:7-25, the struggle exists between two laws:

συνήδομαι γὰρ τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον, βλέπω δὲ ἕτερον νόμον ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν μου ἀντιστρατευόμενον τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ νοός μου καὶ αἰχμαλωτίζοντά με ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν μου. (*Rom.* 7:22-23).³⁰³

In *Conf.* 8.5.10, the speaker-text describes the struggle between two wills, not laws³⁰⁴. Through the intertextual relationship established by the similarity between these *Rom.* 7:22-25 and *Conf.* 8.5.10, it may be possible to equate the two concepts; therefore, it may be possible to say that the two words or concepts are used interchangeably. The concept of will is not absent in *Rom.* 7:7-25: the verb θέλω is used seven times in *Rom.* 7:7-25. The word *lex* appears five times in *Conf.* 8.5.12³⁰⁵. However, while equating these terms may assist in the interpretation of *Conf.* 8.5.10-12, this equation does not function in *Rom.* 7:7-25. In *Rom.* 7:7-25, will (θέλω) is contrasted against action (ποιέω, πράσσω, κατεργάζομαι):

³⁰² See footnotes 237, 256 and 262.

³⁰¹ *Conf.* 8.5.12: "To find my delight in your law as far as my inmost self was concerned was of no profit to me when a different law in my bodily members was warring against the law of my mind, imprisoning me under the law of sin which held sway in my lower self. For the law of sin is that brute force of habit whereby the mind is dragged along and held fast against its will, and deservedly so because it slipped into the habit willingly. In my wretched state, who was there to free me from this death-doomed body, save your grace through Jesus Christ our Lord?"

³⁰³ See footnote 255.

³⁰⁴ See Stark (1989) for an overview of the influence of Paul's ideas regarding the will on Augustine's other writings.

³⁰⁵ The word *lex* also appears twice in *Conf.* 8.5.10; however, this refers to the law that Emperor Julian instituted, and not to the spiritual/carnal laws under discussion.

οὐ γὰρ ὁ θέλω ποιῶ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ὁ οὐ θέλω κακὸν τοῦτο πράσσω. εἰ δὲ ὁ οὐ θέλω [ἐγὼ] τοῦτο ποιῶ, οὐκέτι ἐγὼ κατεργάζομαι αὐτὸ ἀλλ' ἡ οἰκουῖσα ἐν ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτία. (*Rom.* 7:19-20).³⁰⁶

It is therefore not possible to equate will and the law in *Rom.* 7:7-25. In *Conf.* 8.5.10, it is the will itself that is divided: the carnal will and the spiritual will; however, in *Conf.* 8.5.12, the speaker-text paints a slightly different picture:

frustra condelectabar legi tuae secundum interiorem hominem, cum alia lex in membris meis repugnaret legi mentis meae et captivum me duceret in lege peccati quae in membris meis erat. (*Conf.* 8.5.12).³⁰⁷

The *lex in membris* is suddenly contrasted with the *lex mentis*: it is no longer a battle of wills (it would seem), but a battle of the flesh against the mind. This begs the question, whether the speaker-text does imply, if the battle described in *Conf.* 8.5.10 is taken into consideration, that will (*voluntas*) can exist both in the flesh (*membra*) and in the mind (*mens*)? Furthermore, in *Conf.* 8.5.10-12, the battle is initiated by the arrival of a new will, the spiritual one, to combat the old, fleshly one.

The intertextual relationship established between *Conf.* 8.5.10 and *Rom.* 7:22-25 injects instability into the interpretation. It is difficult to discern a clear, singular interpretation from *Conf.* 8.5.10-12 because of the strong intertextual relationship with *Rom.* 7:7-25. While both passages describe a conflict, it is not possible to satisfactorily equate these conflicts based on equating the law with will. The nature of the conflict in *Conf.* 8.5.10-12 is therefore not entirely clear.

Yet, if this confusion is ignored and the conflict established in *Rom.* 7:7-25 is taken as model for the meaning of the conflict in *Conf.* 8.5.10-12, it may be possible to make

³⁰⁶ *Rom.* 7:19-20: "For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do. Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwells within me."

³⁰⁷ See footnote 301.

some sense of it. The speaker-text assists to this end by equating the law of sin to ferocious habit:

lex enim peccati est violentia consuetudinis. (Conf. 8.5.12).³⁰⁸

This law of sin in Conf. 8.5.10 can be equated to the law of sin in Rom. 7:23:

βλέπω δὲ ἕτερον νόμον ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν μου ἀντιστρατευόμενον τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ νοός μου καὶ ἀιχμαλωτίζοντά με ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν μου.³⁰⁹

Ignoring, for the moment, the difficulty of equating the notions of will and the law in Conf. 8.5.10-12, it may be possible to equate the law of sin to habit, as understood in Conf. 8.5.10-12: this may yield the following of the passage. In the conflict described in Conf. 8.5.10-12 (and, to an extent, Rom. 7:7-25), the one pole of the conflict can be equated to habit, particularly, in this case, the habit of lust. The other pole of the conflict needs some clarifying. Not much detail is given on the other law/will. It may be possible to equate this other party to the concluding words of Conf. 8.5.12: *gratia tua per Iesum Christum, dominum nostrum*. No clear equation is made in the text (unlike the *lex peccati*) so this interpretation remains unstable. No further detail is offered other than the fact that the other law/will is spiritual. The injection of Rom. 7:7-25 does not assist in explaining this; it only offers more instability.

This is not the first time that a potential intertextual relationship has been identified with Rom. 7:7-26. This verse is quoted in Conf. 7.21.27. However, there are significant differences between Conf. 8.5.12, Conf. 7.21.27 and Rom. 7.7-25 that should be explored. The most prominent difference is the nature of the *miser homo* in each. The *miser homo* demonstrated significant instability in Conf. 7.21.27, as discussed in Chapter 8, which would expectedly spill into the interpretation of Conf. 8.5.12;

³⁰⁸ Conf. 8.5.12: "For the law of sin is that brute force of habit."

³⁰⁹ See footnote 255.

however, the quotation of *Rom.* 7:25 is different in *Conf.* 8.5.10-12 than in *Conf.* 7.21.27, and so the instability introduced through the intertextual relationship would be mitigated to some extent; it may be transformed by the transposition of the textual material from *Rom.* 7:22-25 to *Conf.* 8.5.10.

The differences in these texts, where they are transformed, will guide this interpretation. The differences are shown below:

<i>Conf.</i> 8.5.12	<i>Conf.</i> 7.21.27	<i>Rom.</i> 7:24-25
<i>miserum ergo me quis liberaret de corpore mortis huius nisi gratia tua per Iesum Christum, dominum nostrum?</i> ³¹⁰	<i>quid faciet miser homo? quis eum liberabit de corpore mortis huius, nisi gratia tua per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum, quem genuisti coaeternum et creasti in principio viarum tuarum, in quo princeps huius mundi non invenit quicquam morte dignum, et occidit eum?</i> ³¹¹	<i>miser ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? gratia dei per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum.</i> ³¹²

In *Conf.* 8.5.12, the “I” is represented by the accusative *miserum me*, the object of the verb *liberaret*. In *Conf.* 7.21.27, the “I” is replaced with a generic *miser homo*. The *miser homo* is the subject of an introductory sentence with verb *faciet*. The accusative *eum* in the next sentence refers to the *miser homo* and is the object of the verb *liberabit*. This verb is future indicative. In *Rom.* 7:24 the *miser homo* is the *ego* in the first phrase, and

³¹⁰ See footnote 301.

³¹¹ See footnote 245.

³¹² See footnote 256 and 262.

is represented by the accusative *me*, the object of the verb *liberabit*, in the second phrase.

The biggest difference between these passages lies between *Conf.* 8.5.12 and *Rom.* 7:24-25 on one side, and *Conf.* 7.21.27 on the other: while the former employs a first person perspective, the latter features a generic third person. While *Conf.* 8.5.12 does not employ the same form for the *miser homo* as *Rom.* 7:24-25 does, the two are similar. The tone of *Conf.* 8.5.12 is more narrative in nature, whereas *Rom.* 7:24-25 employed pathos with a future tense. The “I” in *Rom.* 7:24-25 is significantly more rhetorical, i.e. there is some resistance in assign the “I” to the author/speaker-text, Παῦλος, whereas the “I” in *Conf.* 8.5.12 refers more convincingly to the Augustinus at the time of the events of *Conf.* 8.5.12. The passages are indeed similar: the emotional quality of the pathos evoked by the rhetorical presentation of *Rom.* 7:24-25 as discussed earlier can easily be transposed to the emotional state that the person-text of Augustinus was experiencing at the time of the events of *Conf.* 8.5.12. The perspective of the author-text, however, is significantly different. Whereas Παῦλος is presenting a hypothetical figure, the author-text Augustinus is relating an actual emotional state that he felt at that time. The possibility of an autobiographical interpretation of the “I” in *Rom.* 7:24-25 exists, but the overwhelming alternatives significantly attenuates such an interpretation, whereas the context of the *Confessions* as a whole, the context of *Conf.* 8.5.12, as well as the author/speaker-text Augustinus, together create significant resistance to the notion that the “I” in *Conf.* 8.5.12 is anyone other than Augustinus. The possibility exists that other potential speaker-texts may be considered, particularly those associated with the *miser homo* in *Conf.* 7.21.27, but such interpretations would meet with significant resistance.

After the description of Augustinus’ conflict following the tale of Victorinus’ conversion, another conversion story is described (*Conf.* 8.6.13-8.7.18)³¹³ that brings

³¹³ Namely the conversions of the two court officials at Trier.

Augustinus closer to his ultimate conversion in *Conf.* 8.12.29. But at first, these stories prompt an even greater conflict within Augustinus³¹⁴. The events surrounding Augustinus' final conversion are all recounted in *Conf.* 8.8.19-8.12.30. In *Conf.* 8.10.22, the author-text continues to deliberate on the nature of the two wills described in *Conf.* 8.5.10-12, and again a strong intertextual relationship with *Romans* can be found.

9.5. *Conf.* 8.10.22-24

The issue of the inner conflict between two forces is taken up again in *Conf.* 8.8.19. The speaker-text finds himself in the garden in Milan and is struggling through a terrible conflict within himself (*Conf.* 8.8.19). During this struggle, the author/speaker-text delves deeper into the nature of willing itself (*Conf.* 8.9.21). He comes to the conclusion that there are two wills:

*et ideo sunt duae voluntates, quia una earum tota non est et hoc adest alteri quod deest alteri. (Conf. 8.9.21).*³¹⁵

In *Conf.* 8.10.22, the discussion then turns from the author/speaker-text's understanding of the nature of these wills, to a comment on what others perceive the nature of these wills to be:

*pereant a facie tua, deus, sicuti pereunt, vaniloqui et mentis seductores qui, cum duas voluntates in deliberando animadverterint, duas naturas duarum mentium esse adseverant, unam bonam, alteram malam. (Conf. 8.10.22).*³¹⁶

³¹⁴ *tum in illa grandi rixa interioris domus meae, quam fortiter excitaveram cum anima mea in cubiculo nostro, corde meo, tam vultu quam mente turbatus invado Alypium (Conf. 8.8.19)* "Within the house of my spirit the violent conflict raged on, the quarrel with my soul that I had so powerfully provoked in our secret dwelling, my heart, and at the height of it I rushed to Alypius with my mental anguish plain upon my face."

³¹⁵ *Conf.* 8.9.21: "There are two wills, then, and neither is the whole: what one has the other lacks."

³¹⁶ *Conf.* 8.10.22: "Some there are who on perceiving two wills engaged in deliberation assert that in us there are two natures, one good, the other evil, each with a mind of its own. Let them perish from your presence, O God, as perish all who talk wildly and lead our minds astray."

The identity of these *vaniloqui* and *seductores* is not expressly given. Stark argues that Augustine want to show “that the conflict of will with itself, as [Augustine] has just presented it [in *Conf.* 8.10.22], must be distinguished from the Manichaean position” (Stark, 1989: 356). BeDuhn (2013: 275) points out that *Rom.* 7:7-25 was a text read and used by the Manichaeans, and represented both a rejection of the law and, by extension, the authority of the Old Testament. It is therefore a strong possibility to suggest the Manichaeans as a candidate for the *vaniloqui* and *seductores*. The unanswered hermeneutic issue of the identity of the *vaniloqui* and *seductores* allows the critic to suggest a number of potential candidates, the intertextual relationships identified, the thematic elements present, as well as the context of this passage may assist in suggesting candidates for these *vaniloqui*.

The words themselves, *vaniloqui* and *seductores* may provide a suggestion through intertextual relationships that exist in the *Confessions* itself. In *Conf.* 3.4.7, the author/speaker-text recounts his discovery of Cicero’s *Hortensius*. He muses on the content, in words which allow an intertextual relationship with *Colossians* to be identified.

sunt qui seducant per philosophiam magno et blando et honesto nomine colorantes et fucantes errores suos, et prope omnes qui ex illis et supra temporibus tales erant notantur in eo libro et demonstrantur, et manifestatur ibi salutifera illa admonitio spiritus tui per servum tuum bonum et pium: ‘videte, ne quis vos decipiat per philosophiam et inanem seductionem secundum traditionem hominum, secundum elementa huius mundi et non secundum Christum, quia in ipso inhabitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter.’ (Conf. 3.4.8).³¹⁷

The *seductores* could be equated to those *qui seducant per philosophiam*. However, their identity is not explicitly mentioned. The verb *seducere* is also found twice at the

³¹⁷ See footnote 222.

beginning of book 4³¹⁸. *Conf.* 4.1.1 mainly concerns to Augustinus' time as a Manichaeans, and here the Manichaeans are described as the ones seducing (with Augustinus represented as both being seduced and seducing. Furthermore, the Manichaeans are described as *vani*. *Vanitas* is attributed explicitly to the Manichaeans by proxy through the figure of the young Augustinus the Manichaeans in *Conf.* 9.4.9 (Kotzé, 2007: 78). The pair *vanitas* and *mendacium* appears no fewer than five times in this passage:

*et haec omnia exhibant per oculos et vocem meam, cum conversus ad nos spiritus tuus bonus ait nobis, 'filii hominum, quousque graves corde? ut quid diligitis vanitatem et quaeritis mendacium?' ... et clamat prophetia, 'quousque graves corde? ut quid diligitis vanitatem et quaeritis mendacium? et scitote quoniam dominus magnificavit sanctum suum.' clamat 'quousque', clamat 'scitote', et ego tamdiu nesciens vanitatem dilexi et mendacium quaesivi, et ideo audiui et contremui, quoniam talibus dicitur qualem me fuisse reminiscebar. in phantasmatis enim quae pro veritate tenueram vanitas erat et mendacium. et insonui multa graviter ac fortiter in dolore recordationis meae. quae utinam audissent qui adhuc usque diligunt vanitatem et quaerunt mendacium. (*Conf.* 9.4.9).³¹⁹*

³¹⁸ *per idem tempus annorum novem, ab undevicensimo anno aetatis meae usque ad duodetricesimum, seducebamur et seducebamur, falsi atque fallentes in variis cupiditatibus, et palam per doctrinas quas liberales vocant, occulte autem falso nomine religionis, hic superbi, ibi superstitiosi, ubique vani...* (*Conf.* 4.1.1). "Throughout those nine years, from my nineteenth to my twenty-eighth year, I and others like me were seduced and seducers, deceived ourselves and deceivers of others amid a welter of desires: publicly through the arts reputed 'liberal,' and secretly under the false name of religion. In the one we were arrogant, in the other superstitious, and in both futile."

³¹⁹ *Conf.* 9.4.9: "It all found an outlet through my eyes and voice when your good Spirit turned to us, saying, *How long will you be heavy-hearted, human creatures? Why love emptiness and chase falsehood?...* This is why the prophecy cries out, *How long will you be heavy-hearted? Why love emptiness and chase falsehood? Be sure of this: the Lord has glorified his Holy One.* It demands, *How long?* It cries, *Be sure of this;* yet for so long I had been anything but sure, and had loved emptiness and chased falsehood, and so I trembled as I heard these words, for they are addressed to the kind of person I remembered myself to have been. In the fables which I had taken for truth there was emptiness and falsehood; loud and strong I bewailed many an episode among my painful memories. Oh, that they could have heard me, those who still love emptiness and chase falsehood!"

A further link can be established if the link between the *vaniiloqui* and *loquacitas* is explored. *Loquacitas* is attributed to the Manichaeans at their introduction in *Conf.* 3.6.10³²⁰. The quality of *loquitas* is also used to describe both Augustinus himself (in his role as rhetorician) and the Manichaeans³²¹ (O'Donnell, 1992b: 27). There are good reasons to associate the *vaniiloqui* and *seductores* with the Manichaeans, the philosophers as well as Augustinus himself, in as far as the latter refers repeatedly to himself as a Manichaean, e.g. in book 9. The argument for associating the Manichaeans with the *vaniiloqui* and *seductores* may be amplified through a further exploration of *Conf.* 8.10.22.

At the end of *Conf.* 8.10.22, the author/speaker-text comes to a conclusion to his criticism of the *vaniiloqui* and *seductores*; this passage demonstrates a strong similarity, both thematically and formally, to *Rom.* 7. The texts that are formally similar to *Conf.* 8.10.22 are *Rom.* 7:17 and *Rom.* 7:20. I highlight the similarities below:

<i>Conf.</i> 8.10.22	<i>Rom.</i> 7:17	<i>Rom.</i> 7:20
<i>et ideo non <u>iam ego operabar</u> illam, sed quod habitabat in me peccatum de supplicio liberioris peccati, quia eram filius Adam.</i> ³²²	<i>nunc autem <u>iam non ego operor illud sed quod habitabat in me peccatum.</u></i> ³²³	<i>si autem quod nolo illud facio <u>non ego operor illud sed quod habitabat in me peccatum.</u></i> ³²⁴

³²⁰ itaque incidi in homines superbe delirantes, carnales nimis et loquaces, in quorum ore laquei diaboli et viscum confectum commixtione syllabarum nominis tui et domini Iesu Christi et paracliti consolatoris nostri spiritus sancti. (*Conf.* 3.6.10). See footnote 119.

³²¹ Describing Augustinus as a rhetorician at *Conf.* 4.2.2, 8.5.10, 9.2.2; describing the Manichaeans at 1.4.4, 5.7.12, 5.9.17, 7.2.3 (O'Donnell, 1992b: 177).

³²² *Conf.* 8.10.22: "In this sense, and this sense only, it was not I who brought it about, but the sin that dwelt within me as penalty for that other sin committed with greater freedom; for I was a son of Adam."

³²³ See footnote 299.

³²⁴ See footnote 306.

The thematic links between these passages, as well as the formal similarity, are clear enough to demonstrate a strong intertextual relationship to both verses. The meaning of this relationship is more difficult to ascertain. As demonstrated in chapter 9.4 above, the differences between the contexts of *Rom. 7:7-25* and *Conf. 8* cause a significant amount of instability in the interpretation when the intertextual relationship is explored. The notion of *quod habitabat in me peccatum* lies at the centre of this issue. The *consuetudinis violentia* was equated to the *lex peccati* earlier, but can this also be considered the same as the *quod habitabat in me peccatum*? In *Conf. 8.10.22*, the speaker-text is concerned with the nature of will, not the nature of the law. Once again, the problem of equating these two concepts arises. The incompatibility of these two notions introduced instability into the interpretation once again. The intertextual relationship with *Rom. 7:17, 20* introduces interpretive difficulties. O'Donnell is of the opinion that this passage merely gives us a glimpse of what the author is feeling, this should not be taken as a serious citation (1992c: 50). It may be possible to consider the words in this sentence divorced from the mouth of the speaker-text of *Rom. 7:7-25* (whether the author-text Παῦλος, or some other potential speaker-text). In *Conf. 8.10.22* the force of the context of *Rom. 7:7-25* is attenuated but the pathos is amplified. The speaker-text of *Conf. 8.10.22* may be considered to be Augustinus at the time of writing the *Confessions*, trying to make sense, from an older perspective, of the chaos of emotions that he felt as a younger man, at the time of the events of *Conf. 8*. The past tense verbs *operabar* and *eram* serve to strengthen this interpretation.

However, doing so removes the context of *Rom. 7:7-25*, in particular, the discussion of the two laws. An intertextual relationship can be established between the two laws in *Rom. 7:7-25* and the two wills in *Conf. 8.10-22-24*. This quotation may be empowered by further significance given the context of *Conf. 8.10.22*: the author/speaker-text is attempting to criticise the conclusions of the *vaniloqui* and *seductores* and this quoted text seems to be an important aspect of this discussion.

In *Conf.* 8.10.22, the quotation of *Rom.* 7:17 and 7:20 is followed by an extensive discussion about the issue of this conflicted will. This discussion may be interpreted as a refutation of the notion of a dualistic cosmology/philosophy³²⁵. In the place of this dualism, the author/speaker-text proposes not two but a multitude of conflicting wills (*Conf.* 8.10.23-24). On first glance, this refutation creates some tension, following this quotation. It may be possible to consider the quotation of *Rom.* 7:17, 20 and its context out of place: the quotation presents what could be described as a dualistic formulation of the nature of man: man is torn between two natures, the one spiritual and the other fleshly, the one good and the other evil, which would lend itself to suggesting a dualistic philosophy, precisely what is being refuted in *Conf.* 8.10.23-24. It is for this reason that O'Donnell seems to want to distance the aforementioned quotation from the author of *Conf.* 8.10.22-24, and Boulding's translation includes some extra formulation, so as to make it clear that the author does not commit to the notions contained in *Rom.* 7:17 and 7:20³²⁶. Both scholars seem to recognise the apparent dissonance between the content of *Rom.* 7:7-25 and the context of the discussion in *Conf.* 8.10.22-24. It is at first puzzling to find a quotation from a text that seems to support such a dualistic cosmology, in a context where the author/speaker-text goes to some length to refute it in the following passage (*Conf.* 8.10.23). However, the proceeding refutation can be seen as participating in this intertextual relationship as well. The quotation has been transposed and its original context is transformed. The refutation is itself one such transformation, sharing many of the aspects of the quoted text as well. BeDuhn argues that the quotation of

³²⁵ The Manichaeans were noted for their dualistic cosmology (Coyle, 1999: 521). It is this fact that prompts Maria Boulding to include them specifically in her translation of *Conf.* 8.10.23: "If someone is trying to make up his mind whether to go to a Manichean conventicle or to the theatre, the Manichees declare, 'There you are, there's the evidence for two natures: the good one is dragging him our way, the bad one is pulling him back in the other direction'" (Boulding, 2008: 153). They are not explicitly mentioned in the text.

³²⁶ "In this sense, and this sense only, it was not I who brought it about, but the sin that dwelt within me as penalty for that other sin committed with greater freedom; for I was a son of Adam" (Boulding, 2008: 152)

Rom. 7:22-25 is the author reviewing “yet again the implications of Paul’s wording in *Romans* 7, in a way that both evoked and corrected the Manichaean readings of it” (2013: 348). The intertextual relationship and the strong Manichaean theme-text is therefore possibly not contradictory. However, Stark argues that the author’s treatment of the Pauline material goes further:

“This is not simply a reiteration of the old will against the new or the flesh versus the spirit as it was for Paul in *Romans*. Augustine relies upon Paul’s initial insights, but in this notion of the conflict of the will with itself, Augustine goes far beyond Paul’s analysis.” (Stark, 1989: 355).

The transformation of the notion of warring laws into warring wills as argued above (if such an equation is established by the reader) would support Stark’s position. However, the interpretation is complicated by a number of factors that undermine any attempt to finalise the interpretation: the transformation of the textual materials of *Rom.* 7:22-25, the Manichaean theme-text and Manichaean interpretations of *Romans*, the authority attached to the author-text Παῦλος. These forces pull in opposite directions, opening up the possibility for conflicting interpretations. An absolute interpretation of the role of *Rom.* 7:22-25 is difficult to ascertain without resorting to some historical reconstruction as is the methodology employed by BeDuhn and Stark. The author’s reasons for composing the work as he did cannot be plumbed, although *mutatis mutandis*, the interpretations of BeDuhn and Stark certainly do represent a possible perspective on the text.

The refutation in *Conf.* 8.10.22-24 can be considered an elaboration of the point made in *Conf.* 8.10.22, and the context of the *Rom.* 7:7-25: whereas *Rom.* 7:7-25 described two warring laws, the author/speaker-text discusses the will itself. The two wills (mentioned by the author/speaker-text of *Conf.* 8.10.22-24, not the author/speaker-text of *Rom.* 7:7-25) is interpreted in *Conf.* 8.10.23-24 as a spectrum of impulses, not as a dualistic, black and white option. The connection between the two laws and the

two wills thus makes it possible to transform the original context of *Rom.* 7:7-25 by imposing this spectrum interpretation onto it as well, through the intertextual relationship between these two passages.

The conflict described in *Conf.* 8.10.22-24 continues in *Conf.* 8.11.25-8.12.28, until it finds its conclusion in *Conf.* 8.12.29 at the final conversion. It is here where a passage in the *Letter to the Romans* becomes a key part of the narrative.

9.6. *Conf.* 8.12.29

In *Conf.* 8.12.28-30, the author/speaker-text describes his own, final conversion to Catholic Christianity and the end of his emotional struggle. The narrative describes how the author/speaker-text hears children chanting the words “*tolle lege tolle lege*”, at which point he picks up the book he was reading (presumably a copy of *Romans*) and reads the first verse that chances his eye:

*itaque concitus redii in eum locum ubi sedebat Alypius: ibi enim posueram codicem apostoli cum inde surrexeram. arripui, aperui, et legi in silentio capitulum quo primum coniecti sunt oculi mei: non in comessationibus et ebrietatibus, non in cubilibus et impudiciis, non in contentione et aemulatione, sed induite dominum Iesum Christum et carnis providentiam ne feceritis in concupiscentiis.’ nec ultra volui legere nec opus erat. statim quippe cum fine huiusce sententiae quasi luce securitatis infusa cordi meo omnes dubitationis tenebrae diffugerunt. (*Conf.* 8.12.29).³²⁷*

³²⁷ *Conf.* 8.12.29: “Stung into action, I returned to the place where Alypius was sitting, for on leaving it I had put down there the book of the apostle's letters. I snatched it up, opened it and read in silence the passage on which my eyes first lighted: Not in dissipation and drunkenness, nor in debauchery and lewdness, nor in arguing and jealousy; but put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no provision for the flesh or the gratification of your desires. I had no wish to read further, nor was there need. No sooner had I reached the end of the verse than the light of certainty flooded my heart and all dark shades of doubt fled away.”

Although the source of the quotation is not acknowledged in the text, the passage that Augustinus read is universally agreed to be *Rom.* 13:13:

sicut in die honeste ambulemus, non in comessionibus et ebrietatibus, non in cubilibus et impudiciis, non in contentione et aemulatione, sed induite dominum Iesum Christum et carnis providentiam ne feceritis in concupiscentiis. (*Rom.* 13:13).³²⁸

The similarities are clear enough to make any other interpretation other than *Rom.* 13:13 a highly resisted one. This is a critically important scene: it could be interpreted as the point towards which all the events in books 1 to 8 were progressing. However, the brevity of this scene is quite odd, in comparison with the other conversion narratives found in the *Confessions*. This is not the first time that the author/speaker-text encounters a particular work that transforms his thinking in one way or another. Other times at which the author/speaker-text read a life-changing work include *Conf.* 3.4.7 (the *Hortensius*), 7.9.13-15 (the books of the Platonists) and 7.20.26-7.21.27 (the letters of Paul). In each of the aforementioned instances, the reading of the work was followed by a discussion on the impact the work had on the author/speaker-text's life at the time, or some issue related to the content of the work. After reading the passage from *Rom.* 13:13 (*Conf.* 8.12.29), the author/speaker-text narrates the events that followed directly (*Conf.* 8.12.30). There is no discussion or meditation that follows the reading, in the same manner as occurred in the aforementioned examples. The emotive language and explicit address to God present in the other examples is absent here³²⁹. This intertextual relationship generates a resistance when

³²⁸ *Rom.* 13:13: "...let us live honorably as in the day, not in reveling and drunkenness, not in debauchery and licentiousness, not in quarreling and jealousy."

³²⁹ *quomodo ardebam, deus meus, quomodo ardebam revolare a terrenis ad te, et nesciebam quid ageres mecum!* (*Conf.* 3.4.8); "How ardently I longed, O my God, how ardently I longed to fly to you away from earthly things! I did not understand then how you were dealing with me." *o aeterna veritas et vera caritas et cara aeternitas, tu es deus meus, tibi suspiro die ac nocte!* (*Conf.* 7.10.16); "O eternal Truth, true Love, and beloved Eternity, you are my God, and for you I sign day and night." *quoniam iustus es,*

the contexts of all four instances of intertextual relationships with *Romans* in book 8 of the *Confessions* (including the reading of *Rom.* 13:13 in *Conf.* 8.12.29) are taken into account. The differences between these passages are amplified and generate resistance³³⁰.

The semantic content of *Rom.* 13:13 and its impact on the author/speaker-text is relatively clear from the text: the instruction in the passage convinces the author/speaker-text to undertake a life of celibacy and devotion to the Catholic Church. However, this passage lacks the supporting textual similarities beyond formal similarity that I have thus far identified in the other quotations of *Romans* throughout the *Confessions*. It may be considered strange that there are not stronger intertextual relationships to this text in the *Confessions*, to the same extent as the intertextual relationships already identified, including *Rom.* 1:20-25 and 7:7-25. The importance of these verses in the course of the author/speaker-text's final conversion narrative and the profound impact it had is disproportionate to the relative "presence", as it were, of this verse elsewhere in the *Confessions*. Within the theoretical framework adopted here, it would be possible to read intertextual relationships with *Rom.* 13:13 throughout the *Confessions*: the elements of the Augustinus' conversion are scattered throughout the *Confessions* and all the events and commentary on those events described in the *Confessions* builds up to the event described in *Conf.* 8.12.29 and the reading of *Rom.* 13:13. The Augustinus that opens with *magnus es, domine* in *Conf.* 1.1.1 is the Augustinus who has already read *Rom.* 13:13. It would therefore be possible to postulate an intertextual relationship between the post-conversion Augustinus (the person-text) and *Rom.* 13:13 (as the

domine, nos autem peccavimus, inique fecimus, impie gessimus, et gravata est super nos manus tua... (*Conf.* 7.21.27). See footnote 238.

³³⁰ This "resistance" has been noted in scholarship, although the focus has been on the historical accuracy of the scene and the relative importance *Rom.* 13:13 actually bore for the historical Augustine. Paula Fredriksen discusses the issue in an article entitled *Paul and Augustine - Conversion Narratives, Orthodox Traditions and the Retrospective Self* published in 1986, and is preceded by Leo Ferrari's article, *Paul at the Conversion of Augustine (Conf. VIII. 12, 29-30)*, published in 1980.

trigger of that conversion). Augustinus at the time of writing of the *Confessions* (or the author-text) encapsulates the (earlier) post-conversion Augustinus, and so it is theoretically possible to postulate an intertextual relationship between the whole of the *Confessions* and *Rom.* 13:13. However, as argued earlier, it is possible for certain texts to gain strength through amplification in the course of a reading through reinforcing texts. One of the ways this may be achieved is through similarity between texts, and significant formal similarity between the *Confessions* and *Rom.* 13:13 is only found in *Conf.* 8.12.29.

Conf. 8.12.29 does evoke *Rom.* 13:13 and the context of *Rom.* 13:13 may serve to generate a clearer image of the signifying potential of this verse. *Rom.* 13:13 forms part of what Fitzmyer calls the Hortatory section of *Romans*, which he describes as unsystematic and rambling (Fitzmyer, 1993: 638). It is this quality which may contribute significant instability in the interpretation of the text. Fitzmyer divides *Rom.* 13 as follows: *Rom.* 13:1-7 deals with the relation of Christians to civil authorities; *Rom.* 13:8-10 is a brief comment on love and the fulfilment of the commandments, unrelated to the sections that precede and follow; *Rom.* 13:11-14 contains an eschatological exhortation and the call to decent conduct (Fitzmyer, 1993: 100). It is difficult to formulate concisely a caption to describe the nature of the wider context of *Rom.* 13:13. It consists of an exhortation that does not seem to be part of a structured argument or narrative, as was the case of *Rom.* 1:18-32 and *Rom.* 7:7-25. It would be possible to consider all the above mentioned sections (*Rom.* 13:1-7, 13:8-10, 13:11-14) in the interpretation; however, because of the disjunction between these sections with little connecting them other than the hortatory tone, it is difficult to formulate a central idea occurring in *Rom.* 13 which has clear implications for the reading of *Conf.* 8.12.29 when the context of *Rom.* 13 is transposed into the context of *Conf.* 8.12.29. The context of *Rom.* 13:13 may provide a speaker-text: the exhortatory tone and context would most strongly suggest the author-text Παῦλος. Such a speaker-text could easily contribute meaningfully to the interpretation of

Conf. 8.12.29. However, there is little in the context of *Rom.* 13:13 that has significant strength to transform the interpretation beyond the meaning already established.

While the context of *Rom.* 13:13 does not offer strong, reinforced interpretive possibilities, the intertextual relationships within *Romans* may yet contribute insights into the understanding of the intertextual relationship between *Conf.* 8.12.29 and *Rom.* 13:13. The thematic content of *Rom.* 13:13 allows the possibility of establishing a link with the indictment made in *Rom.* 1:18-32. The censorious tone of the latter section displays similarities with the exhortatory passage in *Rom.* 13:13. Fitzmyer does recognize a parallel between the list of vices in *Rom.* 13:13 and the vices listed in *Rom.* 1:18-32, particularly *Rom.* 1:28-29 (1993: 683). However, there is little lexical similarity between these passages and none of the vices in *Rom.* 1:18-32 are found amongst the vices listed in *Rom.* 13:13. This weakens the strength of the proposed link between *Rom.* 13:13 and *Rom.* 1:18-32 significantly.

Rom. 1:18-32 may however be present in the reading of *Conf.* 8.12.29, through the intertextual relationships already established between *Conf.* 8.1.2 and *Rom.* 1:18-32, and this may allow the strength of the potential intertextual relationship with *Rom.* 13:13 to be increased. If an intertextual relationship between *Rom.* 1:18-32 and *Conf.* 8.12.29 is considered here through the link with *Rom.* 13:13, the implications are worth considering. The speaker-text of the words in *Rom.* 13:13, and by extension, the words read by the author/speaker-text in *Conf.* 8.12.29 would be affected by such an intrusion. The speaker-text of the words read by the author/speaker-text in *Conf.* 8.12.29 would most easily be interpreted as Παῦλος, the author/speaker-text of *Romans*. Given the possibility of the generic features of the diatribe genre-text, it may be possible to interpret the words spoken by speaker-text ironically, that is, by a speaker-text other than, or even in opposition to, the author-text, such as an imaginary interlocutor.

Such an interpretation, given the context of *Rom.* 13:13 and lack of supporting thematic elements between *Rom.* 13:13 and *Rom.* 1:18-32, would be significantly resisted. However, the intertextual relationship with *Rom.* 1:18-32 would reinforce such a possibility, given the possibility of *Rom.* 1:18-32 being spoken in the voice of an interlocutor³³¹. There is therefore a tension created between the potential speaker-texts of *Rom.* 1:18-32 and *Rom.* 13:13. This is further complicated when the context of *Conf.* 8.12.29 is taken into consideration. The author/speaker-text of *Conf.* 8.12.29 is converted by the words he reads, and therefore it would be reasonable to assume that the author/speaker-text (as character) does not consider the speaker-text of *Rom.* 13:13 in any ironic light, but rather imbues the speaker-text of *Rom.* 13:13 with sufficient authority to obey the instruction given in the text that is read. If an intertextual relationship with *Rom.* 1:18-32 is established in *Conf.* 8.12.29, the interpretation that suggests an interlocutor or ironic speaker-text in *Rom.* 1:18-32 is attenuated, and the interpretation that the author-text Παῦλος is the speaker-text in *Rom.* 1:18-32 is amplified.

The importance of *Rom.* 13:13 as an individual text (i.e. separated from its context) within the conversion narrative in *Conf.* 8.12.29 is undeniable: the emotional effect it has on the author/speaker-text is evidence of this. However, having discussed the intertextual relationships identified in *Conf.* 8, it is now possible to evaluate O'Donnell's position, that "the whole of book 8 is a record of reading Paul, particularly *Romans*" (1992c: 3).

The first resistance to O'Donnell's interpretation is the distribution of what is identified as *Romans* quotations throughout book 8: the majority of the *Romans* quotations identified by O'Donnell comes from *Rom.* 7. Perhaps a more accurate interpretation would be that book 8 is a record of reading *Rom.* 7 and the impact it had on the author-text's conversion. This interpretation is also resisted, however,

³³¹ This possibility is discussed in Chapter 7.

since there is, in fact, no report of a reading of *Rom. 7* in the course of the narrative of *Conf. 8*. The only part of *Romans* actually reported to be read by the author/speaker-text is *Rom. 13:13*. If book 8 is a reading of *Romans*, it is hardly a systematic one.

However, it may be possible to condense the quoted texts from *Romans* into a programme: *Rom. 1:18-32* explains the wrath of God made manifest in the world for the iniquity of man; *Rom. 7:7-25* reveals the cause of the wretched state of man (the law of sin) and the emotional state of the wretched man in reaction to this, as well as the solution to this state: the grace of Jesus Christ; *Rom. 13:13* is an ethical response to the state of being under that grace. It may be possible to read this programme into the *Confessions*: *Rom. 1:18-32* can be read throughout the *Confessions*; for those who do not recognize God, the wrath of God is upon them. This includes Augustinus himself, the Manichaeans, the philosophers/astrologers, humanity in general and the reader. *Rom 7:7-25* may be regarded as a concise version of the struggle the author-text undergoes, in understanding the implication of the fallen state of man, accepting the implications and understanding the solution to this state, through the grace of Jesus Christ.

This struggle may reflect the events of books 1-7, and also book 8: at the end of *Conf. 7*, the author-text has come to an understanding of the grace of Jesus Christ. What is lacking, is the commitment to this grace. Book 8 describes the emotional torment of the wretched state described in *Rom. 7:7-25*. However, it is only by *Conf. 8.12.29* that the programme set out in *Rom. 7:7-25* is completed: the author-text reads *Rom. 13:13* and commits to the implications of the state of grace.

9.7. Conclusion

It would do a text as complex as *Romans* a significant disservice to dilute its entirety to the programme described above. I would therefore be hesitant to describe book 8 of the *Confessions* as a reading of *Romans*; rather, the passages of *Romans* quoted in *Conf. 8* may serve as a programmatic reflection of the state and journey that the

author-text undergoes in books 1-8 of the *Confessions*. I would further argue that the pivotal passage in question, *Rom.* 13:13, is significant, but specifically to the author-text, whereas the other quoted texts, *Rom.* 1:18-32 and *Rom.* 7:7-25, possess significantly more universal significance: the speaker-texts and person-texts of the aforementioned texts have been demonstrated to be suitably dynamic to allow for complex and conflicting interpretations, whereas significant resistance was found in the case of *Rom.* 13:13 to alternative speaker-texts. The plethora of conversion narratives in *Conf.* 8 may yet strengthen this point: each conversion narrative is different, but the state in which each person-text found him/herself is the same and could be described by the wretched state found in *Rom.* 7:7-25.

Within the conceptual framework established in this dissertation it has to be emphasised that this programmatic interpretation of the role of *Romans* in book 8 of the *Confessions* is merely one possibility. It is thoroughly dependent on specific interpretations of contingent speaker/person-texts: it does not allow for the dynamic speaker-texts that could be identified in *Rom.* 1:18-32, for example. The infusion of the multitude of "other" texts in *Conf.* 8, and by extension, the whole of the *Confessions*, lends itself to a multitude of interpretations, both complementary and conflicting. It is this quality that provides the text with its true complexity and beauty. To limit the text to a single interpretation, or a single set of complementary interpretations, is to ignore the nature of the text and its power to generate many more possibilities. The aforementioned programmatic interpretation should therefore not be considered a key for unlocking the use of *Romans* in the *Confessions*, but merely one of many possibilities that make the intertextual relationship(s) between *Romans* and the *Confessions* a fascinating perspective on these two texts.

Chapter 10 Conclusion

This dissertation is the product of my dissatisfaction with the prevailing methodologies regarding the relationships between texts. The abundance of terms available to describe relationships between texts, often used interchangeably, does not serve to strengthen scholarly expression and to encourage nuanced descriptions of these relationships, but only confuse and compound misunderstandings. This study reflects my conviction that theoretical based approaches, with clearly defined methodology and terminology, allow for precision and nuance in a field that lends itself to confusion and misunderstanding. Interpretation and literary analysis are complex and that complexity should be appreciated, not ignored or feared. Unlike the sciences, literature disrupts traditional logical structures. Theoretical approaches help in appreciating this complexity by analysing the parameters within which interpretation and textual analysis takes place.

Intertextuality, as understood by Kristeva and Barthes, is one such theoretical approach. In this dissertation I have demonstrated that understanding the fundamental building blocks of interpretation, the Text, and the nature of signification, allows one to formulate a conceptual framework that can be employed to analyse complex interactions between texts. This conceptual framework and its theoretical underpinning serves not only to assist the critic in describing the Text and the relationships between texts in more nuanced ways, it also provides a different perspective on the Text. The Text is not a closed, finite system, but in a process of continuous becoming. Interpretations are perspectives: there is no validity or truth to interpretations. The Text is by its very nature full of paradoxes. Interpretation is about appreciating the plurality of the Text, not about limiting it.

In order to appreciate this plurality, intertextuality frees the Text from any and all authority (in terms of determining or favoring meaning). Instead, meaning is born from the interaction between the Text and the reader. The reader him/herself is a collection of texts and the complex interaction between the reader and the Text

cannot be described in a structured or logical manner. The reader is part logic and part emotion, part rational and part irrational. While there is a part of this Text that may be considered logical and able to be structured, we do not read texts this way. The beauty of the *Confessions* does not result from our confusion regarding the disjunction between books 1-9 and 10-13. A grammatical error does not make a sentence unintelligible or uninterpretable. Paradoxes, lies, irony, metaphor, these are all elements that rail against traditional logical structures, that disrupt the rational and introduce instability. The recognition of one text in another is equally disruptive: multiple contexts and multiple texts intrude into the interpretation and multiply the interpretive possibilities. The theoretical framework of intertextuality does not define intertextual relationships in terms of authorial intention or a kind of similarity to another work, but simply as the recognition of a link between two texts. The conceptual framework I have adopted in this dissertation has allowed me the tools to describe these relationships in a manner that permits complex interactions: texts are measured in terms of strength, relative to the critic's experience of the text and relative to the recognition of other supporting texts. The *Confessions* is a text that is full of such intertextual relationships, as the commentaries and text editions of O'Donnell and Verheijen have demonstrated.

The *Confessions* is a magnificent piece of literature that has challenged the minds of readers throughout the ages and has given rise to countless, often diverging interpretations. Its author, Augustine of Hippo, has been the subject of countless scholarly works and his mind and thought has been studied for ages. As O'Donnell notes, and Kotzé confirms, not many studies of the *Confessions* in the last fifty years have appreciated it for its literary aspects. It would seem, in my opinion, that the *Confessions* suffers from being in the shadow of its august author, and we have not truly appreciated the *Confessions* for its own beauty.

We do not cheapen the *Confessions* by treating its author as a character in his own work and stripping him of his authority, as is done in framework of intertextuality.

Instead, we empower the *Confessions* with unexpected expression and unleash the polyvalent potential of the Text. The *Confessions* is not lessened by treating it as text, nor are the powerful historical and cultural aspects that surround it. Instead, these aspects become dynamic, and in treating these texts outside of the authority of these structures, we allow for a multitude of powerful interpretations.

My analysis has demonstrated the power of initial assumptions in the interpretation of a text and how these assumption can be challenged in the course of a reading. Such disruption does not destroy the interpretation, but enriches it. Multiple perspectives are possible on the text through such a reading. I have shown that the opening of the *Confessions* is suffused with different, conflicting perspectives and texts. By allowing for more dynamic recognition of intertextual relationships, the theme-texts of seeking and finding, once inextricably bound to *Matt. 7:7* in scholarship and potent texts throughout the *Confessions*, can now become linked to other texts such as *Isaiah 65:1*, allowing for other interpretive possibilities and nuances.

This study has also shown that the context of one text has powerful implications for the interpretation of another text; however, when the literal meaning of one text is undermined, either by ironic or metaphorical interpretation, this duplicity spills into the other text, allowing for an explosion of meaning. This has been demonstrated in *Conf. 5.3.5-5* and *Conf. 7.9.13-15*, where the potential implications of an interlocutor found in *Rom. 1.18-32* disrupts the sense in the *Confessions* and reveals the polyvalent quality of this text. My interpretation of *Conf. 7.20.26-21.27* has demonstrated how instability in a quotation may spill into another text: the issue of the identity of the "I" in *Rom. 7:7-25* allows for further instability where it is quoted in *Conf. 7.20.26-7.21.27*. This allows for many different kinds of interpretive possibilities.

My analysis of the various quotations of *Romans* in book 8 has confirmed the importance of *Romans* in the *Confessions*, particularly in this climactic book.

However, the importance of *Romans* is also weighed against the interpretive possibilities that are created through the numerous intertextual relationships with the quoted texts that weave throughout the *Confessions*.

My dissertation has confirmed the incredible power that intertextuality has and the necessity for such a perspective in order to truly appreciate the polyvalence of a quotation rich text such as the *Confessions*. The kind of reading that this conceptual framework has permitted is not limited to the intertextual relationships between the *Confessions* and *Romans*: this study opens up many avenues, both within the *Confessions* itself and other classical texts.

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