

**Identity politics of race and gender in the post-apartheid South Africa: The case of Stellenbosch University**

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**Assignment presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
MPhil (Political management) at the University of Stellenbosch**



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**December 2004**

### **Declaration**

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this assignment is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.

Signature

Date.

## ABSTRACT

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Identity has been a contentious issue in South Africa for many years. This created many problems including, among others, discrimination against people on the basis of race and gender. When the new government came to power in 1994, it promised to make valuable changes, and hence programmes such as affirmative action and black economic empowerment were introduced. This study investigates perceptions of students at Stellenbosch University (US) towards identity politics of race and gender after 1994.

The subject of investigation includes, *inter alia*, student accommodation, language of tuition, relationship between students, class participation, sexual harassment and politics (affirmative action and black economic empowerment). This research investigates the university's treatment of students and how students themselves treat each other.

Information was collected through a survey using a questionnaire in four selected residences, viz. Concordia, Goldfields, Huis DeVilliers and Lobelia.

The findings of this study indicate that there still are some problems as far as identity politics of race and gender at the US are concerned. For example, this study came to the following conclusions:

- The majority of students from the three racial groups who participated in this study have a perception that racial divisions still exist at the US in three areas (classroom, residences and the student centre). The perception is these divisions are caused by the fact that students come from different cultural backgrounds. Language differences also play a role in this respect;
- The majority of students also have a perception that black students are less likely to speak in class because they feel intimidated;
- The majority of black and coloured students support the ANC (African National Congress), while the majority of white students support the DA (Democratic Alliance). Although this is the case, this research also finds that many students at the US do not want to indicate their political support;

- Black and coloured students are positive about the role of Affirmative Action (AA) and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), whereas white students have a different view;
- Women students at the US have a perception that South Africa is still confronted by a problem of gender inequality;
- The majority of students have a perception that white men are the worst affected group by AA and BEE;
- Most students, regardless of their race or gender, feel protected at the US. There is a perception that there is no gender discrimination by their lecturers;
- Men and women students view sexual harassment differently; for example, women students view sexist jokes and wolf-whistling as constituting sexual harassment while men students have a different view. They all have perception that women students are the one who experience more of these forms of sexual harassment than their male counterparts do.

## OPSOMMING

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Identiteit is reeds vir baie jare in Suid-Afrika 'n omstrede kwessie. Dit het baie probleme veroorsaak, waaronder, diskriminasie teen mense gegrond op ras en geslag. Tydens die totstandkoming van die nuwe regering in 1994, is beloftes gemaak om veranderinge teweeg te bring. Gevolglik is programme soos regstellende aksie en swart ekonomiese bemagtiging ingestel. Hierdie studie ondersoek die persepsie van studente, verbonde aan die universiteit van Stellenbosch (US), jeens die identiteitspolitiek van ras en geslag na 1994.

Die onderwerp van die studie sluit ondermeer die volgende in: studente-akkommodasie, die onderrigstaal, die verhouding tussen studente, klasdeelname, seksuele teistering en politiek (regstellende aksie en swart ekonomiese bemagtiging). Dit ondersoek die universiteit se hantering van studente en die behandeling van studente se optrede teenoor mekaar.

Die inligting is ingesamel deur 'n meningspeiling verkry deur die verspreiding van vraelyste in vier geselekteerde koshuise, naamlik Concordia, Goldfields, Huis de Villiers en Lobelia.

Die bevindinge van die studie toon dat daar steeds baie probleme bestaan wat betref die politieke identiteit van ras en geslag aan die US. Die studie het byvoorbeeld tot die volgende gevolgtrekkings gekom:

- Die meerderheid van studente, uit drie rasse-groepe, wat aan die studie deelgeneem het, het die persepsie dat rasse-verdeeldheid steeds in drie areas voorkom (die klaskamer, koshuise en die studente sentrum). Die persepsie word voorgehou, onder andere, dat die verdeeldheid versoorsaak word deur die feit dat studente van verskillende kulture afkomstig is, asook dat taalverskille 'n rol speel.
- Die meerderheid studente het ook die persepsie dat swart studente neig om minder te praat in die klas omdat hulle geïntimideerd voel.
- Die meerderheid swart en bruin studente steun die ANC (African National Congress), terwyl die meerderheid wit studente die DA (Demokratiese Alliansie) steun. Hoewel dit die geval blyk te wees, het die studie ook gevind dat baie studente aan die US nie hulle politieke steun bekend wil maak nie.

- Swart en bruin studente is positief oor die rol van regstellende aksie en swart ekonomiese bemagtiging, teenoor wit studente wat 'n ander uitkyk hierop het.
- Vroue studente aan die US het die persepsie dat Suid-Afrika steeds gekonfronteer word met die probleem van geslagsongelykheid.
- Die meerderheid studente het die persepsie dat wit mans die ergste geraak word deur regstellende aksie en swart ekonomiese bemagtiging.
- Meeste studente, ongeag hul ras of geslag, voel beskerm by die US. Die persepsie bestaan dat geen geslagdiskriminasie deur lektore toegepas word nie..
- Mans- en vroue-studente sien seksuele teistering verskillend. Vroue-studente, byvoorbeeld, sien seksistiese grappe en wolwefluite as seksuele teistering, teenoor mansstudente wat dit nie so sien nie. Almal het wel die persepsie dat vrouestudente meer geraak word deur seksuele teistering as hulle manlike eweknieë.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I want to thank the following persons and organisations for their support and contribution towards this study:

- The National Research Foundation (NRF, South Africa) for the financial aid that enabled me to conduct this study. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at are those of the author and are not to be attributed to the National Research Foundation;
- My supervisor, Professor Amanda Gouws, for her supervision, time, understanding and support that led to the completion of this study;
- Mrs Helen MacDonald, lecturer in the Department of Political Science, for her assistance in helping with SPSS;
- The head students of the University residences, who made the data gathering for this study possible;
- My parents for investing in my education, and for their love, especially my mother (Nowongile Dumiso), who always believed in me and made it possible for me to be where I am today;
- Friends who have been with me during the completion of this study; your emotional support is dearly appreciated.

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## CHAPTER 1

### 1.1 INTRODUCTION

Identity is a socially constructed sense of belonging for people which is characterised by sharing similar cultural norms and values. It gives one a sense of belonging to know who you are and where you come from. Furthermore, identity refers to how people see themselves in relation to others and how they are seen by them. Identity is people's source of meaning and experience (Castells, 1997: 6). In South Africa in the past identity has generally been described in terms of race and ethnicity. An acknowledgement of the diversity of the population is now one of the distinctive features of South African society.

Under apartheid the racial identity of a white minority in power was used to oppress a black majority. The separation of public amenities during apartheid was the clear indication of the abuse of identity. "Mr Phillip Kridiots once said it is true that they (white people) do not allow non-white into their stores. He made this statement while commenting on a complaint by a wife of a Bloemfontein physician that his recently-opened branch, in a new multi-million complex in Bloemfontein, allowed her dog but refused her African maid permission to enter its supermarket" (*Cape Times* 1971 in Maclennan, 1990:36).

In the current dispensation initiatives such as Black Economic Empowerment and Affirmative Action also refer to some elements of identity because they single out other certain racial groups at the expense of others. Some whites who are unemployed at present have lost their jobs as a result of affirmative action (de Beer, 2001: 111).

Gutmann (1994:25) notes that "one's own identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence." The misrecognition of other groups by one group generates a politics of identity where every group claims respect and recognition. Because of the misrecognition, the 'subordinated' feel threatened. When they feel threatened, a sense of anger develops and they fight for their rights or interests. In the 1950s the defiance campaign and the subsequent bus boycotts and other acts of non-violent resistance in South Africa were used by black people to demonstrate their resentment of apartheid laws (*Asian Times*, London, 26: 06:1987). The recognition of groups can be based on

their cultural status, as Hornton (1999: 88) notes that “the demands for recognition by national minorities are fuelled by a desire to see their cultural practices and values acknowledged or protected by the wider socio-political framework.” Such recognition is necessary for the development of a sense of dignity and self-esteem of the marginalised position (de Beer, 2001: 110). However, the demand does not entail only the recognition of culture and values, but also involves other issues such as economic interests. Once this demand is made, there is a tendency to describe one’s social and political identity and interests purely in terms of race and gender, which can be defined as identity politics.

Moreover, Bekker and Prinsloo define identity politics in terms of a competition for economic, political and social power on the bases of race and gender. Bekker & Prinsloo (1998: 39) note that the “politics of identity...are often exclusively perceived within the context of the competition for material status, and power resources within a society.” The apartheid period was an example of identity politics in operation, when black people had to fight for their interests against white domination. For many years one of their main grievances was the restrictions of their freedom of movement. This was one of the most important social demands they presented to the apartheid government, the major institution of society that had power to rule over people.

South Africa moved from apartheid to a rights-based democracy after 1994. Since there has been a change from one system to another, the point of departure in this study is to investigate whether there have been any changes in identity politics along the lines of race and gender. In the process Stellenbosch is seen as a microcosm of South African society; therefore if changes have occurred in the wider society, then Stellenbosch will also be affected.

For example, Stellenbosch University is one of the historically white institutions of higher learning in South Africa which have been challenged by government to speed up the process of transformation so that the staff and student populations begin to reflect the demographic profile of the wider community. “According to official sources, the University of Stellenbosch is doing all it can to actively recruit black and ‘coloured’ students from previously disadvantage communities, offering bursaries and bridging programmes”(Goldberg, 1998: 1). Nevertheless the recruitment of students

from historically disadvantaged communities is treated with the outmost vigilance, because the University wishes to recruit only those students who have the necessary potential for University study. Afrikaans language courses are provided for students who lack proper proficiency in this language and, in addition, students who are more at ease in English are accommodated where practically possible. [www.sun.ac.za/internet/academic/aop/bridging.htm#recruitment](http://www.sun.ac.za/internet/academic/aop/bridging.htm#recruitment)

## **1.2 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY**

The objective of this study is to investigate how students perceive the politics of identity in South Africa after 1994. To achieve this objective, perceptions of race and gender are studied at Stellenbosch University.

## **1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT**

One of the main problems facing South Africa's new democracy today is the issue of identity. The challenge is to break down the walls of identity that are constructed along the lines of race and gender in post-apartheid South Africa and build a multi-cultural society. Divided societies are said to manifest a lack of national identity, because people tend to define themselves in terms of the groups to which they belong, rather than in relation to the larger political community in which they live (Mattes, 1997). In most institutions of higher learning these debates revolve around a number of issues such as accommodation, language, classroom interaction, social interaction, gender discrimination and sexual harassment.

## **1.4 SCOPE OF THE STUDY**

Stellenbosch University (US) was selected as a case study on the basis of three factors:

- It contains the target population (blacks, coloureds and whites);
- There were limited resources for the study; and
- The research had a short life span.

- During the apartheid period Stellenbosch University was generally regarded as 'home' for Afrikaans-speaking white South African students. This came about because Afrikaans was used as the only medium of instruction, which to some extent prevented non-Afrikaans speakers from studying there.

South Africa has now changed and Stellenbosch University is also in a process of changing in an attempt to try and accommodate non-Afrikaans speakers. The Third Draft of the Diversity Framework Document (2002: 11) notes that "the University is committed to change the diversity of its racial composition in agreement with its endeavour to regard South Africa as its important feeder area... at postgraduate level; the endeavour is to be more representative of South Africa, Africa and the World". This shows that Stellenbosch University is making an effort to realise the idea of multiculturalism and multi-racialism.

The language policy states that "The University makes a contribution to the development of Afrikaans as an academic language, but at the same time takes into consideration the multicultural and multilingual reality of South Africa by, alongside the particular focus on Afrikaans, also taking English and isiXhosa into account". Stellenbosch recognizes other South African languages, mostly the majority languages in the Western Cape, where it is situated. This is an immense step forward which is fully supported by some political leaders and their political organisations in this country. For example, "The NNP supports the language policy adopted by the university in 2002, and which states that while the university is primarily an Afrikaans institution, it will also accommodate and empower students of other language groups" (Business Day, 23 March 2004).

To show its commitment to diversity, Stellenbosch University has adopted a language plan. This plan is intended to develop other South African languages in the academic world. The Language Policy (2002: 3) notes that "the University undertakes to contribute by means of particular initiatives to the development of isiXhosa as an academic language". The NNP also fully supports the commitment of Stellenbosch University to assist with the development of IsiXhosa (Business Day, March 2004). This initiative has generated some heated debates about whether it will work or not, but this is not a focal point in this study. The most important issue is the objective of

Stellenbosch University to promote diversity, multiculturalism and multiracialism, which play a crucial role in identity politics. When we talk about diversity in the case of South Africa, various population or racial groups are involved when disparities of the past are addressed. Such an initiative with regard to diversity is a noble objective, which is particularly relevant in the new dispensation and therefore merits the selection of Stellenbosch as a case study where students of different race groups, ethnicity and culture study.

## **1.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

Ideally most societies in the world want to live in peace and harmony without any identity group being oppressed. Therefore, this study is influenced by the idea of multiculturalism, which promotes the recognition of racial groups regardless of their cultural background. Hinman (2002: 1) notes that “people can keep their identity can take pride in their ancestry and have a sense of belonging. Acceptance gives a feeling of security and self-confidence, make people more open, and accepting of, diverse cultures”. On the other hand, people are reluctant to abandon their cultures thus nations everywhere are formulating policies on multiculturalism, which stress the benefits of cultural diversity and strive for ‘unity through diversity’. This shows that diversity is not about one group losing its cultural norms and values, but it is about mutual respect.

Diversity management is difficult because the groups in power tend to be protective of their power, while the powerless want policies to change. This situation arises in any society or institution where there are powerless groups. The idea of a multicultural society is compatible with identity politics, because it is based on an attempt to facilitate inter-racial communications and because, like any conception of democracy, it implies the recognition of a plurality of interests, opinions and values.

## **THESIS OUTLINE**

The first chapter provides a brief overview of the topic and the problem, which this study seeks to address. It also presents the scope of the study, which gives the



background to the selection of Stellenbosch University as a case study. The theoretical framework to be used or tested is discussed.

Chapter 2 surveys the literature on the way in, which the apartheid government constructed identity and gives an account of the origins of black consciousness, the transition to a right-based democracy, and reviews recent research related to the politics of identity.

The third chapter sets out the research methodology to show how the data were gathered and how they would be analysed. The fourth chapter is the first part of the data interpretation, analysis and discussion of the results. This is a part that mainly focuses on race-related issues. Chapter 5 presents the second part of the data interpretation, analysis and discussion of the results. While the first part in chapter four focuses on data based on race, this one mainly focuses on gender.

Chapter 6 presents the main conclusions that are found in this study.

## **CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW**

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### **2.1 INTRODUCTION**

The previous chapter introduced the concepts of identity and identity politics; it also outlined the objective of the study, the research problem, the scope of the study, the theoretical framework and provided an outline of the study.

The fundamental aim of this chapter is to review the literature underpinning the theoretical perspective of this research by looking at how identity politics has been constructed in South Africa during the apartheid period as well as origins of the philosophy of black consciousness. A move to a rights-based democracy is discussed, where the current government's performance is examined. Finally, this chapter looks at recent research studies that have been conducted on identity politics and discusses their methodology and findings.

### **2.2 CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY UNDER APARTHEID**

The politics of identity in South Africa is related to the division of people into different "racial" groups. When the National Party came to power in 1948, it perpetuated segregation laws to separate racial groups. This division of people was characterised by an unequal distribution of social services and economic resources. The purpose of this section is to show that legislation was used to intensify segregation politics and these pieces of apartheid legislation regulated the way that people conducted their lives. Therefore, it can be argued that the apartheid government constructed identity politics in a certain way.

The most important laws that the apartheid government used as instruments to construct identity politics are identified and categorised into two groups. The reason is that they played different roles though their objectives were the same. The first category is the group of legislation which divided South African citizens on the basis of racial groups. These laws were the Group Areas Act of 1959, the Population Registration Act of 1950, the Immorality Act of 1927, and the Prohibition of Mixed

Marriages Act of 1949. The second category is the group of laws which divided people on the basis of economic features. These laws were the Mines and Workers Act of 1911, the 1913 Land Act, and the Bantu Labour Regulation Act of 1969. All of these laws are meticulously discussed to show the ways in which they were used to construct identity politics.

### **2.2.1 First category: separation of people on the basis of racial groups**

In the first category the apartheid government extended the Group Areas Act in 1959; under this Act people were officially divided according to race. Hiemstra (1953: 79) notes that “for the purpose of this act, there would be the following groups; White group, a Native group, (Africans), and a Coloured group”. It was the first time in the history of South Africa that a division of this nature was made. According to the apartheid government, for a person to be identified or associated with one of the groups depended on ‘general acceptance’. This general acceptance was not based on the public interests or ideas, but had to be approved by government officials. “The ‘general acceptance’ had to be proved by the person (government official) seeking to place an African in the Native group, and only when that has been objectively established will there be approved on onus of the person to prove that he does in fact belong to that group” (Hiemstra, 1953: 4). This strategy encouraged government officials to construct identities for others to suit the government’s interests, because there were no other persons who could do that.

In addition to the Group Areas Act, the apartheid government used the Immorality Act to advance its cause. This act was used to ensure that black and white people do not become involved in sexual relationships because this could lead to the production of ‘interracial children’. “The Immorality Act declared intercourse between white and non-white to be a criminal offence”(Van der Molen, 1960:56). Any relationship between black and white persons was declared illegal and therefore that couple had to be prosecuted. This Act denied South African citizens the freedom to choose intimate partners of their choice, because the government’s main concern was to construct certain identity groups. With the Immorality Act identity was constructed in two ways: firstly, it ensured that people of colour did not mingle with whites; secondly, it ensured genetic purity (people produce children of one race).

Furthermore, the Immorality Act was passed to prevent intimate relationships between people of different race groups. It was not meant to protect the citizens of the country from rape or sexual harassment.

The prohibition covers not only the sexual act but all or almost all behaviour of a sexual nature between whites and people of colour, from the point where either party solicits the other to intimacy, to the stage where intercourse take place. The policy underlying these prohibitions is common knowledge, namely to punish all overt tendencies towards sexual intimacy between whites and people of colour, because it is calculated to frustrate the state policy of maintaining different races distinct (Hardie & Hartford, 1960: 46).

This act never considered the interests of South African citizens; instead it was designed to treat couples of different races differently. Mixed race couples experienced emotional frustration; some left the country and others committed suicide.

Moreover, the apartheid government did not stop the identity construction of people with the Immorality Act, but it also introduced the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act. To a great extent these two Acts (Immorality Act and Prohibition of Mixed Marriage) were interdependent, because they affected each other. “The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, No, 55 of 1949, prohibited marriages between whites and non-whites; in case such marriages were conducted they were null and void and the marriage officer has committed a punishable offence” (Van der Molen, 1960: 58). It had the same objective as the Group Areas Act and the Immorality Act mentioned above to ensure that people do not lose their racial identity. The Prevention of Mixed Marriages Act was part of the government’s identity construction because families would never produce interracial children and this promoted ‘genetic purity’, as has been mentioned above.

This act went further to state that, if two people got married outside the borders of South Africa, when they arrived here the law applied. The reason for this was that government realised that people can go out of South Africa merely to get marriage certificates and come back. Therefore, partners to such marriage were prosecuted under the Immorality Act immediately when they returned to South Africa. Mphahlele in Deysher notes that “Karel was not legally married to his wife because of their different ethnicities. However, the two were still bound by love.” The apartheid government never considered the interests of individuals in its legislation,

which in this case refers to their emotional wellbeing and the psychological distress separation may cause. Therefore, to some degree this Act was also against the morals of the public, while protecting the government in its drive to implement its policies.

In relation to these three acts, the apartheid government introduced another act (the Population Registration Act), which took the identity issue further than the production of 'genetically purified' children. Horrell (1971:9) notes that "the Act defined white, coloured and natives (later called 'Bantu') people, and empowered the Governor-General (or from 1961 the state president) to make further divisions. This was done in terms of the proclamation of 1959, as amended in 1961, when the coloured community was divided into Cape Coloured, Cape Malay, Griqua Indians, Chinese, 'Other Asiatic' and 'other Coloured'". This was to ensure that the apartheid government stamped its authority on the population by constructing further divisions of population groups. Therefore, the Population Registration Act is the main source of various 'coloured groups', which can lead to identity politics within the coloured community where one group will get greater recognition than others.

Hellen (1979: 1) notes that "in South Africa the problem of race relations has been endemic. Race relations emerged as a problem from the moment the earliest settlers, after landing in the Cape, first encountered Hottentots and Bushmen." This shows that the problem of racism prevailed in South Africa since the arrival of colonisers, but when the apartheid government came to power in 1948, it never attempted to combat it. Instead it created space for it, because the emphasis was on which racial group was to get privileges. Through the following group of Acts the apartheid government ensured that people of colour did not acquire the same economic status as white people.

### **2.2.2 Second category: group separation on an economic basis**

The first category virtually affected all racial groups; however, the second one focused merely on suppressing the economic interests of people of colour (black, coloured and Indians). This was shown by the introduction of Bantu labour regulations of 1968, which was meant to keep jobs for white people only. Under the Bantu Labour Regulation Act, offices were established in the homelands where all

people who wanted employment in urban areas were supposed to be registered and classified into various categories of employment. This regulation was made to ensure that the number of black people coming to work in the urban areas is fixed; in that way it created space for white people to work without competition from any other racial group. This Act was related to the Group Areas Act, because it was also concerned with the geographical areas for certain racial groups, as black people were supposed to stay in the rural areas and in certain designated townships. Job allocation practised under these regulations played a role in identity construction, because it was based on different categories to determine where people of certain races have to work. These categories were divided into two, where one category consists of high-paying jobs while the other consists of low-paying jobs. There were no white people in the second category, which consisted of low-paying jobs such as domestic servants, vehicle drivers, petrol pump attendants, delivery men, etc.

Furthermore, Horrell (1971: 44) notes that “professional services in urban African townships should, in general, be rendered by white persons”. This regulation was meant to empower white people without any competition from other racial groups. Therefore, economic forces had to comply with the law and apply it in work places. Once this becomes standard practice, it is likely that population groups will develop prejudices and stereotypes towards other groups.

The Bantu Labour Regulation Act did not only construct identity politics along the lines of race but also along the lines of gender. Under this Act there were conditions put in place to look at the kind of position that South African women should occupy. They were not allowed to occupy top positions and they were also not allowed to own land or houses. Horrell (1971: 42) indicates that “no African women were to be placed on the waiting list for family housing in the urban area”. If the woman was staying with the husband and he passed away, that woman had to go back to the rural areas. She was never allowed to stay in the urban area any longer, because the person who had a right to stay in the urban area was no longer there. This is the way that this Act relates to the Group Areas Act, because a person like this was given a permit to stay in that area for a certain period; when she exceeded the permitted period, the law took its course.

According to the Labour Regulation Act, 1968, women were also identified as not being permitted to work in certain areas. Horrell (1971: 43) also notes that “unless with the approval of the Director of Bantu Labour, women may not be engaged for employment in a prescribed area”. Therefore, this act created identity politics both along the lines of race and gender within South African society.

For these reasons Horrel (1982: 85) notes that “the Mines and Works Act of 1911 as amended in 1926 empowered the state president to make regulations dealing, inter alia, with the issue of certificates of competency in skilled occupations. In terms of this act and regulations issued thereunder, Africans were excluded from most of the skilled occupations in the mines”. Through this Act economic forces started to play a role in constructing the politics of identity. Certain jobs were reserved for a particular racial group and through that process white people had the privilege of getting access to better occupations than people of colour did. This act was not passed under apartheid, but the National Party government perpetuated it so that racial divisions continued during this era, giving certain racial group preference.

In the Western Cape, for example, coloured people were given preference over other African people, because if a white employer was looking for a worker who qualified to be a petrol-pump attendant, packer or timekeeper, then he had to see first if there was any coloured person interested in the job before an African person could be considered. This privilege clearly encouraged the politics of identity because coloured people would not want to be associated with blacks in this case. This encouraged coloured people to call themselves ‘coloured’ rather than black.

Another regulation identified under the second category is the 1913 Land Act, which was also extended by the apartheid government at a later stage to take away land from black people. Horrell (1966: 1) notes that “in 1913, however, in terms of the Native Land Act, restrictions were introduced in rural areas. About 10,730,000 morgen of land, predominantly occupied by Africans, were scheduled as Native Reserves... and it was laid down that Africans might not acquire further land from white rural areas outside the reserve”. This was a difficult period for black people in South Africa, because they lost their land under apartheid. In this way the Group Areas Act generated a politics of identity, because whites never lost land, while land

for blacks had to be used as Native Reserves. The land issue is very important as a cause of present-day conflict.

This analysis shows that under apartheid white people had political power which helped them accumulate better economic privileges compared to other race groups. Van der Berg (1991: 6) states that “active promotion of white education and rapid expansion of white employment in the public sector determined unequal patterns of distribution of the fruits of growth”. It indicates clearly that the apartheid government was more concerned with developing white people; as a result they dominated all sectors of production. Meanwhile other people had no chance to participate, because they were powerless since the government was in the hands of white people.

Furthermore, Van der Berg (1991: 6) notes that “the pact government’s active industrial policy (import substitution through tariff protection of local industry and state participation in industry through public cooperation) and its support of farming (through the agricultural marketing system and the cooperative movement) were supplement by its “civilized labour” policy, whereby white workers were given protection against black competition (i.e. job reservation...)”.

The main concern was to ensure that white people dominate all levels (from top to the bottom) of industry as they belonged to the same racial group as the apartheid government, which was referred to as a “white government”. Therefore, economic forces had to ensure that white people are in better positions than any other racial group and in that way identity politics was constructed within industry.

Terreblanche (1991: 9) indicates that “the point of view of economic structure, the very unequal distribution of income, property and economic power is the most serious abnormality”. This situation aggravated the deteriorating social conditions for people of colour because they never got the opportunity to develop themselves in terms of labour skills. These acts closed doors for them and, when they realized that, they started to fight against apartheid. Throughout the struggle blacks came up with different strategies and one of them was to make people aware of who they are and the importance of their history.



### **2.3 ORIGINS OF BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS**

Everything that the apartheid government did in constructing identity politics led to the oppression of other racial groups (Africans, coloured and Indians). This also led to blacks feeling inferior to their white counterparts in South Africa. As a result of these laws someone like Steve Biko realized that there is a need to conscientise black people about their self-esteem. This was a big challenge for him because, although these laws affected black people physically, the more serious damage was occurring psychologically. “Blacks in South Africa had consciously resigned themselves to the malaise engendered by the ruling white minority” (Smith, 1979: xiv). Other population groups were suppressed psychologically, which led to various problems such as loss of self-esteem, timidity and hatred. During the struggle this was considered a serious problem, especially for the oppressed groups such as coloureds, Indians and Africans, who were all categorised under the concept black.

Recognising that this is a problem, from that moment Biko came up with the concept of black consciousness for the first time in South Africa. Therefore, the concept of black consciousness came about as the tool to be used for liberation. As a result various student organisations such as the South African Student Organisation (SASO) and BPC started to use this concept. During that period (1970s) they were the only black organisations functioning in South Africa, because organisations such as the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) had been banned and their leaders were arrested and many of them exiled.

The philosophy of black consciousness defied apartheid’s identity construction. Therefore, it was not defined according to skin colour. Buthelezi in Pityana, Mpumlwana & Wilson (1991: 120) notes that “it defined blacks as those who are by laws or traditionally, politically, and socially discriminated against as a group in the South African society and identify themselves as the unit in the struggle towards the realization of their aspirations”. As the idea of black consciousness was the tool to liberate people, there was no need for them to define black according to skin colour; this is what they were fighting against, as this construction was created by the

apartheid government and used for oppression. Therefore, it was easy for them to mobilise the support of all these groups to fight against the apartheid government. The origins of black consciousness in South Africa were generated by the apartheid government, which oppressed people after it had created divisions, for example, by taking their land, not allowing freedom of movement and implementing unequal distribution of services.

Black consciousness was crucial for people of colour in South Africa, because it encouraged them to fight strongly against the apartheid regime to get equality in everything happening in the country. Although organisations like SASO and BPC were banned in 1977, other organisations kept the black consciousness flag flying. Fatton (1986: 2) indicates that “nonetheless, several organizations rooted in the tradition of black consciousness such as Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO) and the National Forum (NF) crystallized in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s to fill the vacuum created by the banning”. These are the organisations that felt strongly about black consciousness when SASO and BPC were banned. The fact that these organisations kept the black consciousness idea alive shows that people were developing an awareness of themselves. Even today this philosophy still exists because organisations like AZAPO keep it alive.

To some extent black consciousness never discriminated against people according to gender; it included everyone adversely affected by apartheid laws (under the label ‘black’), male and female. Ramphela in Pityana, Mpumlwana & Wilson (1991: 215) notes that “women were thus involved in the movement because they were black. Gender as a political issue was not raised”. Therefore, the philosophy of black consciousness was looking at the interests of black people irrespective of their gender. It was up to women if they wanted to join and work for the movement.

Student politics and politics in general were dominated by men at that time, but the philosophy of black consciousness played a big role by pulling in some women within the movement. Ramphela in Pityana, Mpumlwana & Wilson (1991:215) notes that “the socio-demography of women attracted to the BC philosophy in its initial stages shaped in an important way the nature of their participation and the impact they had on gender dynamics within the movement”. Black consciousness should be

given specific credit at this point, because in most instances there is gender division and even cases where women are not represented at all. As a result many women participated in black consciousness activities – from unskilled to professional women such as nurses, teachers, etc.

Ramphela in Pityana, Mpumlwana & Wilson (1991: 216) also notes that “the recognition by the BC leadership that a greater effort needed to be made to mobilize women’s active participation led to the launching of the Black Women’s Federation (BWF) in Durban in December 1975”. Since then women have participated in politics until South Africa became a democratic country in 1994. Certainly, there were organisations that did not believe in the idea of black consciousness while fighting apartheid. However, for the purpose of this study this issue will not be discussed as it is not a point of departure.

#### **2.4 A MOVE TO RIGHTS-BASED DEMOCRACY SINCE 1994**

Contrary to what had been happening in the past, in 1990 things started to change due to the armed liberation struggle in South Africa. Negotiations took place between the National Party government and the ANC about regime change, which eventually led to the 1994 general elections. This was a difficult period in South Africa, especially for the National Party President, FW de Klerk, because some white people found it difficult to accept the change. This was made difficult because of what the apartheid government had done for them; it was as if they were going to lose their ‘status’ if they were to become equal to other racial groups. Eades (1999: 36) notes that “accommodation with the blacks would, they believed, destroy their society”.

Waldmeir (1997: 222) notes that “Mandela knew De Klerk could not stop them: right-wing whites despised their president even more than they hated Mandela. They believed De Klerk betrayed the Afrikaner nation”. This was a belief among some individual white South Africans who wanted to keep their identity as it had been constructed by apartheid. Under those circumstances President De Klerk managed to change the whole system of apartheid and allow transition to take place in South Africa.

Through the transition period South Africa ultimately attained liberal democracy in 1994. Liberal democracy requires that all people have equal rights under the law, irrespective of race or gender. Through liberal democracy the new South African government tries to promote multiculturalism and multiracialism. Activities that provide special treatment to individuals and groups are unacceptable and should be condemned by everyone. This actually means that no South African citizen should be oppressed because of his or her identity. According to the ANC government, all South Africans are equal; therefore those who had been disadvantaged have to be brought into a state of equality with white people.

When it came to power in 1994, the ANC faced a big challenge to empower previously disadvantaged groups and therefore had to come up with a new approach. As a result the ideas of black economic empowerment and affirmative action were introduced. Walter Sisulu confirms this (in Van der Berg 1991: 2) where he notes that “we in the ANC are seeking new approaches and solutions to overcome the gross inequalities we have inherited, to transform a society presently characterized by such extremes of poverty and wealth”. The black economic empowerment and affirmative action approach looks at the economic imbalances of the past created on the basis of race and gender. This was to ensure that people of colour and women are now well represented in all spheres of industry and that they participate fully in the economy of the country.

In essence, affirmative action and black economic empowerment were introduced to fulfil the government's vision of equality.  
[[www.http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?.an=4126648rdb=aph](http://www.search.epnet.com/direct.asp?.an=4126648rdb=aph)]

notes that “‘Affirmative Action’ and ‘Black Economic Empowerment’ programmes are designated to redress the legacy of exclusion that kept almost everyone except whites from either running business or reaching the top of the professionals(*sic*)”. However, there have been heated debates around affirmative action and black economic empowerment. Some people believe that this is a small-scale approach, which only looks after the interests of a few black elites. As a result a black middle class is emerging, while the masses still live in poverty.

Nzimande (2000) notes that “as a party of the working class we are concerned that black economic empowerment has been limited to black business.... The unashamed stance by sections of black capitalists that are entitled to be filthy rich millionaires during this period emphasizes the need for massive working class mobilization to prioritize the eradication of poverty over self-enrichment. One of the challenges facing the party and the unions will be to influence Black Economic Empowerment away from focusing only on creating a black middle class to the empowerment of the black working class”. Although BEE is there to redress imbalances of the past, concerns have been raised within the tripartite alliance between ANC, SACP and COSATU. One of the main concerns is that most people – especially the illiterate – do not know anything about this approach, neither does it affect nor benefit them directly in their communities.

Furthermore, Goga (2000: 37) notes that it “does increase class division through the establishment of petty bourgeoisie within the (black) target group.” Uneducated people do not get equal opportunities as their educated counterparts do, though they come from the same racial group. In this way the new government is creating a new identity politics among South African citizens.

For some it means reversing the tables; ‘it is now our turn’ seems to be the rallying cry from some people who had been disadvantaged by apartheid. Such an interpretation has connotations of punitive action against those who were previously advantaged. It is also an interpretation which tends to evoke the strongest emotions from both sides of the divide (Ramphela, 1995:7). The majority of people are still economically disempowered and some white people are losing their jobs; hence there is a belief that affirmative action is reverse discrimination.

There has been a growing interest in economic and political activities by South African professionals to accumulate wealth. To some extent this constructs an identity of a black middle class. This has caused a change in as far as the politics of identity are concerned. Some people perceive themselves as individuals based on their economic status rather than on group affiliation. Myers (1997: 2) notes that “while the grape-pickers and millions of other black workers continue to live in extreme poverty, the South African ruling-class, land owners, bankers and

industrialists - are for the first time in two decades able to breath a sigh of relief and sleep a bit more easily: they have achieved, for the moment, the seemingly impossible". The comfort zone that the few black South Africans are in promotes a class identity (black middle class). This is a group of elites and it leaves out the masses and white people and therefore a new class identity is constructed.

## **2.5 OTHER RESEARCHES CONDUCTED IN IDENTITY POLITICS**

In South Africa the area of identity politics along the lines of race and gender has received a considerable attention from prominent researchers such Bekker, Leilde Cornelissen, & Horstemeier (2000), Gouws & Kritzinger (1995) on sexual harassment, Kotze & Booyesen (1985), Esterhuyse & Nel (1999), Mattes, Schlemmer (2001) and van Heerden (1999). There are two reasons for the growing interest in identity politics. Firstly, identity politics has become popular in scholarly circles because of the flexibility of the concept, which enables researchers easily to frame the questions they are interested in as well as the data they gather (Bekker et al. (2004: 2).

Secondly, identity politics adversely divides society. It always creates tension between people. As a result, Desmond Tutu coined the term 'Rainbow nation' which Mandela took further in attempt to break down the walls of identity with the hope that South Africans will respect each other and unite. Croucher (1998: 647) notes that "the transition to multiracial democratic rule requires not only the building of the political, legal and economic foundations of new South African state, but also that the country must come to recognise itself as a united political community with shared commitments and shared goals that transcend the division of racial and ethnic difference." This means that South African citizens must also share responsibilities to ensure that every person feels as part of the nation, women in particular who always face social problems such as sexual violence or harassment.

### **2.5.1 Identity politics of race in some schools and institutions of higher learning or universities**

Booyesen and Kotze (1985) conducted a study at Rand Afrikaans University on “the political socialization of isolation: a case study of the Afrikaner student youth”. The data employed for that study came from research conducted in October 1984 at the Rand Afrikaans University in Johannesburg. This formed an integral part of a three-year longitudinal study aimed at establishing the effect of early adult political socialisation. This study focused on youths between 18 and 19 years of age. The sample was drawn from a universe of all full-time first-year students, while those who were repeating or had studied at another university were excluded. This was a mail survey, mailed to the sample of 550 students of both sexes and from all faculties. A total of three waves of questionnaires were sent to students. For the purpose of that study all respondents whose home language was not Afrikaans were excluded.

The Afrikaner youths’ political socialization of isolation is reflected to the extent to which homogeneity exists in the partisan identification of major socialisation agents. It is stated that the homogeneity of socialisation influences to which the Afrikaner youth is exposed derives from the large-scale degree of similarity between the two political parties such as the National Party and the Conservative Party dominant in the Afrikaner community. At that time these two parties strove towards perpetuation of white hegemony, even if different concepts of co-optation or divisions are applied.

Analyzing the frequency of party political identification of the respondents, it was shown that the overwhelming support concentrated on conservatively inclined to reactionary white political parties. Furthermore, the National Party, Conservative Party and Herstigte Nasionale Party had the support of 85% of the Afrikaner youth. It was clear that these three conservative white parties had an extreme partisan prevalence among the Afrikaner youth. Contributing to this overwhelming support of the NP, CP and HNP by Afrikaner youth are agents of political socialisation. As agents of political socialization, parents were found to be playing an important role. Booyesen & Kotze (1985: 29) note that “examining the findings, the large number of

parental pairs where both the mother and the father support the National Party is one of the outstanding features ... 81 percent of partisan transfer from parents to children occurred where both parents were reported to identify with Conservative Party or the Herstigte Nasionale Party. It was found that 65, 4 percent of the parents individually identify with the National party. Booysen and Kotze found that the daughter is extremely likely to follow the example of the father and somewhat less likely to follow her mother's partisanship. The son is as likely to follow his mother's example as the daughter, but much less likely to follow the father's partisanship than the daughter is. In the analysis altogether 123 (out of a possible 305) cases were encountered where the parents as well as the peer group of the respondent also reported National Party partisanship.

The churches to which the Afrikaners belong as well as the news media used by the Afrikaners disseminated political messages consistent with political communications which came from socialisation agents of the National Party or Conservative Party. Therefore, agents of political socialization played a big role in shaping children's political ideology.

Considering that black and white students come from different political backgrounds the 'Experiences of some black students on a multicultural campus' were examined also at Rand Afrikaans University by Esterhuyse and Nel. The research method used in that study focused both on black and white residences. In this research data were collected qualitatively by means of focus groups and in-depth interviews.

They found that to a large degree identity politics are prevalent at RAU. Esterhuyse and Nel (1999: 41) note that "aggression and hostility between some black and white students is also a behaviour pattern". This was caused by the fact that black students felt that they were discriminated against financially, socially and academically. The discomfort or unhappiness of certain groups was a problem which generated identity politics. The South African government now wants to consolidate its democracy and achieve a multicultural society by attempting to combat or reduce any form of discrimination – hence the process of transformation in historical white institutions. It has to make sure that all social and academic institutions in the country accommodate everybody. Black students at RAU have certain perceptions of their



University; this is most probably caused by their political background and the fact that they are a minority in this campus. Esterhuysen and Nel (1999: 40) note that “according to black students, in their experiences and perceptions the principle of racial separation is still adhered to on the campus. They experience racism to be present in almost all aspects of life on campus.” This perception was generated by the fact that Black students were a minority at RAU and therefore did not have confidence in their identity. Although that study never tested the response of white students to this subject, it is likely that the white students may have had a different view, because they wanted to protect the University as a historically white institution (“my school” as van Heerden puts it). As a democratic country, whatever the situation might be at RAU, the government has to ensure that everybody studying and working there is happy; therefore if this continues, it will be a failure in that respect.

Van Heerden also conducted a research project titled “My school, your school, our school? Issues of attitude, behaviour and identity among black and white pupils in desegregated South African high schools.” This research was conducted in one of the multiracial schools in South Africa. The research method used was a combination of focus groups, observation, in-depth interview, and face-to-face questionnaire interviews. One reason for adopting this method was that some people tend to be shy to speak in a group; therefore, a questionnaire is a valuable instrument to obtain the personal opinions of people.

In this study he found that identity politics are prevalent to a great extent because pupils of all races are struggling to mingle due to the perceptions and stereotypes that they have about each other. These perceptions emanate from the superiority or inferiority complex of children in terms of their social and economic background. This leads to a situation whereby, even in group discussions, a black pupil will choose a group of other black pupils instead of going to the group of white pupils. In a democratic country like South Africa, which encourages people to live in peace and harmony, this does not make things better in terms of breaking the walls of identity politics; instead it makes matters worse. Agents of political socialisation such as the community, media and peer groups play a big role in developing children’s attitudes, as Booysen and Kotze highlighted above; therefore it can be

argued that these agents contribute towards constructing such perceptions and stereotypes. For such reasons schools and institutions of higher learning cannot mainly be blamed for such attitudes. They can be encouraged by government to introduce educational programmes to try and combat such behaviour.

However, the situation is worsened by the fact that these pupils do not expect one child to be a friend to any child from the other side of the racial divide. Van Heerden (1999: 77) also notes that “among whites relationships across racial differences are also an issue. As one white girl said, if we have friends among blacks, the whites don’t accept you and blacks don’t accept you”. This shows that up to that point after years of democracy pupils from both racial groups do not accept each other. The problem is that they do not learn these perceptions and stereotypes at school, but it depends mostly on the social environment that they grow up in. Even those at university have these perceptions and stereotypes, as we saw in Esterhyse and Nel’s study, where black students believed that RAU still displayed racial divisions. Therefore, the biggest challenge lies with communities to ensure that children mingle without having any difficulties or prejudices towards each other.

Through the questionnaires Van Heerden found some remarkable statistical differences. In the Afrikaans school the majority (64%) of black pupils regarded the school as predominately white, thus ‘your school’; one can also argue that this is one of the reasons for black students to be pessimistic about RAU. Only 20% stated that race or colour is irrelevant. The white pupils (23%) regarded it as predominately white (‘my school’), 26% viewed it as becoming a black school (‘your school’), while 41% said race is irrelevant, which can be interpreted in terms of viewing the school as ‘our school’.

Mabokela (2002) conducted a study on attitudes, perceptions and insights of students in two universities in the Western Cape (UCT, US). He gathered data through a survey questionnaire that was administered to undergraduate students. The questionnaire was accompanied by a set of open ended questions for a selected group of student leadership.

Van Heerden's idea of "your school" and "my school" seemed also to be prevalent at these two universities (UCT and US). This is shown by contrasting views between black and white students in these institutions. Maboke (2002: 68) notes that, overall, African students reported some presence of racial conflict and little discussion of racial issues and concerns, while their white counterparts reported little racial conflict and some open discussions of racial issues and concerns. The responses of black and coloured students were always the opposite of their white counterparts. Maboke found that Stellenbosch students were distinctly differentiated along racial lines; Africans and coloured students offered a negative portrayal of the racial climate, and white students presented a more positive assessment.

This is the result of the fact that these are predominantly white institutions with an Afrikaner culture. Maboke (2002: 74) notes that African students attributed their alienation at Stellenbosch to a number of factors, including the use of Afrikaans as the language of instruction and the dominance of Afrikaner culture in all spheres of their lives – academic or social. Referring to the institutional culture, a member of the SRC interviewed says he thought that at the stage when Maboke conducted his study the culture at Stellenbosch was very much Afrikaans.

All these studies were conducted on a smaller scale as they looked at universities and schools, but the following studies by Schlemmer (2001), Mattes (1994), Mattes and Thiel (1998), Bekker, *et al.* (2000), and Bekker and Leide (2002) were conducted on a broader scale than the above, because they looked at identity on a national level.

### **2.5.2 A broader perspective of identity politics in South Africa**

The identity politics of race has received considerable attention from social researchers in South Africa, as have issues of gender or sexual harassment. Schlemmer conducted research on 'race relations and racism in everyday lives'. This was a survey where random sampling using a questionnaire was used as a form of data gathering. He found that racism and intergroup relations are talking points in South Africa. This is an indication that people still believe in racial identity as the most important thing. The politics of identity comes into play because, once a member of any group suffers, it is likely that his fellow group mates will describe his

or her fate in racial terms. However, Schlemmer (2001: 12) notes that “we saw that Indians are the most positive in their perceptions of race relations over the last few years, followed by Africans and English-speaking whites. This shows that, even though South Africa is a democratic country where people are encouraged to be united, they still hold onto their racial identities. This keeps identity politics alive in South Africa, because people would want to protect their interests on the basis of racial categories. This might be to the detriment of South Africa’s new democracy, because one would not want to be associated with other groups on the basis of race. Therefore, the idea of national identity developed in South Africa because it was perceived as a solution to problems created by identity politics. One of the reasons for the development of national identity is that it is important for consolidation of democracy (Gouws & Gibson 1998: 19).

On the basis of the perceptions highlighted above, Schlemmer (2001: 13) notes that “some 59% of all South Africans and 54% of African people”. This concern is greatest among minorities –67% among coloured people, rising to a massive 87% among white Afrikaners – which see racism as a serious problem. All the statistics given by Schlemmer show that identity politics along the lines of race still exist, especially at grassroots level (communities where people live). These results are in a sense positive for South Africa, because all racial groups are concerned about this and they see it as a problem which needs to be combated.

In these results government policy – especially affirmative action, which benefits black people – was mentioned as intensifying identity politics along the lines of race. Schlemmer (2001: 14) notes that “the issue of ‘racism’ today is made even more complex by the fact that we now have a newer perceived ‘racism’ co-existing with the older form – what many of respondents within minorities saw as the ‘reverse racism’ of affirmative action.” Although government promotes the culture of non-discrimination in the new South Africa, it uses strategies that encourage it.

Immediately after the 1994 general elections Mattes conducted a study on “national identity” in which he found that this is one area that does not pose any threat to South Africa’s democracy. Mattes (1997: 29) notes that “nationally, 90 per cent or more are proud of being South African, say it is a key part of how they see

themselves, and want their children to think of themselves as South Africans". He highlighted the point that there are some cracks in this consensus as the proportions of White and Indian respondents agreement with some of these items fell on average by 10 percent between 1995 and 2000. In 2001 things started to change when people became more concerned about the group or ethnic relations; Schlemmer (2001) found that racism and intergroup relations were a talking point in South Africa at that time. This shows that some people believed in racial identity as an important thing. The politics of identity comes into play because, once a member of any group suffers, it is likely that other group members will try and protect their interests.

Mattes notes that in 1994, immediately after the general elections, people viewed racism as one of the greatest problems that the government had to deal with. But as time went by the findings shows that people's perceptions towards races and racism changed. Mattes (1997: 30) notes that "a recent survey conducted by the South African Institute for Race Relations found that 'racism' was rated ninth on the list of 'unsolved problems', with just 8 percent listing it as a priority matter. In fact 48 percent of the total sample (and 49 percent of black respondents) said that race relations had improved in recent years, while 25 percent said that race relations had deteriorated.

In 1998 Mattes conducted further research with Thiel on the "consolidation and public opinion in South Africa". They note that in nationally representative surveys conducted by Idasa, only 13 percent of South African citizens in 1994 (compared to 22 percent in 1995) spontaneously identified themselves as "South African". Most people chose instead a wide range of racial, linguistic and religious labels. At the same time Mattes and Thiel found that there was a strong and very high level of identification with the political community. South African citizens differ in terms of their support for political parties or the government.

In 1995 an outstanding 92 percent said that they were either "proud" or "very proud" to be called South African. As time went by things changed gradually because in 1997 the overwhelming majority agreed that they were proud to be called South Africa (95 percent), that being South African was a very important part of how

they saw themselves (91 percent), that people should realize that we are South Africans and stop thinking of themselves in ethnic terms (82 percent), and that it would be desirable to create one united nation of all the groups living in South Africa (83 percent). These results are interesting because they change every time new research is conducted.

Mattes also conducted a research entitled “Common Citizenship Amidst Diversity? The emerging South African ‘Nation’”. In this study he attempted to answer three questions. What is the extent of identification with the group and the national political community among South African citizens? Does group identity conflict with national identity? Do strong group identities bring about ethnocentric attitudes of “in-group” and “out-group” feelings of superiority and exclusiveness, or a rejection of diversity?

Mattes found that South Africans are strongly attached to the notion of group identity by 4.34 on a scale ranging from one to five. For example, he notes that Indian South Africans exhibited the strongest attachment to their chosen identity groups, followed by Africans, whites and coloureds. Although South Africans are more attached to group identities, they are less chauvinistic. The Oxford Dictionary (2003: 329) defines chauvinism as “an exaggerated or aggressive patriotism and excessive or prejudiced loyalty to one’s cause or group or sex.” However, comparing population groups, Indians again are found to be more chauvinistic, followed by Africans, whites and coloureds. Mattes found that South Africans as a whole accept diversity (mean = 3.55). Indians were most accepting, followed by coloureds, whites and Africans least accepting.

Mattes found that South Africans’ sense of national identity was lower than their sense of group identity, but the difference was small (.05). He found that there is a positive correlation between group identity and national identity. Mattes notes that it is only when members of an ethnic group feel strongly about their identity that they do not feel threatened. Therefore, this will lead them to be comfortable with a national identity. He notes that the strength of national identity increases with one’s ability to accept difference and diversity, and it is associated with higher ratings of one’s own race group as well as more positive out-group ratings (which means that it

decreases as one's evaluation of out-groups decreases). Group identity is strongly associated with group chauvinism, and more weakly associated with positive in-group ratings. Mattes found that whites have a significantly lower strength of national identification than other South Africans. Whites also differ overall in that their strength of national identity is unrelated to their strength of group identity, or to their in-group.

The strength of whites' group identities is heavily related to feelings of group chauvinism (even more so than for the entire sample). To a great extent for other South Africans group chauvinism is strongly related to negative out-group ratings and with increasing favouritism among whites. Unlike other South Africans, strong group identities bring about rejection of difference and diversity, increasingly negative evaluation of non-white South Africans, and increasing favouritism of whites over others. Therefore, the role of ethnocentrism among whites is found to be unique in this case. Group identity is consistently related to ethnocentric attitudes.

According to Mattes, these findings raise several questions. How can whites with a strong ethnic identity, and who are also highly ethnocentric, also have a strong national identity, when they must share their national identity with the very people who are the targets of their ethnocentrism? Mattes thought the answer to this question may revolve around how whites differ from Africans and coloureds in terms of their definition of national identity. For example, for Africans national identity may represent transformation, political empowerment and increased opportunities, while whites may interpret the same national identity as symbolising less political representation or more reduced access to resources than in the past.

Mattes found that African South Africans have strong group identities and positive in-group evaluations of those groups. Racial chauvinism, in the sense of differential evaluation of Africans relative to others, is not implicated in their strength of national identity. Their ratings of other race groups are only weakly related to national identity. All these findings stand in clear contrast to the patterns found among whites. Strong group identities are not associated with ethnocentric attitudes to nearly the same degree as among whites. There is a strong relationship between the strength of Africans' group identities and feelings of group chauvinism.

Indian South Africans, in comparison to other racial groups, exhibit the strongest group identity, the greatest amount of group chauvinism, the lowest evaluation of out-group and the highest level of in-group favouritism. Coloureds showed the strongest sense of national identity than any other groups as well as the weakest.

In this study researchers offered terms such as African, South African white, black, coloured, etc. They offered these terms because their sample included representative sub-samples of the major ethnic, racial and linguistic groups in South Africa; by doing this they were able to assess how social identities vary across groups.

They found that virtually everyone accepted one of the offered terms as her or his social identity. Among black South Africans, the most attractive label by far was “African”, claimed by nearly one third of the respondents. White South Africans were more likely to think of themselves as just “South Africans” as was true of coloured South Africans and South Africans of Asian origins. Few whites were attracted to the term ‘white’, although 25 percent of the coloured respondents claimed the label ‘coloured’ and 15 percent identified themselves as Asians; roughly one third of Africans think of themselves as “South African”; over one half of whites, coloureds and Asians embrace that term.

Bekker *et al.* (2000) conducted research on emerging new identities in the Western Cape. In this study the researchers looked at the construction of identity ‘from above’ and ‘from below’. Identity from above refers to the creation of categories by the provincial government of the Western Cape and its administration. A qualitative research method through face-to-face interviews was used in two phases of this study. In the first phase two groups were interviewed. The first group consisted of representatives of influential provincial organisations such as selected members of the provincial cabinet and provincial administration, representatives of the Freedom Front and journalists. Sixteen interviews were conducted with this group. The second group that was interviewed in this study consisted of journalists and political leaders from the ANC and PAC.



The results of the first phase ('identity from above') show that the first group believed that a Western Cape identity is being threatened by numerous factors such as the downgrading and marginalisation of the Afrikaans language and of the founding cultures of the Western Cape (such as that of Khoisan). They see the Western Cape as under threat as a consequence of a shortage of provincial revenue in a political system where the province pays more to the centre than it receives in return. Implementation of affirmative action is also perceived as a threat (as in the case in Schlemmer's (2001) study mentioned above), since the majority of the provincial population (coloureds and whites) are overlooked by these policies and accordingly feel that they are not first-class citizens.

The second group believed that the existence of a provincial identity is important but, on the other hand, see it as an exclusion of Xhosa-speaking people in the Western Cape. They describe the provincial identity as exclusionary and oriented toward 'European cosmopolitanism'. Respondents who were leaders in the ANC and PAC, moreover, argued that consolidation of this identity would deepen cleavages within the Western Cape population and was detrimental to the broader process of nation-building in South Africa. These results actually reveal that influential political actors in the seat of provincial government are strongly in favour of the deepening and broadening of a provincial identity among Western Cape residents. However, political opposition in the province, as part of the second group that was interviewed, considered the provincial identity as a threat to nation-building in the country as a whole.

The second phase of the research dealt with the construction of identity 'from below'. This phase was concentrated at regional level, where the researchers wanted to see whether people on the ground have the same vision as their leaders. Therefore, this phase was motivated by the results of the first phase. Twelve focus group discussions were used as a form of data gathering in various residential areas such as Khayelitsha East and West, Reebok and Sorgfontein, Summer Greens, Strand and Griqua in Kranshoek. In this phase they found that people believe in provincial identity; however, there are some problems which tend to hamper its development. For example Bekker *et al.* (2000: 229) state that "regional differences within the province also emerged over language identification; people in Sorgfontein and

Reebok believe that Afrikaans was used as a lingua franca in their region whereas 'the Cape (Cape Town) is traditionally an English area'." On the other hand, there was less consensus among Xhosa-speaking people; some believe that their language is not accommodated in the province, while others hold an opposing view. Apart from these differences, they believed that the provincial identity is consolidated by better service delivery and economic circumstances. This was acknowledged by most people who participated in the focus groups, comparing the situation with other provinces such as the Eastern Cape. Although some people had confidence in a provincial identity, they had mixed feelings about national identity. Some people believed that national identity is important, whilst others see it as really not an important issue and prefer to associate themselves with the provincial identity.

This is the result of various factors; one of them was a belief that the Western Cape government delivered better services than the national government does and the second one was based on culture. Bekker *et al.* (2000: 230) notes that "in one case, identification with the nation was considered difficult: in the new South Africa, we are together and we have to work together, which is a good thing... But this place is like a camp and it is difficult for (us) to adapt to the new South Africa...(Wuppertal)" In four other cases, pride, belonging to a new South Africa was asserted (Khayelitsha, East, Strand, Summer Greens, Thembalethu, Khayelitsha East and West); now as South Africans, everybody has equal chances in life (Strand). Bekker *et al.* (2000: 231) state that "what appears particularly meaningful about South Africa in focus groups, however, is citizenship rather than nationality". Reasons for each racial group to be happy with the provincial or national identity are based on the way in which their interests are protected. Some people believe that their language and culture are not respected in South Africa as a country; hence they do not support the idea of a national identity.

The findings of this study support Mattes findings of 1994 and Schlemmer's findings of 2001, where people saw national identity as important thing. One can argue that people were optimistic about national identity in 1994, because it was a transition period during which they were not sure what the new ANC government had in store for them. Therefore, it was difficult for people to judge where they stand as a group in terms of government policies and service delivery by the government. As time

went by, after the second elections had taken place (when the Bekker, Leilde, Cornelissen & Horstmeier (2000) and the Schlemmer (2001) studies were conducted), people may possibly judge the way in which government dealt with issues of delivery. Some may have decided to describe their social and political identity and interests purely in terms of race.

Bekker and Leilde conducted further research in 2002 on new urban identities in a new South Africa With respect to class, culture and race in Cape Town. The research method used in this study was a qualitative method, where focus groups were drawn from different classes, races and cultures. They found that class identity is constructed around common interests and life style. Most of the highly paid people are willing to stay together irrespective of race. Bekker & Leilde (2002) indicate “that one member of their focus groups says I don’t mind if my neighbour is black or coloured as long as we live in harmony with the same standard”. This means that there is a class identity constructed in Cape Town. This person might have problems staying among people who do not have the same standards as his, even if they come from the same race.

On the other hand, they found that some people – mostly black people from Khayelitsha – still hold strongly onto culture, even though they have better jobs which might qualify them to stay with better people (class). Bekker & Leilde (2002: 10) state that “it appears in fact that culture plays an important role in the choice of residential area that residents in this group are able to make. Their fear is that they will not be able to practice some of their cultural activities that they use in Khayelitsha if, for example, they go and stay with white people in Constantia”.

Therefore, their identity is more based on culture than race and class. This actually constructed what Bekker and Leilde called a sub-national identity, where people associate themselves with the region that they stay in, for example, Khayelitsha, Nyanga or Gugulethu. Even some white people believe in culture as the most important thing when, for example, they mention Christianity. In contrast to rich people, poor people have perceived identity politics in a different way.

They tend to discriminate against each other on the basis of race than culture and class, as rich people are doing. Bekker & Leilde (2002: 13) state that “their racial segregation is simply a given fact of life”. In short, according to these researchers, middle-class identities constructed in middle-class suburbs converge around shared class values; the identities of the poor constructed in segregated townships continue to fragment along inherited racial and ethnic lines.

These researchers came up with different findings, some of which show that people change over time. Even the identity of people can change, as we saw some of them initially associated themselves with racial or ethnic groups but at some point associate themselves with “African” or “South African” identities.

The research of Bekker and his colleagues is different from that of other researchers, because they did not look at the way people perceive identity politics, but they investigated the emergence of new identities. They looked at different levels of society, for example, people in the government structure, class and region.

Therefore, I will rely on some of Bekker’s findings to inform this study.

### **2.5.3 Prevalence of sexual harassment at institutions of higher learning**

In the first decade of democracy much has been written on the identity politics of race and gender in South Africa. During this period many research studies have been conducted to investigate the way in which women stand in relation to men. Gouws and Kritzinger conducted a study on sexual harassment in 1995, [the case of South African University to identify and show problems facing women students at institutions of higher learning. One can argue that harassment of women implies identity politics, because they are the main victims, while men are mostly perpetrators. On the basis of these factors harassment in this study is perceived as a marker of identity politics. The populations that were studied with regard to the way that people perceive sexual harassment, among others, include students from Stellenbosch University (Gouws and Kritzinger, 1995). Their study was a survey based on questionnaires and involving a representative sample of students during the later part of 1992. Students were asked whether a list of incidents or behaviours were

perceived as constituting sexual harassment. The list contained items such as wolf-whistling, sexist jokes, pranks, unwelcome invitations for dates. From the list a number of items were mostly regarded as sexual harassment. For example, a relatively high percentage of women students perceived incidents like sexist jokes/remarks and unwelcome invitations for a date as sexual harassment. In the case of more extreme activities – quid pro quo behaviour, sexual assaults and rape (the latter two of which could be termed criminal in nature), a very high percentage of these students perceived them to be sexual harassment.

It is important to consider gender differences with regard to what students perceive as sexual harassment, because men might have different perspectives from women. Gouws and Kritzinger found that, with the exception of one item (repeated, unwelcome invitations), it appears that a higher percentage of women students perceive the various forms/types of behaviour as sexual harassment than of men students.

Sometimes interpretation of various forms of behaviour such as incidents of sexual harassment is determined by the social context in which they take place. In Gouws and Kritzinger's study there are no statistically significant differences between men and women students regarding items such as grading according to appearance, raiding of residences etc. A relatively small percentage of men and women students perceived these behaviours as sexual harassment. Therefore, this can be described as indicative of the campus culture of the specific University. Gouws and Kritzinger (1995: 9) note that "if one is to assume that these behaviours are more often directed at women rather than men students, this finding highlights the 'acceptability' of such forms of behaviour by the student community."

Both men and women may be victims of sexual harassment, according to the policy on sexual harassment of Stellenbosch University. Based on experiences of students Gouws and Kritzinger found that, excluding rape, sexual assault and sexual favours for marks, women were more exposed to various forms of sexual harassment than men. A very high 72.6% of women indicated having been the victims of sexist comments and jokes. A total of 90 students (25 men and 65 women) had experienced forced sexual activities such as sexual assault, sexual intimidation and sexual insults.

Of the total number of women students in the sample (714), twenty one (3%) indicated that they had been raped. Some comments by respondents also indicated that, while not being rape victims themselves, they had friends on campus who had been involved in such incidents. One respondent in this study stated that “some of my friends have been sexually molested and/or raped in men’s residence.” Other comments included the following: “Date rape happens frequently” and “It is disconcerting to know of so many rape incidents. Unwanted touching is also a serious problem.”

In spite of the above-mentioned factors, sexual harassment is also a consequence of individual attitudes and beliefs, but also of organisational practices and institutional culture. Gouws and Kritzinger (1995: 17) note that on the level of student culture at Stellenbosch University, there is the added burden of orientation practices (like “vlagpaal”, where a male student dressed only in his underwear is tied to a flagpole and is expected to be rescued by willing and unwilling women students) which contribute to unregulated discrimination against women in the form of sexual harassment on a peer level. To an important degree this reflects the attitudes of the communities in which students were socialised and recruited from.

Nhlapo (2002:7) comments on the UCT report on sexual harassment that ‘back home’ some husbands actually hit their wives and it is taken as something acceptable that, if a woman offends, she should just be treated like that; he regards what is termed sexual harassment at UCT as not an issue in the township. This indicates identity politics. Wilken & Badenhorst (2003: 197) note that it is one of those unfortunate situations for the female population, which they are viewed as “less” equal partners in the gender equation.

Women students at Natal University were subjected to various forms of sexual harassment such as wolf-whistling; sexist jokes and cat-calls, which is similar to the case of Stellenbosch (see Gouws and Kritzinger, 1995). They (women students at Natal University) maintain that the sexual harassment they experience on the campus is compounded by the fact that the University has provided very little security in and around the residences (Kathree, 1992: 15). It seems that some of these cases happened

inside hostels or residences, because these students (women) highlighted the fact that there is no security control to restrict the access of male students to their residences.

## **CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

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### **3.1 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter covers areas (accommodation, language, social interaction, class interaction, discrimination and sexual harassment of women) from which data will be collected. The University of Stellenbosch is now attempting to improve the social environment for students. In 2003 it appointed a panel of seven members chaired by Dr Van Zyl Slabbert to write and compile a report on student culture. This panel was not a commission of enquiry on any incidents that may have happened in the past; its main task was to consult widely and to propose, in consultation with interested parties, principles and guidelines that can serve as the basis for developing a residence and campus culture for the future that is more in line with the external environment and that will support the strategic goals of the University of Stellenbosch.

The Slabbert Report (2003: 4) notes that at present a considerable measure of diversity already exists as far as accommodation types and accommodation patterns on the campus are concerned. According to the report, there is a growing need among parents as well as students for accommodation of the Academia/Concordia type compared to the “traditional residences” of the University. The most important considerations for students and parents preferring this kind of accommodation are security (both physical security as well as protection against unwelcome interference or intimidation) and freedom.

According to the report, increasing diversity on the campus means that provision must be made for a wide variety of points of view, interest groups, religious convictions and cultural differences. Secondly, there needs to be greater recognition of the constitutional rights of individuals and minorities and greater public awareness of issues such as sexual harassment, labour law issues and different forms of discrimination. This means that individuals and minorities can fully expect that their rights will be effectively protected. This shows that the university authorities realise that there are majority and minority groups, in terms of race. For example, according to the information management centre of the US under Neil Grobbelaar, in 2004 there



are 15 548 white students, 3114 black students and 2874 coloured students registered /studying at the US. These statistics indicate that black and coloured students are a minority, while white students are a majority.

### **3.2 ACCOMMODATION OF STUDENTS AT STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY**

Stellenbosch is predominantly a white institution, meaning that its residences are also mainly occupied by white students. Since 1994 things started to change and people expected the situation to change in residences. The University of Stellenbosch therefore embarked on a process of transformation to reflect the composition of South African society. For the purpose of transformation, the housing of students is one of the most important aspects, including placing students from different racial groups in one residence. However, the US approach seemed to be questionable and raised concerns among minority groups. Oupa Mokoti, the SRC member in 2002-2003, notes that “what the university does is to put four brown students and one black student in a residence, and say that there are five black students in that particular residence.... The following year they put five more brown or black students in that residence, and say that there has been a 100 per cent increase in the number of black students. These statistics do not indicate diversity.” [www.sun.ac.za](http://www.sun.ac.za)

This is identity politics in practice, because minority groups (black and coloured students) believe that the university is not doing enough to accommodate them in the residences, where the majority have been white students.

Tabo Tire, a former head student at Concordia residence, also believes that students are placed in residences according to race. He notes that a great number of black students are placed in Concordia and Huis Sweetheart. A lot of university houses are popular for placing white students. Goldfields has its own ‘obvious’ coloured identity. The results of this study are given in Chapter Four and will be very important in giving clarity to this section.

### 3.3 LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION AT STELLENBOSCH

Stellenbosch is a historically white Afrikaans University, which has been using Afrikaans as the only medium of instruction for many years. Language is an important aspect of learning used to exchange information between a lecturer and students. Therefore, Stellenbosch University has a language policy that determines the language of instruction. Stellenbosch University is committed to the development of Afrikaans and allows other languages to cater for non-Afrikaans-speaking staff and students. The Language Policy (2002: 1) notes that “the University of Stellenbosch is committed to the use and sustained development of Afrikaans as an academic language in a multilingual context.” Its commitment to Afrikaans as an academic language does not exclude the use of various other languages at the University in its engagement with knowledge; apart from Afrikaans, English and isiXhosa, Dutch, German and French are included. Class notes drawn up by the lecturer are fully in Afrikaans, or where possible, fully in Afrikaans and fully/partially (e.g. core class notes) also in English (The Language Plan, 2002: 2). To fulfil this objective Stellenbosch University has two options that are used to accommodate non-Afrikaans speakers. These options are the T and E options. The T option entails the use of English in particular learning and instruction contexts where the target group of students have appropriate proficiency in Afrikaans and English. The T option can take various forms, for example “Material not for assessment (class notes, module frameworks, study guides) is provided throughout in Afrikaans and English. In this case the oral communication language of the lecturer in class is approximately 50:50 Afrikaans and English. Secondly, material not for assessment is provided alternately in only Afrikaans or English, and the language of oral communication of the lecturer in class is alternately Afrikaans or English.” This does not end there; prescribed text books and other compulsory material are in Afrikaans and/or English. On the other hand, the E option is for students who have no proficiency in Afrikaans at all. The E option is the most preferred by lecturers, because it saves time and energy on their side compared to the T option. These options refer to relatively similar circumstance under which they are used.

Although Stellenbosch has T and E options to assist those who lack proficiency in Afrikaans, they are applicable only under certain circumstances. The Language Plan

(2002, 4-5) notes that the T language specification may be considered under nine (9) circumstances which are called T1 –T9. On the other hand, the E option may be considered under 5 circumstances which are called E1 - E5. These include a range of difficult circumstances which may deny one access to information. For example, T2 and E1 help when the programme or modules in the programme are unique and thus not offered at any other South African University. T6 and E3 helps when classes are presented by overseas lecturers or by South African lecturers whose capacity to teach in Afrikaans is inadequate. Professor Brink (2002) notes that “altogether, 65% of lectures at undergraduate level at the University of Stellenbosch are given in Afrikaans and the rest is English.” [www.sun.ac.za](http://www.sun.ac.za)

The University of Stellenbosch has three reasons to be committed to the development of Afrikaans. Firstly, Afrikaans is demographically, on the grounds of both the number of its users and its geographical distribution regionally and nationally, one of the stronger language communities in South Africa. Secondly, Afrikaans speakers are in the majority at the University of Stellenbosch among both staff and students. Thirdly, Afrikaans is a standard language that has been used for decades as an academic language and is a national asset as a fully developed cultural language. Finally, it is a regional language in the Western Cape.

### **3.4 CLASSROOM INTERACTION**

The language of communication at Stellenbosch University has been a contentious issue for some time. The University of Stellenbosch has a Code of Conduct for language of instruction in the class room and the Language Plan has been implemented to ensure that good interaction between students and the lecturer is maintained. This means that a module will be offered with the language option chosen according to a certain specification. For that reason “this Code of Conduct has been drawn up in order to provide practical guidelines for understanding and implementing the Language Policy and Plan of the University of Stellenbosch, which was accepted by the University Council in 2002” (*Kampusnuus*, 18 March 2004: 2). Although Stellenbosch has taken the initiative, the report on the language survey (2002: 2) shows that “the teaching staff generally disagreed on the desirability of using Afrikaans and English in the same lecture.”

Some lecturers show their disapproval of English when they go to lecturer halls. For example, Cruse and Altenkirch (2003) note that “still, in classrooms it’s a somewhat different story. Janet, an English social work student, says she often found some lecturers were not prepared to answer her questions in English. In addition, a foreign BA student who understands no Afrikaans feels some lecturers were negative towards her when she asked questions in English and were not prepared to answer her fully. Perhaps most disturbing of all is what a Sociology lecturer said to a student after she complained about not understanding the terminology, ‘Speaking English to you students is a favour and not a right’ [www.sun.ac.za](http://www.sun.ac.za). This attitude breaches and undermines a fairly good Language Policy, Language Plan and Code of Conduct adopted by US. For example, the Code of Conduct draws a distinction between the responsibilities and expectations of staff and students. Lecturers have a responsibility to inform students at the beginning of the teaching of the module, orally and in the module framework, of the choices and alternatives for which the language specifications make provision. They also have a responsibility to revise and adjust the language specifications where necessary and according to the circumstances. However, the lecturer can expect students to respect the spirit of the Language Policy and plan, especially with regard to the development of skills in a language which is not their language of choice, by deliberately paying attention to it, taking part actively in class and working on their knowledge of subject terminology and subject discourse in both languages. This expectation applies especially to the T specification. Lecturers can expect students to inform them (the lecturers) about their needs with regard to academic language skills.

Students also have a responsibility of accepting that one or a few students...may not exercise or try to exercise a right of veto with regard to the use of Afrikaans or English in the class situation. Students can expect that language skills development will be provided should their academic language proficiency in Afrikaans and/or English be inadequate. Students can expect that they may ask questions and conduct discussions in Afrikaans or English (unless the other languages are required, as in language modules), taking into account their own and the lecturer’s language proficiency. However, according to *Kampusnuus*, (18 March, 2004: 2) relatively few students or members of the teaching staff seem to be aware of the University’s Code of Conduct for language in the classroom.

Apart from the language being an obstacle, black students feel intimidated in the classroom to the extent that they do not even ask their lecturers when they have problems. One black student interviewed by Maboke (2002: 80) notes that “he never goes to his lecturers because he feels like he is bothering them. He goes further to say that he knows of no black student goes to lectures without being intimidated by the atmosphere. He says maybe the white students feel more comfortable, but he knows that none of his black classmates do”.

### **3.5 SOCIAL INTERACTION**

Social interaction of students at Stellenbosch is a contentious issue, because students do not visit each other in their homes and those who work together in social structures like the SRC describe their differences on the basis of race. Yvonne Malan and Kgabo Mokoti, former members of the US SRC, note in *Die Matie* (25 March 2004:7 ) that “they know the pressure to conform that is placed on ‘non-traditional’ members – to such a degree that both of them considered resigning during their term of office. If one is different from the rest of the SRC, because of race or religion, there is huge pressure to toe the line and fall in with the majority’s point of view.” The way in which the SRC is elected ensures that there will not be a critical mass students who are ‘different’ on the council.

In terms of social interaction students on the Stellenbosch campus are divided racially. Based on the personal observations of the researcher, it is clearer that there are racial divisions in the Neelsie (the student centre on campus), where students socialise. They tend to stay in their own racial groups (black, coloured and white) instead of mixing. The separation is more evident when there are big rugby and soccer games on TV. If a soccer match is being played, more black students and some coloured students sit in the open area and watch the big screen. When a rugby match is on white and coloured students watch the game together. White students sit at the open area and watch the match on the big screen, while coloured students occupy the left side of the open area towards the smoking area and watch the smaller TV. In his study Goldberg (1998: 7) notes that the students’ cafeteria in the Neelsie is repeatedly quoted as a visible example of how separate the groups are on campus. One of the students he interviewed said “When you go to the cafeteria, you can see

the split. You can see the coloured students sitting on this side, the white students on that side”.

### **3.6 POLITICAL IDEOLOGY**

Before 1994 black students were influenced by black nationalism and the philosophy of black consciousness. For example, the ANC and PAC were founded to protest against the erosion of black civil and political rights. The Black Consciousness Movement was formed to conscientise black youth in South Africa. As a result, these organisations and their political ideologies played an important role in shaping the political ideas of black youths.

On the other hand, white students were influenced by Afrikaner nationalism and the apartheid ideologies, which aimed at protecting their interests. Mabokela (2000: 4) notes that “Afrikaans universities, together with Stellenbosch became the nucleus of Afrikaner nationalism and cultural consciousness. The University of Stellenbosch carried a history of being the intellectual home of Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid.” Therefore, all the different political ideologies (Afrikaner and black nationalism) that black and white students grew up hearing about since childhood until they came to university played a role in shaping their social context. The question that this study seeks to address is whether these political ideologies still have an influence to students at the US.

### **3.7 DISCRIMINATION AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT AGAINST WOMEN STUDENTS**

Although men and women seem to be getting equal opportunities such as access to primary school, secondary level and tertiary level in recent years, discrimination based on gender still exists. One such form of discrimination is sexual harassment, hence the University of Stellenbosch developed a Policy on Sexual Harassment. This policy seeks to protect women especially from different types of harassment.

According to the Policy on Sexual Harassment of the University of Stellenbosch, sexual harassment covers a broad spectrum of unwanted behaviour and includes:

- Verbal forms such as unwelcome enquiries regarding a person's sex life, telephone calls with a sexual undertone, continuous rude or sexist jokes/remarks, unwelcome requests for dates, remarks about a person's figure, etc.;
- Non-verbal forms such as gestures with a sexual meaning, leering, continuous unwelcome flirtation, etc.;
- Visual forms such as exhibiting pornographic photos, comics, objects, etc. that create a hostile environment;
- Physical forms such as patting, pinching, fondling, kissing, assault, molesting and rape;
- Quid pro quo forms such as sexual bribery (e.g. promising a promotion in return for granting sexual favours) and sexual extortion (e.g. refusal to promote an individual if he/she does not consent to granting sexual favours).

Although the University has a Policy on Sexual harassment, discrimination and sexual harassment against women remains contentious at Stellenbosch; some women students believe that the environment is not women-friendly. In 2000 Altenkirch noted that "one woman engineering student felt that, although her lecturer did not discriminate against her, fellow students made derisive comments. Another female student complained that some lecturers made sexist jokes about women. A female student at the Tygerberg campus felt that some doctors saw them as weak and not worth training as they would end up getting married and having children." Gender discrimination is a major problem for women because it can lead to psychological problems which might affect their academic performance

([www.sun.ac.za/internet/student/publications/matie/argief/20000823/aktueel](http://www.sun.ac.za/internet/student/publications/matie/argief/20000823/aktueel))

In 1998 Stellenbosch students participated in a march against rape after a first-year student was allegedly raped at Simonsberg residence. At that time there was a T shirt in this residence on which was printed "If at first you don't succeed, give her another beer." Student Representative Council (SRC) spokesperson at the time Ms Wynoma Michaels, said "date rape is a huge problem on campus. The message that is being sent out is that a woman who gets drunk deserves to be raped. And men who do this will think they can get away with it, and women to whom it happens will be even more reluctant to come out"

([www.fortunecity.com/marina/cyprus/125/60298.htm#maties](http://www.fortunecity.com/marina/cyprus/125/60298.htm#maties)).

This attitude towards sexual harassment among students is likely to have been influenced by the socialisation to which men have been exposed and it affects women quite extensively. Therefore, this situation requires that institutions of higher learning, including Stellenbosch, create women-friendly environments where women can go and socialise freely without becoming victims.

### **3.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

Empirical research was undertaken at Stellenbosch University as explained in the first chapter. Quantitative methodology was used as a form of a survey to achieve the main objective of this study.

#### **3.8.1 Data collection**

A questionnaire was distributed to selected residences, namely Concordia, Goldfields, Lobelia and Huis de Villiers. These residences were selected because they are the biggest at the US and they contain the target population for this study. Target population is the set of elements that this research focuses upon and to which the results obtained by testing the sample should be generalised (Bless & Higson-Smith, 1995: 87). In this study the target population is black, coloured and white students at Stellenbosch University. Furthermore, these residences are perceived by some students as racially segregated, even though they contain black, coloured, and white students.

The sample was drawn from a universe of all full-time South African students. International students were omitted from this universe, because the objective of the study was mainly to ascertain the perceptions of South Africans. This study is based on a survey design using random sampling to ensure that all students in selected residences get equal opportunities. "In a random process, each element has an equal probability of being selected" (Neuman, 2000: 203). Students were interviewed at the residences. In Lobelia and Goldfields the head students organised that I meet respondents as a group. The questionnaire was distributed and they had to complete it while the researcher was present. This was to ensure that they do not discuss it, because that would have had a negative impact on the results. In Concordia and Huis



de Villiers I had to go door to door after I was supplied with students' room numbers from the head students. This was different from the first two residences, because it was not possible to meet the students from Concordia and Huis de Villiers as a group.

A representative sample size of 120 students was selected, consisting of 40 students who were black, 40 who were coloured and 40 who were white. Of those 120 students, 60 were female, 20 from each race. When the interviews were conducted, respondents were informed about the aim of this study, i.e. that it was being conducted to investigate perceptions of students about identity politics of race and gender. They were told that this information would be used only for research purposes and they would remain anonymous, therefore they should feel free to complete the questionnaire.

### **3.8.2 Data analysis**

A computer program, Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), was used to analyse the data.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS BY RACE**

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This chapter presents the results of this study, which was undertaken in four selected residences, namely Concordia, Goldfields, Huis de Villiers and Lobelia at Stellenbosch University. These results are drawn from the data collected to assess the attitudes of students towards the identity politics of race and gender in post-apartheid South Africa. The main focus in this chapter is on the results based on race, while data on gender are presented in Chapter 5. The results on race are presented, discussed and interpreted.

#### **4.1: DEMOGRAPHY**

According to the data, the number of respondents who participated in this study is one hundred and twenty (120). There are no non-responses – all respondents took part in this study. Respondents who were not available for various reasons, such as exam preparation and absence, were replaced by others who were not initially selected from the list. Out of those 120 respondents 33.3 percent come from each race. In other words, the distribution of respondents who took part in this study is evenly balanced in all categories.

#### **4.2: SOCIAL IDENTITY OF STUDENTS AT STELLENBOSCH**

In the questionnaire I presented respondents with various terms that are known to be social identities for people in South Africa. The question was formulated as follows: “I see myself as: A South African, an African, a Black, a Coloured, and Afrikaans speaking” and “other” for those who identify themselves with other identities which are not mentioned here. They were asked to choose one of the selected terms. Table 4.1 reports the primary social identities of three major racial groupings (black, coloured and white) in South Africa.

**Table 4.1: % Distribution of social identities**

	<b>BLACK</b>	<b>COLOURED</b>	<b>WHITE</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>A South African</b>	25	31	36	92
	62.5	77.5	90	76.6
<b>An African</b>	8	1	1	10
	20	2.5	2.5	8.3
<b>A black</b>	3	0	0	3
	7.5	0	0	2.5
<b>A Coloured</b>	1	8	0	9
	2.5	20	0	7.5
<b>Afrikaans speaking</b>	0	0	2	2
	0	0	5	1.6
<b>Xhosa speaking</b>	1	0	0	1
	2.5	0	0	0.8
<b>Other</b>	2	0	1	3
	5.0	0	2.5	2.5
<b>Total</b>	40	40	40	120
	100	100	100	100

<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>
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 = *Number and percentage of respondents*

As illustrated in Table 4.1, out of 120 respondents who took part in this study the majority see themselves as South Africans. Table 4.1 indicates that 90.0% of white students, followed by 77.5% coloured and 62.5% black students, see themselves as South African. These are very high percentages, which show that people are comfortable about being regarded as South African. Although all these groups see themselves as South African, there are significant differences between percentages, which indicate that more white students prefer being called South African than any other group, followed by coloured students, with the last group being black students. The majority of black students at Stellenbosch see themselves as Africans. On the other hand, coloured students who see themselves as coloured are equal to the number (20%) of black students who see themselves as Africans. This is the only percentage that is highest for the coloured group, because when we look at the South African category, they come second to white students. Therefore, in this research I find that white students see themselves as 'South African', a minority of black students as 'Africans' and a minority of coloured students as 'coloured'. The findings of the present study are similar to those of Gibson & Gouws (2003: 77), who found that "Virtually everyone accepted one of the offered terms as her or his social identity. Among black South Africans the most attractive label was 'African'. White South Africans are most likely to think of themselves as just South Africans".

Interestingly, these findings are different from those of Mattes, Taylor & Poore (2003), who found that South Africans' sense of national identity was lower than their group identity. We can see in Table 1.2 that group identities have lower percentages than the national identity. The reason could be the impact of nation building.

#### 4.3 SOCIAL INTERACTION OF STUDENTS AT STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY

Social interaction of students is very important – from where they stay in residences to the classroom. I asked the following question: “Tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement, there are noticeable racial divisions in the classroom”. I asked this question in order to understand how students from different racial groups relate to each other in the classroom. Do they get an opportunity to assist and learn from each other? The following table reports the observations of respondents who took part in this study about their interaction in the classroom.

**Table 4.2 racial divisions in the classroom by race**

	<b>BLACK</b>	<b>COLOURED</b>	<b>WHITE</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>Strongly agree</b>	9	6	1	16
	22.5	15.0	2.5	13.3
<b>Agree</b>	16	23	18	57
	40.0	57.5	45.0	47.5
<b>Don't know</b>	5	5	4	14
	12.5	12.5	10	11.6
<b>Disagree</b>	8	6	15	29
	20.0	15.0	37.5	24.1
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	2	0	2	4
	5.0	0	5.0	3.3
<b>Total</b>	40	40	40	120
	100	100	100	100

**N** **%** = *Number and percentage of respondents*

Table 4.2 illustrates that, when I collapse agree and strongly agree, 77.5 % coloured students agree that there is racial division in the classroom, supported by black students (62.5%) and (47.5%) white students. On the other hand, when I collapse disagree and strongly disagree, 42.5% white students disagree that there is a racial division and they are supported by 25.0% of black students as well as 15.0% of coloured students.

I therefore conclude that the majority of students from all racial groups have a perception that there is racial division in the classroom at the US, while a minority disagree. Notable is the high number of strongly agree responses for blacks (22.5%). Therefore, in my research I find that there are perceptions of racial divisions in the classroom at the US, because out of three racial categories we have high numbers of agree compared to disagree. This is caused by a myriad of reasons, some of which can be the influence of culture, where students are used to socialising with people from within their own group. In addition, the idea of “your school” or “our school” among students may also have an influence on these results, where black and coloured students may see racial divisions which are not there simply because they know that this university is a historically a white institution. However, white students may claim that there are no elements of racial division in the classroom simply because they want to protect the image of the university.

To take the question of racial division of students further, I asked in the questionnaire “whether there is racial division in residences”. I drew up a 5-point Likert scale where they had to indicate whether they agree or disagree. This question was asked to find out whether there is any segregation at US. Furthermore, this question was asked to find out whether students socialise in residences, given that they come from different cultural backgrounds. Table 4.3 reports views of the respondents’ perceptions on racial divisions at Stellenbosch University residences.

**Table 4.3 % Noticeable racial divisions in residences by race**

	<b>BLACK</b>	<b>COLOURED</b>	<b>WHITE</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>Strongly agree</b>	10	7	0	17
	25.0	17.5	0	14.1
<b>Agree</b>	13	24	21	58
	32.5	60.0	52.5	48.3
<b>Don’t know</b>	6	2	3	11
	15.0	5.0	7.5	9.1
<b>Disagree</b>	9	7	15	31
	22.5	17.5	37.5	25.8
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	2	0	1	3
	5.0	0	2.5	2.5
<b>Total</b>	40	40	40	120
	100	100	100	100

N
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%
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 = Number and percentage of respondents

Table 4.3 illustrates that when I collapse agree and strongly agree, 77.5% of coloured students say there are noticeable racial divisions in residences at US. In this view they are supported by 57.5% of black students and 52.5% of white students. On the other hand, when I collapse disagree and strongly disagree, 40.0% of white students differ; 27.5% of black students and 17.5% of coloured also share the same opinion. I conclude that all these three racial groups have a perception that there are racial divisions in residences; a smaller percentage of black, coloured and white students had the same view. Notable is the high number of strongly agree from black students (25.0%). Therefore, when it comes to issues related to racial segregation in residences, I find that the 25.0% of black students have a stronger view.

These results are influenced by the number of different racial groups staying in residences where, for example, one sees few black or coloured students in particular residences, while in other residences you find only a few white students.

During the literature review and field work it was clear that the University of Stellenbosch does not have a segregation policy or rule; instead it is attempting to integrate students, as the Slabbert Report mentioned above. The Slabbert Report was compiled for some reasons that were similar to the findings (Table 4.3) of this study, namely that there is racial division among students in residences, where one find a certain residence being perceived as accommodating only a certain racial group.

Furthermore, the Neelsie (student centre) is one of the social places mentioned by previous studies (Goldberg 1998, see Chapter 2: 20) where a racial division is more visible. It was observed that black and white students almost always sit apart, i.e. clusters of black, coloured and white students could be distinguished (Van Heerden, 1999: 76). Thus I took the question of segregation further by investigating the situation at the Neelsie. The following table reports views on whether respondents have a perception that there is visible racial division in the Neelsie or not.

**Table 4.4: Noticeable racial division in the Neelsie by race**

	<b>BLACK</b>	<b>COLOURED</b>	<b>WHITE</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>Strongly agree</b>	12	9	4	25
	30.0	22.5	10	20.8
<b>Agree</b>	13	22	21	56
	32.5	55.0	52.5	46.6
<b>Don't know</b>	6	6	3	15
	15.0	15.0	7.5	12.5
<b>Disagree</b>	6	3	9	18
	15.0	7.5	22.5	15.0
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	3	0	3	6
	7.5	0	7.5	5.0
<b>Total</b>	40	40	40	120
	100	100	100	100

**N** **%** = *Number and percentage of respondents*

As illustrated in Table 4.4, when I collapse strongly agree and agree, I found that 77.5% of coloured students say there is racial division in the Neelsie. In this view they are supported by an equal percentage of black and white students (62.5%). When I collapse disagree and strongly disagree, I found that 30.0% of white students disagree, supported by black students (22.5%) and only 7.5% of coloured students. It is clear that the majority of students from all three racial groups that participated in this study have a perception that there is racial division in the Neelsie, just as in the classrooms and residences. Black students have a stronger perception than the other two groups. For example, when we look at strongly agree, they have a higher percentage (30.0%) than the other two groups. These results may be influenced by the fact that they see the way in which students are seated in the Neelsie. For example, each racial group sits in a separate place or at separate tables.

In my research I find that all three racial groups have a perception that racial divisions exist in three areas (classroom, residences and the Neelsie) at the US. Although all these racial groups have the same perception, black students hold the stronger view.

#### **4.4: CAUSES OF SOCIAL/RACIAL DIVIDE OF STUDENTS AT US**

I gave three reasons in the questionnaire that may possibly explain the racial division: cultural differences, language differences and preference for one's own groups. I drew up a 5-point Likert scale where respondents had to indicate whether they agree or

disagree. The following three tables (4.5, 4.6 and 4.7) present the views of respondents to those questions. To begin with, Table 4.5 reports on whether respondents have a perception that culture plays a part (or not) in the social interaction of students.

**Table 4.5: % of students by cultural difference**

	<b>BLACK</b>	<b>COLOURED</b>	<b>WHITE</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>Strongly agree</b>	17	8	9	34
	42.5	20.0	22.5	28.3
<b>Agree</b>	13	28	27	68
	32.5	70.0	67.5	56.6
<b>Don't know</b>	5	2	3	10
	12.5	5.0	7.5	8.3
<b>Disagree</b>	3	2	1	6
	7.5	5.0	2.5	5.0
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	2	0	0	2
	5	0	0	1.6
<b>Total</b>	40	40	40	120
	100	100	100	100

**N** **%** = Number and percentage of respondents

As illustrated in Table 4.5, when I collapse agree and strongly agree, I find that 90.0% of coloured and white students say that racial divisions are caused by the fact that students come from different cultural backgrounds. This view is supported by 75.0% of black students. Interestingly, black students also have a higher percentage of strongly agree. In essence, these results show much higher percentages of agree and strongly agree together for all racial groups. I therefore conclude that, generally, students that took part in this study have a perception that culture plays a role in their segregation at the US.

These results are similar to those of Bekker *et al.* (2000), who found that some black people were reluctant to move from Khayelitsha to white suburbs simply because of their cultural beliefs (see Chapter 2). Bekker and Leilde (2002) found that rich and educated people discriminate against each other on the basis of culture rather than race compared to poor and uneducated people. I therefore conclude that the results of the present study and those of Becker *et al.* (2000) confirm an opinion that culture plays a part in the segregation of students.



While culture plays a role in the racial segregation of students at Stellenbosch University, I also tested for language. Table 4.6 reports views of respondents with regard to the question of language as one of the causes of racial segregation at Stellenbosch.

**Table 4.6: Percentage of students by language difference**

	<b>BLACK</b>	<b>COLOURED</b>	<b>WHITE</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>Strongly agree</b>	21	3	4	28
	52.5	7.5	10.0	23.3
<b>Agree</b>	8	20	24	52
	20.0	50.0	60.0	43.3
<b>Don't know</b>	1	2	2	5
	2.5	5.0	5.0	4.1
<b>Disagree</b>	8	14	8	30
	20.0	35.0	20.0	25.0
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	2	1	2	5
	5.0	2.5	5	4.1
<b>Total</b>	40	40	40	120
	100	100	100	100

<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>
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 = *Number and percentage of respondents*

As Table 4.6 illustrates, when I put agree and strongly agree, I find that 72.5% of black students say that language plays a part in racial division. They are supported in this view by 70.0% of white students and 57.5% of coloured students. On the other hand, when I put disagree and strongly disagree together, 37.5% of coloured differ, followed by 25.0% of black and white students. I therefore conclude that black, coloured and white students have a perception that language plays a part in racial division, while a minority of coloured students hold an opposing view.

The results of this study are similar to those of Mabokela (2000: 68), who found that African students attributed their alienation at Stellenbosch to a number of factors, including Afrikaans as the language of instruction and the dominance of Afrikaner culture in all spheres of their lives - academic or social. Therefore, we can safely say that black students do not socialise with white students at Stellenbosch because they cannot understand Afrikaans, which is commonly used for communication at social events.

When people do not understand a certain language, they socialise with people who speak the same language as theirs. Consequently, it is most likely that people prefer to be with a certain group, which in most cases happens to be the group they come from. In the questionnaire I asked whether people prefer to be with their group. I drew up a 5-point Likert scale where respondents had to indicate whether they agree or disagree with this statement. The following table reports their views as follows:

**Table 4.7: Students who prefer their own groups by race**

	<b>BLACK</b>	<b>COLOURED</b>	<b>WHITE</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>Strongly agree</b>	24	8	13	45
	60.0	20.0	32.5	37.5
<b>Agree</b>	7	27	24	58
	17.5	67.5	60.0	48.3
<b>Don't know</b>	7	3	2	12
	17.5	7.5	5.0	10.0
<b>Disagree</b>	1	2	1	4
	2.5	5.0	2.5	3.3
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	1	0	0	1
	2.5	0	0	0.8
<b>Total</b>	40	40	40	120
	100	100	100	100

**N** | **%** = *Number and percentage of respondents*

As illustrated in Table 4.7, when I collapse agree and strongly agree, I found that 92.5% of white students say that they prefer to be with their own group. In this view they are supported by 87.5% of coloured students and 77.5% of black students. There is no significant difference between these racial categories, although white students have a higher percentage. Furthermore, these percentages are higher than in all other cases. This therefore implies that all racial categories agree that they prefer to be with their respective groups. As one black girl explained, preference for their own group is caused by the fact that they find it is easier to talk to other blacks because they know what they talk about, like traditional things or what they do in the townships. They don't have to explain, they know. They would just say, 'Oh my father also does that'. On the other hand, one white student frankly said this is caused by the fact that he was brought up with the idea that whites should not mix with blacks (Van Heerden, 1999: 77-78). Preference for one's own group may also be caused by the fact that among other black, coloured and white students, there are those who regard the 'own' group as better than the 'other' group.

To conclude, in my research I find that culture, language and preference for one’s own groups are in fact the causes of racial division among students at US. However, preference for one’s own groups seemed to be the main reason, because most students agree with that. Another reason shows some interesting variations, as a minority of coloured students disagree with black and white students that language plays part in the segregation of students.

These findings are similar to those of Van Heerden (1999) and Esterhuyse and Nel (1999), who also find that students in one of the schools in which they conducted their research preferred to be with members of their own groups rather than to mingle with other racial groups. For example, “pupils selected members of their own racial group when they choose team-mates” (Van Heerden 1999; see Chapter 2).

**4.5: INTEGRATION OF STUDENTS AT US RESIDENCES**

I asked a question whether students believe that residences are racially segregated at the US. Students were asked to tick YES or NO. The following table presents the views of respondents on whether US residences are racially segregated or not.

**Table 4.8: perception of racial segregation in residences by race**

	<b>BLACK</b>	<b>COLOURED</b>	<b>WHITE</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>YES</b>	29	21	6	56
	72.5	52.5	15.0	46.6
<b>NO</b>	11	19	34	64
	27.5	47.5	85.0	53.3
<b>TOTAL</b>	40	40	40	120
	100	100	100	100

N
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%
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 = *Number and percentage of respondents*

As illustrated in Table 4.8, 72.5% black students say YES, followed by coloured students (52.5%) and white students (15.0%). I found 85.0% of white students, followed by 47.5% coloured and 27.5% of black students say NO. Thus, if we look at all these percentages, we can say black and coloured students have a perception that US residences are racially segregated, whereas white students hold the opposite view. It is clear that the majority of black and coloured students really have a perception that there is racial division. Most interesting is the results of white students, who

essentially agreed (Table 4.4) that there is racial division in residences, which differs from the results in this table (4.8.9).

Furthermore, I asked a question about how satisfied they are with the way in which the US handles the accommodation of students at residences to verify whether students are certain about their answers regarding racial division in residences. Table 4.9 presents the views of students on their satisfaction with the way in which the US handles accommodation.

**Table 4.9: Satisfaction of students by race**

	<b>BLACK</b>	<b>COLOURED</b>	<b>WHITE</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>Very satisfied</b>	2	9	17	28
	5.0	22.5	42.5	23.3
<b>Fairly satisfied</b>	4	6	14	24
	10.0	15.0	35.0	20.0
<b>Don't know</b>	2	1	3	6
	5.0	2.5	7.5	5.0
<b>Not very satisfied</b>	17	15	5	37
	42.5	37.5	12.5	30.8
<b>Not at all satisfied</b>	15	9	1	25
	37.5	22.5	2.5	20.8
<b>Total</b>	40	40	40	120
	100	100	100	100

N
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%
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 = Number and percentage of respondents

As illustrated in Table 4.9, when I collapse very satisfied and fairly satisfied, I found that 77.5% of white students are satisfied with the way US handles the accommodation of students. They are supported in this view by 37.5% of coloured students and only 15.0 of black students. On the other hand, when I collapse not very satisfied and not at all satisfied, I found that 80.0% black students are not satisfied, supported by 60.0% of coloured students and only 15.0% of white students. My findings clearly show that white students are satisfied, while black students are not satisfied. Interesting is the number of coloured students, which in both cases comes second to black and white students. I therefore had to look at the percentage differences between them and other two racial groups. I find that there is a 40.0% difference between them (coloured) and white students who either feel very satisfied or fairly satisfied, whereas there is only 20.0% difference between them (coloured) and black students who either feel not very satisfied or not at all satisfied. This implies that coloured students share the same view as black students that they are not

satisfied with the way that the US handles accommodation. They (black and coloured students) see low numbers of black students in some residences at the US, while white student believe that the university has no rules for segregation.

#### 4.6: THE LANGUAGE POLICY OF STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY

I asked the question “Do you know the language policy of Stellenbosch University”. I asked this question to ascertain whether students understand it or not. This will help to analyse their reasons for being against or for this policy. Table 4.10 presents the percentage of students who know and who don’t know the language policy of US.

**Table 4.10 Understanding US language policy by race**

	<b>BLACK</b>	<b>COLOURED</b>	<b>WHITE</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>Yes</b>	36	35	37	108
	90.0	87.5	92.5	90
<b>No</b>	4	5	3	12
	10.0	12.5	7.5	10
<b>Total</b>	40	40	40	120
	100	100	100	100

<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>
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 = *Number and percentage of respondents*

As Table 4.10 illustrates, 92.5% of white students say YES, they understand US language policy and 90.0% of black students and 87.5% of coloured students also hold the same view. Looking at this table, we can safely say students in general feel that they understand the language policy of Stellenbosch University. These results are most probably influenced by the fact that it has been such a contentious issue in the past few years. This certainly drew the interest of many people.

After I have ascertained that most of them claim to understand the language policy of Stellenbosch University, I asked the following question: ‘The University of Stellenbosch language policy benefits Afrikaans-speaking students’. This was to verify how they feel about this; the following table presents results.

**Table 4.11: Language policy benefits Afrikaans by race**

	<b>BLACK</b>	<b>COLOURED</b>	<b>WHITE</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>Strongly agree</b>	28	11	5	44
	70.0	27.5	12.5	36.6
<b>Agree</b>	9	24	25	58
	22.5	60.0	62.5	48.3
<b>Don't know</b>	1	2	4	7
	2.5	5.0	10.0	5.8
<b>Disagree</b>	1	2	6	9
	2.5	5.0	15.0	7.5
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	1	1	0	2
	2.5	2.5	0	1.6
<b>Total</b>	40	40	40	120
	100	100	100	100

<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>
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 = *Number and percentage of respondents*

As illustrated in Table 4.11, when I collapse agree and strongly agree, I found that 92.5% of black students say that US language policy benefits Afrikaans-speaking students. They are supported in this view by 87.5% of coloured and 75.0% of white students. When we look at the percentage of students who agree and strongly agree put together, we find that it is much higher than other cases. Consequently, I conclude that students in general believe that the US language policy benefits Afrikaans-speaking students. These results are interesting, because even Afrikaans-speaking students acknowledge that they benefit from this policy. These results are influenced by the fact that there is no section in the language policy where there are any indications of ruling out Afrikaans as a medium of instructions at the US. Instead it is used as the main language of instruction.

I took the language policy issue further by asking a second question, namely whether students believe that it also accommodates all language groups. I asked this question to see if there are any changes to accommodate other racial groups at US as the government requires. How did students from different racial groups feel about this question? The results are reported in Table 4.12.

**Table 4.12: Language policy accommodates all language groups**

	<b>BLACK</b>	<b>COLOURED</b>	<b>WHITE</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>Strongly agree</b>	4	5	6	15
	10.0	12.5	15.0	12.5
<b>Agree</b>	4	17	26	47
	10.0	42.5	65.0	39.1
<b>Don't know</b>	3	4	6	13
	7.5	10.0	15.0	10.8
<b>Disagree</b>	12	8	2	22
	30.0	20.0	5.0	18.3
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	17	6	0	23
	42.5	15.0	0	19.2
<b>Total</b>	40	40	40	120
	100	100	100	100

**N** **%** = *Number and percentage of respondents*

As illustrated in Table 4.12, when I collapse agree and strongly agree, I found that 80.0% of white students say that the US language policy accommodates all language groups. They are supported in this view by 55.0% of coloured students and 20.0% of black students. However, as opposed to this view, when I collapse disagree and strongly disagree, I found that 72.5% of black students differ on this issue, while 35.0% of coloured and 5.0% of white students share the same view as well. This implies that coloured and white students believe that the US language policy accommodates all language groups, while black students disagree. Indeed white and coloured students are influenced by the language policy, because it stipulates that all other language groups are accommodated by using English where necessary. However, black students perhaps have a feeling that all that is written in the language policy is not implemented enough the way they expect it to be.

To conclude, in my research I find that all racial groups have a perception that the language policy of Stellenbosch University benefits all language groups. However, Afrikaans-speaking students seemed to be benefiting more than other language groups, as students collectively agreed.

#### **4.7: CLASS PARTICIPATION FOR STUDENTS AT STELLENBOSCH**

I asked a question about which group is less likely to speak in class. This question was asked to see whether there is any specific group that is less likely to speak in

class. This table presents the views of respondents on which group is less likely to speak in class whenever the lecturer asks a question for discussion. The following table reports the views of respondents on class participation.

**Table 4.13: Student participation in class by race**

	<b>BLACK</b>	<b>COLOURED</b>	<b>WHITE</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>Black</b>	28	24	25	77
	70.0	60.0	62.5	64.1
<b>Coloured</b>	2	11	2	15
	5.0	27.5	5.0	12.5
<b>White</b>	3	0	0	3
	7.5	0	0	2.5
<b>Don't know</b>	7	5	13	25
	17.5	12.5	32.5	20.8
<b>Total</b>	40	40	40	120
	100	100	100	100

N	%
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 = Number and percentage of respondents

As illustrated in Table 4.13, 70% of black students acknowledge that they are less likely to speak in class. These views are supported by 63.0% of white students and 60% of coloured students. Clearly, this shows that black students are the least likely to speak in class, because these percentages are much higher than other indicators. These numbers are interesting, because the number of black students is higher than coloured and white students. These results most probably show some honesty in black students in far as this question is concerned.

This implies that students from all racial groups have a perception that black students are less likely to speak in class. These results are influenced by their (black students) educational background, because most of them are still products of Bantu education, which was inferior. This type of education instilled within Africans that they are not equal with whites and that their development was to be confined within their own spheres (Davis, 1972: 14). This was done by ensuring that blacks had a separate, less funded, lower standard of education than whites did (Boshoff and Carsten, 2004: 2). As a result, when they come to places like Stellenbosch they tend to feel intimidated, because they meet people who can express themselves well in English. Even the environment itself has an influence, because they have to adapt to it before they develop some confidence. The other factor may be political, as one could say they do



not want to speak especially when they disagree with something, because they are afraid to be seen as disobedient or rebellious.

In the questionnaire I drew a 5-point Likert scale with two reasons that may possibly explain their silence, such as they feel intimidated and they do not want to be seen as rebellious. Respondents were asked to indicate whether they agree or disagree with these two statements. The following table reports views of respondents on the first statement, whether they feel intimidated or not.

**Table 4.14: Results of whether students feel intimidated in class or not by race**

	BLACK	COLOURED	WHITE	TOTAL
<b>Strongly agree</b>	17	12	3	32
	42.5	30.0	7.5	26.6
<b>Agree</b>	7	14	15	36
	17.5	35.0	37.5	30
<b>Don't know</b>	7	11	17	35
	17.5	27.5	42.5	29.1
<b>Disagree</b>	3	2	3	8
	7.5	5.0	7.5	6.6
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	6	1	2	9
	15	2.5	5.0	7.5
<b>Total</b>	40	40	40	120
	100	100	100	100

N
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%
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 = Number and percentage of respondents

Table 4.14 illustrates that when I collapse agree and strongly agree, 65.0% of coloured students say that black students feel intimidated in the classroom. In this perception they are supported by 60.0% of black students and 45.0% of white students. When we look at don't knows, white students have a higher percentage of 42.5%, followed by coloured students 27.5% and 17.5% of black students. This gives us an indication that to some extent black students feel intimidated in classrooms. However, although this might be the case, white students are not sure (don't know) if this is really the case. This may be due to the fact that they are not the ones who are silent in class, so they really don't know. These results are also influenced by the fact that they do not want to voice an opinion critical of other groups.

In my research I find that black students display an element of being intimidated in classrooms, hence they become quiet. The results reported in the present study are similar to those of Maboke (2000) and Altenkirck (2003). These results are influenced

by the fact that they know that they come from a poor educational background, which is totally different from that of most coloured and white students at Stellenbosch.

I explored reasons for black students' silence further by drawing up a 5-point Likert scale where respondents had to indicate whether they agree or disagree that "They do not want to be seen as rebellious or disobedient". Table 4.15 reports respondents' views on the matter.

**Table 4.15: Results of whether students are afraid of being labelled as rebellious or disobedient by race**

	BLACK	COLOURED	WHITE	TOTAL
<b>Strongly agree</b>	10	5	0	15
	25.0	12.5	0	12.5
<b>Agree</b>	7	5	4	16
	17.5	12.5	10.0	13.3
<b>Don't know</b>	15	21	29	65
	37.5	52.5	72.5	54.1
<b>Disagree</b>	6	6	4	16
	15.0	15.0	10.0	13.3
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	2	3	3	8
	5.0	7.5	7.5	6.6
<b>Total</b>	40	40	40	120
	100	100	100	100

N	%
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 = Number and percentage of respondents

As illustrated in Table 4.15, when I collapse agree and strongly agree, I found that 42.5% of black students say that they do not want to be seen as disobedient. In this perception they are supported by only 25.0% coloured and 10.0% white students. On the other hand, when I collapse disagree and strongly disagree, I find that 22.5% of coloured students hold the opposite view, supported by 20.0% of black students and 17.5% of white students. Interestingly, the number of don't knows for white and coloured students is high. This implies that they do not have an opinion regarding this reason. This reason is a little bit sensitive and therefore other people may decide not to give their opinion. There is also a possibility that they really don't know.

Therefore, in my research I find that there is a perception that black students feel intimidated in the classroom and also do not want to be seen as rebellious. However, although both reasons appear to be the basis for black students' silence, the main one

is that they feel intimidated. I propose that this reason is the main one, because it has a higher number of “agree” for all racial groups than the other reason.

#### 4.8: POLITICAL VIEWS OF STUDENTS AT STELLENBOSCH

In 1994 South Africa became a liberal democracy, as mentioned in Chapter 2, where people have equal rights, including the right to join a political party of their choice. I asked a question where respondents had to select a political party of their choice. This was to check the role played by agents of political socialisation in post-apartheid South Africa. The following table presents the political party identification of students at Stellenbosch, the majority of whom are Afrikaans speaking.

**Table 4.16: Percentage of political party support by race**

	<b>BLACK</b>	<b>COLOURED</b>	<b>WHITE</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>ACDP</b>	0	3	4	7
	0	7.5	10.0	5.8
<b>ANC</b>	30	12	0	42
	75.0	30.0	0	35.0
<b>DA</b>	0	2	18	20
	0	5.0	45.0	16.6
<b>ID</b>	0	7	1	8
	0	17.5	2.5	6.6
<b>IFP</b>	2	0	0	2
	5.0	0	0	1.6
<b>NNP</b>	0	0	6	6
	0	0	15.0	5.0
<b>Refuse</b>	8	16	11	35
	20.0	40.0	27.5	29.1
<b>Total</b>	40	40	40	120
	100	100	100	100

<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>
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 = *Number and percentage of respondents*

As illustrated in Table 4.16, 75% of black students say they support the ANC, 45.0% of white students say they support DA. I therefore conclude that the majority of black students at the US support the ANC, whereas white students support the DA. When I look at coloured students I see that they have the highest number of “Refuse” (40.0%). Furthermore, their second highest percentage is 30.0% for the ANC. Despite these two percentage 17.5% coloured support ID. Therefore, when I look at these percentages in general, coloured students do not want to disclose their political party

support. However, for those who did, the majority indicated that they support the ANC. What is interesting about these results is the low percentage of the NNP (10%), which used to enjoy the majority support of white youth. As Kotze & Booysen (1988) note that the National party ..... have the support of the Afrikaner youth of 85%. Therefore, in my research I find that the majority of black and coloured students support the ANC, whereas white students support the DA. I also find that many students at the US do not want to say which political party they support; that is why we have a high number of 'Refuse" (black 20.0%, 40.0% coloured and 27.5% white) for all racial groups.

After respondents indicated their political party support, I asked the question whether all racial groups are equal in South Africa or not. I drew up a 5-point Likert scale where they had to indicate whether they agree or disagree. Table 4.17 shows the results as follows:

**Table 4.17: Results of equality of racial groups in South Africa by race**

	BLACK	COLOURED	WHITE	TOTAL
<b>Strongly agree</b>	3	6	1	10
	7.5	15.0	2.5	8.3
<b>Agree</b>	19	13	7	39
	47.5	32.5	17.5	32.5
<b>Don't know</b>	4	5	5	14
	10	12.5	12.5	11.6
<b>Disagree</b>	7	14	27	48
	17.5	35.0	67.5	40
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	7	2	0	9
	17.5	5.0	0	7.5
<b>Total</b>	40	40	40	120
	100	100	100	100

N	%
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 =number and percentage of respondents

As illustrated in Table 4.17, when I collapse agree and strongly agree, I find that 55.0% of black students say that all racial groups are equal in South Africa. They see equality as equal opportunity. In this view 47.5% of coloured and 20.0% of white students support them. On the other hand, when I collapse disagree and strongly disagree together, I found that 67.5% of white students disagree, supported by 40.0% of coloured and 35.0% of black students. When we look at coloured students, we can see that they share the same opinion with black students, because there is no significant difference between the percentages for the respective groups (black 55.0%

and coloured 47.5%). These results are influenced by the fact that white students are a majority at the US, while black and coloured students are a minority. The majority of white students feel threatened that these other two groups may take all the opportunities that they have been enjoying or they may indicate that real differences still exist. On the other hand, the majority of coloured and black students are happy that in all institutions of this country, including the US, they will get preference. One white student lamented that the University of Stellenbosch has special programmes for black students, while it has nothing like that for white students (Mabokela, 2000: 80).

In my research I find that black and coloured students are positive about the equality of people in South Africa today, whereas white students hold an opposite view. After having asked the above question (Table 4.17), I further asked whether students from various racial groups believe that Affirmative Action (AA) and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) are justified. Table 4.18 reports the results as follows:

**Table 4.18: Justification of Affirmative Action and Black Economic Empowerment by race**

	<b>BLACK</b>	<b>COLOURED</b>	<b>WHITE</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>Strongly agree</b>	7	5	0	12
	17.5	12.5	0	10.0
<b>Agree</b>	16	16	8	40
	40.0	40.0	20.0	33.3
<b>Don't know</b>	10	12	12	34
	25.0	30.0	30.0	28.3
<b>Disagree</b>	5	6	17	28
	12.5	15.0	42.5	23.3
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	2	1	3	6
	5.0	2.5	7.5	5.0
<b>Total</b>	40	40	40	120
	100	100	100	100

**N** | **%** = *Number and percentage of respondents*

As illustrated in Table 4.18, when I collapse agree and strongly agree, I found that 57.5% of black and 52.5% of coloured students say that Affirmative Action and Black Economic Empowerment are justified, whereas only 20.0% white students feel likewise. On the other hand, when I collapse disagree and strongly disagree, I found that 50.0% of white students disagree with this statement, supported by 17.5% of both black and coloured students. Notably, the number of don't know is very high for all

racial groups. This could mean that they don't have an opinion on this matter or they are not certain about their position regarding this issue.

In this study I find that black and coloured students share the same opinion that Affirmative Action and Black Economic Empowerment are justified, while white students hold the opposite view. Black and coloured students are probably influenced by the idea that these two programmes were introduced to overcome gross inequalities of the past (Walter Sisulu in Van der Berg, 1991), which puts them in an advantageous position. Furthermore, the noted high number of don't know shows the level of uncertainty in all these groups. Therefore, although these groups agree or disagree, they are not certain about their positions. As far as white students are concerned, these results show that they are probably threatened by the presence of black students on campus and they feel as if they are no longer going to enjoy most of what they had been enjoying.

Taking the question of AA and BEE further, I asked whether "Affirmative Action and Black Economic Empowerment discriminate against non-black people". I drew up a 5-point Likert scale where respondents had to indicate whether they agree or disagree. Table 4.19 reports the results as follows:

**Table 4.19 Results of whether Affirmative Action and Black Economic Empowerment discriminate against non-black people**

	<b>BLACK</b>	<b>COLOURED</b>	<b>WHITE</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>Strongly agree</b>	1	2	6	9
	2.5	5.0	15.0	7.5
<b>Agree</b>	6	12	22	40
	15.0	30.0	55.0	33.3
<b>Don't know</b>	11	11	6	28
	27.5	27.5	15.0	23.3
<b>Disagree</b>	15	15	5	35
	37.5	37.5	12.5	29.1
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	7	0	1	8
	17.5	0	2.5	6.6
<b>Total</b>	40	40	40	120
	100	100	100	100

**N** **%** = *Number and percentage of respondents*

As illustrated in Table 4.19, when I collapse agree and strongly agree, I find that 70.0% of white students say that Black Economic Empowerment and Affirmative

Action discriminate against non-black people. In this view they are supported by 35.5% of coloured students and 17.5% of black students. On the other hand, when I collapse disagree and strongly disagree, I find that 55.0% of black students disagree with this statement, supported by 37.5% of coloured students and 18.0% of white students. Coloured students have no percentage higher than the other two racial groups. Therefore, I looked into the statistical difference again and I find that there is less difference between coloured and black students compared to white students. For example, there is a statistical difference of 17.5% between black and coloured students who disagree, whereas there is a difference of 40.0% between coloured and white students who agree. Even when I look at the number of don't knows, black and coloured are similar. This implies that the majority of white students have a perception that Affirmative Action and Black Economic Empowerment discriminate against non-black people, while black and coloured students hold the opposite view. Certainly, these results are influenced by the fact that these programmes focus on specific racial groups, while leaving out the other group, which is white in this case.

#### **4.9 CONCLUSION**

In this study I found that there is still a long way laying ahead for South Africa, because among students there are some elements of identity politics of race in operation at the US. For example, in this research I find that white students see themselves as “South Africans”, black students as “Africans” and coloured students as “coloured”, even though we are living in a democratic country, which promotes unity among its citizens. The embeddedness of race consciousness in South Africa must be comprehended as the legacy of apartheid. This research also finds that white students are positive about the role of the US regarding racial divisions, while black and coloured students hold the opposing view. Black, coloured and white students have a perception that racial divisions still exist at the University of Stellenbosch. Three areas such as classrooms, residences and the Neelsie are regarded by black, coloured and white students as places where these divisions are visible.

These divisions are caused by, among other things, the fact that students come from different cultural back grounds, which makes it difficult for them to mingle with other racial groups. The majority of students have a perception that language also plays a

role in these divisions. Finally, some students just prefer to be with their own group members.

The majority of students at the US have a perception that black students are less likely to speak in class than any other group. Their silence is caused by the fact that they feel intimidated by the atmosphere where you get English-speaking students and students who had a better education at high school.

The majority of black and coloured students support the ANC, whereas white students support the DA. Although this is the case, I also find that many students at the US do not want indicate their political party support. This is caused either by the fact that they support the smaller political parties or they are just apolitical or they fear intimidation.

Students from all three racial groups (black, coloured and white) who participated in this study hold virtually the same view about the role of Stellenbosch University. They are all positive, but at the same time acknowledge that there are politics of identity in operation. When I look at the role of AA and BEE, I find some interesting variations. The majority of black and coloured students are positive about the role of these programmes, while the minority of white students are of the opposing view.



## CHAPTER 5

### PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS BY GENDER

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This chapter is the second part of the data analysis of this study, which looks at issues related to gender differences among students at Stellenbosch University. As mentioned in Chapter 4, 120 respondents participated in this study, 50% of whom were men and 50% women.

#### 5.1 POLITICAL VIEWS OF STUDENTS BY GENDER

As the racial composition of students has changed and continues to change at historically white universities, there have been murmurs among students regarding their perspectives on the political atmosphere at the US and in South Africa generally. Students have expressed some apprehension about the degree of inequality in South Africa/Stellenbosch. In order to investigate students' concerns about political issues, in the questionnaire I asked a statement whether men and women are equal in South Africa. This was asked specifically to find out the views of men and women students on gender equality in South Africa. I drew up a 5-point Likert scale where respondents had to indicate whether they agree or disagree with this statement. The results are reported in Table 5.1:

**Table 5.1: Gender equality in South Africa by gender**

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
<b>Strongly agree</b>	8	3	11
	13.3	5.0	9.1
<b>Agree</b>	24	14	38
	40.0	23.3	31.6
<b>Don't know</b>	11	17	28
	18.3	28.3	23.3
<b>Disagree</b>	17	24	41
	28.3	40.0	34.1
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	0	2	2
	0	3.3	1.6
<b>Total</b>	60	60	120
	100	100	100

**N** **%** = *Number and percentage of respondents*

As indicated in Table 5.1, when I collapse strongly agree and agree, I found that 53.3% of men say that men and women are equal in South Africa. In this view they are supported by 28.3% women. On the other hand, when I collapse disagree and strongly disagree, I found that 43.3% of women disagree with this statement. This implies that the majority of women are not happy about the degree of gender equality in South Africa, whereas men hold the opposite view.

Interesting is the high number of don't knows for both sexes (men 18.3% and women 28.3%). Now that we have been through ten years of democracy, which is relatively a long period, I would have expected virtually everyone who participated in this study to have an opinion, but this is not the case. This may be because some people are apolitical and are not interested in politics at all or they are afraid to voice an opinion that is critical of the government.

I took the question of equality further by looking at the equality of black and white men. I asked this question to see whether they (the white men) are adversely affected by affirmative action and black economic empowerment or not. In the questionnaire I asked whether white men are the worst affected in South Africa by affirmative action and black economic empowerment. In a 5-point Likert scale respondents were asked to indicate whether they agree or disagree with this statement. The results are reported in Table 5.2:

**Table 5.2: Results of whether white men are the worst affected in SA at the moment by gender**

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
<b>Strongly agree</b>	9	4	13
	15.0	6.6	10.8
<b>Agree</b>	15	21	36
	25.0	35.0	30
<b>Don't know</b>	13	13	26
	21.6	21.6	21.6
<b>Disagree</b>	16	15	31
	26.6	25.0	25.8
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	7	7	14
	11.6	11.6	11.6
<b>Total</b>	60	60	120
	100	100	100

N
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%
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 = Number and percentage of respondents

Table 5.2 indicates that when I collapse strongly agree and agree, 40.0% of men say white men are the worst affected group by affirmative action and black economic empowerment in South Africa. In this view they are supported by 41.6% women. On the other hand, when I collapse disagree and strongly disagree, 38.2% of men disagree with this perception. Interesting is the high number of don't knows for both men and women. If we look at these numbers, men and women have virtually equal percentages. Notable is the percentage of "agree", which is much higher than the others. Therefore, in this research I find that both men and women have a perception that white men are the worst affected group in South Africa. This may be the result of the way in which people define democracy, in that they believe that every South African citizen should get equal rights. They believe that white men suffer double discrimination both as men and as being white, so they get absolutely nothing from programmes such as AA and BEE, unlike their black counterparts.

I took the same question further by looking at the racial differences of students with regard to the issue of white men being the worst affected group. Results are reported in Table 5.3:

**Table 5.3: Results of whether white men are the worst affected group in South Africa by race**

	BLACK	COLOURED	WHITE	TOTAL
<b>Strongly agree</b>	1	3	9	13
	2.5	7.5	22.5	10.8
<b>Agree</b>	5	11	20	36
	12.5	27.5	50	30
<b>Don't know</b>	10	12	4	26
	25.0	30.0	10.0	21.6
<b>Disagree</b>	12	13	6	31
	30.0	32.5	15	25.8
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	12	1	1	14
	30.0	2.5	2.5	11.6
<b>Total</b>	40	40	40	120
	100	100	100	100

N
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%
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 = Number and percentage of respondents

As indicated in Table 5.3, when I collapse agree and strongly agree, I find that 72.5% of white, 35% coloured and 15% black students say that white men are the worst affected group in South Africa. However, when I collapse disagree and strongly

disagree together, 60.0% of black, 35.0% coloured and only 17.5% white students hold the opposite view. Notable is the high number of don't knows for coloured students. This implies that the majority of white and coloured students have a perception that white men are the worst affected group, while black students disagree or are of the opposing view. The position of white and coloured students may be influenced by the fact that white people are excluded from programmes such as AA and BEE, while in the black students' point of view the reason is simple, namely that black people enjoy the positions of privilege or monopoly of resources.

It is important to find out how men and women feel about their treatment at Stellenbosch. In the questionnaire I drew up a 5-point Likert scale where respondents had to indicate whether they feel that both men and women are treated the same at US or not. The following Table report the results as follows:

**Table 5.4: Results of the treatment of students at US by gender**

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
<b>Strongly agree</b>	7	4	11
	11.6	6.6	9.1
<b>Agree</b>	39	36	75
	65.0	60.0	62.5
<b>Don't know</b>	9	12	21
	15.0	20.0	17.5
<b>Disagree</b>	3	7	10
	5.0	11.6	8.3
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	2	1	3
	3.3	1.6	2.5
<b>Total</b>	60	60	120
	100	100	100

**N** **%** = *Number and percentage of respondents*

Table 5.4 indicates that, when I collapse strongly agree and agree, 71.6% of male students say that men and women are treated equally at US. This view is supported by 60.6% of women students. Interesting is the high number of don't knows – 20.0% for women and 15.0% men. When we look at these numbers, the agree category has much higher percentage for both sexes. I therefore find that the majority of both men and women students are happy with the way Stellenbosch University treats students. These results are probably influenced by the low number of incidents of discrimination that occur at the University. It is most likely that if students knew of many incidents where a certain group/s has been discriminated against, these results

would have been different from what they are. However, with the high percentage of don't know responses, especially for women, one can say that there is an element of uncertainty, which may be caused by one or two incidents where they have been victims.

In addition, I drew up a 5-point Likert scale where respondents had to indicate whether some lecturers discriminate against women students or not. The results are reported in Table 5.5

**Table 5.5: Results of whether some lecturers discriminate against women students**

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
<b>Strongly agree</b>	4	2	6
	6.6	3.3	5.0
<b>Agree</b>	8	14	22
	13.3	23.3	18.3
<b>Don't know</b>	20	16	36
	33.3	26.6	30.0
<b>Disagree</b>	22	25	47
	36.6	41.6	39.1
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	6	3	9
	10.0	5.0	7.5
<b>Total</b>	60	60	120
	100	100	100

N
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%
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 = Number and percentage of respondents

As indicated in Table 5.5, when I collapse disagree and strongly disagree, I find that 46.6% of both men and women say that no lecturers discriminate against women students. However, when I collapse strongly agree and agree together, I find that 26.6% women and 19.9% men students disagree with this statement. Notable is the high number of don't know responses – 33.3% for men and 26.6 for women. These results are interesting because men and women have an equal percentage for agree (46.6%), However, although the majority of both men and women believe that no lecturers discriminate against women students, men seemed to be less certain in their position (33.3% don't know), while women lean more towards agreeing (26.6% don't know). I find that the majority of both men and women students do not have a perception that some lecturers discriminate against women students at Stellenbosch.

I asked respondents whether men and women students feel protected at US. I wanted to find out their opinion about the protection of students in general. In the questionnaire I drew up a 5-point likert scale where respondents had to indicate whether they agree or disagree.

**Table 5.6: Results of whether both men and women feel protected around US campus**

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
<b>Strongly agree</b>	9	4	13
	15.0	6.6	10.8
<b>Agree</b>	29	30	59
	48.3	50.0	49.1
<b>Don't know</b>	12	14	26
	20.0	23.3	21.6
<b>Disagree</b>	8	10	18
	13.3	16.6	15.0
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	2	2	4
	3.3	3.3	3.3
<b>Total</b>	60	60	120
	100	100	100

**N** **%** = *Number and percentage of respondents*

As indicated in Table 5.6, when I collapse agree and strongly agree together, I find that 63.3% of men say that both men and women feel protected at US. In this view they are supported by 56.6% women. On the other hand, when I collapse disagree and strongly disagree together 23.3% of women and 20.0% men students hold the opposite view. This therefore means that the majority of both men and women feel protected at US. One of the major reasons is that students do not witness assaults or abuse at the US.

In conclusion, this study finds that the majority of women students have a perception that men and women are still not equal in SA, whereas men see the situation otherwise. When it comes to the issue of white men being the group worst affected by affirmative action and black economic empowerment, both men and women agree, which therefore indicates that they have a perception that white men are the worst affected group. Although these students have different views on gender equality, they agree that they all feel protected on campus; no group feels vulnerable. They indicate

that even their lecturers show no gender discrimination against women or against any other group.

## 5.2 SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Both men and women students feel protected at US; however, this does not necessarily mean that there will be no elements of sexual harassment. Therefore, I asked a question about sexual harassment in order to locate which gender group is more exposed to it. In the questionnaire it is stated that women are more exposed to sexual harassment and respondents were asked to indicate whether they agree or disagree with this statement. The results are reported in Table 5.7:

**Table 5.7: Results of men and women exposed to sexual harassment**

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
<b>Strongly agree</b>	18	21	39
	30.0	35.0	32.5
<b>Agree</b>	16	27	43
	26.6	45.0	35.8
<b>Don't know</b>	10	5	15
	16.6	8.3	12.5
<b>Disagree</b>	12	7	19
	20.0	11.6	15.8
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	4	0	4
	6.6	0	3.3
<b>Total</b>	60	60	120
	100	100	100

N
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%
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 = Number and percentage of respondents

As indicated in Table 5.7, when I collapse strongly agree and agree, 80.0% of women say that they are more exposed to sexual harassment. In their view they are supported by 56.6% of men. On the other hand, when I collapse disagree and strongly disagree, I find that 26.6% of men and 11.6% of women disagree with this perception. This actually indicates that the majority of men and women students have a perception that women are more exposed to sexual harassment than their male counterparts. This may be caused by the fact that in most incidents of sexual harassment that they know of, women have been the victims whereas incidents of men being victims are few.

I looked at what they consider sexual harassment to be. In doing this I drew up a 5-point Likert scale where respondents had to indicate whether they agree or not with six items such as sexist jokes, repeated unwelcome requests for a date, unwanted touching, remarks on appearance, raiding of residences and wolf-whistling. The following Table (5.8) reports the views of respondents on whether they agree or not that sexist jokes constitute sexual harassment.

**Table 5.8: Results of whether sexist jokes constitute sexual harassment by gender**

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
<b>Strongly agree</b>	9	9	18
	15.0	15.0	15.0
<b>Agree</b>	19	29	48
	31.6	48.3	40.0
<b>Don't know</b>	7	4	11
	11.6	6.6	9.1
<b>Disagree</b>	21	17	38
	35.0	28.3	31.6
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	4	1	5
	6.6	1.6	4.1
<b>Total</b>	60	60	120
	100	100	100

N
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%
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 = *Number and percentage of respondents*

As indicated in Table 5.8, when I collapse strongly agree and agree, I found that 63.3% of women students say that sexist jokes constitute sexual harassment. In this view they are supported by 46.6% of men. However, when I collapse disagree and strongly disagree, I find that 41.6% of men and 29.9% of women students disagree. This makes it clear that men and women have different views about this, when women perceive sexist jokes as constituting sexual harassment; men, on the other hand, hold the opposite view. In the men's point of view this may be because there is no physical contact as in other types of harassment. Furthermore, men are mostly perpetrators of this kind of harassment, whereas women are on the receiving end.

Secondly, I asked respondents whether they agree or disagree that repeated unwelcome requests for a date constitute sexual harassment or not. The results are reported in Table 5.9:



**Table 5.9: Results of whether repeated unwelcome requests for a date constitute sexual harassment**

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
<b>Strongly agree</b>	8	8	16
	13.3	13.3	13.3
<b>Agree</b>	26	34	60
	43.3	56.6	50
<b>Don't know</b>	9	7	16
	15.0	11.6	13.3
<b>Disagree</b>	15	11	26
	25.0	18.3	21.6
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	2	0	2
	3.3	0	1.6
<b>Total</b>	60	60	120
	100	100	100

**N** **%** = *Number and percentage of respondents*

As indicated in Table 5.9, when I collapse strongly agree and agree together, 69.9% of women and 56.6% of men say that repeated unwelcome requests for date constitute sexual harassment. This clearly shows that the majority of both men and women have a perception that repeated unwelcome requests for a date constitute sexual harassment. I asked respondents whether they agree or disagree that unwanted touching constitutes sexual harassment. The results are reported in Table 5.10:

**Table 5.10: Results of whether unwanted touching constitute sexual harassment or not**

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
<b>Strongly agree</b>	23	24	47
	38.3	40	39.1
<b>Agree</b>	31	33	64
	51.6	55	53.3
<b>Don't know</b>	4	2	6
	6.6	3.3	5
<b>Disagree</b>	2	0	2
	3.3	0	1.6
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	0	1	1
	0	1.6	0.8
<b>Total</b>	60	60	60
	100	100	100

**N** **%** = *Number and percentage of respondents*

As Table 5.10 indicates, when I collapse strongly agree and agree together, 95.0% of women say that unwanted touching constitutes sexual harassment. In this view they

are supported by 89.9% of men. This undoubtedly indicates that the majority of both men and women have a perception that unwanted touching constitutes sexual harassment. These results are influenced by the fact that the more serious the incident, the greater the likelihood that a higher percentage of respondents will interpret such behaviour as constituting sexual harassment.

Fourthly, in the questionnaire I gave respondents a statement that remarks about appearance constitute sexual harassment. I drew up a 5-point Likert scale where they had to indicate whether they agree or disagree. The results are reported in Table 5.11:

**Table 5.11: Results of whether remarks for appearance constitute sexual harassment or not**

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
<b>Strongly agree</b>	9	10	19
	15.0	16.6	15.8
<b>Agree</b>	22	33	55
	36.6	55.0	45.8
<b>Don't know</b>	15	8	23
	25.0	13.3	19.1
<b>Disagree</b>	12	9	21
	20.0	15.0	17.5
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	2	0	2
	3.3	0	1.6
<b>Total</b>	60	60	120
	100	100	100

N	%
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 = Number and percentage of respondents

As indicated in Table 5.11, when I collapse agree and disagree together, 68.3% women and 51.6% of men students say that remarks about appearance constitute sexual harassment. There is a percentage of more than 10.0% between men and women. These numbers are very high compared to the other indicators disagree and don't know. Therefore, on the basis of the high numbers we can safely conclude that the majority of men and women perceive remarks about appearance as constituting sexual harassment. One of the reasons we get equal percentages for men and women is that both groups are perpetrators of this kind of harassment. No group is a more of victim or perpetrator than the other.

Fifthly, in the questionnaire respondents had to comment on whether raiding of residences constitutes sexual harassment. They had to indicate on a 5-point Likert

scale whether they agree or disagree with this statement. The results are reported in Table 5.12:

**Table 5.12: Location of whether raiding of residences constitutes sexual harassment or not**

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
<b>Strongly agree</b>	8	11	19
	13.3	18.3	15.8
<b>Agree</b>	21	23	44
	35	38.3	36.6
<b>Don't know</b>	13	22	35
	21.6	36.6	29.1
<b>Disagree</b>	13	4	17
	21.6	6.6	14.1
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	5	0	5
	8.3	0	4.1
<b>Total</b>	60	60	120
	100	100	100

<i>N</i>	%
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 = *Number and percentage of respondents*

As indicated in Table 5.12, when I collapse agree and strongly agree, I find that 48.3% men and 56.6% women say raiding of residences constitutes sexual harassment. On the other hand, when I collapse disagree and strongly disagree, I find that 29.9% of men and 6.6% of women students disagree. Notable is the high number of don't knows for women. Looking at the high number of "agree" for both men and women, we can safely conclude that they have a perception that raiding of residences constitutes sexual harassment. However, when we consider the high number of don't know responses for women one can also say that they are not sure about their position. This is due to the fact that some of them do not understand raiding of residences. I found during the data collection period that most respondents asked me to explain the notion of raiding of residence. This used to be a student's practice that was done at the US, especially during carnivals, that does not exist any longer. Even after hearing the explanation, some of them showed some signs of uncertainty.

Finally, I gave respondents a statement that 'wolf-whistling constitutes sexual harassment' and they had to indicate on a 5-point Likert scale whether they agree or disagree. Results are reported in Table 5.13:

**Table 5.13: Results of whether wolf-whistling constitutes sexual harassment or not**

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
<b>Strongly agree</b>	11	14	25
	18.3	23.3	20.8
<b>Agree</b>	19	32	51
	31.6	53.3	42.5
<b>Don't know</b>	11	5	16
	18.3	8.3	13.3
<b>Disagree</b>	17	9	26
	28.3	15	21.6
<b>Strongly disagree</b>	2	0	2
	3.3	0	1.6
<b>Total</b>	60	60	120
	100	100	100

**N** **%** = Number and percentage of respondents

As indicated in Table 5.13 when I collapse agree and strongly agree, I found that 76.6% women and 49.9% men students say wolf-whistling constitutes sexual harassment. However, when I collapse disagree and strongly disagree, I find that 31.6% of men and 15.0% of women students disagree with this statement. This clearly shows that the majority of women students have a perception that wolf-whistling constitutes sexual harassment, while men hold the opposite view. The reason is simple; men do not take wolf-whistling seriously, probably because they are not whistled at.

This is an interesting variation of results, because we can see that men always hold a different view in terms of what constitutes sexual harassment. This response may be explained by the fact that most men grew up in communities where wolf-whistling was seen as a normal act. Finally, the University can also be blamed for not communicating the sexual harassment policy well to students.

To conclude, in my research I find that virtually all items that were presented to respondents are perceived by the majority of women students as constituting sexual harassment. Two items – sexist jokes and wolf-whistling – are perceived by the majority of men students as not constituting sexual harassment. This study supports other research findings, that is, the more serious the incident, the greater the likelihood that a higher percentage of respondents will interpret such behaviour as

sexual harassment (see Gouws and Kritzinger, 1995: 7). For example, the percentage for unwanted touching is very high for both men (89.9%) and women (95.0%) as compared to other items. Gouws & Kritzinger, (1995: 8) note that “With the exception of one item (repeated unwelcome invitations), it appears that a higher percentage of women students perceived the various forms of behaviour as sexual harassment than men”. Like the study by Fitzgerald and Ormerod in the USA (1991), I also find that perceptions of sexual harassment are influenced by the gender of the respondents, with women rating situations significantly different than men.

After noting that women are more exposed to sexual harassment (Table 5.7), I also tried to find out what students really experience as sexual harassment. In the questionnaire I asked respondents about who experienced forms of sexual harassment. This was done to confirm the perception that women students are more exposed to sexual harassment than men. The following six Tables (5.14, 5.15, 5.16, 5.17, 5.18, &5.19) report the responses to this question. Firstly, Table 5.14 reported results as follows:

**Table 5.14: Students’ experience of sexist jokes**

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
<b>Experienced</b>	35	49	84
	58.3	81.6	70.0
<b>Never experienced</b>	25	11	36
	41.6	18.3	30.0
<b>Total</b>	60	60	120
	100	100	100

N	%
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 =Number and percentage of students

As indicated in Table 5.14, 81.6% of women and 58.3% of men students indicate that they have experienced sexist jokes. On the other hand, 41.6% men and 18.3% women students say they never experienced sexist jokes. Although the percentage for both men and women who say they experienced sexist jokes is high, we can say women students are the most affected. Furthermore, the percentage for men who never experienced sexist jokes is also high compared to that of women. This certainly implies that the majority of women students are more exposed to sexist jokes compared to men. This is influenced by peer pressure and the community that men students grew up in.

Table 5.15 shows the results for experience of repeated unwelcome requests for dates as follows:

**Table 5.15 Students' experience of repeated unwelcome requests for a date**

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
<b>Experienced</b>	14	36	50
	23.3	60.0	41.6
<b>Never experienced</b>	46	24	70
	76.6	40.0	58.3
<b>total</b>	60	60	120
	100	100	100

**N** | **%** =Number and percentage of respondents

As indicated in Table 5.15, 60.0% of women and 23.3% of men students say they experienced repeated unwelcome requests for a date. On the other hand, 76.6% of men and 40.0% of women students say they experienced this kind of harassment. These results imply that women students experience repeated unwelcome requests for dates, while men do not. In the question I asked whether students experienced unwanted touching. Table 5.15 shows the results as follows:

**Table 5.16 Students experience of unwanted touching**

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
<b>Experienced</b>	13	30	43
	21.6	50.0	35.8
<b>Never experienced</b>	47	30	77
	78.3	50.0	64.1
<b>Total</b>	60	60	120
	100	100	100

**N** | **%** =Number and percentage of respondents

As indicated in Table 5.16, 50.0% women and 21.6% men students say they experienced unwanted touching. On the other hand, 78.3% of men and 50.0% of women students say they never experienced unwanted touching. Notable is the equal number of women students who experienced unwanted touching (50.0%) and those who never experienced this (50.0%). This implies that male students never experience unwanted touching, while women students have some mixed experiences. This is probably because some people are reluctant to speak about their personal experiences or problems, especially those who believe that it will 'stigmatise' them as individuals. Furthermore, these results could mean that women students do not want to speak

about the most extreme forms of sexual harassment. In addition to this, I asked whether respondents experienced remarks on their appearance. Table 5.16 shows the results as follows:

**Table 5.17 Students' experience of remarks on appearance**

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
<b>Experienced</b>	24	44	68
	40.0	73.3	56.6
<b>Never experienced</b>	36	16	52
	60.0	26.6	43.3
<b>Total</b>	60	60	120
	100	100	100

**N** **%** =Number and percentage of respondents

As indicated in Table 5.17, 73.3% of women and 40.0% of men students say they experienced remarks on appearance, while on the other hand 60.0% of men and 26.6% of women students say they never experienced remarks on appearance. This clearly shows that the majority of women students have the problem of being graded according their appearance, while men do not. But even if men are graded as well, this is certainly happening to a lesser extent compared to women.

In the questionnaire I asked whether respondents experience raiding of residences. Table 5.18 reports results as follows:

**Table 5.18 Students' experience of raiding of residences**

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
<b>Experienced</b>	6	11	17
	10.0	18.3	14.1
<b>Never experienced</b>	54	49	103
	90.0	81.6	85.8
<b>Total</b>	60	60	120
	100	100	100

**N** **%** =Number and percentage of respondents

As indicated in Table 5.18, 90.0% men and 81.6% women students say they never experience raiding of residences. These results show that both men and women students do not have a problem with people who just come and raid their residences. In other words, these results show some changes in student culture because they come and visit other residences and cause no threat to the members of that particular residence. These results are different from those of Kathree (1992:15), since he found

that “women students at Natal University maintain that the sexual harassment they experience on the campus is compounded by the fact that the University has provided very little security in and around the residence”. In the questionnaire I asked whether respondents experienced or never experienced wolf-whistling. Table 5.19 shows the results as follows:

**Table 5.19 Students’ experience of wolf-whistling**

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
<b>Experienced</b>	13	49	62
	21.6	81.6	51.6
<b>Never experienced</b>	47	11	58
	78.3	18.3	48.3
<b>Total</b>	60	60	120
	100	100	100

**N** **%** =Number and percentage of respondents

As indicated in Table 5.19, 81.6% of women and 21.6% of men students say they have experienced wolf-whistling, while on the other hand 78.3% of men students and only 18.3% women students say they never experienced it. These results show that women students are the group that experiences wolf-whistling, whereas men do not. After I asked all the above questions about sexual harassment I drew up a 10-point scale ranging from very bad (at number 1) to very good (at number 10) in order for respondents to rate the sexual harassment policy of Stellenbosch University. For analysis purposes this scale was recoded to a 5-point scale in which Number; 1 = very bad, 2=bad, 3 = not bad/not good, 4=good and 5 = very good. Table 5.20 reports the results as follows:

**Table 5.20: Rating of sexual harassment policy of US by gender**

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
<b>1 (Very bad)</b>	11	3	14
	18.3	5	11.6
<b>2</b>	15	15	30
	25.0	25.0	25
<b>3</b>	22	24	46
	36.6	40	38.3
<b>4</b>	11	13	24
	18.3	21.6	20.0
<b>5 (Very good)</b>	1	5	6
	1.6	8.3	5.0
<b>Total</b>	60	60	120
	100	100	100



N	%
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 =Number and percentage of respondents, (this Table reports result of a recoded 10-point scale variable to a five-point scale)

As indicated in Table 5.20, when I collapse number one and two together, I found that 43.3% men and 30.0% women students rated the sexual harassment policy of US as bad. On the other hand, when I collapse number four and five together, I found that 29.9% women and 19.9% men students say it is good. Interesting is the high number of those who don't rate it as bad or good (number three) for both men (36.6%) and women (40.0%). These results imply that men students have a perception that the sexual harassment policy of the US is not communicated, while women students hold the opposite view. However, although respondents (men and women) have these different perceptions about the sexual harassment, one can also say that they do know much about it. These results are influenced by the fact that in most cases men are perpetrators of sexual harassment. However, the exposure of the sexual harassment policy to the public is very important and in this case we can say the US still needs to do more and educate students about sexual harassment.

To conclude, in this study I find that with the exception of one item (raiding of residences), it appears that a higher percentage of women students experience these forms of sexual harassment than men.

### 5.3 CONCLUSION

This study finds that the majority of women students have perceptions that there is still a problem of gender imbalances in South Africa, whereas men see the situation otherwise. Both men and women students feel that white men are the worse affected group by affirmative action and black economic empowerment in this country. However, in Table 5.3, I found that black students hold the opposing view around this question. Interestingly, although these students have different views on gender equality, they believe that they all feel protected on campus; no group is vulnerable. They indicated that their lecturers show no gender discrimination against women students or against any other group.

In my research I also found that virtually all items that were offered to respondents are perceived by the majority of students as constituting sexual harassment. Two items such as sexist jokes and wolf-whistling are perceived by the majority of men

students as not constituting sexual harassment. Except for one item – the raiding of residences – it appears that a higher percentage of women students experience these forms of sexual harassment. This also indicates that they are the most vulnerable group.

## **CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION**

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The purpose of this study has been to describe and explain how students at Stellenbosch perceive identity politics of race and gender in post-apartheid South Africa. The focus has been on three important racial groups in South Africa: black, coloured and white. Understandably, this process required that I look into different periods, namely the apartheid era and the current dispensation. The latter was selected as the main context of analysis. For example, all the apartheid laws were removed after the democratically elected government took over in 1994. Although this is the case, the notion of identity politics of race remains a sensitive issue in South Africa because of the imposed racial group identities of apartheid (Burgess, 2002: 12). To this day, many people remain conscious of apartheid group identities.

Therefore I conclude that, although people live in the democratic South Africa the past still has an impact at the US, in far as identity politics of race and gender are concerned. For example, US language policy accommodates other language groups, but Afrikaans remains the main language of instruction. Even student culture at the US is still an Afrikaner culture.

I described and explained how each racial group perceived the identity politics of race. This was done by looking at a myriad of issues, e.g. the language policy, handling of accommodation, affirmative action and black economic empowerment, and the relationship between students at Stellenbosch. In this study I found that there is still a long way ahead for South Africa, because among students there are some elements of identity politics of race in operation at the US. For example, this research found that white students see themselves as “South Africans”, black students as “Africans” and coloured students as “coloured”, even though we are living in a democratic country which promotes multiculturalism. This research found that the majority of students from the three racial groups who participated in this study have a perception that racial divisions still exist at the US in three areas (classrooms, residences and the Neelsie).

The majority of students have a perception that language also plays part in these divisions. Finally, some students just prefer to be with their own group members. The

majority of students at the US have a perception that black students are less likely to speak in class than any other group. Their silence is a result of the fact that they feel intimidated by the atmosphere where you get English-speaking students and students who had a better education at high school.

The majority of black and coloured students support the ANC, whereas white students support the DA. Although this is the case, I also find that many students at the US do not want to state their political party support. This is caused either by the fact that they support the smaller political parties or they are just apolitical.

In most cases I find that white students are positive about virtually all actions taken by the University, while black and coloured students have some elements of dissatisfaction. However, when I looked at the role of government, black and coloured students are more positive, while white students show some scepticism. Interestingly, although this is the case, all these groups are comfortable about being a South African. In the white students' point of view, this is caused by the fact that they are accepted by the student culture, which is "white culture". Even the language policy favours them in the sense that it puts the interest of Afrikaans-speaking and the English-speaking students first, who are all white. However, in the black and coloured students' point of view, their opposing stance is influenced by the fact that they feel alienated at the US. As one black student highlighted in the study by Mabokela (2000: 85), it is a difficult environment for them because it is an Afrikaner university, with an Afrikaner culture.

As shown in Chapter 5, this study finds that the majority of women students have perceptions that there is still a problem of gender imbalances in South Africa, whereas men see the situation otherwise. Both men and women students feel that white men are the group worst affected by affirmative action and black economic empowerment in this country. However, when I look at racial differences around this question, I found that black students hold the opposing view, while coloured students have no opinion. Interestingly, although these students have different views on gender equality, they believe that they all feel protected on campus; no group is vulnerable. They indicated that their lecturers show no gender discrimination against women students or against any other group. This is influenced by the fact that Stellenbosch

faculty members or lecturers have implemented a few changes in their teaching styles and techniques to accommodate the diverse academic needs of their students (Mabokela, 2000: 109).

In my research I also found that virtually all gender-related items that were presented to respondents are perceived by the majority of students as constituting sexual harassment. Two items – sexist jokes and wolf-whistling – are perceived by the majority of majority of men students as not constituting sexual harassment. Except for one item – the raiding of residences – it appears that a higher percentage of women students experience these forms of sexual harassment. This also indicates that they are the most vulnerable group than men. These results indicate that the US sexual harassment policy is not communicated well to students.

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